SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES (EXCLUDES ANNEXES B &

Created: 8/19/1958

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-TOP SECRET

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER

^Supersedes,7 and portions of)

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES

CIA HISTORICAL REViBV PROGPJiM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

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TOP (IE CRET' TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE

SUMMARY AND

SIMPLIFIED TABULAR

K DEFENSE MISSILE

The Threat and Soviet

Development Capabilities and

Surface-to-Air

Air-to-Air

Factors Affecting Operational

II AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

Soviet

Development Capabilities and

Factors Affecting Operational

III. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE

Soviet

Factors Affecting Development

Ground-Launched

Development Capabilities and

Factors Affecting Operational

Naval-Launched

Special Problems Affecting Naval-Launched Missile

Capabilities and

IV. SPACE

General Scope of

Factors Affecting Accomplishment of

Capabilities to Accomplish Specific

B-on

TABLE OF CONTENTSContinued ANNEXES

ANNEXTabular Summary. Probable SovietDevelopment Frograms and PossibleDevelopment

ANNEX BSoviet Guided Missile Test Ranges. Testing, andAssociated Activities

(limited distribution under separate cover)

ANNEX CEstimated Nuclear Warhead Capabilities

(limited distribution under separate cover)

TO

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES'

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development of guided missiles and space vehicles, including earth satellites,5 and to analyze factors affecting Soviet operational capabilities in these fields.

FOREWORD

This estimate supersedes, SOVIET CAPABILITIES ANDPROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD,ndHE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM.s well as thosedealing with guided missiles) in. MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND2he new estimate, like its predecessors, is made in the light of our previousthat the USSR does not now intend to initiate general war deliberately and is not now preparing for general war as of any particular future date. It alsothat6 there will be no international agreements on Lhe control of armaments or of outer space.

The estimate is intended primarily to reassess and update our estimates of probable Soviet missile development programs, missile characteristics, and firstcapability dates. Some discussion is provided on factors likely to aflect Soviet acquisition of substantial operational capabilities with missile systems, and Soviet capabilities to place various arbitrarily-selected quantities of ICBMs in operational use are estimated. The reader is cautioned thatfs no longer applicable.

For thc most part, changes in estimated missile characteristics and first operational capability dates result from the accumulation over the past yearonsiderable body of new evidence. Of theissile systems estimated as probably available for operational use8 or earlier, we now have direct evidence on the existence of nine; we also have direct evidence on Soviet development of an ICBM.

Trre-trtle-Bfn-osedOrn-thc trxly Istlaastncd-CONFIDENTIftfc.

comparability with earlier estimates on this subject, thc terminal date chosen for Uils estimate Issame as lhat Of IW predecessor., SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLEIN THE OUIDED MISSILE FIELD,

ECRE?

some of these systems the evidence is extensive, while for others we have onlv limited information relative to characteristics and components. Serious intern gence gaps remain, particularly with respect to the operational status of various systems. Furthermore, we do not have sufficient evidence available on which to base an estimate of the vulnerability of Soviet systems to specific electronic counter measures.

In making this estimateield where positive intelligence remains limited, we have considered the available evidence in the light of estimated Soviet military requirements, known and estimated Soviet capabilities in related fields, and US guided missile experience. The entire study rests upon our belief, nowby evidence,oncerted and continuous Soviet research and development effort in guided missiles was underway

For guided missiles, except where noted otherwise, the operational capability dates given are the earliest years during which we believe missiles could probably have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit, thusa limited capability for operational employment. We estimate that when they first become operational, the missile systems discussed herein will have areliabilityercent, and that improvement will occuror space flight activities, the dates given are thc earliest possible time periods by which we believe each specific accomplishment could be achieved.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Thc USSR has continued to press ahead with its extensive guidedresearch and development, generally along thc lines indicated in our previous estimates.esult of this effort, the USSR now has available for operationalariety of missile systems. Soviet achievements In ballistic missiles have been especially impressive and haveto early successes in the USSR's space flight program. Substantialin developing surface-to-air missile systems has also been achieved.evidence is not sufficient to indicate equal emphasis and similar success in other Soviet missile programs.

'The terra "systemere defined as the percentage of missiles which functiono specifications from missile launching to detonation In the tsigetxcludingprior to launching.

By itself, each of thc guided missile or space programs estimatedutureappears feasible both as to technical achievability and dateHowever, some programs may be slowed or even halted by the competition of other missile or non-missile delivery systems, unforeseen development ordifficulties, rapidity ofchanging military requirements, and/or broad considerations of Soviet national policy. On the otherignificant advance in one or more of the programs might be possiblecientific breakthrough is achieved.

Surface-to-surface missiles. Wcthat the Soviet ballistic missileprogram has emphasizedand simplicity, rather than mlnia-

G RET

or extreme refinement ofSystem mobility appears to haveasic consideration since the early developmental stages. Inlonger-range systems, maximum use has been made of proven components.

4 the USSR has probably had available for operational use ballisticwith maximum ranges ofautical milesjn.. We believe that, depending upon various operational factors, nuclear, high explosive (HE) or chemical (CW)would be used with thesen addition, the USSR probably now hasery short range anti-tank missile equipped with shaped-charge HE warhead.

An extensive Soviet program. ballistic missile is indicatedong series of test firings, averaging about two per monthethat this missile probably became operationaln the basis ofozen test firings over the past year, we estimate that the USSR will also probably have operationalodification of. missile,of. range. Nuclearwould almost certainly be used In both these missiles, although wc do not exclude the possibility of CW use in. missile.

