NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
INDIA
APPROVED FDR RELEASE DATE:7
(bll 31
VI COMMUNISM
Section I General
Section 2 History of the Communiit Party of India
Section
Sectionin National Political Life
Sectionof Labor and Agrarian Movement!
Sectionand Exploitation of Miscellaneous Groups
SectionOrganiution, Illegal Activity, and Government
Infiluabon
Section
Sectionon Principal Sources
CENTRAL iNTELilGENCE AGENCY
Statr-MahckSS, SUPPLEMENT CoSkdentlu
table of contents for supplement vi
Page
Section 1.
Section 2. History of the Communist Party of India
Page
Communist
united2 -2
4
2 -4
2 -5
7
Section 3. Organization
Page
Principles of
Central
a Party
high
district, and local
. . 6
Principles governing Party
and geographic
and
C Publishing
1.
1
TUL
9
SUPPLE Al ENT VI
Seclion 5. Penetration ot Labor und Agrurlun Movements
Page
A. Activity and
Penetration of industrial labor .
2
2
All-India Trade
- 2
and . 3
d
'
and Infiltration of local . g
afTectlng Communist S- 8
of Communist.
Postal and
Banking and 0
0
0
West Bcngal-BlhSr industrial
Iron13
<c>
(d) Other
Kerala
<9>
C. Penetration of peasants and agricultural]6
Kisan Sabha .
-10
-17
strengths and
Section 6. Infiltration and Exploitation of Miscellaneous Croup*
Page
_ j
Peace and Afro-Asian6
Students and- 8
International friendship
Miscellaneous-13
_ 14
MVTXAL
Section 7. Covert Organisation. Illegal Activity, and Government Inftltration
Page
A. Sigiuncance and* 1
overt
3
*
a. Ministry of Defense and the armed- 4
Other ministries and attached
and local
Police
Education8
state and local
ol foreign-10
1irs El
Page
IS)
i iv
9
SUPPLEMENT VI
4
4-1
4-2
4-3
4-4
4-5
4-6
4-7
5-1
5-2
5-3
6-1
6-2
6-3
ot pamphlets Issued by the People'sHouse
CPI printing presses
Translations of Russian-language literary works
Communist and other foreign films certified by
the Indian Censorship Board Percentage of votes polled by major parties in
7 Indian state assembly elections Indian state and national election results by
parties
Voting strength of Socialist and Communist parties in general elections
CPI vote in Indian state and national elections CPI strength in Indian state and territorial assemblies
Districts in which the CPIr more of the vote in7 state assembly elections
CPI voting strength in7 elec- follows lions
Organization of the All-Indian Trade Union Congress
AITUC leaders
Membership of major trade union federations Leading Communist-front groups CommunisUirifiltrated groups and minor fronts Officers of the All-India Peace Council
3
0
7
This Supplement was prepared for the NIS by the Bureau of InteUigence and Research,of State.
Pagk v
-9
GLOSSARY
Association of Democratic Lawyers . ommunist front
aibbaBank Employees' Association Communist-dominated
AIBEFBank Employees'
Defense Civilian Employees'. Communttt-domlnated
AIFEA ederation of Education Associations .. Communist-Infiltrated
Insurance Employees'
Klsan Sabha (Peasants'Iron:
Klsanbody ol AIKS
Peace Council front
ATFWA Progressive Writers' Association Communist front
nationwide network
AJRF . Railwarmcn's Federation s; non-Communist
Students' Communist front; affiliate of IUS
Iron and Steel Workers'controlled
Trade UnionCommunist-Iront labor federation
Women's Conference . Pro-Cvngrras Party
A TLATextile LaborINTUC affiliate
CCP man lit Party of China
CEC ExecutiveCPI enecuUvc body
intelligence BureauNationwide security organisation controlled by
. Home Ministry
InvestigationState-level nrganUallon concerned wlllt crime
and
Klsan CouncilExecutive body of AIKS
Maxdoor Congress affiliate
CPGBParty of Ureal Britain
CPIParty of India
Party of Nepal
CPP Party ol Pakistan
CPSUParly of the Soviet Union
Provinces Trade Union Congress . ITUC slate unit In former Central Provinces
SocialistFormer Socialist wing of the Congress Parly
Federation Separatist party In Madras State
DPFProgressive Separatist party In Madras State
ol Indianfront
of India
People's Oiganltalton (AroAapafaral/anafa Unlled opposition from In Gujarat region of
Stale
HAEA .
azdoorndian Laborfederation controlled by Uio PSP and So-
cialist Party
Association for Afio-Aslanfront
Association of Democratic Lawyers International Communist Iront
Friendship Association front
Confederation of Pre* Trade Unions Xon-Communist International labor group
Monetary Fund
National Congress . name tar the Congress Party
National Trade Unioncontrolled by the Congress Party
Culturalfront
IPSPolice Service J. Home Ministry
People's Theater Communist front
Cultural Society CommunUl front
Union of Students International Communist front
Maadoor Unionaffiliate
Alma Ratiha Samttt (Women's Self Defense ontrowed orr.ar.ua'.ion In West
Glrnl Kamgar Union (Bombay Mill Workers' Communist-Infiltrated
Union)
of state legislative assemblies
or Parliament
Atlantic Treaty Organization
FederaUon of Indianfront
FederaUon of Posts and Telegraph Em-
vl
9
UPPLEMENT VI
GLOSSARY (Continued)
PRPSU HPH
no
P8P TTI RLLU KATO SKLU
TCTUC UCRC
UDP
ULEC
UMC
UNCOK
UP
UTCC
VOKS
WFDY
w; sw
WPTU
WHO
WIDF
WPC
THL
Union of StudentsDemocratic Front
Patiala and East Punjab states Union
Peoples Publishing Rouse iPrtvate).Ltd.
People's Publishing House of Bihar
Praja Socialist Party
Peals. Telegraphs, and Telephonea International
Red International ol Labor Unions
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
Southern Railway Labor Union
Self-Respect Samadhanna Party
Travancore-Cochln Trade Union Council
fulled Central Refugee Council
United Democratic- Front
Uniled Latitat Election Committee
United Maharashtra Committee
rathlra Samttil United Nations Commission on Korea
United Provinces
United Trade Union Congress
ah -Union Society for Cultural RclaUons withCountries
World Federation of Democratic Youth
World Federation of Scientific Workers
World Federation of Trade Union*
World Health Organisation
Women's International Democratic Federation
World Peace Council
Young Workers- League
Both Communist-controlled and norganization* use this name
Communist-front party In Andhra Pradesh and Bombay states
Common trol led Bihar Stale branch of PPH Nationwide democratic Socialist party Non-Communist International labor group Former Communist International labor group
Became UtUr Pradesh In IMO Labor federation controlled by theSocialist Party Former ostensibly nongovernmental Soviet or-
International Communist front International Communist front International Communist labor front
International Communist front International Communist front Former Communist front
vll
1. General
Commnist Party of IndiaikeParties In other areas, functionsual environment: it operatesomestic political organization andart and subservientof the international Communist movement India, which was for centuries an object of Czarist ambitions, has remained an important target area for the Soviet Union. During the early years of the Bolshevik regime, India was viewed as an avenue of attack on the Unitedthe main enemy ofndusceptible market for the export ot aIdeology owing to India's colonial status and poverty. In thes the Soviet Union and the Comintern, operatingmall Indian emigre colony abroadew radicalwithin India, launched the Indianmovement. This movement was formalizedy the establishment of the CPI through the assistance of three British citizens who were agents of the Comintern. In launching the Communist Party in India these agentson the penchant for terrorism in some areas of India (particularly Bengal andhi' appeal of socialism as an ideology, the malaise of educated Indian youth, cultural-linguistic frictions, the lack of effective trade union and peasant organizations, and dissatisfaction among some Indian Intellectuals with the pace of Gandhi's independence struggle.
In recent years Soviet interest In India has been motivatedhort-term desire to reinforce Nehru's neutralismong-range ambition to capture and employ for its own purposes India's economic and manpower potential and itswithin the Afro-Asian region. Slno-Sovlct bloc efforts to further Communist policyIn India and to backstop the CPI have taken several forms. Klrst.. extendsaid and advice to the Indian Communists through the Soviet Embassy In New Delhi and through other chunnels. Secondly, it follows policies designed to gain popularity in India lor Uie bloc and thereby for the CPI. The bloc has supported India In its disputes with Pakistan, and the Soviet Union has played up to Indianfor great power status by urging In-
Notc iscussion of Communist ocUviUes in Nepal, seeubversion.
dia's inclusion in big power meetings. The Soviet Union has supported the basic orientation offoreign policy, and in thetthe CPI to temper its criticism of Nehru and to support him against "reactionary"forces. The Communist bloc has exploitedsensitivities by displaying an interest Inliterature and art. Praise of India's cultural heritage hasrominent theme inby the numerous bloc leaders who have toured India. In addition, concerted attempts have been made to tie India more closely to the bloc economically and culturally by increasing the bloc's share of India's foreign trade, sponsoring the exchange of several hundred official anddelegations, and stepping up thepropaganda offensive toward India. Finally, the Soviet Union in particular has gained some goodwill in India by the grant of substantialaid for Impact projects scheduled undersecond five-year plan.
These actions have contributed to the creation in Indiaavorable Image of the Sino-Soviet bloc and have redounded to the benefit of the CPI. However, the favorable Impact of those actions on the Parly has been in part offset by theaspects of Its lies to internationalThe Party's slavish adherence to theline on issues such as Sovietin Hungary, pressure on Yugoslavia, and Chinese Communist military action in Tibet have created discontent within the Party and have reduced the effectiveness of Its domestic propaganda stressing its independence fromcontrol.
The CPI has invariably followed Moscow's guidance, although policy shifts resulting from external direction have frequently been preceded by intense Inner-Party debate. In response to foreign guidance, it embarked5olicy of infiltrating the Congress Party;he Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, it switched from militant opposition to the warto active supportpeople's war" against fascism;8t attempted to spark an insurrection In India in response to advice from the Comlnform. and1 it was advised to abandon this strategy. More recently,isit by the CPI general secretary to Moscowt resolved to place increased stress on its
1-1
covert organizational structure and to step up Its attempts to Infiltrate the Indian military forces and police.
Until the8 International guidance was usually conveyed to the Party through British Communists; during recent years thr Soviethave assumed direct control over the CPI. Although some Indian Communists areby the example of Communist China, there is no evidence that Peipingirect part In the formulation of CPI policies.
The political environment within which the Pnrty functions In India includes many small semi-national or regional parties as well as four large parties designated as "national parties" by the Indian Election Commissionhe CPI. the Praja (Tenants')Party, and the Jan Sangh (People'sll four suffer from ideological and personalin their leadership corps and from lethargy and Indiscipline in their ranks,common to the Indian political scene.
The Congress Party, which stands for apattern ofas founded nearlyears ago and was the main instrument of Indian nationalism before the achievementt commands an overwhelmingin both houses of Parliament and controlsut oftates. The Indian-held region of Jammu-Kashmir is ruled by the Nationala party which is In complete rapport with the Congress Party.only stateunder oppositioncontrolled by theomposed of conflicting economic and social elements held together by thepersonality of India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress Party has been unable to resolve its inner contradictions and to meet popular aspirationsumber of major Issues. Moreover, loss of Its preindependence real and the preoccupation of its leaders with running the government have lederious deterioration in the efficiency of the party machine at all levels.
The Praja Socialist Partyhe largest democratic Socialist party in India, was formed2 by the merger of two organizations.it hasedicated youthfulthis party has an uninspiring national leadership and has been unable tolternative to the Congress program.
* The Indian National Congress (INC) Is the official name but It is referred to throughout thisaa the Congrcaa Party.The Communist regime in Kerala Slate wasfrom omce by the Government of India onBM New flections are scheduled for
early IHIO.
Factionalism within the PSP centers primarily around personal rivalries and, ideologically, the advisability on the one hand of supporting the Congress government or on the other of entering into tactical cooperation with the Communists. The third of the non-Communist national parties, the communahst Jonightist Hindu party, is effective only in northern India.
With an estimated membership in9, the CPI is the largest opposition party in India. It is the only party, besides theCongress Party, which Is active in every state, and it constitutes the Congress* mostadversary. Although the CPI Itself Is not now capable of unseating the Congress Party at the national level through elections, its potential political threat probably lies in gaining power through the formationnited front and then, in the usual Communist manner, squeezing out its allies. This technique Is particularly well adapted to India where one party holds annational majority, the opposition is fragmented, and the system of parliamentary democracy is not yet firmly established. The CPI functions as an overt, legal organization, and,its activities are kept under surveillance by Indian intelligence agencies, it is notin Its legal activities.
The Party's current strength Is most readily apparent in the parliamentary arena. It polled0% of the total) in7 elections for the Lok Sablia (House of the People, the lower house ofhe equivalent at that time ofotes for every Party member. It emerged from the elections as the major opposition party in the Lok Sablia and in tho West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh state assemblies; more importantly, it won control over the south Indian state of Kerala through alliance with five fellow-travellingand thereby gained on opportunity to test the validity of Its present tactical line and to probe the Indian constitution for points ofThe Communist Party was the onlyopposition party7 to show significant growth overlections.
The CPI is not at presentosition tothe national supremacy of the Congress Party, whichflected seats in the Lok Sabha and polled more0 votesowever. Itotentlol for further growth at the state level. Four states are particularly vulnerable to long-termpressures. Even if tho CommunistIn Kerala Slate falls or retires from office, that state Is likely to remain unstable owing to Its endemic economic and social problems and to
deep-seated animosities among nun-Communist political groups. Communist infiltration ol the state's administrative and police services during the period of Communist rule would probably add to the problemson-Communist successor government. In West Bengal theCongress Party is beset by food shortages,prices, unemployment, and unrehabililated refugees from East Pakistan. These problems have no ready solutions andertile field for disruptive Communist propaganda,in Calcutta, where the Communists have considerable support. The Andhra Pradesh unit of the Congress Party is split,esultant decline In the effectiveness of the stateand the Communists have strongIn the Telengana region of this state, siteajor Communist-inspired insurrection. The Congress Party has been weakened In Bombay State by the Indian Government'sto divide the state between its two major linguistic groups.
During itsears of national existence, the Communist Party has followed successivelyof militant trade unionism, formationopular front with the Congress Party,with the British during World War II. and in the immediate postwar period support for and then opposition to the government headed by Nehru. Its militant strategy of attempting to seize power by force through tactics of guerrilla warfare and paramilitary activities, introducedin strong repressive measures by theand In the loss of about two-thirds of the Party's membership. This lesson has not been lost on the CPI leaders, the majority of whom oppose the use ofarty policy under present conditions. The basic framework for the present CPI tactical line was set1 when the Party abandoned the use of forceactical approach and began to emphasize electoral-democratic methods over traditionaltechniques. The Party set as its Immediate objective the formationommunlst-lcd"people's democratic government composed of all "progressive" elements in the Indian body politic, including those within the Congress Party. This goal, an intermediate step In tho roadthe establishmentictatorship of the proletariat, Is to be achieved through broadening the Party's base, increasing its strength in elected bodies at all levels, and establishing formal united fronts or informal working arrangements with other parties and groups.
oncomitant to its current moderateposture, the Party has attempted during re-recent years to establish its bona fides as aindigenous political body. In8 it completely revised its constitution to include the statement that the Party "strives to achieve full democracy and socialism by peacefultemocratic-appearing organizational structure which stressed the "democratic" side of democratic centralism, still the Party'sorganizational philosophy. It encouraged Party members freely to express their views within CPI councils, and ostensibly discarded the system of fractions through which Communist parlies have traditionally infiltratedgroups. In addition, while reiterating that the CPI is "guided by the philosophy and theprinciples of Marxism Leninism" and "draws on the rich experience of the international working classhe new constitution stressed that the Party "formulates lis policies and determines Its line of action in accordance with the interests and needs of the people and Is responsible to them for itsinally, the Party supports Prime Minister Nehru's basic foreign policies, and in order to remain in step with Indian sentiment it has approved thenot the means to achievehis domestic plans for national reconstruction. However, these superficial changes in terminology and tactics, designed to enhance the Party'sappeal, represent no basic change In the Party's foreign orientation or strategy. Itthe system of fractions, and Its goalomplete revamping of tho Indian economic and social structure by any means which arefeasible
The Communist Party's present potential for extensive sabotage or paramilitary activity isIts covert organizational apparatus hassince1 tactical shift, andin India arc more stable than in the period following independence when the CPI succeeded In forming parallel governments In some regions of central and northeastern India. Communist Infiltration of key sectors of the government Ls potentially more serious. Though infiltration is limited on the national level, it is significant In some states. In Kerala Communists have used their positions as the ruling parly to infiltrate the state administration, police force, andprofession.
Ihe CPI has several Internal assets whichprogress toward its goal. Foremost among these are its capable leadership. Its large trade union front, and its extensive propaganda media. The top CPI leadership, drawn almost entirely from the Indian intellectual class, is notable for its ability, dedication, and flexibility Inthe Party's frequent tacticaligh percentage of the most important leaders have been associated with the Communist movement
foroears, most attended college, andwere educated abroad. Someleaders received their start Inin the Congress Party'sand served prison terms, as did theCongress leaders, for their anti-British
The CPI, which had its genesis in militant trade unionism, controls one of the largest laborin India, and this federation is growing more rapidly than those dominated by the Congress Party and Socialists. Of special significance are Communist inroads among labor in strategicof the Indian economy, particularly in the defense industries centered around Bangalore In Mysore Slate and the iron and steel complex in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.
The CPI publishes In English and the major vernaculars ofaily newspapers andeeklies as welliweekly or monthlyJournals. Theseombinedof more, are on the whole ably edited, and reinforce the Party's activities among the literate segment of the Indian population. These publications reflect the internationalline in denouncing the "war-mongerlng" policies of the United States and in playing up the "peaceful" policies of the Sino-Soviet bloc. In addition they stress certain lines tailored to the Indian reader: Afro-Asian solidarity, Western colonialism, discrimination against non-whites In the United States, Western "refusal" to agreeimitation of nuclear weajxins. and theeconomic strides in the "fellow-Asian" Soviet Union and Communist China. Domestically the Communists' propaganda output is designed tokey target groups: it denounces the "anti-people" policies of the present government, and it promises. If the Communistsommunist-dominated united front are voted into power, land for the landless, increased wages for labor, Jobs for the educated unemployed, additional benefits for students,ational cultural renascence Sizable front groups reinforce the Party's peace, Afro-Asian, and cultural propaganda themes, but front organizations among students, theand women arc weak in most regions of India.
The Communist Party, which is essentially an Intellectual-middle class organizationabor base, has been unable appreciably to exploit the Indian caste system or Hindu-Muslim communal tensions but has capitalized on otherIn Indian society. The Indian Intellectual class, educated in the teachings of Britishis Inherently leftist and views socialismanacea for the economic ills of annation. Congress Party support forhas to some extent undercut Communist propaganda, but at the same time presentpolicies have reduced the appeal of theSocialist movement. Intellectualswith the pace ot development have tended to gravitate toward the CPI as an alternative to the present ruling party. Communist strength among the urban middle class results basically from the insecurity of tills small percentage of the total population, composed chiefly of white-collar workers who are caught between relatively fixed incomes and rapidly rising prices. Communists have also exploited the social dislocation caused by industrialization. For workers who have left their villages and traditional value systems to settle in expanding Industrial areas. Communist propaganda offers notedress of grievancesay of life. In addition, Communist labor organizers have succeededreater extent than those representing other federations in identifying themselves with the interests of labor Communists also exploit the leftist inclinations of Indian students (many of whom facefollowinghe pressure of population on land, and, particularly in bilingual Bombay Slate, regional particularism. Finally. Communists capitalize on the political naivete of those educated Indians who believe that Indian Communists differ from those in the Soviet Union and that Hinduism and the force ol Indianwill deter the spread of an alien ideology.
The Party's most serious shortcoming is Its failure to breuk the Congress Party's hold over the peasantsountryf theis classified rural. The Indian peasantry remains primarily under the Influence of localheadmen and conservative landowners who lean toward the Congress Party. The CPI'ssupport In rural areas restricts its electoral prospects. Since7 general elections, the CPI has stepped up its efforts to attract peasants with small holdings, though it has done little as yet among landless agricultural laborers.
Among inner-Parly vulnerabilities, factionalism Is the most serious. Since its early years, the CPI has been spilt into three Ideologicalcentrists, and leftists. These factions now appear agreeductlcal policy of violence is Inadvisable under present Indian conditions. However, they continue to disagree on the basic feasibility of capturing India by constitutional means and, concomitantly, on the nature and extent of the Party's support for the presentRightists are of the opinion that the CPI should extend major support both to Nehru's foreign and domestic policies In order to strengthen himis reactionary forces within
i|
8
Congress Party and to enhance the Party's prospects tor concluding united front agreements with other opposition groups and, eventually, with the left wing of the Congress Party.maintain tliat the CPI should preserve its ideological purity, its revolutionary character, and its "distinctive" opposition role. Centrists, who now control the Party machine, draw on the views of both extremes. The extent of this schism was indicatedasic CPI policy directive adopted8 which states on the one hand that the united front envisaged by the Party "will not be an anti-Congress front" and on the other that the CPI "must actarty of opposition to the presentespite continuing ideological frictions, as well as personaland inner-Party power struggle, notablefrom the Party have been rare, and the few top leaders who were suspended or expelled for indiscipline have, in most cases beento Party membership. Thus the CPI draws on the aggregate of its leadership corps.
A second serious liability is the unevenof Party strength. More than half the total CPI membership is concentrated in threestates containingf the totalwhile the Party Is notably weak in the Hlndi-speaklng states of north-central India which containf India's population.
Despite the CPI's size and Internal factions, itefinite long term threat to India'sform of government. However, Indianthemselves disagree over when the Party might beosition to capture power. Some have spoken of gaining control over Indiaears, while others have referrederiod ofears or longer. CPI General Secretary AJoy Ghosh Is reported to have commented8 that llie crisis in the Congress Parly was mounting and that the party would be replaced following Nehru's removal from active politics. Hp acknowledged, however, that the CPI was not equal to the assumption of national powernd be had grave doubts, given reasonableestimates of Nehru's physical survival, whether It would be equal to the opportunity when presented Past experience Indicates that ii iv Communists' ability to carry out theirdepends in part on the maintenancealance among the various factions within the Party. However, of perhaps equal importance are other factors beyond the Indian Communists'control. Among the latter are theof the present government's efforts lo raise economic and social levels, the political complex-ton of India after Nehru, and Indian attitudesand relations with Ihe Slno-Sovict bloc,
2. History of the Communist Party of India
history ol the Indian Communistsince thes,andful of Indians first began championing Communist points of view, has been one of shifting tactical approaches, erratic growth, and continuingFollowing Moscow's lead, theParty of India has employed at least five strategies, all of which have involved some form of attack on the Congress Partyo seize the leadership of the prcindepend-ence nationalist movement by militant means,opular front with the Congressor the British Government of India during World War II,nsurrection,f power through primary reliance on the ballot box. The Party made substantial gains during its three periods of moderate strategy, while internal circumstances saved it from the full impact of the two potentially disastrousof militant exclusiveness. Sinceoderate tactical posturehe Party has made notable progress in expanding its popular appeal.
, when the Indian Communists were first organizedegular party basis, they have tended dutifully to conform to the Moscow line. They have sometimes interpreted thiswhich has on occasion beena way unacceptable to Moscow but have always dropped their own interpretation once Moscow's position had been made clear. However, the periodicshifts between support for the extremist and more moderatc^factions within the CPI, as well as the very existence of these groups, have tended to handicap the CPI in adjusting quickly to changes in the international line. Inner-Partywas particularly acute during thehen the CPI, acting on Moscow's advice, attempted to foment insurrection in India after relying on some form of united front activity for moreecade. Factionalism again assumed serious proportionshen Moscow's switchore conciliatory policy toward Prime Minister Nehru raised widespread fears among more radical CPI elements that Communist support for Nehru would cost the Party its revolutionary clan. Although factional differences continue over the characterization of the Indian ruling group, the extent of the Party's tactical reliance onmeans, and the proper tactical line toward the Congress government and the CPI's otherrivals, the Communistcontrast to most major Indian politicalnot actually split over ideological differences anddefections have been rare.
A. Early Communist
The Communist Party of Indiu wasystematic basis in8 and9mall group of radical intellectualsunder the guidance of British Communists sent to India In thes. However, this formalization of the Communist movement inwas preceded byecade of activity by two small groups which were attracted tomore by its theory of violent overthrow of imperialism than by its economic or socialBoth groups were composed of Individuals critical of Gandhi's leadership of the nationalist movement and particularly of his nonviolent methods.
The first of these groups consisted of Indianin Europe, foremost among whom was M. N,engali terrorist who was in close touch with Moscow and the Comintern0oy disagreed with Lenin's thesis that Communists should support bourgeois democratic liberation movements In Asia, but owing to hisabilities he was nonetheless accepted by the Comintern as the external leader of theCommunist movement. With Sovietaid, heeadquarters inwhere theremall group of Indian exiles, and began publishing In English apaper. Vanguard, which was smuggled into India. The second group, composedew radical intellectuals within India, constituted the main target for Roy's activities. Through articles in Vonpriard. personal correspondence, and the despatch of some secrettrained at the Communist University for the Tollers of the East Inattempted to induce these Indians toommunist movement that would seize the Initiative from Gandhi and launch an all-out struggle against British imperialism.
Roy's efforts met with little success. Indianleaders opposed violence on practical as well as moral grounds. Roy's long-distanceto organize radical elements In India into a
I 'inn inp[JTt*i^
SS, SUPPLEMENT VI
were hampered because they were few In number, widely separated, and moat ol theirwith Boy and with each other were known to the British authorities in India. Most of the financial aid and virtually all of the agents sent by Roy were intercepted.
Despite Roy's inability toarty,as an Ideology gained some adherents in India, particularly In scattered urban centers In Bombay. Bengah>and Uttar Pradesh states.4 the Communist threat was consideredImportant to warrant action by British officials. In February of that year one of Roy's agents and the five principal Communist agitators in India were arrested for conspiring to deprive the British King-Emperor of sovereignty overThey were indicted, along with M. N. Roy In absentia, and brought to trial in Cawnpore (this became known as the Cawnpore conspiracyne of the five turned state's evidence,econd was loo sick to stand trial. Theand imprisonment of the remaining three leaders along with Roy's agent brought themovement in Indiairtual standstill.
Owing primarily to the unsatisfactory state of the movement and to Roy's continuing tactical differences with other international Communist leaders. Moscow replaced M. N. Roy as the external mentor of Indian communism In7 by the Communist Party of Great Britainn which Clemens and R. Palme Dutt. sons of an Indian lather and Swedish mother, were active. The CPOB continued to guide the Indianmovement unUl the, when It was replaced by Lhe Communist Party of theUnion (CPSU) as tbe source of direct guidance.
ho CPOB sent lo India threeAllison, Ben Bradley, and Philliphelp their Indianorganize. These agents, exploiting avulnerable labor situation,ilitant leftwing labor movement which attracted sufficient support to call major strikes in theand cotton textile Industries.ase was established among the proletariat, the three agents helped found the first regular Communist Party ofreliminary meeting was held at the endnd inull-fledged organizational meeting was heldonstitution adopted.
In9 the British authorities In India again moved against the Communists. Theyand indicteden for conspiring against British sovereignly and brought them to trial at Meerut (this subsequently became known as the
Mecrut conspiracyifteen members of this group were Communists, oneollow-travcl-ler, and the remainder had participated actively in Communist-led strikes or in the radicaland Peasants' Party, which precededof the CPI. The detention of the top Party leaders disrupted CPI. However, the trial, which lasted for more than three years, probably worked lo the longterm advantage of the Party. It gave the Indian Communists an unequalledlo publicize their views and gained themsince their arrest was regarded byunitive measure againsl organized labor.
Party strategy during theas gen-erally ultrulcftist. Draft Platform of Action-published In the Comintern publication Imprecor in0 called the Congressclass organization of the capitalists working against the fundamental interests of the tolling masses of our country" and recommended that lhe Party foment "revolutionary armedround the banner and under the leadership of the Communist Party ofhis reversal ol the previous policy, which had allowed loosewith leftwing elements in the Indianmovement, was variously interpreted by Indian Communists. The new Party, which was directed from prison during the years of the Mecrut trial, was split between moderates, who argued that the policy applied to the political but not to the labor field, and militants who argued against any form of cooperation withgroups. This split was the genesis of one of the continuing Ideological schisms within the CPI.
B. The united
During the five years immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II. the CPI. whichhad beenuisance element,osition of considerable Importance. Party membership grew from an4 to several thousandnd5 the CPI began publication of its first regular Purty newspaper. Communist. This growth in CPI strength and activities resulted primarily from the successful use of united front tactics, which helped the Party capitalize on the generally favorable reputation It bad gained from its earlier trade union activities and enabled it to cooperate with other groupseriod of rapid expansion of the nationalist movement. However, it alsothe capable leadership of the Party and its effective use of systematic political training and covert organizational tactics.
9
un'Uj.
oscow shiftnited frontformally announced at the SeventhCongress, camearticularly opportune time for the CPI. The last of the Meerutwere releasednd the Party began for the first time to function on an effectivebasis under the leadership of P. C. Joshi. Adoptionoderate tactical line was welcomed in Indian nationalist circles as an Indicationenuine desire by the CPI to cooperate with non-Communist groups.urely political plane, Communist exploitation of the new tactical line was iacilitated both by the Congress Party'sto enlist the support of allleftist orthe independenceand by the vigorous efforts of the newly formed Congress Socialist Partyart of the leftwing of the all-inclusive Congress Party organization, to unite leftwing elements in anto force the Congress leadership toore socialistic program. Further, the outlawing of the CPI in4 by the Britishof India actually aided the Communists by giving the Party an excuse in nationalist Indian eyes for functioningovert organization.
Under the united front strategy, the CPIonce again became infiltration and capture of the Congress Party, which In thes had an estimated membership of. The best entree to the main Congresswas provided by the CSP. In6 the CPISP ofler tonational front" against British imperialism under which major emphasis was to be placed on attracting increased leftist support among laborers and the peasantry. CSP membership was opened toon an individual basis (an open alliance was impossible since the CPI wasach party recognized the existing sphere of activities of the other; and it was agreed that there would be no efforts to .proselytize. The exact number of Communists admitted to the CSP, and thereby to the parent Congress Party, has not beenbut it was probably no moreew hundred. However, byystem of disciplined fractions within* CSP units thewere able to exercise disproportionateand to capture control of some CSP branches.
Friction between the two groups developedatter of months after the CPI-CSP agreement. In6 some Congress Socialists began to complain of Communist efforts to recruit CSP members and capture Socialist-controlledyouth, ond peasant groups. Inhe Socialists discovered secret CPI documentsthat the CSP wasrue Socialist party and outlining tactics for the capture of local party units. In August of that year the CSP National Executive, the party's top governing body, voted to cease admittingthose already in the CSP were notcontact between the two groupsime was largely limited to formal exchanges between CSP General Secretary Jaya Prakash Narayan and P. C. Joshi.
In9 the CPI joined with the CSP and the more radical Forward Bloc,omponent of the Congress Party, in the first serious bid to capture the Congress organization. With theof individual leftists within the Congress, these groups defeated Gandhi's nominee for the Congress presidency and reelectedeader of the Forwurd Bloc. However, it became apparent, when the Gandhians refused to serve under Bose on the Congress executive committee, that the leftists could capture the party machine only at the cost of splitting it. Faced with this prospect, the Communists, who still hoped to influence or possibly capture aindependence movement, backed down, as did the CSP. and Bose resigned from office.
During the summer9 the CPIoderate line toward the Congress PartyCommunists continued to expresswith the dominant rightist element within that party but disavowed any intention ofit. The prevailing attitude was summed up by Harry Pollitt of the Communist Party of Great Britain as follows; "The question of paramount importance in India in our view is the unity of all national forces under the leadership of the Indian Nationalhis truce between theund the Congress right wing, however, was short lived.
The crucial factor affecting the Communists' tactics and their relations with other parties after the Nazi-Soviet pact in August and the outbreak of hostilities in9 was the attitude of these parties toward the war. Congress Parly leaders adopted an equivocal policy which left the door open for further negotiations with the British and Indicated possible support for the war effort if India were guaranteed postwar independence. Initially the Congress Socialists. Communists, and Forward Bloc were mlUtantly opposed tothe war effort. In9 the CSP National Executive suspended the party's provincialand brought provincial units under the direct control of the national headquartersove to prepare for underground activity should CSP opposition to the war evoke governmental repression. This move virtually forced the CPI to break away if it wished to retain control over those
CSP units It had captured.esult ofobstructionism in carrying out this CSP directive, the already strained relations between the CPI and CSP deteriorated rapidly. In0 Communists were formally expelled from the CSP ranks when the Socialist leader, Narayan, switchedore conciliatory stand toward the war effort. CPI members remained within the main Congress organization until their expulsion
During the-sjlghtly more than four years that the CSP and CPI were linked. Communistis estimated to have grownew hundred toajority of whom were concentrated In southern India where Communists controlled the Andhra, Kerala, and Tamil Nad (Madras) branches of the CSP. At the time of0 CSP-CPI split these units went over almost en masse to the Communist camp, and the democratic Socialist movement in south India has never recovered from this mass defection.
C. Wartime
The Soviet demand that all Communist Parties support the war against fascism following the Nazi attack on. inresented the CPIerious dilemma. This advice was at direct odds not only with the inclinations of the more radical Communist elements but also with nationalist Indian sentiment, which wasinsistent on guarantees ofrecondition to supporting the war effort. Nevertheless, after several months of internal confusion the CPI reversed its policy, and in the springt extended full support to the British war effort and attacked the Congress Party for its obstructionist attitude. This time militant sentiment in south India handicapped the Communists. The south Indian branches of the CPI were the last to fall in line, trailing all others by several months.
The British Government of India welcomed the Communists' offers to help mobilize students and labor and to recruit volunteers for the army. The ban on Communist organizations was lifted Inhose CPI leaders who had beenin0 for militant opposition to India's participation in the war were released; and P. C. Joshi, then underground, emerged once again to assume open leadership of the Party.
On Augusthe Working Committee of the Congress Party adopted the so-called "quitresolution demanding an immediate end to British rule over India and threatening toassive nonviolent resistance movement.esult of this move the Congress Party wasby the government, and most top partywere arrested. Since most CSP and Forward Bloc leaders were already In police custody or underground, the CPI was left with an open field for Its organizational activities. At first progress by the Communists was slow, but5 the Party had extended in breadth as well as in depth. During thehe Communiststhe leading Congress Party labor andAll-India Trade Unionand the Ail-India Klsan Sabha (Peasants'Party membership rose fromn the spring2 to0 at the beginning
D. Postwar
The position of the Communists was challenged shortly after the end of World War II whenot the Congress and of other political parties were released from prison. In5 the Congress Party Working Committee expelled those Communists who remained within the party for violating party policy during the war years, and the uneasy collaboration between the two groups, lastingecade, was ended.rovincial elections, the first elections in which the CPI participated openly, demonstrated that the CPI hadignificant factor In Indian politics but was in no position to compete in overt political activity with the two major parties, the Congress and Muslim League. In these elections the Communist Party woneats inassemblies, whereas it had hoped tond polledf the total vote.
The extent of popular disapproval oi thewartime collaboration with the British was indicated by attacks in the immediateperiod on CPI offices in Bombay andand on Party workers selling Communist publications on the streets of the majorcenters. International guidance was vague and imprecise during this period, owingto the Soviet Union's preoccupation with pressing problems. CPI leaders. left largely on their own. differed over their Interpretation of the "correct" tactical line. However, In general, the Partyilitant policy during the first yearalf after the war in an attempt to regain its reputationilitant, anti-imperialist force.
The party's attempt to rehabilitate Itself in the Indian political environment took two basic forms. First, itoncerted propagandato convince the people that the Party was the true heir of revolutionary tradition.pamphlets and periodicals claimed credit
2-4
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Stats-9
Onnfii ii |
most prc-World War II revolutionary activity in India and asserted that many of the terrorists active In Bengal and Punjab duringsere close associates of the CPI. Secondly, it organized strikes and peasant demonstrationseans of sparking an all-out struggle that would force the British to withdraw. Thisnationalist-sounding line did much tothe CPI and to strengthen inner-Party morale. Communist relations with radical groups, such as the Forward Bloc and the Marxist hut anti-Moscow Revolutionary Socialist Party, which had been badly fractured during the war. improvedParticularly useful in improving thestanding with radical elements and even with some nonradical rationalists were actions such as the Party's strong press support lor the Royal Indian Navy mutiny* As an index to the success o( these efforts, Party membership grew from an0 in6 to0 at the beginning
* Trie CPI now claims lo haveajor role in the mutiny, but thisfrom the Parly's news campaign supporting theon the faet that Aruna Asaf All and some ol her followers In the left Socialist movement who were acUve In leading the mutiny suosequenUy Joined thehe Communist Party In the United Kingdom was known as the Communist Party of Great Britain CPGB from the Ume ofounding0hen the Comintern was dissolved and the Party sough; to takeational, rather than international, character. Prom IMS9 It was known as the British Communist Partyn the spring of 1MB, It reverled lo lis original name. For the sake of simplicity,eferred lo as the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) throughout this Supplement.
Inhen it became clear thatwas imminent and that Jawaharlal Nehru would head the new government, theshiftedoderate line openly aimed at winning Nehru over to the Communist camp. Both Moscow and the CPGB" set forth the new line which was formally enunciatedPICommittee resolution which: stressed the need for "bringing new strength to the popularfor the realization of completedcclured that the Communists would "fully cooperate with the nationalnd urged the national leadership to "join the world democratic camp led by the Soviethen it became apparent, shortly after theof Indian independence Inhat Nehru would not join the Soviet bloc, the CPI Central Committee terminated its short-lived moderate tactical line and. following the policy announced at the first Cominform conference in
Warsaw inenounced theParty regimeovernment ofbourgeoisie collaborating withImperialism."
E, Insurrectionary
In8 the official Communist estimate of conditions In India was that the country was ripe for armed insurrection. The politicaladopted at the second Party Congress in March denounced Nehru's policy of neutralism as "nothing moreover for collaboration with British and American imperialism" and calledne-stage revolution to unseat the ruling group and smash landlordism and capitalism. The mechanism to achieve this goal was to be afront from below, consisting of anamong the working class, the peusantry, and the progressive intelligentsia and Includingof the Congress Party. Muslim League, and Socialist groups who were to be recruited "into their leaders."
P. C.oderate who had led the Partyas replaced as genera) secretary by B. T. Ranadlve, head of the most radical faction within the Purty. Although Joshi was prepared to admit errors of "right reformism" and toan aggressive policy in line with theshift, he opposed the extremist position which advocated full-scale attack on allelements in the Congress government. He subscribed to the view tbat the bourgeoisie was split into "nationalist" and "imperialist" elements, and he maintained that the extremist approach would force Into active opposition many people who might be won over to communism or at least neutralized.umber of Partysupported the Joshi interpretation, this group wasefinite minority, and, when Joshiappealed over the heads of the new Party leadership for intervention by foreign Communist parties, the new leadership ruled that he was guilty of serious Indiscipline, suspended him from the Partynd expelled himHe was readmitted)
The CPI Immediately launched an all-outon the new Congress government and on the draft Indian constitution, modeled on Westernlines. The Congress Purty was charged with abandoning the people and selling out tocapitalism and Western imperialism. The people were urged to oppose the constitution and the alleged Congress-imperialist conspiracy. In an effort to spark the final revolution, the CPI attempted to foment large-scale strikes in the cities, peasant disturbances In rural areas, and
Pur HBZjmAi
2-5
violent uprisings among tribal groups In theborder areas of eastern Assam.
The Congress-controlled state governmentspromptly. Onew weeks after the close of the second Partythe government of West Bengal declared the Communist Party illegal and arrested aof its leaders on the grounds that thewere arming the people in an attempt to capture power. On Aprilhe government of Bombay,earch of Party flies, took seven top Communists into custody and charged three with "activities dangerous to publiche government of Madras, which washarassed by Communist activity in the Te-legu- and Malayalam-speaking regions of that state, tightened its security measures and sent troops to the disturbed areas. Communists were taken into custody also at Cuttack, Orissa; Nagpur and Amraoti In Madhya Pradesh; Jharla and Patan in Bihar; and Simla in Punjab. In addition, the Purty was declared illegal in the states of Travancorc-Cochln and Hyderabad.
In8 the CPI Politburo, meeting for the first time since the second Partyrogram envisaging the immediate seizure of powereneral strike which was to be sparkedational railway strike on Marchhe railroad strikeotal failure owing to repressive measures by the government, the refusal of Socialist-led railway unions toand the lack of unanimity on theoftrike within the CPI itself.
Inhe Politburoholesaleof the CPI provincial committeesthe pretense of "proletarianizing the Party" and eliminating "reformist" elements that had sabotaged the strike call. This was followed by the inaugurationrogram of openCommunists in prison were ordered to go on hunger strikes and to create disturbances Into embarrass the government and enlistsympathy. Those outside prison wereto engage in violence to pave the way for the revolution. Detailed instructions werefor the formation and training of guerrilla bands and shock brigades. Training camps were established In various parts of the country, and the manufacture of arms was begun in smallThe areas of greatest activity were the Telegu-speaking regions of Hyderabad (Telengana) and northern Madras (now united in the state of Andhrand the northeastern states of Assam and West Bengal. Police outposts were attacked, villages were raided, and cultivators were urged to defy the authorities and to refuse rent and revenue payments. Parallelwere formedew rural areas, which effectively replaced the local legal governments in civil administration, and attempts were made to sabotage communications and public utilities.
Although the Communists made important gains among the peasantry in the Telcgu-speak-ing area8he net effects of the Party's strategy of violent revolution were to;trengthen the government's determination lo deal firmly with the Communistopular support behind the government and against the Communists;ggravatewithin the CPI; andeduce Partyand weaken Communist-frontThe militant policy had clearly not been successful. The wave of government arrests of Communist leaders drove the Party underground and broke Party communications almostDuring this period CPI membershipdwindled to0 as compared0 In
The failure of these CPI tactics ledteadily increasing agitation within the Party for the adoptionew political line. Thiswas broughtead9 Moscow directive0 Comin-form publication failed to support the existing CPI policy and recommended that the Party follow the successful "Chinese path" to power byits activities among the peasantry and by attempting to gain support among the urban petty bourgeoisie. The first step in this direction was taken in0 when the Centralwas reconstituted. B. T. Ranadive, who was critical of the policies of Mao Tsc-tung, was removed as general secretary and replaced by C. Rajeshwar Rao, leader of the Andhrawhich favored concentration ontrong proponent of the Chinese tactical line. The revised Party strategy was still based on the assumptionrevolutionaryexisted in India, but it combined partisan warfare in certain rural areas where thewere strong with legal tactics andin the rest of the country. This tactical approach was particularly popular with the An-dhra-Telengona section of the CPI. which had substantially increased its strength ineriod and was in virtual controlumber of areas in the Telegu-speaking region. However, it was opposed by other Indian Communists, notably S. A. Dange and Ajoy Ghosh, who argued that,certain shifts of emphasis, this wasthe same policy of violence and revolution as that advocated by Ranadive and would also end in failure. Opponents of the Andhra group
ceived official recognition in0 when R. Palme*Dull, the British Communist leader, urged the CPI to drop armed struggle and work for the establishment of an antl-lmperlallstfront.
F. Parliamentary
1 most Communists recognized that the effort to seize power by force had failed, and.continued pressure from Moscow, the CPI switched to the moderate policy which hasbeen its basic tactical framework. The Policy Directive adopted1 announced that although the Communist brand of "socialism" was still the Party goal, the CPI was notits establishment "in the present stage ofThe Party renounced violence as an Immediate tactic and set as lis goal replacement through peacelul means of the presentand "antioopular" Congress governmentpeople's democracy" consisting of aof all "democratic, antifeudal. and antl-lm-perialist forces in thehis formulation represented two basic shifts in the CPI approach to Indian politics. First, it returned to the concept that the "revolution" (the seizure of power) could take place in two stages: the Party would first capture political powereftist coalition government, and later eliminate its allies anda Communist regime. Secondly, the CPI redefined its potentialwho could help achieve the first stage of theinclude four classes: the peasantry, proletariat, "petty bourgeoisie" (white collar workers and smallnd "national bourgeoisie" (the "anti-imperlaUst" section of the capitalist class). On the International levelalledual struggle against the United Kingdom, to which India allegedly remainedand against the United States, "the chief enemy of peace and advocate of an aggressive war."
The Central Committee of the CPInd AJoy Ghosh, whose special talents lie in the fields of parliamentary tactics and inner-Party conciliation, was elected general secretary.
The Communists first tested their new tactical line ineneral elections, India's first national elections since Independence. Byon local grievances and shrewdlytheir efforts in areas where their strength was greatest, the Communists capturedcats in the central Lok Sobha (House of thentwo Independents, elected In Travancore-Cochin where the Party was still illegal, also joined the Communist parliamentary bloc.the CPI won onlyf the total seats, it was the largest single opposition group inIt alsoignificant number of seats in West Bengal and in four statein South India. (For further Information on these and subsequent elections see thisSectionnder Role inhis performance, which was highly creditable considering the Party's toss of popular support duringeriod of violence, confirmed the wisdom ofoderate policy andstrengthened the moderate faction which had assumed control over the Party apparatushort time before.
The history of the CPI18 was one of gradual evolution toward the right,tactical reliance on the ballot box to attain power,oncerted campaign to gainHowever, this period wus alsoby intense inner-Party friction centering on three interrelated Issues:he Communists' attitude toward Nehru and his government:he extent to which the Party should followmethods; andhe determination of India's "main enemy."
1ew P. C. Joshifavored Communist support for some of Prime Minister Nehru's most popular policiesactical move, but the bulk of the CPI supported1 Party line of attacking Nehru as well as the entire Congress-controlled government asHowever, tho magnitude of theParty victory inlections. Nehru's growing international stature, and India's Increasingly active role on international Issuesoftening In the Internationalattitude toward Nehru and hisInoscow directive instructed the CPI to stop criticizing Nehru; this was anto encourage his government to support Communist objectives In the international field.
This directive seriously aggravated the CPl'sdifferences. The moderates, including the rightist Joshi faction, were prepared to support Nehru's policy of neutrality, but leftists within the Party opposedove on both ideological and practical grounds. Some believed it would be apparent that this reversalasic7 had been dictated by Moscow and that the Party's reputation would thereby be damaged. Others, notably the extremistfaction and the Andhra group, which hoped to capture control of the new Andhra State carved out of Madras Slate inthe fear that the new line of conciliating Nehru would be tantamount to abandoning all op-
position to the Congress Party und that the CPI woujd thereby lose its distinctive opposition
This difference was brought before the third Party Congress held in Madura (Madras state) in3 andt thisGhosh and Dangc. with the support of the British Communist leader, Harry Pollitt, took the lead in formulating the Party line. On the Party's attitude toward Nehru, Die politicaladopted at Madura stated that although "certain acts and declarations of theave been helpful tohe "situation does not warrant that all democratic forces should uncritically and unconditionally give general overall support to the governmental policies even In the internationalhis line represented an uneasy compromise between the Ranadivc and Andhra group on the one hand and, on the other, the P. C. Josh! faction which by this time advocated Communist support for Nehruumber of domestic as well as foreign policy Issues. The Madura resolution reiterated1 dictum that the CPI shouldual struggle against the United Kingdom for theof full Indian freedom and against the United States, described as the "major menace on the international front" However, it placed greater emphasis on the latter and as acalled for Increased stress on the"peace" campaign.
Inner-Party dissensioneak during the months following the third Party Congress. Rivalry between the moderates and leftistsin some defections and expulsions andIn the disruption of Internal alliances. The radical Andhra group, in contravention of the Madura thesis that the Party concentrate on the formationdemocratic united front,"formed illegal Communistumber of villages and engaged in terrorism In ports of Telengana. On the other hand, there were unmistakable signs In theof the program favored by Moscow. In one or two areas the hammer and sickle emblem was dropped from the flags of Communist peasant organizations In an attempt to enhance their popular appeal. Communists organized meetings to publicize Nehru's opposition to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, his proposal for seating Communist China in the UN, and his statement that Communist Chinaegal right toThe fellow-travelling newspaper Blitzto praise certain aspects of Nehru's domestic as well as foreign policies.
In4 the Cominform printed an article by R. Palme Dutt which made two main points:ndia had actually achievedandPI efforts should be directed against the United States as tho major menace to world peace. Since one of the major Communistpreviously had been that the Congress Party was subservient to British imperialistand hence must be ousted before India could achieve real freedom, the article appeared to imply that the domestic fight against theParty should be subordinated to theof mobilizing Indian opinion against the United States. The CPI reportedly receiveddetailed comments from R. Palme Dutt which also emphasized the necessity ofthe. campaign in India.
Ineneral Secretary Ajoy Ghosh, following his return from Moscow,that Nehru's foreign policy had shiftedore truly neutral position, as demonstrated by India's opposition lo. military aid agreement with Pakistan, and that the Congress-initiated five year plan, which the CPI haddenounced, was achieving some economic improvement These kind words for some of the Congress government's domestic as well aspolicies by the CPI's official spokesman evoked noticeably less opposition from the radical faction thanowever, it wasclear that, despite the apparent modification of the Madura thesis, the dual line of struggle was for all practical purposes still In effect, and that the CPI would continue Its domesticfight against the Congress.
The5 special elections In Andhra State demonstrated that the CPI had madeprogress towards achieving uniteddespite its inner disputes. The Party rallied all its resources to contest the elections in the hope ofommunist-dominated state government.nd "rightists" united to conduct an intensive, well-financed campaign which netted thef the popular vote. However, the Congress Party, through mobilization of its own out-of-stateand organizational resources andof an olectoral alliance with two minordefeated many Communist candidates and reduced CPI strength In the state legislature fromlthough the Andhra election resultsard blow to the morale and finances of the Andhra branch of the Party, it was Indicative of the changing attitude of the radical faction that It did not take the defeatignal to pusheturntrategy of violence
By the time of the fourth Party Congress, held at PalghAt In the Malabar district of Madras State int was clear that radical elements within the CPI had been largely won over tolegalleastemporary
2-8
they continued to differ with tbe rightists and centrists over the extent ofto be given to the Nehru government and over the degree to which the Party should rely on parliamentary means to achieve power. The political resolution adopted at theompromise among various groups within the Party and indicated two major shifts of emphasis from the line established atarty Congress. First, India's foreign policy was described as vacillating but essentially independent andolicy of peace. Ajoy Ghosh observed before0 Party Congress that thenterpretation was "sectarian" in that it failed to take into account the "direction in which the government's foreign policy was moving" and the opportunities for CPIof the Indian government's opposition toaklstan mutual security agreement. The CPI claimed credit for the "progressive" features of Indian foreign policy and emphasized the need to further this trend by strengthening India'swith the "peace-loving" Communistand by opposing. "imperialist"which were attempting to draw India into the "warecondly, on the domestic front, the CPI formally recognized that "progressivein the Congress government were trying to industrialize and to push economic, social, and cultural reforms, but stated that theof these objectives was seriouslyby concessions made under the influence of "reactionary" elements to foreign "imperialists" and to domestic "feudal" and "monopolyinterests. Accordingly, the CPI set as its goal the formationroad "united front ofworkers, and national bourgeoisie" that would cooperate in attempting to curb theseand would press for accelerated national development. Despite Its support forfeatures of the government's domestic and foreign policies, the CPI stated clearly that it would functionparty of opposition."
This elaboration of the Party line, with itson legal tactics, clearly defined support to the government, and maintenance of the CPI's role as an opposition putty, had the tripleofaking the CPI appear to have abandoned its doctrinaire opposition to all non-Communist groups,roviding the Partyationalistic sounding argument for leading the attack on "anti-people" policies of thegovernment, andimultaneously aiding the Communist effort to woo Prime Ministerand "progressive" elements in the Congress. The political resolution adopted at Palghat made it clear that the CPI "while resolutely fighting for every progress that can be madeould push on to its ultimate goal. It spoke of using the comparativelyand legal tactics of "mass propaganda" as the means forpeople's democratic"that would "complete the tasks ofrevolution" and "put the country on the path to socialism "
Although the resolution Incorporated most of the ideas of the Joshi faction, which believed that the Party's best chance for growth was to become identified with nationalistic sentiment. It also made some concessions to radical elements which were concerned lest CommunLit endorsement of certain governmental policies prevent the CPI fromtrong campaign against theParty and Its government.
The Palghat Party Congress was followed by an Extraordinary Party Congress held at Amritsar (Punjab State) inolstered by its performance in7 general elections, in which the CPI polledf the vote and captured control over Kerala State, the Party continued Its evolutionoderate,strategy. The prime purpose of the Amritsar Congress was toew moderate-appearing constitution to aid the CPI in I) persuading other political groups and the unsophisticated Indian voter that the CPIona flde indigenousparty, andeveloping the specialframework required forass party while retaining and. If possible,actual central direction and control.
The constitution adopted at Amrltsurthat the Party "strives to achieve full democracy and socialism by peaceful means."terms with connotations ofand subversion, such as "Politburo" andere dropped In favor of names likeandn ambiguous section was also included indicating that If the Communists came to power they would guarantee "the widest possible extension" of individual liberties, and also the right of political organization to all,those in opposition to the government, "as long as they abide by the constitution of theuch was also made at the Amritsar Party Congress of the "new freedom" of inner-Party debate In accordance with7 recognition of "national roads to socialism."
