DISCUSSION OF SOVIET AND US LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS

Created: 8/18/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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hdkrasdik for ths record

SUBJSCTi Discussion ol Soviet and IS long Range Ballistic Me3He Programs

- PRSSEOTi Director of Central Intelligence Senator Stuart Symington

Col. Teaanphler (fornerJy an ssslstant to Kr. Symington, formerly Preaidant of tho Air Force Association, now Assistant to the Predicant of Convalr)

Howard Stoerta,HE staff /

PLACB and TDffii DCI'a

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Senator Symington opened by describing Col. Lanphlar'e background and experience, hia knowledge of the Atlas program, and hie long interest in tbo relative strength of tho us and the ossr. The Senator expressed hia groat confidence in Lanphler, based on long personal association. Lanphinr had cone to hia only the day before with information on Soviet irbm and ICR* progress which did not agree with what the DCI had toldhort tine before (onuly, also in pci's office). Tha Senator felt tha only thing to do was to lay the problem on the table with tho dci, and hod cleared his Intention with Senator Russell be-fore ccraing. pHier adcod that Senator Symington and tho dci vera the first people to whom he had voiced his concern. The Senator indicated that they both planned to talk with Henry Kissinger that night.

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Xanphior said his Information on OS program) ease fron personal experience, and his information on what the Soviets are doing came from people in the IB intelligence services. It became clear during the discussion tbat he referred to people In the intelligence components of tbe mUitary services, in tho abc, and In CIA. Be did not further identify his informants.

Unphier said tha Atlas pro gran toautical wile missile began officiallyears ago. Last uesk,ew weeks of the originalelatively complete Atlas was successfully fired, testing all tbe elements of the system for the first time. This sdaaile'wentiles.

The next milestone, deliveryilitary baso of an operational missile that can react in lessour and cover the target area in Russia, will occur some time0 at the earliest. (Unphier

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does not consider that the oansbLlHy the US plans to acquire at Camp Cook next suaotar will betrue operational capability, since tha missile villlev reaction time and Cookraining base remota fron most targets ln Russia.)

The next adlestoneignificant number of ICBXs in plaoe* The most significant nusbsr In current D3 plans laperational alaa lies ln readiness at nine Atlas bases by Ve also stay have four Titan bases, no earlier2 and possibly later. With st mostlssllns. Therefore, our planned intercontinental mis olla retaliatory force2 is on the orderCBKs at sonsanes ln ths US, If Titan continues to develop. Lanphisr expects theto0 per cent reliabilitySP of something lessdles, he later Indicated his belief that roughlyperationalealistic figure

Turning to the Sovietnphler said his informationthoy bogsn st Kapeetin Tar inan hundreds oftests, and by the end6 had fired on tho orderofsn&e. They then out downtoe ting of tbesa micelles snd established bases ln thsand Intho Kiddle East. Those bason have

been operational sinco6 and The Soviets hove had forapability with several hundred0 alios) out of the Baltic area.

Opon c; we timing, Lanphisr said ho bad been told specifically of bases on islands ln the Baltic opposite Estonia (indicating those at theof the Golf of Rigs). He had heard that there are savwases on thoss islands, but had heard no da tails about these particular basos.

Loading toward the ICBrt problem, hcv.ver, Lanphisr Indicated that Soviotand XCHH bases look vary auoh alike. They lookoyholaa circletraight part on It. In recent instances they've been moving tha big nlBailee* snd presumably tho othara as well, on rails. Ho referred to ths establishment of railroad networks associated vlth launching basos. Re polntod out Murmansk as on area where missile trains have been moving.ontext which Indicated that In this case he meant IClf'a. He sddsd that tha Soviets havo begun to establish missile banes (presumably IRBHs) in the Karl time Provinces of tbo Soviot Far East, some op peal to Formosa, snd some la Indo-Chlna. Re had begun to hear this information about the Far East vithin about the past throe months* snd had soon boss locations Indicatedop.

On tho ICuX, Lenphier's iindoretandine Is that tho Soviet* have launched missiles fron Espustln lar and from tha Sputnik beea atiles into the eot in the Kamchatka area and into the north central Siberian area (ba pointed this last oat very generally eo pap). The more conservative figures he has beard are thatoa fired* ginning in January, and that anotherore fired in tbe first five months of ly$fl,otal of about OO firings Inil* range. In thesesomething wae aeon, observed, or known tooint, sane timet with mid-course guidance pick-op, and to land in the impact area. Thereoncentrated bunch ofo UO during three months in the summerith six in one week. Lanphler had plotted theseiringsraph, which he had ahowo the Senator but had not brought to the DDX'a office. On ouestlonlns, he reiterated that these firings did not lnelado those to IRBM ranges.

Lanphler added that hia information vas that tbe So Tints had tested at least two missiles with nuclear warheads in excessegaton, one of which went atiles. One, however, weeouple of thousand sdlesew rsnge in tha sea north of rSirmansk. ive warhead in this direction, overr.bere of their own people, ia en indication of their oonfioenoe.

On tha basis of this tostlnj record, Lanphler belisves tha Soviets are now establishing tho baaos that we won't be establishing1nd that, they are .two to-tires ysars ahead of oa. He oaid ho wo aid not argue that tbey now had an operational ICtti that thoy could completely rely on, but ho thought they would havo scnotMru like oar2 capability within the next twolvo months.

. Later, tanphierechnical point bearing on tho above, be noted that the US waa going toissiles (presumably Atlases) toroduction rata ofonthnd build gradnallj toonth In his opinion, cor estimateoviet icais operoticaalear or son two years was notwith tho firing of only six ICaKa to date. Lither the one waa orer-ectlrutad or ths other underestimated.

Tbore waa considerable discussion about how much of tho US the Soviets could roach with missile* launched from various points la the USSR, with Lanphler pointing outiles range waa not needed from Kurnanok and other northern areuo.

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Senator Symington said he had haard of six ICW firlnEo an early ea January, the DCI Indicated that he vonld hav. said fewert

that th8r* ^toon

Urla- nd Whier held ine^haalting that the latter waain the InUlLigsnca services. The Senator queationedfreQ. ^telllEence, and Uashler suggested that information^/he top very rapidly. They were reassured that CIAa position to check Lanphler's Information without having to relyfroa other

several tiroes aade It clear that his information was hearsav

froa people in the intelligence business, although he said not allource. Ho believed it vas sufficiently differentofficial position, and apparently so much more. The ECI, on tho other hand, stated

that ho did not feel that ha vaa minimising the danger, but that he could

^ttftJ^ Ylt5(Lanphlor fon "rings. He said haUp omponent

.AfUr,LailPhJfr had left the room,eviewed for tho Senator

St It? ro^co and deploy ICBMe, emphasizing

that the estimated operational capability for future dates would vary depending cpon Justirst operational capability waa achieved. Ha also noted that our statements on itumbors of test fitfSLns were based on-what we considered to bs reasonably good detection capabilities.

Evaluation!

Lanphisr claims no direct sources of lnforaaUoo aboutR. He has apparently gotten his information from talking with people In or on the fringes of intelligence, possibly in comeotlon with his work at CORSaVe

There is no hard intelligence to back up his statements about Soviet alssila testing end operational bases. On testing, it is possible that ho has nlxod up firings to various distances. Interpreting more of them

eTidenco warrants. On bases. It Is possible

that his statements reflect unconfirmed information In the possession of thegonoe conminlty.

ii. STOERTZ,

Original document.

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