Intercontinental ballistic missileincehe USSR has test fired at least four and possibly six missilesistance ofautical miles. We believe this rep-

* Estimated nuclear rarhead capabilities for those arid other missiles discussed In this estimate arc given Inlimited distribution under separate cover).

resents the development of an ICBMwhich, when first operational, will probably be capable of delivering apayloadaximum range ofith an accuracy (CEP).ystem reliability of aboutercent. By theswill probably be considerablyAt the beginning of the, the CEP could bend could be reduced to. later in the period.

Available evidence is inconclusive as to the designed payload-carrying capacity of the Soviet ICBM, which we haveestimated asounds. Recent evidence and re-analysis maythat the USSR is developing an ICBMound payload.logistical and operational problems are associated with missiles of the sizes necessary tooundsangehese problems' would be greater in the case of the heavier payload. In the light of thiswe estimate that the Soviet ICBM is designed touclear payload ofounds, although thereossibility that it is designed to carryounds.

The USSR will probablyirst operational capability with ten prototype ICBMs at some time duringhe possibility should not behowever, that in the latter part8 the USSR may establish an ICBM capability with missiles comparatively unproven as to accuracy and reliability.

We believe that Soviet planners intend toizeable ICBM operational capability at the earUest practicable date, although we have no direct evidence on

TOP OBGTI-Er^

preparations for ICBMand deployment. We estimate that the USSR has the technical andcapability to produce ICBMs,launching facilities, establishlines and train troopsateto have an operational capabilityCBMss about one year after its first operational capability date. some time, andCBMs' two or at most three years after firstcapability date. some timer at the latest. Thisthat the USSR could achieve ancapability with ten or more, but lessCBMs by the endepending upon when during theyear the first operational capability is achieved.

urface-to-air-missiles. For several years the USSR has had in operationalixed surface-to-air system which we believe is now capable of employment against aircraft at ranges upith greatest effectiveness00 feet. Thisis known to be employedense and costly complex ofites around Moscow; targets of lesser importance will probably be provided with considerably less elaborate surface-to-air missileWc believe the Soviets also have available for operationalurface-to-air missile with similar characteristics, except for improved capability tosmall, supersonic targets. It is probably suitable for employment either with the Moscow system oremi-mobile system.

'These numbers are selected arbitrarily In order to provide some measure of thc Soviet capacity to produce and deploy ICBMs; they do nofan estimate of probable Sovietor stockpiles.

Neither of the above systems is likely to be effective against very low altitude attack. We therefore estimate that the USSR is developing and will probably have in operationurface-to-air systemaximum range of aboutffective at altitudes fromeet to at0 feet. Wethat for improved defense of critical areas, the USSR will probablyurface-to-air system with effectiveness at altitudes upeetaximum range.

We estimate thathe Soviets will probablyirstcapabilityurface-to-air system of limited effectiveness against ICBMs,ystem could possibly have some effectiveness againsturface-to-air system with limitedto counter reconnaissancecould and possibly will be developed for useore sophisticated system could be integrated with an anti-ballistic missile systemater date.

Air-to-air missiles. Three short-range systems which employ HEare now estimated as operational. Two are believed to have radar guidance with rangeshe other,ange of up tos believed to use infrared guidance. Most currently operational Soviet fighter aircraft types could be modified to employ0 thc USSR will probably have. air-to-air missile.

Air-to-surface missiles. The present operational system is capable ofuclear or HE warhead at subsonic speedange of about. against well-defined targets, such as ships. With dif-

5

guidance, the system could beagainst land targets. Wcthat the USSR is probablyand may now have operational an air-launched decoy to simulate medium or heavy bombers. We believe that the USSR will probably develop andupersonicwith improved guidanceange of atuitableide variety of targets.

Naval-launched missiles. The Soviet navy probably now has the capability to launch subsonic cruise-type missilesew converted submarines ofdesign, although there is littleevidence of submarine-launcheddevelopment in the USSR. Wcthat the current system couldnuclear warheads against land tax-gets within. of thesubmarine. These cruise-typecould be launchedubmarine only after surfacing. We believe,thathe USSR will probablyubmarine-launchedmissile system available for firstuserototype submarine of new design. This system will probably be capable ofuclear warheadubmerged submarineange of.

We estimate thathe USSR will begin equipping itsfleet with surface-to-air missilesaximum range ofith effectiveness at altitudes fromeet to at0oviet shipborne surface-to-air system for use againstat higher altitudes and longer ranges will probably become available. These systems, while primarily for air defense, could be modified for employ-

ment against surface targets. Late in the period of this estimate, the USSR will probably also haveissilefor use in anti-submarine warfare.

Soviet space programs. We believe that the ultimate foreseeable objective of the Soviet space program is theof manned interplanetary travel. The program is supported by extensive Soviet research effortsumber offields, including rocket propulsion, electronics, space medicine, astrobiology, astrophysics and geophysics. Presentappear to be directed toward the collection of scientific data andapplicable to fuiure spacethc ICBM program, and basic scientific research. Soviet requirements for space vehicles have probably been established for fairly specific scientific and/or military purposes in accordancelanned step-by-step progression.

Soviet success In ballistic missileand earth satellite launchings to date leads us toonsiderable Soviet capability for earlyin space including: surveillance satellites, recoverable aeromedicallunar probes and impacts, lunarand planetary probes to Mars and; "soft landings" by lunar rockets and recoverable manned earthanned glide-type high altitude research; heavy earth satellites and manned circumlunar; and manned lunar landings. While each individual achievementfeasible as to technical capability and earliest date attainable, we doubt that the USSR can accomplish all of these space flight activities within the time periods specified.

op OEoncT

SIMPLIFIED TABt SUMMARY' Probable Soviet Guided Missile Development Program

Designation

Operational Date

9

Ground-Launched Ballistic

S-4SS-5*

CBM

SS-a. t.