At the same time. Communist leaders made it clear that there had been no fundamental change In the Party's goals. Its external loyalties, or Its organizational methods. Subsequent policy statements indicate that strong central direction and control continue to be used and that violence is not ruled oututure lactic if the Party
should deem such action necessary. Reminders that* the CPI was still pledged to full-fledgedand that violent tactics could be resumed seemed primarily aimed at justifying continued authoritarian control and at discouraging Party members from taking seriously Party propaganda that the CPIemocratic organization. Like earlier Party pronouncements, the politicaladopted at Amritsar emphasized tbe need to "combat individualism and restore discipline" In the Party, and in8 the CentralCommittee warned against the "heavyof alienncluding not only "bourgeoisndut also what it termed "anarchistic concepts of organization."
In the year since the Amritsar Parly Congress there has beeit.no basic change in Party line or tactics. The CPI has continued to reiterate the goals of combatting the. menace to peace" and of striving "io achieve socialism by peacefuln working for these objectives it has also continued to stress the tactics of organizingowerful mass movement" based on the "working class and Its allies" and "backing it with mass sanctions" to overcome the resistance of "reactionary" forces both inside and outside the Congress government. Since the Amritsarhowever, the CPI attitude towards Prime Minister Nehru has become more critical.he CPI Central Executive Committee, replying to charges by Nehru that Communist rule had contributedense of fear andin Kerala, accused the Prime Minister of distortion of fact, partisanship, andinterference in the affairstateAlthough the Communists have continued to treat Prime Minister Nehru with respect and toistinction between him andelements" In the Congress, sincehere have been fewer notes of Communist praise for his "Independent policies" and less mention of "progressive elements" in the Congress Party. Instead the CPI National Council at Its8 meeting spoke of the "bankruptcyhe "dwindling support for the Congressnd the growing "massand masshis developmentthat Party leaders may believe they went too far at the Amritsar Party Congress InNehru and his government. In8 and9 there were reports that the Party planned to place increased emphasis on covertand operational techniques. It thus appears likely that the CPI, while continuing to operate within the framework of its peaceful,tactical line, may be revertingosition of more doctrinaire opposition to the present Indian government. However, itscourse will, as in the past, be determined by the dictates of the Soviet Union.
3. Organization
Structure
rinciples of organisation
The CPI is organized on the basis of aadopied in8 constitution is al least the sixth constitution adopted by the Party9 andonstitution drawn uphe organization of the Party under8 constitution Is shown in Fig. like Its predecessors,8 document calls for five territorial levels ofprovincialistrict. Intermediate, andasserts tho Communist concept of "democratic centralism" as the guiding principle of Party organization and operation.
* The Party consUtuUon provides tor "state orunits. The distinction in the use of these terms Is not clear, bat It appears tbat Party leaders intended that "state" should be used to describe organluUons coterminous with the present Indian slate boundaries, whereas "provincial" would be used for Parly units in Bombay State where two Party unitsMaharashtra and Oujaratcommittees which correspond to the areasby the two ciajorll nguutic group* In Iheand In the federalndareas. In practice, Ihe termoldover from the period of British rule, has been retained to describe all second-level admlnlstraUvc units In CPI publications and Inner-Partyand this term Is used throughout Inule their provincial committersthe name of the slate in which they arewith the major exceptions of Bombay and Madras states: In the latter Ihe committee Is called the Tamil Nad (land ol the Tamils) Provincialafter the historical name of this region
In the field of Party structure "democracy"that all executive organizations be elected but "centralism" requires that these executives at each echelon except the very lowest be elected not by the membership but by the executives of the next lower echelon. Similarly, although all Party members may engage in free and frankwitllin their Party units of all questions affecting the Party and its work, the minority must carry out the decision of the majority, the lower Party organizations are responsible to and must carry out the decisions of the higher Party organs, and the Individual must subordinateto the will of the collective. In the CPI, as in Communist parties elsewhere, centralism has been the dominatingery small group of national leaders lias determined Party policy;have been carefully controlled; andbodies, particularly at the national level, at their Infrequent meetings have done little more than ratify the policies handed down to them from above. Despite the emphasis on strong central control, however, the CPI has consistently fulled to achieve the strong monolithic unity to which it aspires largely because of factionalism, indiscipline, and indifference at all Party levels.
Much more than its predecessors,8 CPI constitution emphasizes the "democratic" elemenl In "democratic centralism" in accord with the Party's current effort to present itself to theas peaceful and progressive rather thanThis new emphasis is reflected inchanges, primarily at the national level, in the abandonment of distinctive Communist terms, such as Politburo, cell, and fraction, and in the operating principles laid down to govern the behavior of the individual Party member.
The organizational changes adopted8 are ostensibly directed toward broadening Partyand making It more responsive to theThusevel system of nationalunderolitburo responsibleentral Committee elected by and responsible to an All-India Partybeen replacedevcI system in which the highest echelon, the Secretariat is responsibleentral Executive Committer elected by aCouncil which is in turn electedarty Congress representing the provincialIn effect the Secretariat,o 8merely replaces theemberandmember Central Executivereplaces themember Central Committee. Thus, at the very highest level of Party direction, and in Its real focus of power, participation has been narrowed rather thanalthough this point has been obscured by Party propaganda describing the Secretariatew body, the Central Executive Committee as the new equivalent of the Politburo, andem-ber National council as replacing the Central Committee. Since the Party Congress remains, as it was in the past, the only body representing the next lower territorial echelon by election undthe "supreme organ of thehe National Council appears to be the only really
3-1
iENTIAL
UPPLEMENT VI
COlMCil
|iDi
.. ;
ugakizatioh or thxty or8
new element in the national Party structure as establishedlected by the Partyfrom among Its members and meetingthe National Council Is the "highestbetween the biennial congresses and has been presentedeans for developinginitiative" at all levels and making the views of the membership known to the top leadership. Although the establishment of this new echelon may open up possibilities for change in the future, there has been no Indication to date that itshas in any way affected the dominant power of the Secretariat. Moreover, since the National Council elects the members of the CentralCommittee and theunction previously performed by the much larger Party Congress, its establishment, like the decreased size of the two highest echelons, represents aon rather than an expansion of the role of the Party's lower levels in the selection ofleadership.
As in the case of changes in Party structure, the increased emphasis on democracy in the "internal life of the Party" seems to have little If anycontent. Although, as compared with4 constitution,8 document devotes much more space to emphasizing the resolution of differences by discussion and to reiterating the right of the Party member to make his views known and the obligation of the higher echelons to consider the views of lower echelons andmembers, the basic principle of complete subordination to Party decisions remains firmly Axed.
z. Central organization
The central organization of the CPI consists of two representative bodies, the Party Congress and the National Council. In which supreme power is theoretically vested, and tho high command, which Includes the Central Executive Committee, the Secretariat, the Central Control Commission, the Audit Commission,upportingstaff. The establishment of the National Council hasew element at thelevel since this body remains inbetween tho sessions of the Party Congress which, in contrast, is elected anew for each of Its meetings.
a. Party CoxcressUnder thearty constitution the Party Congress Is to meet once every two yearslace and time to beby lhe National Council. AnCongress may be convened al the discretion of the National Council or when demanded byParty organizations representing at least one-third of the total membership. Four regular congresses have been heldhe first in Bombay inhe second in Calcutta Inhe third in Madura Innd the fourth in Pfilghat in
npecial congress was held at Amritsar which has also been referred to in Party literature as an Extraordinary Congress.
Membership in the Party Congress is of two types, cx officio and elective. Members of the Central Control Commission and the Centra) Executive Committee arc the ex officio members of the congress; members of the Nationalmay attend its meetings but may not votethey have been elected as delegates byconferences.
Under6 constitution the Nationalfixes the number of delegates each provincial conference Is to elect to the congress on the basis of the number of members whose dues quotao the national organization has been paid Information on the number of delegates elected to the first three congresses is incomplete, and reports of the numbers attendingelegates attended the first All-India Party Congress. The second was attendedelegates, according to non-Communist pressand. accordingarty newspaper. For the third congress, various reports put the number in attendance, At the fourthelegutcs were electedttended, and at the Extraordinary Party Congress inere electedttended. At the third congress, representation was basedatio of one delegate forembers on the rolls,inimum of 3for each unit quallflylngrovincialThe same formula cannot have been used for the fourth and Amritsar congresses; the Party's own membership figures for those years, respectively, and the ratio would therefore have been on the order ofembers, without taking into account the number of national headquarters(reportedlyttending the third congress andlected to the congressr any provisioninimum number of delegates from each state or province.
The constitution describes the Party Congress as theorgan" of the Party. Thediscusses and acts on the political andreport of the National Council, passes on the reports of the Audit Commission and the Centraland hears andon appeals from disciplinary action. Itthe Party program and constitution andthe Party's policy and tactical line. It elects the Central Control Commission and the National Council, the latter by secret ballot,residium to conduct the congress; theceases to exist when the congress adjourns. Until the establishment of tho National Councilhe congress also elected the members of the Central Committee and the Politburo.
In practice the congress has been lessthan the prevailing constitutionongress is convened only when the high command deems the time rightarge all-PartyRelatively few of the delegates have any real impact on the proceedings except by voting, and many delegates do not bother to vote on the most important resolution, the political resolution. On the whole, the congress isatifying body.
The congress is not without significance,in several respects. Since the smallgroup actually determines the time ofand this group has chosen to call only five congresses during the Party's entire lifetime, the mere factongress is .summoned is likely to signalize some important development in the Party. It may mean the adoptionhanged policy or tactic or. as in the case of the congress heldf organizational changes.within the Party may have reached suchthat the leadership feels compelled to honor the commitment to "inner-Partybyession of the "supreme" body of the Party. By the same token the callingongressemonstration to all Indians that the Party is "democratic" enough to submitpolicies and plansizable number of members.
The congress doesorum where policy and program are hotly debated, and thehas been at times under severe fire in these meetings. Important concessions have been sought and won by various factions. Usually,the prevailing leadership's steamroller has served toesult not too unlike that planned. Most amendments submitted byto the important political andresolutions, which ore drafted by the high command, are withdrawn or defeated. According to available information the fourth congress, heldas the first at which an alternativeresolution was offered; this resolution was supported by about one fourth of the delegates. At8 congress an amendment that would have undermined the intent of the draft political resolution, although defeated,urprisingly. The vote on the politlcnl resolution itself
For most of the rank-and-file delegates the CPI congresses are probably high points in otherwise drab lives. Therelurry of activity for some weeks or months both preceding andongress. Provincial conferences are held to elect delegates and to consider draft proposals that will
be voted upon, which arc usually circulated inby the high command. Afterwards many meetings are held by state and local Partyto hear reports of the proceedings and to make plans for carrying out congress decisions. Parades, rallies, mass meetings, andheld In conjunction with the congressa festive atmosphere. In the businessdelegates have an opportunity to observe their national leaders in competitive action and to assess their qualities, forming impressions that may be conveyed to Party members back home Any delegate mayoment of glory byamendments to proposed resolutions, even though most of them are withdrawn or defeated. Atongress moremendments were reportedly offered, and at8 congress, more.
The business sessions are held In great secrecy, with elaborate security precautions. Newsmen are provided with officially prepared resumes of the proceedings, which reveal nothing of inner-Party disputes, although by consorting withthey pick up enough to write fairlynews reports. The Party leadership hasprogressively more publicity conscious with each succeeding congress. The third congressas the first at which the full text of the political resolution was released, after its adoption.8 congress was the first for which the full Party publicity machinery wasbefore, during, and after the event. Thesecretary of the CPI held press conferences, beginning weeks in advance, to publicize theIn unprecedented moves the leadershipthe draft of the new constitution two months before the congress, and the draftresolution the day after the congress opened but before It had been considered by the delegates. The monthly and weekly English-language Party organs devoted much space to the congress for several weeks. The weekly New Age carried many pages of "color" stories about the congress Itself, and highly Informative articles about the closed proceedings written by Party leaders. After the congress the decisions were interpreted In the monthly New Age.
b. National CouncilThe National Council is to meet at least every six montlis or on demand of one-third of its members. Its membership, not to, is elected by the Party Congressanel of candidates proposed by theNational Council. The panel is toiew tobroud-boscd,leadership, closely linked with the masses, firm in the revolutionary outlook of the working class and educated ins to bring together "the best talent and experience from all states, from mass fronts, and from other fields of Partynd la to Include at least two representatives from every state or province. The membership of the National Council elected at the Amritsar Party Congress Is shownnder Reference Data.
The method by which the members of the first National Council were elected Is not entirely clear. Reportedly every provincial delegation at the Amritsar Congress was asked toist of candidates for its area from which an election committee selected the final slate.lan to elect the members on the basis of Party strength in the various states and provinces was abandoned before8 constitution was put in final form, there is some relationship between the size of the provincial parties and the numbers identified with the region as shown in thetabulation which lists the seven largestcommittees.
I'm* int or I'ercxmt or total Pa my total codxcil
MUUDUHlF MEMBERS II1?
Andhra Pradesh
..9
7J
. .
3s
4J
Bengal
is apparent, however, the relationship is far from precise. The two states having the largest membership. Andhra Pradesh and Kerala,accorded the largest number ofarc not represented in proportion to their membership strength, while other states have greater representation than their membership alone would justify.
The National Council replaces the formerCommittee as the "highest authority" of the Party between congresses and replaces the Party Congress as the body by and from which theExecutive Committee, the Secretariat, and the general secretary arc elected. In addition it elects the Audit Commission which supervises Party finances and submits reports to the council and the Party Congress. It is empowered lo fill vacancies in the Central Executive Committee, the Central Control Commission, and the Auditbut no provision Is made with respect to vacancies in the Secretariat.
The National Council Is responsible for direct-ing all Party work, for enforcing the Partyand for carrying out the political line and other decisions adopted by the congress. It discusses and decides on the political andreports and other matters put before it by
3-4
9
Central Executive Committee, and may take up any other matters. It submits its ownand organizational report and tbe Auditreport to the congress.
The Impact of the establishment of the National Council on the Party is not yet clear. By9 It had held only one meeting since It wasat the Amritsar Party Congress in April i. The Interposibion of this new tier in the * hierarchy between the Central Executiveand the All-India Party Congress in time could bring about greater decentralization of Partyor could be the means of tighteningauthority over state and. local organization. The leadership which proposed the change may look upon the council as an experiment, conceived to demonstrate that the Party was becoming more representative not only to Indians generally but also to those rank-and-file members who had become more conscious of their Individuality after the post-Stalin liberalization moves in. and lhe Party's own successes with "peaceful methods" in the general election
What little evidence Is available indicates that the council has thus far been firmly controlled by the Central Executive Committee. AccordUig to reports of the council's first meetinghe Central Executive Committeethe agenda for the council, and councilcentered chiefly on decisions taken by the Central Executive Committee meeting that Immediately preceded the council session. The council was precluded from "thorough discussion" of an important report on the "crisis" of thefive-year plan, according to Oeneraly Ghosh, because the CentralCommittee failed toesolution on the subject Reports of the October meeting Indicate, however, that the Party center was under fire forimplementing the Amritsar decisions moreSome members, moreover, urged that the council meet more frequently thanAllegedly in order to "lighten the heavy burden" of the central Secretariat,were organized to meet periodicallyoftencr than the entire body) and review Party activities in the fields of education, trade unions, peasants, students and youth, women, culture, and peace. These specific and implied criticisms are not necessarily significant since criticismigher or lower body, part andof self-criticism, is endemic in the CPI. and tbe proliferation of committees andin any Indian organizationustomary substitute for action. Nevertheless, the provision for semiannual meetings. If observed, together with the fact that the council, unlike theontinuing body, may subject theof the high command to more frequent reviews than has been the case in the past. The existence of the National Council may on the other hand merely make available to tho higharger corps of national workerstheir own close direction.
c. Tut high commandCentralCommittee. Secretariat, Central Controland Audit Commission are the formally established components of the CPI high Under the new Party constitution allthe Central Control Commission are elected by the National Council; this commission, asearlier constitutions, is elected by the Party Congress. The number of members on theExecutive Committee is set by theat not morend membership of the Secretariat, elected from among the members ol the Central Executive Committee,o 8the general secretary. The number of Com trul Control Commission members under the new constitution is determined by the Party Congress, which8 electedsame number asin4 constitution. The members of these bodies are listed in.
The functions of the Central Executivewhichey position between the elite Secretariat and the broad-based National Council, are spelled out In considerable detail In the constitution, It Is responsible to the National Council for its general operations and, in turn, meets every two months to consider thereport of its work between CentralCommittee sessions. In general it isfor carrying out the decisions and directives of the National Council and for directing Party work between council sessions. In this context.
NT UAL EXECUTIVE aiMMI'ITKICffWl-
ovtadaa Nair.
. S. Xnmboodiiipad.
UiuiKbaraa Pktnoia
I'. Kairiuiriwti.
S. PraawU Raw. C. BaJeAwar It no. Ravi Narayan Heddy.. Snrdcanl
. CPI NATIONAL OFflCERS.3
CENTRAL SKCKKTARIAT
HarWsJieii Sii.gli SurJIu. M. R. VtHlataiuman.
CENTRAL COXTltOL: S. V. Gbnte. Minimum. Hnijulibdul Iffllim. P. Nnrayniuui hair. I' ftnitiaai.
Ajoy km. . Secretary. Dr. Z. A. Ahmnd. M. lliasaiapuiuisiith. S. A.. K. CopnNn. Hhupvh Gupta. P. C.. T. Ransili.e. CKNTltAL EXECUTIVEwmben of Central
SrrtUrial. JjOli llawi. Pbaal Bon. Itoanuh Cltwidru. K. Damodarau Sokan Singh Joah _Mnrekrt.liiiii Kiuinr
it has authority to decide on any political orquestion, although theoreticallycould be reversed by the council Inthe Central Executive Committee Is tothe following specific tasks on behalf ofconvene regular sessions of theprepare reports and resolutions for suchguide and assist provincial committeesParty press and publications program;Party parliamentary group, the all-Indiaor fronts. Party educationaffairs, and relations with
Members of the Central Executive Committee are drawn from the top leadership of the Party and most have extensive experience in CPISixteen of the presentembers were serving on the Central Committee1 or7 Joined this organizationndere first electedhis continuity of leadership is shown in, underData.
The Central Executive Committee, appears to be meeting much more regularly than itsthe Central Committee. Until thes Central Committee meetings wereas muchear apart; later, six months apart, although6 and the adoption of the new constitution meetings were convened with somewhat greater frequency. During the first year following adoption ofhe Central Executive Committee met five times. It prepared the agenda for the oneof the National Council, discussed Parlyaffairs, considered substantive reports on various Issues prepared by Party leaders, and passed resolutions among others:xpressing "strongest condemnation. aggression in Lebanon and thafbf Britain Inhat "opposition parties and the Primehaveistorted and misleading picture of the situation in [Kerala]) recommending that appropriate steps be taken to "rouse public opinion against India's continued dependence.) expressing "deep concern over the food situation in the country" and warning that this "situation will deteriorate alarmingly if the present (governmental) policies are) calling upon the "democratic masses and all progressive elements" to agitate for the Impositionelling on land holdings; andntlsing the "heroic struggles" of depressed groups In various states.
The constitution does not specify in any detail the duties of the Secretariat or its top officer, the general secretary. It provides only that theand general secretary are to "direct and carry out the currentn behalf of the
Central Executiveo specificare given to the general secretary by8 constitution, although in practice heas before, the dominant figure within the Party. Secretariat members are to functionbut with specific responsibilities assigned to each. They arc to devote full time to national Party work and are expressly forbidden to belongrovincial or district Party organ. Theis empowered to set up such Party bodies and "make such arrangements as arc considered necessary" to guide day-to-day CPI activities. The description of the Secretariat ineliberate effort atto provide latitude for itsan attempt to dissociate it from the old Politburo, long known as the formal power center for the Party.
In practice, the relationship between theExecutive Committee and the Secretariatto be as undefined as that between theCentral Committee and the Politburo. The record indicates, however, that although theoccasionally issued statements in its own name, it tended to work through the Centraland that this body was the more frequent Party spokesman. This practice continues under the reorganization plan adopted The statements attributed to the Secretariat,ew exceptions, have been concerned more with organizational than with policy matters. within Party circles the Secretariat, like its predecessor, remains predominant. It Includes most of tho top organizational and ideological leaders within the CPI, and it continues tothe direction of Party development.
Both leading bodies have been strongly criticized for their methods of directing Party activity and for the failure of their members, many of whom have strong local interests, to give adequate time to national Partyarly report4 indicated that only two or three Politburowere permanently attached lo the center and that this small group made "vital" decisions for the Partyhole. The draft organizational resolution presented at the third Party Congressook Party leaders to task forfunctioning" and assertedewmembers did not have authority to makefor the Central Committee. The Politburo, it continued, should confine Itself toand interpreting" Central Committee decisions on major policy questions, although it might issue statements or make organizational decisions to meet "urgentuch actions,should be "nothing more than the minimum that is required"eeting of the full Central Committee should be called at the earliest oppor-
9
ini i_
Central Control Commission, althoughhaving some degree of autonomy because it is elected by the Party Congress rather than the Executive Committee, is formally subordinate to the Central Executive Committee, although somewhat less so then it was to the old Central Committee. Previously the commission'shad to be submitted within three months to the Central Committee for "endorsement,"the method of endorsement was notUnder the newwo-thirds majority of the Executive Committee may stay the implementationommission decision, which Is then referred to the National Council for final resolution. Both old and newrecognized the right of final appeal oncases to the All-India Parly Congress.
Only fragmentary information is available on the actual work of the Central Control II appears to concern itself mainly with minor Inner-Party disputes at the local orlevel, functioning somewhat In the manner of the Soviet Orgburo. It apparently exerts noinfluence on the central leadership and has on occasion voluntarily referred cases brought before it to the Central Committee for decision. According to the fullest report available on the actions of this body, the commission elected1 met four times in onealf years and consideredases. In some instances itwitnesses. Including the appellant, and in others it apparently limited itself to scrutinizing documents. It confirmed the actions of someunits, set aside those of others, referred several cases back to provincial units with afor reconsideration, and voluntarily decided to reopen Iwo coses. The constitution8 for the first time provided for controlat the provincial level. The decisions of these bodies are "ordinarilylthough the provincial committee maywo-thirds vote stay Implementation of the decision and either assume responsibility for the issue itself or refer it to the Central Control Commission.of these provincial commissions may mean that the Central Control Commission will have fewer cases brought before it.
The Central Control Commission, or itsmembers, may be more important in central functioning than the constitution or availableon Its corporate work imply. The unusual specification ol personal qunifications forthe caliber of Its members (all five are reliable, long-time Partynd the fact that executing the limited functions enumerated in the constitution takes little of their time pose the possibility that this body may have additional
responsibilities not listed In the constitution. If so, these axe believed to lie in the field of covert Party operations (see this Supplement, Sectionnder Covert Organization).
The Audit Commission, the least importantof the high command, is elected by the National Council to "supervise over theof the central Parly finances and report on the same to the National Council and the Partyhe membership and term of office ol this body are not specified in the constitution. Little information Is available on the functioning of this commission, but its functions are probablyst-audits of Party finances.
d. National urAnyuAiiTBasTheof the central office charged with providing day-to-day guidance to the CPI's all-IndiaIs not clearly set forth in Party statutes or organizational resolutions. The constitutions in effect8 contained two stipulationson this Issue:embers of the Centralwere to function as representatives, or-garuzers, and instructors lo the provincialand, tn addition, were to divide among themselves the "various fields of activity of the Central Committee" (publications and press, mass fronts. Party education, finance, and special.he Central Committee wasto elect such additional secretaries or"such departments and committees as may be considered necessary Tor most efficienthe constitution adoptedn detailinggave the Central Executive Committeefor approximately the same activities aa Uic old Central Committee but was so written as not to make guidance of provincialthe members' first obligation. In anto strengthen central functioning, it stated that Secretariat members, to whom specificwere to be assigned, must devote themselves exclusively to central Party work. As under earlier constitutions. Ihe Central Executive Committee was empowered to "set up such Party bodies and make such arrangements ashe organizationaladopted by8 Party Congress spelled out this arrangement in somewhat greater detail. Central work. It said, was to be done not only by members of the Secretariat but also by National Council members and "above all" by CentralCommittee members. The latter. It said, arc responsible to the National Council which elected them for seeing tliat national Party work Is properly conducted and that their owndecisions und those of the Nationalare implemented by the stale committees. These strictures on members of the executive body, although not entirely new, are somewhat more specific than past directives and indicate greater pressure toward the goal: members of central bodies are to think, act. and talk likeof the all-India Party, whether they are functioning from national headquarters in New Delhi orrovincial or district unit elsewhere.
Fresh attempts are now being made to persuade central leaders to abandon the old pattern of one individual acting as sole director of the functional activity that constituted his first interest. The organizational resolution8 was quite blunt on this point. It said thul the practice offunctioning, of no checkup has got tohat members of the Secretariat should divide up work among themselves on the principle offunctioning, individual responsibility torof decisions, and regular collectivet said also that the central Partyhad to organize "proper Party life" for headquarters workers and to "decide about the form of organization al Parly headquarters."
At various times Party directives have been adopted distributing icsponsibility for orgariiza-tlon of the various Parly activities between the central and provincial levels. According to theresolution presented to the Party Congress, the peace front as well as labor and peasant fronts were to be directed by the center, while all other front organizations were to be directed mainly by provincial Party committees with only "very broad" direction from the center. Similarly, the organizationadopted by the Party in8 specifically calls for central subcommittees to deal with labor and peasants but makes state and districtresponsible for directing all other front organizations, including the All-India Peacewith only general guidance from the center. It calls upon state and district committees to "pay serious attention" to front groups among women, students, and youth. On the subject of central responsibility, it says only that the national Party headquarters should convene meetings of leading comrades working on these fronts and "formwherever necessary andI clearly states, however, that these subcommittees "will not replace the committees of the massnor issue directions to similarIn the states. Their function is to help the Party center to atudy problems and to enable the Party center lo give guidance which should be through the state committees."
DENT1AL
Information indicates that the ers_ organization in9 included the following subcommittees, most ol them headed by members oi the Secretariat:
with spoken and written prop-iganOa. designed to carry out Party abas; Includes Party periodicals, newspapers, and pamphlcU, speeches in Parliament and Matend explanatory verbal propaganda In meetings.
EeuoiioN"Concerned with cducaUon of PartyIn order to develop efficient cadres through party schools, publications, and speeches; has been assigned task ofyllabus for ansystem of Partjwhools.
ways to raise funds andto bring lover unit finances Into anunder closer central control than In; .
Pmttnew central activity; this subcoui-mlttee la responsible for coUecLng Party records in order to Keepistory up to date andunified understanding" of the Party's performance.
for sol parliamentary work, tnchidlnsj discipline of MPs. on major potlUeal issues Lhe Central Executive Committee guide* Uir parliamentary subcommittee.
Tun* uniondirect all trade union
Pluujttdirect all peasant arUvilics.
Piactadvise such fronts as the friendship societies, all-India Peace Council, ami Indianfor Afro-Asian Solidarity
Wotus'sadvise cxlsUng women's front or*nd to stimulate greater participation by aomen in activities useful to the Poily.
Ccltuiiilsupervise acUviUea anions exlst-Ing front groups for writers, drama lists, artists, and musicians.
SroDuiTs' aho youthsupervise and expand Parly actlviUes among this target group.
Utile information is available on theof these subcommittees. The peasant front subcommittee, aided by representatives of state and district units especially concerned withorganization, during the summer8ocument on the Party's all-India peasant gram. Reportedly the Party leadership reached agreement for the first time on thecovered in this document. Onof the Central Executive Committee, thiswas approved by the National Councilnformation is not available on the wt of the education subcommittee in preparing syllabus for Party education, although the or-puuzatlonat resolution adopted at8 Party grtss singled out Party education as the most rtant of the leadership's tasks. It is not whether the subcommittee recently cstab-to supervise the Parly's major publications, weekly newspaper New Age and the monthly 'leal of the same name, functionsr comes under the agit-prop subcommittee.
Staff work for the national headquarters is done by the Party Headquarters Unit (commonly called th PHQ) which is believed to consist of junior Party official* representing various fields ofactivity. This organization, which isat the Party Congress, has occasionally opposed the prevailing Party leadership. It played an important role in rallying opposition against the militant Party liney holdingmeetings and byewsletter, the PHQ Open Forum. More recently, at the third Party Congress, the PHQesolution criticizing the Central Committee for failure to submit to theeport on Its activities.
In addition to the subcommittees listed above and the PHQ, the following functional groups are behoved tottached to the ccntrul
Liaison Coumittex ioathis Committee carries out the CPI's obltcaUon to guide the Communist Party of Pakistanlthough closest contact with tne neighborrobably maintained by the West Bengal unit of the CPI with the East Pakistan branch of the CPP. The liaison committee,eeting earlydecided lo advise the CPP to study the progressive change* In the Indian party's policy over tbe pastears,iew to adopting the current parliamentary path of the CPI should the CPPegal party within Pakistan PABLiassairrsaY Paartoffice is thefor planning the Party's parliamentary actmty and functionservice bureau for Communist members of Parliament. In1 had anResearch Bureautaff of fiveby three Politburo members This boreaa gathers background InlormaUon for *peeches In Parliament and also services tha Partyhole (sec this Supplement. Secnonnder Organization lor AcUvtty in Parliament).
KasuRCBCPI reportedlyood research secUon at one limetaff of, but by late IMS this had become depleted because many staff members had been called back to their home states to carry on organisational work. Tho unit utilized overt sources ofof Ihe Indian Council of world Affairs, the Delhi School of Economics, and theofprovide backgroundon various political issues for Party
_tnthistaff of three, headedt Das Gupta,eading CPI economist who frequenUy wrote for Parly publlcaUont.oMMtrrsz iNroeauTioMunit aa of mid-IBS? reportedly consisted of two Party members whose main duty was lo clip newspapers and maintain Indexed flies of press reports and backgroundecretariate of seven members and three clerks, describedari of tho lnformallon bureau, handled Internal andcorrespondence, maintained files dealing with the organisaUon. looked after accounts, and generally kept the office going.
Putty PuaucsnoN*This unit supervises Uip Party* publication of books, pamphlets, and so forth, presumably In coordination with Ihesubcommittee of the Party headquarters.
In8 the Central Executive Committee established the following allocation of functions among Secretariat members in accordance with the constitutional provision that "specificshould be assigned to each member:
Ajoyresponsibility tor Partyserves on New Age (weekly) editorial board: member of agll-prop and Party cdueaUon
esponsibility for peasant wort; chairman of tbe peasant and member or the finance subcommittees.'
Uotalsi' Member of the peasant subcommittee.
BhvkshrcsponHblUty forwork; serves on the editorial stafl ol Sew Age (weekly) and on Uie agit-prop and Parliament
M.responsibility for Party education; member of the Party educaUonatUnds lo rouUne work In the central Party oraea.
responsibility tor Sewmonthly >', chairman ol tbe Parly educationof the agit-prop subcommittee.
ain responsibility for trade union activities; active in the Party press andprogram; chairman of the trade unionember of the agit-prop. Party education, and finance subcommittees.
esponsibility for New Agen agit-prop. Party education, and Party mstory subcommittees.
The various central headquarters stalls operateumber of differentew Delhi. Main Party headquarters issaf All Road. The editorial work on the monthly and weekly New Age publications is apparently carried on at this office. The trade union front, the All-India Trade Union Congress,mall staff at this address, and the peasant front, the All-India Kisan Sabha,esk. The offices of thegroup areindsor Place. The Party offices serve not only as working quarters but also as social centers for Party workers and members of Parliament and, In the case of some ot the latter, us living quarters.4 the Party reportedly acquired six modern buildings In the AJmer Oate section in order to provide close coordination for the parliamentary group elected in the first general elections. The average monthly cost of maintaining the national offices was estimated at that time al
The total number of paid workers in various central Party offices Is not available. Accordingeliable estimate,4 thereull-
0
Ume workers, paid the equivalent of fromer month. This figure probably Included only staff members, und not those working as clerks and messengers.9 there wereolding editorial positions on the four language editions of the Party weekly alone.
rovincial, district, and local organisation
Below the national bodies, the CPI is organized on three mainprovince or state, byand by local area and institution. Anfourth or intermediate level may be formed according to the Party constitution between the district organization and the basic branch.hows the place of the various subnotions^ units in the formal organizational structure.
The principal changes in organization below the national level Introduced8 were:he establishment of provincial and district councils paralleling the National Council;heof control commissions at the provincial level;bandonment of the requirement that the selection of secretaries at the provincial level be confirmed by the nationalf the right of secretariat members at all levels to bold office in lower bodies;f the term branch for cell to designate the basic unit and much greater emphasis onof the basic unitserritorial rather than functional basis. Although, like the changes on the national level, these alterations were propagandized by the Party as moves In the direction of greater democracy, there are noin the reports of provincial and lower level operations thai the centralized chain ofhas been weakened.
Most of the provincial and many districthave held conferences since the Amritsar Party Congress, and they appear to have taken the first steps to bring their organizations into line with the plan adopted at Amritsar. (As early as the summer7 the old Central Committee directed reorganization by branches, rather than by cells, and in some states ihe process was well under way before the Amritsar Congress which formally approved the change.)
The development of provincial and loweralong the lines specified is uneven,Some previously poorly organized slate branches have produced elaborate rosters ofand subcommittees, but these may be only paper plans. Some state units were slow tothe changes. In some cases because they opposed certain aspects of the oiganlzalional plan. In West Bengal there was strong opposition to substituting branches for cells, mainly on the
i
pound that trade? union work wouldembers argued, had been the most effective recruiting agency for the Party. In Andhra Pradesh elements supporting the long-tune activist P. Sundarayya were reluctant tobecause the new plan represented astep toward reliance on parliamentary means to achieveactic which they opposed. In the Maharashtra area of bilingual Bombay State competition for power among two nationalfrom theT. Ranadive andatters. However, the wheels of reorganization have been set in motion, and all Party units now appear reconciled tothe experiment.
The provincial organization as described in the constitution is almost an exact replica of theIt consists of the following bodies:
Piotwclu."highest organ" of Uie state apparatus, (unctions similarly to the Party Congress on the national level; normally meets every two years and is composed of delegates elected by dutnet conferences with the basis of represer.taUon determined by the provincial
aximumembers elected by the provincial conferenceanel ol names submitted by the outgoingcouncil; functions aa the "hlfhcstBetween provincial conferences: meets al least every 'our months (compared with every six month* Ice the National Council).
Pscmscm. Exrcvrrtxof no more thanembers elected by the provincial council from among its members; has authority to "carry on the work" ol the provincial council between Its
Ftotixciax Sec*ecretary (comparable to the general secretary on the national levell. elected by the provincial council from among the members of the provincial executive cornrnlltce; empowered to "direct and carry out Iho currentnofrovincial executive committee."
PMtvniciu, CoimioLby theconference; has powers on the state level similar to those of the Central Control Commission on the national leveL
Psovocsu Anrrby the pro-vinaa! coancU: has authority "tose disbursement of provincial Party"
A provincial organization may be exempted by tbe National Council fromrovincial council, presumably it Party organization in the area is too rudimentary toomplexstructure, in whichrovincial committee elected by the provincial conference carries on Party work between conferences. This committee, in turn,ecretary andto "carry on currenthe provincial screlanes are the most direct link between the
center and the lower organization. All of them are believed to be members of the Nationalor Central Executive Committee and areto attend meetings of those bodies, toon them, and to transmit their directives to lower units. They or other members ot* provincial secretariats, insofar as they carry out theirto elicit regular reports of Parly activities from district Party officials and, through them, from the branches which are in closest touch with Individual Party members, areey position to report on and Interpret grassroots Partyand sentiments. The provincialas ofere as follows:
Btstt
AndhraRajeahwar RaoDoraBharmnay
O Sardesai
MehtaN. Oovlndan Salr MadnyaH Khandkai Madras (Tamil. VenkalaramanL. UpadhyuyaPaUialkLilian Slngli SurJIl Ha) untilK. Vyaa UttarDayal Ttwarl Westyou Basu Tisartoaias HimachaJ PradeshSinghDebfederallyFarcoqi
In addition to the above, V. Subblah Is listed as general secretary of the Communist Parly In Pondlcherry. the French enclave which has been transferred to India for administrative purposes but remainsart of France pendingby the French assembly effecting de Jure transfer. The Communist organization in this area functions semiatttonomously, and Pondi-cherry is not normally listed among CPIcommittees In inner-Party documents. The Party organization in Himachal Pradesh, included in the above tabulation, may not qualify as aprovincial unit. According to one report, delegates from that territory joined with those from Punjab in their provincial conference some time7
District organizations (the districts are the largest administrative units within the Indian states and are roughly similar to counties In the United States) are to establish parallel bodies to those which exist at the provincial level with the exception of control commissions which do not exist below the provincial level. Their functions
correspond generally to those of comparablebodies, but the constitution allows greater flexibility in details. For example, the district conference sets the number of members of thecouncil, and the latter decides the number of members of the district executive committee and secretariat. The district council is free to decide how frequently It will meet. As at the stateistrict organization may be exempted fromouncil If the state councilxecutive committee so decides, in which case the district conferenceistrict committee to carry on work between conferences, and thecommittee elects a' secretary and 3
The Partyr branch, the so-called "primarys organized on the basis of local governmental units or by factory, occupation, or institution. An individual mayember of two local branches, one based on residence and the other on place of work, but may vote in only one and is considered an associate member of the other. The Generaleeting of the entire branch membership, is the "highest organ" of the primary unit and corresponds roughly to the conferences at the district and provincial levels and to the Party Congress at the national level. TheBody, which meets at leastonth, elects the branch secretary and assistantto conduct currentranch whose membership exceedss toranchsimilar to the executive committees at higher levels, and the branch secretary andsecretary. Membersranch may beinto "groups of convenientach with its own convenor. The functiongroup" Is to "distribute and check up [on] the work ofand. when necessary, organize preliminary discussions to facilitate political debate in the branch meeting.
The constitution emphasizes particular powers and functions for all organizational levels, distinct from the elective functions shown innd the general obligation as parts of the chain of command to carry out the policies laid down by the Party Congress and the National Council. The provincial conference Is to "determine the line of the Party and mass work" in the state, and is charged with suggesting "changes In the all-India policies and the general line of thehe state executive committee, tn addition to guiding district committees, is to direct the state Party press and publications program, the work of members of legislative assemblies, state Party work In mass organizations, Party education, and Parly finances.
The district conference is to determine the line of Party and mass work for the district Inwith the decisions of higher bodies. The district executive committee is specifically charged with "checking up the work of lower units,"guidance and "practical assistance" to mass organizations, directing party members who serve on local governmental bodies, promotingof Party Journals and literature, anddistrict Party schools.
The optional intermediate stage ofbetween the basic and district units, which has been similarly provided for in pastis toocal conference of delegates elected by conferences of branches In the area and is to be directedocal committee which elects its secretary. This organization works under the direction of the district executive committee. It is specifically charged with responsibility forthe work of branches directly under it.
The branch, which Party leaders claim hasthe traditional cell, is responsible fordirect day-to-day contact with "the masses" and for organizing work at the lowest leveL Its particular functions arc to "win the masses" In Its locality or sphere of activity toParty activity, to "build up and rxutlcipate in masso sell Party Journals and publications, to collect dues and raise other funds, to draw into the Party "sympathizers andand to Increase literacy among Party members. The secretaryranch Is toimonthly report to the next higher committee on new candidates and full members.
Information on Uie number ofbelow the provincial level is availablea few provincial committees, asor
TERMTE AM)
UNITS
Andhra ranches
own and talukToup ofommittees
Blhiir
is
branches
local committees
branches
taluk committees
Pradesh
31
<2
na
branches
Bengal
Calcutta, West Bengal, district committee8 reportedocal committees,pecial units. Houghly district in West Bengal reportedranchespecial units.
All .stale and some district organizations, city units, and local branches maintain offices, but very little information is available as to theiror the size of their staffs. District officeselatively new development.entral directive said that district secretariats were unnecessary.
In addition to the headquarters staff at all levels, there probably areaid Party workers Aliroughout the country, working at various levels cither part or full time.ccordingarty report, thereaid workers, and trie* Party aspiredotal; available information does not indicate whether that goal was ever reached. Secretary General Ghosh told 'the Amritsar Congress8 that the total number of paid workers had decreased. The distribution of such workers, state by state, is uneven. Keralo. for example, reportedlyaid workers plus an unknown numberfor by-elecllon campaigns and otheractivities. In some states there are probablyarty report8 from Andhra Pradesh said that thereull-time workers in thatotalaidf them part time, reportedlythe Bihar provincial conference latehe Punjab state unitull-time workers at about the same time.
Although much more effectively organized al the local level than any other Indian party, tin: CPI is far from satisfied with the stale of its localThe paucity of reliable cadres Isby national leaders to the failure of lower level units to educate members and keep them sleadlly at work. If Party self-criticism may be accepted at anything approaching face value, well over half the. membership Is almost whollyand most of the day-to-day work is done by poorly paid workers. Party work in front groups and other "mass" organizations has been almost totally neglected in some areas.
B. Leadership*
* Detailed ie.(urmntlon an individual Party leaders Is included in this Supplement. Sacnotfhich In-dades biographic reports onember* of the National Council and other leading Indianand fellow-travellers.
Conformity with the international Communist line, experience in Party work, andesserrank-and-file approval are the three main factors determining the leadership of the CPL Thethe only stablein the process ol creating leaders. Theline changes, and rank-and-filelargely pro forma, can always bein Inner-Partyhange in Party policy has sometimes resultedhange in leadership, but more often it has only changed the balance of power among factions within the leadership.
Despite intense factional struggles, the CPI has seldom permanently discarded dissentingIt has in some cases suspended or expelled dissidents, but the period of ostracism has not been long. Most of those deprived of the Party's confidence rehabilitated themselves byaccepting the official line and were in lime restored to leadership status. Thus the Party utilizes the aggregate talent and experience of practically all those who have served as leaders. This continuity at the toptablitzing force thai helps maintain the loyalty of certainelements. At the same time It hascontributed to the Party's popular appeal. Many Indians probably lump the names of P. C. Joshi. B. T. Ranadive. S. A. Dange. and AJoyname athe names ofand Congress Party leaders as among the group of polltlcos who have competed through the years for popular support.
The CPI has developed, on the whole, ancorps of national and provincial leaders. In comparison with the leaders of other parties they stand out particularly for discipline, forto sacrifice personal interests to those ot the Party, for intellect, for political competence, and for general ability. Most have made the Party their sole career, und few have madecontributions to the arts, literature, oras have some other Indian politicalIn the broad spectrum of Party activities leuders with many different' specialties have emerged: organizers, speakers and orators,theoreticians, economists, covert operators.with truly expert knowledge of trade unionism and peasant problems, und agile
| na anuwil in2 6T
the"re veteran Communists who were active in the Communist movement ins. An additional six joined the Partyine were Party founders and several others were admitted during the first few yearsthe founding meeting. Eleven served on the earliest Cenlrul Committee for which names of members arc available, the committee selected in
seeome of these leaders started political activity in the Congress Party, moved into the Congress Socialist Party formed within the Congress organizationnd left it when the exercise in Congresscooperation colUpsedany served in prison, together with leaders of the Congress and Congress Socialist Parties, because of their preindependence activities. The majority of this leadership group is middle-aged;f theisted inre Inge bracketreoungestndears old. The proportion of"intelligentsia" In the leadership group is striking. Of theor whom Informationlevel of education Is available,ave college degreesthers attendere educated in Europe. Twenty-two arc known to have traveled abroad. Almost all speak English, and most know more than one of the Indian languages. Only one woman, Ha)rahember of the Central Controlis Included In this leadership group. Twenty-two of those for whom religious affiliations are known are Hindus,rahmins (members of the highest Hindure Muslims,ikh.re from northern India and onlyre from the south, although more than half the total Party membership is concentrated in the latter region. This predominance of north Indian leadership is explainable historically. The Party originated in urban Industrial centers of the north because the foreign Communists who aided In its founding concentrated on those centers as the best recruiting grounds. Thus Party leaders in this region have more Influence within CPI circles than those in the rural south- where the movement did not become Important until thes Four of the five men who have served as general secretary arc from the north.
Among the top Party leaders, two major types stand"bureaucratic" leader who operates best in the Party's Internal organizationaland the "popular" leader who can sway crowds. The general secretaries, listed below, have been primarily of the first type:
Provisional)MS
IMS-ISM
K*oK. Ghosh IMl-prraenl
The first three of these leaders, all of whom are still active in the Party, most readily lendto group charactcrizalioii, representing as they do the "old Bolsheviks" in the CPI. All three have been active in the Party since its for-
4
, mv) reoocia me in general urawTi :rnm Ihe lop central leadership group, C. Rajeshwar Rao and P. Sundarayya (ace, under Reference Data) both Important national figures, are Ihe top CPI leaders In Andhra Pradesh. M. N. Govindan Nair heads the Parly unit in Kerala; S. A. Dangc and S. G. Sardesai direct Party afTairs in Bombay State; and Jyoti Basu and Ishowani Sen compele (or top.honars in West Bengal.information is available on CPI leadershipthe SUte level The situation is believed, however, to parallel that at the state level, with members of Ihe top slate executive bodiesParty affairs at the district level and members of the district bodies controlling theParly organs and branches. Inleaders at the local level are lessless well educated, andhorterof Communist activity than the Party's na-'tktnal leadership. Being closer to the grassroots [level they occasionally disagree with national ty policies which have adverse localPI endorsement of Soviet intervention in tuDgary) but are prevented from making their fell by the strong tradition of democratic ralttm within the Party.
There arc numerous factors that divide national local CPI leaders and encourage factional ipingi to promote the special interests of var-elements within the organization. These are based primarily on Ideological ids, are aligned behind the major throreti-wllhin Die CPI, and differ primarily over degree of militancy to be employed by the
Party, and, concomitantly, its attitude toward the ruling party and the government. In some areas, particularly West Bengal and Andhraideological differences are furtherby personal rivalries. In addition,frequently arises from the various vestedwithin the Party. Those leaders whose chief concern is trade unionism usually favordefense of working-class interests butextremes of violence that would bring about repressive actions by the government. Some spokesmen for the peasant population, inthe interests of that group, urge the use of violence on the Communist Chinese pattern, while othersoderate line in order to gain the cooperation of all segments of the agrarian population including small landholders. Leaders who speak for the middle class tend toore moderate ideological line based on class collaboration. Conflicting regionalcorresponding to the general language-ethnic divisions of India, at times have plagued the Party, but are now troublesome inew areas. Also, theothernumerous individuals who aspire to power. In9 the most obvious aspirants togeneral secretary were B. T. Ranadive, P. C. Joshi. and S. A. Dangc. Their ambitions put them in competition with one another andy Ohosh whom each hoped to replace.
Despite the melange of overlapping personaland conflicting pressures and speciala workable balance among the various groups has generally been maintained. However,ew occasionsalance was not achieved, the Parly leadership became badly split, and factional fighting came out into the open. At such tense periods In the Party's history, the debate was not so much in terms of theInterests of various factions within the Party but focused more broadly on the question of the proper line for the time, given Moscow's current line and the existing situation tn India. The leaders tended to lino up according to theirand theoretical views, each claiming his interpretation to be the one blessed by Moscow and suitable for India.
The most important factional struggles have been described inf this Supplement, and the major proponents of various lines have been identified.8 the leadership .seemed generally to have reached agreement on one basic issue; al) elements appeared agreed that violence was nol the proper tactical line under current circumstances However, factional bickeringover tlie degree to which the Party should rely onrbanicntary path to power and over
Lrnisr
Basavapunnalah
Rao
P. C. Joshi Dr.. Ahmed A. K. Qopalan
this lactic wou,dactually enable the CPI toeople's democratic got ernmcnt In India- in general, dependingon the extent of their advocacy of par-uamentary means, Party leaders fell roughly into the following three categories
CE.vrmsrhosh S. A. Dangc E. M. S. Namuoodlrlped P. RamamurU Dr. O. M. Adhlkar) KioirrrsT
S S. Josh
Harklshen Slnih Surjit Naroyan Reddy
During8 and9 some of these leaders appeared to shift ground, probably in an attempt to enlarge their personal followings within the Party, and adopted postureswith those which in the past permitted characterization, however imperfectly, ofas rightists, centrists, or leftists. . Ranadive, long considered leader of the leftist, proviolcnce group, defended the resolution adopted at the Party Congress8 which endorsed parliamentary methods. M. Basavapunnalah. previously knownfirebrand" leftist, at times seemed to stand with the centrist group. P. C. Joshi, leader of the rightists for many years,calledeasure of opposition to the government which would place him among the centrists. In general, the three factional groupings appeared in9 to be tending toward convergence at the center, andwas tending to be more personal and more over tactical differences than over basic problems of Party strategy.
C. Membership
I. Principles governing Party membership
The CPI invites as members any Indian citizen overears of age who accepts the program and constitution of the Parly and who agrees to work in one of the Party organizations, pay dues of one rupeeer year, and carry out Party decisions. Applications for membership may be submittedarty committee at any level (basic, intermediate, district, provincial, orust be submitted atonth before the recruit expects to be admitted, and must be endorsed by two Party members.of the committee to which the prospective member applies are normally final, except in the case of former "leading members from another political party" whose applications must beby the next higher committee
If approved, the applicant Is regardedcandidate member" for six months during which he has the same rights and duties as fullexcept the right to vote and to hold elective office. The committeeandidateIs charged under the constitution withfor his elementary education on Uicconstitution, and current policies of the Party and with observing his potentiahtles for development. After six months the local unit may admit the candidate to full Party membership or. if his performance has not been satisfactory, prolong the probationary period for an additional six months. All candidates and full members sign the following Party pledge:
I accept the alms and objecUvcs of lhe Party and agree to abide by its constitution and loyally to Carry out decisions of thehall strive lo live up to the ideals of communism and shall self-lessly serve the working class and the tollingnd lhe country, always placing theof the Party and the people above personal interests
On admission to full membership, eachisarty card, the form and content of which is determined by the Central Executive Committee. Party membership, under thecarries clearly defined rights and The obligations of Party membership are, umong others, to:articipate in Partyread Party publications, and cultivaterelations" with other Party members;tudy Marxism-Leninism;bserve the Parly constitution and Party discipline;ractice self-criticism; andaintain vigilance against tho "enemies of the working class and themong the rights of Party members areo participate in Party elections and hold office within the CPI;o criticize Party committees and leaders at Party meetings; ando address sun appeal or complaint on any matterigher Party body, including the Party Congress.
Indian Communist leaders in dealing with problems of Party membership are caughtilemma: the membership should be sufficiently large to attract popular attention at all levels and. if possible, influence governmental policy by any means the leaders decide; at the same time, it should be sufficiently small and disciplined to respond quickly and unitedly to centralThe trend during recent years has been towardmass party" while at the same time retaining disciplined cadres capable ofthe somewhat unwicldly mass base of the Party into concerted action.
s7ate-Mauch9
most successful CPI recruitment driverecent years was the one begunhen lhe leadership called for doublingby the time ol the next national Party Congress This target was achieved, and byhe month during which the Amritsar CPI Congress was held, membership reached. The success o( the mernbership campaign, however, posed numerous problems. The requirement that applicants lor membershipix-months' period as candidate members before achieving full Party status was abandoned during the drive, and uniform standards formembers were not applied throughout the country.esult, accordingeport by the Kerala unit of the Party, the new recruits were not "fanatical" and operated more asthan regular members. An Andhrareport complained that most of the newwere Illiterate and therefore could not read Parly literature, and lacked "politicalandome Party leaders complained about trying to "mix water with milk."
National leaders also were clearly uneasy over the rapid growth in membership, fearing that cracks in CPI solidarity would widen, diversity of opinion would grow, and the perennialof illiteracy aturdensome weight on the Party. Oeneral Secretary Qhosh's organizational report to the Amritsar Congress noted the "heavyof alien ideas Inside the Party, of bourgeois nationalism, of reformism and sectarianism, of anarchistic concepts of organization and generalhile the influence of the Party has expanded, Marxist-Leninist consciousness of the Party membership hashupesh Gupta, central Secretariat member, wrote inhat the new members added in recent years "by andemainof the fundamental teachings of Marxism-Leninism."
Perhaps as manyof thearly members In9 areaware of Communist ideology and of the problems of running the CPI; these are the Party's hard-core members. In addition, certain areas where the Party Is best organized and where participation in Party-directed work hasa habit over theexample. Kerala, metropolitan Calcutta, and Andhraprovide0 more reliable, responsive members even though they may not be wellideologically and may require leadership. Thia record compares favorably with that of lhe Congress Party whichembers,0 of whom are considered active. CPI membership outnumbers that of the two otheropjwsitionthe Praja Socialist Partyembers and Uie communalist Jan Sangh withew tens of thousands. The percentage of active members In these parlies is probably lower than in the CPI.
CPI leaders at the time of the Amritsarsaid privately that they hoped toembers0he scheduled year for the third general election. The organizational resolution adopted said: "Notwithstanding the Party's growth, our Party even now Is toohe Party mayfind that it has to make amembershipoderate policy,estricted membership consisting primarily of disciplined cadres for eventual direct action. It Is reasonable to assume that the oft-repeatedideological ignorance, anddealingembershipould be compounded if CPI membership were doubled or tripled.
Composition
a. Sizs and9 the CPI had the largest membership In Its history, but this did not result from steady growth since the formation of the CPI. as shown by the following tabulation of Party membership through the years:
(January
lat .
(March!
0 candidate members
These fluctuations reflect mainly changes in the Party's policies and the government's reaction to them and lo some extent recruitment drives, rather than organized defections, groupor periodic screenings- The slow growth42 reflected the Parly's status as an illegal, underground organization. Theexpansion of CPI membership during World War II resulted from the fact that the Party became legal2 and had an open field foractivity owing to the wartime
merit of leaders of most other Indian political parties (see this Supplement,he precipitate decline8hichabout five years' growth, resulted from the unpopularity of the Party's experiment withinsurrectionary tactics, but following the adoptionoderate tactical line1 Party strength grew steadily, surpassing the8 peak
CPI membership by states and territories as of8 is shown in. This table shows that CPI membership is unevenlythroughout India. It is largest In the rural south. More than hall the members arcin three southern states, Kerala,Pradesh, and Madras, which have apopulation of0l the total Indian population. In West Bengal, mainly in the metropolitan area of Calcutta. Is another large cluster0 members, and in each of the states of Bihar, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh there arc morehe Party is weakest in proportion to total population in the Hindi-speaking belt (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, andhichmoref the total population.
