GENEVA TALKS

Created: 12/4/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CURRENT ^INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

48

GENEVA TALKS

further moves toa record which will place on the test the onus for any fallure to reach agreements, Soviet bloc delegates ln both Geneva conferences naveformal "declarations" summarizing bloc proposals and

criticizing Western positions. These declarations, one of which bas already been published, are further efforts to place the bloc ln tbe strongest possible position ln the final stage of the talks and may foreshadow proposals to raise the talks to

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the foreign minister level. Inecember Interview with Premier Khrushchev, Senator Humphrey gained the Impression that Moscow is willing to make some concessions in order to reach some kind of agreement for nuclear teat cessation. However, the Soviet leader gave the impression he does notagreement on measures to prevent surprise attack.

Nuclear Test Cessation Talks

Onovember the Soviet delegate introduced astressing the "merits" of the Soviet position and accusing the West of evading anby insisting on detailed discussionontrol system.

After listing four major points in the Western position which "cast doubt on the successful completion" of the talks, tbe Soviet declaration stated that the USSR would not object to the inclusion of "basicon control"reaty on the cessation of tests. This ostensible concession was intended toeak point In the Sovietvague relationship between the Soviet-proposed treatyrotocol on controls.

ecember the Soviet delegate clarified the declara- ion, stating that although he would prefer to have the treaty and control provisions embodied in two separate, documents, he was prepared to accede toinsistence on one document. Tbe Soviet delegate objected to the article In the American draft agreement requiring the parties to pledge prompt and full cooperation with a nuclear weapons test controlon the grounds that tbe American concept would create an International organization

not under control of the three nuclear powers.

ecember the Soviet delegate retreated froa the recommendations made by theat Geneva last summerorld-wide inspection system, alleging that the technical talks at that tine did not examine tbe question of whether an "entire" system was needed. He Is now insisting that any control organization be limited to the three nuclear powers, with decisions based onagreeraont. This, inwould provide Moscoweto over all actions of tha organization.

It is apparent from his further comments that the Soviet delegate is particularlyin his government's veto power over decisionsInspection of anyviolation. He insisted that inspection be performed by ad hoc groups formed only after receipt of evidence from which the organization "decides" therestrong suspicion"uclear explosion. He then contendedystem confined to the territorial possessions of the three nuclear powers and to the oceans would be adequate at present, since this would coverercent of the territory of the world,0 percent of that of tbe nuclear powers."

The agreement to embody all commitments in one documentoncession in form only and does not alter the basic Soviet position that an agreed draftermanent and unconditional test cessation agreement with only tbe briefest reference to controls must precede discussion of the details of the control system.

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Surprise-Attack Talks

Onovember the Soviet delegate introduced awhich spelled out bloc proposals linking "concrete measures" to reduce the danger of surprise attack withdisarmament measures. The Czech delegate followedraft agreement along the same lines. Both documentswith minor variations long-standing Soviet proposals for ground control posts and aerial photography to beby such "concrete" disarmament measures asof foreign forces in Europe by one third andof both parts of Germany.

For the first time, Moscow set forth its views on theand general location of control posts at railroadmajor ports, and According toontrol posts should be located on the territories of members of the Warsaw Treaty, including six in the USSR, andosts in NATO and Baghdad

Pact countries, including six in the United States. These totals were said to be based on the density of population and communications networks.

In addition to Moscow's standard proposal for aerial photographyiles on either side of tholine in Europe, the Geneva declaration for the first time extended aerial inspection to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Japan, and Okinawa. Aerialzones in the Soviet Far East and the western United States were made conditional on the establishment of both ground control posts and aerial photography zones ln Europe and the Middle East.

This omnibus plan linking Inspection systems with specific disarmament steps is designed to sharpen the contrast between the bloc's demand for "practical" measures to prevent surprise attack with Western insistenceareful technical study of the problem, avoiding political issues posed by the Soyiet die-armament proposals.

Original document.

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