Ground-Launched Anii-Tank Missile

prior8

Range

xn.

m.

.

,

ards

Weight and Type

bs. Nuclear, HE, CW

bs. Nuclear, IIS. CW

Upbs. Nuclear, HE, CW

Upbs.

Nuclear, poss. CW Upbs.

Nuclear

bs. Nuclear

bs. HE

Altitude

m.

Submarine-Launched Missiles

cruise-type

ballistic

m.0 njn

SA-2

SA-3

SA-4

SA-S

bs.-

Ground-Launched Surface-Io-Alr Missiles

*fw iua,

limited eflecUveness aealnst ICBMs

0 njn.

bs.'

Shipborne Surface-to-Air

8 IM0

2fc njn.

jn.

bs. HEbs. HEbs.bs.'

Air-to-Air MissUes

AA-2

AA-3

AA 4

t.t. Up0 ft

t. Up0 ft.

Missiles

AS-'

ss

100

n.m

nm.

bs. Nuclear,bs. Nuclear

other pertl-cauabllltles In apace

DISCUSSION

I. AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEMS

THREAT AND SOVIET REQUIREMENTS

One o/ the most Immediate and greatest of Soviet military concerns Is theof key Industrial and military installations and centers of control. During the period of this estimate, the USSR will be faced withdiversity in the weapons systems that can be employed against Its forces and territory. There may not be large numbers of some of the newer Western deliverybut wllh nuclear weapons even small numbers will increase considerably the Soviet defensive requirements and problems. Soviet planners almost certainly recognize thatguns and aircraft armed with guns have only limited capability against certain types or tactics of high performance aircraft and will have no capability against USmissile systems. Thus, as their airrequirements became more exacting, they probably planned lo arm increasing numbers of interceptor aircraft with air-to-air missile systems, largely replace anti-aircraft guns with surface-to-air missile systems and develop anti ballistic missile systems.

During the period of this estimate the USSR will require surface-to-air missilecapable of engaging Western aircraft and missiles at altitudes fromeet lohundred miles. Soviet planners probably now consider their requirements to include:

Static and mobile all-weather systems with altitude capabilities up0 feet and horizontal ranges of at leastm. with either nuclear or HE warhead.

Static all-weather system with altitude capabilities of up0 feet and arange. wllh nuclear or HE warheads.

Static and mobile all-weather systems with low altitude capabilities down to abouteet and ranges of at least.

Anti-missile systems capable of engaging shorterallistic

9 there will beobile anti-ballistic missilecapable of engaging missiles with ranges ofm.taticsystem capable of engagingallistic missiles. There will alsoequirement for an antl-satellit* defense system to countersatellites orbitingewmiles altitude and. In the latter years of thcystem may be needed to counter hypersonic glide vehicles. All surface-to-air systems will need to be capable ofWestern saturation and confusion tactics and electronic countcrmeasures.

To Increase the kill capability of Its fighter aircraft during the period of this estimate, we believe that the USSR will require air-to-air guided missiles for defense against Western aircraft and cruise-type missiles, operating at altitudes ranging fromeet0 feet As speeds of aircraft and rates of closurethe USSR will require longer range and improved air-to-air missiles which arewith Soviet aircraft InterceptorAir-to-air systems will need to beof all-weather operation and all-angleand of resisting electronic counter-measures. Soviet planners probably will also consider it desirable to employ nuclearIn air-to-air missiles under certain

At present, surface units of the Soviet navy depend primarily upon land based air cover lor air defense. The limited radius of action of Soviet fighter aircraft Imposes what the USSR probably considers toevere restriction on the surface forces of the Soviet navy. Soviet planners probably viewsurface-to-air missile systems as arequirement, not only to attend the radius of action of their ships, but also to provide Improved air defense, even whenland based cover.

There arc current requirements for all-weather systemsow altitude

It

orizontal range of at leastm with HE warheadltitude capabilities up0 feet and arange of at leastjn. with either nuclear or HE warhead.

9 on. the USSR will probably alsoystem with altitudeup to0 feet and arange of. with either nuclear or HE warhead.

Soviet planners probably consider It desirable that these naval air defense systems beof modification for alternative use as ship-borne surface-to-surface weapons innaval roles.

DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITIES AND PROGRAMS

Surface to-Air Systems

ince shortly after World War II, the USSR has been engaged In an intensivefor the development of surface-to-air missile systems. The Soviets appropriated German surface-to-air missiles, missileand associated guidance systems. These, together with lend-lease electronic equipment and available Information on Western radar design, development, and techniques were of enormous value to thc Soviet surface-to-air development program. Of additional value was thc knowledge and skill contributed by German scientists and engineers in the USSR.0owever, Soviet scientists displayed an originality In basic concepts,they continued to utilize theof German electronic technicians, as well as liative Soviet resources, to develop some of these basic concepts into operational

ignificant amount of information has become available on guided missilearound Moscow. Herringbone orinstallations were first observedconstruction In aboulhese installations have been associatedtatic surface-to-air missile system reportedly designatedy lhc Sovietsn this estimate. Possible surface-to-air missile sites have been observed or re-