The distribution of CPI membership also varies within the states of greatest CommunistIn Kerala, which has more than a
Trivandrum Koshlkode Palghat Ern&lculam
ter of the total Party membership, CPI strength is concentrated in the central region of the state as shown by the following membership figures by districts
5.m0
In Andhra Pradesh, the state with the second highest Party membership, CPI strength IsIn the coastal region (the first fourin the following tabulation) and in theof the abortive Telengana uprising (districts five throughhe following tabulation gives CPI membership figures for this state by districts and major areas
PI MEMBERSHIP BY PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE8
Number ol members
Percent of total
Number ol members
Percent of lots!
Number orre
Percent of total
n DK-
CHEAEK,
Andbra Pradesh
Bombay
Gujarat.
Maharashtra (including Bombay City)
Kerala
Mndliju Pradesh
Punjab
ItojustliOn.
filar Pradesh
West Bengal
Federally ndmlntMcred:
Ddhi
Territories:
Iliniachnl..
...
Tripura
Total
l.M
a.o
1.8
?
0
i.i
J_o_
418
4
5
595
0.6
in. iff i)0
0
iso
e.o
0.6
s.e, ii. e
0.6
O.l
/.ft
io0.0
3
500
145
Figure*o not include candidatenumberingmi loltkU readiedime wbeu the piobnliouary period wi icm reliable Uian thaw lor later years.
6 do-
abandoned. State lisurcs3 ut
'i*'niF"'c>jtjili'
State9
West Bengal, Party strength Is concentrated to the city of Calcutta and In three neighboringarganas, Midnapore, andf0 new68 were in therural regions of the state,tronghold ol the Congress Party. This increase was particularly apparent in Darjcellngest6nd6PI membership In West Bengal as8 is tabulated byas follows:
Calcutta
. .
...
537
500
306
Dinajpur
center
fairlydata are available on the social composition of the delegates to the various CPI congresses, only two reports, both released durings, give an Index to the makeup of the entireThe first, released at the time of the first Party Congressnalyzes the totalThe second provides an analysis of membership in three provincial units inGujarat, Assam, and Delhi. The number of members in these states was,,.. These analysesthe following Information in percentages on the Parly membership:
origin
and agricultural laborers
a
a
it
graduates
Party workers
delegates to the various Partyarc probably atypical of the general CPI membership in that they comeighergroup andigher proportion of potential leaders and professional Party workers, the composition of these delegations provides some indication of social and economic stratification within at least the upper echelon of the CPI. An analysis of delegates to three All-India Partyof the CPI. held8 is given in, under Reference Data. Comparison of the delegates to3 congress with the membership at the time, shown in the tabulation above, indicates that bourgeoiswere less prominent among rank-and-file members than among the delegates. Indeed, the most striking characteristic of the analysis ofto all three congresses Is the largeof middle class and peasantry. Thisbetween membership and delegates, which can be shown statistically3 only,continues, Judging from the characteristics ascribed to delegates to the congresses6 The relatively few delegates to the first Party Congress, numbering. must have constituted the Party leadership The Partyat the time was tophcavy with full-time functionariesf the total membership, were described as full-timers or "professional revolutionaries who spend all their working hours educating and organizing Party membership." Among the delegates to68igh proportion of middle-level und lower-level Party lenders, along with the group of national leaders and full-time paid Party workers. otnumber held elective governmental positions which would undoubtedly put themigher income group than the average for the membership. Ofelegates attending the PalghAt congressere members of central, provincial, and district committees:erved on taluk or local committees and onlyere listed simply as Party members. were members of Parliament,ereof state legislatures.ere municipal councilors, andere district and village The breakdown forelegates attending8 congress Isere members of central, provincial, andere members of taluk or localandsmaller percentage than at6 Partylisted as members only The data on age and duration of membership in the Party indicate that delegates have "grown up" in the Party, since the preponderance of young delegates has declined. At thef the delegates were At68 congresses about two-thirds wereut since onlyndelegates, respectively, were overears of age at the two congresses, the CPIyoung" Party.
iscipline and training
Inner-Party discipline and ideological purity have become increasingly important duringyears as the CPI has expanded itsand adopted some superficial trappingsemocratic organization. According to New Age, the official Party Journal, the Party's objective
is as follows: "We have to build notass party,ass Communistass party of the working class, on firm Ideologicalin the spirit of proletarianand In conformity with the principles of Marxism-Lenlmsm.'* To achieve this objective Party leaders have followed the dual policy of attempting to educate and indoctrinate newand those already within the Party fold and of establishing detailed disciplinaryfor useindoctrination fails.
Since its early years the CPI has been plagued by chronic resistance and occasional defiance of central authority and established policies, both among the leadership group and the articulate membership. These Instances of friction have usually been kept within manageable bounds and have seldom resulted in organized defections or notable expulsions, with several8 Oeneral Secretary B. T. Ranadlve suspended the entire Andhra unit of the Party for failure to support his militant strategy; P. C. Joshi was suspended from Party membership9 and expelled0 for indiscipline, and his successor as general secretary. B. T. Ranadive. was in turn suspended1 after his fall from power; and Somnathormer Central Committee member, has twice been suspended for activities contravening the prevailing Party line or for indiscipline. In addition, some members of provincial and local units have been suspended or expelled for "failure to perform their duties withnon-Partynd so forth.ule, however, expulsions and suspensions from the PCI have beenfor top Party leaders who.carried their opposition to the prevailing line outside normal Party forums. .Less severe types of discipline, such as censure or public criticism, have usually sufficed to keep rank-and-file members in line.
The Party constitution adopted In8 is more explicit than earlier constitutions indiscipline and establishing disciplinaryAccording to this document, discipline is "based on conscious acceptance of the aims, the program, and the policies of the Party" and isfor preserving andthe unity of the Party, for enhancing iis strength, its fighting ability and its prestige, and for enforcing the principles of democraticWithout strict adherence to Partythe Party cannot lead the masses inand actions, nor discharge its responsibility towards them."
The disciplinary measures which may be taken against dissidents, in order of severity, are as follows: warning, censure, public censure, removal from Party positions, suspension from Party membershiperiod not exceeding one year, removal from the Party rolls, and expulsion. The differences among these various degrees ofaction are not defined, but It Is likely, for example, that "removal from the Party rolls"ess drastic measure which can be more easily cancelledater date thanocal committees are empowered, subject to the affected members* right of appeal, to imposetypes of punishment, but any measureexpulsion or suspensionartybecomes effective only after approval by the next higher committee.
In addition to these procedures for action against individual dissenters within the Party, the provincial councils, or in their absence the provincial executive committees, have the "right to dissolve or take disciplinary actionower committee in casesersistentof Party decisions and policy,reach of Parly discipline is
The CPI also monitors the personal lives of its members, and disciplinary action may be takenember for moral lapses. According to the constitution. "Party members found to be strikebreakers, habitual drunkards, moralbetrayers of Party confidence, guilty of financial irregularities, or members whose actions are detrimental to tho Party and the working class, shall be dealt with by the Party units to which they belong and be liable to disciplinaryhe disciplinary measures which may be taken are identical with those applicable to those who violate Party policy. The constitution admonishes Porty units lo use the more severe types of disciplinary action with "utmost caution, deliberation, and Judgment" and urges thatbe made, even after disciplinary measures have been taken, to "help the comrade to correct himself."
A Party member against whom disciplinaryis proposed shall. In accordance with thebe informed of the allegations against him and has the right to be heard In person by the Party unit in which his case is being discussed. In all cases the member against whomaction has been taken has the right ofto the provincial or Central Control(see this Section, under Centraland theoretically he may carry his appeal to the Party Congress, although there are no known Instances in which an appeal has beento this body.
Education of Party members has beenprimarily through the Communists'program. Overt CPI periodicals and pamphlets appear in English and In all of theIndian languages. These are on the whole well-written, inexpensive, andidewithin Parly circles. In addition, Partyhave published strictly inner-Party journals to explain the prevailing Party line and elicitviews on various problems. Party Letter and Forum, both published by the nationalhave appeared at various times in the past, but it Is not known whether these arc stillParty Organizer is circulated in West Bengal, and Sandesatn (Directions) Is theorgan of the Andhra ^Pradesh branch of the Party. Party publications, accordingPI document, are useful in that they "activize the Party ranks, sharpen their understanding of Party policy, and unify themhey make It possible to swing the entire Party into actionisciplined and organized way."
The CPI does not rely entirely on the printed word for the political and psychologicalof its members. Party publications,of their caliber, have no direct impact on the Illiterate masses within the Party, and these elements have become increasinglysince7 membership campaign.device used by the Indian Communists is the Party school. However, available information indicates that Communist training schools are formed on an ad hoc basis and that the Party has notermanent hierarchical system of training establishments since disbanding of tho guerrilla warfare training camps7 there were reports of short-term CPI indoctrination courses in Travancore-Cochln and Malabar (merged6 lo form Keralaadhya Pradesh, Calcutta, New Delhi, and Bombay. Others were undoubtedly given in other areas. These ranged in length from one week tp one month and the curriculum in most cases included Marxist philosophy,economics. Communist peasant and trade union activities In India, and important political and organizational problems confronting the CPI. The principal lecturers at those courses were E. M. S. Namboodiripad. B. T. Ranadtve. Dr. G. M. Adhikari, and local Partyumber of short training5 days) were held throughout India in7 to explain to Party members the proposed organizational changes to be considered at the8 Party Congress, and this congress was in turn followed bylectures to explain the congress decisions.
Party educational methods since the Amritsar Party Congress have probably advanced furthest in Kerala where the CPI has controlled the state government sinceneries of weekly study classes for local laborers were reportedly Inaugurated in that state. These evening classes on the theory and practice ofwere reportedly conducted by the local branch secretaries, and attendance among the various branches varied
The absence of adequate training facilities was recognized in tho organizational report submitted to the Amritsar Party Congresshis report recommended:he organization of short-term Party7 days) in each state;he establishment of schools especially geared to the needs of cadres in "mass(trade unions and other front) increased interstate visits by Party leaders toa national outlook among Party members; andn improvement in the literacy andeducational level of Party members. Thisset the following goal: "Sufficient knowledge should be imparled lo all Party membersear so that they arc able to read andParty Journals in the state and currentand internationaln anto achieve these objectives, an Education Committee was established within the CPI high command, and work was begunyllabus for Party education. This committee is not known to have submitted its report bynd no known permanent Party schools have been
Foreign Communists arc believed to haveinor role in CPI educational techniques.Indian Communists were reportedly trained in tbe Soviet Union and Communist Chinatbe period of CPI, but the only indication of foreignthan normal indoctrination received during the visits of various delegations to Communist-blocrecent years is the report thatIndians departed in8 for "technical training" In Budapest and Prague. No foreign Communists are known to have participated in CPI education within India since thes.
D. Finances
Statistical data on the expenditures andof the Communist Party of India, including the provincial, district, and branch committees, are extremely fragmentary. Apart from theof fund drives by some of the larger state committees in the Party press, occasional reports of amounts collected In such drives or
1FNTIAL
other special campaigns, and perennial references to the difficulty of raising funds, the Communists have always been secretive about their financial operations. Most of the information available on Party finances relatesew of the larger state and district committee budgets, to the number of "full-timers" and "part-timers" working for the Party, and to some, of Its more important front and propaganda activities. Using availablehowever, it is.possible to make someof Party expenditures that probablyairly reliable picture of tho general magnitude of these expenditures.
* #"
xpenditures
The CPI is estimated lo be currently spendingupees per year (one rupee equalsxclusive of itspublishing, and bookselling programs which are self-sustaining enterprises. In addition, the Party is estimated to be building up assets and savings at the rate ofupees per year. There is no firm basis for estimating the annual gross value of the CPl's printing,and bookselling enterprises, but these appear to be making profits ofupees per year, and the annual gross value of the business may run as high0 rupees, excluding expenditures on propaganda bybloc countries in India.
Because of the Party's low pay scales and the relatively lower costs In the India market, the Party's rupee expenditures arc comparable to at least equivalent dollar expenditures at us. prices. Although these expenditures are small compared with those of VS. parties, the Indianare spending three to four times as much as the major non-Communist opposition party, the Praja Socialist Party. More important, they are spending more on organisationalon trade union activities aseven the dominant Congress Party. Inhe Communists, with an estimatedof lessupees, polledone-fourth as many votes as the Congress with its many big-business and well-to-do party backers. Furthermore, one of the CPI goals is now reported to be raising the Party fund0 rupees by the next general election
The Party's financial history closely reflects its organizational growth.2 when the Party first began to function as an effective legalannual expenditures are estimated to haveupees.wing to the Party's wartime expansion,rose to an estimated annual rate of closeupees distributed as follows:
Payments to Party
Rents,
Net publishing expenses
Elections
Party fronts and conferences .
Prorated portion of theupees spent by the6 elections.
At the same time the Party's investment in the publishing and bookselling business is estimated to have risen to somewhereupees.8 the rate of expenditure on CPI and front activities was estimated at more than three times7 rate, orupees. This expenditure wasas follows:
Central and stsU
District and
Additional payment* to Parly
All-India Trade Union
Other
General, state, and
* ElecUon expenditures and Interest ondebt proratedears.
By7 general election the CPI was able to raise or borrow0 if5 special election in Andhra,ortion of the unified state of Andhra Pradesh, is included. Furthermore, the Party's publishing, printing, and bookselling business is now self-supporting. The main publishingin Delhi and Bombay make annualto the Party's exchequer that more than offset the combined deficits of several of the state enterprises. Finally,8 the CPI was estimated to have built up the Party's assets toupees.under Reference Data) shows theof these assets. Mores Invested in the publishing enterprises, slightly mores invested In building and property, and the remainder is held In Party funds.
Much of the recent financial expansion has been achieved since the Communists were elected to office in Kerala. By the end7 the Kerala unit of the Party had apparently paid of! itsdebt and was reported to have built up Its Party fundupees. By the end8 this fund was estimated to have risenupees. The Kerala Provincialupees In9 budgetuilding program to house not only its stateand the New Kerala press but also the Party's numerous district and branch
2
Almost no details arecentral expenditures beyond the factaccounts arc now kept of thethe "central executive" (presumably theCentral Executive Committee, andCouncil) as distinct from the expensesto its parliamentary work. All but athe members of the Central Executivedraw salaries as members of Parliament,of Communist publishing concerns, orTrade Onion Congress (AITUC) officials,it Is presumed the center's wage bill Isprimarily to maintaining its smallSince the bulk of CPI expenditures inIncurred by the publishing concerns, it isthat these enterprises are charged withas wellumber of otherProbably the most important Itemexpenditure is travel within India andParty leaders to Moscow andthe Communist bloc. Expenses forof the CPI National Council are borneby the state where they are held.also be true of Central4 the annual expenses ofPolitburoupees. It hasthat the expenses of theexecutivehole have since risenrupees.
The most important item ofat the state level is payment of thewho run the Party organization andfront activities.8 theProvincial Committee, whichmoref total CPIupees for the payment of full-workers as comparedfor the rest of its current expensesItems as travel, rents, postage andParty newspapers, and so forth. Somecommittees In areas where tradewell organized, notably MaharashtraBengal, rely on the trade unions toall or most of the full-time Party workerstrade union front. Elsewhere expensesworkers are apparently dividedproTincial committees and the tradeon their relative financialprovincial committees fix the rate ofand there are graduations based oni and family responsibilities. The present aver-
s rate for most states appears to beupeesmonth for full-time Party workers, andu-per month for those working on the trade frontunder Reference Data) the estimated annual expenditures ofnd its front organizations for the center and
the statesnformation In this tabic Is not definitive but includes approximations based on limited data. Estimates of AITUCarc particularly rough, being based on the number of full-time workers that seem to be charged to trade union rather than provincial committee budgets and the broad assumption that total trade union expenditures probablydouble the payment lo these Party workers.
c. Publishing activitiesBecauseprinting, and book distribution activitiesusiness enterprise, finances for theserequire separate treatment. Nois available on the total expenditures of these enterprises, but rough estimates can be made of the size of the wage bill and the working staff,% of whom ore probably0 (under Reference Data)eneral picture of finances of these enterprises, the approximate number of workers employed, the estimated wage bill, the net profit or loss, and the approximate size of the CPI subsidy.enterprises of six Party units which were self-supporting8rofit ofupees, but this was in part offset byestimatedupees.by the remaining units.
evenue*
Therereat deal of partial Information on sources of funds for the CPI, but this isto permit assessment of the relativeof the various sources. Most of the funds arc probably raised locally; aid from thebloc, largely concentrated on propaganda and front organizations, is estimated at less than one-fourth of the total.
The collection of dues and levies fromhas been an Important source ofthe various state corruulttecs fixing therates. Dues rangeupees(the national dues of one rupee areby provincial dues in some areas),take the formraduated scale basedearnings. The Uttar Pradeshfor example, has adopted therate of levies in percentages on
Single persons Families
rupees i
Up to
101
12*
Over
In Andhra Pradesh, members who are employed are required to "donate" fromf their earnings, in addition to annual dues of one rupee.
As part of the levy system CPI members who are also members of the Indian Parliament (MP's) or of state legislative assemblies (MLA's) arespecific amounts. MP's are required toonthly levyupees. In which theExecutive Committee, the provincialand the district committee share equally. The levies on MLA's are set by the provincialcommittees. Many of the MP's and MLA's, however, have been slow to pay their levies, and pressure has had to be exerted on them. Other Party members who have political appointments are also assessed. For example, members who are appointed to the Legislative Select Committee and the Expert Committee in Kerala must "kick back" half of their daily earnings ofupees to the Kerala Provincial Committee; in Calcutta,to the bfennlal District Committeeof the CPI musteeupees per head to the Party. The percentage of total Party revenues raised from these sources is. however, small owing to the limited number of members affected.
A second internal source of CPI funds Iscontributions from Party members,and businessmen. Some members of wealthy landed or business families who have joined the CPI have turned over most of theirto the Party. For example, E. M. S. Nam-boodiripad. Chief Minister of Kerala, is reported to have0 rupees from the sale of his land. Inumber of fellow-travellers, particularly in Bombay, contribute to the Party or its peace and Afro-Asian solidarity fronts. Finally, some small businessmen pledge financial support to the Communists In anto ensure labor peace;
A thud source is the annual general fund drive which is geared to collect money from labormembers at the time of their bonus payments and from peasants at harvest time.rive was instituted In-Andhra Pradeshnd the provincial committeeupees, compared with an original target. More than half of this collection, however, may have been profits earnedice purchase arrangement between Andhra Pradesh traders and the Cornmunist government of Kerala. This general fund drive has to some extent replaced special drives for specific purposes, but special fundraising campaigns are still used to finance the purchases of new presses and plants forpublishing enterprises, Party headquurters buildings. Party congresses and conferences, and election campaigns. In states where theParty is Influential, such as Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, relatively little difficulty isin raising the set quota; In others, the actual collections are frequently less than half the target.
A fourth local source of CPIuse of official governmental Influence oronly In those states where Communists havepositions of importance- The Communist-controlled state of Kerala Is the best example In the first two years in office the Kerala branch of the Party Is estimated to have collectedupees through official coercion, bribes, and kickbacks. Anti-Communist press reports allege that special fund drives in Kerala are designed to conceal the How offunds into the Party treasury.
Several provincial committees have attempted to raise additional funds through Communist-controlled business enterprises. To date the sale of books, pamphlets, and periodicals printed by local Party presses hasrofit inew states. These enterprises areoss, and the chief purpose of such projects is clearly propaganda rather than profit. The central publishing house has been the most profitable and Is estimated to be00 rupees per year to the central Party headquarters. Some of this money,was used to repay the loan which the Party floated toupee building to house the enterprise. In Kerala the Party has beenwith some other types of businessCPI-sponsorcd labor cooperatives operate toddy shops, and peasant associations work on government projects, with the profits reverting to the Party.
Although the CPI's main income Is derived from localand donations, levies and dues, and misuse of officialParty also receives an undetermined amount of external aid Irom the Communist bloc, provided directly and indirectly. In recent years, there has been little proof of direct subsidy to the CPI from.umber of devices have been used to provide support Indirectly. On occasion Soviet and bloc Embassies in New Delhi have been reported to make cash contributions via contact agents to avoid the appearanceirect tie-up. Other assistance has been provided by payingrates for carrying feature articles in tbe Communist press, by commissioning Indianof Russian books, and by providing virtually free of charge large quantities of books andfor sale by CPI book bouses. Furthermore, the Soviet Embassy is reported to be paying high salaries to several CPI publications men who pre-
sumabiy serve as TASS employees.0 rupees worth of Soviet aid was forwarded through the People's Publishing Rouse In Bombay to the Communists in Kerala to helpUC leader S. A. Daugeupees per monthalariedof the WPTU, and7 heupeesemorial In honor of one of India's most prominent trade union leaders. There was no subsequent announcement on the use of this money, and it Is assumed that most of it was spent on AITUC activities.8 it was alleged that Dangc hadery large0 rupees) from abroad. Although the rate of ATTVC expenditures has certainly been increased In the past two years, this report appears to be exaggerated; the actual increase is0upees annually. Although these sums appear small, the general financial position of most Indian trade unions is sothat the additionew thousand rupees could prove decisive If usedtrike or critical period of jurisdictional rivalry.
E. Propagandaontent
The main targets of Communist propaganda in India are the four broad classes which the Party visualizes as Its potential allies ineople's democratic government: the workers, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and the anti-imperialist "nationalist" bourgeoisie.propaganda, both domestic and foreign,ual motivation:t is designed to draw the Indian peopleroad national front against the United States and Western military alliances, andt is designed to enlist for the Communists
the support of 'particularly vulnerable targeteducated unemployed, landlesslaborers, minority linguistic and caste groups, and the unstable middle class.
Domestic Issues upon which the Communist Party has centered its propaganda and agitation1 have included the following ofinterest to peasants and agricultural workers: the periodic shortage of food, the need for price control, high rural indebtedness and lax burdens, the government's failure to provide adequate drought and flood relief, and the need for reform in land tenancy and eviction procedures.directed to workers have been the following propaganda themes: the need for increased wages and social security benefits, trade union rights, labor unity, opposition to retrenchment andthe desire for equal wages for men and women, and opposition to foreign business
"monopolies" in India. Themes of specialto students have been use of the mother tongue as the medium of Instruction, reduction of tuition and examination fees, the right ofand teachers to participate fully in political activity, student freedom in matters of student union elections and activities, and increasedfor technical, professional, and scientific training. On the woman's front the Communists have centered their propaganda and agitation on such issues as women's and children's welfare, abolition of the dowry system, increasedopportunities for women, and government aid to women's organizations.
Other domestic issues on which the Partyvarious groups urc the need forof India, linguistic and regionalnationalization of banking andIndustries, democratic liberties and civil rights, tho desire for higher standards of living, corruption in government, national culturaland caste discrimination and com-munaUsm. National sovereignty, imperialism and colonialism, Afro-Asian solidarity, racialism,of India by American capital, nuclear tests and weapons, praise for the Communist bloc, and world peace arc the major international Issues upon which the Communists focus theirattention.
PI media
Propaganda and agitation on domestic andissues are carried out by the Conununist Partyariety of ways: the printing of news and comment in newspapers andthe production and distribution ofand books; the production and exhibition of films; the observance ol such days as "Faminehe organization of meetings, signature campaigns, demonstrations, fasts, and hunger strikes; the presentation of dramas and skits; speeches In Parliament and the state assemblies; and the newest method oftaken by the government of Kerala.
CPI publishing houses in India turnitles of books and pamphletsotal ofopies. The cost of this production is estimated atupees. The cost of the Party's newspaper and periodical output probably does notupees. Thus, totul annual expenditure on the Party's publishing program is estimatedupeesxpenditures on other media arc probably less than those on theprogram, and it Is thus likely that the CPI spends less than the equivalent ofear on propaganda activity.
a. Printed matterPrinted matter Is the principal medium of mass communicationby the Indian Communists. The Party and its front organizations publish numerous newspapers and periodicalsarge number of pamphlets. However, of the moreewspapers and periodicals In Indiaew dozen are Cornmunlst sponsored,mallnumber toe the Party line. Partyrank among the top six In circulation only in Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal.
ewspapers and periodicalsThe CPIumber of central and provincial organs. On the whole these are ably edited and have an attractive format. The most common lead articleighly biased account ofin government or "antlpeople" policies and statements by government officials, closelyby articles praising the Sino-Soviet bloc, denouncing the United States, and reporting on CPI meetings and policy statements. Theof each Issue Is usually devoted toarticles praising some aspect of Lite In the Sino-Soviet bloc, "exposing" reactionarypolicies, and publicizingagitations in the various states. Theorgans of the CPI are the responsibility of the Central Executive Committee while those at the provincial level are the responsibility of the provincial committees concerned. The CPI alsoew district organs, but districtof the Party are notule financially or organizationally able to publish their own journals.
The number of organs published by the Party depends on various factors, the two mostof which are Its financial resources and the degree of political freedom It enjoys. After the CPI gained legal statusnd even shortly before in anticipation of thisargeof Party Journals sprang up throughoutA weekly central organ. People's War, was started in English In Bombay, while provincialwere started in the Bengaliunjabiand identically named Journals in Tamil, Telegu. andhe Party enjoyed complete freedom in developing its press during World War II and the immediate postwar period, but when it changed Its tactics8 it became the target of governmental repression, and the Party press was hard hit. Many of the publications which had come into existence prior8 were forced to close down. In north India, the Bengali daily organ of the Bengal Provincial Committee, Swadhlnataas bannedas were Lokyug (People's Age) In Marathi, Janyug (People's Age) In Hindi, Janyug (People's Age) in Oujarati. and Naya Zamana (New Age) in Urdu. In south India. Deshabhlmanl and all three language issues of Janatakti had to suspendThe Party's central organ (then called People's Age) was banned Inut although the provincial press was decimated, the central organ was able to continue Its existence under various namesreak of only six months.
After the Party changed its tactics1 and gained some measure of freedom, the Party press began lo reappear. Swadliinala resumedinnd the Tamil version of Jana&akti and the Marathi-language Yugantar (People's Age) began in1 In anattempt to revive these propaganda media beforeeneral elections. During the elections the circulation of Party publications was greatly expanded, but this was done on aand unbusinesslike basis, and mostran Into debt.2 the Partyto meet the debts incurred during the election period and get the papers on abasis. Yugantar was suspended formonths and then restarted at double the price; Swadhlnata had to sell its printing press andheaper one; and the Tamil Janasaktt switched from daily to weekly publication In
4 the Party has made strenuousto rulse the level of tho Party press und put Itound financial footing. There have been drives to reequip the Parly press with newto use better newsprint, and to make the organs less sectarian and more appealing to broad sections of the population. Available data on the official organs published by the CPI as ofhe most recent date for which complete Information Is available, are presented in tabular form innder Reference Data. Since7 the Party has started at least one new organ. This is Sandesama monthly theoretical and political Journal of the Andhra Pradesh ProvincialCommittee, supervised by an editorial boardersons (Kambhampatl Satyanarayunu. the chief editor, Thammareddy Satyanarayana, Ka-dlyala Oopalarao. and Mahldhrahis monthlyublished In Telegu andirculationn The most important of the current publications are the weekly New Age, the official Party newspaper, whichirculation07 and is
estimated to have,0 Innd the Party's theoretical journal, the monthly New Age. Both are edited by Party stalwarts. In9 the Central Executive Committee formed an editorial board to supervise boththe board included P. C. Joshi (chief editor of tbe. T. Ranadlve (chief editor of thend M. Basavapunnalah, Mohil sen, Zlaul Haq, and Ramdas.
Like the CPI, many or the Party's fronthave their own organs. The history of these organs has been much the same as that of the Party organs, for the fortunes of the front organizations are'closcly tied to thaw of the CPI. When the CPI faced governmenteriod the front organizations, too, were often repressed to the point of beingcompletely disrupted. With the change in CPI tactics1 and the concomitant revival of CPI front organizations, publications ofstudent, peasant, labor and other frontsto appear. As of7 six suchwere known, available Information on which is presented InnderData-in addition to the organs ol the CPI and its front organizations, thereumber ofand periodicals which may be described as feUow-travellng. The most Important of these is Blitz. It has an estimated circulation ofs published in Bombay by the Blitz Publicationsnd is edited by the well-known fellowaranjla. This sensational journal, which plays up racial conflicts in the United States, ulleged evidences of. policies, and scandals In the Indian government,articular appeal to the student community in India. Fellow-traveling newspapers andare published by enterprises which, if not controlled by Party members and sympathizers, arc either subsidized or under contract to the CPI or significantly Infiltrated by CPI members. Among the newspapers and periodicals in various intelligence reports asor consistently following the Party line are the following: Andhra Prabha (Light of Andhra, published in Madrasndhra Praja (People of Andhra,nal ha (The Masses,eralam (Kerala,ava Keralam (New Kerala,avrashtra (New Land, Patna) Orissaelhi Timesanchshtl Herald (Five Principles Herald,umber of publications In Jammu and Kashmir: Jammu Lok Sabha (Jammuammu Sandesh (Jammuartand (Sun).A) (Newri-nagar Kong Posh (Srinagar Saffron Flower).
Two fairly new publications. Link and Daily Maratha. may be examples of the direction in which the Communists are now expanding in an effort toroader audience than that reached by purely Party publications. Inew joint stock company was formed to publish tho Marathl-language newspaper entitled the Daily Maratha which came out in support of the conceptnited Maharashtra stateBombayoncept favored by the CPI. Although ostensibly an independent paper. Daily Maratha is reportedly Communist linked. Its editor, P. K. Aire, who hasuccessful career both in Journalism and motion picture production, was one of the members of an Indian filmwhich visited ihe USSR TJve subeditor is V. M. Bhavc, formerly associated with New Age, Two of the men active in the joint slock company which publishes Daily Maratha are M. V. Donde. who went to Moscow in5rip sponsored by the Indo-Sovlct Cultural Society, and Lalje M.ormer member of the CPI and an All-India Peace Council delegate to the Helsinki Peace Festivalhe CPI hasgiven extensive financial assistance to this journal which, through supporting Maharashtrlan aspirations, has become the most popular Marathl-language paper.
eekly news magazine similar in style to the American publication Time, was started8ublic joint stock company. Reported to be among its shareholders are Dr. A. V. Baliga. prominent Bombay surgeon and CommunistNargis. popular Indian film star andof an Indian film delegation to Moscow as well as star of the Joint Indo-Sovict film Pardesi; and Mrs. Aruna Asaf All, former CPI member who is still apparently sympathetic toward communism The editor of Link is Edataormer CPI member, and the editorial staff is well sprinkled with active or former members of the CPI and fellow travelers; among them are: V. S. P.ontributor to the CPl's New Age; O. P.PI member; J.PI member; V. V.ellow traveler formerly with the pro-Communist Delhi Tunes andHerald; T. A. Balakrishnan. editor and printer of the Delhi Times; C. Ramachandran. CPIwho was formerly on the staff of New Age; A. Vlshwanathan, CPI member and until recently on the staff of New Age; Bhat Bedl, CPI member and special correspondentommunist Urdu daily. Link's staff of foreign correspondentsIqbal Singh, well-knownand P. K. Trlpathl, former staff member of TASS In New Delhi. Link has reportedly been backed by Defense Ministerrishnaeading
1
35, SUPPLEMENT VI
9
In tho Congress Party's left wing,ubscriptions are said to have been taken out by the Indian Defense Ministry for placement in service libraries and reading rooms.
Another new periodical of the Link type which may be Communist infiltrated is Indian Foreign Affalrt, published and edited by Jatcndra M. Ag-garwal and printed on the Roxy Printing Press in New Delhi.
Another new field of Communist press activity opened with the CPI victory in Kerala, int was reported that theof Kerala was making sizable government loans to some papers in that stato, including Dcshabhimani, organ of the Kozhlkode District Committee of the CPI, which reportedlyoan0 rupees. At the same lime Krishna Iyer, Kerala Law Minister, admitted publiclyress conference that the Kerala government had blacklisted certain opposition papers bythe placement of governmenta major source of income for many small newspapers. In addition, the Kerala governmentubsidy to tbe major Indian wire services to carry government handouts.
Another new venture of the CPI isarty-dominated news agency. In7 it was announcedeeting of the Kerala Newspaper Owners' Associationress service Irad recently been established in Mew Delhi by the CPI and that an accreditedhad already been assigned to Trivan-drum, the capital of Kerala. The organization of an indigenous Communist press agencyime when India's leading press service, the Press Trust of India, was in danger of bankruptcy and trying to increase its rates was. well limed, but there is no information on the extent to which the new Communist news agency, known as the Indian Press Agency, has succeeded In luringpapers to use its service. The agency isin New Delhi, and David Cohen, an Indian who was formerly editor of Unity, the organ or the Communist-front Indian People's Theateris listed as chief editor.
onperiodicaX literatureBoth the Central Executive Committee and the variouscommitteesumber ofsnd bookselling houses,ew districtrun bookstalls. In addition, thereumber of other publishers and booksellers inwho publish and distribute Communist
Most of the Party publishing houses nre private limited joint stock companies In which shares arc heldmall group of individuals, usuallyParly members. The Peoples Publishing House (Private) Ltd. Is the leading enterprise of thisew houses, like JanayugamLtd. in Kerala, are public limited stockin which the controlling interest is owned by Party members and the balance of shares are offered for sale to the general public. To save money which would otherwise go lo thein taxes, the Vlsalandhra Publishing House Ltd. in Andhra Pradesh is reportedlyhange-overorporate structure Lo thatublic trust. Most of these enterprises seem to operaterofit, bringing the Party anestimated as highear. Data relating to leading CPI publishing and book houses are presented tabularlynder Reference Data.
These concerns publish in English as well as In vernacular languages, the central housein English and the provincial houses in the languages qf their particular region. They publish both books and pamphlets, and while the bulk of the output is purely communist literature they arc lending increasingly to publishworks. Some of the output is Indian in origin, and the remainder consists of translations or reprints of foreign works. The Partyhouse in West Bengal, the National Book Agency (Private)or example, has through the Soviet Trade Agency in Calcutta, obtained the rights to translate and publish in Bengali many Soviet books, including numerous children's books. Similarly, the New Century Book House, the Party publishing house in Madras slate, has translated and published inumber of Soviet works. These two houses, and presumably the other CPI publishing concerns, havewho can not only translate from Russian but also from English and the various Indian
CPI publishing houses areood position to obtain both foreign and domestic Communist works for publication, and they undoubtedlyfor much of tbe nonperiodical Communist literature published in India. However, some Communist or "progressive" material, both foreign and domestic, is published in India by houses which cannot, on the basis of availablebe clearly Identified as Communist. Star Publications in Madras, for example, haspublished inignificant number of Soviet books, although this concern is not known to be under Communist control. In West Bengal, the Eastern Trading. Ganguly and Co.nd the Popular Library have alsoignificant amount of Communist literature. It is possible that these and such others as C. H.
9
Publicationsalco Publishing Houseurrent Book House (Bombay),Literature Publicationsharatl Libraryhaudhuri and Sonsellat Publishing House (Tirunulveli) aitd Shila Prakoshani (Delhi) are non-Communist Party houses which publish Communistperhaps on contract, purelyrofit motive
In the field of bookselling, each Party housenot only its own output, but also material from other publishers, both Indian and foreign. The2 "Catalogue of Important Books" Issued by the Mew Century Book House in Madras (all of the CPI booksellers put out lists andof books for.sale)ide range ofand "progressive" literature published in India by various publishers and Inommunist China, the United Kingdom.and the United States. The booksellersiscount on stock from other Indian publishers as wellubstantial discount from foreign publishers. Most If not all the Partyhave direct contact with Communisthouses abroad, and they periodicallyto the Government of India for allocations of foreign exchange for the Importation of books. The People's Publishing House (Private)nd possibly some of the provincial houses, export books to Communist booksellers abroad.
Therearked trend in all Communist book-houses to handle non-Communist as well aspublications. In fact, the houses even sell publications from rival political organizations. They also handle textbooks approved by the local school textbook committees In part this is done for profit motive. In part toroaderof the people.,
Some of the party houses, such as the Prabhat Book House In Kerala, operate bookmobiles und set up temporary book stalls at festivals andIn the sale of Communist literature they are helped by teams organized by the Party to conduct special sales drives among workers, peasants, and other groups. These teamspeddle their wares from door to door, sell them in the street, outside schools and factories, near streetcar and bus stops, and at railway
While much Communist literature is sold through the Party houses, perhaps the bulk is sold through outlets which on the basis ofdata cannot definitely be identified as Purty enterprises and which may Indeed not be Party houses. Among these are the Assam National
Book Agencyhauonl and Sonsurrent Book Distributorsopular Book Depotn Kay Bee and Companyxford Book and Stationary Companynd the Delhi Book Centre (Delhi).
The largest CPI publishing and bookselling house is that operated by the Central Executive Committee, the People's Publishing HouseLtd.hisorporation in which all the shares are owned by various members of this committee No information is available on the capitalization of the enterprise, but S. A. Dauge alone reportedly0 rupees worth of shares. Dange has been in charge of the PPH since8 Amritsar Party Congress. The main office of the PPH Is in New Delhi where the national office of the CPI is also located. It has only one branch, in Bombay, where the main office was located before its transfer to New Delhielective list of pamphlets and booksby the PPH ineriod isinnder Reference Data.
Althoughommunist publishing house both in management and output, the PPH aspires to be recognizedational publishing concern.tep in this direction, It isstepping up its outputinimum ofear and diversifying to include not only Communist works but also nonsectarian items of literary merit whichider appeal.
With regard to the various publishing houses run by the provincial committees, the mostInformation is available on the People's Publishing House of Bihar (PPHB) and the Visa-landhra Publishing House in Andhra Pradesh. PPHB was started in Patna, Bihar.6 on an Initial capitalupeesonatedommunist leader. In6 the Bihar Provincial Committee of the CPI took over the management of the enterprise, perhaps because of the poor financial state of the publishing house which thenank balance of onlyupees. At that time It was decided tbat the PPHB would serve not only Bihar but also the eastern portion of Uttar Pradesh. During its first year underParty management, the PPHB appears to have published atitles tor the BiharCommittee in Hindi and Urdu. These Items were apparently pamphlets and folders priced atayc paiser less, and the number of copies rangedn the case5 naye paise publication0 in the case of one selling foraye paise. No definite information is available on what press printed these items for
3-J
the PPHB, though It is thought to have been the Yatim Press in Patna.
Bookselling Is the principal activity of the PPHB. The total value of sales5 rupeesuring the0 rupees during the.tems valued0 rupees accountedfales, the remainder being composed of Indian publications. One-third ofupees accounted Tor by Indianrepresented textbooks. Some of thelike Soviet Sang ki Communist Party (The Communist Party of the Sovietarxioad Kya Hat (What isnd Janwadi Chin ka Bhumi Sudhar Kanun (Land Distribution Law of People's China) were obviously published by Communist houses and had been approved by the Education Department of the non-Communist Government of Bihar.
The publishing activity of the VisalandhraHouse (Communist) in the state ofPradesh has beenairly large scale. During the first five years of its operation this houseitles (includingeprints)opies. The distribution of this output by subject was as follows:
Theoretical
23
88
Andhra Pradesh
IB
.
IS
17
and poetry
IS
stories
SS
18
'27
story collections ..
8
34
Sis original.
The publishing house claims that It pays royalties higher than.the prevailing market rate and that authors, both Communist and non-Communist, are pleased to liavc it publish their works. The house prides itself on the number of children's books it has published, claiming the volume of output Is unprecedented in the history of anyconcern.
It sells bookside variety of publishers obtainedonsignment or credit basis into its own publications.6 the sale of other books far exceeded the sale of booksMarxist ideology. The house refuses, however, to carry anti-Communist literature, sexand books which promote "superstitious and blind beliefs."
arty printing pressesThe CPI owns an undetermined number of printing presses. The largest of these is operated by the Party's Central Executive Committee in New Delhi and known as the New Age Printing Press. Some of thecommittees, but apparently not all, also have presses which print some of the periodical and nonpcrlodical publications put out by the CPI and its front organizations, They also appear to do job printing for outsiders. Most of the Party presses appear to operaterofit, often helping the Party to meet the deficits incurred byof newspapers. Available data on leading Party presses are presented innder Reference Data.
The Party printing enterprises appear to beeriod of growth which beganhe Ma-dhya Pradesh Provincial Committee, for example, has been trying to raise money to purchase its first press. The Bihar Provincial Committee has decided toress of its own and has made overtures toward the privately owned Yatlm Press on which its organ, Janasakti, has been printed; the West Bengal Provincial Committee has been trying toew rotary press valuedupees; the Tamil Nad Provincialhas ordered large printing machinery from. and has been soliciting funds toa new building lo house its press.
The Party and its front organizations have some of their printing done on presses which, on the basis of available information, cannot beestablished as Party-controlled presses. Among these are the Roxy Press (New Delhi) which handles some of the printing for the All-India Peace Council and the Chinese Communist and Soviet Embassies; the Punjab Press (Delhi) which prints the Tclcgu edition of Soviet Land for the Soviet Embassy; the Baliya Press (Delhi) which prints the Tamil edition of Soviet Land; the New India Press (Delhi) which prints the Hindi version of Soviet Land; the Naveen Press (Delhi) whichindi fortnightly for the All-India Peace Council; the Guha Printing Works (Calcutta) which prints Antarjatik (Peacefor the West Bengal Peace Council; Usha Printers (Bombay) which prints ISCUS for the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society; the Sree Printing Works (Calcutta) which prints Parichayathe Asha Lakshmi Press (Darjeeling) which prints Agradoot (Messenger) for theParty; the Jai Hind Press (Ernfikulam) and Central Cooperative Printers (Trivandrum) which print Party weeklies; and Cooperative Printings (Trichur) on which is printed the daily Navajeevan (New Life).
If TIAL
Motion picturesIndianellow travelers have established severalto produce motion pictures. One of these, the Red Eagle Film Company Ltd. was organizedhe formation of this company was Denuded by the feUow-traveling BUtz in theterms;
To break the throtUinc grips of financiersthe art ot the cinema In India toonto rods, Mulk Raj Anand has floatedcompany to make pictures. Thewill be financed entirely by smallair,ie people of the country, newonlyupees
The first picture scheduled to be filmed was Two Leavesud, based on the book of the same name by Mulk Raj Anand, long active on thecultural front. This production wasthe first and the last to be produced by lhe company.
Inhe formation of anothermotion picture company, the People's Coop-eraUve Cine Society, was announced. Tbe aim of this society appeared to be to produce one or two motion pictures based on Communist dramas, such as You Madeommunist and Prodigal Son. popularized by the Kerala People's Artommunist-Iront organization believed to bewith the Cconmunist-front India People's Theater Associationhe IPTA Itselfa feature film6 entitled Dharti Ke Lai (Children of the Soil) which dealt with famine conditions in Bengal.
7 Naya Sansaroint Indo-Sov.rt film production venture, was organized in Bombay. This enterprise produced theale of alleged contact between Russia and India inh century. The film was jointly directed.by V. M. Pronin of the USSR and Indian fellow traveler K. A. Abbas and was basedcreenplay by Maria Smirnova and Abbas. Indian film, artists Nargis, Bairaj Sahni. Prtthvlraj, and Davidast president of IPTA) starred with Soviet artists in the film. Pardesi, the production of which allegedly cost theofas to be followed by other motion pictures, but none had appeared by
Despite their meagre film production, theare able to influence India's motionindustry through inducing some artists to accept the Communist propaganda line and through infiltration of top-echelon ixjsilions. An outstanding pro-Communist In tho Bombay film industry is K. A.rolific writer who. In sedition to producing screenplays himself, writes scenarios based on stories by others. Ismat
Chugtai, Mulk Raj Anand, Rajendia Singh Bcdi, Majruh Sultanpurt. Krishan Chandar, V. P. Sathe, Zla Sarhady. and Sardar Jafri are alsosympathizers who are frequent contributors to Bombay productions. Pro-Communist actorsaddition to those who starred inKapoor. K. N. Singh, and Durga Khote. Directors and producers who follow the Communist line in Bombay include Shahldhani Mazumdar, and Bal Chhabda.are probably also numerous In theand Madras film industries, but detailedon these areas is not available.
There is no evidence that the CPI owns orcommercial film distribution or exhibition facilities; feature filmsommunist theme are distributed and shown through commercial channels. However, the Parly, and to an even greater extent its front organizations, haveeading role In exhibiting films on abasis for propaganda and educational purposes. Most films used for these purposes are of Soviet. Communist Chinese, or other foreign origin, although Communist organizations In India have begun to produce short propaganda films by using commercial facilities. The All-India Trade Union Congress, lor example, recently exhibited its first documentary, They Work and They Live.
c RadioRadio broadcasting in Indiaonopoly of the central government conducted by All-Indiaepartment attached to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The only access to radio the Communists have is through infiltration of personnel or via scripts, musical compositions, or other material usedby the broadcasting agency. While there has been some Infiltration (see this Supplement,his has been limited, and radio isignificant Communist propaganda
The CPI encourages the composition ofsongs for which purpose competitions have occasionally been staged. Such themes as peace or the visitoreign Communist culturalto India are sometimes chosen. These songs are presented at cultural programs, worked into films and stage productions, and broadcast over Radio Moscow and Radio Tashkent.they are recorded and sold commercially in India Inive members of the Kerala People's Art Club visited Madras City at theof His Master's Voice recording company to record hits from the drama You Madeommunist. It is not known whether such songs are broadcast over All-India Radio.
d Other mldia--Tiic Indian Communists appear to have made an extensive study of the forms of communication In rural India, adopting some of the more important folk forms for their own purposes. For example, in theareas, the Indian People's Theater Association makes use of such folk forms as the barrakaf/ia (bardic recital/and folk song) and of the fiarl-katha, and .vecdhi natakan (open-airor the burrakatha which is usually presentedrincipal singer and two other persons whochoral and drum accompaniment, the IPTA has composed new ballHds dealing with such themes as the .life of the peasants, social reform, and the pre-independence famine in Bengal.the harilcatha Is the narration, by an interweaving of song, poetry, prose, and dunce, of the Hindu religious epics. While retaining the purity of the form of presentation for thesethe IPTA has supplied Communistmatter. The vcedhi natakan is similar to the kathakaU of Kerala, an open-air. all-night dance drama, and is used for propaganda plays. In an attempt to capitalize further on these media, the Communist government in Kerala State has raited the Vallothol Academy, aorganization in the slate for the training of performers of kathakaU and other traditional arts, to the statustate academy of music, dance, and drama.
The Communists have not overlooked thestage in urban areas. Prithvlraveling group whose mainstay is Prithvlraj, well-known stage and screen actor and member of the All-India Peace Council, specializes inplays for the middle classes. One of the company's most effective productions is Dlwar (Wall) which describes the transition from the good life of ancient India to the misery and wretchedness allegedly brought by foreignOther types of Communist stage activity in urban centers include ballets such as the Btrth of Urvasht, the Triumph of Life, end The Boon, written by the talented Mulk Raj Anand who. among other pro-Communist activities, holds membership in the All India Peace Council and the All-India Progressive Writers' Association.
oreign Communist media
Little Communist materialropagandaentered preindependence India. Sinceindependent, however, India has entered into diplomatic, trade, and other relations with the USSR- and subsequently with the Eastsatellites and Communist China, and the entry of printed matter snd films from theworld has become commonplace, as has the exchange of delegations and missions.
Maximum Soviet expenditures onpublications in Hindi, Urdu, and Bengali and meant for distribution In India arc estimated at about the equivalent ofor thehis figure Is based on anitlesotalopies. Soviet expenditures on periodical literature invernacular languages probably approximated the equivalent ofhinese expenditures on Indian vernacular publishingtoraction of that ofS.R. Judging from the relative output. The totalol the two countries on the publishing program for India, including publication output in English. Is probably, at the maximum.nnually. Expenditures on other media probably raise the total foreignexpenditure on propaganda in India to about
a. Printed matterCommunist periodicals are Imported into India from Communist and non-Communist countries. In addition.nations publish some periodicals in India.
No reliable Information Is available on theof foreign Communist periodicals imported. Indian customs statistics revealounds of magazines und periodicals0 pounds of newspapers were Imported from Communist Chinao direct Imports of periodicals or newspapers fromere recordedlthough it Is known that Hindi and Urdu versions of Soviet Union and Soviet Woman, both printed in the TK&SJL, are distributed in India. Most imported Communist periodicals are printed in English, although not onlyut also Communist China has facilities forin Hindi and Urdu (issues of China Pictorial in both these languages arc imported from China).
The Soviet Embassy in New Delhiaily cyclostyledorm of stenciling) publication in English entitled News and Views from the Soviet Union, subscription Lo which Isaye paiseer annum.ri-weekly basts the Embassy Issues vernacular versions of thisin Hindi. Bengali. Qujarati, Marathl. Te-legu, and Urdu, andl-weckly basis versions appear in Malayalam. Tamil, and Punjabi. The embassy also publishes Inortnightly,Land, which is sold ataye paise per
2
ii^
Marathi
Telegu
Malayalam
Punjabi
Orlya .
Karinat!;!
English
Bengali
Hindi
Tamil
Urdu
CJujarati
Tola)
0
copy. The languages of publication and estimated circulation of Soviet Land are as follows:
0
The Chinese Conununist Embassyally eyclostyled publication In English, News from China. It also publishes an English-language fortnightly. CAfna Today (estimatednd its Urdu version. Aj ka Chin. Intwo Chinese language dailies, the China Re-mew and the Chinese Journal of India, arc thought to be subsidized by Conununist China. Tho China Review is printed on the Lita Press, reportedly owned by the Chinese Consulate in Calcutta, while the Chinese Journal is printed at the Kuna Ming Tang press.
Communist nonperiodlcal literature is imported from many countries, but available information prevents determining the quantity. Foreign trade statistics7 showounds of books imported into India directly fromounds from Communist China, as comparedounds from the United Kingdomrom the United States. The value of books and pamphlet Imports directly from.7 wasupees. This small volume and value suggest that Soviet material enters India via other countries.
Although most of tho Imported works areto be in English, the Soviet Union produces and ships to India books and pamphlets in Hindi. Urdu, andatalogue of the National Book Agency.alcutta, listsitlesin Hindi7 In the Soviet Union,n Urdu, andn Bengali. The books fell into the following categories:
classics 2 and political 21
H M 28
f the fiction In each of the threerepresented Uterature for children and youth. Characteristic of the books Is their high quality and low price.
Of Communist literature published inby Indian publishing houses, bothand non-Communist. It appears thattitles far outnumber Chinese titles. While more thanranslations of Soviet writers' works wore thus publishedhere wasranslation from the Chinese.otal of overranslations of Russian works have been published in Malayalam in Kerala andn Tamil In Madras. The number of Indianof Russian poetry, drama, and fiction,in various languages of India7 by various publishers, is presented in6 under Reference Data.
mall percentage of the motion pictures imported into India each year come from Communist countries. As shown in7 under Reference Data,fm andfm foreign films certified by the Indian censorship board7 were from Communist countries.. is the largest supplier of these films. Communist China and Czechoslovakia are approximately tied for second place, each accounting forhird of the number supplied byumbers of films are Imported from Hungary, Rumania, and other4. had Its own agent in Bombay to arrange for the importation and distribution of Soviet films Sometime45 an Indian firm, K. T. Brothers, reportedly was appointed sole Importing and distributing agent for Soviet motion pictures.
1M3
WW
D
na
5 V,
0
n a
I3SS
io&
At the end8. wasa total ofours undinutes each week to South Asia (India. Pakistan. Ceylon,andhina was broadcasting onlyut has sinceore hours. As shown below. Soviet broadcasts to South Asia have steadily expandedoth in terms of hours per week and In number of languages:
English
Bengali
Hindi
Tamil
Urdu
With the inaugurationours per week of Hindi-language broadcasts, the same amount as in English, Communist China has begun to expand its radio output to South Asia.
F. Reference data
The tables Included in this Subsection present detailed statistical data in the general order of reference in the text
html
SUPPLEMENT VI
9
MEMBERS OF THE CPI NATIONALROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COMMlTTKB
3
Dr. Z. A. Ahmed.*
Hujiab Begum.
wiu Chakraverli.
Homesn Chandra.*
S. A. Dauge.*
. Ghatu. Ajoy. K. Gopalan." tmpesh. C. Jwbl.* rs. Parrulhi K'Whnan. Hireiidra NaUi Muker|oe-N. Praaadaajjad Zulwer.
ANDHRA.sqdoom Mohiuddln. K. L. Narssiinham. Guntur Bapanayya.
Rao.*
ChamlrasekbaraHanumauthaV. Krishna Rao.
T. NogiaJs Sckhara Reddi. tt. Ydla Reddy. Ravi Narayan. Suudarayya. T. Satyanarayana-
:
Achincya IthaUaeharya.
Plianl Horn.*
:
Ali Aalunf.
Siinil
JagaiHialh Sarkar.
Karyanandogendru NaihJndradocp Sinba.
: Oliiraau MclUii. Diukar Mehla.
KERALA8-K.chutbuBalaehandruN. CovlndanK. Vwudeva"C.lofsmmaUnniK. Warrior.
MAUHYA;
Balkriahiia K. Gupta.
L. R. Kiiandkar.:
G. M. Adhiktui.
Chandra Gupi* Chaudhury.
6mdam Deshmubh.
S. G. Patkar.
B. T. Ranadive.'
S. G- Sardeaai*
: Thiam Meslichandra.
