6 September b'
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
THE OUTLOOK IN POLAND
OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
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THE OUTLOOK IN POLAND
To assess the current situation and probable trends in Poland, with specialon regime stability, economic prospects and relations with the* USSR.
he Gomulkain Poland hasnique posiUon within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is considerably more independent ofcontrol than any other satelliteMany of itsn agriculture, church-state affairs, andwith the Westdepart inways from the pattern Imposed elsewhere by the Soviets.
In general, however, departures from the Bloc norm have gradually become less pronounced during the past year or so, partlyesult of the Polish regime's efforts to stabilize its internal position and partly in response to Soviet pressures for greater conformity. We expect this trendore orthodox position to continue in the foreseeable future, but we believe the present leadership isnot to return to Stalinism or to full satellite status.
We believe that the Soviet Union will almost certainly maintain or increase its efforts to reduce or eliminate thefeatures of the Polish experiment.
But, since Gomulka would almostcombat extreme pressures and would have the support of Uie Polishin doing so, we think that the Soviet approach will be cautious. If moderate pressure proves ineffective, however, Uie USSR might work for Gomulka's ouster. Even in this case, we Uiink Uiat Uiewould resort to military intervention only if developments In Poland were likely to Jeopardize the political or militaryof the Bloc.
nternally, the Gomulka regime has been steadily improving its posiUon.control of the Partythough not completely assuredhas increased and the Party's control of Uie people has improved. Nevertheless, threats to the stability of the regime continue and are clearly apparent in such fields as church-state relations. However, despite theanti-communism of thewe thinkopularis unlikely; underlying allin the public mind is the feeling that the Gomulka regime is preferable to any feasible alternatives.
conomically, the regime bus made perceptiblethough unevenprogress and we do notrisis is imminent Nevertheless, major economic problems,ow standard of living, an unbalanced industrial structure,eficit in foreign trade accounts, willto threaten stability for thefuture. The regime will probably continue to look for realistic rather than strictly doctrinaire answers to these
e believe Uiat,esult of bothand mtexnal pressures, Poland will find it more difficult to diverge from the Bloc line in its relations with tbe West Nevertheless, within the limits imposed by its Communist convictions and its membership in the Bloc, the Polishwill probably attempt to foster an improvement in East-West relations, to expand its economic contacts with the West, and to maintain some freedom of action in the conduct of its foreign affairs generally.
Since its establishment Inn the face of opposition from Uie USSR, Uie present regime in Poland hasnique position within Uie Sino-Soviet Bloc. Its domestic programs under Party FirstWladyslaw Gomulka are characterized by an approach more flexible than roundin Uie Bloc and. If only by Uie same comparison, are more enlightened In terms of individual welfare and adherence to legality. Gomulka and his supporters are stronglyby their Polish heritage and aware of Polish sensitivities. For purely pragmatic reasons ihey also welcome contiolled but widespread contacts with Uie West, and In order to facilitate their own development and to minimize Soviet pressures, they genuinelyolicy of peaceful coexistence.
Soviet policy has adhered by and large to the critical decision of6 not to intervene overtly against Uie reformingin the Polish Party. But the Soviet leadership has evidently viewed developments In Poland with an uneasy and watchful sufferance. There have been scarcely-veiled warnings and pressuresoo marked deviation from Uie Ideology and policieselsewhere in Uie Bloc. The Soviet-Polish relationship clearly continues to be marked by some degree of tension and
Thc Gomulka regime initiallyide measure of popular support, basedon its repudiation oftalinistits defiance of Soviet control, and its promises to Improve living standards.the past year or so, however, popularhas clearly diminished as unrealisticexpectations of an Immediate and marked rise in the standard of living have not been met and as the measures and policies actually undertaken by Uie regime have revealed its continuing adherence to Communism.to Gomuika's policies and general atU-tudeedication to the goalsenuine allegiance to thc conceptocialist camp. These tenets run contrary lo thc anti-Russian andfeelings of the Polish population.
The Gomulka regime, while It does not appear to be In immediate danger, thusto face two Important sourceson-conformist Bloc country, Poland isrecarious relationship with Uie USSR so long as the latter Insists ona high degree of uniformity In BlocFurther,ommunist regime. It ishaky position with respect lo Uie Polish people. Thus, while attempting to improve tbe performance of Uie Polish economy and to transform Uie stateorking model of modern Marxism. Uie regime must also
some balance between the mutuallydemands of the USSR for Blocand of the Polish peoplereer and better life.
INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS Intro-Party Situation
When Gomulka became leader of theparty ine was faced with strong opposition from elements essentially hostile to his "liberalism" or to hisor to both. The hard core of suchconsisting of tho Soviet-oriented "Natolin" faction, sought to disrupt hisand to remove him from high office. Inarge (but somewhat nebulous) segment of the party, particularly within the central apparatus and in provincialremained uncommitted or was actively hostile. The members of this group feared that the power, prestige, and security of the Party and of themselves personally would be Jeopardized by the Gomulka program. Even the party members who helped bringto power for the most part supported himompromise candidate and as asymbol. Gomulka, withmall personal following, thus found himself at the headarty of doubtful loyalty which had, moreover. lost virtually all of Its Influence and much of its control over the people.
Since the parliamentary electionsomulka has devoted great efforts to building his position within thc party and restoring the party's authority over the people. This campaign has met with limited success. He has isolated or purged some of his most violent Natolin opponents, has silenced the most outspoken liberalsnd has improved his control over the apparatus. Active opposition to Gomulka within the party now appears to be sporadic and confinedinority pro-Soviet element at upper and medium levels and to those in localwho have lost place nnd power. The majority of party members and leaders are probably lo some degree antl-Russlan andto Soviet domination.
Gomulka's position lsnow seriously threatenedivalby imminent organizationalposiUon Is not completely assured.unqualified support of Gomulka Isconfinedmall minority of themembership. While almost all of theare presently committed tohas few completely reliabletop party organs. Stalinist opponentsCentral Committee appear to compriseone-fourth of the total, while theofman body appears to be mademiddle-of-the-roaders wire supportore or less conditional basis.among thc party rank and flic Isdespite the recent "verification"which weeded outfinactive or corrupt members, suchremain. At provincial levels,functionaries appear to acquiescemore militant, moreGomulka and thehisbe won over if the parly Is ever tooperational strength. Despite allhowever, the vast majority ofsees no acceptable alternative toleadership.
Sincehe Polish regime has moved openly toward tougher InternalAmong other Indications ofrend have been thc virtual deathblow dealt the powers of the workers councils, the tightening of conirol over press and publishing, the broadening campaign against liberaland Journalists, restrictions in certain contacts with the West, the gradualstrengthening of the secret police, the Increasing stress on Party control, and the growing official emphasis on Poland's lies with the "socialist camp."
Most recenUy, the regime has stiffened Its attitude loward the Roman CaUiollc Church, moving wlUi iorce against allegedly illegal Church activities andressagainst Church policies. This appears at least In part to have been caused byof thc Church to expand its influ-
and to gain new concessions from the state. The government has apparentlywithin the letter of the6 Church-Slate agreement and has reavowed Its Intention to continue to do so.
these developmentsoreInternal policy, but we do notthey signify asasic change inprogram Nor do theyapitulation toMost of these moves seem toin additionasicallythe regime's attempt toeffective control of Polish life, itscheck both liberal and Stalinistefforts to deal with pressingand its attempt to reduceof friction between itself and theregime has continued to reassert Itsthe most significant aspects of Itsthe voluntary and gradualof agriculture, the emphasis oncoexistence with the Church, anddetermination to follow aPolish road to socialism. Thehave occurred have been limited loof Internal policy in which thea matter of expediency, hadln to strong popular pressures.workers councils, for example,tolerated because their existencefait accomplithe result ofactionand fostering themdangerous, at the time, than wouldany attempt to subdue them.
Since Gomulka's accession to power.economic policy has been freed of certain elements of Marxist dogma and has been considerably less responsive than before to direct Sovicl influence. This has resulted in more realistic planning, Increased attention to consumer welfare, and growing concern with efficiency in thc allocation of resourcesdevelopments unaffected by the hardening of the regime's poiilical attitude.
These changes in policy, combined with the establishment of more equitable andrelations with thc Soviet Dice and the
improvement In relations with the West, have enabled the Polish economy to makeprogress sinceotable improvement in food producUon andignificant rise in rural incomes and morale, Increasedof raw materials,heckingerious lnilalfonary trend. Thus the regime appears to have coped with Its most serious and immediate problems and to have laid some foundations for future advancement. But progress has been uneven, and hasarge degree been made possible by foreign credits. There hasairly rapid growth in industrialabout seven or eight percent per yearumber of important commodity goals have not been met. There has been anin the standard of living, but It has been Inadequate to satisfy the expectations of the Polish people. Labor discipline remains bad, worker productivity low. Other problems still to be solvedesperate and worsening shortage ofow level of worker real income, an unbalanced industrial structure,eficit in foreign trade accounts.