ported at other locations, but to date theurface-to-air missile system equipment has been identified only at Moscow. In that area, forty-five missile sites have been located with accuracy sufficient to indicate theirin two concentric rings withnd. from the center of the city. There arc probablyites In the system, of whichre on the inner ring andn theypical site hasaunch positions Joinedetwork of roads.with the system are buildings which could be for housing, maintenance shops and limited missile storage. We believe that some Moscow sites became operational4 and that all sites were operational by the end

ach site in the Moscow systema track-while-scan radar (USdesignationaving aboutvertical and horizontal coverage. Recentindicates that the guidance system at each siteraffic-handling capability ofargets andissiles simultaneously. The missile employed with thc system has radio-command guidance and Isingle-stage, liquid propellant vehicle. It can probablyound payloadpeed of aboutaximum range. Nuclear warheads wouldthe kill probabilities achievable with these missiles and willequirement for effective use of the missiles under someHowever, HE warheads will bein most applications. Recent information from Gennan returnees indicates that the missile may use an adjustable proximity fuze armedignal trom the ground. Weit was designed lor optimum effect against aircraft at altitudes00 feet, it can probably achieve CEI's0 feet at these altitudes. Limited effectiveness could probably be obtained at0 feet altitude. However, theystem has certain limitations such as limited capability against small, supersonic targets, immobility and limited azimuthal coverage at each site.

he appearanceoosted surface-to-air missile at the Moscow Paradei7 suggests that the USSR has now ovcr-

-to

nl least seme of these limitations. This missilean probably reachaltitudes In less time than can theissile, androbably more effective against small, supersonic targets. We believe that tills missile could be employedemi-mobile giound guidance system' coverage capability and could be adapted with little difficulty to the Moscow system. This missile couldorizontal range ofm and an optimum designof00 feet, with some capability up0 feet. Its speed would be aboutnd it couldEP of0 feetound pay-load. Nuclear warheads would Increase the kill probabilities achievable with theseand willequirement for effective use of the missiles under some conditions. However, HE warheads will be effective In most applications. This missile system couldhave been operational

The above systems probably have noat very low altitudeso overcome this deficiency, it Isalthough there Is no direct information, that the USSR has developed and could have In operationurface-to-airfor low altitude coverageith optimum design altitude of fromeet0 feet and limited effectiveness0 feet. Maximum horizontal range would be aboul. This system coulday-load ofoundsEPeelaximum speed of. Nuclear warheads would Increase the kill probabilities achievable with these missiles and willequirement for effective use of thc missiles under some conditions. However. HE warheads will be effective in mostGuidance would be semi-activewave radar homing. Futurewould be toward increases in range and altitude capabilities.

Although there Is as yet no evidence, we estimate that for improved capabilities inof critical areas, the USSR will probably develop and have In operationtatic surface-to-air systemwith effectiveness at altitudes up0 feet, and capable of carrying nound payload.

Nuclear warheads would increase the kill probabilities achievable with these missiles and willequirement for effective use of the missiles under some conditions. However HE warheads will be effective In most appti-cations.ystem will probablyorizontal range. with mid-course command, terminal radar homing guidance,EP ofeet. Tlie Soviets have displayed interest In ramjet engines which could be utilized In such aalthough from an operationalolid propellant ls preferable.

We have little evidence Indicating either Soviet priority or technical approach to an anU-balusUc missile system. Considering thc technical problems Involved, wc estimate that in thehe USSRirst operational capabilityissile systemapable of limited effectiveness against ICBMs.ystem could possibly have some effectiveness againstonsiderable Soviet electronicprogram, extending well beyond thc period of this estimate, would belo achieve an effective anti-ballisticsystem.ifferent but simpler miss He, the above anti-ballistic missile system could alternatively be employed against high -altitude aircraft and cruise-type missiles.

We believeround-based missile system with limited capability lo countersatellites could be and possibly will be developed in the USSR in the. Due to the guidanceystemigh velocity intercept vehicle, we believe that ansystem available as early as this could probably engage oidy those satellites whose orbits had been established. It Is possibleore sophisticated system could bewith an anti-ballistic missile systemater date. It is also possible thatt the earliest the USSR coulda surface-to-air system with limited capability to engage hypersonic glide vehicles.

Shipborne systems. Although we have very Utile evidence of Soviet programs for shipborne surface-to-air missiles, we believe that the USSR will probably develop and have

u

operation in the fleetow altitude defense systemithsomewhat similar to those estimated for theand-based low altitude defense system. Over water, its maximum range would probably be increased to about. Ship storage and handling requirements would favor the use of solid propellants.issile could probably be modified to permit dual purpose useurface-to-surfaceas appropriate to naval requirements. Wc estimateoviet shipborne missilesystem against high altitude, longer range targetsill probably. Theystem could probably accomplish this mission with certain modifications for shipboard handling and storage, and modifications could also permit dual purpose employment against surface targets.

Air-to-Air Systems

SS. In56 the USSR acquired the results of German efforts on air-to-air missile designs. German scientists in the USSR advanced certain of these designs and assisted the Soviet development untillthough even before that timeative capability for advancedDuring the subsequent years, withassistance, they continued development of air-to-air missile systems.

e know from German returnees that2 the USSR had In activeadar beam-riding air-to-air missile,"ShM" by the Soviets andn this estimate. Unsuccessful flight tests of this missile2 necessitated redesign ofof the missile control features, anddelayed an operational capabilitylieissile it very simitar to the US Sparrow I. developed Inthe same time period. It is designed to operateelatively high-poweicd radar compatibleersion of the Soviet all weather interceptor. FLASHLIGHT. Thu: system is estimated toaximum head on range"all approach range of

Distance bcl*cvn launchingI reran and Utftt at Ume ol launch.