Itira Singh.:
ti. V. Kakkilaya.
N. L.:
Gokiil Mohain Roy Cliun-ntaiii.
Rumskrishna Pal.
Curucaaran Pntnuik."
PUNJABSinghSinghSinghHariSiiwhK. Vyaa.
TAMIL
P. Jocvaoaudain.
m. KalyanasiiiKliirnni.
P. lininamuiti.*
K. Ramani.
B. Srinivasa Kao.
N. Sankarayya.
M. R. Vunkalaramnn.'
;
Dashralh Deb.
Blren Dutl. UTTAR:
Siiiv Kumar Mlwa.
Kali Shanksr Shukla.
Jul Bahadur Singh.
Shank ar Dayai Thrarl.
S. S. Yoauf.
WEST: milanffar Ahmed. Jyoliudrajrel Gupta. Jollyom Nalli LaWrl. Bhowaniancn Sen.
: M.
Yog Duu.Shawm.
of Uie Central ExcchUvc CommilU*.
. MEMBERSHIP OP CPI CENTRALSS, AND YEAR OP ELECTION
lAUt
m cm anas)
in-
(TKN-tativk)
hembkhb) (incoh-i'l.VMll
khubuh)
19S8
hmed, Musaffar. Ahmed,li. Aruoaasil,aUiwala,haradwaj, It. D
Bora, -
B<*e, Amu
Chandra,aiuodaran, K. . .
Dange, S. A
Deb. Dashmlh. |ii.,Ji-i'i:kli..
(I'D).
X.
X.
X
X (died).
X
X. X.
X (PB)
X (PB)
X
X (PB).
X
X (PB)
X (GSPB).
X
X
X (PB).
| X
| X
X
X (GS and PB).
X
X
X
X
X (PB).
X
X
X (CS and PB).
X
X
X (CS)
X (CS) X
X
X <GS and
CS)
uoioowa al oml or tnfilc.
nnliHutd)
owal SliCMtafy, CH-CenU-al SecreUfUl. 'flu-mlltwa33 are not avullnlNV.
rn CaaUal KwortW. CaaunHUwS
of lhaw xirvliie .hi (bn mall wntinl oom-
NIS SUPPLEMENT9
X selected data
RUB
i* aiaiH
airaaaui'Nit
Mr M .
l1 (ItorHn)
Culled Kln|dan
kliiiinl 7. A
Bnpi
Munlim.
ibm
d | . | | v * .
(Cambrida*)
Europe, Near East,
MoU..
CwumuniM China,Moe
M
4
iwkab.
Ml
Kuilh* CMtc.
Jyoli
Communist China,
Hindu
h a
Hlad*.
i
la United Kiag-
i Chins,
1 1
Eastern Europe.
tpihfrii antii .
I'.MO
Banana Univer-
ommunkri China ..
Hindu.
Naif CMltl
lj.;.
_ C It
Bombay.
Hindu
Brahmin
llaail im.
,
oibrr Uk* eounlriea-
.
te.
i. A If
Pradeah
I WW
L'tlar Pradnth.
Hindu.
Near EmI
A.
A. K
Gupta. Bbuprab
CoinmuHlit Chtun,
Hindu
Xambiar east*.
<Londonl
Europe, Near Kaat, Sou Hies* Asia.
L, WMtara Laws*
HladM
nmoN
COMMUNISM
wa
Aim
37
ins.
in
mar
About WJS
Nutunul Council,
Maharashtra provincial wcreUrist Fart,:
ow Bengal Provincial Committee Party: Hccri-lurut.
Central Executive Committeeational Conned.
Mbk
fi-yV* SoWia
Party: Score lariat. CEC.
Mh
Party: CEC
N tilo ii np II.
Secretary of WsM Bengal Proviaeial Committer Publk:
engal Anaoinbly. Party:
CEC.
National Counell.
Secretary of Assam Provincial Commit-In,
Party: CEC.
National Council. Party: CKC.
National Council
Assistant Scenrtso of KrraU Fiovii.csl
Cou.millre
Party:
Hi-eroUrUt
CEC.
Council.
Public:
Party:
Chairman of Central OnoIroJ Comrab-aioo.
National Couucil. Party:
General Secretary
SecrcUrist-
CEC Parly:
Secretariat.
CKC
National Counell. Public: Ls* Mat
Party:
Secretarial.
CEC.
National Counell
engal Provincial Coraatlltoe. Public:
K'lf Seoia.
Extendvn experience In agit-prop activities; reportedlydiflkulUea.poorwoVs tacoow.
Aitivs la pwuini front
Leading CPI orgaoiicr in Ullar Pradesh; e* tensive nxperlotK In ugtt-prou andactivities
Active in Parly education nud organisational affairs.
Opposition leader in Wni Bengal Asavniblyrominent labor agllalor.
Former CPI student lemW.
Active in Ali-lndu Fence Coaacil (AlPO and Indian Associs-Uon for Afro-Asian HolMtsrlly, reportedly disrikod by most CPI leaden; reported to mtm emlwulud Al I'C fundi.
Editor of A'wnirngKiM, Mulaynlcm CPI scekly; proiilie writer in Maiuy-Ium and aellv. In AU-ludL. PNpHtfN Writers' As-eialion (AIPWA).
leadingrgiuilMt,cen-lary id tho AILIudb Tradend vie ptvd-deul of ttic World Federation of TradePI leaderactilit CPI general .ecrrlary during. 1MB Moscow vUL
Extensive eiprrknt* In cpi uiideiground sctlvi
Good orgaiuscc and conipruniUer: leader of "center" group within Psrty.
Effictlm spoascr snd peasant organiser; jwvsideot of llio Ail India Kigan Ssbha (AIKS) and deputy CPI leader In the Lot SabKa; member of Uio World Peace Council.
Eflmtve debater,and riropBgamlHl: leader of CPI bloc inoWla and member ofm .Iff* editorial board; bachelor.
NIS 3S, SUPPLEMENT VI
-9i c
0/ BIIIM
BaCBOamGMB
hitel
BrKum
Sudan
11 A&
Abdul
iiiifi..i
p. c
i i. i
Communist Cliinn.epal
n if
*i
Hindu.
M&btatiyn (peiwaiil) iwate.
M. X. Uovindau
Kaatara Europe, Western Kurope
tS lllkf' Ifllli It
P. Nararaaai
Hindu. Sail caste.
lOOS
*
lUffli Mbuol...
. 8
mad*.
Nair Casio.
A'.ll"L'l"ll mllvji"
sKi I'liiiiii
PiiUnr,
Illndo.
i (Brahmin)
raate.
ll
l In 1
^ -: 1 1 llltlllll Lilt fNtinn
* '4 * r m 1 * 1 1 I
uniiiiuiniiL-
P
** *
R.S
-aWi . * i
Coi Chins,
Hindu.
;.
* a a | r*4
U
school... .
iB. T
Prsdmli. Hindu.
Ksaatriya
hk n
Hindu.
Bratuum.
jis,
bestial
CoJfcUtENTIAl.
NIS SUPPLEMENT VI
9
namb
or birth and Bicxonoi.M)
l.'CATIO "
TttAVCL
C. Rajtshwur. .
ml hiu 1'radmti. Hindu.
KuntuinIMS
Kuroiiv, iSuedOll...
IWf.iv, R.
Pradesh. Hindu.
r
Buni.
Pradesh. Hindu. . ,caste.
4
- H fl. .
.
lihowaid
1
college; do drgrac. If 3till
CoinmuhUt China. ..
Harkiahuii
Pradesh. Hindu, lloddy CWW.
VciikuUtraniaii. M. U
Sikh.
a
i.
b
Muslim.
i
IAL
9
joined PA1TI
.
CliC.
National Council
Sf*reUiyndlira I'rudcali Provincial
Cointd;.
Parly:
cue
National Council
lW.alary fur
lvi5
.
Aboul HEB.
iwo
CKC
Numindl
Andhra IWk Prwtarial Caa.ii.nuv. Public s "
AlidlunA*icml>ly. CKC.
oKH.II.
Seemlmy of tl* Maka/saMr*Kictulivc Cum mi Hue. Party: CKC
National Council.
Wrai Ikiujaloculive Com-mi Mm. Party:
National Council Pubfa
Andhro Pradrali AnannUy.
KC
National Council.
Secretary of Punjab Provinclul Execu-
Party: CKC.
NaUoaal Couarrf.
i: of "i" . Nad Provincial Kaoru-livi; Com mi lieu. Party:
National Cannon. .
ember of" ril(iu,n.
SSJS
Identified will,fthrasow wi,|llplo.^todlrcovertVP
AIMinayS |cadinB,n in
Kns-rvcil laoipcraaanil awl arldou parUri|<atC* in CPfiiKctinai: aataor ot nuntcroui Party paraphk-la;rain behind all Cl'l uotiviUen In Madras SUM.
uneral secretary of the Curiiiiiuniil Pnity illInlerraU arc prtiiutrily literary; active inladlan PratAe* Tlmatd AanctsUon;for CPI lliitwin williin Pahininii
DEKTIA1,
SUPPLEMENT VI
-9
. CHARACTERISTICS OF DELEGATES TO THREE ALL-INDIA CPI CONGRESSES
oki gat
origin:
Working
Peasants mill agricultural
* - laborers
Middle
landlords
Other
Education:
Nonmalriculntcd'"
MatricuUlcd
College graduates
Dale of joining Parly:
0
11MI-47
I
3
Aw;
Under 35
Under 28
Over 65
Holders of elective ol&ce:
National legislature
Suite legislatures
Municipal council*
District and village councils Position iu Party:
Member* of central bodies..
Members of piovinci.il bod-
18
18
"60
4 t?
SS0
t a
t
8
0.6
81
0.6
0 6
8
8
7
j
8 34
t
7
a
a
2
.
its
ol district bodies. Membcre of intermediate
and basic bodies
Ordinary I'arir mrnibcm
8
for various categories do not In all cases add upecause information is incomplete.
crehristian,ain; tlic rest were presumably Hindu. Close to three-fourths had served jail sentences for an aggregateears, nod more than half had had experience In underground work.
Figure may be too high. It is based on Party cluuac-terisationf the delegatus asrbitrarily these have been divided between "middle" snd "other."
High school class work completed but etaminations not passed.
. ESTIMATED CPI FINANCIAL8 (In rupee*)
cw vwit
and
rvHu
tOO.OUO
I .Otit)
** *.
(wo
Bengal
Nod (Mininv.)
Bihar
ti>HW
K O
jnb
0
Pradesh
Maharashtra
it a
n a
a
na
a
a
a
a
a
nort
a
a
a
Prndcah
a
o
a
a
a
a
torjj
lillO
Figure* in parent Im>wb arc Iruni Pnily documents: lemalndor uic estimated. The eatogury "publishing enterprises" include* all Parlyusses, publishing hoium and bookxclusive of any buildings: the estimate for Uic Center, for example, includes the Nt* Joe (weekly andhe Now Arc Press, tho main People's Publishing House at Delhi together with Its Bombay sulfciduuv. tlic Parly'sok housra in Delhi und two book houses in Bombay but not the Uiildinga ImusiiiB these enterprbeti. Iiicludai Parly's reportedrupee interest in rcorguniwclMatalha (see bc-lnw under CPI media) und ib* new
Cftfchoskivakinu press.
** In I'.1JS the Party lean reported to haveupcin worlh of prcipi-riy in one deal (In: Parly is ntoi kuouii
lo own noma Cooperatives but there IS almost no information on number or amount of Againstamis the Andhra Pradesh Provincial Commute* is climated to have an election debtupee* as of January ltttft.
1 Incluika newbeing bruufdtl froisi Communist China. II lncludva Student Health Horn.
NIS SUPPLEMENT VI
9
. ESTIMATED ANNUAL EXPENDITURES OF THE CPI AND COMMUNIST PftONT8
rujwn)
cn CHIT
J orst r*
nuxr
u>
waub pill
utile rutincs*
s
aoo.ooo
0
m.ou
0
0
iW.OOO
V.
0
Pradesh
i'- -
p p
Nad (Madras)
0
UN)
0
0
Pradesh
.
Awn
30
30
0
a it a
a
% JL a II I 1
0
0
rnidrsli
It flj (Ml lid D
a
ncluded in
20
4
a
r: desfa
a
a
071
ono
t it iti
from Psrty dorunsenu.*rr FJocUoa npradii.m prorated Figureson it* anpnr-ldr nraaalnrd amif-Hp,.ells* press andmtrrpfi-rai Mwt i( lakUhmm and
puit-Uinepaid by the Psjlr In work In Ibe varioussiiUaiioti*.
Assumes ciiuugh jot* availatolu Ihrutbjhtconsgerepottednttfag9 clec-IIoim have not been relaloed.
0 West Bengal budget paidill-ilmcra an average ofupees per monthamily allowance, nowere made lo part-time worker* It in estimated that anuU-liiuo workers aro employed and paid by trailsublishing houses,ew mUcrlluncrni* front budgets. Auumcsull-timers paid'by Undo unions andy press and book house.
Assumes half the BihSr full-timer* are paid by Ihe 1unions snd includes half of an00 rupees paid by AITUC lo wrwkers discharged8 *uiko al Jam.hcdpur
1 full-timers held legislallvo or municipal ofhee,stimated lo have been paid by Uie Parly; remainingull-ii ir,.BBsumed to be paid by fmnts orf-support! rig
Assumesull-timers and part-lit nan oa trade union budgets andith press and book shop*.
9
5
NIS SUPPLEMENT VI
-9
PI NEWSPAPERS
iI and rf.ACK Of
run motion
o i'I.aOD us rnistiNO
(Fatrioi)
(People's Age)
.
Htm Life)
Jahasakti.
(People'sBlnJIHith)
VlRAI.ANVIinA
(United Andhrnl
(New Age)
New Aoe
New
(New
tlM
An I'M*
(Aruuu)
NaT* Dl'hta
(New World)
MatamaT...
(Opinion)
S*aMHMaT*
(Indrpendcjior)
Jana&akti.,
(People**
(People's Alt")
Malaynlaai MnUynfaun.
Tamil
* -
Teirgn
Ilciupdi
Malayalam Kanuada. .
KmmAd*..
OH"*
Bengali
Hind
Hindi
Hindi
Daily .
DaMy Dally .
Dally .
Dully..
Daily
Daily
Weekly
Weekly
Weekly Weekly.
Weekly
Weekly Weekly
Weekly
Weekly Weekly
(Sovindankutty
Kuiliikode. Kerala.
Nair
Puthen Madoen.or
Tnc-liur, Kerala.
32 Broadway, Madras Clly. Madras.
K. Bajngopida lino.
Boekiugkanipct, Vtjiiynvnda. Andhra Pradenti.
Hantaan. Kumar
kmaddU Strew, CaJenlU.
l
Uortavksk Stan*
Central Lorrytnha
W Ali Road, DiUil
N.B. nfeoon
Central Ccopcrallvn Printers, Trivandrum. Kerula.
K. Damodaraii
tiaakokun, Kerala.
li. ii. Krishna Ban
K. V. Tempts St, DwplOfi II yaore.
IF. N. Sflulvaa
Mcna. It oud. Miuigalorc, Myaora.
Ananl CUarcn.
PsUtpara. lane, Cuttnth. Ortasn.
Bimal
HA Lower Cwenlarrtta,engal.
Survadoo Vpadnaj*
SS Alimnddun Street,Weal Bengal.
S!- .
Longurtoli, Paliui, Biliar.
Hannah Sinlia
alsni-bagh,ilar Pnukali.
M. Covliwiunkutly
Deahnbbimanl Praaa, Koahikode, Kerala.
M Gopirj'.hin Naar
Janayueamullon,K. Warier
CooperativeHehOr. Kerlala
S. KrkJinuwamy
JnnusakU Press. Mndnu City, Madras.
K ItnJaicoiMln Rao
Swntanlra Artijuyo-mtttM, Andhra
. Choi lurk*
Gonnaakl. PrtMera (PrtiaW) Ltd, Cakutta.Ikngsi
Carbakab Smoa
Awami Pristine Pun.ity. Punjab.
D. P. Slnhn..
New Age Printing Preoa. New Delhi.
N. B. Menon
CfcnUnl Coopeeatlvti Printers,nrirum, Kerala.
K
JaJ Hind Prena, Krnak-hun.
G. It. Krithna llao
Janasaktl Printers, Bangatorii. My-
U. N. Srinivai Bhott
Aruna Praia. Maiignloru. Mysurc.
Ananl Charan Pradlwt
Navayuaa Itwa. Cutluek,
Saryarteo I'nadhaya
I'... -I lad,
Calcutta,Urngal
Yutini Press, Pat na,Kinhn
Adhikar Press,ekiiow, UlUr Pradesh.
raotPi
>nd X
ANDALS,7
rnaoaturm
T. Ir-Iuehildarr (editor)..
X.air (editor)
K. K. Wurior.MlU.r)
P Jen anai dam (editor)
Sam; Ualbarji (editor)
Sanaa Singh JuabC JoahlOH)
E&Urval board:
opaUn (chairman)
C. Unnltaja.
K. K. Warior.
K. Until Kriahiuui
tvnda*aioodaran (editor)
. KrUhua Kao
U. N. tuinlTu Bhnli (ndllor)..
Ram Kriahna Pali (editor)
Pramalh* Rliowmkk (ndttor)..
SurtaaVo Upadhava (editor)
Ali Aaliraf (axUtoe)
Eamenh Hinta (editor)
.
BP
e up
* up
0 np
2
7 np
0
op
30np
a a
Organ ofmlilkodu Dlatrietho CI
Organ of liar KnrUaof the CPI. Organ ol llm TitoliOr Dl.liicl Cumino of Uic CPI.
Organ of Ihe Tamil Nadmt oil. 1 lilted aa owner.
Organ of lhe Audlua Pradeah Provincial Cuuimitlee of thu CPI. I'atnsa*utted Andhra CulturalnV nallr Ikied aa owner
Organ of the WentProvmci.-dof Ilie CPI. The .lull
largest paper In WihI Buiigiil in eirciiliii.loii.
Organ of the Punjab ItovMkuI Com mi Iof the CPI
Oignii of Uicutivo Coinmltlee of Urn CPI.
Organ of the Ktrala Protlaeial Committee of the CPI. Startedi.
n a
Probably aii orgaa of Kralkulaiii Dkirici Com ml tin- of the CPI in Kerala. K. Damodaran onieinlly Ikied na owner.
Organ uforc Provincialhe CPI.
Organ of the Smilh Kanuni District Committee of the CPI.
Organ of tha OraM Provincial Committee- of Ihe CPI Organ of lhe WfjL Bengal Ptuviiicial Cuiumlllcc of the CPI.
Organ cfWral Ueogal Provincial Committer of tho CPI.
Organ of Ulu Bihnr Provinelal Committee of the CPI. r'allcrlng7
for lack of fundi. Organ of the Ullar Pradeah Provincial Committee of tha CPI.
1XNTIAX
NIS SUPPLEMENT VI
March9 Fiotu Hi
TrTLB
ANP PLACB orI CATION
AND FLICK OP I'HIVliaa
.
Monthly
M ell Mi
athak
Prasad Pathak
WoUu
'
i
Telegu
el Ik* CommunalP. Siiihn
Lnkabcai Preaa, Daryccliug, Weal Bengal
. Slniia
Age Printing; Pwsn.atatc, RaniieUu.
J. Satyanarayana
Swatantra Art Printcss, Vljayn-vadA, Andhra Pradesh.
Gungadhar Moreshwar
Adblkari IlaJ Bba.ao.,
Ago Printing Press New Delhi.
1
HwnlunUa Art Printers.AndbraM. Adhikari
* ST. *
Houtbli
Age Printing Prcsn, Bombay
li.'.l.
h
Sana. + 1
a p. *
ugh. Jminndiu- City, Pmiiab.
4 Data not availalitr..
Oaraar* passel omc rupee
. ORGANS PUBLISHED BY CPI
no nans
ibm: r
Uaioa He-us- ^
G. aViraaUva
Samacuab (Penan
Ravinsr.
Monthly
ow Delhi
Dwljlndnr Nnndi
H Munsht Nikalan, KamalaNawKauri
English
(Peace
L v I .
. i Nikalan, Kamala Mnrhct.
New Delhi
Ittswos
DbaramlaUaalcutta.Hcnanl.
lUli.idu Maiumdii
. .
ISC
Oj-arteriy
a
3/1 Human Pura Lane. Calcutta, Weal Bengal.
D. C.'
Naas Building. Bombay.
B
in] ntiai,
COMMUNISM
1ST naftOrlaUTIU
L.TI'.K
IVjs.hI I'uUiak
np..
a
Party organ. No inform.lion us lo kbica commUtc* i. rnpoB&iblc
T. Itanadive (editor in IU48>
. litorj
0
join ml of Die CenUnl Kiccutlve Committeeic CIT.
Probably im oigau of thu Andlirn Pradesh ProvlncJnl Committee of Ihe CPI. M. Mohluddin officially listed as owner
op..
.
u a
. (cdeUf).
a*
*
of tbe Maharashtra Provincial Ccaniurttce of ihe CPI.
I lit} : iiu1 ii i ftf F 1k I'd hi
.
a
Vlw MJiLIJ | rUVIIlCLU iJ:liHsA^ W |nV "LI |T
ournal.
Organ of All-India Trade Union Congress.
Organ of the AB.Io.lks Peace Council,.. P. Pulivmiow be odilor.
Organ nf tho All-lmlla Peace CMswflL
Oigsn of ibe Wast Ikngslouncil.
Prob-hly Ihe urc-ui of Ike West gtancal brsocfc of tbe Ale-India Progressive Wiitcm' Association; Pnriehayu (Private) Ltd ofli-clally irsted s* owner.
Organ of the ladc-Soviet Cultural Society; slsrtcd4
NIS SUPPLEMENT VI
EADING CPI PUBLISHING AND BOOK8
Publishing(Private) Ltd.
People's Publishing House-
J.tiutyugam Publications Ltd.
Prabhalam Printing and Publishing Company (Private) Ltd.
Pralihat Book llotiac
Denliabhiniaui Printing and Publishing Company. Ltd.
Janaaakti Fubbshmg HouSO.
New Century Book House.
Raul Jliansi Head. New Delhi
hetwadi Main Itoud, Bombay City, Bombay.
Quilon, Kerala.
ErnHkulam, Kcrnla.
Krn.lknlim, Kerala.
Kozbikode.
Madras City. Madras.
109 Mount Road, Madras City. Madras.
CPIcu liveS. A. Dange and S. V. Chute own shares
P. Sun (ill (general manager).
B. D. Gujarati (general
Kerala Provincial Com out tee
of tbe CPI. Board of Directors:
C- Achuths Moriondirector).
ovindun Nair.
P. K. Vasudevan Nair.
K. C. George.
N. Gopinslhan Nair.
P. Gangadharnn.
S. Kumarun.
M. N. Rsniachnndran Nair.
P. It- Modhavan l'lllui. M. Padmunabhan (managing
Subsidiary of Prabhalam Printing and Publishing Company (Private) Ltd.
P. Narayanan Nairdirector).
Coin-
Tamil Nad Provincial
mlttco of the CPfA.. Ayynnunr (manager)
Tamil Nad Provinuialof the CPI. S. KrishnuKwamy (mana-
Owia New Age Printing Ptyss.. movedelhi in HI S. A. Dnngc has been In charge of the PP.H. office since the Amritsir Party Congress- Profit ofupees per year goes to CPI National Council. Plans publishear on subjects.
Only branch ofII. inouly known in Bombav as. book stall." oiwratMatel Road and ISStrwt. both in Bombayercirupees; the profit Profit goes to CPI Nn Council.
Established mid-IMG and has aulboriscd capitalees. All nine directors arc to ranking members of the Communl* Party in Kerala. Has ocnui control over thehich printn and publishes Jam yuoa*.
Establishedutherii eapital lOO.OUO rupees. Man-agents for Prabhat Bonk llouw (sec below).
lias brandies in Trlvandrum, Kottaynm, Alkpiicy, Cnniuuinre, and Mongulorc. tnl.utos publications of ihe government and tlto Printing nod publishing (Private) Ltd-
Branches In Koehikode. Cmmaiiore. Telhehcrry. und Chcukonnu.
Has atull time workers fer translation work. Majora through the New Ceo" Book House in Madras. Oprofit.
Dealt solely with Communist ture but falling sales forced it converteneral book SO During periodarch 4 sales amounted0 rupees.
TIAL
U
3 (IWisnrift
nanus
.n
Int Ltd.
Agency
Xstionsi Book (Private) Lid
People. I'ubhihing House of Bihar
Burhingnsinpet Port Office. Vljsrsvada. Arrikii PrB-
ankim ChaUcrjcn Mlroct, Caleutln, West Bengal.
Palna, Bihar
Aodhia l'rsde**i I'mvinml Conunilire af Ibc CPI
through Urn in-rff./a
I'l'uiMMa &Whl (United Andbr* Cultural Commit.
tr4.
K. Snbhal).
West Bengal Provincial Coin-mltlcoof the CPI.
ff-inil Basil. Sudlian Dulta. and MuitCli- Ahmrd (board of dueetors).
Bihar Provincial of Ibc CPI
house in Andlim Pmh-I. Swted3 or i. ha* nn authorixrd capitalirtually in Andbra Pradesh on tin' pubbuiil inn of bonkaeneral nsinre Out-pvl In ilmon was TJO liUcaotal ofS0t oporattw alsoeneralund ha* book .tores in Vljayo-vSrla openedadluntOr aad an Sgesiev to llrdrrS-baH Ctly. Sales autminlupee annually in tho Vijnyavridn store. The total book sales operation wisrofit ofOOa moalh In early I'JSI
Combination publishing house uud book store. Kook nloru formerly Mid only Communistut during recentaa carried Bon-ConimunWt books as well- Translates and publishi* Soviet books.4 sales estimated0 rupees Has oos branch st Madsa Street. Calcutta.usiness officeurlys Sou Street In Calcutta
Siartedas taken overCPIervo. BtUrUltarublicat iont accountedof Ihe IQV.'ST saW
KLKCTED LIST Of PAMI'IILKTS LOBDKD BV THK PEOPLE'S PUBLISHING, HOIirlH.
r evnuc*-now
Porknt
.Sonic Aspect* of tlte AgrarianAbout Kerala.
Awntssr Congress of the Communist Parly
The Kerala Agraiian Relation* Hill
Itesolulious of the Communist Party of India
adopted al Ibe Eslraordinary Parly Congress,
Asatitssr, April 8
Con.titol.on of the Communist Party of India
The Mnhslmn and the Ism
Review of tho Second Conernl KfcctloiM
CostnanaU lo
Foea. on Monopotr
Focus on Ihe Public Sector
Do Knd. Justify Mcaos7
stood Plvc-VcsrCrlltquo
TeeA Balanca Sheet
Snsse Font* of Transition Iron. Capitalism to
Ghosh
National Council of thecutivc Coiomiltsu of the CPI.
Ajoy Ghosh
C. Achulhn Mnnon
National Council of the
K. M.ninboodinpad
Central Commillee of Ihn CPI A. K. Gopslau and Hin.idn Xstfc Muserje*.
AmarSnn
Saifcn Glio.1i
Howard Melanin
IUieafc Qypta
Ones*
A. SoboW
8 August ISS8..
May
. ..
Ma) IMS
7
7
7776f,
21
16
51
*4
d
3
up.pp
0 np.p
0 rupcis.p
p.p.p
T1AL
One hundred nawpnp)one rupee (USU.2I)
l'I HUNTING PRESSES, IMS
Proa.,
Awaml Printing Prow
.
UanaeakU Pi.il... (Prt-ratc) Ltd.
Press.
Jaimanhti I'n Uei
JanayiigAni Preta
Nnvnyuga Press.
New An* Printing
Swalunlru Art Printers..
Manuals; r. Mysore.
Jullundur City, Punjab
It
Calf.Ua, Went Bengal
roadway, Madras City, Mad ran.
Bangalore. Mysore
Quilon. Kerala
Cutluck, (iriaaa
Hani Jhuuai Road, New Delhi.
RajogopalachaH Hired,ndhra Prn-deah.
Thought to bo owned by the Punjab Provincialof Uic CPf.
Printing
Pushing Co,
.an.,
Jauay ugani Publications Ltd, Qullon. Kerala
People's Publishing House (Private) Ltd.
.Wan-fAra Fitfiuuin .Samiii (United Andhra Cultural
Printseekly tssticd by ike South Kanara Dislricl CPI Commit-Ico In Mysore Stat*.
iVainun Xamnnn, organ of tin- Punjab Provincial CommitUw of the CPI, is printed by thia press, aa wai ths Aim* MWka, journal of the AH-Imna Km Mohka (how believednbltralkmt.
Prf.it* laasUwi, organ of tbe Kos-mkodc IH-trirt Committee of Ua CPI.
SwHnanla. organ of the Went Bengal Provincialrinted oa ll.lt press. In9 tbs rum planned loew rotary pies* trmn Communist China, priced at equivalent of nboutif II obtained thu neceessnry importts payroll7onth.
Tho Janasaktl Press owns the Janaaakll Tamil iiewnpuper which t> printed on Ha prcanos In0 tha bin was constriKUiig iU own building in McKny'a Oarden, Madras City. Larger printing machinery has saw barn onVred, reportedly froen the UAH It-
Pitata the Kmmada-lang-age /naajsntt,the Mysore Provincial CPI Committee.
the
Prinla Jaaayayaia, puUiohcd by Kr.ala Pm.inclal Commitlea.
ya. ftnnua, organ ofrnviuetul Committee.
eekly and monthly, ore printed on lids pices. It waslocated In Bombay but moved to New Delhi
ViWanifAra, organ of Ihe AndhraProvincial (fcraoiittee. is printed oo thia press The picas was acquired in I'lilnd is theeass In Andhra Pradesh outside Hy-dcrabad City. It -a.lprofitonth in ov.tcn
9
OM fj' M
OP THAN8LATIOXS OP ROSSI AX-LA NO GAGE LITERARY WORKS. DT EAXUlIACh AND
PUBLISHER. I'l.'BUSHED7
runuaiirn
Mil.
ui,k-iLi ;
lAbrary. CakulU
II
Book AgencyalculU'
I'hMJiiii ft Pubtiahimj Cii. (Private)
A Sow. 11
ruulhlJug lluuw, TuuiKival
> it Cuiijtiiiy,,
1 library, Ciduu&U
Prakiabani, Calcutta
IV Jut v. iv
LVtlu
ell: i.
0
1
0
I
I
Publishing Ho WW, Bombay
I
U. I'. Madras
Nair, KoUayam
OMMUNIST AND 0TII1CK FOREIGN FILMS CERTIFIED UY THE INDIAN CENSORSHIP
BOARD,
i
of
Utut]
of totJ
nnlof
of loUl
of lotal
rcr!Id .1
txwiitne*.roiiiiuic*
i it-,1
KU'J
U7
fllS
W
ft*
_ 7DU_
SS
(
,'IL'i
m
4. Role in National Political Life
Kxlent of roleresent position
The Communist Party of India occupies anposition in the Indian political scene. In7 national elections for tbe Lok Sabha (House of thehe lower house ofIt polled,f the total vote as comparedIneneral election* Although its strength in the Lokeats outlectedbe CPI Is nonetheless the largest opposition party in this house as well as in the upper house of the national Parliament. The CPI was out-poUed among opposition parties in7 Lok Sabha elections only by the Praja Socialist Party (People's Socialist Party.hat0 votes, compared with slightly less0 for the CPI, but captured lower seats owing to dispersion of the Socialists' limited, resources.
* The former state of Andlira. formed3 from theea king portion of the composite Mirtril Slate, srss merged with the Teiegu-spcaJUng region of the former BydciObsd state (commonly called Telengang) to form Andhra Pradesh In accordance with tho general reorganization of Indian state boundariesinguistic basis on November
Communist legislative strength is even more apparent and of more immediate significance in several of the Indian states. The CPI is tbe largest opposition party In the West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh state legislatures. Itt the vote in5 special elections in the Atkdhra region ol Andhra Pradeshwere not held in tins arean the Telcngana region of the statethe second general elections* In West Bengal, the Partyf the vote in7 state assembly elections, compared. More importantly, the CPIlurality of scats in the Kerala State assembly7 and subsequently formed agovernment by enlisting the support of Ave fellow-traveling Independents. Its position in Kerala has given the CPI anto lest its present tactic of seeking to capture control over India through constitutional methods and has substantially reinforced itslo maneuveremocratic frameworkosition of strength.
The Party's major failure to date In thearena has been its inability to break theParty's electoral hold over the peasantry in many parts of India, The Illiterate peasants, who remain largely under the control of villageand local landowners, tend to vote according to the dictates of these leaders, many of whomesled Interest in continued Congress Party rule. Moreover, as the Communist Party has progressively devoted lis major energies during recent years to united front tactics and winning elections, its front groups among students and womon, though still larger in most states than similar groups organized by other parties, have dwindled. In addition, the geographicalof CPI support is extremely uneven. It is strong in West Bengal, the south Indian states of Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, and the Federal Territory of Tripura and has significant pockets of strength in Punjab and Bombay states. It is weaktatewide basis in Assam, Rajasthan, Mysore, and the "Hindi belt" (the North Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar in which Hindi is the dominantinally, the CPI has been handicapped by Itsloyalties and the adverse reaction within India to certain Soviet policies and actions.
Despite these shortcomings. Uie CI'I is India's most dynamic national opposition parly. Thein the Communist vote27 resulted in part from the1 of tactics based on the belief that India was ripe for revolution in favor of aof replacing the Congress regime through parliamentary meansommunist-dominated alliance of aU "progrcasive" groups and parties. Following this shift, the CPI. which1 stood discredited after two years of abortiveactivity, made slow but steady progress In gaining support among the electorate. Thegains, however, have resulted equally from factors inherentountry withrowing unemployed oreducated class,arge body of idle laborers. Popular aspirations are rising in India, but economic development is hampered by such factors as Inadequate capital and limitedknowledge. In addition, the rulingParty has lost Its preindcpendencc elan and has become faction ridden, corrupt, and le-
thargic. Leaders of that party are finding Itdlfflcult to accommodate landlessand landlords, laborers and industrialists, and doctrinaire Socialists and capitalists within one organization. Effective governmental action on popular issues, such as land reform, hasincreasingly difficult. Furthermore, the democratic opposition in India remainsthus providing an opportunity for the use of united front tactics by the CPI. Theof the democratic Socialist movement has been one of repeated mergers and schisms and continuing factional squabbles. The Socialist vote Is now split between two parties, the PSP and its splinter group, the Socialist Party.the Communists benefit from the political naivete of many of the educated Indians. Some Indians believe that Indian Communists differfrom their counterparts in. and Communist China, and still others, including many who are staunchly anti-Communist, believe that the force of Indian traditions and theindividuality and religiousness of thewill. In themselves, deter the spread of the Communist ideology within India.
8 the CPI extended its operations in two areas in an effort to overcome its prime weaknesses. It launched or participated in aof joint opposition agitations against thein many rural regions in an attempt to break the Congress Party's hold over theIn most states the CPI derived littlebenefit from these agitations, but in West Bengal it gained some support in theWest Bengal is one of the Communists'target areas for the next national elections, scheduledural base to complement its strength in Calcutta.would make theerious threat to continued Congress Partyin that state. Secondly, the CPI stepped up its activities in the "Hindi belt" by participating In antlgovernment agitations and by entering an increasing number of candidates in local elections. The Party gained some local support through these efforts, but it has not been able to challenge effectively the Congress Party in this region.
ole of the Sino-Soviet bloc
The CPI is only one facet of the totaleffort to subvert India. Indiaignificant factor in the formulation of internationalstrategy toward neutral nations by the Sino-Soviet bloc which hopes ultimately tothat nation's economic and manpowerand to make use of India's strategicand its cultural influence in much of thesian area, Thus, the Soviet Union,ChiriiT, andesser extent the East
European satellites have attempted to reinforce the CPI by increasing India's economic andties with the Communist bloc. Thefeatures of Soviet and Chinese Communist foreign policies toward India arc much the same. But the impression isMoscow'sto give India aid which China needs, Uic Soviet Union's more open support for India'sin the Kashmir dispute, and theChinese Communist refusal officially tothehinese border along the generally accepted MacMahon line. has been more eager during recent years than Peiping for partnership with Nehru.
Until recent years the international Communist movementolicy of strict opposition to the Indian government, which was viewed as still under imperialist control. The first evidence of softening occurred during thes, when the CPI was instructed tolightly more constructive approach toward Nehru, but the Soviet Union did not openly alter Its own basic policy untilollowing Nehru's visit to Communist China. In5 anin Pravda praised Indiaeace-loving, independent state, and the following month Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov referredpeech to the "independent foreign policy of the sovereign state ofhis switch came at an embarrassing time for the CPI, which was then engaged In an election campaign against Nehru's party in Andhra State. These Soviet statements probably contributed to theParty's defeat in these elections and clearly indicated that the Soviet Union, inpolicy shifts, paid little heed to theproblems of the CPI.
The impact of the Sino-Soviet bloc on India and on the Indian Communist Parly has both positive and negative features. On the one hand, continued Soviet interference in the Eastsatellites and pressure on Yugoslavia,purges innd the Impact of the de-Stalinization campaign, and Chinese Communist repression In Tibet have createdamong intellectuals within and on the fringes of the CPI and have had an adverse effect In India In general. However, Indians have had no immediate experience with Soviet imperialism and are impressed by the economic andprogress in this "fellow Asian" nation. The CPI and foreign Communists have succeeded in capitalizing on the readiness of many Indians to accept, often unquestlonlngly, the extensive claims to progress made by the Soviet Union and Communist China and to believe that India can learn much from the example of these nations where conditions are supposedly similar to those
4-2
i MilL
Id India. On balance, the impact of the SIuo-So-viet bloc and the success of the Sino-Sovietand cultural offensive toward India have been assets for the CPI.
The Sino-Soviet attempt to gain popularity and pierage within India during the past four years has taken numerous forms. Nehru received red-earpeturing visits lo Communist China4 and the Soviet Unionnd Bulganm ond Khrushchev, Chou En-lai. Ho Chl-minh. and premiers of several of the Eastsatellites have toured India. Theimpact of most of these visits was negligible, with the one major exception of Chou En-lai. but taken together they flatter Indians and contribute to increased respectability for the Communist bloc. By the end8 the bloc had extended0 in economic aid and credits lo Indiu. the Soviet Union andcontributingf the total. This aid has gone primarily into the construction ot heavy industries scheduled under the second five-year plan. Aid from Communist sources has received disproportionate publicity in India and has brought to the country several hundredtechnicians who have enhanced Sovietby their ability, friendliness, and abstention from political activity. The bloc's mostproject is the iron and steel plant at Bhilai (in Madhya Pradeshhe construction ofis being supervised by Soviet technicians and financedoan from the. When the first blast furnace was inauguratedeading Indian newspaper, in an obvious thrust at the construction of similar mills by the British and West Germans, wrote lhat "In Bhilai, Russian experts are all praise for Indian engineers and technicians who have beenwith construction work. In this respect. Bhilai is claimed to have provided more scope lor Indian engineers to work in responsibleand gam vital experience in erection work than anywhere else." Another Importantobserved that the Soviet technicians "are setting an example by mixing with local workers and people. Although theyeparate school for their children, they have no exclusive club or hospital as at Itourkela" (site of the Orrman-constructcd mill).
Byndia had tradewithloc countries, including theUnion and Communist China. Bloc trade with India remains small but has shown aincrease5 both in volume and in percentage ol India's total trade. Imports from the bloc rose fromf India's total imports)f totalhereas exports to the bloc increased57 (an increase%% of total8 the USSR stepped up lis purchase of Indian pepper, cashew nuts, andmajor products ofin an obvious attempt to help raise the economic level In this Communist-controlled state.
Number op relocations
1
7
Sinceeveral hundred CommunUl blocranging in sizemeinber cultural troupes to small delegations of educators,or journalists, have toured India, and an even larger number of Indian groups have been invited to the bloc, particularly to the Soviet Union.8 alone.ommunist delegations toured India, and Bl official or unofllcial groups from India visited the Soviet Union, Communist China, or theEuropean satellites. The nature of the delegations from India is shown by the following tabulation:
Type or deuo avion
Athletic
Cultural and professional
Economic ..
Oovernmental Science and technology
Trade union
Communist Party and front groups.
6 the Czcchoslovakian Embassy in New Delhi oflcred Cscch currency at one-third the usual rate to encourage Indian tourists andto visit an Industrial exhibition in Prague, and Inlourist. Die Soviet travel agency,day tours ofR. at the low all-indusive priceupees. hundred Indians participated in these lours before the Soviet Union withdrew theprice in Similar package tours of Communist China, which were neverpopular owing to their higher costs, were also discontinued in8 In9R. offered toilateral travel agreement with India to encourage tourism. this proposal. India would allocatepecified number of tourists to the Soviet Union which would in turnlarge number" to India, presumably by utilizing rupee balances built up under the trade agreement.
5 there hasteady flow into India of printed literature designedpublicize the cultural, economic, and technological progress of the bloc. Forty-five known bloc periodicals were circulating in Indiaegular basis at the endn indication of the total number of English-language books imported from the bloc or published by the bloc in India is given by the
Increase tn the size of the annual catalogue of the Communist-operated People's Publishing House In New Delhi This catalogue increased fromages at the beginning7ges in8 and was supplemented by numerous lists of new arrivals throughout the year. The bloc's propaganda efforts also include motionand the Soviet Union's expanding broadcast schedules in English and the major IndianFurther information on Sino-Soviet bloc propaganda activities may be found in thisSectioknder Propaganda.
B. Strategy
Theoretically CPI strategy is based on anof Marxist-Leninist principles to conditions in India. In actual practice, since the Party line is ultimately approved by Moscow, Indianstrategy isrojection of the policy interests of the Soviet Union and the Sino-Soviet blochole. The CPI, inethod of operation, has thus been forced not only to evaluate conditions in India but also to interpret Soviet directives which have occasionally been ambiguous, particularly in the periodfollowing World War II (sec thisSectionnder Postwar Interim).
ollowing"*the failure of its attempt to foment revolution, the CPIew policy directive which is one of the basic documents in the evolution of Party strategy and which set the broad tactical framework within which the Party now functions. This directive, representing as itajor tactical shift, affected all Partybut had particularly important implications for its parliamentary strategy. Under the new tactical line the CPI announced that while it still adhered to the goal of "socialism'1t was "not demanding the esUblishmrnt ofin our country in the present stage ofThe downgrading of the use of violenceactical approach tor the immediate future contained In this directive together with the Party's decision to seek replacement of the present "antidemocratic and antipopular governmentew government of people's democracy" basedoalition of all "democratic, antifeudal. and anti-imperialist forces" was put Into practice almost immediately. Beforeeneral elections the Party began working for the establishmentnited front with other opposition jwrties and redefined its program and objectives to appeal not only to the working class and peasantry but also to the middle class and the "nationalistenned as the anti-imperialist section of theclass.
Although the general tenor of theolicy directive was moderate, the CPI retained some facets of Its former "leftist'" strategy, and its new policy was ambiguous In several importantparticularly with regard to adherence to constitutional methods. The Party continued tohard" line toward the Indianwhich was termed "antidemocratic" and "antipopular." It retained the view that India was not Independent but remained subservient to British Interests. Further, Party leaders observed that the "road that will lead us to freedom and peace" will not be found by parliamentary means alone. However, these interpretations weremodified as the CPI. under Moscow'scontinued its evolutionore open "rightist" (cooperative and peaceful) strategy. 4 the Party recognised Indian independence from British control andaturalbegan to concentrate its efforts against the United States as India's "main enemy." 6 It gave almost unqualified support to Nehru'spolicies and praised some of hisdomestic policies. And in the same year General Secretary AJoy Ghosh came outarty pamphlet in favor of almost exclusive reliance on the parliamentary path to power.
Espousal of parliamentary means reached its highest pointpecial Party Congress held at Amritsar (Punjab State) int this conference the Party laid the groundwork formass support by playing down itsto the Soviet Union, discarding names such as "cell" and "Politburo" which have aconnotation, and stating in the newthat the Parly "strives" to win powerHowever, subsequent statements by CPI leaders and inner-Party documents indicate clearly that the Communists' adherence tomethods is qualified and that the Party's goal, once control over India is achieved,omplete revamping of the Indian social,and economic structure in accordance with classical Communist principles.
In functioningemocratic framework in recent years, the Communist Party has placed major emphasis in carrying out Its politicalon united front activities. Parliament and tho state assemblies, although useful as propaganda forums, have been of limited value in enabling the Parly to influence national policies or attract new supporters. By contrast, its united front activities, although of only moderate success thus fur. have enabled the CPI lo expand both into new gco-
* Theand "rightist" factions arc described in dcUU and the major proponent* of each are Identified In this Supplement.nder Leadership.
arch)
areas and among new target groups. In. M. S. Namboodlripad, thenChief Minister of Kerala, described thewhich the Party attaches to its united front efforts in the following terms:
winning India province Byot Uie chief thing. Our real object now is to bringroad alliance with Uic Congress and Indian Socialist parties. We shall try to get them to alter their programs and policies to fit In withnally, to adopt OftlB all-India basis.
The basic CPI tactical approach, which follows classical Communist formulations, is one ofto "unitend simultaneously "struggle against" other opposition parties In an attempt to neutralize them or. If possible, draw them into alliance with the CPI in electionas well as in joint anligovernmenton local or national Issues. For example, the political resolution adopted by the CPI in8 recommended "Armstruggle" against the leaders of Lhe democratic Socialist parties and at the same time urged the development of "common actions" with theirThe CPI has been more successful during recent years in concluding agreements withparties or local branches of nationalthan with national parties themselves.the price it would have lo pay for acoalition with the Praja Socialist Party, for example, would be too high. In carrying out Its united front tactics the CPI insists on retaining its freedom ofolicy directive4 warned against becoming submergednited Front organization, thereby "preventing the Party's Immediate mobilization of the peopleIts own banner."
The Party's application of the strategy adopted1 and supplemented by political resolutions at Party congresses6 has not gone unquestioned within Its ranks. On the one hand, the "rightist" faction has called for even greater emphasis on parliamentarian lam and increased support for the central government in an effort to strengthen and attract "progressive" elements within the Congress Party; on the other, the "leftist" faction has questioned some of the basic principles of the parliamentary strategy and has favored more doctrinaire opposition to thegovernment. Few CPI members favor anreturn to revolutionary activity, but many disagree with the extent to which the Parly has pubUcly pledged to use peaceful means to achieve power The "leftists" (P. Sundarayya. Bhupesh Guptajrt. Basavapunnalah. and others) fear that posingemocratic party may cost the CPI its revolutionary clan and that theof Party membership may further reduce dedication and discipline within the organization. This faction believes the CPI should not play down its revolutionary role solely to win voles, facilitate united front agreements, or remain In power in Kerala. The more moderate andgroup, which includes AJoy Ghosh und E. M. S. Namboodtripad, believes that the Party's capture and retention of power In Kerala, plus the lesson of thensurrection, proveoderate tactical posture Is. In the long run, the more successful policy.
During recent years, the basic problemsthe Party have increasingly been resolved in favor of thehis trend reflects the dominant Communist view thai Congress Party strength Is eroding, that the CPI is beat qualified to benefit from that purty's losses, and that primary relianceoderate tacticalwill enable the CPI to gain respectability and eventually benefit from political polarizationthe Communists and the Congress. Inthe Party's moderate line and its support for the Nehru government have been dictated by the Soviet policy toward India and the Importance which. has placed on continued Indian neutralism.
sentiment within the Parlylight increase owing to certain local developments. The Party encountereddifficulty in attempting to rule Kerala. Nehru became more outspoken In his criticism of developments in that slate and ol international communism. The rise of military regimes on India's eastern and western flanks, in Pakistan and Burma. Increased the Communists' awareness thai they must devote more attentionong-range strategy for use after Nehru's departure from the scene. Finally, increased Western aid to India appeared to ensure fulfillmentajor portion of the second five-year plan, therebythe impact of the Communists'J. performance in the economic sphere.esult of these and possibly other factors, the CPI began during the latter part8 toNehru, who had not been criticized on abasis during recent years because he was considered to ben addition. Party leaders attempted to remove confusion within CPI circles over the extent of the Party's actualas contrasted with its announced reliance, on constitutionalarly documentin West Bengal during lhe year observed that thereheaven and hell" differencetheconcept" that the final goal of socialism can be achieved through
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" TIi" _
SUPPLEMENT VI
pcacetul methods and theInterpretation which claims that only limited advances toward socialism can be achieved through peaceful means. This documentwith the observation that "Socialistis not possible only by working inside the legislatures or through elections.ruly revolutionary party,.the basic work has always been and is, even today, toassFinally, to remove any remaining doubts about its true objectives, the CPI launched aattack8 againsthich one Party spokesmun described as anta "turn the Party to the pulh of class collaboration andreformism within theof bourgeoishus, CPI strategy, as It had emerged by the beginningas one of public support for constitutionalism and par-liamentarianlsm in an attempt to win votes and enhance the Party's prospects for concluding united front agreements, but actually the Party had not abandoned classical Communist principles and objectives.
C. Relations with other parties
ii- united front tactic
The Communist Party's tactical approach toward other Indian political parties is based on the classical Bolshevik concept of attempting to ally with and simultaneously fight against these parties. Its first venture into the field of united front activity took place6 whenreached agreement with theeftwing faction led by Jaya Pra-kash Narayan which functioned within the all-India Congress Party structure. Under thisIndividual Communists (the Party was then Illegal) were admitted to membership in the CSP. By successful use of "fractions" the Communists0 had captured CSP units in the Andhra. Madras, and Kerala regions (Andhra and Kerala did not then exist as separate slates) thereby establishing the basis for Communist strength In south India (see this Supplement, Sectiosnder The United8 the Communistsifferent united front approach. Believing that India was ripe for revolution, the Party called upon members of the Congress, Muslim League, and Socialist parties toevolutionary movement "Into theirhen the masses failed to respond, the CPI again switched its tactical line, adopting1 the dual united front approach (simultaneous appeals to the leaders andof other parties) which has remained its basic strategy. **
Tho attempt to enlist the support of all Indianhichajor plank in thecurrent tactical platform, has placed its mark on virtually all activities of the Party and its major front groups. Tills tactical approach has not been limited to election campaigns but has been employed between elections in almost continuous attempts to induce other parlies to support CPI activities and policies. Every anli-government agitation sponsored by the Party has been as broad based as possible. In every state or national election1 the Party hasto conclude electoral agreements with other opposition groups based, if possible,utually acceptable minimum program or at least an apportionment of seals to avoid splitting the non-Congress Party vote. By securing the assistance of other opposition parties and groups in elections and agitations, the CPI hopes tothese elements, particularly the Socialists, that they can gain power only In alliance with the Communists. Although CPI leaders have publicly stated that they will notwith parties formed primarily to represent the Interests ofand caste groups, with "feudal" landlords, or with the "imperialist bourgeoisie" (thatol the bourgeoisie which. In contrast to the "nationals allied with international capitalism andn actual practice they have attempted to conclude agreements with virtually any amenable group. The onlyreservation that the CPI attaches to its united front activity is the stipulation that ihe Party musL retain its freedom of action and its distinctive character.
Several factors In the Indian politicalhave aided the Communists in carrying out their united front tactics. First, thepredominance of the Congress Party on the national level makes Communist united front proffers more attractive to other opposition par-tics than might be the caseore equally balanced party system. Non-Communistparlies can see little prospect for gaining power under the present Indian politicaland many are thus sympathetic toward Communist efforts to confront the ruling partynited front, thereby capturing more seats than would be the case were the non-Congress vote split. Secondly, the Communists' moderate tactical posture plus the Indian government'stoward international communism have given the CPI increased respectability andits prospects for concluding united front agreements. In addition, the general currency of Socialist doctrines in India and the inability of some educated Indians to distinguish between
socialism and communism have increased theParty's maneuverability. Finally, the CPI has exploited the inherent weakness,and lack ol inner-party discipline of many opposition groups.
The Indian political spectrum consists of six main non-CPI elements: the Congress Party, which polled% of the vote in7 Lok Sabha elections; the democratic;; corrimunal and rightistinor and regionalnd radical leftists not affiliated with themong these, the democratic Socialists andleftists are the main targets for CPI united front efforts'.-;
Indian Socialists have remainedfrom the Communists on any generalfor India or on sharing power in abut they are vulnerable toby the CPI owing to basic weaknessesdemocratic Socialist movement. Indiandiffer among themselves on basicare pseudo-Marxists, others favorand still others arc attracted byeconomic concepts.2 the twoparties existing at thatIndianParty and the Kisan Matdoor PrajaWorkers', and Tenants'to form the Praja Socialist Party.the merger never developed firm roots.rivalry coalesced over the attituderuling Congress Party, and4 Drof the faction favoring militantthat parly, was expelled for indiscipline.year he founded the Socialistok Sablia elections this parlyotes,uarterpolled by the PSP. Socialist Partythe PSP In Andhra Pradesh,Rajasthan, and in the federal territory
The Socialists have encountered increasingin formulating an appealing program that wouldlear alternative to the Congress Party and the Communists. They have been cauRht between Ihe Congress Party's advocacySocialist pattern of society" as its primeand social goal and the Communists'drift toward the right. Finally, the Socialists have few leaders of national stature. Jaya Pra-Xash Narayan, founder of the Socialist wing within the Congress Party4 and former leader of the PSP, has withdrawn from politics to devote full Ume toa re's Bhoodan (land redistribution) movement Acharya J. B. Knpalani lakes no active interest in purely party affairs, and several other former Socialist leaders have either retired from politics or Joined theleftists.esult, the Praja Socialist Party has no leader of national stature capable ofthe diverse factions within the partyomogeneous unit, although it lias goodleadershipand of dedicated, youlhful followers.
