INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF THE GEVENA CONFERENCE TO STUDY THE METHODS OF DETECTIN

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INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TO STUDY THE METHODS OF DETECTING VIOLATIONSOSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

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88

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

WPIOVtOIOMEIUSI

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TO STUDY THE METHODS OF DETECTING VIOLATIONSOSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

88

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

SEJHET^

PREFACE

This intelligence analysis of the Genera Technicalon controlsuclear test moratorium has been prepared by Dr. Herbert Scorttle,ssistant Director, ScientificCIA, and Chairman. Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. The mat 1

has'been prepared fornic

tlon in responseumbernformal queries received from within the intelligence communityrecis of his views on the Conference.

contents

Page

SUMMARY AND

Soviet Attitude Toward the

Evaluation of Soviet Intentions to Carry Out Concealed

Nuclear

Major Intelligence Revelations by the

ANNEX AReport of the Conference of Experts toPossibility of Detecting Violations ofAgreement on the SuspensionNuclear

ANNEX BEvaluation of Eastern Representatives at

Geneva Technical

figure

Following Pagehoto Eastern Delegation at the Geneva Technical

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TO STUDY THE METHODS OF DETECTING VIOLATIONSOSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS

INTRODUCTION

conference, lo study methods ofviolations of an agreement to suspend nuclear tests, took place at Oeneva,during theuly tohe Western Delegation, whichitselfingle team under theof Dr. James B. Fisk. was composed of representatives from the United States, United Kingdom. France, and Canada. Tbe Eastern Delegation, under the chairmanship of Dr. Fedorov, consisted of four separatefrom the USSR. Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania. Although the Soviets made attempts to broaden the scope of the conference, the Western Delegation succeeded ln maintaining the position that thewas technical, not political, and that the decision on halting nuclear tests wasatter for consideration. However, political overtones were present throughout theand agreement on technical matters frequently reflected political concessions.

In general, the Soviet approach was aimed at demonstrating the relative simplicity lnnuclear explosions under all types of conditions- The ranges at which detection could occur were exaggerated by theirof idealized data or theories to support their position. The dlfflculUes In discriininat-ing between signals from explosions andevents were also minimized by theIn general, the Eastern Delegatesheavily on simplified theories with only minimal use of data to support those theories. The Western Delegation, on tho other hand, relied heavily on the statistical approach using the wealth of data accumulated by thesystemeriod of years. TheDelegation furthermore emphasised that many natural events gave signals similar to those from explosions and emphasized thefor discrimination tn any detection system.

The conference approached the problem first by agreeing upon the detection methods which might be useful inystem and then discussing and agreeing on theof each of these methods for detecting and identifying explosions under different types of environmental conditions. Both sides agreed on the following banc methods for use by this system.coustic waves, radioactive debris, seismic waves and radio signalsIn the case of nuclearat high altitudes (more thanoeveral additional methods were discussed and considered promising, but no specific recommendations for Inclusion of these methods were made in view of the lack of experience in detecting explosions under these conditions.

After reaching agreed conclusions on these basic methods, discussions were held on the technical equipment which would be required by the control system. Ail ol these methods were then consolidated into an overallcontrol system lor detecting violationsuclear test suspension. In addition to the basic technical methods ol detection, this system included the principle of inspection of the location of events which could not befrom nuclear explosions bymeans alone .Finally, agreed conclusions were reached on the technical requirementsontrol organization withoutto the political problems involved therein. The agreed conclusions of the conference which have been published are included as anneximited number of the transcripts are available in various Governmental officesomplete transcript is expected to be published by the Department of State in the near future.

summary and conclusions

Sovietsery strongto obtain an agreed report without split position on the capabilitiesystem to detect violationsuclear test

The Soviets made three major political concessions of great Intelligence potential in agreeing to:

inclusionargef control posts in the

principle of on-site inspectionnumbers of unidentifiedof being nuclear explosions.

c. Restricted overflight withobservers aboard.

he Soviets were apparently prepared to discuss most of the technical problems ofprimarilyheoretical basis, but were handicappedegotiatingby the Western Delegation's versatile use of statistical aria technical data.

i. The Soviets gave no evidence ofto carry out concealed nuclear tests In the eventuspension agreement.

discussion

attitude toward the conference

The most significant factor in the Soviet approach to this conference was their strong motivation to achieve an agreed report. This attitude became increasingly apparent as the conference progressed and was exemplifiedumber of major political concessions. Just prior to the opening of the conference, serious question arose as to whether the Soviets would even attend, but when the seriousness of the Western Delegation was evidenced by theof Its members at Geneva, the Soviets in turn proceeded to Geneva and the conference began as originally scheduleduly.the first two days were spent in political maneuvers in which the Soviets attempted to force the Western side to agree in advance that if the conferenceuccess, then nuclear testing should cease. The Western Delegation steadfastly refused to consider the problem of desirability of nuclear testand insisted on limiting the discussions to the feasibility of detecting and identifying violationsossible agreement onof nuclear tests. The strong propaganda position of the Soviets, resulting from their unilateral announcement of test suspension while. was embarked on an extensive series of tests in the Pacific, made it difficult to keep the Western position from appearing unduly negative and might have provided the Soviets with considerable propagandahad the conference broken down in the initial stages and the proceedings been However, after two fruitless days of

such discussions, the Sovietsay's delay, obviously In order to obtainand then returned to the conference. Thereafter the discussions were almosttechnical In nature, although strongly influenced by the political overtones.

The first real evidence of Soviet desire for agreement developed In the final stages of the discussion on the acoustic method ofnuclear explosions. The Soviets haddata optimizing the ranges at which detection could be obtained and had presented to the conference draft conclusionsthese ranges. In return, the Western Delegation hadtatistical analysis which demonstrated that under practicalthe ranges would be very much less than those proposed by the Soviets andalternative conclusions using much shorter ranges. After considerable discussion of the validity of these analyses and theconclusions, the Soviets accepted the Western draft conclusions with only minor modifications This agreement was the first real indication that the Soviets were prepared to accept scientific facts and did not desire split conclusions.

A more important example of this desire for agreement was demonstrated in thewhich followed on the use of radiactive debris for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions. The outstanding Westernin collecting good early debris samples by aircraft and the difficulties experienced in reliably obtaining adequate samples by ground collection techniques led the West into proposing the use of aircraft ln addiUon to ground sampling. The Eastern Delegation on the contrary strongly endorsed the thesis that ground sampling was reliable andand that the use of aircraft wasunduly complicated and expensive. This Soviet position was obviously based on their political sensitivity to the use of aircraft for intelligence purposes. Discussion on the relative merits of these two methods wasThe Western Delegation pressed the Soviets for data to support the reliability of the ground detection system, but the Soviets never succeeded in presenting data tothis unsound technical position.private attempts were made tothe Soviets that our emphasis on aircraft was not based on desire for unrestrictedbut rather on sound technical grounds, the Soviets were still extremely chary of the inclusion of any mention of aircraft as anelement of the system. The Soviets delayed achieving agreed conclusions on this subject for several weeks while apparently awaiting Instructions from home, and theproceeded to other subjects.again the Soviets agreed to the inclusion of aircraft samplingasic clement of the system even to the extent that overflight might be occasionally required. Admittedly, such overflight would be conducted by theof the nation Involved, but the principle of having observers on board such aircraft was agreed to. Soviet agreement on this subject wastrong proof that, provided the Western Delegationoundposition and held to this position, then the Soviets' desire for agreement would lead them to make major political concessions.

In the discussions on the use of seismic waves for detecting explosions, the Soviets again tended to theorize and to simplify the problem, particularly insofar as the ability to discriminate between seismic signals thatfrom explosions and those fromIn this case, the Soviet attitude may have been largely due to lack of scientificin such discrimination. Theof. data from the Rainiertest was convincing to the Soviets and produced gradual acceptance by them of the difficulties involved in suchAfter the differences in scientific views had been Ironed out, agreement was reached on the seismic method without raising any major political problems. The Easternaccepted these conclusions on thethat at least five stations shouldtrong seismic signal capable of determining the direction of the first motion in order to identifyercent of the earthquakes and eliminate them as possible nuclear explosions. This agreement laterajor factor In the discussions on the overall test detection system and the number of control posts

In the discussion that followed on the use ol radio signals (electromagnetiche problem of discrimination between such signals from explosions and lightning flashes waaominant factor. The Sorleis presented strong theoretical arguments for the potentialities for such discrimination using machine methods. However, no specific data were presented to support their proposal. In this particular discussion, the Sovietsto have beentronger technical position relative to the West than In any of the discussions on otherajor difference of opinion developed at this tune, and continued almost to the end of theon the feasibility of shielding out and thereby eliminating the electromagneticfrom nuclear explosions.resented data to support theof such shielding but this was" never fully accepted by the Soviets who wished to avoid any downgrading of the usefulness of this method. Unfortunately, the final record of the conference never completely clarified the technical facts-on this point

Since neither side gave any indication ol experience at detecting tests at very high(greater thanoilometers),on such test detection were primarilyheoretical basis. (These discussions occurred prior to the VS. ORANGE and TEAK shots at Johnsonoth sides presented material on the possibilities of using gamma and neutron radiation, ionization phenomena, and optical methods. Thepressed very strongly for the use of "sputniks" equipped with gamma anddetectors while the Western Delegation pressed for equal consideration of the use of ionization phenomena. The most violentof the entire conference occurredan informal meeting designed to iron out the final wording of the conclusions on these methods. The Soviets exhibited greatto the Western proposal to use radioassive radio telescopes orsystems, probably because of their fear of the inteUigence potential of such systems In view of the lack of experimental data in advance of. tests and theof US. theoretical calculations on the Ionospheric phenomena, conclusions were finally agreed to which placed the use of gamma and neutron detectors in satelliteslightly dominant position orer thephenomena, but neither method was recommended for specific inclusion in adue to the technical uncertainties still existing.

Discussions on the equipment to be used by the detection system were almost entirely technical in nature and involved no serious disagreements. The Soviets for the first time raised the possibility of using ships asfor detection stations in ocean areas where suitable land masses were notThe usefulness of ships for acoustic and electromagnetic detection was seriouslyby the West and finally only includedowngraded basis. For the land stations, it was agreed that all four basiccoustic, seismic, electromagnetic anddebris collection, would be Included at every station. This collocation has been found difficult by the West but was strongly endorsed by the Soviets and is very likely their practice.

The major problem of the conferencearound the integration of these various methodsorldwide system capable of detecting tests under all possible conditions. At the Soviet insistence, the discussion on all the basic methods had been aimed atand identification of tests of yieldslloton (KT) or greater despite Westernto include consideration of higher yields as well. Therefore, in designing the overallT was initially usedasic parameter. The detection and identification of underground explosions was the dominant factor in determining the basic characteristics of the system of control posts.

The initial Western attempt atystem involvedtationsT worldwide system, while the Sovietstations. The Soviet proposal wasinadequate for discriminating between earthquakesT energy equivalent and

s

tations would never obtain signals with clear first motions from such an event. The Eastern Delegation proposed the use of existing worldwide seismic stationsupplement to the detection system, but the ease with which seismic records could beand the signals from an explosion made to resemble those of an earthquake rendered this solution impractical. At this point, the Western Delegation proposedystem be designed with capabilities of goodofT and greater and the Eastern Delegation accepted this approach.estern system wouldtations while the Soviet designed system would. Not unexpectedly, theagreed to thetation system just prior lo the conclusion of the This Soviet acceptanceorld-wide system which would involve between IS andontrol posts ln the USSR manned by aboutersonsecond major political concession resulting from this conference.