EP ofeet,0 pound HE payload. Thc beam-rider conceptogical first step In the development of an all-weather attack capabilily. but Inherentmaneuvering limitations would probably have led the Soviet planners to considerystem as only an interim solution, to be supplanted during the period of this estimate by more versatile systems.

Since World War II, emphasis on research and development on Infrared within thc USSR and Satellites has Indicated that thc Soviets couldignificant Infrared capability. Although the Germans worked on anhoming head for the Soviets, we have no further knowledge of the utilizationissile guidanceormal developmentwe believe the Soviels probably had operational an air-to-air missile system with infrared homing guidance. This system couldaximum range of.EP ofeet5 pound HE payload, but would be limitedailcone attack angle of about sixtyThis missile could be utlliied with most Soviet interceptor types which are nowAn infrared missile system Is lesslo countcrmeasurcs and hasgmter growth potentialeam-rider system. Because of this II will be aflexible system capable of continuing utility through the period of this estimate. Clouds, rain and fog reduco the effectiveness ofhoming, allhough such conditions seldom occur0 feel in the USSR.

Soviel missile guidance development work indicates Interest in semi-active radarbut there is no firm data that suchwas pursued with respect to air-to-air missiles Considering the general level ofelectronic capabilities, andormal development program, wc estimate thai an air lo-air system with semi active homing guidance (AArobably will beinto service use in USS.olissileersion ol the FLASHLIGHT wouldaximum range. tn head-on attack andn tail attack,EP ofpound HE payload couM be employed.

TOP ODOnOT

missile system could be improved and modified for employment with advancedfighters.

USSR will probably develop foruseonger range{AAA)oundwarheads would increase theachievable with. thesewillequirement for effective usemissiles under some conditions.warheads will be effective In someThe requirement to safeguardof the launching aircraft fromwouldange capability ofnautical milesead-on attack atA rocket propulsion systemthis requirement couldangen.m. under conditions of tall attack;likewise be sufficient to safeguardaircraft at high altitude. Atcloser approaches could befor both head on and tall attackwarheads. When firstmissile system could employhoming or passiveEP ofasic guidance system probably couldto Include composite semi-activewith passive homing (ECMThese estimated refinementsin service use'

FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

believe that the USSR isthc extensive integration ofsurface-to-air missiles into its airAs suitable missile systems andequipment become available Ina large portion of the medium andanti-aircraft guns will probablyout of thc defenses of staticthe USSR Concurrent surface tc-alf and

' Pending Uie operational aval lability of this long range missile, lhc USSR coo id have operaUoruU an unpilded alr-to-alr rocketoclear warhead which would be limited to attacks at lower alUludes or lo Utl attacks al high alUtodes. See NIKINO-SOVIETIcAi*Ann.rriES through mid-ims, lfl July mi.

alr-to-alr programs will be Justified during much of the period of this estimate because of their complementary relationships. Throughout the period the proportion of surface-to-air missiles in the overall Soviet air defense effort will probably Increase,as offensive muisilc systems become an increasing proportion of thc Western threat.

the next several years, thetechnological change and lhe possibilityobsolescence will increase theInvolved In committing largeresources to defensive missile systems.of expanding Soviethowever, leads us to concludoUSSR will be able to produce andquantity thc defensive missileIt can develop for operationaleriod. The numbersdeployed will be governed by theof the benefits to be gained and theuse of the same resources forWe believe Ihat, because of itsimportance, the Moscow area willbe the Initial recipient of advancedas they are placed In production.

Surface-to-Air Systems

Information from recent Germanindicates that the USSR was engaged in at least limited series production of surface-to-air missiles and systems equipment of theype as earlyt the same time,arallel development program, thealsoumber of prototypesm rface-to-air missile which was somewhat similar in configuration lo the surface-to-air missile which appeared in the Moscow Parade in7e have evidence of thc deployment of only theissile.

In addition to the Moscow launching sites and associated equipment, the USSR hasubstantial Investment in at least four and possibly more lhan six large support facilities whkh are spaced along lhe Inner Moscow ring. The function of these facilities Isdepot assembly, storuge, maintenance and recycling of the Moscow defense missiles. On one occasion tn5 moreballea and/or trailers were observed at one

of these facilities. This indicatesotal of several thousand missiles could be at these facilities at one lime. The availability of this number of missiles at support facilities,with Uie fact that repealedhave consistently revealedmall number of missiles on site at any one time, leads us to conclude that these supportplay an important and Integral role In the Moscow missile defense system.

surface-lo-alr systemsbeen observed elsewhere In the USSRform, even though more thanhave elapsed since thc last sitein the vicinity of Moscow. There isthat prcUminary construction or abut similar system was InitiatedLeningrad areaubsequentof the area by Westernfailed to reveal evidence of thecompleted sites In this area. However,for observation have beenIf site construction atriority and pacethat observed at Moscow, the groundshould have beene believe, therefore, thatmay have altered an earlier intentLeningrad, and that thcmissile defenses of this area probablya system with greater flexibilitycost than that at Moscow.

the above, we believe thatand costly Moscow missilepecial case, dictated by theand priority of that area1 square mile areaby the Moscow surface-to-aircontains not only the center ofand political control and a

large scientific research and design bureau complex, but also an Industrial concentration which accounts for almost one-fifth of Soviet gross Industrial production. While theseJustified thc unique expenditure ofand effort applied to the Moscow area defense system, we believe that this ls unlikely lo be thc case in other areas.