Dr. Lohla3 Socialist Party at every level has rejected all Communist overtures, but local units of the PSP have cooperated with the CPI Incampaigns and mass agitations. Theattitude toward the PSParked shiftreviously the CPI followed an accommodating policy toward the national leadership of that party in the belief that aagreement between the two groups was possible. However, Hie Praja Socialists' refusal to aid the Communist attempt lo form leftistgovernments In Travancorc-Cochin and Madras Slates followingeneralforced the Communists to revise their est! mates. Inhe CPI Centralpublicly announced that the PSP leadership "has abandoned all pretense to Marxism, isan antistrugglc policy, and Is striving for coalition with the Congress Party."
The results of4 state elections in Trav-ancorc-Cochln, the most outstanding example of electoral cooperation between the CPI and PSP.urther disappointment to theThe major gainer from cooperationthe PSP and the Communist-dominated United Front of Leftists was not the CPI. which dropped fromssembly seatsut the PSP, which rose fromhe PSP furlhcr antagonized the Communists by defectingafter the elections toinistryby the Congress Party.esult of this experience, the Central Committee of the CPIircular in4 calling the PSP the "second line of defense of the ruling classes" and laying down the following policy guidance for the Communists:
Initcad of appeal* to Uic ranks and lower uniu> to brliiK pressure on the all-India leadcrnhlp lo join hand* with the Communist Parly and theforces, appeal to them to light and defeat their leadership In order to nuke unity possible
The CPI has also made frequent overtures toward the numerous small radical leftist parties standing between the Communists and democratic Socialists. These panics, which usually combine some element of Marxism with virulenthave resulted from successive fragmentation of the radical left, frequently over minorIssues. They are concentrated primarily in West Bengal, long the center of Indian radlcul-
ism, and Bombay. Most arc weak and have little potential (or significant growth. TheSocialist Party, Forward Bloc, and Marxist Forward Bloc, all of which differ with the CPIover that Party's subservience to theUnion, have cooperated with the Communists during election campaigns and Joint agitations in West Bengal where they are strongest. However, other branches of these parties have frequently opposed the Communists as. for example, in Kerala where the Revolutionary Socialists oppose the Communist government. The largest of these splinter leftist parties, the Peasants' and Workers' Party, limited primarily to Bombay State,with the CPI within the United Maharashtra Committee but has been careful lo retain its(Further details on these parties will be found In Chaitxr V,)
At one time the Communists hoped to effect leftist unity among these radical parties, but such prospects appear to be diminishing. As the CPI has grown in strength, these small parties have become increasingly aware of their vulnerabilities, and they fear absorption by the Communists.esult, they have become less amenable to close cooperation with the CPI. and there were reports in9 that several were attempting to unite In order to prevent Inroads by the
Despite its announced policy, the CPI hason several occasions to enlist the support of regional communal parties or state or Vocal branches of such organizations. Thesuccess in this effort has been limited (seelthough8 therearked increase in cooperation between the CPI on the one hand and the Hindu extremist Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha on the other hand in village, city, and district elections. The Communists have frequently supported Independent candidates in areas in which there was no Party nominee. In addition. Communists and fellow-travelers have occasionally contested as Independents In areas where the CPI label mightandicap.
One of the major conflicts within theParty in recent years has centered around its attitude toward the Congress Party. At the fourth Party Congress In6 the CPI went farthest In its characterization of the split within the ruling party, describing its attitude toward the Congress Parly in the following terms:
Although the Congress la the uoUUcal party ol the bourgeoUlt, which has taken many landlords into Its fold. It haa among itsast number of dcmocraUc elements. It has anand democraticur approach toward the Congress and Uio method of crIUeism of Its politicalave to be such as do not repel honest Congressmen but draw them toward unity. They have to be such as strengthen the forces that however haltingly, arcelatively progressive stand.
8 the CPI had shiftedosition of more doctrinaire opposition to the Congress Party. The political resolution adopted at the special Party Congress in April of that year continued to refer to the "democratic forces in the Congress Party" and concluded that "there is common ground for united activity between the masses following the Congress and ourowever, the major emphasis was on the growth of "right reaction" within the ruling party: "Increasingly Isolated from the advanced democratic masses, corroded from within by dissensions and factionalthe Congress Party istate of political and moral decline,tate of chronicReactionary elements are] securing increasing grip over the Congress Party's organization, [and] the extreme right.annot be defeatedimultaneous battle, waged with determination and vigor, to defeat the antipeople policies of the Government"he Congress Party).
The CPI reportedly hoped to conclude anagreement with the Congress Partyut these efforts were apparentlyby leaders of that party. The Communists have never succeeded since Indian independence in reaching an electoral arrangement with the Congress Party on the national, state, or, so far as Is known, local levels. They have, however, occasionally supported individual Congressmen (they covertly supported Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon for election to the Lok Sabha7 against hisrajaominee of the United Maharashtra Committee).
he united front in election campaigns
the Party's tactical pattern foreneral elections took shape, it became evident that the Communists would join forces with virtually any group. They directed their efforts mainly toward regional parties or local units of national opposition parties rather than toward these national parties themselves, presumably in an attempt to capitalize on the weak discipline within these groups and thenaivete of many local politicians.attacked the national leaders of the Kisan Mazdoor Prajaocialist group formed shortly before the elections by Acharya J. B.ormer president of the Congress Party, but expressed their willingness to negotiate with "elements or individual leaders in the Praja Party
,
even with units ot the Praja Parly."the CPI reached agreement on theol seats with branches of this party in the Andhra and Malabar regions of Madras State.
The problem of contesting the elections wasacute for the Communists in two stales. Travancore-Cochfn andn which the Party was illegal. In Travancore-Cochin the CPI sponsored the formationnited Front ofincluding two other Marxist partiesroup of sympathetic independents. Members of the front capturedeats inember state assembly, of whomventually declared their Communist affiliations when the CPIa legal party shortly after the elections. The United Front of Leftists was revived during4 special elections in Travancore-Cochin, at which time It received cooperation from the PSP, but has since been inactive. In Hyderabad, the Communists wereorming the People's Democratic Front, an alliance of six local leftist parties, which woneats inembcr state assembly. This organisation survived8 when it officially merged with the CPI.
* These two stales, as well as several others, ceased to exist following the reorganization of Indian slate borderslnguisUc basis Inajor portion of Travancore-Cochin wasIn Keralawhereas Hyderabad wasamong Andhra Pradesh, Mysore, and Bombay
Of even greater importance for theIs' purposes was the network of bilateralusually limited to mutual support for each other's candidates,ost of regional parties ranging from Marxist groups lo the separatist Dravidian Federation, an anti-Brahmin and anti-north Indian party in Madras Slate. Accordingeport issued by the Central Committee after the elections, the CPI concluded agreements with the following local or minor parties: the LeftGroup in Bombay; the Forward Bloc (Marx-Lit) in West Bengal, Bihar, and Orlssa; the Klsan Party in Bombay and parts of Hyderabad; the Peasants' and Workers' Party in the city ofpur, Bombay State; the Revolutionary Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh, the Lai (Red)Party in the Punjab; and the Dravidianand Tamil Nad Tollers' Party In Madras. Although the Communists were disappointed over their inability to conclude agreementsreater number of local units of national parties, their performance was nonetheless an impressive start in covering Indiaeb of united front agreements with regional organizations.
b.The CPI formulated its strategy for7 general elections well in advance. Inhe Party issued an appeal to all left-wing parties to "come together on the basisutually agreed minimum program around which can be drawn all patriotic forces opposed to the Congresseneral Secretary Ajoy Ghosh set as the Party's major goal "breaking theposition of the Congress Party" and toward this end he urged the adoptionflexible" united front policy suited to local conditions in each area, slating:
Our general strategy Is to make every effort to buildnited front whenever-wise an electoral alliance or adjustment,is feasible. There Is no harm In arriving at an unwritten agreement on distribution of seats where nothing else Is possible
As, the CPI directed Its major efforts toward the Socialists and radical leftists, but it also attempted, without success, to conclude an agreement with the Akallilitantparty among the Sikh community In Punjab State.ublished commentary on the results of the second general elections, the Centralnoted that except In West Bengal andthe Party's success in building "democratic unity" wasimited character. mostly in the nature of local adjustments."to the committee report, the CPI had electoral agreements with local units of the PSP in parts of Assam, Madras, and Punjab and had anwith the Scheduled Castes Federation in the last-named state. In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar "only progressive individuals could benited front, thanks to the antlunlty attitude" of the Praja Socialist Party. Theconcluded that "tactics of united front were not followed by the Party with the requiredand vigor In many states."
The Party's failure appreciably to extend itsof united fronts7 was in part offset by its success in entering broad-based coalitions in West Bengal and Bombay. In West Bengal the majorlo the Congress Party consisted of the United Leftist Election Commilteen alliance of the "big Ave" leftist parties in the stale: the CPI, Praja Socialist Party, Forward Bloc, Marxist Forward Bloc, and RevolutionaryParty. Member parties agreedommon minimum program and pledged support to each other's candidates, although they retained the right to campaign as individual parties. Members of the ULEC woneats Inemberof whichere captured byThis organization continued to cooperate in by-elections in the state until9
when the Forward Bloc, with the support ot the PSP. defected andandidate against the CPI nominee.
The CPI participates in two united fronts in Bombay State organized before the elections to agitate for partition of the state between lis two major linguistic components. The moreof these, the United Maharashtra CommitteeMaharashtraas formed in6oosely knit alliance of opposition parties united solelyesire for the establishmenteparate Marathi-speaking state. Component parties include three communal groups, the Jan Sangh. Hindu Mahasabha, and Schedulrri Castes Federation and four leftistthe CPI. Praja Socialist Party. Peasants" and Workers' Parly, and the Lai Nishan (Hod Flag) Party. The UMC captured slightly moreeats Inember legislature, ofere won by Communists. That the Communists profited from their participation In thisIs shown by the fact that the CPI held only two seats in the Bombay legislature before the elections. The UMC continues to functionnited bloc In the Bombay assembly on Issuesto the movement to divide Bombay State, but owing to friction between the Communists and Praja Socialists the*PSP National Executiveits members in7 to functioneparate entity" on other matters.
The Qujarati People's OrganizationMahagufaral Janataressure group organized in the Gujarati-speaking region ofState Inas never been as influential or popular as the UMC. The GPO. which Is supported by most opposition parlies and independent politicians in the Gujarat! region of Bombay, isoalition of political parties but rather has Itself many of the attributesona fide party. It enrolls members as Individuals but does not object to their retention of membership in another party, and all GPO candidatesthe elections under the same electionThe GPOotal ofeats in the Bombay assembly. Two of the successfulwere reportedly Communists, the firstever electedlate body from this region.
The CPI hus been unable to break theposition of the PSP in cither of thesebut has made definite gains inits organizational strength through association
* Since wowontested at InOp*ndenIs,UfCcuH lo Identify all Party members In the legislature The figure Is taken from published Communist sources and Is believed tn be substan-tially correct.
with these popular movements. Of particularit has begun to expand In rural areas, whereas previously the CPI was limited almostto Bombay Cityew other urbanIn the state.8 Uic CPI launched an intensive drive to recruit additionalinto the UMC in mi attempt to capture local units. The results of these efforts are not known
c. LocalThe Communists have also made every effort to form electoral alliances with other parties in local elections al the district, city, and village levels. Information on the success of this phase ol the Communists' program is spotty, but It uppears that the Parly has had considerable success in some areas Party labels frequently mean little in these campaigns in which local issues and personalities predominateesult, regional parties and local branches of national parties have been particularly amenable towith the CPI. The fragmentary data available on local elections are included under Parliamentary Role, below.
he united front in mass agitations
The second phase of the Communists' united frontagitations on pressing localreceived increasing emphusls since tile second general elections. In virtually every instance the Communists have appealed for, and frequently received, support from other oppositionhere leaders of other parties havetheir overtures, the Communists havedirectly to the members for cooperation. These agitations, which have on the whole been peaceful, have utilized Die Gandhian techniques of passive resistance and courting arrest againstnt.people" policies of the Congress Party-controlled state governments
The political resolution adopted at the special Party Congress in8 stressed theof "mass struggles and all-sided activities" in order to combat tho "over-growing attacks" on Uie people by "vested interests and theThe resolution listedubjects forcampaigns (presumably these can beby local campaigns on local issues).in the subjects for nationwide agitations are "realization of the targets" of the five-year planemocraticpenetration of Americanhe state governments' food policies; the need for "radical agrarianorruption; "popularization of the achievements of the Keraland the refugeepolicies of the state governments.
he CPI launched or participatedgitation* to protest against the wiage of basic foodstuffs in Delhi and inof Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh. Madhyaand Punjab. Agitations against the existing hndholdmg system were conducted in Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Hajasthan. In Assam the Partyass movementthe previous year to ensure that. oil refinery was constructed in that stale In the summer8 the CPI wasin reviving In West Bengal the Anti-Price Rise and Famine Relief Committee,formed6 and including the Praja Socialists, CPI. and nine splinter leftist groups. In September this committee, headedraja Socialist,eries of massdesigned lo "impress upon the slatethe need for relieving the distress ol thehe agitation ended after II days, when the Chief Minister agreed to increase the funds set aside for loans to peasants and establish all-party advisory committees on food distribution at various levels in the state. ersons, of whom an estimated one-half werewere arrested during this period. In8 the PSP withdrew from this committee owing lo tactical differences with the otherparties. Other mass agitations in West Bengal8rotest launched by Uie United Central Refugee Council, anof all leftist parties except the PSP and Revolutionary Socialists, against the proposal to resettle Bengali refugees from East Pakistan in otherass protest by leftist student groups against the proposed increase In tuition feeseveral Calcutta colleges;trike of streetcar workers ledoint committee ofof labor unions controlled by thePSP. and Communist parties. In most of these agitations the Communists, through their greater discipline and concerted use of theirmedia und front groups, gained major credit for the concessions which were given
D. Role in
PI elcctorlal strength and tactics
ommunist Party leaders haveincreasing attention to winning elections. However, elections are not viewed as an end In themselves but rathereans through which to increase the Party's bargaining power andits prospects for eventually forming anational government., whichat the end of ^iis Section, shows by states and federal territories the percentage of the total vote polled by the CPI in all state and national electionsn this table, as In the case of other statistics cited in this Section, unless otherwise indicated,lection results and those for special state elections have beento correspond to the new stale boundaries createdhus, the same geographical areas are compared throughout.
ationwide basis, the Party doubled its vote between the first and second general elections, and in7 campaign for the Lok Sabha It polled0f the total)ime when Party membership stoodhe Congress Parly polled more0n thisThe results of the two general elections arc compared for the major Indian patties in, under Reference Data. Tills table shows that all major political groups except theleft and Independents increased theirof the slutc assembly volehe CPI.% gain, registered the highest percentage increase, closely followed by the Congresshe total vote for candidates of the democratic Socialist parties contesting for state assemblies declinedetween7 elections, whereas the CPI vote increased by more. The percentage of votes polled by the Socialists declined In II states, remainedin one, and increased only in Assam, while the CPI gained electoral support inf thetates The Socialist and Communist vote in the two general elections is compared in. under Reference Data.
The CPI. in contesting elections, is bound by the same legal provisions as those applying to other parties, and it does not appear that Indian election laws aflect the Party's performance. Tho Communist Party does benefit from the provision that any party polling more thanf the total national vote is recognizednational"t isniform election symbol which appears on its ballot boxes in all states to aid the illiterate voter in identifying the party of his choice. However, this provision also works to the advantage of the PSP and Jan Sangh which, together with the CPI and Congress Party, athe four officially recognized "national" parlies.
Group votingommon occurrence in India, and the personal choiceandidate by thevoter is limited by existing traditions and social patterns. Caslc unity and tics to religion, family, and the native village arc undergoing fairly rapid changes, particularly in urban areas, where the Communists have capitalized on the
.^TlAT.
SUPPLEMENT VI
9
state of social (lux to attract .supporter; However, at the village level the choicearty or candidate is still frequently advised, if not dictated, by the village headman, caste leader, or elderoint family. Since these localfrequentlyested interest in the status quo and tend to be conservative by nature, this practice probably redounds to the benefit of the Congress Party and helps to explain thefailure to improve their electoral position appreciably among the peasantry in many regions. However, the Communists' victory7 in Kerala, the most literate of Indian states,that this traditional loyalty system can be disrupted, even In rural areas..,
In attempting to tnereasc its electoral appeal, the CPI has followed several procedures which differ from thoso of other opposition parties. It has concentrated Its resources where its strength and potentialities are greatest, whereas most other parties enter candidates in every possiblean approach which not only spreads their propaganda resources too thinly but also cuts into their finances, since candidates for stateand the Lak Sabha mustupees. respectively. These deposits arc forfeited if the candidate fails to poll at least one-sixth of the total vote in bis constituency. In theampaignc of the Communist candidates for the Lok Sabha were elected, whereasf the% of the Jan Sangh nominees won. Forty-six candidates from each of these other par-tics lost their deposits. The Communists base their campaigns on pressing local problems and have not dissipated their energies discussing political Ideologies or international affairs, neither of which is of particular interest to the vast majority of the electorate. Communist Party workers have tended to remainarticular village for weeks or months In order to become Identified with the villagers' needs, whereas workers for most other parties usually spenday or two tn avillage. The Communists have alsonumerous tricks to gain votes. One of the mostthis may eventually backfire on the Party In the case ofto ask landless peasants to stake out thatof the landlords property they would like to have when the Communists come to power.
Since the population of India islliterate and political parties are denieduse of the government-controlled radio, campaigning is conducted primarily through mass rallies, processions, and house-to-house contacts. In the first two methods the Congress Party has been more successful thun Its rivals, butecided edge in individual contacts. In many states the CPI has an extensive network of local "volunteer" workers who carry themessage to the voters and. even moreget out the vote on election day. The CPI has supplemented its other activities bypractices where possible, but it probably has not improved its relative position by these tactics Local units of virtually all Indian parties have resorted to false registration and purchase of votes. That the Congress Party would profit most by these methods is suggested by the fact that its financial resources are greater than those of other parties.
echniques employed in major election cam-
The Communist Party was largely isolated at the end of World War II owing to its wartime collaboration with the British. It usedrovincial assemblyfirst in which it participatedegaltest its popular appeal and to regain respectability.the CPI hoped toopular front agreement with the Congress Party or Muslim League, its overtures were rebuffed. The CPI thus contested alone on an election manifesto designed to appeal to regional particularism and to enlist the support of workers, peasants, middlemen, and employers.
ommunists were elected forrovincial assembly seats,f the Party's victorious candidates were in constituencieslor representatives of labor. The CPIf the total) and emerged as the third-ranking party,oor third, in popular vote behind the Congress Party and Muslim League. This was,reditable achievement considering the fact that onlyf the adult population was enfranchised, the primary qualifications being based on property and income.
The Communist Party's moderate tactical line was first effectively employed Inelections, held from1 througho select members of the stateassemblies and the central Lok Sabha. The Communists' election manifesto for this campaign promised something for each of the four classes. It promised land for the peasant, better wages for laborers, greater benefits for the middle class, and concessions for the "nationalhe manifestolear call for establishmentnited front in order toowerful mass movement which alone can break the power of those who rule over ushe united fronts concluded by the Communists in these elections
above under The United Front in Campaigns.
CPI concentrated its efforts in those areas fta which iteasonable prospect forcu. Excluding their front parties, the Commu-nliU entered onlyandidates for the Lok Sabha. of whomere successful; only 9forfeited their electoral deposits. Bythe Indian Socialist Partybut elected onlyf the party'socialists lost their deposits. In addition toCommunlsU elected to lhe Lok SuMa under the CPI label, anere elected by the People's Democratic Frontndependents elected by the United Front of Leftists In Travail core-Cochin later re-rcaled their Communist affiliations. Withflected seats in the Lok Sabha, the CPI emerged as the largest single opposition party. Three of the successful Communist candidatesunderground, and five others were in prison during the campaign. Charges against these eight were withdrawn shortly after the elections, when the CPIegal party in all states.
In assembly elections, the Communists achieved several notable successes, emerging as theopposition parly in Madras State, Hyderabad. Travancore-Cochin, and West Bengal. The Purly alsocattering of seats In Orissa andandtrong showing Inmall federally administered territory located along India's border with East Pakistan. The four southern states (Madras, Travancore-Cochin,and Mysore) accountedf the Communists' seats in theabha; the Party showed particular strengthart of Keralan Warangal and Nalgonda districts of Hyderabad, center of the abortive Telenguna uprising; and in six districts of Madras: Tanjorc (now in Madrasalabar (now Inast God*van, West Crodavari. Krishna, and Ountur (the last lour districtsontiguous area In what is now Andhraontributing causes for the Communists' success in this region were the prevalence of strong regional sensitivities,factionalism and corruption within the Congress Party, and stringent economic
Evaluating the election results, the Centralof the CPI noted that the Party'swas best where it had less mass"in the face of terror and repression"he Tclengana region of Hyderabadhere It had succeeded in attracting substantial support from the pcasunts. and where It hud madeuse of the "national"ppeals to linguistic particularism. The Central Committee also noted the success of the Party's "flexible" united front tactics.
Although these elections revealed substantial support for the CPI. they also Indicated twoareas olindustrial area,Bombay City,elt stretching from Bombay lo Calcutta through the central portion of India. In the states of Bombay. Rajas than. Uttar Pradesh, andstatesf the total IndianParty elected only one candidatetate assembly and none to the Lok Sabha. The CPl's performance inlections is compared in. under Reference Data.
7 the CPI had gained considerablein parliamentary activity and election campaigns. It had participated ineneral elections, in special state eloctions inand in the Patiala and EastStates' Union4 and Andhrand in numerous local government elections. Itpreparations for7 campaign earlier than other parties, and it was effectivelywhile most parties were still selecting their candidates and formulating their election strategies. The Party's efforts were directedtowards defeating the Congress Party in as many constituencies as possible and. if possible, forming "alternative governments" In one or more stales. Writing shortly before the elections, CPI Oeneral Secretary Ajoy Ghosh said, "All ourin the election should be directed toward breaking the monopoly position of the Congresshosh recommended that the Party avoid entering candidates in "all senseless contests" and concentrate on electing Communists in areas where the Party was strong and forming united fronts elsewhere. To coordinate the Party'sP. C, Joshi was given responsibility forthe campaign In north India and E. M. S. Namboodirlpad. who later assumed office as Chief Minister of Kerala, directed Party activities In the south.
The CPI election manifesto issued in7 denounced the central government's internal policies in strong terms, criticizing itsmeasures for agrariantsto resolve the food shortage, and its failure to root out "blackroarkctlng, profiteering, andhe government was dubbed aapparatus" which follows 'antipeople pol-
NIS SUPPLEMENT VI
0
and crushes "every manifestationribute was paid in the manifesto to "progressive" features of India's foreign policy, but the CPI attempted to arrogate credit for these policies by stating that "this is precisely the orientation for which the Communist Party ofIn alliance with other patriotic and democratic forces,n addition to demandmg equal right* for women, increased benefits for refugees and scheduled castes and tribes, and betterfor the armed forces and police, thestrongly reflected the four-class approach, as shown by the following excerpts:
A naUooal minimum wage should* be fixed, and workers should be assisted to secure fair wages In all organized industries. Pending such fixation, an Immediate increasehould be granted tu workers on the boats of already Increased productivity of labor.
The Communist Party demands that the slogan of land to the tiller should be Implemented without any further procrastination or delay. Further, there must be substantial reduction of the burden of rent und taxes.
The middle classpecial role to play in the rebuilding of the nation. But It Is denied *heopportunities and Is tormented by growingand economic difficulties. The Party will fight for expan&Jon of employment and olher opportunities so that the economic distress of this class is relieved and its talent and potentialities are fully lapped for the rejuvenation of the country. The Communist Party recognlaes ttiat In the present stage of our development, patriotic-minded Indian capitalists can make an Important contributionthe economic development of our country The Party desires that Indian industrialists should be protected against foreign competition, that all legltl-male rights of the capitalists should be ensured, and (hat their active cooperation shuuld be secured for Implementation of Uae plan of national
The results of7 state assembly elections arc portrayed graphically In, for the four parties recognized as national parties by the election commission and for minor parties andNo results are shown for Jammu and Kashmir since polling was not held until later and since the CPI does not function openly. Tho most spectacular result of the secondelections was the Communist success in Kerala where the Party wonflected seats in the sute assembly and increased itsof the total vote fromoowever, the CPI also registered notable guins in West Bengal, where it capturedeats Incmber Legislative Assembly, and in Bombay Stale, where participation in the UnitedCommittee and Gujarat! People'senabled the Communists to increase their legislative strength from one seat inlectionsn the first general elections, more than halt the total Communist vote was polled in Andhra Pradesh and Madras.7 these two states accounted forf thevote,igher proportion thanas polled in slates in which local Party units had previously been weak or virtuallyThe following tabulation compares by percentages the geographical distribution of the total Communist vote In the two generalThe percentages given for Andhra Pradesh include the vote polled by the People's Democratic Front In both elections, and7 figuresthe results for5 special elections in the Andhra region:
.
14
JJ
Pradesh
IA
M
.
...
OA
Pradesh
Bengal
TMiirroniss
Pradesh
1J
CPI improved its showing7 among industrial workers in most regions of Indlu.in Bombay. Bihar, and West Bengal, but remained comparatively weak in rural areas. In comparison with its performance in southern and eastern India, the Party continued to make apoor showing In the "Hindilthough the Party improved its position In Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar states over, It polledf the total vole in Madhya% in Uttar Pradesh,% in Bihar (see,he geographical distribution of CPI votes in7 assembly elections is shown in Fioubea map appearing at the end of this Section. Wherever possible these results are shown by districts. For Bombay and Madhyuwhere district results are not available,arc shown for the various historical "regions" which were merged to form these integrated states. Although two Party members were reportedly elected In the Gujarat area of Bombay State, no CPI vote Is shown in this region since these candt-
"
ulriiiliim
. PERCENTAGEVOWS POLLEDAJOR PARTIES IX7 lHOIAK STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
5
dates contested as nominees of the GujaratlCrganlzalloii, and their constituenciesbeore detailed breakdown of the CPI vote by districts Is Included inppearing at the end of this Section. This table lists the CPI vote, by totals andfor all districts in which the Party polled moret the total vote.
The CommumsU lost legislative strength only in two states. In the Telengana region ofPradesh (assembly elections were not held in the remainder of that statet dropped fromeats In the first general electionslthough the CPI continued lo poll approximately one-fourth lhe total vote. The Communists'to win additional scats in this area resulted from factionalism within the CPI and from the Party's Inability lo conclude an electoralwith the Socialists. In Madras State, CPI representation declined fromwing to the existence of an effective Congress Party machine, the enactment shortly before the electionsill reducing rents for tenant farmers, andof anll-Congrcss sentiment behind the separatist Dravidian Progressive Federation.
The CPI strengthened Its position in theLok Sabha, capturingfeats for which elections were held and polling0 votes. Once again It emerged as tbe largest opposition party In the house, although it is still overshadowed by the Congress Party whicheats. Analytlng Its performancethe elections, the Central Committee attributed the Party's gains lo:he increased "political maturity" and "seething discontent" ofhe popularity of the "mass struggles and campaigns" led by the Party, and the adoption of "realistic" and "flexible" united front tactics;he "advance of the world Communistand of the Ideas of) thein Party activity among laborers; andhe fact that the Party's "propaganda was much superior to that of the Congresshe Communist Party demonstrated in these elections that it is capable of capitalizing on the ruling party's shortcomings and that under existingitotential for future growth.
E. Parliamentary role
Indianion of states ruledtronggovernment which, under the constitution, retains all residual powers. The bicameralincludes an upper house, the Rnjya Sabha (Council ofhich is Indirectly elected by the state legislatures, has restricted functions.
andontinuing body since approximately one-third ol its members retire every two years. This house furnishes another forum for CPIand gives the Party an opportunity to make up for chances missed during debates in the lower house. The more Important Lok Sabha, which Is directly electederm of fiveIt may be dissolved earlier by the Indian President acting on advice from the Primebeen the target of most Communistactivities during recent years.although the Communists have effectively utilized this houseropaganda forum, they have been unable, in view ot the smaUness of their parliamentary bloc, appreciably to influencepolicies.
The CPI has been more effective in influencing legislation or policies on the state level since ll has considerable strength in several assemblies and since these bodies arc more responsive than Parliament to Internal or extraleglslativeHowever, the state legislatures, which may be either bicameral or unicameral (Kerala falls into the latterave limited and clearly defined functions. Central control over the states is assured by the fact that the states are not financially self-sufficient and that thegovernment has the power to supersede any state government and impose "President's rule" if the national interest requires such action.administration, which is under the control of the various state governments, is rudimentary in most parts of India. Village panchayatshave been revived only recently in most states and have functions which are not yet clearly evolved. Village self-governmentack of funds, excessive governmental control, and the absence of expert guidance and staff. In addition, many villagers are apathetic toward local admhilstrutlon, and party loyalties arc frequently lax at the local level Thesehave aided thettempt tooothold In local government in some partsi
Before the second general elections,activity was viewed by the Communists as an Important but nonetheless ancillary weapon to broaden the base of CPI support, presumably in preparationeizure of power by other means. Although efforts to form united fronts continue to take precedence over CPI actions in Parliament, the Party's success in Kerala State in7 elections demonstrated that parliamentarycould, in itself,irect means to power. This development strengthened "rightist" sentl-
within the CPI. Kerala is now one of the main fronts in the Communists' struggle for power In India.
Despite their increased emphasis onactivity during recent years, thehave never camouflaged their distrust of "bourgeois" parliamentary institutions in India or their basic belief that these institutions must be substantially altered before they can serve the people. Bhupcsh Gupta, leader of the Communist btoc in the Rafya Sabha, wrote In an article in the8 issue of the/New Age (monthly):
The bourgtoliK in general and the Congress Party in particular want to make out thai Parliament ukind of supraclasnt should be our Uuk. In our Ideological propaganda, to lay bare the real character of Par-kament and IU serious Umitauona Tbe danger ot parliamentary Illusions is not always properly recognized: sometimes loose talks aboutpath" tend almost to Idolise the bonr-pcoule as the revisionists do. Yet Ihe reality Is tbat without combatting these illusions, we can never look forward to any fundamental change ol our bourgeois parliamentary InslltuUons so that Uiey become genuine Instruments of service to the masses and for social transformation
arliament
Eight Communists were elected to provincial legislatures inlections, and one Party member, Somnath Lahiri, was electedlo the Constituent Assembly. Lahiri's performance in the assembly was bombastic, but Cosununist representation in state and national legislatures was too small at this time tooticeable impact. It was not until the firstelections that the CPI devoted significantto its parliamentary strategy. Theommunist MP's who took their scats in2 were distinguishable from their parliamentary colleagues primarily by their youth. Fifty-eight percent of the Communist members were underears ofomparedor the Congress Parlyor the Socialists. They also differed from other MP's in their almost total tack of previous legislative experience. Ninety-six percent of the Communist MP's had never before servedational or state legislature, whereasf the Congressmenf thewere new to legislative work.
Since Communists formed the largestbloc in the Lok Sabha, the CPI requestedas the official opposition party during the early days of the first session. This claim wasby the Speaker on the grounds that the CPI lacked the rcqjusite number of seats to qualify for recognitionparliamentary party." The
Speaker did, however, recognize the Communistsparliamentarynd. Gopalan. then Communist leader In the Lok Sabha, to occupy the scat which would normally be allocated to the leader of the opposition. This situation continued after the second generalin which CPI representation in the Lok Sabha rosend there Is still no officialparty although the Communists form the largest single non-Congress pnrty. Communist representation in the less important andelected upper house,ember Rajya Sabha (Council oftood at2 and at
a. OaOAN-rzATioN for activity in Parlia- -mbntThe CPI is the most elaborately andorganized of all parliamentary groups. Party tactics in both houses are formulatedarliamentary Executive Committee, under the leadership of Bhupesh Gupta. According to aadopted at the Party Congress at Amritsar in
On major political Issues, the Central Executive Committee and the Secretarial will guide the Parliamentary Executive Committee, which shall be responsible for all parliamentary work,discipline of MP*
Information is not available on the exactof the Parliamentary Executive Committee, but they are believed similar to tliose of theSubcommittee on Parliamentary AfTulrs which guided the Party's parliamentary activities before the Amritsar congress. The work ol this subcommittee was described In New Age (monthly) in7 as follows:
It will be tbe task of the subcommittee to give. In close touch with the Politburo, broad political guidance to the parliamentary group and. Incases, also CfcaaaW organisational and other pracUcal questions In connection with the work in tbe Parliament and take necessary decisions
According to the rules of procedure Ink Sabha, three qualifications are regarded aa necessaryarty can be officially recognised asumber of members equaluorum of thenity of ideology and program, and the possession of an organization outside as well as inside Parliament. By these tests, only theParty Is eligible for recognition. The dlsUnc-tlonparliamentarynd adlsUncUon which has been carried over from the pretndependence Centralsomewhat vague. Doth are considered equal from tha point of view of opportunities to speak on tbe floor, and both are allotted blocks of seats In the chamber. The major dlllerencejt, however, arc two: only "parties' aro given office space In Parliament House, and "groups" have only an uode.lned and limited right to be consulted on Important Issues of policy.
NIS 3s, SUPPLEMENT VI
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them. Final decision* on all major pollUcul questions shall, however, be taken In consultation with lhe Politburo.
Party leaders in the two houses of Parliament were given discretionary responsibility to set CPI policy "when decisions have to be taken into any matter immediately on the floor of theowever,ecision was subject to review by the Politburo. Thus, the Party'sfor parliamentary activity is similar to its general organizational structure; effectiveIs vestedmall group at the top.
The Communist group In Parliament is welland has been able to marshal extensive factual data duringheir preparation is aided by the use of Party channels (the CPI Secretariat frequently requests state blanches to .supply data on police Hrings'and other localand through the assistance of the Research Bureau. This bureau, which Is located in the Communist Parliamentary Office in New Delhi, employs five full-time workers and ison subject lines (labor, land reforms, budgetary matters, and sohe Research Bureau also aids coordination between theparliamentary front and other Partysince it services the Partyhole.of parliamentary and nonparliamen-tary efforts is further aided by tbe presence of numerous top Party organizational leaders in Parliament Five of the eight members of the CPI Secretariat are MP's, and anf theentral Executive Committee membersarliament. The CPI contingent in the Lok Sabha was led78 by S. A. Dange, member of the Party Secretariat and generalof the Communist-controlled All-India Trade Union Congress. There were reportsthe end8 tliat he might be removed from tills position owing to his failure on occasion to clear his plans with the Party high command. A. K. Gopalan, member ol the Secretariateader of the CPI peasant front, now functions as deputy leader in this house. Party affairs in the upper house are directed by Bhupesh Gupta.
The CPI exercises strict control over Party members in both houses ofeporthey are housed in ahostel in New Delhi. Communist MP's are reported Lo mix freely with non-Communists In the lobbies of Parliament, but to maintain aaloofness outside. Their duties andare clearly spelled out. and all Communist MP's arc expected to devote full time toactivities when Parliament is inDirective to Communist MP's" adopted by the Politburo in7 imposes the followingon the Party's representatives in
t will be tbe task of communist members of Parliament to carry out the line of the ParlyUic Parliament and they roust speak aad funcuon In absolute conformity with tbe Party Une.
he attendance In Uic House must be retarded aa lhe most elementary duty of every Communist member ofhey must not absent themselves from Parliament wltlioul the prior approval of the group of lheentralsubcommittee Discipline In this respect must be strictly enforced
Ol All our comrades In Parliament must be active on the floor of the House and otherwise.
(i> Our MP comrades must divide up the various subjects for systematic study amongst themselves
In both their public and private life thoMP's must practice simplicity and avoid all showlnesa and extravagance which oreoncomitant of bourgeois parliament life
it) Conununist MPs mas', pay Party It Was regularly and without any default These levies should be regarded as thehare* on their earnlnca.
b. TacticsThe Communists entered the Lok Sabha2 with little advance preparation butetermination to use parliamentary institutions to further their own objectives. In this they have been successful within the limits provided by the parliamentary forum. In using Parliament to advance their propaganda and exert pressure the Communists liave taken fullof parliamentary procedures as they have evolved in India. Three practices have been of particular benefit:roceedings In both houses of Parliament normally beginquestion hour" during which ministers answer written queries forwarded hi advance by members. Their answer* may be followed by "supplemenoral questions pursuing the same subject. This procedure gives therequentto challenge and. if possible, embarrass the government. Communists haveumber of queries far in excess of their proportional strength in Parliament One Communist MP- -Hlrcndra Naththe distinction of asking more questions than any other member duringules of procedures provide thatmotions" may be Introduced lu postpone scheduled business before the house and toimmediate discussion of an urgentCommunists Introduced half ofd-joummrnt motions made duringThese dealt primarily with publicor disasters in which some government fault could bearty publicationthat "thanks to lhe eccentricities ofprocedure, almost all of [the Com-
9
adjournment motions) were refusedby the Chair, in spite of such refusal, however, we usually succeeded la forcinghakeup in the government's) Under another rule of procedure, tn MP canalf-hour discussionnutter of public importance" which has elicited in answer in Parliament that is unsatisfactory or needs further elucidation. During1 Parliament, Communists were responsible forf thealf-hour discussions on such issues.rule provides for discussions of matters of public importancehort period, but longeralf-hour; of theebates conducted under this procedure during the first Parliament, the CPI Initiatednd participated in most of the others.
During their first few years in Parliament, the Communists frequently adopted dramaticto call attention to their cause, particularly Ln the lower house. They repeatedly accused the Lok Sabha Speaker of partiality and occasionallyout of the chamber In protest against his rulings or against "reactionary" governmental oobcies- In addition, the Speaker often found it necessary to take Communist MP's to task for Iheir unparliamentary behavior. Onemember, K. Anandan Nambiar, had thedistinction of being the only MP everejected from the Lok Sabha tor his conduct.
The Party's propaganda approach was set early In the first session when A. K. Gopalan called the President's inaugural address setting forth the rortrnment's program,eclaration of war against the Indianuring the neat few rears Communists in Parliament followed anegative policy. Their primewas to "expose" the government by playing up Its "antipeople" policies, by championing jwpu-lar grievances, and by Introducing impossiblesolely for Its propaganda value. Inour years before the linguisticof Indian states, they demanded "immediate Ueps to distribute the statesinguisticnhey recommendedupees (abouteto supply free rations to unemployed laborers during the following six months. They flcmanded revision of Indian policy to combat 'Anglo-American imperialism" and cliarged that "Anglo-American spies [are coming to India] in the guise of experts, advisers, Ford Foundation and other institutional representatives, botanists and aoosofttts. geographers and explorers, and so on and so forth."
5 the Communists In Parliamentomewhat milder lino In accordance with the Party's increased>mphasls on moderation and its revised tactical view of Prime Minister Nehru. Since that time they have seldom showed open disrespect for parliamentary institutions and conventions and have tended to act moreona fide opposition. Walkouts have become less frequent, and the Speaker has found It leuto call Uir Communists to taak for theiron the floor of the two houses.
The Communists claim credit for allmeasures adopted by the Government ofbut it is unlikely that their small contingent ln Parliament has had an appreciable effect on basic national policies. They rightly claim credit for certain administrative changes and minor shifts. Their activity In Parliament led directly to discontinuance of the practice of flying the British flag over Parliament House on certainand to the withdrawal of facilities given the British for the recruitment of Gurkha troops on Indian soil. However, their majoragainst the acceptance. aid, against the Commonwealth link, for land reforms, and for spectacular measures to end unemployment-have failed to influence national policy, although in many cases they have been successfulgambits It is not likely that thegiven the present administrative structure in India and the fact that they haven the Lok Sabha, aspire to make orinfluence policy. Rather, Parliament to the Communists Is merely one more propaganda medium and one more method of convincing the people that the present government is not oriented toward their best interests. In theLeninist context, they believe thatin these Institutions helps "to prove to the backward masses why such parliaments deserve to be dispersed; it helps their successful dispersal, and helps to make bourgeois parliamcntarlanism politically obsolete."
erala Stale
CPI control over the Kerala government (as ofay be better understood when viewedackground of the political and social composition of the state and the factors in Kerala that have given the Communists their strength. One of the smallest and most unstable of Indian states. Kerala was formed In6 under the linguistic reorganization scheme by merging two Malayalam-speaking regions, the former Travancore-Cochin State and the Malabar district of Madras. Both regions have histories of political Instability, poverty, andconflict. Travancore-Cochinecord in India by huving five separate ministrieshen the state was formed by merging two former princely states, and March
hen the governmental machinery broke down completely, necessitating direct centralrule over the state. Each ministrya delicate balance of competitive regional and religious interests which survived, on theonly slightly more than one year. Four of these ministries were formed by the Congress Party, and the fifth was organized by the Prajafirst'PSP state government inThus, at the time of7 elections both these parties had demonstrated their inability lo rule Travancore-Cochin effectively. Malabarwas equally unstable. The Congress Party-wonut of thetale assembly scats from this region ineneral elections, whereas the socialistsnd the7 seats.
Kerala's political instability stems fromand economic factors. Greatly overpopu-lated, with an averagenhabitants per square mile, Kerala is the most densely populated state in India (the all-India average1nd this densityer square mile in the narrow cultivable coastal belt.opportunities under the state's agricultural economy are totally inadequate for the rapidly expanding population.esult,and underemployment arc the highest in India. Accordingtatement by theFinance Ministernlyut ofen over the age ofre regularly employed;ave partial employment, and the remainingre completely without gainful work. Kerala Is also the most literate state in India owing primarily to the enlightenedof the former princely rulers and to theof Christian missionaries;f the populace is literate, compared with an all-India average of less. andis of particular political import in Kerala among this educated group. Finally, the Kerala populace is divided into three large communalChristians, andinto three regionalof Travancore. Cochin, and Malabar. Deep-seated regional .and communal cross-currents among these various factions have detracted from homogeneity in the democratic political parties in the state and from the ability of the successive governments in the regions which now comprise Kerala to deal effectively with the endemicof the area.
The Communist Party was first organized in the Kerala region during the periodbymembers of the Socialist wing of the Congress Party. It made considerable headway,in Malabar, during World War u, when most of the Congress Party leaders were in prison.
6 itubstantial boostesult of Its participation in the Pun-nambra-Vayalar uprising which was designed lo liberate the state from the Maharaja and hisdewanir C. P. Ramaswainy Aiyer. The dewan ruthlessly suppressed thejailed the top Party leaders, and outlawed thean which lastedowever, the Communists turned this temporary defeat to their advantage. Many people in the state were impressed by their tactic of "direct action" which was In marked contrast to the do-nothingof the Congress Party in the state during this period. While the Party was banned, those CPI leaders who were free concentrated withsuccess on spreading the Communist line among the peasantry, and the Party was ready for the first general electionshich It fought covertly. When the ban on the CPI was removed following the elections,embers ofember legislature who had been elected as Independents revealed their membership in the Communist Party.
Party membership Inccording to official Party figures ins the highest in India. The CPI's main supporters are industrial and agricultural laborers. On abasis its hard-core followers are primarily Ezhavas and Thlyyas (low-caste Hindus) andesser extent members of the Scheduled Casteshe Party Is particularly active on the labor front, and It controls one of the largest trade union federations in the state. On abasis, the CPI istlonespecially among laborers, and in theregion, where It has attracted support among the peasantry. The CPI is the best organized and most efficiently operated party In Kerala, and It has been the most effective In appealing to the populace. Nearly all of its top leaders arespeakers and persuasive writers In English and Malayalam. In addition, the Party controls directly three excellent Malayalam newspapers and one English weekly which carry its message to the literate.
Although the CPI did not expect to win ain Kerala In7 general elections, it went all out toreditable showing and to ensure that it at least emerged as tiie largestgroup in the state assembly. The Party mobilized its excellent village structure behind the campaign,ecord number ofand began its campaign far earlier than other parties. Moreover, whereas the other all-India parties campaigned on the nationalissued by their respective partythe CPIeparate election rnanifesto for Keralaomprehensive program
9
designed to appeal lo all low-income groups in the slate. It promised inter alia immediateof land, Impositioneiling on income from land, substantial reduction in the rents paid by tenant farmers,cross-the-board wage boost for laborers. Although this platform won votes for the CPI, the exaggerated hopes it aroused have returned to plague the Communist state ministry.
The extent of the Party's success In thesesurprised even the Communists. The Party increased its popular vote2nd capturedflectedseats. This substantial gain wasa protest vote against continuing poverty, land scarcity, and unemployment and against lhe successive failures of the. Congress Party and Praja Socialists to improve conditions In the state, but it wasribute to the organizational ability and intra-party discipline of the CPI, which succeeded in channeling these frustrations toits own ends.
By enlisting the support of five Independents who were elected with Communist support, the CPIlim legislative majority,ommunist-dominated ministry was installed in office onmcmber cabinet9 Communistsf the fellow-traveling Independents. Although lacking inexperience, the cabinetigh-powered body including most top CPI leaders in Kerala. It is ably led byM. S.ember at that time of the CPI Politburo, and one of the top theoreticians within the Party. This electoral victory gave thehance lo probe the Indian constitution and its defenses, to ex]>erlment in using the powers of the government to Increase the strength and finances of the Communist Party, and to convince the people of India that the CPIegal,and constitutional alternative to the Congress Party,.
In attempting lo use Kerala to enhance its prestige throughout India, the CPI has facedobstacles. First, this regime. In contrast to Communist government' In other parts of the world, functions without the backing of the state police force. In the second place, the Indianand the strong central governmentserious restrictions on the Party's activities in Kerala and on its ability to adopt dramaticFor example, the proposal to nationalize foreign-owned tea, coffee, and rubber plantations In theproposal which was embodied in the Party's election manifesto and reiterated at Chief Minister Namboodlri pad's first pressafter assumingabandonedto opposition from the Government of India.
Of particular importance, the endemic econoi problems of Kerala lunnot be solved quickly, and the Communist ministry has thus not been able totriking improvement In livingin that state. Finally, the Party relicsarrow iwo-vote majority in the legislaturethe Communistnd theor discipline within the Party and the continued support of the five Independents are thus of utmost importance.
In governing Kerala sincehehave employed some of the time-tesled techniques of international communism totheir position. Overtly the Communist ministry has followed the followingt has repeatedly stressed itslis adherence to democratic principles, and its support for the Indian constitution; inuntilt adopted anstance toward the Congress Party-controlled central government and praised. for its "cooperative attitude" toward Kerala.tan initial reputation for efficiency and honesty In governing the state; even Congress Party members stated that "papers moved faster through the Government Secretariat" and that the Communist ministerserious interest in the problems of the people.t attempted to consolidate the base of Communist support in the state by appealing to low-income groups and depressed classes and castes. The pay of several hundred thousand governmental employees at the slate and local levels was increased; peasants were secured against eviction from land,omprehensive land reform bill was introduced (this had not been passed by the Legislativeas of; and greater benefits In educational opportunities and employment rights were given to depressed groups.he government granted additional powers to village councils 'panchapots) and announced itslo decentralize further by rcvumping thestructure of local administration. The motive for this proposed "reform" Is undoubtedly to aid the excellent CPI organizational apparatus at the village level.he ministryosture of moderation toward private Industry in an effort to attract capital to the state. In on appeal to foreign capital. Namboodlripad stated in Bombay In8 that Kerala would not deviate from the central government's stand onand conceded that foreign capital should be invited to Kerala on terms "slightly morethan those which the foreign Investor might receive in his own country.helightened IU control over educational facilities in the state. The University Act, adopted shortly after the Communists assumed of-
NIS SV
flee, brought Kerula University under more direct supervision of the ministry. The Education Act, passed by the assembly inthe government to take over any private school in the state. This highly controversial measure, aimed at Christian schools, was finally approved in9 by the Indianwhose assent is requiredill of this type becomes law,lightly modified formIt still gives the government extensiveover therivate schools. In addition lo these two bills, the governmentthe pay of theeachers In the state, revised "obsolete" textbooks to include favorable comments on Communist China and the Soviet Union, and broughtillage libraries in the state under the direct supervision of the state government.he cabinet established morecomposed of Communists andto advise the government on virtually every facet of Its operations. These committees ereated an aura of democratic operation, providedfor deserving CPI members, and brought non-Communlsls and members of the opposition parties into association with the government.he Kerala ministry established one of the most widespread -propaganda machines in India. The Public Relations Department of thewas greatly expanded, the state governmenttipend to the major wire services in India, and itever over the local press through the placement of governmental advertising, ansource of income for many small
The regime's covert activities have been of even greater significancease study In the CPI's tacticsuling party. The Kerala Communists have infiltrated the government services and the police force and have used their control over the government to Improve the position and finances of the Communist Party in the state. Shortly after assuming office, the Communist ministrythe existing ban on employing Communists in governmental service. Subsequently, several hundred new positions of officer rank were created In the slate government Secretariat. Many of these were stalled with Party members andIn addition to new appointments,has been strengthened by promotions and transfers (see this Supplement,overnmenthe Kerala branch of the CPI reportedly improved its finances by moreupeests firstonths in office. This sum was reportedly raised in large partrom those who receivedcontributions" from those appointed
PLEMENT 9
to serve on the numerous committees in tho state;he establishment of dummy cooperatives through which state funds are channeled to the Party; anddonations" from Industrialistsgovernment-approved loans.
Many of the gains of the Kerala Communists have been made possible by the absence of anopposition in the state. The legislativeis divided among three separate parties; the Congress Party, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Muslim League. Although these parties have cooperated against the Communists on specificeffective long-range cooperation has been hampered by deepseated historical animosities. Further, the Congress Party, which wasby its electoral defeat, had failed by9 to resolve Its own internal conflicts and toonsistent and effective strategy lothe Communists.
Although tho Communists have mude definite gains in both their overt and covert operations in Kerala, their rule in the state has not been ansuccess. The ministry has been unable toramatic improvement ln livingIt has failed to solve the food shortage in the state, appreciably reduce unemployment, or attract significant outside investment to facilitate industrialisation. It has also been unable to carry out many of its preelection pledges and, in addition, has been forced to adopt strong police methods to suppress opposition agitation. In June and Julyinor dispute between students and the state government over ferry rates was parlayed by the oppositionajor agitation resulting in violence between students and the police. Later in the same month police firedob of demonstrating workers near the city of Qullon In the first such attack on laborers since the Communists assumedcr. Inpolice were forced to open fire againstplantation laborers in another area of the state. This violence, involving two of themajor targetandembarrassing pressures within the CPI and detracted from the Communists'pledge that the police would not be used in an "antipeoplc" manner,
These adverse factors have no doubt cost the Communists some support, although this cannot be accurately measured since there has been no reliable gauge to the Communists' popularitytatewide basis sincet appears likely, however, that the Kerala ministry has countered these losses by strengthening the Party machine In tho slate and by attracting support from teachers, low-paid government employees, and depressed castes and classes. Whether the
9
CPI has lost support orIn neither case was the change decisive by Marchministry's shortcomings have produced three detrimental effects. First, thehad not succeeded by9 inKeralaationwide showpiece which would appreciably enhance the Party's prestige throughout India. Secondly, the Communists'to exploit democratic machinery to further their own objectives has brought them into direct conflict with the central government. By the end6 the Kerala Communists had virtually abandoned their policy of moderation toward the Government of India. They were attempting to placelame for the ministry's shortcomings on limitations In the constitution, indifference or discrimination by the central government toward Kerala, and the mefflcieiicy of the Indianapparatus. Tin- central government, for its part,irmer attitude toward Kerala Prime Minister Nehru publicly pointed to the "sense of insecurity" whichrule engendered, several additional bills were returned to the state government forand conditions in Kerala were the subjecteated debate In Parliament late in the year.hinly veiled threat, the weekly New AgeduringThe Keralawill look after the Kerala government for which they voted in their millions. They willit for all they arc" Finally, the effects of Communist rule have Intensifiedwithin both the central and stateParty organizations. Some Party leaders have had second thoughts on the advisability ofinistry in one state while another parly controls the strong central government. Others have contended that the ministry, bound by constitutional limitations and conflictinggroups within the CPI itself, has been loo moderate and has failed to attempt drasticCited as major examples of the ministry's deviation from communistic principles are the Kerala government's concessions to one of the largo North Indian industrial firms to encourage constructionayon pulp factory in the state and the draft land reform bill, whichodest celling on land holdings and provides full compensation for any excess land taken over by the state.
The Communists' prospects for remaining inin Kerala until2 national elections hinge primarily on their ability to satisfy localon the attitude of the centralof India, and on the balance betweeno major factions within the CPI. During the first few months9 there were signs ofopposition within Kerala to theregime. Small landowners announced their Intention to oppose tlie draft land reform bill, and Christian and Nair groups became more articulate In opposing tightened governmental control over education. There were also indications of ain the attitude toward Kerala of theGovernment which has the power under the Indian Constitution totateand institute "President's rule" (directby an appointee of the Indian In addition, the Kerala government's prospects could be affected by the left-rightwithin the CPI. Some Communistapparently believe that the ministers should resign and that the CPI should revert to aof doctrinaire opposition throughout India. M. N. Govindan Nuir. leader of the Kerala unit of the CPIember of the "leilist" faction within the Party, staled in8 that thepolicy had "occasionallynd reportedly favored resignation of the Kerala Government following the police firing onworkers In October. However, the Kerala state executive committee of the CPI. which Is dominated by "rightist" elements, resolved InWe cannot throw away the right to rule the state." CPI General Secretary AJoy Ghosh reportedly believes that the Communists should strive to retain control over Kerala until shortly before2 elections and should then resign voluntarily in order to have completeof action during the campaign.
ther state assemblies
The CPI is the largest opposition party in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh II now has at leusL one Party member in each state assembly inwhereas followingeneralthe Party had no representation in four. The Communists Increased their representation7federaland Inf thelates. In Punjab, CPI representation remained constant, and the Party lost legislative strength in Andhra Pradesh and Madras. It registered its most striking gains in Kerala, West Bengal, and Bombay.under Reference Data) compares Communist strength in the various state legislaturesfollowinglections,inguistic reorganization, and7 elections.