Foreign Trade. The Imbalance intrade accounts will probably be thc most difficult economic problem facing the country duringeriod. In tho absence of new foreignts solution will require an increase In exports of goods and services of about one-third, even if imports remain at7 level. If Imports riseas isthe necessary increase in exports will be even greater.
The existing structure of production and demand in Poland makes thc balancing of foreign trade especially difficult. Exports of coal, normally Poland's most profitable cx-
' Lone, and medium lerm credits obtained by Poland from6 to9 amounted to4 million, of which0 million was utilized to finance Ihc deficit on current account6 percent of the credits came from Western sources, andercent from Uie Soviet Bloc. Short-Urmcredits of some SM million wcrofrom Western Europe in addlUon. the Soviet Union cancelled Poland's exUUng In-debtcdrteu of0 million and increased payment* for Ui* use of Polish railways.
probably cannot be raisedore8illion metricear, compared to aboutillion tons. Domestic requirements are growing, whileln thc coal Industry has beento provide for both domestic andneeds. Furthermore, foreign demand has fallenachinery exports have beenrapidly and great reliance Is being placed on them for the, but, the net gain of foreign exchange frommachinery is only moderate since the machine building Industry has large import requirements. Poland Lt thus forced by short-run exigencies to export products which,more normal conditions, would be among the least profitable. This, in turn, compounds the difficulty ofalance intrade.
Machinery export goals, tripled5ill probably be at least approachedesult of the recent Polish-Soviet trade agreement (which underwrites half of these exports) and agreements with other Bloc countries. This will case the Polish trading position with the Bloc but will not overcome the foreign exchange shortage with non-Bloc countries. Some further alleviation may be obtained through Increased exports of basic chemicals and from an Increase in receipts from the Polish merchant marine, fromand remittances, and from transiton Polish railways. But the consumer is likely toonsiderable part of Uie burden of Uie foreign exchange shortage; his standard of living will not improve at the rate of Uie past two years.
Dependence on the USSR. Theof the Stalinist period and the goals of the Communist party for economictend to maintain Polish economicon the USSR- The Bloc is ansource of supply of materials forheavy industry, of liquid fuels, and of machinery and parts. It is also the major market for Polish exports of machinery. The share of the West in Polish foreign trade has been Increased fromercent4 toercent7 and tlie Poles arc clearlystrong attempts to diversify their foreign
markets and sources of supply. But thegovernment considers most of Poland's trade with Uie Bloc to be profitable as well as vital to Uie achievement of presentgoals. The trade agreementswith nearly all Soviet Bloc countries for Uieppear to stabilize Uie Bloc's share of Polish foreign trade7 level. Moreover, the decline in West European demand for certainPolish exports (especially coal and meat) and the exhaustion of most sources of Western credits, make an expansion of Polish trade with Uie West'extremely difflcult.
Despite dependence on the USSR, aor complete bloc embargo on trade with Poland would not cause the Polish economy to collapse. At first. Poland would suffer large losses, including severe unemployment In some industries, and, owing to Poland's low standard of living,oderatein the availability of consumer goods would be keenly felt by the Polish population. However, supplies of essential consumer goods would be reduced only moderately because Poland Is nearly self-sufficient in foods andarge share of Its Imports offor light Industry from the West.ifarge amount of Western aid loeadjustment, Uie Polish economy could be reoriented to Uie West, though weit very unlikely Uiat Uie USSR would allowe-oricntationto occur.
A Soviet embargo wouldrofound effect on Polish military forces, which are heavily dependent on thc USSR for arms,and equipment. Tlie Polish munitions industry is still small, although it hasconsiderablyt produces the post-war4 medium tank,World War II artillery ranging fromm up to andm guns or gun howitzers, light trucks, Uie new Soviet small arms, ammunition and spare parts. ProducUon of these items is sufficient forrequirements. Thc army, however. Is still dependent on the USSR for heavy artillery, heavy tanks, and specialized equipment. The Polish air force is even more dependent on thc USSR Polish aircraft production Is Urn-
ilea to the obsolescent Soviet FRESCOoonthand theight helicopter; this producUon could not be sustained for moreays without the Import of raw materials, components and parts from the Bloc. In addition. Uie air force relies on Uie Bloc for Its POL, Including jet fuel. Thc Polish navy depends on the USSR for much of its equipment and supply and all ships larger than minesweepers. The extent of Polish military stockpiling Islt is doubtful, however, that the USSRparticularly after the Hungarianhas allowed major accumulations of military supplies from Soviet sources.