Since at present it Is technically Impossible touclear explosion by seismic means alone, inspection of the site of anevent suspected ofuclear explosion is necessary in order to prove orthe existenceoncealed nuclear teat. It was agreed thatpost system would leave unidentified somevents per year of yields greaterT equivalent. Inspection would be required in such cases. ystem is to have any capability for yields of lessT. inspection an abasis would be required tn order to deter the conduct of lower yield tests. The Soviets early in the conference referred to the need for inspecting sites of suspected nuclearbut consistently deferred theof statements to this effect In any of the agreed conclusions. Finally, however, ln the conclusions on the control system suchwas agreed to. This acceptance ol the principle of inspection was the third and perhaps most Important political concession made by the Soviets at the conference tn order to achieve an agreed report

evaluation of SOVIET intentions TO carry out concealed nuclear tests

Prior to the conference, many members of theelegation believed that the Soviets were attempting toituation in. nuclear testing would stop and the Soviets would continue weapons development by means of concealed tests. The conference gave no evidence to support this thesis and indeed led all Western representatives with whom this was discussed to change their views. While the Soviets fought strenuously on many points and attempted to minimize tbe difficulties in establishing an adequate test detection system, this approach appeared aimed entirely at avoiding politicallysituations such as large numbers ofwithin the Soviet Union, overflight and free access to many locations behind the Iron Curtain. On all of these points, they ended up by making major concessions.the Soviets strongly pressedigh sensitivityne capable of reliably detecting explosions as-lowT. Had their objective been toystem susceptible to evasion, they would have given much readier acceptance to the Westernto consider higher yield systems. In view of all the factors involved, it is believed that presently the Soviets have no intention of carryingoncealed nuclear test ln the eventoratorium and that In accordance with present national estimates they would openly abrogate such an agreement before risking being caughtiolation.provided that the principle of inspection Is adequately safeguarded In the politicaland treaty, it is believed that theas designed is adequate to deter anyfromoncealed nuclear test. Without on-siteystem would not be capable ofoncealed, deep underground nuclear test of low yield.

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ANNEX A

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTING VIOLATIONSOSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON THE SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR TESTS"

Note by tbe Secretary-General

In accordance with the requests of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America, the Secretary-General has the honour to circulate for the information of the Members of the General Assembly the attached report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violationsossible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests.

LETTER DATED8 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Pursuant to agreement reached between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America in the course of an exchange of notes in April. May andonference of experts of both sides convened In Geneva8 to8 to study the possibility of detecting violationsossible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. The conference of experts concluded Its work with the adoptioneport which the experts participating in Uie conference have submitted to their respective Governments. The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America had agreed in their exchange of notes to keep the Securityand the General Assembly informed of the work of theof experts through the intermediary of the Secretary-General.ave been instructed by myto submit to you the attached "Report of the Conference

'United NationsGeneral Assembly8he above report Is being submitted to lhe members oi tbe Security Council aa

UN

of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting VloIsUonsossible Agreement on the Suspension ol Nuclear Tests" with the request that it be circulated to the Security Council and the General Assemblyocument of the United Nations.

{Signed) G. ARKADEV

Deputy Permanent Representative of

the USSR to the United Nations

LETTER DATED8 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Pursuant to agreement reached between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the course of an exchange of notes ln April, May andonference of experts of both sides convened in Geneva8 lo8 to study the possibility of detecting violationsossible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests.

The conference of experts concluded its work witheport which the experts participating ln the conference have submitted to their respective Governments. Theof the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had agreed ln their exchange of notes to keep the Security Council and the Oeneral Assembly informed of the work of the conference of experts through the mUrmcdlary of the Secretary-General.ave been instructed by my Government to submit to you the attached "Report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violationsossible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests" with the request that it be circulated to the Security Council and the General Assemblyocument of the United Nations.

(Signed) James J. WADSWORTH Deputy Permanent Representative ol the United States to the United Nations

report of the conference of experts to study the possibility of detecting violationsossible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests

i. introduction

accordance withesult of an exchange ofthe Chairman of the Council ofof the Union of Soviet SocialistN. S. Khrushchev, and the President ofStates of America,egarding the calling of aexperts to study the possibilityossible agreement on theof nuclear tests, there began on 1In Geneva, in the Palais des Nations,of, on the one hand, expertscountries and. on the otherof experts of the Union ofRepublics, the Polish People'sthe Czechoslovak Republic and theRepublic of Romania.

Secretary-General of the Unitedwas represented at the ConferencePersonal Representative, Mr.onference facilities andwere provided by the UnitedExperts express their appreciation foroffices of the Secretary-General andRepresentative, and for thethe Secretariat staff attached to the

agenda for theuly, included the following main

Exchange of opinions on the problem of the various methods for detecting atomicand on other general problems of the Conference deliberations.

Determinationist of basic methods of systematic observations for phenomenaof an explosion.

A system for controlling the observance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

rawingeport of experts to the governments of those countries represented at the Conference, with conclusionsystem for controlling the observance of an agreement on theof nuclear tests.

Conference heldfficialcompleted its work onugustprior agreement the Conference heldin private.

Conference of Expertsphenomena accompanying nuclearset off under various conditions.

of these phenomena, namelywaves occurring when there arein air and in water, the seismicthat occur when there arethe ground, under the ground, andthe radio pulses that are producedare explosions In the atmosphere,optical and gamma radiation whenover long distances, serve to indicateand to estimate their time and place.

nuclear explosions occur inthe radioactive debris whichmixes in the atmosphere, and isover great distances.uclearis set off in the ocean or in thethe radioactive debris will remainclose to the site of the explosionconsiderable time.

sensitivity of modernand geophysical methods ofmakes it possible to detectby the Indications describedconsiderable distances, as hereafterThus it Is known that explosionsyield which are set off on the surfaceearth and in the lower part of the atraos-

phere can be detected without difficulty at points of the globe which are very remote from the site of the explosion. On the other hand, explosions which are of low yieldew kilotons) can be detected with good reliability given the present state of observationalonly If therepecially set upsystem such as that suggested in Section IV of this report.

asic difficulty ln detecting andsmall explosions arises because many natural phenomena (earthquakes, thunder storms and others) give signals which are similar to those produced by explosions, or which by their presence hinder the detection of the signals sought,

J. The discrimination of the signals ofevents from signals of explosions Is aidedareful analysis of the recorded data, taking into account readings obtained atpoints. Those remaining .unidentified events which could be suspected as beingexplosions might be resolved byof the site.-

K. The Conference of Experts hasthe methods of detecting nuclearby the acoustic, hydroacoustic andoscillations which they produce In the air, water, or In the earth's crust, and. also the detection of explosions by the electromagnetic oscillations which are propagated from them, and by the radioactive debris that thecause.

L. The Conference has examined theand limitations of each of thesefor the detection of nuclear explosions and it has agreed that the combined use of the various methods considerably facilitates the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

M. After examining the separate methods, the Conference examined the question of the technical equipment of the control system necessary to detect and identify nuclearand, after that, It passed to the question of the control systemhole.

N.esult of the examination of these questions the Conference reached thethat It is technically feasible to set up, with the capabilities and limitationsin Section IV of this report, aand effective control system for theof violations of an agreement on the worldwide cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

O. In the present report Information is given about the various methods of detection and identification of nuclear explosions, about the technical equipmentontrol system -andontrol systemhole. Copies of the individual documents containing the conclusions adopted by the Conference on each of the questions mentioned are attached to the present report. Verbatim records and working documents in the working languages of the Conference will follow as soon as they are available for attachment to the report.

ii. basic methods for detection and identification of nuclear explosions

Conclusions as to the Applicability of the Method of Recording Acoustic Waves for the Detection of Nuclear Explosions

The Conference of Experts examined the process of propagation of the acoustic waves caused by nuclear explosions and the methods of recording these waves with the aim of de-tenranlng the possibility of using them for detecting nuclear explosions.

hen there are explosions introng air acoustic wave is formed which propagates over large distances. An indication of the amplitude of the air pressure wave Is givenormula which is approximately validomogeneous atmosphere and according to which this amplitude Is proportional to the cube root of the yield and inverselyto the distance. However, theof this acoustic wave is stronglyupon meteorological conditions andbe predicted accuratelyimpleofind, The observed

tude In certain cases can be five times larger or smaller than that predicted by awhich Includes only the energy release and the distance to detecting station.

apparatus ol special designthe air warene kllotonin the air above local backgroundrelatively large distances.

The detection capabilityingle station is strongly dependent upon the orientation of the propagation path to the station with respect to the upper winds. When the upper winds are mainly in onene kilo-ton explosion can be detectedigh degree of confidence downwindistanceilometres and upwindistanceilometres. When the upper winds are erratic and the average wind is small, such as frequently happens in the spring and fall, detectionne kllotoncan be accomplishedimilar degree of confidenceistanceilometres independently of the direction. On the basis of the records from three stations, the location of the explosion can be determined with an accuracy of betterilometres.

acoustic apparatus at controlthe above distances from an explosionexplosions which occur betweeneight ofilometres. Aextrapolation of existing experiencethat for explosions taking place upaltitude of about SO kilometresreat change in the detectabllityacoustic wave. Whether awave will be generated at higheris not well known from director from any theoreticalfar discussed. Deep undergroundexplosions do not producesufficiently intense for detection

An underwater explosion in the oceansvery strong underwater sound waveshich even In tho case of

small explosions can be detected at distances

of0 kilometres.

Acoustic waves which resemble incases the acoustic signals of nuclearmay be produced by natural events (primarily meteoric, volcanic or submarinen such cases theof the event as natural oruclear explosion must be basedomparison of acoustic data with those obtained by aid of other methods.

It is noted that methods of recording of pressure waves may be further Improved to increase the precision and the sensitivity, and to eliminate background noise and spurious signals.

B. Conclusions as to the Applicability of the Method of Using Radioactive Debris for Detecting and Subsequently Identifying Nuclear Explosions

The Conference of Experts has studied the process ol the dissemination of radioactive debris resultinguclear explosion and has considered the coUectlon of samples of radioactive debris and its analysis as one of the methods for detecting and subsequently identifying nuclear explosions.

When an explosiononsiderable quantity of radioactive debris Is produced. If the explosion Is basedission reaction then this quantity amountsuriest TNT equivalent of the energy of the explosion as of one hour after the reaction. Thermonuclear reactions will lead to theofritium, and othersubstances which result fromirradiation and which, in principle, can also be used to detect an explosion.

When nuclear explosions occur between the earth's surfaceeight often kilometres the radioactive debris is thrown into the atmosphere where it Is carried by winds to great distances. Theof this radioactive debris Is greatly Influenced by the vertical and horizontalof the wind in the troposphere and in the lower layers of the stratosphere. Thelso decreased as aof washing out by rain anddeposition.

The distribution by height of thedebris carried In the atmosphere will depend in the first place on the energy of the explosion, on the conditions ln which thetook place (Lb. on the earth, under the earth, or in tbe air) and on theconditions at the moment of explosion In the case of low energy explosions in the air upeight of approximately tenthe radioactive debris will initially concentratemall volume below the trop-opause. This debris will gradually getboth horizontally and vertically in the troposphere and in the courseeriod of from one to thirty days (depending on the turbulence of the atmosphere, the windand the dimensions of the particles which carry the radioactive substances) it can be detected close to the earth's surface, as also at various heights up to the tropopause.