Air-fo-Air Systems

e have no direct evidence of scriesof Soviet air-to air missiles. Wehowever, that thc difficultproblems related to the small size of these missiles and the specialized componentswould not prevent Uie USSR from achieving quantity production. The USSR has and continues to produce substantial numbers of fighter aircraft, airborne intercept radars, and associated early warning and ground conlrol Intercept systems whleh, when taken together, represent thc major portion of the industrial effort required for Uieemployment of air-lo-oir systems. We estimate that the USSR, having made thisls concurrently improving Uieof its fighter force with air-to-air missiles.

enerally, there are no significant factors which would limit or materially delay this program. Relatively few modifications are necessary to equip presently operaUonalaircraft with air-to-air missiles. Existing facilities at Soviet airfields should be adequate for missile handling and checkout, exceptossible need for humidity-controlled missile storage areas to protect guidance components. Special training required for air and ground crews could be accomplished as part of normal training programs.

13

AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS

uring the period ol this estimate, the USSR will have requirements for atr-to-sur-face missile systems to reduce bomberand increase thc probability of successful air attack against targets with heavy local defenses. In establishing requirements for air-to-surface missile systems during the period of this estimate, Soviet militarywould need to consider foreseeablein Western land and shipborne air defense systems. They would probably assess Western air defenses about as8 on, capabilities of Western surface-to-air guided missiles will beimproved from present rangesm. and altitudes ot up to0 feet. Land and shipborne interceptorwill be armed with air-to-air guided missiles and unguidcd rockets (including some armed with nuclear warheads) which will be continuously modified and Improved.addition,1 and throughout the remainder of the period of the estimate. Western land-based surface-to-air guided missiles will have ranges up. and possibly greater. The range of Western shipborne surface-to-air guided missiles will Increase to.

hroughout thc period of the estimate. Soviet planners would consider that they would face Increasingly effective early warning radar and semi-automatic OCI equipments.

aced with these defensive capabilities, Soviet planners would probably havethe following requirements during the period of this estimate:

A current requirement,or an alr-to-surfacc missile system of aboutautical miles range for use against shipping, naval task forces, and land targets.

9equiremeut for an air-to-surface rnlssile system for use

against both naval and land targetsange of at.

A requirement for some missiles of both the above types to be modified as anti-radar missiles.

Improvements to both basic missileIn the nature of improvedcharacteristics rather thanranges.

An air-launched decoy to simulateor heavy bombers.

DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITIES AND PROGRAMS '

he USSR began development of an alr-to-surlace guided missilehich wc now believe was operational in Sovietbomber units. Thosystem, which was developed with the assistance of German designers andasmploys beam-riding for the first part of thc trajectory and semi-active radar homing for terminal guidance. The speed of the missile is aboutMach and It"aximum range from thc launching aircraft of about. Employment of this missile system requires that the launchingbe at altitudes00 feet. The missile then flicslat angle approach. It is estimated toound nuclear or possibly HB payload and toEP ofeet against ships at sea or other similarly well-denned radar targets.

e have estimated that the USSR alsoequirementeneral purposen. air-to-surface missile that would notsuch well-defined targets and could be employedider variety of targets, including those on land. Although there Is no evidence lo so indicate, we believe it well within Soviet capabilities to have modified the above missile system by substitution of a

detailed Information on fiovlct alr-to-sur-race inlWif testcelimited OliUllunder separate cover).

-TOP-fi&Gtl-JHf

command guidance systemEPeet.

We estimate that the USSR willupersonic alr-to-surface missile systemange of at. and with Improved propulsion and guidance systems.ystem could become available tobomber units duringeriod. For use against general land targets, this missile could employ any one of several guidance systems, Including radar or inertlal types, and could probably achieve CBPs of one-half to. depending upon thechosen and thc type of target attacked. Modification of this missile by the addition of terminal homing, guidance would make It more effective against well-defined targets such as ships, and would result in greater accuracies.

Equipping of the two precedingmissiles with guidance systems capable of homing on radiating radar transmitters Is believed to be within Sovietpecial type of passive seeker will be the only major development necessary to fulfill this requirement. We estimate that guidance systems of this nature couldlthough there is no evidence to support this development.

Although we have no evidence, weon the basis of operational desirability and technical feasibility, that thc USSR is probably developing and may now havean nlr-launched decoy to simulateor heavy bombers.ecoy could confuse, saturate, or otherwise degradeair defense capabilities. This system could use passive radar corner reflectors and/ or active echo simulators (beacon)inimum guidance system pre-setight pattern. Internal stowage of

decoys Is required In order to preserve the per. formance capabilities of the carrier aircraft. It ls therefore desirable that the site of the decoys be minimized to permit stowage of as many as possible. Thc decoy would probably be propelledurbojet engine which would permit the decoy to simulate aircraftImprovements to this system will be required to maintain ils compatibility with advanced bomber developments.

FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

We believe that tbc. subsonic air-to-surfacc missile is now In series production. However, we have no direct evidence regarding the Soviet facilities engaged In thisThe problems of producing this missile are similar to those encountered in theof aircraft. Because of the limited number of missiles carried per aircraft, and the somewhat limited operational requirement for its employment, production of the overall quantity required by the USSR should not Impose serious economic problems.