A Party document reviewing the work of the CPI contingent In the West Bengal assemblyas follows on the role of state. the assembly today is one of the mostforums for the general political education of the peoplehole and. in combination with the growing militant and united mass movement,
tial
3S, SUPPLEMENT VI
-8
the realization of important demands of thearty tactics in these bodies have been similar to those employed in Parliament, withnotable exceptions. Communists in statehave concentratedreater degree, but with limited success, on achieving unitedwith other legislative groups. In most states other opposition parties have refused lo be drawnnited opposition front, although they have, on occasion, cooperated with the CPI on specific issues before the legislature. The United Maharashtra Committee and Gujarat!Organization, both of which containmembers, functionertain extent as united legislative blocs, although unitybreaks down on issues not Immediatelyto the move to divide Bombay State. In Or baa, where Ihe minority Congress Party rules only by virtue of its alliance with the Jharkhand Purty, the CPI and PSP have cooperated closely In their efforts to unseat the ministry. The other major opposition party In this state, the Canal antra Parishad, has remained aloof from this informal CPI-PSP alliance.
CPI members in state assemblies have been more bombastic than their parliamentaryat the center, and criticism of the state governments has been more vehement and more precise than that of the central government. No-confidence motions have occasionally beenby Party members in the states, andare still frequent. Like the CPI faction In Parliament, Communist blocs in the various state assemblies are organized in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism, although this organizational structure is frequently less formal at the state level. Communist assemblymen are charged with responsibility for specific subjects and function under the general guidance of aappointed by the Party's ProvincialCommittee. It appears, however, that greater discretionary authority is given Party leaders In the state assemblies than in Parliament.
In general, CPI assemblymen try to create the impression that the Congress Party is the party of "bighat its budgets are oriented toward the privileged classes, and that thesehave done little for the common man. In West Bengal, under the leadership of Jyoliember of the Central Executive Committee, the Communists have concentrated on criticism of the state government's food policy and its failure to resettle refugees from East Pakistan. The Andhra Pradesh branch has devoted its attention generally to the state government's allegedand particularly to its failure to legislate effective land reforms. In Bombay, Partyhave centered their attack chiefly on therefusal to divide the state between two major linguistic components.
esult of their numerical strength lnassemblies and the fact that stateare more immediately responsive to public opinion, the CPI has been more successful Inpolicy at the atate than at the national level. Some of its agitations, in which legislative demands are frequently reinforced bydemonstrations outside thehave produced concessions from the state governments, particularly in West Bengal, and have occasionally resulted in the appointment of committees, Including Communists as members, lo recommend remedial action on pressing
Local government
According to the draft political resolutionto the third Party Congress inhe Communist attitude toward organs of local government Is as follows:
Dy their Ilrnlled spheres of action, llie proximity to the very people who elect them, the day-to-day constant contact with the execuUvr machinery which Is not like the hardened bureaucracy ol the slate machine, the municipal and local bodies can be used for the diced benefit of the people by our representatives. However poor andbe their powers, these small centers areof power, power to do good for the life ol Uie people. Our representatives must learn the nrt of running them
Detailed data on the composition of district boards and village panchayats are not available, but the CPI Is known to be significantly strong in local bodies In Kerala and lo have pockets of strength in local governmental bodies in Andhra Pradesh and In parts of Bombay, West Bengal, Punjab, and Madras. According to the weekly New Age, the Communists controlanchavats in Andhra Pradesh. InCommunist-dominated united frontsajority in municipal councils of Vijayavada and Guntnr. two important municipalities hi that state. In district board elections ln theregion of Bombay In the spring8 Communists captured onlyf theor the Congress Party, but showed significant strength in the two districts of Sholapur and Ahmadnagar. In7 the United Maharashtra Committee wonfhe Bombay Municipalf these were won bynd the followinglrajkar, one of theof the CPI, became mayor through Indirect election by the corporation council. However,its obvious prestige value, this election is
9
cording to available data, is the Communist Party's first majorityocal body above the village level In Uttar Pradesh.
The Communists have some strength Inwhich as now constituted by theof India includes the four settlements Inari-knlahend Yanaonunder French rule. Thishichopulationsby the Government of India through an appointed Chief Cornmlssioner, but it has an elected assembly. (These four areas wereto Indiae facto basisut de Jure transfer await* ratification of the treaty of cession by the French assembly.) 5 the Communist-dominated People's Front won eats inmembcr Pondicherry assembly andf the total vote, compared witheatsr the vote for the Congress Party. This assembly was dissolved In8 owing to continued political Instability resulting fromchanges In party alignments among non-Communist groups. New elections are scheduled for
The CPI undoubtedly has representation In many additional local bodies for which noIs available. However, with the exception of Kerala and parts of West Bengal, the number of such bodies of local administration in which the Party is sufficiently strong to make aimpact is small. The greatest long-range danger lies perhaps in the fact that discipline among other opposition groups is frequently lax at the local level. The Communists have thus been able successfully to use united front tactics and tooothold in numerous local bodies.
F. Communist activities in other areas I. Ini and Kashmir
The disputed state of Jammu and Kashmira special problem for the Communists. Both. and the CPI support India's claims to the stale against those of Pakistan. Tho Soviet Union has offered to provide specialassistance, including technical advisers, to this strategically located state on India'sfrontier. However, the CPI ts hampered in its operations within the stale by theof the Government of India toward Jammu and Kashmir. There Is no unit of the CPI in the slate, and the Communists work through other parties to gain their objectives. Until7 they operated within the National Conference Party, which is closely affiliated with theParty The National Conference Party, led by Premier Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, became
the ruling party7 after the Maharaja'swas overthrown at the time of India'sEven before It assumed power, this party espoused radical economic and social reforms which the Communists supported, and7 It allowed no other party to function If it became too critical of the government.now apparently function within theNational Conference Party formed in7 under the leadership of Ohulam Mohumnmdupporter of pro-Communist causesormer deputy premier of the state. However. Sadiq does not want open ties with theand reportedly has said he wouldPI unit In Jammu and Kashmir. No Information is available on the extent ofInfiltration of Sadlqs party.
The National Conference.won% of the total) In thenember National Assembly In the7 elections (it wasreduced" toy defections, primarily lo the Democratic Nationalowever, these election results probably do not accurately reflect popular attitudes, sincef the National Conference candidates were elected withoutowing to repressive measures by the state government. The Democratic Nationalwitheats, Is the largest opposition group in the assembly. There has been someof the Kashmir Government by Communists, but this is apparently not serious (seender Government Infiltration).
hutan and Sikkim
little information is available on Communist activities in these strategically located border states, both of which are de facto protectorates of India. The major threat to both probably comes from the possibility of subversion by the Chinese Communists. Although there is no firm evidence of Chinese Communist activity in these states, both are potentially vulnerable to such activities
6
^Cbm^DENTIAL
State9
lo iheir economic backwardness, historical, religious, and trade tics with Tibet, and thoin both states of large groups which are racially akin to the Tibetans. In addition,intadian hegemonyossible field forpropaganda.
Bhutan, UioTarger of the two states (estimated, is one of the world's most backward areas. It has no political parties, no constitution, no courts, no codified system of law, and no modern facilities for communications. An absolute Maharaja sits at the top of the state's feudal administrative pyramid, and there is noevidence of agitation within the slate, by the Communists or by other groups, forgovernment ,liJ
Sikklm (estimated, which has closer ties with India (an Indian official serves as chief executive officer of thes somewhat more advanced. Agitationore representative typo or government has apparently grown during recent years. There are several non-Communist political parties in Sikklm, but no reliable evidence of Communist activity.
ffshore islands and Portuguese possessions
There is no evidence of Communist activity in the Laccadive, Andaman, and Nlcobar islands. These remote and sparsely populated islands, which are "union territories" of India, arcby administrators appointed by the Indian President. Opposition political parties arc notIn the Portuguese possessions on India's western coast (Ooa, Daman, and Dlu) und there is no evidence of Communist activity In these
g. Reference data
The tobies in this Subsection present detailed data In the general order of reference in the text.
7
. VOTING STRENGTH OK SOCIALIST AND COMMUNIST PARTIES IN GENENDIAptrctntap*ht utal tiaU territorial autmbtu tlrttOHi)
cpi
Sin tat
i
i
Pradesh
Bengal
lerrllorfo*:
Pradcali
total- for lite Ktaai, Maulooi Praja Part* and IttlUii SoeiiUM Vmiijad feeSocUIWt Party aod Soeiairxn.
PI include Ihe vote for tlm l'iHt|tlr'a DouuieruUd Front, counterpart of lhe. CPI In Hie Telengana region of tho stale Sinne elections were not kekd la the Andhra region ia7 total* include molt* for4 apeetsl eketloas la thai arca.% polled by Ibe Pcoplc'a Democratic Front.
4-i
tial
arch IQb'J
. Cl'I WIT. IN INDIAN STATIC AND NATIONAL
A III. OP ELWTiON
a
ot* i.
"in
POLLED
ar cm
Ul
Aottfir* Pradceti
SLnlii.
Uk Sal
Suit aaaonMy {Aadhra Win
Stale im-'nbly |rrtfiuii).
MMM
4
State
A11
Slat* ww-tnblt
Uk Smkka
Slule
UkSahkm
Banbay
Stair
UtSmtkM
Kerala
State
UkStbka
Slate MKiublf fTravaneiire-Cuct
fn
'i'.
Uk Sabha
Madhya Pradesh
Uk
State uaaernbly
Uk Sabha
Madras
Stat*
State
Uk BmU*
Stale
State AMcnibl r
UkS*kk*
5
7
7
7
7 IW7
1 52
itn
7
7
7
7
SUA
7 til
1.8
8.5
fa
S.6
6
06
4
<lalra
Stall' wxinltly .
UMk
SaUU
Punjab Stair ae*aaaaar<
SlnU- aa^mbly (PKPSU
/-MSaaaa
Rajattasa
Slate aaacmUy
!MM
,
Citar Pradnb
Stale MoniUy
Lok fataa
Slala aaaoDthly
Wert DenpU Stub* auambly.
StaU- aaartably
I*k
I'Vdeml TVrrlloriw llimoeiial l'radnli
Stale aawaably
Uk Sea**
Territorial
Lot See**
Maaipur
Hwtoral Colaee
seW-i
Territorial Council
Aaaaa
Tripora
Elortoral
UtHabka
Territorial
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
Vote* polled by tbeemocratic Fiont are ineluoVd in tba naulu tor Bombay aitd Andhra Praditub.
9
. COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN INDIAN STATE AND TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLIES
a HE a
AK6KK-blt
HEfBE&ESTATION
ma
uUd
in:.?
Pradesh..
Pradesh.
Bengal
Pra-
0
.
Except for thuemocratic Front,ol the CPI In tlw TotonKfinu region ofradesh, Ogurod do nut include allied parties or fellow-travelingotals differited inwing to Inclusion iuabove table otndhra election results.Antembly dissolved following imposition ol President's rule tn
. DISTRICTS IN WHICH THE CPIR MOttK Or* TBK VOTK INKMBI Y
LLKCTIONS
am, Inlaid
ana
en vote
It INT
or totai,
0
I
t
l
District elecUunl the rate in iImmp " AwcmMy election*
u* available for Bombay aad Ma.la.raowever, tjac* the CPI pallednd Male- leapcctively, tbe Parly piobablyf Ihe vote In lew. il any, districts ia thoseot held lo tlwee dklrieu7 It-uH, pvea are from5 apeeial aieeUoo* in Andhra.
5. Penetration of Labor and Agrarian Movements
Activity and strategy
Since its formation. the Communist Party of India has relied primarily on labor for its mass support. The All-India Tradehe labor arm of the Party, is one of tbe largest labor federations in India and isosition to reinforce Party activity in urban and industrial centers throughout the country. In addition, AITUC is strong in certain heydefense, petroleum,services, and Iron andituation which enhances the Communists' potential forin espionage and for disruptive activity should the present moderate Party hnc change.
Party activities among the peasantry, which did not receive serious attention until the, have been much less successful Althoughcontrol the largest single peasantthe All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasants'this front group Is not effectiveational scale. Communists recognize their inability to break the Congress Party's electoral hold over tho peasantry (see this Supplement. Suctionnder Role in Elections) as one of their greatest shortcomings. The Political Resolution adopted by the CPI at the8 Partyslated: 'The failure lo organize and develop kuan sabha und agricultural laborers'onstitutes the greatest weakness of the entire democratic movement. Without resoluteto overcome this weakness, the democratic movement will not get built and the Party will fall toecisive force in the political life of the country."
Party propaganda aimed at laborers stresses two major points: the "ever-growing attacks" on workers' rights by "vested interests and theand the Communists' desire to secure for the laborreater share of nationalMore precisely,7 CPI electionstressed the need for:ationalwage and ancross-the-board pay boost;xpanded social Insurance and unemployment benefits;orkers' participation In the management of Industrialf "restrictive" trade union legislation; andhe removal of all restrictions on collectiveIn the agricultural field, the manifesto called for the impositioneiling on land hold-
mgs and redistribution of excess bind among the landless peasants, reductions in rural rents and taxes, extension of cooperatives for rural credit and marketing of produce,rohibition on the eviction of peasants by landlords.
The Indian labor force ofofficial estimatesgricultural (landless laborers, tenant farmers, and small% industrial, and the bulk of the remainder is enguged in smalloccupations. Trade union activity among the scattered handicraft workers has beenand they remain largely unorganized The same is true of the peasants, and thehave been further handicapped In their efforts to capture this group by its generalits lack of political consciousness, the favorable impact In some areas of thevillage development schemes, and the lack of homogeneity within the agricultural class Thereonflict of interest between landless agricultural laborers and the small landholders who are among their employers. This conflict in addition to caste differences (the landowners are usuallyugheras thus far prevented combination of the two groups within the sameThe AIKS is thusenant and small landholder organization. Separatefor landless agricultural laborers have been formed by the Communists in Andhraand Punjab states, but these are small and ineffective.
An0 workers arc engaged In industry, and about half of these arc organized.elong to large unions with moreembers, while the remainder arc scatteredost of small unions, most with lessembers. Many of India'sworkers have only recently left theirand their caste and family tics andvalue systems have been disrupted. This void has frequently been filled by energeticorganizers who have succeededrenter extent than representatives of other trade union federations In identifying themselves with the workers' aspirations. Industrial workers are susceptible to exploitation also owing to their low pay scales In the more industrialized statesmonthly earnings in Industry range, |
fromupees ^oosit
t is estimated by this sourceupees per month wouldiving waget would provide adequate food, clothing, and shelterertain measure of frugal comfortndia has an over-supply of labor for its current level of development, and thebargaining position is correspondinglyThese conditions, plus their inability to provide effective spokesmen for their interests from within their own ranks, have made workers vulnerable to exploitation and victimization by employers and have increased their general
Communists, in addition to exploiting the real grievances of the workers, have also benefited from the general nature of the Indian trade union movement. Union activity, which began shortly after World War I. has fallen mainly Into the hands of politicians, who represent an educational and social level having little in common with the workers. The four main federations are allwith political parties. The Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) Is closelywith the ruling Congress Party; the All-India Trade Union Congress Is the labor arm of the CPI; the Hind Mazdoor sabha (HMS-Indian Laboris controlled by the Praja Socialist Party and the Socialist Party, and the United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) Is associated with the Revolutionary Socialist Party and other radical leftwing groups. INTUC Is often Inhibited by Its association with the ruling party from making exaggerated labor demands, the HMS suffers from lack of funds and organizational drive, and the UTUC Is loo small to provide effectivecompetition for the Communists. As athe ably led AITUC. which is reinforced by the effective and dedicated Communist Partyhas been able to make steady Inroads among labor during recent years.
H, Penetration of industrial laborarly activity
The Indian trade union movement beganommunist infiltration commenced almost immediately, particularly among Indian seamen who were recruited by agents of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in British ports. These seamen were probably used by theCommunist movement to carry messages and propaganda to the embryonic Communist movement In India.
Effective Communist trade union activity within India started6 following the arrival of the British Communist George Allison, who wassent to India by the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU). Allison and anotherCommunist, Philip Spratl, were instrumental In organizing textile workers, railroadmen,employees, dock workers, and pressmen, particularly in Bombay City By the endbe Communist-dominated Glrni Kamgar Union (Mill Workers' Union) which was led by S. A. Oange, now general secretary of the AITUC,0 members among Bombay textile workers. The Communist-controlled QIP (Great Indian Peninsula) Rallwaymen's Union had aof0
ll-India Trade Union Congress
a. BackgroundThe first national tradefederation in India, the All-India Trade Union Congress, which has been the labor arm of the CPI since theas founded0 Its organizers were not Marxist revolutionaries, but bourgeois nationalists with close ties to the Congress Party. Most affiliated unions were headed by English skilled workers indirectlywith the government or by humanitarian reformers; all were sadly lacking, from thepoint of view,lear conception of the meaning of the class struggle.
Communist infiltration of the AITUC began in the, and9 Communists weretrong minority position, ranking behindof the Gandhlan and democraticwings of the Congress Party. The history of the AITUC duringas one offriction among these three groups anddefections by various elements which formed rivalemblance of harmony was created In1 when all three groups agreedolicy of non coupe ration with the war effort of the British Government of India. MowGvor. this harmony was short-lived.the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the CPI switchedolicy of supporting the war. while leaders of the Congress Party and its Socialist wing, the Congress Socialist Party, werefor their continued obstructionism. By the time the nationalist leaders wereommunists had gained firm control over many of AlTUC's constituent unions and were firmly entrenched in the nationalas well. Congress Party leaders, who failed in their attempt to regain control over thewithdrew7 and formed the rivalNational Trade Union Congress. They were soon followed by the Socialists, who withdrew In8 to form the Wind Mazdoor Sabha. and AITUCtrictly Communist front organization.
b Ohuanization and financesThe present constitution of the AITUC was adopted5 when the Congress Party and the Socialists were still nominally within the federation. It is,ommunist-inspired document.rade union as "an organ of class struggle" and states that in the long run "labor and capital cannot be reconciled withinhese passages were omitted when the document was amendedut there is no reason to believe that the basicof the federation have changed.
The most important executive body, according to the constitution, is the Generalearly conclave of representatives of all affiliated unions.hows the theoretical position of this body within the AITUCUnder the amendednion with lessembers is entitled to oneat the General Session; larger unions elect one delegate forembersinal fraction largerounting for an additional delegate. Despite their designation ashese sessions have In practice been held much less frequently.27 only seven sessions were convened, and actual direction of AITUC affairs has devolved on the higher officers.
The national officers elected at the Generalarc the president; seven vicehe constitution specifiedeneral
- coma.
. 1
a treasurer; and not more than fivesecretaries (four prior. Thedoes not specifically define the functions of these officers except to indicate that they shall be ex officio members of the General Council (seen practice, however, the president has tended toigurehead, and principalin the case of most Communistrested with the general secretary.
Membership on the General Council, the largest executive body elected during the Generalhas been by industrial category withrepresentation for each categoryliding scale similar to that used in determining representation of session delegates.ouncil members were elected;7 there. In the future, according to an amendment adoptedembers will be elected from among the session delegatestate basis, each state being entitled to one representative on the council forembers upne lor everynd one from each trade federation or group formed In the state by the General Council. The council may. also, within certain limitations, co-opt additional members. The General Council Is supposed to meet at leastear, and although its functions arc not clearly indicated by the constitution, in practice it has determined or sanctioned AITUC policythe intervals between General Sessions.
Within the General Council thereorking Committee which, according to the constitution.onsist of the national officers of the AITUC andmendment) elected by the General Councilystem of cumulativehe constitution further provides that the Working Committee shall meet at least twice ii year and that It has authority;o take all necessary steps for carrying out the resolution* passed at the previous General Session;o deal with any emergency that arises during the year affecting the interests of the working class; andenerally to advance and further the aims and objectives of the AITUC. The Working Committee may appoint from amongeven-man Political Committee to conduct "political propaganda" among the working class. NoIs available on the functioning of this committee.
Communist Party control over the AITUC Is ensured by the fact that the top leaders of the federation are also active in the major PartyThe members of the CPI Central Executive Committee have traditionally dividedfor the various types of Party work according to their own specialized Interests and capacities
SUP
For example, S. A.ember of thisand general secretary of tbe AITUC. has major responsibility for Communist trade union activity. Efforts arc now being made, however, to abandon this pattern in favor of one that would provide more generalised central executiveover each major activity. For further details on central CPI control over Party activities in various fields see this Supplement.entral Organization.
In addition to its central organisation, the AITUC has regional branches. The constitution provides that in every, "provincial administrative unit" (state or federal territory) all unionswitli the AITUC shallrovincial Trade Union Congress (TTJC) Committee.tate consists of two linguistic units, twoTUC committees may be authorized by the General Council. Unions not affiliated with the AITUC may not become members of the provincial committee,nion which "proposes tothe constitution of the AITUC" without seeking membership may be enrolled by thecommittee as an associate member,voting or other privileges of AlTUC-atruiatod unions.
The AITUC Is financed in part by contributions levied on member unions. According to the amended constitution, each affiliated union shall pay:n annual contribution ofupeesembershipr less,upeesembers,upeesembers, andate of two nayeupee) per member for unions withembers;orld Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) levyupeesor major fraction thereof,inimumupeesembership of less;nnual subscriptions to the Trade Union(the AITUCelegation fee of
T 9
2 rupees por delegate to the General Sessions, anduch other levies as may be fixedote of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Oeneral Council. Levies may be passed on lo the individual workers rather Uian being paid out of the constituent union funds, and collection tactics at times involve considerable pressure.
Funds are also available to the AITUC from sources outside India, probably by way of the CPI in most cases. The AITUC is aided somewhat more directly by the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions. The substantial sum paid to S. A. Dangc as WFTU vice president,as salary, Is reportedly turned over to the AITUC. Specific needs at times of crises arc often partially met through WFTU0 andheupeeso the defense of workers on trial for acts committed duringeriod of extreme militancy. The8 strike by the Jamshedpur Mnzdooras reportedly financedarge gift from the WFTU.
c.37 tho post of general secretary of the AITUC was heldoderate non-Communist. N. M. Joshi;during this period CPI leader S. A. Dange twice occupied the president's chair and was one of five vice presidents during the remaining term. In7 Dange formally took over and has since retained, the post of general secretary, which had become the locus of power within theAnother hardcore Communistong record of holding office in the AITUC is S.Lrajkar who was elected presidentike Dange.rom the Bombay area and is amember of top CPI executive bodies. The leadership of the federationsin.
5-4
INTIAL
SUPPLEMENT VI
on committees, boards, and otherlocal, national, andwhich laboromponent.6 verified figures had not yet been published by
intuc aituc
tuc
There isreat discrepancy between claimed and verified figures. The centralofficial responsible for investigating theclaims8. officialhat in his opinion lhe AITUC claimembers was exaggerated by; the INTUC claimyhe HMS claimy; and the UTUC claimy. If tills assumption is correct, the relativestrengths of the four federations isas follows:
O
While the INTUC claimedodest increase In membership0ITUC gains, even allowing for exaggeration, have beenlaimed;hisis discussed below under Organization and Infiltration of Local Unions.
Most informed observers in India doubt that the AITUC Is larger than the INTUC. In any event, the Government of India officially recognises the INTUC as the largest labor federation ininding in favor of the AITUC would result in Indian labor being represented In international groupsommunist organization.
The regional distribution of AITUC strength in India Is suggested by the distribution ofepresentatives (elected by industrial category) on the Gcueral Council of the organization, asin the following listing:
t, Phesbkt policiesThe most explicitof AITUC policy are contained In theto the General Sessions by the generaland in the resolutions passed at theseIn addition, AITUC policies which goor modify the positions outlined in theseand resolutions are Implicit in otherby federation leaders and in the stands taken by the AITUC or Its member unions onquestions.
AITUC policies are applications of CPI policies, which in turn arc determined In part by the needs of international communism. AITUC makes no attempt to conceal its Communist affiliation. For example, the general secretary's report atITUC session began bythe Soviet Union for launchingevelopment which proved that "the working class Is advancing, the world of capitalism andreceding" The report criticised the "American imperialists" and pointed with pride to the "generous" and "efficient" help received by India from the "socialist countries headed by the Soviett condemned the "antlworking class, antipeasant. ontipeople" monopolist forces within and outside the Congress Partyon the national and state levels butrepeatedly to the "progressive" mousures being instituted by the "working class"in Kerala.
The AITUC's labor policies give expression lo the CPI line for India, which as ofoderate npproach, reliance on legal and parliamentary means, and support for some pliases of the Congress Parly government's economicContinuing the trend set at Uic fourth Communist Party Congress inhe AITUCesolution at7 conference came out strongly in support of the second five-year plan, calling on the trade unions to launch ato assure Its success. The second plan was deemed more worthy of support than the first, which cmpiiasized agriculture (and thus did not lead to economic independence) because:arge part of the investment under this plan will be In the state sector;eavy Industry willhere will no longer be sole reliance on capitalist countries for aid;and reforms are promised; andhe government "has adopted socialism as itst the same time the resolution charged that since the plan isby bureaucratic agencies, it is notamenable to "criticism and proposals of the democratic masses and their organizations";
5-(
these organizations must therefore seek to Increase the degree of "democratic participation."
Another resolution adopted7 pointed to the need for trade union unity, without whicheal victory tn the working class struggle is notn view of the "intransigent attitude" of the Congress-controlled INTUC. the AITUC set as its Immediate goal persuading the HMS and UTUC to Joinnited labor front. In anto prove its bona fides, the generalreport to the Oeneral Session observed that "unityrinciple and notommunist hopes for closer cooperation with these two federations are encouraged by the fact that both have refused to make common cause with INTUC. However, in9 both HMS and UTUC leaders appeared to bo waryational alliance with AITUC, and prospects for closewere remote.
The publicly slated policy ol the AITUCfollows the current moderate line of"Organize and unite, demonstrate andnegotiate and settle; If that falls, strikeandast resort" is7 general secretary's report. Theposition in Kerala is also ofdetermining this viewpoint. The Chiefthis Communist-run state. E.eading Party theoretician andof the CPI Central Executive Committee,inaugural address at the AITUC conferencestressed that "long-term agreements toindustrial peace are of paramountThis moderate policy on strikes. Iswithout opposition. Some Westleaders are especially strong instand, and others would no doubtquickly should it cease to be of tacticali
As regards wages and other issues betweenand management, the AITUC has also become more restrained. While continuing to demand more pay and additional benefits for labor, It has attempted,ew notable exceptions, to keep these demands within the general requirement of moderation As S. A. Dange lias been quoted as saying, unions should not try to apply rigidas to minimum wages and percentagein wages^ut should in making theirtake into consideration the conditions of an industry. Here again, however, as in the case of the strike policy, the AITUC unions are not as circumscribed in their actions as are unionsthrough the INTUC to the Congress Party government.
f. INTBBNATIQNAL affiliationThe AITUC
a member of the Communist-front Worldof Trade Unions, and S. A. Dange hasice president of the WFTUbetween the Soviet-controlled union and the Indian Communist trade union movement is also maintained through visits of Indian leaders to. S. A. Dangeortion8 in Moscow, ostensibly for medical treatment. In the other direction, representatives of laborin the Communist bloc visit India, particularly to participate in or observe meetings of the AITUC. At the7 General Session of the AITUC. "fraternal delegates"trade union representatives fromzechoslovakia, Rumania, Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Into these visits, regular contacts arethrough the Soviet and other Communist-bloc embassies in India.
International contacts are limited bymeasures restricting the number of trade unionists permitted to visit Communist countries. Often AITUC members are denied visas on the grounds that their Invitations to visit Communist nations were not transmitted through theof External Affairs in accordance withregulations. However, In line with its foreign policy of non-alignment, the Government ofalso restricts the number of Indian tradevisiting Western countries.
There appears to be relatively little directwith Communis! labor organizations in other countries of Asia. Inradeconference of Asian and Australian countries was held in Peiping under the auspices of the World Federation of Trade Unions, but India was not represented. At the suggestion of the Soviet delegate, the conference resolved toermanent liaison bureau to coordinate theof Asian and Australasian trade unions. This was to consist of four members, one each from. Communist China, India, and Australasia. There Is no evidence, however, that an Indian member ever served on the bureau or that it actually began functioning.
2 the Chinese Communists showed ainterest in Indian trade unions byroup of Indian labor leaders to Peiping for the May Day celebrations. Invitations were extended tothree members ot the Central Committee of the CPI, other important Communists, and several influential fellowthan to any Df the national trade union federations. When the Government of India objected to this procedure, the Chineseinvited the three national trade union
5-7
federations to send representatives. The INTUC turned down the Invitation, but the HMS Joined the AITUC in accepting. However, some of the Communist delegates, Including S. A. Dangc, were denied passports by the Government ol India.5 the All-China Federation of Labor againa group of Indian unionists for Uic May Day fcsttviUes. While the Soviet Union's influence on AITUC is clear, there is no evidence, despite the visits cited above, that Communist China exerts control over or has substantial influence on the organization.
rganization and Infiltration of local unions a. Factors affecting Communist successAs has been the case In many other countries. Communist organizers have often established greater rapport with the workers than havefor non-Communist unions. INTUChave tended to remain aloof, but thehave mixed fregly with the workers In their homes and at community gatherings. They liave studiously maintained an unobtrusive standard of living. While INTUC leaders in Bangalore, for example, are reported to ride in state cars, the CPI labor leadericycle between his modest residence and the various factories. In avoiding acts that might alienate them from the workers by placing them too conspicuouslyigherlevel, Communist organizers put themselvesetter position to Influence the workers and to orient them toward tlie Communist Party.
Few of the membersnion need be Party members for the union lo come under de facto Communist control. As elsewhere, many non-Communist workers are willing to acceptleadership because it appears to be moreand more competent in seeking short-range gains than the alternative non-Communist leadership. The indifference of many otherworks to the advantage of the CommunLsts; sparsely attended union meetings aremall but disciplined Communistnon-Communist majorities are often split by running dummy candidates for organizationalwhispering campaigns againstcandidates or officers, and other devices are employed to undermine the opposition; if efforts to takenion fall, it can be, and often is, spill.
In addition to effective discipline within localthe Communists maintain tighter lines of control than non-Communist labor organizations between the national headquarters and localLocal union leaders operate underfrom higher levels, and the entire movement is integrated under AITUC control. The leader whoicycle ratherar In the area of his direct leadership may nevertheless fly back and forth to higher union headquarters onWhen the penetration of an Industry or an industrial complex, such as the iron and steel works at Jamshedpur (sees given high priority, top-level leaders play direct roles inthe acUvities of the local unions. S. A. Dange, for example, visited the Jamshedpur area several times prior to the strike
Communist unions benefit not only from their own qualities but In many cases from the inept-ness of opposing unions, particularly INTUC-uffili-ated unions which are handicapped by too close identification with the Congress Party and theThe necessity for followinglabor policy and refraining from actions which might annoy (he authorities prevents the INTUC from pursuing courses of action which would dra-maUcalfy demonstrate interest in the workers' welfare. Local INTUC leaders tend to rely on Uie stale rather than their own efforts to fulfill their objectives.onsequence, concessions given to workers belonging to INTUC unions areattributed by the workers to staterather than to the effectiveness of the union.
Employers sometimes play Into tho hands of the Communists. Those who adopt an attitude ofopposition to labor unions foster the belief, on the workers' part, that only through such opposition as the Communists provide can the employers be persuaded or forced to give way. OUier employers, who are willing to deal withsometimes prefer to deal with theon the grounds that AITUC Is moreand dependable.
It has been argued thai in the long run the cause of labor would be aided by cutting the INTUC loose from the government and byree ballot system similar lo that used by the NLKB In the United States whereby Indiancould choose their own union. Theof India, however, refuses to adoptractice, apparently out of fearree trade union movement might not be amenable tocontrol. That Uiere is no strong non-Communisl trade union movement independent of the government in the meanwhile works to the advantage of the AITUC.
b. Axe as or Communist strengthhave concentrated their efforts in selected fields of industry with the major criteriabeing the susceptibility of workers toblandishments and the strategicof the industry. It Is often difficult to de-
5-8
niial
9
PIDKXT1AT.
tlie exact degree of Communist control or influencenion or in the unions of aIndustry. In tho opinion of an American official, on the basis of personal experience and the testimonynowledgeable official of theof India Labor and EmploymentCommunist strength lies mainly in theindustries or parts thereof (thoughby Communists or fellow travelers, theare not alt affiliated.with AITUC):
laimed
Not xmuAta wmi ATTUC: Post and telegraph Basking .
Insurance efense ivil aviation .
AITUC aitiliatso:
Plantations (Kerala)
iron and steel (Bihar and West
Inland waterways (Weat Bengali
Engineering (Weat
Mini eg (gold and
Tobacco
Communist strength in post and telegraph, banking, and insurance enterprises is perhaps due lo two main factors, apart from Communistin, and effort toward, domination of these key groups. First, these are governmental Industries (post and telegraph entirely and the other two largely) and it Is particularly difficult for INTUC unions, associated as they are with the rulingParty, aggressively to represent the workersovernment industry. Secondly, many of the unions in these industries are composed largely of white-collar workers who are educated and who frequently are dissatisfied with the fruits of their education.
The first factor andesser extent the second also help to explain Communist strength in the defense industry. Civil aviation Is also government owned, and the union in this Industryigh proportion of white-collar and skilled workers. It Is significant that the Communist-dominated (or strongly influenced) unions In all of theseIndustries arc not affiliated with the AITUC. Such affiliation would perhaps too clearly identify Communist influence and thus increase the unions' liability to Congress Party counter-measures.
The importance of the iron and steel industry has stimulated the Communists to an all-out, well-organized, and well-financed effort to gain control. In the remaining areas of Communist strength it would seem that localised and particularisedhave made for Communist success.
In certain additional key Industries theare sometimes creditedtrength they do not actually possess. They arc weak, though not unrepresented, among port and dock workers and among engineering workers, except in the city of Calcutta. They appear on the whole to be weak among railroad workers, although they have pockcu of strength In this Industry. The Communists' overall position In the textileis weak, but they have made recent gains in Bombay (sec below under Textiles).
ostal andprincipal organization representing postal and telegraph workers Is the National Federation of Posts and Telegraph Employeeshichembership ofnd has nine all-India affiliates. The NFPTE is not officiallybut most of its leaders arc eitheror are amenable to Party control orThe NFPTE is affiliated in India with the Confederation of Central Government Employees' Unions, which is non-Communist but in which Communist Influence is sometimes apparent.
Before5 the NFPTE was affiliated internationally with the non-Communist Posts. Telegraphs, and Telephones international IPTTI) but left that organization allegedly because the PTTI objected to the federation's sending fraternal delegatesorld conference of the WFTU and to other Communist-run meetings. However, there are indications that leaders of the federation would tike to reafflliate with the PTTI. 7 the NFPTE secretary general requested financial aid from the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and PTTI for the projMJsed strike of government workers (seeesolution adopted during the federation's annual convention ln0 recommended rcuffilia-tion. However, the PTTI Executive Board has not accepted these overtures. Its decision will be based In part on the reportTTI member who was sent to India in8 to determine whether the NFPTE was Communist controlled and to ascertain the advisability ofivalas had been suggested by two leaderson-Communist union of postal and telegraph workers in Calcutta. This representative reported that the great majority of workers In the local unions affiliated with the NFPTE are democratic In outlook but are ill equipped to combatefforts hi their midst. Commenting on NFPTE office holders, the PTTI observer said that the president, an independent attorney,wavering Bombay independent" who has little actualIn the organization and is inclined to surrender
5-S
MjoENTML
which7trike of bank employees in Calcutta. The strike was broken by being placed under compulsory adjudicaUon, apparently on the decision of Prime Minister Nehru and B. C. Roy. the Chief Minister of West Bengal. Theapparently preferred not to persuade the Calcutta bankers to moke limited concessions to theit could easily havethis would have bolstered Communist unionand enhanced the CPI reputation forthe demands of the workers.
efenseCommunist infiltration ol government defense and ordnance industries has reached the point where the central government regards lhe major unions in these establishments as Communist controlled Communists haveinfiltrated the only importanthat field, lhe All-India Defense CivilianFederationhich probably liasembers. S. M. Joshi, the general secretary of the federationember of Uie Praja Socialist Party, so neglected his duUes that S. M. Banerjce, Member of Parliament from Kan-purellow-traveling official of the localworkers' union, became the most Influential figure In the AIDCEF. Communist domination of the federaUon Is somewliat concealed, since it Is nominally independent and not affiliated with the AITUC. The government does not anticipate the restoration of non-Communists to power. Party officials forced Mrs. Mai trey ee Bose. president of the West Bengal INTUC and of the AIDCEF. to resign from the latter office, and Uie INTUC. in turn, with Uie support of Central Law Minister Asoke Sen. was In Uie process ofa rival INTUC defense workers' federaUon in
trategic plantsThe South Indian city of Bangalore (Mysorelessed by aclimate, hashriving industrial center. The Government of India has located four strategic government-owned plants in the city: Hlndusthan Aircraft, Bharal Electronics, Hindu-sthan Machine Tools, and Indian Telephone Sensing the strategic Importance of Bangalore, the Communists haveajor effort in this area. They have been aided by the weakness of the INTUC and the lack of effective action on the part of the ministries of the central government under which the factories operate The INTUC state president in Mysore is reported to be Inept, and the general secretary, whileability and integrity, is preoccupied with holding his own against strong Communist unions in the Kolaf Gold Fields,hort distance outside Bangalore, and on coffee plantations In Coorg District. INTUC unions in Bangalore have
IDEKTIAI.
been handicapped, as in governmentelsewhere, by being identified with theand regarded as company unions.personnel in the plants have suffered. In their efforts to combat Communist mfiltralion. from lack of sufficient training and experience. The facts that the employees arc skilled and largely literalc and that many of them are from the Kerala area, in which Communist influence is strong, have also aided the Communists inthe plants.
Uritil about the endhe Government of India attempted to give' special favors to the INTUC In aU: four plants. However, finding the INTUC unions weak and unrepresentative,officials shiftedolicy of favoring so-called "independent" or unaffiliated local unions whose leaders supposedly had little or nowith any national labor federation or political party These unions were infiltrated orby Communist-controlled unions, and by the end8 Communists controlled orthe unions in three of the four plants and were strong in the fourth plant.
Communist activity in these plants appears to be controlled directly by central AITUC officials. The leading local Communist organizer is M. S. Krlshnan, treasurer of the Karnatak (Mysore) Provincial Trade Union Congress (the state branch of the AITUC) and secretary of the Bangalorecommittee of the CPI.
Of the four government plants in Bangalore, only Hindusthan Aircraft Limited (HAL) has hud serious labor difficulty The Hindusthan Aircraft Employees' Associationhe local union, was organized during World War II by thewhich was then American, and allln the factory were members. Control over the association was vested in an executiveofembers Al first there were few If any Communists on the executive committee, but.esult of successful Infiltration intoembers of the committee are nowThe membership of the association isf whomre active. Communists probably account for no more thanf the active membership. However, the bulk of the membership is passive and has beenby Communist intimidation. The small anti-Communist element lacks strong leadership and has been unable successfully to challenge the tightly organized Communist fraction.
Communists appear to have furthertheir position within this organizationesultabor disturbances at HAL which present an interesting case study of Communist labor tactics When the central government failed promptly to accede lopoiut demand for higher wages and improved working conditions, Communist leaders of the association organized protest demonstrations in Bangalore, and two Communist membersfast unto death" to call attention to their grievances. The hunger strikers and aboutther union leaders were arrested. This action temporarily stopped the disturbances, but It further uMiumed theiragainst management. Slowdowns by labor were met by the arrest of several more labor leaders, including M. S. Krlshnan. This led in8atdown strike by workers in one section of the plant and lo popularduring which police opened fire on an unruly mob The management retaliatedockout. The employees were subsequently forced bynecessity to return to work without then grievances having been met. Some concessions were subsequently made by the government,under pressure from Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon who visited Bangalore in Despite those concessions, which were largely credited to the Communlsls, labor resentment has continued and has helped strengthen Communist control over the local union.
The Communists, also under the leadership. Krishnan. captured the union at Bharat Electronics In the latter halfn8fmployees belonged to the union. The managing director and personnelof the plant, under instructions from the central Defense Ministry, have refused tothe union but have been forced nevertheless to bargain with Mr. Krishnan and his lieutenants, The local management has been unable to carry out Instructions from the Defense Ministry to break the union and set up an "independent" rival.
At Hindusthan Machine Tools. S. Krlshnan was elected president of the HMTAssociation Lnnd Communists are now in effective control of the union. Labor relations have been relatively harmonious at this plant, and,esult, the Government of India selected HMT as the. Industrialin which labor wasoice inthrough representationointCouncil., did not reverse this decision when Krishnan became president of the union, despite the fact that he was among those charged with Incitement to violence ln theAircraft disturbances, and when elections to the Jolnl Management Council were held inhe Communistsesounding victory byajority of the labor representatives on the council. Included among those elected was M. S. Krishnan. Communist success In these elcc-
tlora reflected the extent of Communist control over the local union, and, more importantly, it also indicated the enhanced prestige of thefollowing the HAL disturbances.
Communist infiltration of the union at Indian Telephone Industries has so far been less than at the other three government plants in Bangalore. The Communists hold the key position of general secretary and several other posts, but theof non*Communist Influence is indicated by the recent reelectionocialist to theof the union.
A new Central Industries Employees' Federation, including unions in the four plantsorkers, was formedonference in8 in Bangalore. This conference was inaugurated by P. Ramamurtl. member of the CPI Central Executive Committee and vice president of therominent Socialist leader presided,ommunist desire to represent the new federation as bipartisan as well asrecognition of continuing Socialist influence in the Bangalore factories, particularly, as noted above, in Indian Tolephone Industries. Elected president of the new federation was F. Louis,of the Communist-dominated union of Hin-dusthan Aircraft and one of the principal figures in the8 disturbances at that factory.
he West Bengal-Bihar industrialDuring Uie last four years the Communists haveoncerted drive to capture the labor movement in the rapidly developingarea of northeastern India. Here, owing to the conjunction of large-scale coal and ironthe Government of India hasarge share of Uic new heavy industry under the second five-year plan. Communist influence in, orof. labor in this area would give the CPI considerably more political leverageational scale. Thus far the Communists have notin establishing Uie AITUC as the recognized union in any key plant or mine, nor are theyetosition to disrupt, at will,in this area where India's hopes for anfuture are centered. The drive has. however, established the Communists as the principalto Uic recognized non-Communist unions, most of which are affiliates of the INTUC. and has brought them closeosition of predominance in the two steel plants at Jamshedpur and Asansol. In Uic Bengal coalfields, and In the iron mines.
The Importance the Communists attach lo their penetration of this area is indicated by the fact that their efforts arc under Uic personalof AITUC General Secretary S. A. Dange. In the four months before the8 strike at the Tata Iron and Steel Company (sec below).
Dange made at least nine trips to Jamshedpur. where the company's plants are located. Inhe is the president of the Communist union in Uie Indian Iron and Steel Company at Asansol.
Prominent among those assisting Dange in this area are three members of Parliament from West Bengal: Mrs. Renu Chakravarti. Mohammed Bias, and Sadban Gupta. Between Dange and theseCPI figures on the one hand, and the local union organizers on the other Uiere are threelevels whose role Is not always clear. The Bihar and West Bengal state AITUC organiza-Uons appear to play only peripheral roles in labor activity in these industries; this is in markedto Uie deep involvement of the West Bengal provincial AITUC In trade union affairs inThere are also two AJTUC-afflUatedfederations in thia area: the Federation of Engineering and Metal Workers and Uie Indian Mine Workers' Federation. Information on these federaUons is meager, and even the CPI press does not publicize their functions. It Is not clear what operational role they play, but It has beenthat they probably supervise Uie day-byday deployment of CPI funds and organizers In their respective spheres. In addition to its formal or-ganlzuUon, tho ATTUC makes use ofnd "coordinating" committees to carry on Its activiUes in this region. These frequently include non-Communists willing to cooperate with tho Communists for limited objectives. Theseare particularly active during crises but also carry on during interim periods in Uie name ol trade union unity.
Communist methods in this area have included murder, assault, intimidation, sabotage, illegal strikes, and hunger strikes, but the success of Uic Communists here, as elsewhere. Is mainlyto their closely knit organization and their ability to identify themselves with the workers, It Is noteworthy that in this Industrial arealabor activity has been limited primarily to matters immediately affecting Uie workers, and union platforms have not been used (as they were used In Calcutta) to support CPI positions onand international Issues. The Communist union approach to management in the West Bengal-Bihar Industrial region is lo offeragitation so long as the union Is notand relative industrial peace if it becomes the official bargaining agent.
(a) steelThe steel Industry is the base for India's industrial aspirations, and it is here that Uie Communists have come closest totheir objecUves in Uic West Bengal-Biharregion. Both of the private sector steelTata Iron and Steel Company and the
Indian Iron and Steelstrongunions. At the three public sector mills, which only recently began production, laborhas so far been limited to construction workers.
On. the Communist-led Jamshedpur Mazdoor Unionn afniiale uf the AITUC,ne-day token strike in the Tata Iron und Steel Companyhe largest Indianof steel, in an attempt to secure recognition by management as the. workers' sole bargaining agerit. Although the strike was declared illegal by the government of Bihar and opposed by the recognized union In the plant, the INTUC-con-trolled Tata Workers' Union led by Congress labor leader Michael John, It was an initial success In thatf the plant's labor force did not report for work. This success stemmed fromfactors:orker support for the economic demands of the JMU;he intense pro-strike campaign organized by the JMU;ffectiveof non-Communist laborers byommunist supporters, many of them Party workers Imported from Calcutta;ack ofpolice protection of loyal workers; andhe limited duration of the strike which did not threaten the workers with serious economic losses.
Following the token strike, TISCO suspended overMU organizers, and labor-management tension increased. On Mayhe Communistsitdown strike, which was accompanied outside the plant by large-scale intimidation and attempted sabotage. By Mayroduction was so disrupted that TISCO closed most sections of the plant. Thisumber of acts ofand arson in the town of Jamshedpur which were dealt with firmly by the police, who on three occasions fired on unruly crowds. Onlter law and order was reestablished. TISCOthe plant, and when it became cleararge number of workers were reporting for duty, the JMU called off the strike. On Juneormal production levels were reached. The loss in man-hours caused by the strike reduced the production of steel0 tons.
The failure of this second phase of the strikelow to Communist prestige among theIt led lo the discharge ofctive JMU supporters, and It reinforced TISCO'sto deal firmly with future JMUWith most of its top men in police custody or under indictment, the JMU has had to import temporary leaders from West Bengal. In9 it was making strenuous efforts to win back the support of the employees and lo secure theof the suspended workers.
At the Indian Iron and Steel Company atthe Communists6 organized the United Iron and Steel Workers' Union (UISWU) following nearlyears of agitation against andattempts to capture the recognized IKTUC-controllcd Asansol Iron and Steel Workers' Unionince its formation the UISWU has gained the supportarge number of workers within the plant, and most observers now believe thul it is stronger than the AISWu. The company management has at times negotiated directly with the UISWU to terminate specific agitations,and sitdown strikes. The willingness of management to deal with other than recognized representatives of the workers and the absenceoncerted UISWU attempt to force recognition have led to reports that the CPI and the Indian Iron and Steel Company management liaveecret agreement and that the CPIegular bribe to keep it relatively quiet.
At the three public sector steel plants, which have only recently gone into production, the labor force has heretofore consisted almost entirely of construction workers. The AITUC and INTUC have both been chary of committing their prestige in organizing such temporary workers Both the AITUC and INTUC have, however, given indications of intention to organize the workers In the newly opened plants. As yet there Is no firm evidence of marked activity by either group.
(b) iron oneThe principal iron mines in India, whichf the nation's Iran ore, are in the Blhar-Orissa border area. The ownership of most of the mines is in the hands of three majorTata Iron and Steel Company, the Indian Iron and Steel Company, and Bird and Company. The principal mining areas are Qua. Noamundi. Blrmitrapur, Bcdampa-har. and Barabil. Total employment.
Union competition In tho iron mines takes place entirely between the INTUC and AITUC With one exception the INTUC unions, generally led by Michael John and other organizers from Bihar, are recognized by the mine management. Although AITUC did not start Its organizational work In the minest wastrong positionspecially at Barabil and Oua. At the Barabil mines of Bird and Company, the CPI6 gained control of the union formerly affiliated with the INTUC and presented additional workers' demands, in part to forestall the growthew INTUC union. The company retaliatedong lockout which in turn provokedmob violence during which the police opened fire on the demonstrators. The strike failed to produce concessions from management.
pential
3S, SUPPLEMENT VI
-9
a result, the union lost some prestige withbut is still In control and very active.Gua-Noamundl area, the AITUCajor challenge toeries or clashes culminatedattack byPI followers onheadquarters in which two INTUCwere killed. In the ensuing murder trialof the Communist union was sentencedimprisonment 'und several other leadersprison terms. Thiseverethe CPI and left the INTUC, at least forbeing, in a'relatively unthreaicnedthisf
ost Importantare the Ranlgan) field in West Bengal and the Jharia field in Bihar which togetherf the coul mined in India. Together with other fields in West Bengal and Bihar they cm-ployiners inctive mines, many of which arc very small.
In the Raniganj field and many of the other fields in West Bengal the most prominent union is the Colliery Mazdoor Congresshis union is affiliated with, the Socialist HMS but is infiltrated by Communists, whose influence has grown to the point where It is doubtful whether the CMC could undertake major activitiesCPI approval. The Communists areosition to commit the CMC towithout the consent of HMS leaders at the top. In some other coalfields Communist unions arc dominant. These unions arc uffUlatedwith the AITUC and with the AITUC-afnii-aled Indian Mine Workers' Federation.
The Communists, although active, have made little headway in challenging the dominantof the INTUC in the Jharia coalfield tn Bihar. They arc. however, making efforts to organize the new coalfields in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh which arc being developed under the second five-year plan.
(d) otherand chemical factories have beenin conjunction with the coal-iron-steeland more are continually being established. In the Jamshedpur area of West Bengal,unions or Communist fractions In other unions are not yetosition to disruptat will, but theyerious challenge to the dominant position of the INTUC unions. In Hie Asanol area of West Bengal the AITUC seems In general to betrong position,seldom the recognized union. Exceptions to the general Communist strength in the West Bengal-Bihar area are the Government ofChittaranjan Locomotive Works in West Bengal and the Sindrl Fertilizer Works In Bihar, where no AITUC fractions are yet visible.
ailroadsThe largest federaUon of railroad workers in India is the All-India ltull-waymen'a FederaUonhichembership. or over half the totalrailroad workers. The AIRF is affiliated with the Socialist HMS and is controlled by HMS leaders, although some of Its constituent unions are dominated by Communists. The All-IndiaMasters' and Assistant Stationlaimedhich is affiliated with the AIRF. is headed by Rajonieading AITUC trade union leader In the Bom-buy area. That there may be some Communist influence in the AIRF at the national level isby the fact thai S. A. Dange. Communist Party leader and general secretary of the AITUC. was invited to7 convention of this
The only union of railroad workers affiliated with the AITUC Is the Southern Railway Labor Unionhichembership0 railroad workers in the southern part of Madras Slate. The SRLUecognized union9 when recognition was withdrawn by the Government of India because the SRLU. in common with other Communist unions In India,olicy of violence and sabotage inwith the CPI tactical line of that time.ack of recognition, Uie SRLU hasits membership. At its last annualat its headquarters nearelegates fromranches attended.rallies were held and were reportedly attended by0 people. Among the speakers wereopalan. Deputy Leader of the CPI In the Lok Sabha, and P. Ramamurti,PImember. The demand for recognition was prominent in the resolutions and all the speeches. In8 the secretary of thenandan Kambiar.ast which focused attention on SRLU's charge that the Government of India was being politically discriminatory inrecognition. The fast was brokenildly conciliatory, although unyielding note was received by A. K. Gopalan from Prime Minister Nehru, with whom he had interceded on Nambiar's behalf.
ajor labor organizations in the textile industry, whose main centers are Ahmadabad and Bombay, are dominated by the Congress-controlled. INTUC. Affiliated with the INTUC textile federation is the AhmadabadLabor Associationhichon-
gress showpiecerogressive, althoughunion. In Bombay City, also, the 1NTUC union,0 claimed members, is theunion, although the Communists havebeen fairly strong in this area.
The Communist position in the Bombay textile industry improved In9 withnited front union, the Mumbai Olrni Kamgar Union (MGKU-Bombay Mill Workers'he union grew outolitical the Samyukia Maharashtra Samiti (United Maharashtrarganized to work for the establishmentarathl-speaking state with Bombay as the capital city. Twowho were among the most active in planning for the new labor union were the Praja SocialistJoshi and the Communistange, who arc now the union's president and general secretary, respectively. Leaders of the Praja Socialist Party and of the HMS havetheir disapproval of S. M. Joshi's making common cause with the Communists but have taken no disciplinary action against him. probably because Joshi is one of the most effective PSP workers ln Bombay and also because pasthas indicated that he would not be amenable to central party or HMS direction on this issue.
As of9 the new unionembers. This number apparently included thef theTUC-cont rolled Mill Mazdooi Union. On the basis of its membership, which exceeded that of the 1NTUC union, the MGKU wasrecognition by the state government In9 as the "representative union" of textileIn Bombay.
eralaIn7 Indian general election the Communistslurality in the south Indian state of Kerala (see thisSectionnder Parliamentaryhen they formed the stateew and unusual relationship between the stateand the Kerala wing of the Indianlabor movement was established.