The spreading of the cloud in theIs determined by many meteorological processes.esult of the action of these processes the cloud is bound totage when it is mixedertical direction and spreadorizontal direction inay as to afford the most convenient conditions for taking samples

Calculations and experimental data give ground for considering that this stage will be reached in the period between the fifth and twentieth day of the existence of the cloud. Before that period the cloud may be too small, both in its horizontal and its vertical extent. After thirty days haveonsiderable part of the radioactive debris will decayample willesser proportion of the natural or other background, thereby making more difficult the detection and identification of an explosion

radiochemical techniquespossible to detect and Identifyample ofissions. The timeof this fresh debris can befive to ten per cent of its age ifcontains" fissions and isto any considerable extentfission products.

he taking of samples on the surface of the earthetwork of control posts makes It possible to carry out continual monitoring of the contamination of the air at manypoints by means of air filtration and also by collecting radioactive fallout andin ram. If control posts are disposed at distances of the orderthen an explosion with an energyt set off in theabove the surface of the earth) will be detectedigh degree of reliability in the period of five to twenty days although the place of explosion cannot be exactlyand although the tune of explosion will be determined with some error.shows that with favourableconditions an explosion of even lessercan be detected ln this way.

In the course of the period of time of from two to five days after an explosion of energy equivalentt the collectionample of radioactive debris from the explosion which Is sultable-for analysis can be effected in the air by an aircraft If tho area of the supposed location of the cloud is knownThe taking ofample will make it possible to establishthe point of the explosion by means of using meteorological data for back-tracking the trajectory of movement of the cloud.

Underground or underwater explosions set off at shallow depths and accompanied by the throwing up of earth or water can also be Identified by the method of collectingsamples although with leaser reliability than for explosions of the same energy ln the troposphere.

The Conference of Experts considers that systematic measurements of radioactivein the air and also the collection of radioactive aerosols deposited on the ground and measurements of the radioactivity ofcan be successfully used for the detection of nuclear explosions and also, in many cases, for assessing certain parameters relating to them even in the absence of other indications.

The utilisationegularethod for detecting nuclear explo-

sions, of tbe taxing of samples of the air by aircraft over oceans can be used for detecting nuclear explosions. For this purpose use should be made of existing aircraft flights over the oceans which are carried out bycountries for the purposes ofobservations.

he Conference of Experts considers that the method of taxing samples of radioactive debris can also be used successfully forinvestigation of the factuclear explosion in those cases when there are the appropriate lndicauons from other methods.

For this purpose it is possible to use the detection of radioactive debris remaining at the point of the supposed explosion (on the earth's surface, under the earth, in the water) and also the determination of the presenceadioactive cloud In the period between two and five daysupposed explosion in the atmosphere in the area where the cloud is calculated to be by the time of mvesUgation.

Inase search for the radioactive cloud can be made on an aircraft having equipment for the taxingample ofdebris. To this end use should be made chiefly of the aircraft flights over the oceans made for the purposes of meteorological observations-

some cases use can be made offlights over the territories of theUSSR, the UK and other countries toair samples for the purpose ofdata obtained by other methods ofof nuclear explosions

The Experts consider that to accomplish this task it would be quite sufficient to make use of the aircraft of the country beingand that in such cases it Is sufficient that flights for the purpose specified should be made along routes laid down in advance. Representatives of the USSR, the USA, the UK or other States participating in theof the control system may be on board these aircraft in the capacity of observers.

Experts note that in the coursethe sensitivity and efficiency of theof collecting radioactive debris willa consequence of the atmosphereof the radioactive products itand alsoesult of the perfection of the techniques for collecting and analysing samples.

C. Conclusions as to the Applicability of the Method of Recording Seismic Waves for the Detection of Nuclear Explosions

The Conference has considered the processes of propagation of seismic waves generated by nuclear explosions and the methods forthese waves for the purpose ofthe possibility of using them for the detection of underground and underwater nuclear explosions.

When nuclear explosions occur under the ground or under the water, longitudinal, transverse, and surface waves are formed and get propagated to great distances. The first longitudinal wave Is the most important, both for detecting an explosion and for detorrnlnlng the place of the explosion, and also foran earthquake from explosions. Transverse and surface waves also help to define the natureeismic perturbation.

Longitudinal seismic waves caused by underground nuclear explosions set ofl under conditions analogous to those in which thehot occurred can be detected and the direction of first motion of thewave can be determinedistance ofilometres, and also at distances ofat sites which are considerably more quiet than the average for:

explosions of the order of one klloton recorded during periods of favourable noise conditions.

explosions of the order of five kllotons recorded during periods ofnoise conditions.

* The underground nuclear explosion "Rainier" with an energyllotoiw (Nevada) was set oQ in unfavourable condlUons for transferring energy to the ground. However, even worse conditions of coupling are possible.

It must be noted that all seismic stations situated at thousands of kilometres from one another cannot have an identically high or Identically low level of background at one and the same time.

Conditions for detection andol underwater explosions set off inwater butufficient depth, aremore favourable than conditions for detecting underground explosions.

Control posts carrying out seismicshould be put at sitesinimal level of microseismic background, such as are possible in Internal continental regions. Such stations, when provided with arrays ofcan Insure the obtaining of the data indicated above. However, at stations which are in unfavourable regions such as coastal and island regions the noise level will be higher than at quiet stations insideIn these cases for detection andof the sign of first motion theof the explosion must increase In the ratio of the powerith respect to thebackground level This is in part compensated by the fact that quiet stations inside continents will register more powerful explosions at distances ofilometres. Bursts with an energyilo-tons and more will be detected by quietplaced at the distances named.

The majority of earthquakes can befrom explosionsigh degree of reliability if the direction of first motion of the longitudinal wave is clearly registeredr more seismic stations on variousfrom the epicentre. Thus not less thaner cent of all earthquakes taking place in continents can be Identified. The remaininger cent or less of cases will require the analysis of additional seisroograms where this is possible; and for this purpose use must also be made of the data of the existing network of seismic stations. If required, thesestations should be further equipped with improved apparatus, In relatively aseis-raic areas it is sufficient merely to define the postlon of the epicentre. In this connection cases of detection of seismic events will beas suspicious and will require further investigation with the help of other methods. For those cases which remain unidentifiedof the region will be necessary.

In regions where the regular disposition of seismic stations in quiet conditions is notthe percentage of correct Identification of earthquakes will be leas.

With modern methods and making use of the data of several surrounding seismicthe area within which an epicentre is localized can be assessed asquare kilometres.

t is noted that the range and accuracy of recording and identifying undergroundexplosions can be improved In the future by means of perfecting the methods ofseismic waves, both by way of perfecting apparatus and also by way of perfecting the methods for differentiating an earthquake from explosions.

D. Conclusions on the Applicability of the Method of Recording of Radio Signals for the Detection of Nuclear Explosions

The Conference of Experts considered tbe generation and propagation of radio pulses originatinguclear explosion and the methods ol recording these signals in order to determine the possibility of using them for the detection of nuclear explosions.

n the caseuclear explosion in the atmosphere, thereowerfulradiation (radioaused by the gamma radiation accompanying theIn the case of underground,or specially shielded explosions radio emissions are not expected which can beat great distances by modem

When the explosion is carried out on or above the surface of the earth (water) and without specially constructed layers to absorb gamma rays, the energy and spectralof the radio signal are such that its essential components are propagated over the whole terrestrial globe. The strength of the radio signal depends upon certain features of the construction of the bomb and on the altitude of the explosion. An explosionlloton yield can be detected by means of radio signals at distancesmthat in the neighbourhood of thestation there Is no high noise level from local thunderstorms or other sources.

By radio direction finding methods, tt isto determine the azimuth of the signal source with an accuracy oft. aboutmistancem Tbe time of production of the signal may bewith an accuracy of severalThe attainment of such accuracy depends on the choice of sufficiently flatand on the absence of electricalat the receiving site.

flashes emit radio signalssame frequency range and act asfor the method of detection of aexplosion by means of Its radio signal.

Close to the source of radiation, the forms of radio signals from lightning and fromexplosions examined to date are quite different. However, at distancesilometres, due to the distortion of the form of radio signals ln the wave guide formed by the earth and the ionosphere, the form of radio signals from some individual lightning flashes is similar to the signal from nuclear explosions. Tbe number of signals from lightning flashes recorded by apparatususing special techniques of signaldepends on the sensitivity of theand on the locality and can amount to from ten to several hundred signals per second. Existing techniques can be applied to exclude automatically the preponderant majority of signals from lightning. Theof the remaining signals due tofrom those due to nuclearrequires the application of specialincluding criteria on form of signal, spectral distribution and distance to source of radiation.

In the present state of the technique of the discrimination of signals in some individual cases the recordignal cannot beeither as cominguclear explosion or from lightning.

Conference of Expertsfurther research should be carried outto understand more fully theol atmospherics involved insignals from nuclearatmospherics, by means of theof the theory of this problem, theand systems tlzation of data aboutand the development of suitableinstruments. The Conference considers that there are good prospects forof procedures of signal discrimination.

heoretical considerations suggest that recording of radio signals can be used tonuclear explosions occurring at altitudes up to the orderilometres.

E. Conclusions on the Methods of Detection of Nuclear Explosions Carried Out at High Altitude (More thanbove the Earth

The Conference of Experts has givenconsideration to the gamma radiation and neutrons resultinguclearand the conditions of recording them from earth satellites: and to opticaland ionization of the air hi the upper layers of the atmosphere in the caseigh altitude explosion (altitudesand has arrived at the following

ilo ton nuclear explosion produces at its source delayed gamma-rays from fission products, and prompt gamma-rays andThe number of prompt gamma-rays and neutrons depends upon the construction of the device and upon the materialsit. The delayed gamma-rays areaffected by these factors.istanceilometres ln vacuo, typical quantities of radiationne kilotonexplosion arc:

gamma-rays

uanta/cm1 during the first second

gamma-rays

uanta/cm1 distributedime of' sec.

Special shielding; of the exploding device can consideraoly reduce the gamma-radiationthe reaction. Dul cannot reduce thefrom Onion product* However. suchinvolves increasing by several times the weight of the whole device.

eutrons/cm* distributeduneew seconds

The cosmic background at tbe height at which earth satellites orbit is under study at the present time, attention being paid to the quantity, nature and energy of the particles, however, on the basis of preliminary data, it can be considered that the detection of anfrom an earth satellite is possible, by means of registering the gamma-raysthe nuclear reaction, neglecting shielding, and also by means of registering the gamma rays of the fission products and the neutrons. If both prompt gamma rays and neutrons are registered, it is possible to get some Idea of the distance to the explosion. The use of gamma-raysuclearwill make It possible to detect thein cosmic spaceistance of the order of hundreds of thousands of kilometres from the earth. Estimate of the maximum distance for the detection requires datathe magnitude of the cosmicat the orbit of the earth satellite. If there is an explosioneightm and above, and if the height at which the earth satellite .orbits is some thousands of kilometres, one can neglect the absorption of gamma quanta In the upper layers of the aU mospherc. The Conference of Expertsthat It Is possible to use for theof nuclear explosions at high altitudes the registration of gamma-radlatlon andwith properly instnirnented earth satellites.

n the case of an explosionreat height light will be emitted at the point of the explosion and there will be luminescence In the upper layers of the atmosphere under the actionays and fast atoms from thein the device. Light phenomena may be detectable from the surface of the earth in clear weather at night with the help of simple apparatus; in day time with the help of more sensitive apparatus. In cloudy weather the detection of optical phenomena from stations on the earth's surface would probably be extremely difficult.