The USSR has produced and is continuing to produce considerable numbers of BADGER Jet medium bombers, which we estimate are the primary carriers for thelthough larger aircraft could also be modified ascarriers. We believe thc missile Is small enough so lhat two can be carried externally on one BADGER. Production of the aircraft and associated navigation and electronic equipment represent the major portion of the investment required In establishing thissystem. This Investment has been made We do not believe lhat the necessarywould seriously hinderignificant operational capability with missile equipped aircraft

15

III. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS

REQUIREMENTS

uring thc period ol this estimate the USSR will have requirements for surface-to-surface missiles to provide nuclear and non-nuclear fire support for ground forces, forof naval surface lorces, for fulfilling naval offensive missions, and for long range nuclear bombardment of targetstrategic nature. Specific requirements for surface-to-surface missiles will vary from very short range missile systems capable of attacking pinpoint targets to missile systems capable of attacking all major land targets located in North America. Soviet planners probably consider that these missile systems should be programmed initially to supplement andto replacearying degree other delivery systems. Decisions to developmissile systems to the point ofInto operational units would be taken In the lightariety of factors, Including the relative priority of the development effort within the missile program, thc cost andof thc system in relation to other available weapon systems, the availability of appropriate warhead materials, etc.

round-launched systems. We believe that in preparing their requirements formissile systems, Soviet planners would have considered systems in the followingcategories:

Close support systems with high mobility and simple but extremely accuratecapable of attacking hard targets and enemy strone points on the battlefield at rangesew thousand yards lo about.

Systems with ranges fromapable of supporting major ground force eifm.cnLs (up to and including thc Soviett distances corresponding to the deplh of operations envisaged in Soviet ground operational doctrine, and ofdeep targets such as air bases andcenters.

A system with maximum rangeapable of delivering nuclear payloads on distant targets In Eurasia and its periphery from launching sites within the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

A systemaximum rangeapable of delivering nuclear payloads on all targets In lhe continental US from launching sites well within the USSR

oviel planners would desire that to the maximum extent practicable, such systems have warhead effects and accuracieswith the missions to be accomplished, have high resistance to electronic counter measures, that once launched Ihey be independent of guidance and control from the ground, and that they be highly mobile. The Soviets may alsoequirement for cruise-type, ground-launched decoys for use inwith long-range attack by manned bombers.

aval launched systems. The USSRrobablyubmarine-launchedsystem of. range to attack land targets within Western-controlled areas. Soviet requirements for surface-to-surface missiles to be employed by surface vessels can be metarge extent by the dual-purpose surface-to-air/surface-to-surface systemsearlier. However, Soviet planners probably also have requirements formissiles capable of employingwarheads.

f ACTORS AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITIES

he exploitation of German personnel and equipment in the early post-war period,with parallel and subsequent native efforts, enabled the USSR lo make significant progress in thc development of ballisticof short and medium ranges. In addition toton thrust rocket motors which were availablec estimateotoron thrust

was successfully developed and availablee also believe the USSR has high capabilities for development of guidancewarheads and airframes for ballistic missiles.

There ls evidence that the Soviet ballistic missile effort has been well conceived and that programs have progressed step-by-step,maximum use of proven'And reliableMiniaturization or extremeof components probably has not been emphasized In Soviet missile development, but, rather, reliability and simplicity have been the objectives. Tlie mobility evidenced by missiles displayed ln the Moscow Parade of7 isasicin Soviet surface-to-surface missile systems under development. Even ICBMs mayertain extent be rail mobile;previously prepared sites would besome of these would have only aof fixed equipment.

The surface-to-surface program hasdevelopedimited number of basic missiles and has, in logical progression, extended Soviet missile capabilities from those ofoward an ICBM operationalThroughouteriod,in nuclear, guidance and propellant technology will be incorporated In subsequent generations of missiles. In some cases,will be scheduled into subsequent productionasic model change. We believe that toward the end of the period, solid or storable liquid propellants willbe used in most, if not all, Soviet surface-to-surface missiles.These propellantsreaction time, lend simplicity, andoperational problems normallywith non-storable liquid propellants.

Although the USSR will continue tocomponents to improve accuracy, and to decrease missile size and weight, suchprobably will not be incorporated until they result In significant improvements in missile performance. In all surface-to-surface missile systems, especially mobile systems, accuracy is dependentonsiderableon the degree lo which launching site and faigct locations are determinable. In-

herent missile accuracies are somewhat better than lhe accuracies specified ln the text and tables, which lake into consideration average degradation factors.

In size and weight ofIncreased yields will follow fromnuclear technology. It Isbelieve that at least the earlier,missiles were developed for HEand that as nuclear weaponthe emphasis probably shifted toFor missiles with. or less, we believe HE.CW warheads will be employed lnwith Soviet military policy andupon nuclear stockpiles, missilecharacter of the target andWe estimate that fornd over, nuclearbe employed, although we do notpossibility of CW use

GROUNO-IAUNCIIEO SYSTEMS Development Capabilities and Programs'

short range missOes.Soviet progress in the missilebelieve that for several years thehad the capability of making closemissiles available to ground forcemissiles could Include: (a) amissileange ofyards, capable of delivering ashaped HE charge against tankshard targetsEP of aboutemploying wire link commanda missile capable of delivering apayload to ranges on lhe orderards which could with aobtain an accuracy offeet, employing radio commandthe lack of evidence, we estimatefirst of these missiles probably has been

detailed Information oa Soviet ground-laurKhed ballistic missile teat protrams.al the Kapiistln Yar lest rang* north of the Caspian Sea. acelimitedunder separate cover).

and Is now operational; Sovietot the second missileossibility.

n ballistic miuile. Until the Soviet display7 in Moscow, direct intelligencehort range ballistic missile was very limited. However, analysis ol thc photography of that display confirmsissileof. maximum range. The high degree ofas evidenced by the trackedeapon system which isand ready for almost immediateuse. As such, it would be necessary that thc weapon be transportedueled, operationally ready condition.