Populor Standing of Regime
he limited success Gomulka has had in consolidating his Party position has been achieved at the cost of losing some of thche once enjoyed among the population at large. Forced by the weakness of his party to rely on popular good will as Uie mainstay of his regime during Uie winter. Gomulka was sustained by Polish nationalism and political realism. But even whenUie "patriot" enjoyed naUonwideGomulka the Communist wasonly as Uie bestad lot. Now, in part because of belief that the regime Isto Soviet pressures and isore orthodox Communist stance, both apathy and hostility arc growing among Uie people. Many formerly pro-Gomulka Party Intellectuals, for example, have retreatedon-cooperaUve silence. They had Initially hopedradual evolution ln Polanda more or less Western European form of social democracy; now Uiat their freedom has been curtailed, they view Gomulka with fewer Illusions. Even more Important in terms of the regime's stability has been its failure significantly to ameliorate economic conditions. Particularly among the workers Uie inability of Uie regime toapid rise in living standards is responsible for growing disillusionment; alcoholism,lawlessness, and absenteeism remain major problems. The peasants, who have gained Uie most from Gomuika's policies,to approve of the regime's agricultural
policies, but their traditional suspicions,conservatism, and religiouspreclude the development of any staunch support.
espite continued economic difficulties, and the growth of popular disappointment, and even hostility, there have been few overt expressions of dissidence and the frequency of these has been decreasing. The people appear to be held in check primarily by inertia, fear of reprisal, lack of clear orobjectives, Uie regime's continuedof relatively free Church activity, and the possibility of Soviet Intervention in the event things got out of hand. Underlying allis Uie feeling Uiat though far from perfect, and perhaps moving in thc wrong direction, Gomulka continues to offer some hope and is preferable to the only discernibleore Soviet-oriented regime.
e believe Uie Polish armed forces are in general loyal to Uie Gomulka regime, arc more Polish than "Satellite" In spirit, and arc strongly anti-Soviet in attitude at Uie rank and file level. However, some of Uie senior officers in Uie higher command echelons are probably pro-Soviet. Relations with thehigh command now appear to be close and Uie USSR continues to supply and equip the Polish military establishment. But there are undoubtedly mutual suspicions between thc two. It is almost certain. Uiat there has been no resumpUon of the degree ofcharacteristic of Uie period when Soviet Marshal Konstantln Rokossovsky was Polish Minister of Defense.
e believeudden and major change in Poland's relations with Uie Soviet UnionGomulka regime will probably be able to survive Uie manifoldthreats to Its position. We do anUel-pate,ore or less chronic state of Instability within the Party and in thcrelations with Uie people. We do not foresee any moves which will enable GomuUta toully loyal and effective Party or to gain other than conditional acceptance from the public. And, given Ihis state of in-
we anticipate occasional flare-ups In the public temper, including scattered strikes and possibly riots. Spontaneous violencecale sufficient to Jeopardize the regime's position, although unlikely during the next few years, cannot be excludedossibility. It could result from reactions to individual acis of thc regime, much as serious riots in Warsaw resulted from the banning of the journal Po Prostu announced int could also result from reactions to anof events and policies, suchajor deterioration ln the standard of livinglear retrogression toward Soviet-style Communism.
Given the nature of much of his Partyegal ouster ofby vote of the Central Committeeis, while not likely, possible under certain circumstances. If, for example, major economic failuresa crisis, or if the USSR presented the regime with some form of ultimatum, theCommittee might decide on Gomulka's ouster. Any successor likely to appear in such circumstances would probably move in the direction of further restrictions on personal liberty, internal programs more In conformity with those approved elsewhere in the Bloc, and closer dependence on the support and guidance of the Soviet Party. In the event of Gomulka's death, there are others who would try to carry on his regime. They might succeed In doing so, but there would piobably be greatly increased pressures from thcwing of the party, opposite pressures from the general public, and possibly newby the USSR to reassert control.