The Communist election victory resulted In part from Communist labor strength in the state; Communists dominate most segments of labor, and Party leaders had built their political careen, mainlyoundation of militant tradewhose mdftus operandi Included not onlytechniques but also incitement toand occasionally murder. Upon assuming office the Communists, needing labor tranquillity to attract new industry and investment to the state, shifted their emphasis andolicy of peace In industry, direct negotiations between
employers and employees, and three-yearpacts. The new Kerala Labor Minister, T. V. Thomas, who wasilitant leader of coir and transport workers, soon had to hisonsiderable number of notably successfulsettlements, particularly in the plantation industry. Many employers went along with the new governmental policy and concluded "truce" pacts with Communist unions in an effort toindustrial peace.
This moderate governmental policy was not without opposition within the CPI. Some Party members, as well as others outside the CPI,that many labor awards were more pro-management than pro labor and that thegovernment was sacrificing the workers'In favor of industrial harmony. Thiswas exacerbated inhen the government made an agreement with the Gwullor Rayon Manufacturingwned by theindustrial firm of Birla, which concededcarte blanche powers to management on personnel and labor questions. The government was no doubt aware that this contravened earlier Communist policy, but the need for new industries was apparently politically compulsive. Theof the Kerala government among Laborersfurther in8 when police, dispatched to protect management while finished goods were removedocked-out factory, fired on acrowd of cashewnut workers near Quilon, causing two deaths.
When the CPI Central Executive Committee met in the Kerula capital city of Trivandrum inhe moderate labor policy of thegovernment was severely criticized by some Party leaders. Labor Minister T. V. Thomas'among the Kerala coir workers castigated the state government for falling to bring heavy industry Into the state. Several delegates blamed the state cabinet for the police firing near Quilon. The most severe criticism, however, came from the leaders of AITUC plantation unions in Kerala. They pointed out that in the8 by-election in Devikolam constituency, the successfulcandidate and Labor Minister Thomas had assured the plantation workers that in the eventommunist victory the AITUC union wouldarge bonus payment for plantation workers throughout the state;mall bonus, however, had been paid.
esult of this criticism the Keralapromised the national CPI officials toore militant laboreeting of Kerala AITUC officers was called, and it was decided that the first target for the new Communist labor pol-
Co?!
SUPPLEMENT VI
t Mahch lySD
would bo the tea and coffee plantations, LNTUC's major area of strength In the state, and in particular the Kannan Devon Hill Producea British-owned enterprise Located in and around Munnar The Communist plantation unions gained membership in this regiontrike inince many workers joined in hope of .greater gains or in fear ofintimidation. However, the strike wasin early November without achievingconcessions from management. The strike's failure and the violence it precipitated detracted from the Communist's reputation among the workers in Kerala, and some of the newly won AITUC support on the plantations was lost.it is likely that the Communists arc still stronger on the plantations than when the CPI government assumed office inn the other hand, they have failed, despite strenuous efforts, to make serious inroads among port labor in Cochin. Tlie Communists were strong inlabor before the-elections, andtatewide basis, they have gained somewhat since.
thersCalcutta shipowners have. official that Communists dominate the Inland waterways' unions in West Bengal and East Pakistan. Leaders come from the industry.have admittedly paid both INTUC and HMS labor leuders to form rival unions, but the Communists have not been dislodged from their position.
Communists completely dominate theindustry In and around Calcutta. INTUC and HMS unions are weak and refuse to challenge the AITUC.
he Communist union at the KoUYr Gold Fields (now government owned) in Mysore State grew considerably stronger. Communist unions in several manganese ore mines in Madhya Pradesh also gained in strength. Theappear lo dominate organized labor in theindustry, being particularly strong Inand Andhra Pradesh.
The AITUC affiliated All-India PetroleumFederation dominates the petroleum industry, particularly in Bombay. However, thereew INTUC-sponsored federation supported by the non-Communist Petroleum Workers' International Federation isival to the Communist federation.
The rather small union in the civil aviationIs Communist dominated and the INTUC has not been uble toival organization. Teachers' organizations sometimes operate as trade unions, and some of these are underInfluence or controL The Communiststo be strongest among teachers' associations (no such organizations exist tn Kerala) in West Bengal, where they haveommunistto the largest teachers' organization, the All Bengal Teachers' Association. The general secretary of this organization is also the secretary of the secondary teachers' group and the principal Communist leader in the All-India Federation of Educational Associationshe ALFEA top leadership managed, however, to keep the Communist minority in the organization under controL
C. Penetration of peasants and agricultural labor
lMmlla Klsan Saolut
The Comintern6pecialof the Krestxntern (the Comintern's peasant international) to carry on work among Indian peasants, but little effective activity took placea national peasant organization was formed In Indiaithin this organization fourfought for control: The Communists, the Congress Socialists, and two regionally oriented groups. The Communists exploited differences among the other groups and rapidly gainedover the organization, which8 took the name All-India Klsan Sabhaut their tendency to regard the AIKSubsidiary of the CPI led to the resignation of manyand5 the Communists werealone In the AIKS.
This organization, like the CPI,oss of prestige owing to the Communists'with the British during World War II. Itfurtheresult of the Communist cm-barkmentilitant leftist strategyhich resulted in police repression and which practically eliminated the AIKS as aorganization. Almost the entireof the Central Kisan Council (see below) was either in jail or underground, and no meetings of the Annual Session were held8lthough meetings have been held, the AIKS has not succeeded in gainingstrength.
a. Structub*The AIKS. as provided by its constitution, consistsierarchy of threegoverning bodies and three units at lower levels, as follows:
Annual Session of elected delegates All-India Klsan Committee Central Kisan Council Provincial Klsan Saoiias District Kisan Sabbas Primary Klsan Sabha;
9
Any peasant (fcuon)ears of age or over may enrollember in the AIKS by joining one of the Primary Klsan Sabhas and by paying the dues fixed by the provincial unit. Theamong the Primary, District, andKlsan Sabhas are determined by theconstitutions, which differ from area to area The provincial constitutions also determine the manner Iri which delegates to the Annualof the AIRS ore selected. Delegatesrovincial bastsatio of one forrimary members, subject to aof five delegates per state.
The Annual Session Is supposed to be thepolicymaking body of the AIKS, but init has,generally servedubber stamp. The next largest body in the AIKS Is theKisan Committee. Each province Ison this committee according lo Its strength, members being elected from among the delegates to the Annual Session on the basis of one committee member for every five delegates. The committee in turn determines the size of the Central Kisan Counciln effect theboard of the committee, and elects its members.
That the AIKS has been declining in vigor Is suggested by the difficulties it has had inits organizational structure. Not only has attendance at Annual Sessions been spotty and payment of provincial dues to the centraluncertain and Irregular (secut meetings of the important Central Kisanhave been poorly attended. Only three CKC meetings were held between34 Annual Sessions, and one of these hnd to befor lackuorum (one-third of the memetween57 sessions, CKC meetings were not productive, according to aCommunist, partly because on twouorum was lacking.6 the CKCwas reduced fromhus reducing the quorum to nine.
3 ig34
lose
b.Membership claimed by the AIKS (no information Is available on actual as opposed lo claimed membership) has been as follows at the times of the Annual Sessions-
ooo.oco
The decline6 was particularly striking since the CKCoalor theoal of7 was also not met Membership drives, according to Communist sources, were not carried out as directed In many
Membership claims for various regions fluctuate widely, but It appears that the Communistmovement Is strongest in Kerala, Punjab, and West Bengal. According to the official organ of the West Bengal branch of the CPI, at the time ot7 Annual Session of the AIKS thefor these states, accounting for over two-thirds of the total claimed AIKS membership, were as follows:;; and West.
c. LeadershipThe AIKS officers normallyeneral secretary, two or three vice presidents, two to lour joint secretaries,reasurer. The presidency Is largely an honorary position, and incumbents of this office have notule governed the organization. The present incumbent, A. K. Gopalan, who took officeapable peasant leader as wellember of the CPI Central Executive Committee and deputy leader of tho Communist group in the Lok Sabha. The pressure of other duties,has left him little lime for the AIKS.
The general secretary Is the most Important official in the AIKS.3 this post has been held by N. Prasadaember of the CPIExecutive Committee. He also represents the dominant faction in the Andhra Pradesh branch of the CPI.whlch is the chief advocate ol anrevolution. Rao has been obliged to run the AIKS almost slnglehandedly and claims to be the only official functioning full time from the organization's central office in New Delhi
3 the treasurer of the organization has been Baba Gurumukhunjabi whose age (burnnd long revolutionary career,aboutears In jail, give him prestige which is ot value In soliciting contributions for the AIKS-
d. FinancesThe financial resources of the AIKS and of its constituent branches areinadequate, the main source of Income being membershipember must pay an annual subscription, the amount to be determined by the Provincial Kisan Sabhas,inimum of about two cents. The Provincial Klsan Sabhas are supposed to forward this money to thebut it appears that Ihey cither do not collect or do not forward the money regularly. For the fiscal year endingembership fees paid to the AIKS6 rupees, or only about one-tenth of what the claimedshould have produced. In addition tofees, the AIKS should receive affiliation fees from the Provincial Kisan Sabhas at the rate of one paisaraction of one cent) per member plus such other quotas as may be fixed by the
^
CKC or AIKS. Most II not aU of the Provincial Klsan Sabhas are remiss in meeting theirobligations lo the central organization, and at any one time several are likely to befor nonpayment of dues. Atession eight Provincial Klsan Sabhas were unrepresented, and at7 session five (of about fifteen) were unrepresented for this reason.
Donations are the second major source of AIKS income.7 donations amounteda sum hardly sufficient to case the financial pressure on the organization. While thetrade union wing secures substantial sums from the CPI and from the Soviet Union through the CPI. the Indian Communists' agrarian wing Is virtually unsupported from foreign sources. This fact indlcules that the Indian peasantry has been relegatedecondary position by theCommunist movement.
e. PoliciesThereharp cleavage within the AIKS on basic policy, with the majorcentering uround the degree of support, If any. which the Communists should give to the agrarian policies and programs of the Congress Party government. This basic split was manifest, for example, at the Annual Session of the AIKS at Bangaon. West Bengal, inespite the efforts of the Central Kisan Council to smooth over differences before the meeting convened. The general secretary. N. Pra-suda Rao, In his report lo the Annual Sessiona blistering attack on nearly every aspect of the Congress Party's agrarian policies andthe needlass struggle aguinst the government's program of "capitalism In Rao claimed that land reform measures which had been enacted were ineffective and. in fact, had been designed to be ineffective. While the AIKS must rely primarily on legal methods, he said, this docs not exclude agitationalHo called for land reform withoutand an all out effort against "monopoly and capitalism" in agriculture.
This approach, typical of the Andhra peasant faction of which Rao is the leader, is opposed by other elements within the AIKS, particularly the West Bengal and Kerala groups. Spokesmen of these less militant factions claim thatland reform measures, particularlyof zamindarl holdings, have altered thefeudalistic rural pattern. The AIKS should thus seek lo unite the landless worker and the small landowner Instead of adding to existingbetween these groups. The West Bengal and Kerala factions also favor AIKS participation In governmental extension services, cooperatives, and rural movements such as Bhowlan (hindll of which are derided by the militant wing. This basic schism within the organization is not likely to be resolved In the near future, but it is likely that major emphasis will be on moderateas long as the CPI adheres to its present tuctical line.
f. International connectionsThe AIKS is not affiliated with any international organization. The president of the organization attemptedo secure AIKS affiliation with the Trade Union International of Agricultural and Forestryection of the WFTU. However,on this issue by the All-India Klsanwas postponed and there is no indication that the matter was ever again taken up.
z. Present strengths and weaknesses
It may be that the growing weakness of the AIKS, outlined above, docs not accurately reflect the status of Communist influence in rural areas. There are factors which weaken the nationalregionalism, forwhich may not adversely affect the position of Conununist peasant groups locally. That aunit fails to contribute funds, or even to report, to central headquarters, does not necessarilythat it is defunct. There may in fact be some truth In the repeated protestations of CPI loaders ttmt despite the national deterioration in AIKS functioning, the CPI's influence among the peasants Is growing. However, this growth, which in any event is small as yet, has resulted primarily from activities of the CPI rather than those of Its peasant front.
Peasant groups organized by the Socialists, the Congress, and other political parties and factions are even less effective than the Communist peasant associations in most areas, with the one majorof Bihar State where the Praja Socialist Party dominates the peasant movement. In most other areas the principal competition to the AIKS is posed by the central and state governments. Governmental measures, such as the abolition of certain types of large landholdlngs andome states protecting tenants from arbitrary eviction, although limited In scope and filled with loopholes, nevertheless represent progressetter lite for the peasantry. Thus far these measures, together with the peasants' basic lack of political interest, have enabled the Congress Party to retain major electoral support among the peasants. However, there are indications,in West Bengal, that dissatisfaction among the rural population Is on the increase and that the Congress Party's position may be endangered
a
Stats9
the long tun II further concessions, which would be opposed by the strong landed elements within lhat party, are not made.
Communist efforts to attract mass support among the peasantry have failed thus far owingombination of fuctors. First, the AIKS itself is faction ridden, financially weak, and ineffectiveationalscaie. In addition, the Communists' peasant program is primarily political and is feared to furthering the political objectives of the Party. It is the opinion of some qualified observers that the Communists will not gain substantial strength among this segment of the population unless they incorporate in their program theof the technical advice and assistance which the peasant wants and which he Is currentlyin some areas through the government's Community Development and National Extension Service schemes. Communist efforts are further handicapped by the general conservatism of the peasant, his illiteracy, and his continuedto local village headmen and landowners. In some areas, particularly Bihar State. Vinoba Bhave's Bhoodan (voluntary land redistribution) program has undercut the Communists, although this movement Is not effective nationally.
One of the most serious factors limitingsuccess among rural elements has been the Party's quandary regarding the landlessworkers. Constituting anf the agricultural population in some areas, they arc employed, generally at extremely low wages, by tenant fanners, small landowning peasants, and wealthy landlords. Their grievances would be Ideally suited to exploitation by the Communists were it not for the fact that such exploitation would run counter to the interests of the small peasants,ommunist target group. The effective organization of the landless laborers to obtain higher wages or land would hurt tlieemployers and would reduce the prospects of achieving additional support among this group which provides the backbone for the AIKS. This problem is further complicated by casteMost landless laborers are of low castes considered inferior and riluaily Impure by the castes comprising the bulk of the small landowners and tenant farmers. Thus an Influx oflaborers into the AIKS would result in an exodus ol many peasants and would discouragerecruitment among these groups.
There appears toonsensus among thethat agricultural laborers should beinto separate unions and that theseshould not be affiliated with the local kisan sabtias and the AIKS; recent Communist Party resolutions advocate their affiliation with the AITUC. Little has been done as yet inagricultural workers except in Andhra Pradesh and Punjab. In Andhra Pradesh the Agricultural Laborers' Association0 membersan exaggeration) as0 in theKlsan Sabha. Local units of thishave applied to the government foras trade unions but have not been recognized. In Punjab the Communists have organized anLaborers' Association (Dehati Masdoor Sabha) whichembershipowever, the Communists have notay to Lake full advantage of the dissatisfaction among agricultural laborers without losing support among the small landowning and tenant peasants whoajor portion of the rural
State9
nfiltration and Exploitation of Miscellaneous Groups
Target groups
Most policy directives issued by the Communist Party of Indiahen the Partyits efforts to foment revolution in India, nave stressed the need for more intensive "mass" activity among students' and youth, cultural groups, and intellectuals. However, availableindicates that, with the exception of the Communist "peace" front, these directives have not been followed by Uie measures necessary to Increase Party support among these groups.labor and the peasantry remain the major targets of CPlTirganizutional and propaganda techniques, and it is among these groups,tbe former, that the Party has achieved its greatest success (see this Supplement,oreover, Indian Communists have been primarily concerned during recent years with winningand forming "united fronts" with otherparties, and activity among miscellaneous groups (all target groups except laborers andhas, of necessity, beenelatively low priority.
Actual supervision of the Party's activities among these secondary groups appears to behaphazard. Theoretically, national control rests withmember Central Executivewhich, under the8 constitution, is given responsibility for "direction of the Party's work in all-Indian mass organizations (or massrovincial executive committees areto direct Party activities in suchon the state level, and district executivehave responsibility for "guidance andassistance to the mass organizations,"on the localowever, it appears that these execuUvc bodies, which have broadfor all Party affairs, have little time for front groups. Perhaps in an attempt lo remedy this deficiency,einber National Council announced in8 the appointment ofsubcommittees on education, trade unions, peasants, women, students and youth, culture, and peace. The membership of these subcornrntttces includes such prominent Party figures as B. T. Ranadivc, P. C. Joshi, and M. N. Govindan Nair on the subcommittee on education; Romesh Chandra on the cultural subcommittee; and Rcnu Chak-ravarti on the subcommittee for women's affairs.
The functions of these subcommittees are not known, but it is assumed that they will act asbodies for Party activiUes in the various fields.
In Uie decade before World War II the CPIits attention among miscellaneous groups primarily toward students and writers. The All-India Progressive Writers' Association (AIPWA) was founded by the Communistsnd0 Communists captured control over the All-India Students' Federationormerlyby the Congress Party. Communist efforts among these and other target groups intensified2 when the CPIegal party andree hand owing to the imprisonment ofParty leaders lor opposing India'sin the war. During Worldhe CPI captured the leading Congress Party organizations among laborers and the peasantry. The Indian People's Theater Association (IPTA) was organized by the Communistsnd Uie All-India Friends of the Soviet Union was constitutedational basishe influence offront groups began to decline6 when Congress Party leaders, recently released from prison, embarkedrogram of rebuildingmass organizations. The decision of Uie CPI8 toolicy of violence in an attempt to overthrow the governmenturther blow to Uie Party's front groups, and it was not until this tactical line was repudiated1 and the formationoalition government of "people's democracy" became Uic Party'sobjective that front groups againosition of Importance. During recent years Uie Communist Party has concentrated chiefly onthe Intellectual and professional classes by enlisting their support in the All-Indiaie various "friendship associations" organized to popularize Communist countries,organizations. ALPWA, and the All-Indiaof Democratic Lawyers (AIADL).
The success with which the Communists have been able1 to infiltrate miscellaneous target groups and attract sympathizers has varied. Their efforts to dominate the student community have not been successful. The close identification of the All-India Students' Federation with the CPI and unpopular developments within the Sino-Soviet
6-1
bloc during recent years have detracted from the federation's appeal. Communist success in the women's movement has been limited primarily to Andhra Pradesh, where the National Federation of Indian Women (NF1W) is active, and to West Bengal, where Communists control the Women's Self Defence Organization (Manila Alma RakshaRecent directives call forwomen's sections within the other frontIn an attempt to expand Partyamong this segment of the population.well-known writers are active in the All-India Progressive Writers' Association and manyand journalists are leftist in outlook, but there is little information on the membership or influence of AlpWA. The Communistfor actors and musicians, the Indian People's Theater Association, is active in certain localities. Many of the workers in the Bombay film industry arc pro-Communist, and several screen writers and actors appear regularly at meetings of various front groups (see this Supplement,nder Propaganda). The Communists have met with their greatest success during recent years in the peace movement, the Afro-Asian solidarityand several of the friendship associations. The All-India Peace Council, tlie Indo-SovietSocietynd the India-ChinaAssociation (ICFA) have successfullyon Indian interest In peace and In theprogress made by the Sino-Soviet bloc. These groups have attracted considerable support, particularly in urban areas, and have sponsored numerous programs at which prominent people, Including government officials and members of the Congress Party, have participated. Theof India considers membershipnown Communist-front group lo be derogatoryaffecting civil service employment andin the armed forces. In8 the Government of India instructed state governors and central and state cabinet members to refrain from participating in front organizations formed "with mixed intentions." The major friendship associations were subsequently removed from the proscribed list, but top government officials are prohibited from participating in the peace front and most other Communist-dominated movements. Although the Communists have failed to build many of their front^groups into effectiveorganizations, some of these are nonetheless of local importance since they complement Party activities In its areas of greatest strength (Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal) and since non-Communlst organizations have been even lessin most fields of front activity. Theof the Communist-front groups can seldom.
if ever, be laid to effective competition from non-Communist organizations. There are no effective non-Communist groups that correspond to the All-India Peace Council or the Indian Association for Afro-Asianndo-American associations function in some of the Inrgcr cities, but only the Delhi group is known to be active. There are several groups aimed at preserving ties of friendship between Britain and India, such as the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and several university alumni groups, but none of these, in contrast with the bloc friendshipis sponsored directly or Indirectly by aparty.
In the student movement there is no unified nation-wide non-Communist organization. After the spill In the prewar All-India Students'non-Communist students formed the All-India Students' Congress, but political rivalries soon made this organization ineffective he Students' Congress was succeeded by theUnion of Students (NUS) which has no direct connection with any of the non-Communist parties, but this, too, has split Into Lwo competing factions centered In New Delhi and Hyderabad. There are no estimates of the strength of thisbut its activities appear to have been Limited to portions of the states of Bombay, Raja-sthan, Punjab. Uttar Pradesh, and AndhraAccording to an officer of the NUS. thehas functioned occasionally in other areas, such as Madras, Calcutta, and Bihar, but it Is evident that the NUS is not an effective all-India organization, and lis activities in many key areas, such as Calcutta, have been limited. Into this nonpolitical organization there are student groups which are affiliated withpolitical parties, although, with theof the student front organized by theProgressive Federation in Madras State, these are usually small.tudent association backed by the Praja Socialist Party won some student elections in Kerala The Yuba (Youth) Congress, an arm of the Congress Party,embership, but this figure is highly exaggerated, and the organization does not appear to be effective.
The leading non-Communist women'sis the All-India Women's Conference which iso be pro-Ckmgress. Thiswhichembership0 Is overears old and has units throughout India Many of India's most prominent women have been leaders of the conference. Although theWomen's Conference Is more widelythroughout India than the Communist-front NFIW. its appeal is limited primarily to
9
partition of the state (seelthough CPI participation in both groups has enabled the Party to extend its support ln Bombay, the Communists. have been unable lo capture control over either.
Several vulnerabilities In Indian life andhave enabled the Communists lo gainamong Indians who have Utile or nofor communism but who can supportcauses espoused by the CPI. The strongheld by most Indians against colonialism and racial discrimination make them susceptible to Communist propaganda and altracl them toward front organizations ostensibly designed tothese evils. Because Indians associate the West with colonialism and race consciousness.propaganda on these issues redounds against the West. Envy of Western,also motivates some Indians to take an anti-Western view. The belief that Americanis materialistic and Inferior to Indian culture is widely held and Is fostered by pro-Communists. Many Indians accept the Communist line that tlie United States used the atomic bomb against "Asian" Japan rather than against "European" Germany. The Communists also contrast "race conscious" and "war-mongering" policies of the United States with the "peaceful" policies of the Soviet"fellow Asian nation" which has made great strides In economic and technological advancement. In addition, the Indian emotional bias against the West stems from specific issues such as opposition. military aid lo Pakistan and to Western military alliances. ultural and emotional affinity with Communist China, which is struggling, like India, to achieve economic and social development.most Indian intellectuals disagree with the repressive methods employed by the Chineseand believe that these methods are not suited to the Indian environment, theytend to accept, often unqucstlontngly. theclaims lo progress made by the Chinese. All those factors tend to enhance the popularof the various friendship associations and of tlie Communists' peace front. Moreover. Indian interest in African nationalism and in the other recently independent nations of Asia provides aaudience for "Afro-Asian solidarity"
Some policies of the Indian government have assisted the Communists ln their front activities, particularly with respect to those organized onissues. Since the CPIegal party, front groups are not bound by the stringentunder which they function in many other countries. The fact that some Indian positions on
International issues arc similar to those of the Sino-Soviet bloc probably aids the Indiancause. Soviet economic assistance to India is given disproportionate publicity by the Indian press. Also, the participation of members of the Congress Party (and of those government officials who still occasionally participate in Communist-front activities despite the8 ban) in meetings and rallies sponsored by front groups tends to give respectability to such activities.
Economic factors1 are also significant inthe susceptibility of various groups toblandishments. Communists havethe interest of the Indian people in raising their low standard of living by publicizing themade infthe Soviet Union and suggesting that communism would work similar miracles in India. The desperate poverty In which mostlive and the rising level of expectationthe effectiveness of such propaganda.propaganda based on purely economicis directed primarily at the working class and Is channeled through front groups amongand the peasantry. The only other major Communist-sponsored or -Infiltratedappealing almost solely to economic interests are the United Central Refugee Council and the Anti-Price Rise and Famine Relief Committee, two united fronts formed by radical leftist parties in West Bengal. Although the Party views theclass and "nationalist bourgeoisie" ashe CPI has no specific front groups of significance designed to appeal to these classes. Rather, itto attract these elements into its other front activities organized around international or cultural themes.
The intellectuals (loosely defined in India as those with college diplomas) have historicallythe leadership ol radical and leftwingin India and exercise considerableIn molding public opinion among the middle and, insofar as articulate opinion exists among this group, tlie lowerelatively high percentage of those belonging to the CPI orits objectives arc drawn from thegroup which is particularly susceptible to the Communists' "peace" and "colonial" themes. Some Indian intellectuals participate In CPI front groups owing to personal frustration because they have been shunted aside and arc no longer inof prominence The most notable example is C. Rajagopalachari. former Governor Oeneral ofI. Home Minister and Chief Minister of Madras State, who has participated actively in the peace front during recent years. OthersIn these organizations owing to their lack of political sophistication and their adherence to Gandhlan idealism and pacifism. Still others, as for example, R. K. Karanjia. editor of thetabloid Blitz, lend their support to these groups because they believe in CommunistHowever, potentially the most disruptive segment of the intellectual class is the educated unemployed group; many members of this group have been recruited to tho Communist cause in which they serve as paid organizers, writers, and agitators. The appeal of communism to this group Is both practical and emotional. For young men who have no jobs and who have beenaway from the traditional values of their society, communism offers an outlet and aNot only doesurnish an ideology, but It holds out the example ofhereactivities are subsidized by the state and, according to Communist propaganda, where university graduates are guaranteed employment The political importance of this group has been illustrated in Kerala State, which hasommunist-dominated ministry sincen0raduates enter the employment marketin this state, und probably no moreind suitable positions. The remainderJobs as manual workers, which they believe to be beneath their dignity, or they join their idle colleagues In the coffee shops where Communis! propaganda Is readily available.
In addition to the real threat of unemployment after graduation, the Communists profit from the tradition of political activity among students.Indian independence, the Congress Partystudents to agitate against the British.7 that party has attempted, withoutto channel the students' energies Into other fields.7 the president of the Congress Party stated that since students should not participate In politics the Congress Party would make noattempts to organize this group.esult, organizational activity among students has been left by default to the Communists and to regional parties in the various states. In attempting lo attract the student community, the Communists usually start with Issues directly affectingInterests, such as tuition fees or allegedof the universities, and then they seek to involve the students in broaderumber. citizens who have lectured at Indian universities have reported that many slu-donts seem to accept tho Communist line.
. State9
Techniques
The Communists have utilized two methods of attracting support among target groups: cstab-lishing new organizations and taking over those already active under non-Communist direction. An example of the first method is the AU-lndia Peace Council, which the Communists founded; of the second, the All-India Students' Federation, which the Communists successfully Infiltrated. When infiltrating an organization. CPI workers first join and become active hi the group, then seek election as officers 'and, from that position, attempt to direct the policies of the organization. When the Intent of the Communists becomes clear, tbe non-Communists sometimes leave the group, as in the case of tho AISF, and theassume full control. If the Communistsew front group, they usually (the ICFAotable exception) retain the keyThey select an innocuous name or onea widely held sentiment, such as "peace" or "Afro-Aslartnd attempt to bring in prominent non-Communists. Actual control usually rests with the general secretary, whoarty member and whoisciplined"fraction" within the organization. The president, in manyigurehead, isell-known non-Communist. In at least one case, this situation has led to disputes between the president and general secretary. S. D.rominent fellow traveler who formerly headed the All-India Peace Council, resigned8 becauseisagreement with Romosh Chandra, the CPI member who served as general secretary, over the management of AIPC affairs. There is no special organizational apparatusthe CPI with the various front groups, but discipline among Communist members ofwhich are already front groups, as well as those which lhe Parly is attempting to capture, is maintained through the traditional Communist system ofll Party members in these organizations functionisciplined unit under the guidance of the top-ranking Communistwho presumably receives instructions from the appropriate national or local CPI
Some of the methods used by theromoting their front groups arc particularly suited to conditions in India. Internationalfront conferences stimulate activity among some local front groups. Since theof the delegates, whose transportation ispaid by the front organizations or the Sino-Soviet bloc. Is In the hands of the Indian affiliate of the international group, manywho are eager for travel abroad becomein the Indian organization in the hope of being selected as delegates. The use ofis also well adapted lo the Indian scene. By advertising "cultural evenings" featuring Indian music and dancing, front groups areany cases to attract larger audiences than would be the case with mere speeches. Drawn by interest in seeing the artists perform, audiences usually are subjected to Communist propaganda before the entertainment begins.
In choosing propaganda themes, thehave taken into consideration the interests and prejudices of the Indian population. All front groups stress issues dear to Indianrenascence, atomic weapons control, antlcolonlal-ism. pancli shila (the five principles of peacefuls well as certain issues tailored lo particular groups Communist at women emphasizes their socialand economic exploitation. The All-IndianFederation stresses the poor facilities and inadequate living quarters for many students. Besides stressing certain Issues and takingof particular groups into account, thealso decmphaslzc certain aspects ofdoctrine so as better to influence target groups. Because many of the front groups are aimed at the middle class, aspects of Communist theory emphasizing the interests of theare frequently ignored in favor of theof middle-class Interests. Indianalso play down communism's traditional atheism. They do not inquire Into the religious beliefs of Party applicants or members, and they often present religious dramas at public meetings to attract larger crowds. The success of these tactics Is indicated by the fact that the CPI has successfully infiltrated Desheligious organization in Punjab whichoothold In the bodies controlling the Sikh community.
C. Front organizations
A few Communist-front groups, notably the All-Indian Students' Federation, serve as recruitment and training centers for CPI members, but most function primarily as propaganda vehicles.and mass organizations have been formed to appeal to particular target groups, toroad cross section of the public, or topecific issue and, when the agitation ends, the organization usually disbands.information on most of these organizations is limited and docs notomplete picture of these groups or of their interrelationships.
The most important Communist-front groups {those clearly under Communist control) are listed in Fieunder Reference Data) lo-
6-f
gcther with available descriptive data; theseare described more fully below. In addition to these groups, there are others which arc dominated by the Communists or in which the Partyignificant foothold. However, the lack of information on these organizations prevents detailed coverage. Some arc united fronts of political parties, as for example the two linguistic organizations In Bombay State, while others are local bodies functioning among various target groups on the state, district, or town level. Some, like the various Youth Leagues, appear to be components of regional or perhaps nationalbut no further information ison these groups. underData)isting of theseidentified from various intelligence reports, together with the fragmentary descriptive data which are available.
eace and Afro-Asian solidarity
The All-Indian Peace Council, an affiliate of the World Peace Council, was one of tho mostCornmunlst-front organizations In Indiathe.9 It had declined markedly in importance probably because itspropaganda themes had worn thin andactions had detracted froms claim to champion world peace. Although the AIPC was still Important in9efugeew frustrated intellectuals, its continuationeparate entity was in doubt (see below).
The Indian peace movement was launched9 following instructions from Moscow giving this campaign precedence over other Communist-front activities and temporarily relegating the class warfare themeecondary1 dissension within the peace front, as in the CPI, between "rightists" and "leftists" (see this Supplement.ffective functioning of the front group. The original All-Indian Peace -Committee, formed9 by the "leftists" and ted by U. Chakkarai Chettiar, president of the All-India Trade Union Congress, was superseded in1 by the All-India Peace Council. Under the new moderate CPI tactical line adopted that year, the AIPC was envisagedehicle which would attractamong the middle class and "nationalist bourgeoisie" It Included several non-CPIand was lieaded^by Dr. Saifuddinuslim long active in the Congress Party but now clearly Identifiedellow traveler.Krishan Chandar, an active Party member, occupied the Important position of generaland was de facto leader of thehort time later, presumably at the third AIPC congresshandar was replaced by Romcsli
Cliandra, another CPI member who hasto serve as general secretary since that time.under Reference Data) shows AIPC officeholders following thehere possible, they are Identified as Party members of fellow travelers, most of those not so identified, owing to lack of information, are believed to be non-Communists who support the objectives of the "peace" movement.
13 the AIPCeries of meetings in the various states toaggression" In Korea, organized several large conferences (the All-India Conference of Women for Peace, the All-India Cultural Conference for Peace,reparatory Committee lo discuss India's representation at thend sent delegations to the Soviet Union and Communist China. AIPCattracted numerous well-known Indians who were not affiliated with the CPL SeveralParty members of Parliament andatil, then president of the Bombay PradeshCommittee andember of thecabinet, ignored the advice of the Congress working committee and participated in "peace" activities. Others attracted by this movementMrs. Suchetaember ofand wife of Socialist leader Acharya J. B. Knpalani; Dr. J. C.ell-known Oandhian economist; Blitz Editor R. K. Karanjia; and Mulk Raj Anand and K. A. Abbas, both left-wing authors-Three new themes were Included In the AIPC propaganda linehe CPI, acting on Instructions from the Soviet Union, revised Its earlier view that India was not independent but remained subservient to British imperialism. atural concomitant, Britain was replaced in the formulation of the CPI tactical line by the United States as India's "mainhe first major opportunity for extensive anti-American propaganda over an issue directly affecting India was the signing of the US -Pakistan MutualAgreement Inove which was resented by virtually all Indians. However, the strong position taken by the Indian government against the military aid agreement undercut the CPI and AIPC to some extent. With Nehru and the Congress Party the rallying point forthe Communists were unable to capture the issue for their exclusive use. Another theme that gained prominence during this period was that of Asian interests and solidarity, and the AIPC began to devote increasing attention to "Asian culture" and to extol Its superiorityinally, the Nehru-Chou En-lai declaration espousing punch shtta (the five
[principles of peaceful coexistence) was publicized fby the AIPC as on alternative to aggressiveof the Western bloc, and reiteration of this theme hasrominent feature ofand AIPC propaganda since that time.
Although these new tactical lines werearound appealing issues and gained support lor the AIPC, there were nonetheless indications that the leaders of the movement werethat this support was not aiding the Party's attempt toroad-based united front. Party leaders charged that comrades in some areas were using the peace movement to promoteParty interests; others, speaking at the third Communist Party Congresslleged that "the whole peace movement has been neglected by then addiLidn, attendance at some AIPC functions was below expectations.despite these handicaps, the movement had gained important adherentsnd itswere receiving extensive publicityIndia.
ne of India's prominent elderC. Rajagopalachari,omehad refused permission for the All-India Peace Convention to meet in New Delhiecame associated with the peace group. Inhe addressed the second Madras State Peace Conference and in Novemberape-recorded message to the Annual All-India Peace Congress which was held in Calcutta. He also inaugurated the All-India Peace Convention, which met in Bangalore In7 and which marked the beginning of an intensive campaign against nuclear tests by the Western powers, an issue wlilch the AIPC has continued to exploit.
Althoughthe Communists have continued to rely on the same appealing issues to popularize their peace front, the AIPC has declined induring recent years. The sectarianism still prevalent among Communist Party members has carried over to the peace front. At itsin Jaipur inhe AIPC called for unification of all forces working for peace andseeking common national Issues on which to base united action.ater meeting, the council expressed regret that some AIPC workers did not support the peace policy of the Indianinasmuch as this gave the impression that the AIPC was an "opposition" group. Aprepared for the Calcutta All-India Peace Congress6 observed that "our ownand suspicions against other forces of peace" have prevented "the fullest development of those forms of activity and organization which could really widen and strengthen the movement for peace."eport prepared for an AIPCinisted Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Madras as states where peace committees weret was alsoat that time that steps were being taken to reorganize committees which had ceased to function in Delhi, Punjab, Orissa, Kerala, and Maharashtra. Meetings held8 by most branches evoked little response from the press or the public. Neither the All-Kerala Peaceheld in7 nor the Madras State People's Convention, held the following June to support the Stockholm Congress for Disarmament and International Cooperation, attracted much interest outside of Communist circles. Otherconferences have suffered the sameattendance has been restricted to Communistsew fellow travelers. When larger crowds have been present, the attraction in most cases has been the promise of musical and dance
No information Is available on the membership of the peace movement or its sources of finance. Membership fees probablyortion ofand. In addition, fees arc charged delegates at some peace conferences. It is probable that the AIPC receives funds from Its Internationalthe World Peace Council. S. D. Kitchlewcontributed to the Indian peace effort all or atizable portion ofhe received with the Stalin Peace Prizehe AIPC has published the Peace Review In English and several counterparts in various vernacular languages, but available information does not indicate whether all of these are still being Issued.
Dr. Kitchlew, who had served as president of the AIPC since Its formationesigned8ispute with General Secretary Ro-mesh Chandra over the policy and theof the organization. He reportedlythat Chandra made all the decisions and that AIPC affairs were not well managed under his direction. In matters of policy Kitchlewfavoredore militantOne of the vice presidents. Panditell-known fellow traveller who has also been active in the ICFA, is now president.
In9 there were reports that the AIPC had been dissolved and its functions taken over by the Indian Association for Afro-AsianThis has been denied by Pandit Sundarlal, but most observers believe the AIPC will be eclipsed in importance by. if not actually merged with, the IAAAS. The down-grading of the AIPC indicates that the Communists are now finding "Afro-Asianetter propagandathan the more generalized "peace" theme.
SUPPLEMENT
i
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is located temporarily in the office of thebranch of the India-China FriendshipSome of the activities undertaken by this groupampaign against vs. policyCommunist Chinaeceptionroup of Indonesian visitors. The Bombay branch alsoesolution at one of its meetings urging India's recognition of the Algerian govern-mcnt-in-exile andeport on the "Fourth World Conferenceombs" from one of the delegates.
No information is available on IAAASor the number of branches It has created.
tudents and youth
Although the Communist Party realizes theofollowing among theof India, it has not been successful in Its efforts toass organization among this group. The All-India Students' Federation, the most important Communist-front student group, has declined ui strength during recent years. The organizationembershiput this figure is undoubtedly Inflated The virtual monopoly of the AISF on collegehas been broken In its former stronghold of West Bengal;f the college unions were dominated by AISF leadersnlyut ofnions arc now under their control. In Andhra Pradesh the AISF controls only oneunion, and the Delhi and Uttar Pradesh branches are reported to be inactive.
The AISF was founded6tudent conference inaugurated by Jawahaiial Nehru and chaired by Mohammed All Jlnnah. the founder of Pakistan. From its inception the organization wus split between pro-Congress and Communist factions. The two groups finally splithen they could not reach agreement on Gandhi's "individual satyagraha" (passiveagainst the British) campaign. The Communist organization retained the name All-India Students' Federation; the non-Communists formed the All-India Student Congress.
The Communists hoped in taking over the AISF to establish an organization through which they could influence students toward communism and recruit and train workers for the CPI. There are several reasons why the Indian student group In particular seemed toeudy target for Communist efforts. Not only are studentsinterested in politics, but they have also historically participated freely Ln direct action such as strikes and demonstrations. They also have many personal grievances. They often live in extreme poverty and arc further frustrated by the threat of unemployment following gradua-
ti'tiii
ihtial
Despite theso student vulnerabilities, the AISF has been unable to capture the student movement. It is, however, the largest politicalfunctioning within the student
During the past two years, the Communists have tried lo better their jxwltlon In the student front. In preparation for the Sixth World Youth Festival held in Moscowumber of local youth festivals were held. Preparatorywere formed in West Bengal, New Delhi,Uttar Pradesh, Maoriya Pradesh. Mysore, and Bihar. The Bombay groupBandung Day" and other special events. The West Bengal Festival, largest such event ever held in that state, featured cultural and sports events0ay. One purpose of the local festivals was to selectto the Moscow Conference. This, in part,the response to the festivals, since many students, regardless of their attitudes toward communism, would welcome selection as ato an international Communist conference lo receive an expense-paid trip. In West Bengal alone, morepplied for passports for travel to the Soviet Union, although all of India had been allottedelegates.
The dissolution of the AISF was underinPI policy directive Issued in July of the same year ordered continuation of the federation butew direction to theyouth movement Deciding that "the college unions are emerging as the commonof activity for the masses ofhe CPI directed that the main role of the AISF should be to work within the student unionsational federation of these unions. This report pointedack of interesl among PartyIn the student movement and the virtual abandonment of "Party-building tasks" within the AISF.lso proposed that subcommittees be established within the state and district branches of the CPI to expand Party activities among students. The national headquarters of lhe AISF was moved from'Ncw Delhi to Calcutta, where the AISF was more active, in on attempt to stimulate the organisation, but the actual effect was lo weaken it further by detracting from its positionational organization.
In accordance with the decision to work within lhe framework of the college unions, the AISF' has attempted toational Union of Students (NUS) in West Bengal and to Infiltrate thenon-Communist NUS In other regions. The non-Communist NUS, an outgrowth of the All-India Student Congress, was established0 and although active In some areas, is not annational organization. It is strongest In
Uttar Pradesh, and it Is here that thehave made their most Intensive efforts to infiltrate the organization. In other areas, the AISF has appropriated the name of NUS and launched its own organizations. In West Bengal, efforts of the state branch of the AISF to organize an NUS which would unite all college unions of the area failed, and the result was thai two NUS organizations, one Communist and the other non-Communist, were formed.
One possible exception to the general decline in AISF strength may be Kerala, where the local branch claimed lo have increased Its membership008 by "sustained constructive work and organizing principledamong the mass ofhisclaim Is undoubtedly exaggerated, but the Kerala group may at least have maintained lis earlier support. There have also been reports thai the Andhra Pradesh branch of the AISF was working hard to regain its hold on the student group and that the federation had revived its monthly bulletin. Student Nem.
The AISFational conference, Its first meeting In several years, at Udalpur innd elected new officers. Mar&lial Nautiyal, who had been active in the student front in Banarus, was chosen president Hiren Das Gupta, who had served as general secretary since the former incumbent, Sukhendu Majumdar.working with WFDY. was elected to thatA student leader from Kerala. Chandrap-pan, was elected one of the vice presidents.to the Communist weekly New Age.from every stale except Assam andattended the conference, and attendance0 at the closing session. Thedecided to continue workingational Union of Students as the only way of uniting the Indian student movement and also announced its intention to organize study camps for AISF
There is little Information on the structure of the AISF. As with most organizations of this type, the national organization is the strongest Below this there are various provincial and local federations Reportedly, many of the town and district federations function only at certain times, such as when preparations are being madeouth festival. Officers of the AISFeneral secretary, and several vice presidents and joint secretaries. At least some of these officers are no longer students but are older persons who work full time for the federation.t least two of the top lenders. Sukhendu Msjumdar, then the general secretary,oint secretary, were widely known
as full-time CPI workers. The new leaders electedautlyal and Hiren Das Qupta, are also paid Party workers. No definite information is available on the organization's finances. TheUnion of Students probablyto the AISF. Thereominalfee, which is often not collected; admission Is frequently charged, to cultural programsby the federation; and delegates toand conventions must pay delegates' fees. In some cases, articles are soldrofit; for example, the Bombay federation0 flags to raise moneyestival. The AISF hashad difficulty financing its activities, and lack of money may be one reason why the AISF publication, Student News, lias appeared (until recently)ew times in the past several years. There have been reports that the CPI has drastically reduced Its expenditures for student activity during the past few years.
The Communists have also tried toass youth organization to promote Communist causes among young people who are notombay Youth Conference was heldor "working-classefugees, and "young middle-classndian youths have also attended the variousWorld Youth Congresses. As of9 there was no nation-wide Communist youthbut there were democratic youth leagues and youth federations ln various parts of India (see. under Reference Data) which were affiliated with the World Federation of Democratic Youth. Inouth and student leaders recommendedation-wide youth organization be formed. By9 plans were well advanced for ayouth conference the following month.
The Andhra Democratic Youth Federation, the most important of the local organizations, was formedt actsoordinating body for the local youth organizations in Andhra Pradesh and has organized sports and cultural events, evening lectures, and adult education classes. Its activities are aimed at attacking and exposing "the prevailing backward customs whichindrance to the social progress of the youth and thehe federation claimed that membershipeak period" hadut even If this figure is correct, present membership is undoubtedly much lower. The Kaltkata Yuba Sangh (Calcutta Youthcame into being during thehich saw the birth of so many Communist fronts. It claims to0 members, some of whom are affiliated through federated groups.onthly journal, Jawbanhis organization lists its alms as:in national reconstruction, raising the social consciousness of the people, sponsoring antl-illtteracy campaigns, organizing sports andfunctions, fighting for the rights of youth, agitating on national issues, and working for peace. One of its major activities Is holding youth festivals, and the preparatory committee plans to hold local festivals throughout West Bengal In preparation for the Seventh World Youth Festival to be held at Vienna intherInclude conducting night school classes and participatingholera inoculation campaign. No detailed information is available on theof other youth groups.
nternational friendship associations
ISCUS. the Indo-Sovict Cultural Society, was founded in2roup of fellowin Bombay City as the successor to an earlier organization, the All-India Friends of the Soviet Union, which had been active inut ceased to exist as an effective front shortly after World War II. Its purpose is tolimate of opinion favorable to the Soviet Unionroad mass of people. Accordingly. ISCUS has sought to depict the Soviet Unionrogressive and democratic landising standard of living and has flattered Indian sensitivities by claiming that thcro exists in the Sovietreat interest in Indian art, history, and literature.
The major activities of ISCUS Includedelegations to the Soviet Union andvisiting Russians; film showings;of Soviet photographs, books, crafts, and so forth: Russian language classes; libraries ofbooks and periodicals; and fosteringbetween Indians and Russians. The quarterly magazine. ISCUS, publishedas an estimated circulationopies and includes news of the local cultural societies as well as articles by Soviet, Indian and other writers. One of the most successful ISCUS functions is the allowing of Soviet films.to figures published in the8 edition of ISCUS, the National Council, the organization's largest executive body,opiestitles which are shown by ISCUS branches or loaned to institutions and organizations for the freight chargesmall fee. Theclaimed during the two-yearo have furnished films toranches and to morether organizations in areas where there wore no branches. The National Council and theseranches claimed to haveilm showings during this period. Including bothndm. films,otalpectators These showings were concentrated in urban areas.
0
i
In Bombay. West Bengal, and the Blndi-speaxing states of North India, as shown by tbe following tabulation which lists ISCUS branches that presented moreeparate film showings during the two-year period (these figures do not include films received directly from the Cultural Section of the Soviet Embassy In New Delhi):
Film Nuuaotor
showings spectators
1
00
Ahmadabad Barodaombayalcutta ftnpur Lucknow Moradabad.
The Penfriendship SecUon of ISCUS. whichcorrespondence between Indians and Russians, claimed tondians and "half as many Soviel members" on Us register at the ond8 The National Council deplored thebetween the number of Indian and Soviet registrants but commented that this was gradually being overcome by the receipt of additionaladdresses. According to the Nationalreport to the Fourth National Conference of ISCUS Inhe "Russian-language section of the National Council providesof Russian letters into Englishhis report also observedarious ISCUS branches played hostoviet delegation, led by E. I. Afanuscndo, Minister of Education ofS.R, which came to India to attend the Third National ISCUS Conference. During this same period, three ISCUS delegations visited the Soviet Union onfrom the AU-Unlon Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and the Soviet-Indian Cultural Relations Society. classes arc reportedly conducted by ISCUS at Bombay. Calcutta. Delhi,ew other urban centers whereas In the smaller towns self-study groups are encouraged. Other significant activities during this period included anonears of Soviet cinematography inand Calcutta: exhibitions on Sovietin Bombay. Bangalore. Hyderabad, Kftnpur. Mysore, and Calcutta; and exhibitions In other areas on Soviet books, showing the interest of the Soviet people In Indian culture, and publicizing consumers cooperatives Inaunching of the first Soviet satellitea number of ISCUS activities whichthe eventriumph for Soviet science. Public lectures on "Sputnik" were given atCalcutta, and Konpur.oviet film, Sputnik, was shown by several branches. Twenty-one branches reportedly held special celebrations commemoratingh anniversary of therevolution.
Accordingeport at the Fourth National ConferenceSCUS hasranches. This report observes that totalfigures are not available, but that the membership of theranches which havefigures is" The Bombay City branch,laimed membership, Is the largest, followed by West Bengal, Moradabad.,,, and.
The national organization of ISCUS consists of the National Council and the ExecutiveDay-to-day direction of the central office and the branches is given by the Executivewhich holds frequent meetings. This group was established by an amendment to the ISCUS constitution several years ago when it was felt that the National Council was too large to give adequate guidance to Uie organization. TheCommittee is elected by the Nationaland all of its members, except the topmust live in the town where Uie national office Is situatedmportantinclude the president, Dr.ombay surgeon whoedical delegation to the Soviet Unionaswant Singh, generalRajniawyer and president of Uie Bombay chapter of ISCUS; Daniel Laell-known fellow traveler; and Dr. Abraham Sliolum Erulkar.
Little is known of the financial backing ol ISCUS. Members pay annual dues ofaye palsc (abouto the branches, and the branchesortion of this sum to Uie national office. However. It has been reported that theCouncil received from this sourceupees7ome ISCUS members are listed as3 ofn Bombay City are sond it Is assumed that these members contribute to ISCUS coffers. Small amounts are apparently also received from the nominal charge for Uie use of films and the fee charged for Uic translation of letters from Uie USSJt
Many ISCUS activities have attracted littleattention.6 naUonal conferencelittle public response and almost noAn exhibit of photographs in Madras drew few visitors, and an ISCUS conference in Bihar reportedly made litUe impact on Uie public. The conference of the West Bengal chapter of ISCUS
_
1
inrop6. It alsoerious factional split within the organization over the leadership of the West Bengal branch. However, the number of branches has grown, and the activities of ISCUS, taken in conjunction with present Soviet policy toward India and theof Soviet economic aid, suggest that some people have been influencedore pro-Soviet frame of mind.
The functions of the India-China Friendship Association (ICFA) are similar to those of ISCUS. The group entertains visiting Chinese delegations and sends Indian delegations; to China, arranges film festivals and photographic exhibits, and sponsors Chinese language classes.CFA planned various activities to commemorateth anniversary of the birth of Buddha.ICFA promotes the admission of Red China to the UN, the association refrains from tooa championing of Chinese interests.it does not make invidious comparisonseconomic progress in India and China but stresses "the common background and aspirations of the Indian and Chinese people."
This organization grew outocal China Friendship Association which was inaugurated in Bombay1 by R. K. Karanjia,editor of Blitz. The first national conference of the ICFA was held ln New Delhi inreliminary meeting in May of that year. Both of these meetings wereby many well-known non-Communists. The presidium elected included Dr. Gyan Chand, Saifuddin Kitchlew, Mulk Raj Anand, and Gen. S. S. Sokhey, all prominent members of themeraber Executive Committeeational Council with moreembers were formed. Officers elected at3 meetingPandit Sunderlal as president, and Chatur Narainongress MP, as generalAlthough Malaviya had been associated with Communist-organized activities, iton-Communist was elected to the post of general secretary of the ICFA, since this position is traditionally heldommunist in Party front organizations.ongress Party member of Parliament, Chowdury Brahm Prakash. was serving as general secretary. Pandit Sunderlal continued as president and Mrs. Umaongress Party member, became viceommunist MP, ,K. G. Wodeyar, was appointed secretary and the office secretaryPI member, Duijendra Nandi.
The second national conference of the ICFA at Calcutta in5 was attended bymembers of the Congress Party. Among the resolutions passed were two calling for theof the United States from Taiwan and admission of Communist China to the UN. Indian Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menonthe third annual conference of the ICFA, which met at Bombay innd this meeting was also attended by many otherParty members.
8 ICFA claimed toembers, but It probably had. At8 annual conference, ICFA announced that it hadtate or regional branchesistrict or primary branches. The Bombay branch was tlie largest and most active, owing primarily to the efforts of R. K. Karanjia. The West Bengal ICFAembershipnecline over the figureivenhe third state conference of the West Bengal ICFA in8 was not well attended, and this branch also complained of financialThe annual membership fee for the West Bengal ICFA wasayeuch of the association's financial support comes from wealthy Bengalis who harbor friendly feelings toward China.
The National Council of the ICFA met at New Delhi int called for an India-China Friendship Fortnight from Septemberohich was to culminate in the observance of Chinese National Day on Octobernhinese Film Festival, inaugurated by UnionHumayun Kabir, was held as part of theactivities. The National Council alsoan intensive drive for signatures to the "National Petition todopted by the Third National Conference of the ICFA. ICFA also planned toibrary in memory of two Indians, Dr. Atal and Dr. Kotnls, who had been active in the Friendship Association, to be financed in partrupee donation from the China-India Friendship Association (the Communistcounterpart ofhere were plans in9 forhinese-language class in New Delhi and publishing an English-language quarterly. Reports of the ICFA state that theposition of the National Council is serious and that the fees from the branches are notreceived. According to ICFA, the receipts of the organization for the year endingupeesois available on the source of this money or on expenditures.