The radiationuclear explosionin the upper layers of theegion of Increased ionization which Isby the absorption of cosmic radio-signals or by anomalies in the propagation of radio waves.

Our knowledge of the absorption of cosmic noise by ionospheric phenomena Is notto determine the number of natural events similar to those resulting from aexplosion.

The Conference of Experts considers that it Is possible to use the recording ofphenomena, using appropriate radio techniques, and of optical phenomena for the detection of nuclear explosions at high

he Conference of Experts has notthe problem of the detection ofexplosions which might be conducted in cosmic space at distances of millions offrom the earth

P. The Conference has recommended the inclusion of the first four of these methods in the number of basic methods for detecting nuclear explosions by meansetwork of control posts, and considers it possible to use several methods for detection of nuclearat high altitudes as stated Innd IIE 2.

iii. conclusions on the question of the technical equipment of the control system for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions

Conference of Experts has considered the questions related to theontrol net intended to detect and identify nuclear explosions, and has come to the following conclusions:

l. The posts of the control net situated in continents should regularly be equipped with apparatus for the detection of explosions by the acoustic and seismic methods and also by the methods of recording radio signals and of collecting radioactive debris.

Certain posts situated on islands or near the shores of oceans should be equipped, In addition to the methods just mentioned, with apparatus for hydroacoustic detection of

Posts located on ships stationed orwithin specified ocean areas should be equipped with apparatus for the detection of explosions by the method of collectingdebris and by the hydroacoustic method. The method of recording radioand the acoustic method might also be used on ships if suitable equipment isbut the effectiveness of these two methods, particularly the acoustic one, will be considerably less than on land.

The apparatus installed at posts of the control network must be uniform and must satisfy tbe following basic technical

A. Seismic Apparatus

The seismic apparatus of the control post should Include:

Approximatelyhort-period vertical seismographs dispersedistanceilometres and connected to thesystem by lines of cable. Theshouldavimiimof the orderrequency.eceiving band adequate tothe characteristic form of the seismic signal;

2 horizontal seismographs with the parameters indicated in;

One three-component installation of long-period seismographsroadbandonstant magnification of the ordern the periodeconds;

One three-component installation of seismographsarrow receiving band and magnification of the ordereconds;

At certain posts one three-component installation of long-period seismographs with magnification of the ordert periodseconds;

uxiliary equipment necessary in order to get precise records of tho seismic signal; recording devices, chronometers, power supply units and apparatus for receiving automatic radio-signals giving correct time.

The seismic apparatus should be installed in placesinimal level of micro-seismic background, away from industrial areas, and on outcrops of bedrock (wherehe seismographs should be installed in suitable vaults.

The area required for Installing the seirzaic apparatus should be about 3x3 kilometres.

B. Acoustic Apparatus

The infra-acoustic equipmentontrol post should Include not less than three sets of microbarograpbic units each of which shouldystem for averagingressure sensing unit, aline and appropriate electronicand automatic writing instruments;

The sensitivity of the mlcrobarographic stations must ensure recording of acoustic signals in the period0 seconds, with an amplitudeynes per cmJ;

The pressure sensing units of the micro-barographs should be dispersed at aboutilometres from one another In order tothe direction of arrival of the acoustic signal and the speed of propagation of the signal;

The hydroacoustic apparatusost, which is recommended for use only in oceanic zones, should Include several hydrophones placed in the main submarine sound channel.

The hydrophones should be connected with the recording station on the coast by cables. Recordings of the hydroacoustic signal should be made in several frequencyeneral frequency range of from one cycle per second to several thousand cycles per second.

The infra-acoustic equipment operates best in areas of low surface winds and flat terrain covered with trees or shrubs.

foradio Signal

The apparatus foradio signal should consist of:

A loop-shaped radio direction finderadio direction finder with vertical antennasilometres from one another,requency rangeilocycles per second which will detect signals as lowillivolts per metre;

A device for recording the form of the signal, the device to provide recording of the form of the radio-pulserequencyilocycles per second when the Intensity of the field Isillivolts per metre and more;

An automatic selecting device based on separating out the characteristicsignals accompanying nuclear explosions by their form, by their spectral density and by their ampUto'deevice for analysing the signal spectrum that provides display of the spectral density of the signal in0 kilocycles per second. Although existing techniques exclude themajority of signals from lightning,-further advantage will be taken offrom tbe acoustic, seismic or other basic methods of detection to aid In furtherbetween signals from nuclearand from lightning flashes;

The requisite measuring and auxiliary apparatus and also power-supply units and means for obtaining correct radio time signals.

The site on which the antennas and the electromagnetic recording apparatus areshould be on flat or rolling terrain withetres clear space around theand distant from sources of electrical interferences, power lines andlines.

for Collecting and Analysing

Radioactive Debris

The apparatus for collecting and analysing radioactive debris should include:

A large filtering installationhrough-put capacityubic metres of air over4 hours, and which Is usedhour basis;

Equipment for collecting radioactive depositionsa surface withquare metres area should be used. During dry weather, the surface can be washed down to collect dry fallout;

A laboratory for simple radiochemical analysis.

Apparatus should be located In open areas, preferably on high ground, with highfrequency. Apparatus should not be located In cut-off valleys or near regions with high natural background.

E. Apparatus Installed on Aircraft forRadioactive Debris and Detectionadioactive Cloud

A filtering Installation for aircraft should provide for the collection of thequantity of the products of radioactive decay, the rate of filtering beingubic metres an hour.

The aircraft utilised for the collection of radioactive debris should have equipment for the comparatively fast determination of the presence of fresh radioactive debris.

A small radiochemical laboratory will be located at each base for routine aircraft sampling flights.

Aircraft flights over ocean areas should be laid out as nearly as possible inorth-south direction, and located near the sides of the major continents, as well as In the centre of oceans remote from continents.

All the apparatus of the control posts should be designed for reliable continuous operation.

Improved apparatus and techniques should be actively developed and expeditiously incorporated Into the control system for the purpose of continuously improving thefor the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

XmC^LASBffiED

iv. conclusionsontrol system for detecting violationsossible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests

Conference of Experts, havinga control system for detecting violationsossible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests, has come to the conclusion that the methods for detecting nuclear explosions available at the present time. viz. the method of collecting samples of radioactive debris, the methods of recording seismic, acoustic, and hydroacoustic waves, and the radio-signal method, along with the use of on-siteof unidentified events which could beof being nuclear explosions, make It possible to detect and Identify nuclearincluding low yield5he Conference has therefore come to the conclusion that it is technically feasible to establish with the capabilities and limitations indicatedorkable and effectivesystem to detect violations of anon the worldwide suspension of nuclear weapons tests.

The Conference of Experts has come to the following conclusions regarding such a

he control system should be under the direction of an International control organ which would ensure the coordination of the activities of the control system inay that the system would satisfy the following technical requirements and perform theinvolved:

The development, testing, andof the measuring apparatus and of the equipment, and stating the criteria for the siting, of the control posts;

Carrying out at the control posts and on aircraft, mentioned Inf the present Conclusions, of continuous andobservations for the phenomena which make It possible to detect nuclear explosions by the use of the methods recommended by the Conference;

Reliable communication, with the aid of existing channels where they are suitable for this purpose, between the international control organ on tho one hand and, on the other hand, the control posts and the bases from which the regular aircraft flights are carried out; communications andshould ensure the speedy transmission of the results of observations, off reports, and of necessary suppUes;

Means of transport of personnel of the control posts in accordance with their duties and. so far as necessary, for the staff of the international control organ;

Timely analysis and processing of the data from the observations of the control posts with the aim of speedily Identifying events which could be suspected of being nuclearand in order to be able to report thereon in such manner as Is considered by governments to be appropriate;

Timely Inspection of unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclearin accordance withf the present Conclusions,

Staffing of the control system (theof control posts on land, on ships, and on aircraft, and also the staff of thecontrol organ) with qualified personnel having appropriate fields of specialization;

assistance In puttinga scientific research program, withof raising the scientific standard of the

system.

etwork of control posts Isby three main parameters:

minimum yield adopted forexplosion or the natural eventssignals;

number of control posts;

probability of correctof natural events, particularly

The dependence between these parameters is such that with an increase in the yield of

the explosion or the number of control posts the probability of detection and identification increases, and the number of unidentified events suspected ofuclear explosion decreases. On the other hand, for the idcnti-flcatlon of the Increased number ofevents resultingmaller number of control posts it would be necessary tothe number of on-site Inspections or to make greater use of information coming from sources not subordinate to the International control organ or. if necessary, both.

The Conference considers that theof detecting and identifying underground explosions is one of the most difficult, and that,arge extent, it determines theof the network of control posts.

he network ofand-based control posts (equipped in accordance with Section III of this report) and abouthips. Ofontrol postsould be situated in continents,n large oceanic islands, andn small oceanic islands;the exact number of control posts within the limits indicated above, can be determined only ln the process of actually disposing them around the globe, taking into account the presence of noise at the sites at which they are located, and other circumstances.

The spacing between the control posts in continental aseismic areas would beilometres, and in seismic areasilometres. The spacing between the control posts In ocean areas wouldnd moreilometres; the spacing between island control posts in seismic areas would beilometres. This would lead to the following approximate distribution of control posts over the globeetworkontinental posU):

North,, South; together withontrol posts on islands and abouthips.

he tasks of the personnel of the control posts would include the ensuring of thef unctioning of apparatus, the preliminary processing of data received, and theof these data to the international control organ and to the government of the country on whose territory the control post is located Inanner as may be consideredby governments.

In order to carry out the tasks required one might need for each control post aboutersons with various qualifications and fields of specialization, and also some persons for the auxiliary servicing staff.

addition to the basic networkair sampling would beaircraft carrying out regular flightsroutes over the oceans alongof the Atlantic and Pacificalso over areas of the oceans whichfrom surface control posts.

When it is necessary to investigateadioactive cloud is present, ln the case of detection of an unidentified event which could

be suspected ofuclear explosion,aircraft flights would be organized lnto collect samples of radioactive debris in

accordance with Section

the control posts detect ancannot be identified by thecontrol organ and which could beofuclear explosion, thecontrol organ can send angroup to the site of this event Indetermineuclear explosionplace or not. The group would bewith equipment and apparatusto its task in each case. Thewouldeport on theIt had earned out to theorgan, and to the government ofon the territory of which thewas made inanner as mayappropriate by governments.

network of control posts disposedtogether with the use of aircraftwould have the followingsubject to the qualifications discussed6 and 9:

(a) Good probability of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions of yields down tolloton. taking place on the surface

of the earth and up toilometre altitude, and good probability of detecting, but notof Identifying, explosions taking place at altitudes fromoilometres. In these cases the Independent methods enumerated in Sections U.ndould be used.

(b) Good probability of detecting nuclear explosionslloton yield set off deep in the open ocean. In this case use would be made of the Independent hydroacousUc and seismic methods described in Sectionsnd II C.