In its domestic policies, the regime'sto restore Party supremacy will continue. The Party will almost certainly continue its efforts to improve its control of non-Party organizations. Greater officialwill probably be placed on the need for agricultural socialization, but wc do not expect any important changes in agricultural policies. The regime will probably continue lo prefer legal methods of rule and willfrom terror tactics exceptastbut it will almost certainly not hesitate
to use 'administrative" measures in cases where milder tactics have failed. Toleration of certain aberrations, such as the right of Catholic deputies In the parliament tofreely, will be continued only so long as such practices do not receive great publicity and do not jeopardize basic policy.
The Church-state conflict will almostcontinue and the regime Ls likely to step up Its efforts to delimit the Church'sand activities. But while recurring crises are probable, both sides appear tothe need for the presentmodus Vivendi. The regime will probably not return to brutal persecution, and will certainly seek to avoid any measures so intense as seriously to risk extensive popular disturbances.
It is also our conclusion that the Gomulka regime will probably try to maintain Itscourseew political andmodel. Within the trendtrengthening of Party dominance andat least exterior orthodoxy, the regime will probably seek to be relatively moderate in its dealings with the people and will continue to look for realistic rather than strictlyanswers to its economic problems.
The success of such an experiment,is not as yet assured. Even aside from Soviet pressures for greater conformity, there are internal reasons why the regime might be tempted to abandon moderation andAn inability to cope with economic problems through other thanmeasures, for example, might leadronounced stiffening in the over-all line. If there are more strikes or more protestin the univcrsIUes, the regime, to keep control, would probably react with theforce. This, in turn, would furtherpublic opinionalready made suspicious by the trend of recent eventsstrengthen thc Stalinists and the conservatives, and.persuade even the sincere devotees of "socialist legality" that their policy wasunrealistic. In short, it is possible that the only way the Party in Poland can ultimately retain its supremacyostile environment is through recourse to force.
there may neverull return tohe behavior ot the regime In Poland could, under these circumstance*,different only In degree from theof the hard-line regimes in the other Satellites. In these circumstances, it islhat Gomulka would resign or be forced from office.
Economic Outlook. We believe thateconomic situation is likely to remain severely strained during the next few years. Weecline ln the availability of foreign credits, growing investmentIn most economic sectors, and little Increase in personal consumption. Inbecause of the difficulty of increasing coal exports and the competition of domestic demand for consumer goods and construction materials, we doubt that the regime will be able to expand exports sufficiently toalance on foreign transactions in goods and services, eveninally, sincerales of increase In agriculturalwere in part the result of exceptionally good weather, they are unlikely to beeven though we expect liberalpolicies to leadontinued growth In average annual outputs.
Considerable opportunities exist toefficiency in the allocation andof resources outside agriculture. Tne government Is reducing the scope of central planning and increasing the degree ofallowed producers, and lt Intends toUie price and distribution system. But these measures are being introduced slowly and arc unlikely to have much effect In the next year or two.
In general, we believe Uiat economicand the troubles they cause in terms of Uie regime's relations with the people, willey problem for the regime.within the party over both specific measures and thc general trend ln economic policies is also unlikely to be resolved. But wcontinuation of Gomuika'sprogram for reform and, on balance,that Uie regime will be able toajor economic crisis.
RELATIONS WITH THE USSR
he uneasy state of relations betweenand Uie USSR following the PolishRevolution" was calmed in Uie spring7 when the two parties apparentlytheir differences. In exchange for Polish promises to adhere to certain "basic laws of socialism" (later codified at Uie Bloc conference ln Moscow In, the Soviets apparenUy decided to tolerate Uieexperimentonsequence, the Poles sought to avoid or muffle any majorwith the USSR and Uie Soviets withdrew at least their open support'of Gomuika'sat home. In public utterances, both sides reavowed their "unshakeable friendship" and relations in general appeared to besatisfactory.
Thc regime's desire to reach anwith Uie USSR was not based only on its fear of possible Soviet reprisals and its exposed geopolitical position. There Is aidenUty of interests between Poland and the USSR on some key areas of foreign policy, especially on West German rearmament. The status of the Odcr-Ncisxc frontier colorsentire international ouUook; so long as the USSR is Uie only great power tothe permanency of the Oder-Neisse. Warsaw will consider thai ii has good reason tolose alliance with Moscow. The possession of thc Western provinces thus limits the Polish freedom of maneuverFast and West Apart from matters of Realpolitik. thereasic Ideological agreement between the Polish and SovietThe Polish regime is sincerely loyal to the conceptocialist camp, though it would certainly welcome changes within the Bloc structure, and, fundamentally, theCommunist party depends on Soviet power for its own survival.
