CENTRAL 1NTEE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM FOR : The Executive Secretary
i Report on the Status of the Foreign
Intelligence Program as of8
attached,Report has been prepared pursuant to Presidential directive/as forwarded to the Director cf Central Intelligence through,your memorandum of
Tha Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this reporteptember
C. P. CABELL General. NJSAF Acting Director
APMfJVfD FOR fflWSr"
,C) by National Secunp. "ouncll
ANNUAL. REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
STATUS OF THE FjO REIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (as of
Submitted by Intelligence Adviaory Committee
vioutly discharged by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IACJ and the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) are now to be vestedingle United States Intelligence Board. Other specific
improve coordination within the intelligence community. Special emphasis was also directed toward improving the quantity and quality of our intelligence in certain vital areas, including thoseparticularly important by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.
B. Evaluation. Capabilities to Provide Warning of Attack
With respect to the "early warning" problem generally, we continue to face increasing difficulties in being able to provide prior
28 intelligence warningoviet attack on.. forces,
as the USSR's growing strength in advanced weapons sytems improves its capabilities for surprise attack. This problem will be compounded when the USSRubstantial delivery capability withand long range ballistic missiles in position.
During the past year we made some progress in increasing our existing early warning capabilities. ew "General Indicators" list was developed. Specific action was taken to improve the means of
as the first step toward attaining more rapid transmission goals.
transmitting critical intelligence to the highest authorities. Require-
C. Evaluation and Estimates
Tho intelligence community againarge number ol coordinated national intelligence estimates directed at various phases
of Sino-Soviet Bloc or Free World activities of interest to Tbe extensive production of basic intelligence on abasis continued. Substantial improvement also was made in the processes of producing and coordinating current intelligence related to the national security. Sino-Soviet Bloc
With respect to political intelligence on the Soviet Bloc, we continue to benefit from the relatively more open atmosphere in the post-Stalin USSR and the greater accessibility of Soviet personalities at all levels. These developments provide us with a. broader basis for inference as to the course of events and elements of change within the Bloc, though generally speaking
the field of military intelligence, we obtained additional infor -mation on Soviet military research and development,!
| Our military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc continues to be adequate to support broad assessments of
The comparatively large flow of political intelligence on Free World countries continued. Somewhat greater emphasis was placed ontrends in public opinion and their impact on the attitudes and policies of Free World governments. Intelligence on Soviet Bloc activities in Latin America is improving gradually but must be developed further, as must our knowledge of activities of the local military and of labor and student organizations. Our political intelligence on the Middle East continued toatisfactory basis for the assessment of longer range trends and to serveramework for current
reporting. However, the fluidity and complexity of local political developments, as well as the many external factors affecting the
volatile Middle East situation, appear likely to place increasing de-
for intelligence information and analyses on this area. In Africa, extension of our foreign service representation should enlarge the volume of the steadily increasing but not yet adequate flow of political and sociological intelligence. Political intelligence on non-Bloc countries in the Far East generally met
in the Far East was also generally adequate to meet normal However, military intelligence coverage of the Middle East became increasingly difficult in aome areas. Reporting of military information on Africa needs to be broadened, especially in tho light of thc rapid emergence of nationalist movements which are subject to exploitation by the USSR.
We again revised our list of Priority National Intelligencecontinued to emphasize Sino-Soviet strategy, intentions andto the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority wasto Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack; defenseattack by aircraft or missiles; and capabilities, intentionsrelating to the utilization and control of space. The newProblems Committee was established to facilitateof the intelligence community on critical collectionits first assignment, the CCPC examined our total collection effortguided missile
We took advantage of collection opportunities which arose (both in the overt and clandestine fields)esult of our increasedin certain areas, further relaxation of travel and othercontrols by the USSR and Satellites, intensified East-West exchange activities, greater availability of certain types of Blocthird nation agent operations and extensive liaison arrangements with foreign intelligence services. Significant gains also resulted from our improved technical collection techniques and the intensified efforts of our attaches.
Nevertheless, there are important deficiencies in our collection capabilities, particularly with respect to obtaining certain critical types of intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We continue to be hampered by severe security restrictions in most Bloc areas; high-levelof Bloc governments remain extremely difficult; and much urgently needed technical data on matters such as new weapons systems probably can be obtained only through further development of highly specialised collection techniques* Recurring crisis situations in different areas of the world will probably continue to place increasing demands forin the quantity and quality of our political and economic intelligence. In addition, we need to develop new technical collection methods and expand our clandestine efforts to make significant progress toward closing many important gaps in our military and scientific and technical information. Moreover, in order to realise the maximum collection potential from our service attache system we should increase our attache representation and coverage, particularly in manyareas of the world where the attaches arepecial position to obtain significant general intelligence not readily obtainable from other sources. In brief, we can expect steadily to improve ourOriginal document.