The Identification of underwater explosions can, in comparatively rare cases, be made more difficult by natural events which give similar hydroacousUc and seismic signals.

(c> Good probability of recording seismic signals from deep underground nuclearin continents equivalentlloton and above. In this case use would be made of the seismic method described In Section II C.

The problem of Identifying deepexplosions Is considered In Item 8.

long with the observation of signals of possible underground explosions the control posts would record at the same time anumber of similar signals from natural earthquakes. Although, with the present state of knowledge and techniques, theof control posts would be unable tothe signals from undergroundfrom those of some earthquakes, it could identify as being of natural origin abouter cent of the continental earthquakes, whose signals are equivalentlloton.mall percentage of continental earthquakes equivalentlloton.*

It has been estimated on the basis ofdata that the number of earthquakes which would be undlsttnguishablc on the basis of their seismic signals from deepnuclear explosions oflloton yield could be In continental areas fromear. Those unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions would be Inspected as described In item 6.

The capability of the control system to identify underground nuclear explosionslloton yield depends on:

The small fraction of earthquakes that can be Identified on the basis of data obtained from the control posts alone;

The fraction of earthquakes that can be Identified with the aid of supplementary data obtained from existing seismic stations; and

fc) The fraction of events still leftwhich could be suspected of being nuclear explosions and for which thecontrol organ carries out inspection In accordance with item 6.

Although the control system would have great difficulty In obtainingarefully concealed deepnuclear explosion, there would alwaysossibility of detectiona violation by inspection.

The on-site inspection carried out by thecontrol organ in accordance withould be able to identify with good probability underwater nuclear explosionsieldlloton and above.

he Conference notes that In certaincases the capability of detecting nuclear explosions would be reduced; for instance, when explosions are set off in those areas of the ocean where the number of control posts is small and Uie meteorological conditions are unfavorable; in the case of shallowround explosions; when explosions are set off on Islands in seismic regions; and in some other cases when the explosion is carefully concealed. In some cases It would beto determine exactly the area Inuclear explosion that had been detected took place.

However, the Conference considers that whatever Uie precautionary measures adoptediolator he could not be guaranteed against exposure, particularly If account Is taken of Uie carrying out of Inspection at the site of the suspected explosion.

he system described does not include specific means to detect and identify nuclear explosions at high altitudes. The Conference has formulated its findings on the methods of detecting nuclear explosions set off at altitudes greater than

ilometres and has characterized these methods in Section II E.

he Conference of Experts recommends the control system described above forby governments.

The following experts participated as delegates at the Conference:

Experts

Dr. James B. Fisk Dr. Robert F. Bacher Sir John Cockcroft Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence Sir William Pennoy Prof. Yves Andre Rocard Dr. O. M. Solandt

Delegations of:

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

E. K. Fedorov N. N. Semenov I. E. Tamm M. A. Sadovski

I. Leipunskl

P.E. oubkln

S. K. Tsarapkin

People's Republic

M. Mlesowlcz L. Jurkiewicz M. Blusztajn

Czechoslovak Republic

C. Slmane F. Behounek A. Zatopek Z. Trhlik

People's Republic of Romania H. Hulubei

annex i

conclusions as to the applicability of the method of recording acoustic waves for the detection of nuclear explosions

Conference of Experts examined the process of propagation of the acoustic waves caused by nuclear explosions and the methods of recording these waves with the aim ofthe possibility of using them for detecting nuclear explosions.

The Conference came to the following

When there are explosions Introng air acoustic wave is formed which propagates over large distances. An indication of the amplitude of the air pressure wave is givenormula which is approximately validomogeneous atmosphere and according to which this amplitude is proportional to the cube root of the yield and Inverselyto the distance. However, theof this acoustic wave Is stronglyupon meteorological conditions and cannot be predicted accuratelyimple formula ofind. The observedin certain cases can be five times larger or smaller than that predicted by awhich Includes only the energy release and the distance to detecting station.

Existing apparatus of special design can detect the air wavene kliotonin the air above local background noise at relatively large distances.

The detection capabilityingle station is strongly dependent upon tbe orientation of the propagation path to the station withto the upper winds. When the upper winds are mainly In onene kilo-ton explosion can be detectedighof confidence downwindistanceilometres and upwind atilometres. When the upper winds are erratic and the average wind is small, such as frequently happens in the spring and fall, detectionne kilotoncan be accomplishedimilar degree of confidenceistanceilometres independently of the direction. On the basis of the records from three stations, the location of the explosion can be determined with an accuracy of betterilometres.

he acoustic apparatus at control posts at the above distances from an explosion can detect explosions which occur betweeneight ofilometres. Aextrapolation of existing experiencethat for explosions taking place up to an altitude of aboutilometres there should notreat change in the de tee lability of the acoustic wave.ubstantial acoustic wave will be generated at higheris not well known from director from any theoretical considerations so far discussed. Deep underground andexplosions do not produce air waves sufficiently Intense for detection purposes.

An underwater explosion in the oceansvery strong underwater sound waveshich even ln the case of small explosions can be detected at distances of0 kilometres.

Acoustic waves which resemble incases the acoustic signals of nuclearmay be produced by natural events (primarily meteoric, volcanic or submarinen such cases theof the event as natural oruclear explosion must be basedomparison of acoustic data with those obtained by aid of other methods.

he Conference of Experts recommends the inclusion of methods for the recording of acoustic, air and hydro-acoustic waves in the list of the basic methods for the detection ot

nuclear explosions with the aidetwork be further improved to increase the precision of control posts. The Conference notes that and the sensitivity, and to eliminate back-methods of recording of pressure waves may ground noise and spurious signals.

annex ii

conclusions as to the applicability of the method of using radioactive debris for detecting and subsequently identifying

nuclear explosions

Conference of Experts has studied the process of the dissemination of radioactive debris resulting;uclear explosion and has considered the collection of samples of radioactive debris and its analysis as one of the methods for detecting and subsequently identifying nuclear explosions. Thehas come to the following conclusions:

When an explosiononsiderable quantity of radioactive debris Is produced. If the explosion Is basedission reaction then this quantjty amountsuries. equivalent of the energy of the explosion as of one hour after the reaction. Thermonuclear reactions will lead to the formation ofritium, and other radioactive substances which result fromirradiation and which, in principle, can also be used to detect an explosion.

When nuclear explosions occur between the earth's surfaceeight often kilometres the radioactive debris Is thrown into the atmosphere where it isby winds to great distances. Theof this radioactive debris Is greatlyby the vertical and horizontalof the wind in the troposphere and in the lower layers of the stratosphere. The concentration is also decreased as aof washing out by rain anddeposition.

The distribution by height of thedebris carried in the atmosphere will depend ln the first place on the energy of the explosion, on the conditions In which thetook place. on the earth, under the earth, or in the air) and on the meteorological conditions at the moment of explosion- In the case of low energy explosions in the air upeight of approximately ten kilometres the radioactive debris willmall volume below the tropopause. This debris will gradually get disseminated both horizontally and vertically in theand in the courseeriod of from one to thirty days (depending on theof the atmosphere, the wind structure, and the dimensions of the particles which .carry the radioactive substances) it can be detected close to the earth's surface, as also at various heights up to the tropopause.

he spreading of the cloud in theis determined by manyprocesses.esult of the action of these processes the cloud is bound totage when it is mixedertical direction and spreadorizontal direction inay as to afford the most convenientfor taking samples.

Calculations and experimental data give ground for considering that this stage will be reached ln the period between the fifth and twentieth day of the existence of the cloud. Before that period the cloud may be too small, both in its horizontal and Its vertical extent. After thirty days haveonsiderable part of the radioactive debris will decayample willesser proportion of the natural or other background, thereby making more difficult the detection andof an explosion.

Existing radiochemical techniques make it possible to detect and identify fresh decay productsample ol radioactiveissions. The time of origin of this fresh debris can be determined within five to ten per cent of its age if the sample iTOtoiTMissions and is notto any considerable extent by oldproducts.

The taxing of samples on the surface of the earthetwork of control posts makes It possible to carry out continual monitoring of the contamination of the air at manypoints by means of air filtration and also by collecting radioactive fallout andIn rain. If control posts are disposed at distances of the orderthen an explosion with an energyT set off in the troposphereilometres above the surface of the earth) willigh degree of reliability in the period of five to twenty days although the place of explosion cannot be exactlyand although the time of explosion will be determined with some error. Calculation shows that with favourable meteorological conditions an explosion of even lesser energy can be detected in this way.

In the course of the period of time of from two to five days after an explosion of energy equivalentT the collectionample of radioactive debris from the explosion which Is suitable for analysis can be effected in the air by an aircraft if the area of the supposed location of the cloud Is known approximately. The taking ofample will make itto establish approximately the point of the explosion by means of usingdata for back-tracking the trajectory of movement of the cloud.

Underground or underwater explosions set off at shallow depths and accompanied by the throwing up of earth or water can also be identified by the method of collectingsamples although with lesser reliability than for explosions of the same energy in the troposphere.

The Conference of Experts considers that systematic measurements of radioactivein the air and also the collection of radioactive aerosols deposited on the ground and measurements of the radioactivity ofcan be successfully used for the detection of nuclear explosions and also, in many cases, for assessing certain parameters relating to them even in the absence of other Indications, and It recommends the inclusion of the method of collecting samples ofdebris in the number of basic methods for detecting and identification ofetwork of control posts.

The Conference of Experts recommends the utilizationegular control service,ethod for detecting nuclear explosions, of the taking of samples of the air by aircraft over oceans. For this purpose use should be made of existing aircraft flights over the oceans which are carried out by variousfor the purposes of meteorological

Conference of Experts considersmethod of taking samples ofcan also be used successfully forInvestigation of the fact of aIn those cases when there areindications from other methods.

For this purpose it is possible to use the detection of radioactive debris remaining at thehe supposed explosion (on the earth's surface, under the earth, in the water) and also the determination of the presenceadioactive cloud In the period between two and five daysupposed explosion in the atmosphere in the area where the cloud is calculated to be by the time of Investigation.

Inase search for the radioactive cloud can be made on an aircraft having equipment for the takingample ofdebris. To this end use should be made chiefly of the aircraft flights over the oceans made for the purposes of meteorological

some cases use can be made offlights over the territories of theUSSR, the UK and other countries toair samples for the purpose ofdata obtained by other methods ofof nuclear explosions.

The Experts consider that to accomplish this task it would be quite sufficient to make

use of the aircraft of the country beingand that in such cases it is sufficient that flights for the purpose specified should be made along routes laid down in advance. Representatives of the USSR, the USA. the UK or other States participating in theof the control system may be on board these aircraft ln the capacity of observers.

he Experts note that in the course of time the sensitivity and efficiency of theof collecting radioactive debrisonsequence of the atmospherecleared of the radioactive products it contains, as alsoesult of the perfection of the techniques for collecting and analysing samples.

conclusions as to the applicability of the method of recording seismic waves for the detection of nuclear explosions

Conference has considered theof propagation of seismic wavesby nuclear explosions and the methods for recording these waves for the purpose of detennining the possibility of using them for the detection of underground and underwater nuclear explosions. The Conference has come to the following conclusions:

* The underground nuclear explosion "Rainier" Willi aa energyllotons iNevadat was set oft* In unfavourable condiuons for transferringto the ground. However, even worseof coupling ore possible.