Soviet Pressure. Moscow has embarkedigorous campaign lo strengthen Bloc unity and to eliminate the "revisionist"Steps undertaken in the course of this campaignsuch as the attempt to solidify CEMA, the establishmentewCommunist journal, Uie break with Yugoslavia, and the execution of Imre Nagy
have had pointed Implications for theParty, which Is clearly regarded as Infected withn addition, the USSR has criticized some aspects of Poland's interna! situation, including agricultural decollectivi-zatlon, but in general It has done so indirectly and by Implication, and apparently has re-frabicd from exerting much pressure on these points.
reaction to Soviet pressuresconciliatory. But while Polandon issues such as YugoslaviaNagy execution, It did not adopt thein full. Similarly, the Poles haveto stress their affiliation with thethan their individual road toIhey continue to refer to the USSR"first" or "central" and "moststate, rather than to adopt theline followed elsewhere that it"leader of the socialist camp."
The precise nature of the Soviet pressures which may be used against Polishcannot be forecast with any degree of certainty. They could range from gradual, indirect, and only mildly compelling measures to direct action. Including even militaryWc believe that lhe SovieU would resort to the latter extreme only if theythat developments in Poland were likely to Jeopardize the political or military security of the Bloc. Moscow may for the present view Gomulka as the best man to insure internal Polish stability. Further, it probably believes that tlie trend in Poland is already In the Soviel-desired direction, and may expect some acceleration of this trend to result from possible Western moves, such as the withdrawal of US aid or theof atomic arms by West Germany. We tliusow-keyed Soviet approachlouccession of Polish retreats on several issues and aimed at reducing or eliminating the distinctive features of the Polish experiment.
We believe that Polish efforts toa workable agreement with thc USSR and lo steer clear of crises in that relation-
ship will continue In the foreseeable future to be one of the regime's key policies. Thereide area, particularly in the field of foreign policy, in which the Polish Party would probably be willing, if necessary, to defer to Moscow's wishes. Gomulka mightfor the sake of Bloc unityIn campaigns or actions of which he would not otherwiseHe might also under certaindiminish his friendly contacts with thc West if he believed that by so doing he could avoid Jeopardizing his own powerand the Polish Partjt's Independence of Soviet control.
oviet demand that the Poles give up US aid appears unlikely in the near future. Moscow could makeove at anye believe that the regime would probably give in loemand,if Moscow were willing to make up whatever losses the Polish economy would Incur. Publicly, the regime would probably attempt to Justify such an action by alleging US provocation. Privately, the regime could console itself by the contention thaton this issuo need not impair lis internal independence.
The Polish regime would be most likely to stand up to Soviet pressures If II felt that lis own organizational autonomy werejeopardized. Thus, if Soviet movesto be designed to-reassert Moscow's control over party organizational matters, such as the composition of top party organs, we would expect the regime to resist. We would also anticipate resistance to Sovietfor immediate major changes in key internal policiesthose that form the identi-fymg features of lhc Polish road lo socialism.
' Khrushchev appealed to condemn all American Satellites In hu blast* at theBut he himself has asked lortrade credit* and in mid-July he, in effect,tlie Polish policy by statlne, that "we do not sec anything bad" In "capitalist credits" to socialist stales "marching In lUp with all socialisto some extent.thus seems to be using the USever lo use against the Poles.the aid desired by Warsaw can continue,U> Khrushchev, only so long an Uie Polishis faithful to Uie Soviets.
such as gradualism in agricultural
Should Polish-Soviet relationsrisis stagebecause of Polish resistance to Soviet pressuresoviet ultimatumthe Poles would clearly be operating at aThe USSR has at Its disposal and inariety of poliUcal andweaponssuch as subversion andwhich could be used to great effect against Warsaw. And, of course, if resort to non-violent methods proved frutUess, Uie USSR could Intervene with force.