In addition to the two large friendship societies, ISCUS and ICFA, there are several satelliteassociations. There are nine branches of an Indo-Bulgarian Friendship Society, three branches of an Indo-Czechoslovakian group, and five of an
Stats9
Cultural Society. There are also Iriendship societies for Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, and Rumania. The Rumanian association was formedwo branches of the Indo-Bulgarlan association were founded in Madras and Trivandrum in preparation for an exhibit of Bulgarian paintings and photographs Otherhave been organized to fete groups of folic dancers or other cultural delegations. These associations are usually formed by the samethat is active in the AIPC and the major friendship associations Just before the visitelegation or the opening of an exhibit. Theypecific purpose and usually do notas active organizations, although they may be revived for special occasions.
iscellaneous fronts
The National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW) is the Indian affiliate of the Women'sDemocratic Federation (WIDF). It was founded4 after Communistfailed in their attempt to infiltrate and capture the Ail-India Women's Conference. It claimed to haveranchesembershipnut these figures areinflated. Most of Uie NFIW strength lies in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, andIt purports toroad-basedit receives little support from middle-class women. Its leadership is composed ofor well-known fellow travelers. The NFIWeriodical, Worrun't Sews, andagitations on issues of special concern to women as well as international political problems. Women active in the NFIW include GeneralHajrahPI member and wife of Z. A. Ahmed; Renueputy louder of Uie Communist bloc in the Lok Sabha: and fellow travelers Anasuya Gyan Chand and Push-pamoyec Bose.
The All-India Association of Democratic(AIADL) owes its founding primarily to Shc-hangshu Kumar Acharya who. after attending meetings of the International Association ofLawyers (IADL) and founding localgroups in Allahabad and West Bengal,Uie all-India association inesolutions were passed at the association's first meeting supporting panch thUa anda ban on nuclear weapons. Some of the declared alms of the association were to defend -the status ot Indiaovereign democraticlo defend "persons victimized bylaws or arbitrary and illegal executiveand to safeguard world peace.
Vnrnnr'iT"*
The first activity of Uie association was toan Asian Lawyers' Conference at Calcuttaighteen Asian countries were represented at Uie meeting. D. N. Pritt of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers presided. Some members of Uie AIADL, led by N. R. Dos Gupta, toured Communist Chinand S. K_ Acharya attended the IADLin Brusselsember of the CPIan of wealth, it Is probable that Acharya provides some of Uie financial support for theAt the time of its founding, theclaimed there were democratic lawyers' associations in many states and that totalof the organization wasersons The officers elected at that time were P. R. Das, president, and S. K. Acharya and Daniel Latin, Joint secretaries.
The All-India Progressive Writers' Associationhe Communist-front writers' group, was establishedeveral Important nan-Communists, such as Sarojim Naidu and Rabin-dranath Tagore, participated in early meetings of this organization, whose purpose is toommunist slant into contemporary Indianand Journalism. The AIPWA has sponsored conferences for writers In the various Indianas, foronference of Hindi writers held in Allahabad int has been particularly active among Urdu writers, and there Isunjabi Writers' Association which Is apparently affiliated with AIPWA.
The most important project of the AIPWA was tile Asian Writers' Conference held In New Delhi during AIPWA had hoped to use the meeting as an instrument of Communistand had planned lo organize on Asia-wide writers' organization which would be Communist controlled. roup of non-Communist writers took control of the conference, defeated the proposal toermanentand thwarted the Communists purpose. Members of AIPWA were Instrumental ina largely pro-Communist Indian delegation for Uie second Asian-African Writers' Conference which met during8 at Tashkent. However, the controversies which arose over Uie method of selecting delegates more clearlyAIPWAommunist front and mayagainst the organization.
Those who have been active recently in AIPWA affairs include leftwing authors Mulk Raj Anand and K. A. Abbas; CPI members Krishen Chandar and Sajjad Zaheer; and Tara Shankeron-Communist writer who attended theconference. The history of Uie association has included many factional disputes as to Uie in-
L
3
elusion of non-Communist members and theof the organization. Sajjad Zaheer Istoaction which favored theof some non-Communists in the delegation to the Tashkent conference. This position was opposedore militant group.IPWA was reported to beweakenedperhapsesult ofulk Raj Anand organized anWriters' Conference. One state convention of this organization lias been, held in Calcutta and another is scheduled to be held in Madras. This organization was described by amember of India's delegation to theconferencerepresentative organization ofowever; as organized byellow traveler with contacts in many front groups, the All-Indian Writers' Conference Is susceptible to Communist domination; it seems to be antoew writers' front which is less openly associated with the CPI.
The Indian People's Theater Association (IPTA) was formed3 ln Bombay. Its purpose Is to present dance performances and playsCommunist themes. This association sends troupes of artists on tour throughout India and often furnishes entertainment duringorganized by other front groups. IPTA haseature film, Dhartuke-lal (Children of thene of the most famous IPTA dramas, You Madeommunist, wasimes in the old state of Travancore-Cochinart of Kerala) before being banned by the state government. An affiliate of IPTA, the KeralaArt Club, performed You Made Me aand Prodigal Son at Bombay ln8otal audiencehe Eighth Conference and Festival of IPTA was held in Delhi fromo Januaryhis meetingropaganda victory for thecause, for it received support fromartists and government officials. Thewas inaugurated by Vice President Radhak-rishnan and drew daily audiences ofPTA workers were assisted In making arrangements for this conference by employees of the Soviet Embassy Information Department However, the work of some of the IPTA branches has not progressed satisfactorily. Reportedly, the CPI has charged the West Bengal branch, whichembersith corruption and "un-Party" activities and threatenedof the branch if these defects were notOfficers elected by IPTA8 include Sachin Senengali artist and fellow traveler, president; Vishnu Prasad Rava. Hajindar Singh Raghubansi. Balraj Sahm.ubra-maniam. vice presidents; and NlranjanPI member, general secretary. IPTA has published an English periodical, Unity,indi newsletter, Abhtnayutinformation does not Indicate whether these are being published at present.
D. Reference data
The tables In this Subsection present detailed data in the general order of reference In the text
vADlSG COMMUNIST-niONT (lltOCPS. INDI*.
M> ITS
ANDTI ON
HfcMBI
HI*
Aaaodaiion of Deoto-craUr La*rm.
All-India from Council
All-India Progrcuire WriUts'
All-India Htudi<ntn' Federation
All-India Youth
To provnie lendto
muni.li aadaration; aSBated of IVroo-
until-
nviniiuUn Connmiitlit "pence" propofniMlu: aUiliulird with tbo World fVaor Council.
To tlnactheii IB* CPI auwag aaUtara and lajrct Coaamufual content into conu-mpoiary Indian wrilli*.
To diaaoinlualo Commuiiial vims anion* tlie aludaot community and rotrullfor ih-aaad Xlh the World f. tioa of Democratic Youth
Affiled *ilh the WKDY
K. Achar)a. P.
Chandra. Pandit Wliil. H. S. Sokhry. Mulk IUJ Auand. J. C. Kumarappa. Mulk Itaj Anand. K. A. AQbaa.
1 Zabtcr. K. Darao-daraa, Hirandraliandrnpniui, lilrci. Da* Ouola.
ChiUo Bow, K. N. fviudllyo Khcim-nli BhnUncUarya.
laMXIOdUSS).
NJNflNn
4
I DBKTIAL
AND IVrHHX.IHON.ll.
1 -
aair
Demurr-Uc YonUiH.ri.
Klaf Democratic Youlh Fed-
I .
Bombay Cil> Youlh League
rtOrrMioa of Ibiiu Youlh
Wi.|iwiia-Hon.
Indian AuociaUou foran Solidarity.
Indian I'voplv'a Theater Auocii lion
lado-So'lel Cultuial
Kalikaia Yuba Hunch fOUlllllH Youlh FcdcinUou).
Manila Alma lLilulis Snraitl (Women* Selfrgan, luimo).
National Federation ul Indian Womi-ii.
ealth Home
United Central Ui'difica Council
Ulial Dnmoctatiii Youlh Podera-Uon.
UUar Pradesh Dwuaeralk Youlh league.
To pron-ole Communis! ideology mid autlvlththe youtbhfi. Pr*Wh: alslialed ailh WFDY
To promote Communist ideology and activities among youlh In Bihar Stale; aBtliatad with WFDY.
TohI
octlvlllca among youth; affiliated with WFDY.
TounW-dmniaateo: fcderalKKi of youthl .illilinltoii with WFDY la ordur to. .
To promote lui w
iiiiuilil Clnmi
To promote- the "Afio-Aaian" and "pcar-t" luopngand* tbemua;with then Peace aod Sjbdartty Coma .1
To prvarail drama* and oilier cnlci-taiumeiilcitimmiial propn-Itanda coolenl
Plomou iro-reaaedn th" Dttl
To promote Communist Ideask- yontli of Calcutta; to rocrull CPISliatsd alia tbe WFDY
UMol Weat Dengs! into lln* Cammiirinl movement: aflili-atcd wlllinteraaUOrnl DnaeenUe Padarathaa (WIDF).
Atlrart Indian women into Iho Com-muniitin-iil: alCllalcd with WIDF.
ollowing among Calcultaand il.imMwlr.tUi Com-usaM coneern with Kudeuta' health; anUaled wilh Interna-' nion if KtudiMiU (HIS).
Win adherent* among Calculta'*imputation include, otherparties.
<ollowing for tlie. CPI among the youlh in Orlioa; affiliated with tbe WFDY.
Formednitedr-gauUaltvn; now woraa amonglaborart, parUeuIarly in Kanpor: aAlialed with the WFDY.
Kritliuii Chandra Chnueluiy. ..
hakravany .
Ar.ind C Panigr HnJ Narain, Hariafa Chandra.
Pmidll .Sm-Ierlal,'m* Nehru. Chowdliury lir.liiii Prahaeh, Tara Chu-i. Cyan Cbaod, It K. Karaajia
Mrs. llmriMliwnrl Nehru, Dr. Anup Singh. Daniel Ulilt. Maag-tdaa Pakwa. P. T. Sharoia.S. Mofcbcy.
Snchln Hen Gupta, Mrmi|ati Sen Oupta, Dulraj Sahani. P. C. Joshi. Tara Chaad. NL--mal Cbort. Hircndm Nalh Muki-rj...
.Ujnl Palel. Daaiel UUfi.
Cautam Cliatto|sidhya, rtliardn Mitra, Sukuniar Giiptu.
aitgulv, ManlkunUla Hon, llajiah Begam
Auiitnya Cymmliand, ltumi Cltakrnvunl, lliijrali Uegu'ii, Puepomoyers. Harsh Lailli
A Cbakravarly. bumar Muktrjee, Srlrakl MuUrth.
Xand Ka.horc Patnuik, Chln-lamam Parugrshl
Pandey, C. H. Kadri, Itomrah Chandra.
eriod"!.
lOO.
I Ah).
h a
WaM llcngal
1, onlyl.
at oi so
branchesiu0 (IKW!
HO,
U.QO0 (IBM),
it u
, 1
. COMMUNIST-INFILTRATED GROUPS AND MINOR FRONTS
I.NTS
Students' A
All-India Federation'of
1 local Churches.
All-India
dent Bloc. All-India Student Congress.
All-India Confer-
COCC
am pur Youth Lvoxuo
Anti-Nuclear Convention of All Religious Orgs it
AnU-Price Rbe and Famine Relief Cora mil tee.
Bhopal Federation of Youth
Bhulabhui Driai Memorial
li-til.tu
Bombay City
Bombay Youth Anochukm..
Bombay Youlb Congress
Calcutta Film Society.*
Cbaodcrnagore DcniociaUo Youth Leaguc.
Civil Liberties League
Council of Medical Students Delhi Youth
Democratic YouthOf Delhi.
Democratic Youth League of India.
Doth
Film Witters'arbbela Democratic Youth League
Composed of African students studying In Bombay; haa co-Operated with the IAAA8 and am oniiUiel* wlUt tlie ICS but ia not known in be alBIUted wilh the latter oi gun ballon.
Reportedly CommuuUl'i. ihif or matioiioo purpose* or strength pfi
Ad aflillal* of tbe WFDY.
Ltd by CPI nsaaabcr Chiaumaud lo be in-
1'orwcd in IUSA by Mulk Raj
Anand;on in id Ting
nlfllli.lt on wllli Lite Afro-Asian
Writers'FDY afliluilo aeUvo In the
fodnr.il territory of Muuiuur;
mayirnnrh of Ihe AU-
fndia Youth League. Said Ui atrolLed by the
All'C.
A uniud front of radical Wtiat
. ii. Wirt Bengal;
ducltdi..'ii'.H against the shortage of food aad lb* pnee
Aasoctatrd with lhe FIT, acUve In Bho-ial district, Madbya Pradesh Stale
A culturalin Bombay City which provides housing for leflwlngcn and iion-Ciunmu-niats; kid bylacllwala,PI Politburo
CPI dominated; ncUvc among
Lhe motion picture colony in
outh oigiinltAllnii active in
Chaudernagore, Weal Bengal
State. Active In Weal Donga).
Led by tlariafa Chandra; behaved
An affiliate of Uie WFDY.
An affiliate of the WFDY; helped
organize Uie FIY. A cultural organisation actlvo
among the Sikh community;
reportedly baa substantial
Communist infiltration.
An affiliate of the WFDY; pre-tumnbly formed In Carbheta. Oilsaa Statu.
India-Indonesianndian Council of Foreign Trade.
Indian Council forof International
Tttdo.
fDdo-Arab Society
I ndo-Bulgarian Friendalu'p
Indo-Ceechoslovakian Friendship Society.
I ndo. German Cultural
Indo-Koreaii Cultural So-
ciely.
In do-Latin American
Writers' Society. Indo-Mongolian Cultural
Society. Indo-Polish Cultural Society.
Iitdc-Rumanlao Friendship
Society. KaUultural
Kashmir Committer.
Kerala People's Art Club...
Little Theater.
Lota linkjlia Dal (Peasant Youth Association).
Mnhigujarst Janata Pari-ahad (Gujarat! People's Orgs ui tat: on).
Malay aloe Samajam (Ma-Inynlee Asaoclalion).
Marxist Study Club
People's lulu caliilm Center.
People'a Relief Commit ton. .
Hat cooperated with the IAAA9-
Aasoeialed wilh the org&ultatlou are Mur&rji Vuidya, K.. Hlrat.
Ron byflarah. P. Nambtar. V. C. Row.
and A. B. K. Ayyeogar; haan Uia major cJUes of India but la largely Inacllve. Led by Dr. Abiahaui Shuluiandllri; not active.
Formed to promoteiil Cafmtny; eoep-eraledISCUS lowbeo Manbal Xtiuiov
Bombay; led by M. T. Vyaa. Formed to prunvla inLercal Ib North Korea; led by P. N. SbariuD.
l-cd by Dr. Rajba Vira.
Led by Mrs. Monmobni Sebgal Hal want Siand Jamendra Kumar Jain.
Active In Kerala Htalu; supported by tbe Cumiuunttl -late
Active in New Dwlhl when, il work*ic Kuh-inir gonrnment of llakthl GbuUm Motanmad, use of the wort prominentrun* An! AIL but the ml power Mlo be btU by CPI member M. Farooqi.
dramaannto of IPTA.
CPI dominated; active In Wort Bengal.
A united front of tlie majorrUes In the Guja-ratl-apeaklog region ofStale; favors dividing Bombay beta-en IK twollegui.tif group*.
Active Ia Weat Bengal amoeg tbe Malayak* popoIaUonofPI dominated
Active in Weat Bengal.
ISoviet fllma in Weat Bengal; reportedly inorged wilh ISCUS in HIM
Active in Weal Ihmgal; provkUs Iwallh aervieea and food.
fill IHI II, UJJ
9
("Ill UK Ml
Maharaalilra Sa-mtU (CruWd Maharaahtn Committee).
BmiMoCt Natoka AkiHleml
(Academy ol
Koeiety lor Cooueiptxuy Sludica
Hri Nurayani. Dhuma I'liih
Tanjoro Democratic Yomli Tliree Colors Aad Five Star.
Vlh- Plaal Youlh
Wot Ueiigul oulh Federation.
A united front of all man* op-poaiUoo partra ia the Marat bi-speaking area of Bombay State; favor*ataAl among il. tiro major linguistic groupi
A cullurid tw Kan tuition acllvo in Kacakh
A theater group in Weat Bengal; CPI domiaaiad
Staledor.vi.T. pakttrtaaa.aorli ia. and Die like intowhere current problema arc di*eue*ud: publisheswpowy.
bociid welfuro snjinidationaVJ| Ihe Lm-cwlc Kshav* commanity la Kerala glair;ro-Coaareaa Party, but taa CPI haa gained cuUtaaUal aupport from the
nj
A WKDY nlllliMe active lD tag Tanioru di.ulm of Madras
Active in Allahabad University4 la proanotlna; la-dn-CUaa frWadahip, do la-formaUOB oa lu acuvltlta that time.
Active in tho Unoibuy suburb of Vllu Parle.
lie waa gvj. OFFICERS OF THE ALL-INDIA PKACK COUNCIL.
jvu.ini.iia. IVU
l
Hailo*,
Cciicful bWutAry. Vice IWfcuta
Secret nrl(
Trca-u*
Sm7.id.llii Kilehlcw*
Itomosli Chandra"
Mulk Ilnj Auaiul*
H. L. Alal"
Pnthvi Raj Kapooe-
D. D. Kueaaabi-
J. C. Kumarappa'
G. M.
ingli*
RAnn Jang llahadur Singh.
Viruasiiiiuda Mukerjl
K. Suuramaiilani
.
Saifuddln Kltehlow*
Ilomeab Cbiiiulra*'
Mulk ltnj Anaud*
M. L- Alal*
Prllbvi Raj Kapoor*
D. D. Koaambi*
J. C. Kumarappa*
. Ssdlq*
Gurbuksh Suigh*
llitna Jung Bahadur Singh..
Vivekanandn Milkerjl
K. Subraniuiliim
S. S. Sokbejr*
Paadit
OnikaraaUt Tbakur
ludutal Yagaifc
T. M. Kirahnajiwaniy Alva*.
Hatyapriya nunmrjoo
flala Kondoiah
K. Madliatanar
Mabnk Datl Man
Hal*
ai*viva'. .
NiMliiddiu
. Chnntlra.**
Itaj Anand*
lal.*
Je-epfc Huadaaatry
X.
J. C. Kumarappa.*
CM Harlio.*
fJurtMkili Siiigli.*
Rona Jung Bahadur BlogD,
Viveknunndu Mukerjl.
oae.
fakbey.*
Paadll SuaderiaL*
Omkaroath Taakar.
Indulal Yagnik.
Diiij. Boh.
K.aranMaa-arao. Cbalur N'araia Mataviya *
Prominent tillow CPI members.
7
9
ntial
7. Covert Organization, Illegal Activity, and Government
Infiltration
Significance and scope
The Communist Party of.India works outside as well as within the law. Major emphasis is placed at present on legal, parliamentary actions and legal, overt organizational forms, while illegaland cdvert organization arc subordinated. This adherence tb'a moderate tactical line is in accord wilh directives from Moscow, and it isby the memory of the Party's loss ofand prestige duringeriod of illegal and insurrectionary activity,
In8 the CPI embarked on thephase of its strategy. It changed Its tactical approach by subordinating legal, parliamentary activity and support for the Congress Partyat the national and state levels toactivity (armed struggle in particular) and opposition to these governments, The Partyintended to submerge shortly afterthis new tactical line, but swift action by the state governments caught it before it could do so effectively. Leading Communists were arrested, the Party was declared illegal in several states, and Party offices were closed. The Impact of this repression on the Parly, which was then organized largely on an overt basis, was serious. Accordingocument prepared1 by the Andhra Provincial Committee, when repression hit the Party inJ
Secret cell functioning and Bolshevik tenacity were wanUng. Party organizationn the face of the enemy'sonslaught. Secrecy and strength, that are the primary requisitesecretwerearty cells closed down and many members resigned and retained home.
Despite this initial setback the Party continued for more than two years to engage In guerrilla warfare, sabotage, robbery, assault, arson, and murder. Parallel governments were formedew rural districts of Telengana (the Tclegu-speak-ing region of what was then Hyderabad State) and the northeastern frontier area. Camps were established lo train Communists inew small-arms factories were opened. However, the combination of governmentaland the failure of the populace to respond to the Communists' call for revolutionfailure for this attempt to capture India through violent means. The Communists weretonational liberation" army evenkeletal scale, their isolated parallelwere overthrown, and their use of violence caused Party membership to decline from08 to an0t no time did the Communist insurrectionerious threat to the newly independent India.
CPI capabilities for sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and paramilitary activity are. on the whole, even less today thanhile the Party has greater numerical strength at present, betterresources, increased experience inas well as violent activities, and actual control over the administration of one state, these conditions are more than offset by the fact that general conditions in India are not as explosive or exploitable as8 when the government was grappling with serious economic and politicalresulting from World War II, thewithdrawal of the British, and partition of the Indian subcontinent.
Since the adoptionoderate tactical linehe CPI has made notable advances inass base, and, more Importantly, it won control over Kerala Stale by constitutional meanshe CPI noweal, long-range political threat to the Congressa far more serious threat than thethat took placeuring theof armed struggle. Perhaps in anticipationhanging political climate in India as the CPI grows stronger. Moscow has recently advised the CPI to focus increased attention on its presently small covert organization. In its present state of being almost completely above ground, the CPI is vulnerable to repression by the central or state governments.
Of more immediate importance than potential for armed struggle Is Communist infiltration of the government and of private organizations and groups. Some Communists have infiltrated into the Indian army and navy, where they areosition to engage in espionage and where they have attempted to spread unrest by playing upon the grievances ofewhave been identified in other departments
Tun. iiij^gTiftL^
SUPPLEMENT VI
MAHCH9
the central government, but infiltration of both the military and civilian departments of theof India is reportedly small. Infiltration at the state level is more serious, particularly in Kerala, anduch lesser extent In Kashmir and West Bengal In Kerala the CPI has used its position as the ruling party to place Communists and Party sympathizers in the police force and in virtually all governmental departments.
B. Covert organization
he year of its formation,2 the CPI was organized primarilyovert basis even though It functionedegal party9hile covert, the Party attempted to work In and through legal labor, peasant, and youth organizations and political parties, andthe latter half ofs the Communists achieved Important success in infiltrating the Congress Socialist Party and through it theCongress Party.
2 the CPI againegal(it had been binnednd was able to come out in the open. From then on there was little felt need for covert organization, nndthe Party became almost completelyThis situation continued8 when the CPI changed its tactical line and called upon the people to take violent action against theParty and governments. With the failure of this tactic the Party reverted1 to legal struggle and legal, open forms of organization
Information on recent covert activities Issparse, but scattered references Inreports and Party documents give someof the scope of its undergroundstructure. The CPI's small covertapparently consistsumber of cells, now called "specialome attached directly to the central Secretariat or Central Executive Committee and some attached to the various state secretariats or committees and responsible to only one or two men on the parent body.from time to .time, as circumstances dictate, the center assumes direct control over the covert cellsarticular state, relieving the stateor committee of its responsibility.
In. A. Dange,ember of the Secretariat, was reportedly the person at thein charge of the covert technical apparatus. Later reports Indicate that S. V. Ghate, chairman of the Central Control Commission, now occupies this position, although these reports have not been confirmed. There are also other experienced Party leaders who are quite capable of leading clandestine activities. They include P.ember of the Politburondember of the less important National Council; Hariklshan Singh Surjlt. formerly amember and now on the CentralCommittee, who is reportedly one of two CPI members responsible for Communist activities in Kashmir and who guides liaison between Indian Communists and those in Nepal. G. M.ormer Politburo member and now on theCouncil; and Abdul Halim of the Central Control Commission who has had extensivein illegal activities
Some "special branches" exist in theservices, armed forces, police, and probably tn defense and ordnance factories. The espionage network of the CPI is undoubtedly based in large part on cells such as these. Another part ol the covert apparatus consists of nn informal network of couriers through which Importantare transmitted within the Party and tooutside, Yet another part appears to bewith obtaining, through donations from persons who wish to remain anonymous and through Party-operated commercial enterprises (particularly publishing houses, seenderortion of the money needed to finance CPI activities;references in Party documents to "contact cells" are presumed to refer to this section of the covert apparatus. There is also within theounterintelligence group which checks the bona fides of Party members and sympathizers toinfiltration by governmental agents. In the past when the CPI was operating under conditions of repression there were (and may still be) units concerned with the clandestine production andof Party literature.
That the West Bengal unit of the Party has lhe most highly devclojHHl underground apparatus is suggested by the nature of the people (Bengal has traditionallyotbed of radicalhe size of the overt Partyin Calcutta, and the state's strategicWest Bengal Is ideally situated to serveiaison or control center for the East Pakistan Communist Party since inhabitants of the two areasommon language and cultural heritage.
Inhen governor's rule (control by the central government of Pakistan) was imposed in East Pakistan and the Communist Party ofwas banned in the province, the West Bengal branch of the CPI gave underground support to the East Pakistan Communists in the form ofpersonnel, printed pamphlets, and funds. Liaison between the two groups apparentlyfor there have been numerous reports of contact between Indian and Pakistanisince the Imposition of military rule in Pakl-
7-J
stan int is likely that tillsis handledovert wing of the CPI located in Calcutta. Sajjad Zahcer, member of the CPI National Council, is reportedly in charge ol this operation. Information on the size of the covert apparatus in West Bengal is fragmentary, but it is estimated to consist of no more thanersons.
The Punjab branch of tlie CPI probablyole in the western part of India similar to that played by the West Bengal branch in the east. Satwant Singh of the Punjab Provincialhas from Ume to time reportedly met with Pakistani Communist leaders, and it is likely that CPI aid to the West Pakistan section of theParty of Pakistan' is channeled through this committee. The Punjab Provincialis also rcajwnsible for Party operations in Kashmir where no overt provincial or district committees have been established, and where the CPI operatesovert basis within the twopolitical parties, the National Conference and the newly formed Democratic NationalSatwant Singh and Uariklshan Singh Sur->it are said lo be responsible for operations in Kashmir.
The absencetrong covert apparatus in the CPI that is prepared to copehange in the Indian political climate has caused concern among some Party members since1 tactical shift. In3 the Bombay committee of the CPI stated that while maximum use must be made of legal and open activities, care must at the same time be taken to defend the Party organization from possible repression. Inhe Andhra Provincial Committee recommended tospecial cadre" be established ln the state for carrying on underground work since all top leaders were well known to the public and the police and It would be difficult for them to engage in clandestine activities without being detected. Inember ot the Maharashtraof the Party reportedly stated that "if. attacks the CPI at this time, the government would be able to destroy itong time to come."
Inuring the celebration ofh Anniversary of the Communists' assumption of power in Moscow, the Kremlin reportedly advised CPI delegates tliat every Communist Party shouldell-knit covert apparatus prepared for armed struggle ItVand when necessary. Thiswas reportedly repeated in8 by the political First Secretary of the Sovietin New Delhi. The Soviet Union, as well as the "leftist" faction within the CPI, is apparently concerned over the possibility that the CPI might suddenly become the target for repression, perhapsesult of Nehru's death and the assumption of control by conservative elements within the Congress Party. On the other hand, "rightists" within the Party reportedly feared thaton underground activities would belie the Party's claim to moderation and would endanger its chances of capturing India through theof united fronts with other parties. CPISecretary Ajoy Ghosh, who formerly opposed any move that might compromise the Party'smoderate tactical line, was reportedly won over to tlie need for greater emphasis on covert organizationisit to Moscow lnccording to one report, the headquarters for the revitalised underground apparatus will be located In Andhra Pradesh and will be led by P. Sunda-rayya. This trend toward greater stress on covert organization wasoost by the scries of military coups in neighboring countries and by the Communists' fearimilar move mighttake place in India. Inhe Central Executive Committee reportedly resolved tbat the CPI would move ahead as rapidly asin its efforts to strengthen its covertstructure and that it would intensify its efforts to infiltrate the government and the armed forces.
C. Illegal activity
hen the CPIoderate tactical line, illegal activity has been closelyby the Communists* desire to foster the impression that the CPIespectableparty seeking power by peaceful means.of Communist-led sabotage andor Insurrectionary activity declined steadily and rapidly afternd there is no evidence that such activity is included in the present Party tactics. Communists have occasionallyiolent turn to popular agitation as. for example, during agitations in Bombay State designed to force the government to divide the state between its two major linguistic groups and during labor disputes In various parts of the country, but this activity is usually spontaneous and not jiartoncerted drive to disrupt India by violent means.
Illegal Communist activity today appears to consist primarily of espionage, smuggling. Illegal entry and exit, and possibly caching arms foruse. Espionage Is believed directed primarily against the Indian armed forces and strategicof the economy In which the Communist-sponsored trade union movement is strong:transportation, posts, telegraph andcommunications, petroleum, defense, and heavy industries. Information on thesecollected through covert cells or normal Party or trade union channels, is undoubtedly
wardixl to the Soviet Union and also retained by the CPI for use should future Party lueticsan attempt to paralyze the IndianSmuggling and illegal migration arcparticularly in the exchange of personnel and materials between the CPI and Communists in East Pakistan. There have also beenreports that gold has been smuggled lo the Indian Communists from foreign sources through covert landings along India's long coastline.
D. Government infiltration
T
I. Central government
a. MiNisTHv ok Defense and the ahmkd skhv-ickbThe CPI was the only important Indian political party that supported the British wurduring World War II. The Party pledged to recruit from among Its members and"suicide squads" to sabotage the enemy's rear lines and serve as the nuclei around whichbands could be formed. It also promised to promote recrultmenj^for the Indian armed forces. Tbe British accepted these Communistrogram foruerrilla army comprised largely of Communist volunteers, and permitted Communist enlistment In the Indian armed services. Thus, during the Second World War. the CPI was presented with an idealto infiltrate the armed forces. The actual extent of CPI penetration during this period is not known, but it was apparently limited primarily to the lower ranks.
After the CPI came out in opposition to the Congress governmenthe Government of Indiaolicy of eliminating Communists from the armed forces. Party members andwere placed under close surveillance, and when sufficient evidence was accumulated against them they were discharged.or example,enwere reportedlyfor Communist leanings, and one man was discharged for the same reason Inthers,ew of officer rank, were discharged during subsequent months.
Present Communist infiltration in the armed services appears to be negligible. General Thl-mayya. Chief of StafI of the Indian army,stated in8 thatere then under observation In the army. There probably arc Communists within the Indian0 men) who are not known tout presumably they number less than one-half of one percent. Most Communists or reported sympathizers are in subordinate positions, with the possible exception of Major General B. M. Kaul who served as Chief of Staff to Generul Thlmayya when the latter was Chairman of the NeutralRepatriation Commission in Korea. Kaul is not known toarty member, but appears to be sympathetic toward communism (in Korea he reportedly preferred social contact with officers from Communist rather than non-Communist countries).
Accordingeport innfiltration of the Indian navy is also negligible and Is limited to three small groups in touch with the CPI and the Revolutionary Communistarxist splinter group. The first consists ofnlisted men scattered throughout the navy who have been instructed to solicit money for the West Bengal and Kerala branches of the CPI and toinformation on the following subjects among others: behavior of officers, naval restrictionslo enlisted men but not to officers,In pay between officers and enlisted men,conditions for enlisted men, und securityThe second group, composed of seven men on the Indian navy's flagship, the INS Mysore, has reportedly been instructed to spreudamong the crew, enlist the support of senior noncommissioned officers, secure pages from the classified code books, and gain control over the ship's central communications center. The third group consistsmall cell in the Cochin Naval Base which is apparently engaged primarily in espionage
No information is available on infiltration in tbe Indian air force.
The potential for infiltration of the armed forces is probably enhanced by the fact that Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menonember of the extreme left wing of the Congress Party and has associated with known Communists and fellow travelers. He is highly ambitious and wouldcooperate with and accept support from any group which might enhance his prospects forPrime Minister. He reportedly haswith fellow travelers in Bombay city and haseekly news magazine called Link which has on its editorialumber of CPI members or sympathizers. This magazinecirculates in reading rooms within Indian military establishments.
The Communists' inability thus far seriously to infiltrate the Indian armed forces results in part from the pro-Western orientation of most topof the three services and,esser extent, from the conservative village background of many recruits. However, these factors are not Ineffective deterrents to infiltration. Into keep subversive elementsinimum the armed forces have traditionallycreening process in which local police and civil
officials arc asked to flic reports on thepolitical activity, and party affiliation of prospective recruits. If these reports reveal aof Communist activity or sympathy, theis rejected. Any connection withwithin three generations is reportedly grounds for rejection of an applicant for, orof an enlisted man from, the Indian navy. In the army, brigade commanders have thein peacetime to discharge without appeal enlisted men whose political loyalty is in doubt. Those who become active in the Communistafter Joining the army are reportedlyby this method. Information regarding the procedures for dismissing officers on political grounds is not available. Apparently, however, these procedures are cumbersome; officersof Communist leanings are frequentlyto remain within the service underwhile their contacts, methods of operation, and habits are studied.
Communist control over Kerala State hasertain extent compromised the procedure forthe enlistment of known Communists, since the armed forces can no longer placeconfidence on reports from officials in that state. There are conflicting statements on what measures the armed forces are adopting to meet this problem. According to one report, thehave unofficiallyolicy of rejecting all recruits from Kerala, regardless of the nature of the political report, on Individual grounds such as physical unfitness or lack of aptitude.
. T.ember of the CPI Secretariat, reportedly admitted privately that the Party had "lost contact" with the armed forces, and several Party documents circulated among CPI leaders during the year stressed the need for more effective Party work among the military. In addition, it has been reported that in9 the Central Executiveconcerned over military coups in neighboring countries, resolved that the Party should intensify its efforts to penetrate the army and police. for coordinating these efforts atwas reportedly givenommunistIn Andhra Pradesh, P. Sundarayya. Thegrowing interest ln the armed services was demonstrated during8 and9 by increasing publicity in the Communist press on disparities between the benefits given to enlisted men and officers, more intensive efforts toCommunist bookshops among the military, and additional efforts to attract support among retired military men who enjoy positions ofin their native villages.
b. Other ministries and attached depabt-uzktsThere are few reports of Communistin other ministries and attachedof the central government, and it is likely that tliere Is little such infiltration. Few cases of subversive activity have come before theunder the provisions of the Civil Service (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules promulgated9 to strengthen the hand of the government in dealing with subversivein public service and to check the spread of subversive influences among public servants. Onlyases of suspected subversives, and ali of these were not suspected of being Communists, were brought before the authorities for hearing under these rules during the. Ofnlyere discharged from government service. The government claimed3 that the promulgation of the rules and the action taken under them hadalutaryIn checking disloyal activities amongemployees. However, the rules have been kept In abeyance for unknown reasons sincend no action has been taken under them since that time. In lateigh official in the Ministry of Home Affairs reportedly stated that although the ministry knew the identity of Communists in the Government ofIt was not always able to take appropriate action to remove them.
Only two persons in the Ministry of External Affairs have been reported to be CommunistSadar Kavalam Madhava Panikkar and Trlloki Nath Kaul. alayali whose daughter and son-in-law are Communist leaders in Kerala, became known for his pro-Communist bias while serving as India's first ambassador to Communist China in thes. Alter his assignment In Communist China he was sent to Egypt as ambassador, and after service on the States Reorganization Committee he returned to diplomatic service, becoming India's Ambassador to France. Kaul, who is related to Nehru by marriage, has been called by some observers an out-and-out sympathizer with the Chinese Kaul was reportedly instrumental in getting India to recognize the Mao regime. He went to Peiping0 as Counselor, and2 he became Minister of the Embassy in Peiping.3 Kaul was appointed Joint Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, and4 he served as Deputy Chief of the Indian delegation to negotiate the Sino-Indlan agreement on Tibet. Later4 he became Chief of the Indianon the International Control Commission for Vietnam. At present Kaul is ambassador to Iran.
Thereeport In3 ofof tho Ministry of Informationbut tills remainsthe pro-Communist poet, dramatist,Harlndranath Challopadhyaya,produced, and acted In many(AIR) programs. Other talentedhave frequently been associated withgroups such as the All-IndiaWriters' Association have also hadtheir works broadcast by AIR orthe March ofultural periodicalby tbe ministry. Of the variousattached to this ministry, All-Indianow perhaps the most vulnerable toinfiltration, for two of AIR's regionallocated In the Communist-controlled stateat Trivandrum andhe directors of tho two stationstold the Central Intelligencethe state government had made nointerfere with the normal operation of the
The Indian Statistical Institute, anorganization which does work for theon contract and which plays arole in India's planning for economichas reportedly had two or three CPI members on its staff at various times during the past four years. Soviet technicians have aided this Institute, and the director. P. C. Mahalanobis. iseftist, although information on his exact political views is not available
tate and local
a. KeralaCommunist infiltration In the state and local governments in Kerala IsThis infiltrationase study of what might be expected In other states should they come under Communist control, and Itwhat the CPI Itself readily acknowledges: the assumption of powerommunistis not the end but only the beginning of the struggle to establish the dictatorship of theproletariat.
The new Communist government in Keraladecided in7 not to movetoward Infiltrating the government services. In fact, in an attempt to establish its bona fides, the new cabinet rescinded apassed by the previous regime which hadthe control of the Kerala Public Service Commission over recruitment to the stateservices and increased the cabinet's power to appoint and promote civil servants. Thegovernment actually went even further and expanded the powers of the Public Service
Commission by bringing some previously exempted governmental positions under the commission's jurisdiction.
After four months of rule, however, thewere ready to move. Onhe Chief Minister of Kerala announced on the floor of the assembly that the state government had lifted the existing ban on the employment of CPI members and sympathizers in governmentaland that it was attempting to absorb those who were dismissed or previously refusedon political grounds. Most departments of the government were reorganized, and many new posts wereortion of these were filled with Communist members and actual orprocess which is still going on. Byew governmental positionsonthly salaryupeesr more had been created. The positions included transport officers, welfare officers, labor officers, press and information officers, education officers, and health officers. Communists or pro-Communists have reportedly been appointed to every ministry in the government. to clerical positions and above in the State Secretariat alone were reported in7 to includenown CPI membersIncluding six relatives of knownAn even larger number of Party members were probably employed as drivers and laborers in Ihe governmental Secretariat and inindustrial enterprises.
The Communist regime has filled manygovernmental positions with members of groups among which it hopes to extend itsIn7 the Kerala governmenta new rule providingf all civil-service appointments In Kerala be reserved for "backwardThlyyas,Latin (Roman) Catholics,or scheduled castes and tribes. In8 the state government announced that It would appoint ex-convicts to governmentalin accord with certain "liberal principles" and in consultation with the Public ServiceIn8 It announced that inthe age limit prescribed for employment in government services it would thenceforthfrom the age of any ex-serviceman theof years he had served in the armed forces.
Many government employees who have proved unsympathetic to the Communist regime or its policies have been transferred, suspended, orIn8 the ministry ordered tbe transferubinspector of police in Trlvandrumesultetition by local Communiststhat he had behaved "rudely" towards
them. In8rdered Uie transfer of the superintendent of police In Kuttayam district, and the inspector and subinspector of police at the town of Munnar for firing on Communist workerslantation strike. In8 the governmentirst-class magistrate in Trlvandrum to the rank of second class,because heetition toase Involving violence which was pending against some Communist Party members. In the latter part- of8 the government suspended for alleged corruptionfficials in the Policen the Transport Department, andn the Forest Department. Charging officials with corruption and suspending them at reduced pay for several months pending full inquirythe state governmentevice for bringing pressure on officials who have refused to cooperate with the new regime.
While trying to infiltrate and subvert the state's traditional administrative machinery, the CPI is simultaneously taking the more important step of divesting the state government of some of its power and redistributing it at lower levels, where the Communists are strong. This policy is referred to by the Communists asand people's7 the stateset up an Administrative Reformsto recommend ways of "decentralizing" powers at various levels and "democratizing"bodies by securing "effectiveof local self-governing institutions or other representative bodies in administration.'" As an example of the shift, the Communists began Ino give workers In state-ownedoice in the managemcut of these concerns;irstepresentative of the workers was Includedewly formed State Transport Board which has wide powers of control and management over the State Transport Department. Another instance of decentralization was the government's abolition of the posts of Divisional Educationin8 and the transfer of their powers and functions to the lower districtofficers. The Health Department was also reorganized and decentralized. Village libraries were given power to select their own books. In judicial affairs, the number of civil cases being registered in the Trlvandrum courts has declined, and villagers ure being encouraged to take their cases to the village panchayat (council) forrather thanonstituted court of law.
olice, DepartmentUnder the Indian constitution the maintenance of Internal security and direction of police operations are assigned to the state government. In each state the police are integratedingle police force organizedtatewide basis with no separate local orpolice systems. By forming aGovernment in Kerala the CPI has been placedosition where it can exercise extensiveon tho police system.
The main obstacle In itshe fact that all top-ranking state police officials must be drawn irom the Indian Police Servicen whichtraining, and advancement arcby the Home Ministry of theof India. Police officers of the rank ofsuperintendent of police and above arcIPS men, while other police personnel belong to the state civil service. Inhere were onlyPS officers in Kerala outtate police force of
Shortly after the Communist government took office It reportedly ordered Inspector General of Police, N. Chandrasekharan Nalr. the top policein the state, to withdraw his nominations for four senior officers to receive training inpolice functions In Calcutta and in the United States and substitute four junior officers recommended by Communist Party leaders. Nalr's refusal to accede to this and to otherof the Communist government madearget for attack by the CPI press; it charged him with failure to cooperate with the ministers and with communicating with New Delhi over the heads of tlie state government. Nalr. who had reached retirement age but had been continued in office by the previous state government,ather than taking the too obvious move of replacing Nalrommunistarly sympathizer, the Communists split the functions formerly exercised by the Inspector General. Broad administration of the policewas vested In the Inspector Generalapable and respected officer next In linetandpoint of seniority was appointed to fill this post. However, several keythe Criminal Investigation Departmenthe Railway Police, and the Armed Reservoplaced under theof the Inspector Generalnd N. R. Srinlvasaeak man subject to Communist pressure and according to severalarty sympathizer, was appointed to this position. The CID, the elite of the state police, has responsibility for keeping the government informed on political activity in the state. This function is performed by keeping foreigners and members of tlie political opposition under surveillance, by following theof all political and semipolitlca!and by monitoring messages sent through the postal, telegraph, and telephone systems In the state. Formerly one of the CID's main
gets was the CPI, but under Iyer's administration the CID has reportedly been expanded, reoriented, and seriously Infiltrated by Communists.ol police V. P. Nair, who served as Chief of the Special Police Branch ol the CID andtrong opponent of the Communists, has been transferred. Whereas in the past the Kerala CID cooperated with the local branch of the Central Intelligence Bureau (CIB) of. Homethis close working relationship has now been completely disrupted. The CIB must rely entirely on its own agents to follow Communist activity in Kerala, the state CID. for Its part, is now engaged In spyjng on CIB personnel.
The Armed Reserve Police, which ts also under the Inspector General of Policeixed reserve quartered at various district and subdivisions! headquarters throughout Kerala and equippedemimilitary basis. The armed reserve Is called in to handle assignments that are too demanding for the regular district police. In the past it has frequently been brought into action against Communist-led strikes or masshowever,embers of the armed reserve In Malabaristrict ofState but now part ofnown as the Malabar Special Police, were dismissedommunist-inspired strike. Since it has come to power, the Communist government has ordered the reinstatement of these men. The Communist Party is reported to have cells In armed reserve units at Kozhikodo and Malap-puram and presumably among other units,no additional information is available.
ove to curry favor, the presenthas given the regular police increased pay and housing allowances. At the same time, ita new police policy, declaring that thewould not permit the police to function in an "antipeople" manner, that It was not theof the police to interfere in labor disputes, and that the authority to use sections of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to the use of police weapons rests with the ministers and not with district officials. Despite the government's attempt to correct the "antipeople" altitude of the police, the latter apparently have not always acceded to the demands of local Communist Party members or extended them full cooperation.esult there were numerous transfers ot police officials during the first year of Communist rule, and in8 the government discontinued overtime and housing allowances for the police. Law Minister Krishna Aiyer announced in the stale assembly in8olicehad been transferred "for reasons of Actually, many ot these transfers took place because local police officers came intowith the local branch of the CPI. Mostconcerned were exiled to less desirable posts, and in many cases they were replaced by officers who are more tractable or by promotion from the ranks of subordinates who owe their newto the Communists.
Following extensive criticism within the CPI over the police's opening fire on strikingtea workershe Kerala branch of the Party proposed In Novemberommittee toew police code for the state. The proposed committee was to consider, among other matters, the conditions and circumstances under which firearms might be used by the police, the feasibility ofthe public" with the work of Uic police, and the establishment of village police or at least an association of the village panchayats with theIn someember committee was established by the ministry in9 with the following composition: two membersenior advocate of the Supreme Court of India, the secretary of the All-India Manufacturer's Association, and M. Krishna Menon. the state's Inspector General of Policen appointing the latter to theon which he will apparently serve full lime, the Kerala governmentay to shunt Mrnon from his post at least temporarily and reintegrate the functions of Inspectorof Police in one man.rinivasa Iyer.
ducationIndia,control of education is exercisedat the state level. The various statethrough their ministries of educationlocal educational policy, administer stale schools, and exercise indirect control over private schoolsystem of recognition,and grants-in-aid. The formation of aministry In Kerala put the Communist Party In an excellent position to UifUtrate andthe educational system In that state.
Soon after assuming office, the CommunistMinister ordered an increase in salary scales of primary school teachers in bothand state-aided private schools. This was followed In7omprehensive education bill designed to tighten thecontrol over the elaborate private school system Inood part of which is in tha hands of various Christian churches but partially dependent on government grants. The bill as passed by the state assemblyeasure of nature requires assent by the Indian President fore it becomes law) stipulated that all teacher* in state-aided schools would be appointed from a
government-maintained register of eligibleIt also provided that teachers in private schools were to be paid directly by therather than indirectly through theof these schools. This legislation wasmodified at the request ol the central government, but the Kerala ministryretains extensive power to control private schools and the stipulation that teachers must be selectedovernment register remains.
Before the Communists assumed office,were not'required to register beforebut in8 the Director ofInstruction ordered those who wished to teach in public schools during the academic yearin8 to register with districtofficers, and directed that new teachers must be appointed and assigned within theof their residence. At the same time,committees of the CPI In Kerala weredrawing up their own lists of allor fellow-traveling teachers. In8 the ministry ordered the restoration of teaching certificates to those teachers who had lost them in the past on grounds of Communist activity.
Besides attempting to penetrate and extend their influence over the teaching stafl in theschool system, the Communists have also sought to extend themselves in themachinery and in the Department ofthrough new appointments, transfers, and promotions, ln. K. N. Namblar, the brother of Communist leader A. K. Go pal an, was reportedly promoted over the headsfficers to the position of Deputy Director of Education in Kozhlkode district.
b. Other state and local governmentsThe only other states in which Communistof the government Is known to beare Kashmir and possibly West Bengal.the CPI has no provincial organization ln Kashmir. Communists and Communisthave for years been interested in that state.hen Kashmir wasrincely state. Communist elements were closely associated with the popular struggle for freedom from the Maharaja's rule. They operated within Uw National Conference, the party which led this struggle and wlueh formed the government lnKashmir after the state's accession to India. Two persons with pro-CommunistGhulam Muhammad Sadlq and his brother. Ohulam Mohiuddln Kharra, served as ministers in Sheikh Abdullah'sell-known Indian Communist, B. P. I. Bedi, served as Adviser In Chief to Sheikh Abdullah and chief of hisdepartment during Abdullah's Emergency Administration and for two years thereafter; Bedi's European wife, who isommunist, headed the Plebiscite Departmentthe Emergency Administration and later servedember of the State TextbookAnother Communist fellow traveller in the Sheikh Abdullah government was DurgaDhar who served as Home Secretary andHome Minister.2 it was reported that some secretaries to the government and aof officers scattered throughout allof government, including the Nationalwere Communists or fellow travelers and that Communist sympathizers were numerous in clerical and administrative positions.
7 Sadiq and Dhar withdrew from theConference and formed the rival National Democratic Conference. They arc not now in theumber of Communist and Party sympathizers probably continue to hold positions in the state government, although no recentIs available.
Information on Communist infiltration ln West Bengal is fragmentary, but thereelief among some sources that the state police is seriouslyby Communists and CPI sympathizers. It has frequently been reported, for example, that the CPI has been able to obtain information from police files in the state. One probable reason for the shift of CPI headquarters from Bombay to Calcutta, capital of West Bengal,ere subsequently moved to Madras and later to New Delhi) was that the CPI leaderssome of the Calcutta police to betoward their program.
During thes there was someof government in the Telegu-speaking region of southern India: excerpts from classifiedprepared by the Hyderabad CID appeared in CPI documents; the Andhra provincial CPI committee statedeport that manyservants and teachers had attended Party training schools for members and cadres, asalthough not as members. There is some Infiltration ln the municipal administration of Delhi where the Communists dominate theworkers union.
There is probably some Communist infiltration in the Bombay municipal administration Aprovincial committee organizational report made to the Politburo in2 stated that there was some form of Party organization among municipal employees. There is evidence that the education officer of Bombay city. Miss Kapila Khandawalla, is pro-Communist although she claims membership in the Congress Party. A
35 sul
member of the Bombay corporation was reported in8 to have asked the municipalto investigate allegations that the education officer had repeatedly used her position to arrange for Bombay public school children to attendfunctions. Certainly, Bombay city's educational system has been infiltrated by the CommuniBts at the teaching level. The wives of several leading Bombay CPI officials holdpositions in the Primary School Teachers' Association which likewise has been accused of pressuring Bombay school children Into attending Communist-backed functions.'- f
On the state level In Bombay, twowere uncovered in the ijtate Educationhin6 theBureau (CIB) reportedly suspectedacting Governor of Bombay State,Idas Pakvasa, of servinghannel forChinese Communist propaganda activitiesBombay area.7 it was reportedhas been no successful Communistpenetrate the Bombay state police service
According to one report, the total number of CPI members or sympathizers in8 in the Bihar State service or in central services located in that state. Of these,ere dismissed and the remainder were under surveillance. The state government was apparently unable to Initiate dismissal action against those under surveillance since no orders establishing procedures to bein such cases had been received from the central government. None of these suspected Communists is known to occupy an important
E. Role of foreign Communists
Foreign Communist agents came to Indiaovert basis and engaged In illegal activity during the British period, before World War II. Most of these agents appear to have been sent by theParty of Great Britain which had primary responsibility for directing Communist activity in
Indiaoreign agents also came to India In7 and8 and appear to have engaged in illegal activity by urging the CPI to enter the offensive phase of the "people'sstrategy and adopt armed activity as its principal form of struggle. During recent years illegal activity appears to have been restrictedto Communist diplomatic andmissions. The Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, TASS, and trade agents representingCommunist nations engage in subversiveat least to the extent of providing financial aid to the CPI andafe channel of communication with Moscow.
Communist China may have some covert agents working among India's small Chinese community. During the Chinese Communist seizure of Tibethereew reports of smuggling of arms and supplies into that area from West Bengal and Assam.
Another case of illegal activity has been the penetration of Indian territory by smallof Chinese troops. Usually these troops withdraw across the frontier Into Tibet uponan Indian patrol; however, in6hinesetroops in civilian clothes were reportedlywell inside the Indian protectorate of Slkklm near Gangtok. They were said to have been ledieutenant whose identity documents and uniform were found when his personal effects were searched by Indian authorities.
It appears that Soviet personnel, particularly the staff of the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, and possibly representatives of other Sino-Soviet bloc missions, are kept under surveillance by. Home Ministry.8 the Soviet representative of Inlourlst, the Soviet travel agency,isa to return to India from home leave in. The reason for this denial is said to have been the Indian Home Ministry's suspicion that he was engaging In activityto the security interests of the Government of India.
9
8. Personalities
General
The leaders ol the Communist Party of Indiaoth on the slate and national level,ard core of well-trained tacticians andWhile they come predominantly from the middle class, all classes are represented, fromto Brahmin. Included are dissident Christians and Muslims, members of the major and minor professions, laborers, and intellectuals. Many hold the highest academic degrees obtainable from some of the leading universities in India and Europe. Several arc elected members of the Indianincluding both the Lok Sabha (lowernd the Rajya Sabha (uppertill others are members of the various staten addition, the CPI has the supportroup of high-caliber fellow travelers.
Some of the CPI leaders joined the Party through the militant left-wing labor movement in thes, when general conditions of unrest and growing political consciousness provided afield not only for nationalism but for theof socialist ideas. Others were formerly associated with the Congress Party and its left-wing affiliate, the Congress Socialist Partyany joined the CPI2 when the Party enterederiod of rapid expansion. The reasons advanced for defection to the CPI from the Congress Party and the CSP have not always been logical or clear cut, but it appears thatfostered by centuries-old customs, caste prejudice, and unemployment drove many fence-sitters into the Communist camp, andwith the Congress movement andon the part of its leadership were certainly significant factors. For many of the malcontents and opportunists, the CPI, more than any other political group, established itself as the "greatt the same time offering aand cure for all Indian aliments.
Several of the Communist leaders, as well as some of their fellow travelers, have closewith leading civil servants,ew have contact with thenigher echelons of the rulingParty. In some instances this Is the result of the Communists in question occupying electivether cases the ties are those ofor friendship.
A Communist government was elected in Kerala7 by democratic process in an election that wasefeat of discredited Congressmenictory for communism. The CPI's publicity machinery, both statewide and countrywide, seems to have been more successful in favorablyKerala than the non-Communist press has been in givingad name.
The Kerala experiment, and the8 Amritsar Congress with its forma) acquiescence in the parliamentary approach, represent perhaps the two most significant events in CPI history. In spite of the parliamentary approach (which is used mainly for tacticalhe leadership appears to be firm, refusing to permit talk ofand "peace" to blunt Its ideological sharpness or its perspectives on ultimate Party goals. There doesactional line-up among both state and national leaders, based to aextent on tactics and strategy. However, this lias not lessened Lo any appreciable degree the cohesiveness of purpose of the leadership in general.
CPI leaders, who areonsiderable extent the offspring of middle-class landlords and small traders, take an optimistic view of the Indianscene, where they sec the Congress Party permeated with dissension and worn byincreasing public awareness of theshortcomings, and other political groups weak and divided among themselves. They look with confidence lo the forthcoming nationaland with even greater confidence to the still2 elections.
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