When nuclear explosions occur under the ground or under the water, longitudinal, transverse and surface waves are formed and-get propagated to great distances. The first longitudinal wave is the most important, both for detecting an explosion and forthe place of the explosion, and also for distinguishing an earthquake from explosions. Transverse and surface waves also help tothe natureeismic perturbation.

Longitudinal seismic waves caused bynuclear explosions set off under conditions analogous to those in which thehot occurred can be detected and the direction of first motion of thewave can be determinedistance ofilometres, and also at distances ofat sites which are considerably more quiet than the average for:

Explosions of the order of one kiloton recorded during periods of favourable noise conditions.

Explosions of the order of five kilotons recorded during periods ofnoise conditions.

It must be noted that all seismicituated at thousands of kilometres from one another cannot have an Identically high or identically low level of background at one and the same time.

Conditions for detection andof underwater explosions set off inwater butufficient depth, aremore favourable than conditions for detecting underground explosions.

Control posts carrying out seismicshould be put at sitesinimal level of microselsmlc background, such as are possible ln internal continental regions. Such stations, when provided with arrays ofcan ensure the obtaining of the data indicated above. However, at stations which are In unfavourable regions such as coastal and island regions the noise level will be higher than at quiet stations insideIn these cases for detection andof the sign of first motion the energy of the explosion must Increase In the ratio of the powerith respect to the increase of background level. This is ln partby the fact that quiet stations inside

continents will record more powerfulat distances olBursts with an energyilotons and more will be detected by quiet stations placed at the distances named.

he majority of earthquakes can befrom explosionsighof reliability if the direction of firstof the longitudinal wave isr more seismic stations on various bearings from the epicentre. Thus not less thaner cent of all earthquakes taking place In continents can be identified. The remaininger cent or less of cases willthe analysis of additional seismograms where this is possible; and for this purpose use must also be made of the data of the existing network of seismic stations. If required, these supplementary stations should be further equipped with improved apparatus. Inaselsmlc areas it is sufficient merely to define the position of the epicentre. In this connexion cases of detection of seismic events will be regarded as suspicious and will require further investigation with the help of other methods. For those cases which remaininspection of the region will be necessary.

In regions where the regular disposition of seismic stations In quiet conditions is notthe percentage of correct identification of earthquakes will be less.

With modern methods and making use of the data of several surrounding seismicthe area within which an epicentre is localized can be assessed asquare kilometres.

he Conference of Experts recommends the inclusion of the method of recordingwaves in the number of basic methods for detecting nuclear explosions with the helpetwork of control posts. The Conference notes that the range and accuracy ofand Identifying underground nuclearcan be Improved in the future by means of perfecting the methods of recording seismic waves, both by way of perfectingand also by way of perfecting the methods for differentiating" an earthquake from explosions.

ANNEX IV

CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF RECORDING OF RADIO SIGNALS FOR THE DETECTION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

Conference of Experts considered the generation and propagation of radio pulses originatinguclear explosion and the methods of recording these signals in order to determine the possibility of using them for the detection of nuclear explosions. Thecame to the following conclusions:

n the caseuclear explosion in the atmosphere, thereowerfulradiation (radioaused by the gamma radiation accompanying theIn the case of underground,or specially shielded explosions radio emissions are not expected which can beat great distances by modern

When the explosion is carried out on or above the surface of the earth (water) and without specially constructed layers to absorb gamma rays, the energy and spectralof the radio signal are such that Itscomponents are propagated over the whole terrestrial globe. The strength ot the radio signal depends upon certain features of the construction of the bomb and on theof the explosion. An explosionilo-ton yield can be detected by means of radio signals at distancesm

surolng that In the neighbourhood of thestation there is no high noise level from local thunderstorms or other sources.

By radio direction finding methods, it ts possible to determine the azimuth of thesource with an accuracy of aboutboutmistancem. The time of production of the signal may bewith an accuracy of severalThe attainment of such accuracy depends on tbe choice of sufficiently hatand on the absence of electricalat the receiving site.

ightning hashes emit radio signals in the same frequency range and act asfor the method of detection of aexplosion by means of its radio signal.

Close to the source of radiation, the forms of radio signals from lightning and fromexplosions examined to date are quite different However, at distancesilometres, due to the distortion of the form of radio signals in the wave guide formed by the earth and the ionosphere, the form of radio signals from some Individual lightning flashes is similar to the signal from nuclear explosions. The number of signals from lightning flashes recorded by apparatususing special techniques of signaldepends on the sensitivity of theand on the locality, and can amount to from ten to several hundred signals per second. Existing techniques can be applied to exclude automatically the preponderant majority of signals from lightning. Theof the remaining signals due tofrom those due to nuclearrequires the application of specialof discrimination, including criteria on form of signal, spectral distribution andto source of radiation.

In the present state of the technique of tbe discrimination of signals in some individual cases the recordignal cannot beeither as cominguclear explosion or from lightning.

The Conference of Experts recommends that further research should be carried out in order to understand more fully the physical properties of atmospherics involved insignals from nuclear explosions and atmospherics, by means of the development of the theory of this problem, the collection and systematization of data about atmospherics and the development of suitable automatic instruments. The Conference considers that there are good prospects for improvement of procedures of signal discrimination.

Theoretical considerations suggest that recording of radio signals can be used tonuclear explosions occurring at altitudes up to the orderilometres.

The Conference of Experts recommends the inclusion of recording of radio signals among the methods of detecting nuclear explosions.

annex v

conclusions as to the methods of detection of nuclear explosions carried out at high altitude (more thanom)

above the earth

Conference of Experts has givenconsideration to the gamma radiation and neutrons resultinguclearand the conditions of recording them from earth satellites; and to opticaland ionization of the air in the upper layers of the atmosphere In the caseigh altitude explosion (altitudesm) and has arrived at the following conclusions:

UNCLApclDnED

A klloton nuclear explosion produces at its source delayed gamma-rays from fission products, and prompt gamma-rays andThe number of prompt gamma-rays and neutrons depends upon the construction of tbe device and upon the materialsit. The delayed gamma-rays areaffected by these factors.istanceilometres In vacuo, typical quantities of radiationne kllotonexplosion are:

gamma-rays

uanta/cm* during the first second

gamma-rays

uanta/cm3 distributedune of' sec.

eutrons/cm1 distributedimeew seconds.

The cosmic background at the height at which earth satellites orbit Is under study at the present time, attention being paid to the quantity, nature and energy of the particles; however, on the basis of preliminary data, it can be considered that the detection of an explosion from an earth satellite is possible, by means of recording the gamma-raysthe nuclear reaction, neglecting shielding, and also by means of recording the gamma rays of the fission products and the neutrons. If both prompt gamma rays and neutrons are recorded, it is possible to get some Idea of the distance to the explosion. The use of gamma-raysuclearwill make it possible to detect thein cosmic spaceistance of the order of hundreds of thousands of kilometres from the earth Estimate of the maximum distance for the detection requires datathe magnitude of the cosmicat the orbit of the earth satellite. If there is an explosioneightm and

tnp ItTTTh'ffT"V. Clrvlcr in

considerablyIgaBSlWa'JlaUonthe reac*RM;lmslHMinal reduce theirom aaslon products. However, such shielding Involves increasing by several tiroes the weight oi the whole device.

above, and if the height at which the earth satellite orbits is some thousands ofone can neglect the absorption of gamma quanta In the upper layers of theThe Conference of Expertsthat It Is possible to use for theof nuclear explosions at high altitudes the recording of gamma radiation andwith properly Instrumented earth

the case of an explosion at alight will be emitted at the pointexplosion and there will bethe upper layers of the atmosphereactionays and fast atoms fromIn the device. Lightbe detectable from the surface ofin clear weather at night with thesimple apparatus; in day time withof more sensitive apparatus. Inthe detection of opticalstations on the earths surfacebe extremely difficult.

The radiationuclear explosionin the upper layers of theegion of Increased Ionization which isby the absorption of cosmic radio-signals or by anomalies In the propagation of radio waves.

Our knowledge of the absorption of cosmic noise by ionospheric phenomena is notto determine the number of natural events similar to those resulting from aexplosion.

The Conference of Experts considers that It is possible to use the recording ofphenomena, using appropriate radio techniques, and of optical phenomena for the detection of nuclear explosions at high altitudes.

Conference of Experts has notthe problem of the detection ofexplosions which might be conductedspace at distances of millions offrom the earth.

annex vi

conclusions as to the question of the technical equipment of the control system for the detection and identification of

nuclear explosions

Conference of Experts has considered the questions related to theontrol net intended to detect and Identify nuclear explosions.

The Conference has come to the following conclusions:

The posts of the control net situated in continents should regularly be equipped with apparatus for the detection of explosions by the acoustic and seismic methods and also by the methods of recording radio signals and of collecting radioactive debris.

Certain posts situated on islands or near the shores of oceans should be equipped, in addition to the methods Just mentioned, with apparatus for hydroacoustic detection of

Posts located on ships stationed orwithin specified ocean areas should be equipped with apparatus for the detection of explosions by the method of collectingdebris and by the hydroacoustic method. The method of recording radio signals and the acoustic method might also be used on ships If suitable equipment Is developed, but the effectiveness of these two methods,the acoustic one, will be considerably less than on land.

The apparatus installed at posts of the control network must be uniform and must satisfy the following basic technical

A. Seismic Apparatus

The seismic apparatus of the control post should include:

pproximatelyhort-period vertical seismographs dispersedistanceilometres and connected to the recording system by lines of cable. The seismographs shouldaximum magnification of the orderrequency.eceiving band adequate to reproduce the characteristic form of the seismic signal;

2 horizontal seismographs with the parameters indicated in point

One three-component installation of long-period seismographsroadbandonstant magnification of the ordern the period0 seconds;

One three-component installation of seismographsarrow receiving band and magnification of the ordereconds;

At certain posts one three-component installation of long-period seismographs with magnification of the ordert periodseconds;

Auxiliary equipment necessary in order to get precise records of the seismic signal; recording devices, chronometers, power supply units and apparatus for receiving automatic radio-signals giving correct time.

The seismic apparatus should be installed In placesinimal level ofbackground, away from Industrial areas, and on outcrops of bedrock (wherehe seismographs should be installed invaults.

The area required for installing the seismic apparatus should be about 3x3 kilometres.

B. Acoustic Apparatus

(l) The infra-acoustic equipment for apost should include not less than three sets of microbarographlc units each of which shouldystem for averaging out turbulentressure sensingransmission line and appropriate electronic amplifiers and automatic writing instruments;

The sensitivity of the raicrobarographic stations must ensure recording of acoustic signals in the period0 seconds, with an amplitudeynes per cm=;

The pressure sensing units of the microbarographs should be dispersed at aboutilometres from one another in order to determine the direction of arrival of the acoustic signal and the speed of propagation of the signal;

The hydroacoustic apparatusost, which is recommended for use only in oceanic zones, should include several hydrophones placed in the main submarine sound channel.

The hydrophones should be connected with the recording station on the coast by cables. Recordings of the hydroacoustic signal should be made in several frequency sub-ranges,eneral frequency range of from one cycle per second to several thousand cycles per second.

The infra-acoustic equipment operates best ln areas of low surface winds and flat terrain covered with trees or shrubs.