There are drawbacks for Uie Soviet Union, however, in any major effort to coerce Poland-It is doubtful, for example. Uiatdespite the questionable loyalty of some elements of Uie Polish secret police and the existence of pro-Soviet elements within the Polish PartyUie Soviet leaders could estimate thataction against the Polish regime would succeed. Nor could they conclude Uiat aof trade and aid would necessarily mean an immediate collapse of the Polish economy. In fact, large-scale economicagainst the Poles would probably be effective only if Uie resulting shift of Poland's economic orientation to the West wereby thc threat of military force. There would be personal suffering and majorin the economy in the eventloc economic blockade, but. In thesepopular support of Uie regime would probably increase.
It is our beliefoviet military campaign against Poland wouldtf opposed by the regimemeet stiff, albeit relatively short-lived, resistance from thc Polish armed forces.olish regime asked for Soviet miliiary assistance to maintain Itself In Uie faceopular Insurrection, the Polishwould probably be divided In itsand organized resistance to thewould not be possible. In either of thc above contingencies, however, individuals and small units would conUnue harassingfor as long as possible.
In sum, we believe that the USSR, because of the many disadvantages and uncertainties involved In direct action, will seek to gain
greater Polish conformity through gradual means raUier than through extreme pressures. We also think Uiat Uie Soviets continue to estimate that the Gomulka regime willat least to the minimum degree required by Moscow, and that, therefore. Uie USSR will prefer to work through Uie Gomulka regime rather than attempt to effect Its ouster. But because we cannot Judge with certainty thc precise nature of Soviet pressures and Polish reacUon to them, we are unable to rule out the possibility Uiat Soviet-Polish relations might at some stage develop, into an open crisis.
RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC AND YUGOSLAVIA
he Satellites. Polish policies toward the remainder ol the Soviet Bloc do not appear to differ materially from the prescribed norm. "Friendly socialist relations" arc maintained with few visible strains. Probably In partesult of Soviet pressure. Gomulka has gone out of his way to reassure the other Satellites of his loyalty to socialism and has carefully avoided any "missionary" work in other Bloc states. But, beneath the surface, there iscertainly some lingering degree ofor animosity between Poland and some of Uie other Bloc states. Privately, someofficials barely conceal their distaste for Czech and East German Stalinism andand until Uie spring of Uus year Uie regime maintained an obviously coldtoward the party and government in Hungary. We believe, however, thatefforts to maintain correct relations with other Bloc states will continue.reaction will be prc-detcrmincd by the general Soviet policy.
ommunist China. Polish relations with Communist China are also correct andconform to Uie Bloc-wide pattern. But Warsaw's onetime optimism, its belief lhat the Chinese party was an ideological brother-in-arms, has disintegrated as aof Uie increasingly hard-line attitude of Peiping. Thus the once cordial feelings of the Polish regime have been replaced byand wariness. Althoughtrade ties are not likely to be affected.
Poland, in our belief, will continue to resent what it interprets aa Peiping's switch inThe attempt to develop specialrelations with Communist China hasbeen abandoned and Is not likely to be resumed in Uie forsceable future on theof either party. Communist China can be expected to go along wllh any heightened pressures against Poland and, indeed, mightajor role (as It has against Belgrade) in any such campaign.
Yugoslavia. Once hopeful of expanding economic and pollUcal tics with Yugoslavia. Poland has been forced by the Bloc'sof Titoifficult posiUon. Warsaw has not Joined Uie Bloc campaign with any enthusiasm and has to date avoided making many of thc harsher statements now standard in other Bloc capitals. Furthermore, It has not reduced in any way Its efforts to maintain close contact with Yugoslavia through exchange delegations, cultural ties, and economic relations. Nevertheless. Uie Gomulka regime has condemned certainof Yugoslav ideology and has branded Uie Yugoslav Party as solely responsible for the current state of tension. While UieIs probably sincere, the charge that only Yugoslavia is guilty was made largelyesult of Gomulka's interest in Bloc
We believe that Warsaw will doit deems feasible to keep relations with Yugoslavia friendly and we expect Poland to continue to drag its feet In thccampaign. But, In the event that Uie USSR takes further steps against Yugoslavia, suchreak In trade relations, andUiat Uie Bloc follow suit, we think it probable that Uie Gomulka regime wouldalbeit reluctantly.
REIATIONS WITH THE WEST
policy toward the West is basedsame doctrinal foundations as Uiat ofUnion and all other members ofBloc. These foundationsand Include the conceptInevitable triumph or Communism.Polish policy is far more often than not
a witting instrument of Uie USSR. Even proposals apparenUy InlUated by Warsaw for its own purposes, such as tha Rapacki Plan, coincide with Soviet policies.