C. Apparatus foradio Signal

The apparatus foradio signal should consist of:

A loop-shaped radio direction finderadio direction finder withilometres fromrequency range ofer second which will detect signals as lowillivolts per metre;

A device for recording the form of the signal, the device to provide recording of the form of the radio-pulserequencyilocycles per second when the intensity of the field isillivolts per metre and more;

An automatic selecting device based on separating out the characteristicsignals accompanying nuclearby their form, by their spectraland by their amplitude,evice forthe signal spectrum that providesof the spectral density of the signal in the frequencyilocycles perAlthough existing techniques exclude the preponderant majority of signals from lightning, further advantage will be taken of information from the acoustic, seismic or other basic methods of detection to aid in further discrimination between signals from nuclear explosions and from lightning flashes;

he requisite measuring and auxiliary' apparatus and also power-supply units and means for obtaining correct radio time signals.

The site on which the antennas and the electromagnetic recording apparatus areshould be on flat or rolling terrain withetres clear space around theand distant from sources of electrical interferences, power lines andlines.

for Collecting and Analysing

Radioactive Debris

The apparatus for collecting and analysing radioactive debris should Include:

A large filtering installationhrough-put capacityubic metres of airours, and which is usedhour basis;

Equipment for collecting radioactive depositionsa surface withit-area should be used. During dry weather, the surface can be washed down to collect dry fallout;

A laboratory for simple radiochemical analysis.

Apparatus should be located in open areas, preferably on high ground, with highfrequency. Apparatus should not be located in cut-off valleys or near regions with high natural background.

Installed on Aircraft for Collect-

ing Radioactive Debris and Detectionadioactive Cloud

iltering installation for aircraft should provide for the collection of thequantity of the products of radioactive decay, the rate of filtering beingubic metres an hour.

The aircraft utilized for the collection of radioactive debris should have equipment for the comparatively fast determination of the presence of fresh radioactive debris.

A small radiochemical laboratory will be located at each base for routine aircraft sampling flights.

Aircraft flights over ocean areas should be laid out as nearly as possible inorth-south direction, and located near the sides of the major continents, as well as in the centre of oceans remote from continents.

All the apparatus of the control posts should be designed for reliable continuous operation.

Improved apparatus and techniques should be actively developed and expeditiously incorporated Into the control system lor the purpose of continuously improving thefor the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

annex vii

conclusionsontrol system for detecting violationsossible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests

Conference of Experts, havinga control system for detecting viola-lionsossible agreement on theof nuclear tests, has come to thethat the methods for detecting nuclear explosions available at the present time, viz. the method of collecting samples ofdebris, the methods of recordingacoustic, and hydroacousUc waves, and the radio-signal method, along with the use of on-site inspection of unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclearmake It possible to detect and identify nuclear explosions, including lowhe Conference has therefore come to the conclusion that it is technically feasible to establish, with the capabilities and limitations indicatedorkable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the worldwide suspension of nuclear weapons tests.

The Conference of Experts has come to the following conclusions regarding such a

l. The control system should be under the direction of an International control organ which would ensure the coordination of the activities of the control system inay that the system would satisfy the following technical requirements and perform theinvolved: _

The development, testing, andof the measuring apparatus and of the equipment, and stating the criteria for the siting, of the control posts;

Carrying out at the control posts and on aircraft, mentioned Inf the present Conclusions, of continuous and effective observations for the phenomena which make It possible to detect nuclearby the use of the methodsby the Conference;

Reliable communication, with the aid of existing channels where they are suitable for this purpose, between the International control organ on the one hand and, on the other hand, the control posts and the bases from which the regular aircraft flights are carried out; communications andshould ensure the speedy transmission of the results of observations, off reports, and ofsupplies;

Means of transport of personnel of the control posts in accordance with their duties and. so far as necessary, for the staff of the International control organ;

Timely analysis and processing of the data from the observations of the control posts with the aim of speedily identifying events which could be suspected of beingexplosions, and in order to be able to report thereon in such manner as isby governments to be appropriate;

Timely Inspection of unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions, in accordance withf the present Conclusions;

Staffing of the control system (theof control posts on land, on ships, and on aircraft, and also the staff of thecontrol organ) with qualifiedhaving appropriate fields of specialization;

assistance in puttinga scientific research programme,aim of raising the scientific standardsystem.

etwork of control posts isby three main parameters;

nunimum yield adopted forexplosion or the natural eventsequivalent signals;

number of control posts;

probability of correctnatural events, particularly earthquakes.

The dependence between these parameters is such that with an increase in the yield of the explosion or the number of control posts the probability of detection and identification Increases, and the number of unidentified events suspected ofuclear explosion decreases. On the other hand, for theof the increased number ofevents resultingmaller number of control posts it would be necessary tothe number of on-site Inspections or to make greater use of information ccroing from sources not subordinate to the international control organ or. if necessary, both.

The Conference considers that the problem of detecting and identifying undergroundis one of the most difficult, and that,arge extent, it determines theof the network of control posts.

network of controland-basedposts (equipped In accordance within Annex VI) and aboutontrol posts aboutbe situated in continents,nislands, andn small oceanichowever the exact number ofwithin the limits indicated above,determined only in the process ofthem around the globe, takingthe presence of noise at the sitesthey are located, and other

The spacing between the control posts In continental aselsmic areas would beilometres, and in seismic areasilometres. The spacing between the control posts in ocean areas wouldnd moreilometres; the spacing between Island control posts in seismic areas would beilometres. This would lead to the following approximate distribution of control posts over the globeetworkontinentalorthsia

, South, Africa

; together withontrol posts on Islands and abouthips.

tasks of the personnel of thewould include the ensuring of thefunctioning of apparatus, theof data received, and theof these data to the Internationaland to the government of thewhose territory the control postanner as may be consideredby governments.

In order to carry out the tasks required one might need for each control post aboutersons with various qualifications and fields of specialization, and also some persons for the auxiliary servicing staff,

addition to the basic networkair sampling would beaircraft carrying out regular Sightsroutes over the oceans alongof the Atlantic and Pacificalso over areas of the oceans whichfrom surface control posts.

When it is necessary to investigateadioactive cloud is present, in the case of detection of an unidentified event which could be suspected ofuclear explosion, special aircraft flights would be organized In order to collect samples of radioactive debris in accordance with Conclusions in Annex U.

When the control posts detect an event which cannot be identified by thecontrol organ and which could beofuclear explosion, thecontrol organ can send angroup to the site of this event in order to determineuclear explosion had taken place or not The group would bewith equipment and apparatusto its task in each case. Thegroup wouldeport on theit had carried out to thecontrol organ, and to the government of the country on the territory of which the investigation was made inanner as may be considered appropriate by

The network of control posts disposed as described, together with the use ofas described, would have the following effectiveness, subject to the qualifications dis<-cussed innd 9:

Good probability of detecting andnuclear explosions of yields down toiloton, taking place on the surface of the earth and up toilometre altitude, and good probability of detecting, but not always of identifying, explosions taking place at altitudes fromo SO kilometres. In these cases the independent methods enumerated in Conclusions in Annexes I, il, and IV would be used;

Good probability of detecting nuclear explosionsiloton yield set off deep in the open ocean. In this case use would be made of the independent hydroacoustic and seismic methods described in Conclusions innd III.

The identification of underwater explosions can, in comparatively rare cases, be made more

36

difficult by natural events which give similar hydroacoustic and seismic signals;

(c) Good probability of recording seismic signals from deep underground nuclearin continents equivalentiloton and above. In this case use would be made of the seismic method described in Conclusions in Annex in.

The problem of identifying deepexplosions is considered ln item 6.

long with the observation of signals of possible underground explosions the control posts would record at the same tune anumber of similar signals fromearthquakes. Although, with tbe present state of knowledge and techniques, theof control posts would be unable tothe signals from undergroundfrom those of some earthquakes, it could identify as being of natural origin abouter cent of the continental earthquakes, whose signals are equivalentilotons,mall percentage of continental earthquakes equivalentiloton. *

It has been estimated on the basis ofdata that the number of earthquakes which would be undisUnguishable on the basis of their seismic signals from deepnuclear explosions ofiloton yield could be in continental areas fromear. Those unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions would be Inspected as described in Item 6.

The capability of the control system to identify underground nuclear explosionsiloton yield depends on:

(a) The small fraction of earthquakes that can be Identified on the basis of data obtained from the control posts alone;

UNCLA8SIFTED

fraction of earthquakes that can be identified with the aid of supplementary data obtained from existing seismic stations; and

The fraction of events still leftwhich could be suspected of beingexplosions and for which thecontrol organ carries out inspection in accordance with item 6.

Although the control system would have great difficulty in obtainingarefully concealed deepnuclear explosion, there would alwaysossibility of detection of such aby inspection.

The on-site inspection carried out by thecontrol organ in accordance withould be able to identify with good probability underwater nuclear explosionsieldiloton and above.

he Conference notes that in certain special cases the capability of detectingexplosions would be reduced; forwhen explosions are set off In those areas of the ocean where the number ofposts is small and the meteorologicalare unfavourable; ln the case ofunderground explosions; when explosions are set off on islands ln seismic regions; and in some other cases when the explosion is carefully concealed. In some cases it would be impossible to determine exactly the area inuclear explosion that had been detected took place.

However, the Conference considers that, whatever the precautionary measures adoptediolator, he could not be guaranteed against exposure, particularly if account is taken of the carrying out of inspection at the site of the suspected explosion.

The system described does not Include specific means to detect and identify nuclear explosions at high altitudeshe Conference has formulated Its findings on the methods of detectingexplosions set off at altitudes greaterilometres and has characterized these methods in Conclusions in Annex V.

The Conference of Experts recommends the control system described above forby governments.

BLANK

annex b

evaluation of eastern representatives at geneva technical conference

scientists

BALASHOV, Rons tan tin IvanovlchBala-shor participated only in the acousticand gave the Impression to Westernthat his primary interest was ln the experimental and field aspects of thisHe seemed familiar with the details of the actual equipment used for this method and might be responsible for the operation of the acoustic net

He did not associate much with Western scientists and It was not very easy to get an Impression of his qualifications. Hedid not give an impression of beingoutstanding. However, he was very sincere ln his attempt to learn whatever he could about interpretation of acoustic records. He said he had come to this program about five years ago.

BREKHOVSKTKH. Leonid MaksimovichBrekhovskikh's primary scientific field is acoustics and radiowave propagation, and he was probably one of the best Soviet scientists at the conference. It is believed that he is not directly associated with the Soviet long-range detection program, but probably serves ln some capacity as an adviser on the acoustic and electromagnetic phases. He seemed very sound theoretically and very much interestedurely scientific approach. He stated that he is director of the Acoustical Institute of the Acadeioy of Sciences of the USSR

BrekhoTsklkhery amiable, honestoutgoing and seemed quite willing to carry on discussions with WesternHe speaks and understands English reasonably well.

FEDOROV. Yevgmly Konstantinovich. Chairman of Eastern DelegationFedorov was by all means the dominant Individual on the Eastern Delegation leading allwhether they were technical orHe was ln complete command of the situation and even ln specialized scientific fields the individual scientists followed very closely his direction While he wasgetting political advice from Semen Konstantinovich Tsarapkln, Tsarapkin.almost never spoke at the meetings and one got the Impression that Tsarapkin was strictly an advisor and not directing FedoroVs activities.

On occasions, Nikolay Nlkolayevich Seroc-nov interjected himself into the discussions, but even though Fedorov obviously had to recognize Semenov's prestige as anhe always kept MaMaM in the directing role.

Fedorov demonstrated tremendous abilityeaderroup and particularly as Chairman of the Delegation at the conference table. He showed an excellent ability toout the key points of the problem and direct the discussion along lines mostto the Soviet views. He Is also adept at shifting the subject away from points sensitive to the Soviets. When backedorner, he becomes more vituperative, long-winded, and takes the offensive frequentlyersonal basis against the position of the opposite delegation. Heommanding presence at the conference table, thinks very rapidly and Is very capable at presenting views on an ad hoc basis. While apparentlysound on an overall scientific basis, he Is nevertheless not averse to stretching scientific truths in order to establish his point In many cases, he has twisted scientific facts or used them falsely in order to give theof justifying the Soviet position. Overall he is an extremely capable individual, ruthlessifficult adversaryonference table.

There was no indication during theof Fedorov'a connection with nuclear

weapons development programs or with the Soviet long-range detection program.In his positionenior scientific administrator, his connections with thesatellite program, and also his military associations, he is generally familiar withweapons development programs, but there is no evidence that he is directly responsible for any of these. He personally took the most active part in the scientific discussions on the radioactive debris method which Is reasonable In light of his meteorological background, which was the key factor on this subject. However, bis scientific knowledge of the field was not sufficiently great toery close association with the details. Heno experience with the radiochemical aspects of this problem.

He can read English rather easily and Ihe can understandood bit of spoken English, but has difficulty Inhis thoughts and speaking them in

GUBKIN, KonstanUnOubkin's primary field of Interest wasand he seemed quite familiar withoviet acoustic detection program. It is quite likely that he is responsible at least for the theoretical and analytical aspects of this, but-he showed less familiarity with theand Instrumentation aspects. On several occasions, he discussed simplified hydrody-namlc calculations which might indicate some possible connection with the weapons effects or perhaps even weapons developmentHe is apparently Involved Inresearch of some sort because of several rather transparent attempts on the part of him and his associates to avoid discussing the organization for which he works.

Gubtanoung, enthusiastic and very competent scientist On occasion, henaive and allowed his enthusiasm to lead him to make comments which were not necessarily too sound. He Is extremelyshowed willingness lo talk to Westernand at social occasions his drinking increased his natural gay, good naturcdHe speaks broken English and seemed interested in trying to expand his knowledge.

On the other hand, It was somewhat difficult for him to understand unless one confined the conversation to very simple phrases.

KIRDIN, GennadyKlrdln participated only in discussions on the diffusion ofdebris In the atmosphere. Privately, he stated that he had never applied thesecalculations to atmospheric conditions prior to the meeting. His connection with the long-range detection program is not clear, but possibly he is associated with the debris phases of the program at the Institute ofGeophysics. His one presentation did not show any particular evidence ofcompetence.

LEXPUNSKI, Ovsel IllchLeipunskiprimarily in the discussion on high altitude and electromagnetic methods. His approach seemed to bo primarily theoretical and gave no Indication that he was directly connected with the Soviet long-rangeprogram. He did show some knowledge of weapons development, but not sufficiently to give any indication of whether he was presently connected with this program. His presentations were reasonably competent but did not demonstrate any outstandingability. He made one presentation on debris from thermonuclear explosions which had little, it any, scientific value and seemed aimed primarily at the propaganda aspects of dangers from nuclear weapons. His paperehash of his published article on clean bombs.

Initially, he seemed to be somewhatand impressed with himself, buteriod of time became more relaxed. Heery determined Individual who kept his mind rather narrowly on his objectives.

PASECHNTK. Ivan PetrovichPasechnik appeared to be the Soviet scientist in charge of the seismic detection program. Histo the problem seemed routine and straightforward and he did not evidence much Imagination. He Is probably directly responsible for all experimental programs in the seismic field. He showed some knowledge of the acoustic program and may have some responsibility in this work as well, particularly

CO.

as field instrumentation is concerned. It is possible that the Soviet acoustichas been parasitic on their seismic pro-grain. Mention was made of collocation of acoustic and seismic stations and Pasechnik mentioned putting the simplified sylphondevice at seismic stations. It is possible that Pasechnik is responsible for theof these.

He appeared toairly competentbut definitely not In the top echelon scientifically. He seemed very positive In his attitudes and belligerent toward any possible criticism. His statements were frequently made for the purpose ofiew rather than achieving the best scientific answer. Heittle English but seemed to have to rely primarily on translation.

RIZNICHENKO, Yuriy VTadimirovichBiznlchenko is one of the better SovietHe arrived only at the latest stages of the meeting after the discussions on seismic detection hadumber of difficultproblems for the Soviets. He indicated that he was experienced In seismology of earthquakes, but had no practical experience in studying the seismic records fromHe approached the problem ofbetween earthquakes and explosions on an idealized basis and did not seemof the very difficult practical problems In this field. It was unlikely that he Iswith the Soviet long-range detection program, but he was probably being called in as an adviser at the last moment- Hethe erroneous theory that explosions do not produce shear waves. When he was shown the experimental Rainier data, he readily acknowledged his error.

SADOVSKI, Mikhail AleksandrovichSadovski appeared to be the senior member of the group responsible for Soviet programs in the field of detection of explosions. It seems probable that his responsibility covers at least the geophysical aspects of the Soviet long-range detection program, that is, at least the acoustic and seismic methods and probably the electromagnetic method as well. He did not participate in any of the discussions on the subject of radioactive debris and it seems possible that this part of the Soviet program is administered separately from the strictly geophysical aspects. It seemed probable that supervision of the LRD program Is his full-time duty although possibly heenior adviser, thoroughly familiar with all aspects. On one occasion, he indicated that hislay in analyzing results and planning programs and that he allowed youngerto actually conduct the experimental work.

Initially, Sadovski gave the impression of being gruff buteriod of time hevery friendly and associated quite freely with his opposite members on the Western Delegation. Western scientists found him easy to discuss scientific matters with andin his approach. He did not follow party lines in these discussions, but appeared to seek the best scientific solution. Hisstature was sufficiently high to permit him to take independent positions and on one occasion to the amusement of the conferees he contradicted Academician Semenovand stated that the Western delegates were correct and Semenov wrong. He gave the Impression ofeasonablyscientist, but not brilliant. Heittle English but relies almost completely on translation.

SEMENOV, Nlkolay NlkolayevlchSemenov was the Eastern scientist at thewith probably the greatest interna-ationai reputation being an Academician and Nobel Prize winner. This scientific stature was not demonstrated by Semenov's activities at the conference. He appeared very narrow-minded and on many occasions missed the point of the discussions. These examples of obtuseness were probably not In many cases calculated in order toovietbut wereack of comprehension, perhaps brought on by personal prejudice on his part. His approaches were frequently naive and his points were often presseddespite the lack of scientificHeost peculiar insistence on superiority of (even nonsensical) theory to experimental data. On at least one occasion, heiven calculation to the point

where the Western Delegation had to show up the falsity of his calculation. Despite these unsound viewpoints, he never was willing to admit any errors.

There was no evidence in his activities that he was directly involved in the detectionor the weapons development program. However, thereossibility that he is an adviser in the latter or may have been involved sometime ln the past It is also possible that he may have been involved in theaspect of the detection program but this subject was studiously avoided in any Soviet presentations.

Semenov gave the Impression ofery vain Individual, proud of his establishedscientific reputation. He gave little or no evidencerue scientificand seemed completely engrossed in party'line scientific thinking. He was cold and only showed any signs of warmth when his vanity was being catered to. Semenov took pride that Sadovski, Gubkin, and Brekh-ovskikh were his students.

TAMM, IgorTamm was probably the best true scientist in the Eastern Delegation.his field of theoretical physics was not particularly pertinent to the discussions of the conference.onsequence, he participated almost not at all in the discussions of theHe was probablyajor factor in the Soviet delegation. His closest association seemed to be with Ovsel Illch Lelpunski and he showed his greatest Interest during theon methods of detecting tests at high altitudes. At the formal conferences he was practically ignored by Fedorov.

Tamm has an extremely warm and friendly personality. He is very outgoing andabout everything in which heandremendous fund of energy. He showed no hesitation in associating with members of the Western Delegation andrather liked to talk English with them. He is very uninhibited and relaxed withHeonsiderable fondness for pretty girls. Heremendousfor mountain climbing and is stillactive despite his age.

USTYUMENKO,was primarily involved in the electromagnetic methods and is probably responsible for this phase of the Soviet long-range detectionHe seemed to have fairly general knowledge of all types of instrumentation which might be used in the long-rangeprogram and took over in the absence of Sadovski the detailed discussions on thefor the instrumentation. He was very active in defending the electromagneticagainst Western criticism, but did not demonstrate outstanding scientific ability in this respect. In fact, heendency to overlook facts In order to support hisOn one occasion in the formalhe deliberately mis-stated theposition even thoughrivatethe matter had been previously explained to him. He gave rather convincing evidence that the Soviet electromagnetic program has been pushed very bard, even including some type of automatic discriminator. This Is the one example where they may be morein techniques of detection than we are and Ustyumenko displayed confidence in this.

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SCIENTISTS

Czechoslovakia was represented by threeCesmir Simane, Frantisek Behounek, and Alois Zatopek. Of all the satelliteSimane seemed to be the closest to the Soviets and was allowed to makeon subjects which involved seriousinterests. However, his presentations did not demonstrate any outstanding scientific ability. Throughout the conference, he gave the impression that he was trying to ingratiate himself with the Soviets.

Simane does not appear to be anscientist and probably holds his senior position in the Czech Atomic Energy Programesult of Soviet support. He seems very impressed with his own abilities and pleased with himself every time he makes aHeervous habit of giggling or laughing after almost every sentence which reinforces this impression.

Behounek took almost no active role at all. He was called on to give one stereotyped talk

42

on radioactive fall-out which did notto the conference work at all and was aimed for its propaganda value. He gave no indication of any scientific competence.

Zatopek seemed toeasonably sound, conventional seismologist. He showed nowith the long-range detectionbut did make presentations relative to general problems Involved in conventional seismology or earthquakes Heriendly individual with no apparent politicalHe was very unhappy at his not being allowed to come to. and not being allowed to travel outside of the Ironelieve he would like to cultivate hiswith Western scientists.

POLISH SCIENTISTS Neither Marian Mensowitch nor Leopold Iurkewitch, the two Polish delegates, gave any evidence of being directly connected with or knowledgeable of the long-range detection program. Mensowitch is believed toery competent physicist and appeared bored by having to participate In the interminablesessions. The presentations which both Mensowitch and Iurkewitch made were purely the formal type, probably prepared by the Soviets and did not contribute to theof the conference. Both Poles seemed very eager to be friendly with Western scientists and would like to avoid giving the appearance of close association with the Soviet unit. It is believed that they were responsible foron at least one occasion. Informationestern Journalist

RUMANIAN SCIENTIST

Horla Hulubei did not participate in any of the scientific discussions at the meeting and apparently had no knowledge of the rjfc^cts of the conference. His presentations were obviously prepared by the Soviets and did not contribute to the work of the conference. Heery friendly individual and associated at several occasions, particularly with the French delegates, probably because of his long past associations in France. Heto be somewhatonely individual and was not seen with the other Easternoutside the meetings.

CONTIDENTIAI

Original document.

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