In certain respects, however, the Polish regime has developed Innique line. This was more pronounced ln6 era, butfrom Bloc practice still exist. The Polish policy of permitting relaUvely free ties with the West on both an official and private level, although ostensibly ln accord with Uie USSR's own program, far surpasses anything followed elsewhere In the Bloc. For example, Poland is pressing for admission to suchinstitutions as Uie International Bank and Fund and Uie General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. Even more important are the suspension of Jamming of broadcasts from Uie West and the receipt of economic aid from Uie US, developments which have no Bloc parallels.
Despite some signs of Soviet concern, the Polish regime has continued to press for American economic aid. While we doontinuation of this aid at roughly present5 million7illionrincipally in commodity credits) will basically alter either Uie Polish economy or Uie political convictions of Uie Polish leaders, it is valuable to Uie regime in its relations with the USSR and its ownas well as useful economically.* Were
large exlaUng reserves of grain are due In large part lo the two recent US loans to that country. These reserves wereon-tribuUng larlor In the government's decision to reduce compulsory deliveries ot grain by one-third and, If supplemented by addlUonal US grain shipments, may leadnal ehmlna-uon of compulsory deliveries. Reduced compulsory deliveries, in torn, freed larger amounts of grain for use as feed and thereby helped to improve meat and milkImports of other consumer goods went directly Into consumption or were used primarily to replenish depleted stocks. The two principal functionsossible fuiure US credit towould be. Ill lo raise availabilities olconsumer goods (Iclothing from Imported cotton and wool, shoes from Imported raw hides,o hasten the development of the (footnote continued on following page)
US aid discontinued. Poland would almost certainly drill closer toove would probably strengthen the hands of Party elements ln Poland who oppose Gomulka and his program; wouldPolish chances to use its economic ties with the USargaining point with the Soviet Union; would probably prevent theof some Polish plansradualist approach tond would damage, if not destroy the hopes in other Satellites, whatever their extent, of eventually going the road of Poland.
here appear to be four principal reasons for the Polish regime's departures from the Bloc line on foreignhe symbolic value of even modest divergencies from the Bloc line In terms of the regime's relations with the Polishts apparentlydesire for International detente, which is, ineflection of the conviction that heightened East-West tension perforcethe regime's ability toegree ofts view of the Westource of economic and technical aid and, possibly,ever to be used against the USSR In certain situations;tswith national interestopposed to Bloc Interest -and its unique ability to date to further such interests. Underlying these factorseneral altitude within thewhich is more cosmopolitan and less xenophobic than that characteristic of
(footnote continued) Ulht *cd food Industrie* Tbe need foe addi-Uonal consumer goods will become particularly acute when compulsory deliveries Inare abolished. Possibly evenone-run itandpolnt would be the purchase of US or Weil European machinery and equipment for which adequate substitutes cannot be found in Poland or In other Bloc countries. Bottleneck* in food processing and leaUles could theieby be avoided and Lhc mod-ernliaUon of these industries hastened.
espite sentiments on both sides for closer contacts, Polish-West German relations are currently confined at the official level toaffairs. The problemesumption of diplomatic relations between the twois thwarted by sensitivities regarding the recognition of East Germany and the question of the Oder-Neisse line. The question lscomplicated by Polish concern overhostile Soviet reactions to theof any especially close Polish-Westties. These factors, combined withanimosities between thc two peoples, have led to an impasse which is not likely to be resolved ln the near future except through West German Initiative andto accept Polish terms.
lthough the Gomulka regime wfllcontinue to seek to retain some freedom of action in Its conduct of foreign affairs, we believe that lt will become more and more difficult for ll to do co. Pressures fororiginating from the Bloc and from within Poland itself will probably increasingly circumscribe such efforts. esult of the Soviet posilionand perhaps of specific Sovietregime has already aligned its international posture more closely with that of the Bloc and Is likely toto do so. It Ls becoming somewhat more difficultrivate _Polish citizen to maintain close contacts with the West esult of increasing concern over Western press accounts which stress Polish differences with thc USSR, the regime has stiffened in its attitude toward Western newsmen. on this score could eventually lead to severe restrictions on foreign correspondents and fear of the consequences of Western broadcasts concerning such issues as the Church-state conflict could result in aof radio jamming.Original document.