We estimate that theasolid propellant system, although operationally preferable, probably would not have been available for the first generation missile. The present version,may be either liquid or solid propelled We believe that4 thc missile could haveadar track-radio commandsystem, possibly with some InerUaland that an accuracy ofeet under average operational conditions could have been achievederminalsystem were used. Consideringdevelopment in guidance technology, we believe that this missile probably nowor soon will employ, an all-inertia!system. Although not materiallythe accuracyissile of thisshort range, an Incrlinl guidancewould require less ground support envi-ronment. improve the operational flexibility of thc system, and overcome Its vulnerability to electronic countermeasures. We estimate this missile to be capable ofound payload to ranges ofm.EP ofeet.

. ballisticissile inaximum range classas developed, probablyogical outgrowth of the. and became operational not laterhere is some evidence Uiat It may have been operation^ as earlyliis missile could5 ton thrust liquid proju'llant motor and be capable of de-

ound payload. We estimate this missile to have been Initially developedadar track-radio command/lnertlal guidance system having an Initial CEP of 3boul one to twoith subsequentimprovements resultingEP of about V> to.. wethat this missile could employ an all-inertial guidance system with approximately VsL CEP.

nm ballistic missile.

3 Information havethe existenceissile of. maximum range. We believe the missile systemecame operationalt could5 ton thrust liquid propellant motor and be capable ofayload upounds. Wliile we believe that ttiis missile was initially developed with an HE warhead, we estimate that it could also currently be equipped with nuclear or CW warheads. Wc believe that4 this missile probablyadar track-radio com-mand/incrtiat guidance system andEP of about one to. with aimprovement in CEP to about y. to one nm.6he USSR will probably be able lo utilize an all-inertial guidance system with comparable accuracy.

n m. ballistic missile.. maximum range missilealso clearly established C

J The Soviets arc engaged In an extensive program onissile;have averaged about two per month since

J testing has been conductedariety of purposes and may, in severalindicate ICBM component testing. C

3 We estimate that theas initially opeialionalnd that It is now capable of delivering payloadsupoundsEP of one lon. at maximum range. Although

believe the missile was initially developedadar track-radio command/incrllal guidance system. It Is probable that80 an all-inertial system could be developed and employed tn subsequentgiving approximately the same CEP but with improved operational flexibility and increased mobility.

everal largeabouteet long and about five feet in diameter, weie displayed in the Moscow parade. Intensive engineering anulysis of photographs of these missiles indicates arange ofepend-Uig upon the payload weight. Although there is other evidence of missiles of both ranges. It Is not possible to associate definitely either ther thcith the Urge missile displayed in Moscow,

. ballistic missile. Analysis (

ozen firingsange. over the past year.urface-to-surface missile of. range would bring within range of missiles launched from within thc Sino-Soviet Bloc oilew critical peripheral targets. The USSR probably willissilef this range operational This dab" is piedicated on the belief that thiselatively simple modification of. missile, including, for example, reduction in payload weight or possibly changes inor tankage. Payload weight could be upounda. Reduction in payload would be compatible with improving Soviet nuclear warhead technology. Essentially the same guidance system as theould be used, piobablyEP of aboutt maximum range. 80 an1 lial guidance system could become available for use. Whllr wc haveissile system that isodifiede cannot discount the possibility that thc vehicles fired to. range ic-prcscnt thc initial testingew missile system oi thai they were dual purpose tests which included component testing for ICBM or carlli satellite vehicles.

t is possible that the USSR will develop during the period of tills estimate onrange ballistic missile systemaximum range of atm,of being launched from Soviet territory against virtually all peripheral targets. Soviet interest inystem was indicated as earlyut there has been no further evidence of developmental work or test firing activities to this range.the target coverage achievable. missiles, and thc availability ol other delivery systems for coverage of more distant peripheral targets, we believeile missile is probably viewed by Soviet planners asairly lowal the present lime. They might therc-foie have deferred development effort until later in the period of this estimate, when theyexpect sophisticated guidance, solid or storable liquid propctlants, and Improvedto be available. In any case, theof test firings would probably precede first operational capability by about two years.

mtude (ICBM}.

Theic is firm evidence f_

3 that test ICBMs were launched lo

. onanuary, 29pril andhere is less conclusive evidenceest ICBM/ESV was also launched sometime in7 and In addition, three So.iel earth satellite vehicles have beenrbit' andith what wc estimate to haw ttecn basic ICBM hardware Calcula-Lions based on the earth satellite orbitsthat they were launched somewhere In the vicinity of the Aral Sea. Analysis of the transportation facilities in this area, includ-inj*of unique railroad cars, tends to |thcTyura Tarn area as the'

] indicates that lhc range ii.il is in Ihe vicinity of the Kamchatka Liuhv Thus, the Soviets appear lo haveddition lo Kapustin Yar, an entirely nrw test range ofm length for launching larger missiles, IGYand other space vehicles.m.hoilcr range thanulll-

19

desired for ICBMtudy of Soviet population densities ln relation tolaunch sites and booster Impact areasthis range to be about as long asfor land Instrumentation. The range could be almosi doubled by using shipborne Instrumentation.

There Is no direct informalkm on theof the Soviet ICBM. There has been no conclusive Intelligence regarding ICBM component testing, but numerousstatementsositivebetween ICBM and satellite launching vehicles and proven military hardware. Tho largef the last stage of Soviet satellite rockets, as determined by photography,"that the ICBM and the Soviet satellite launching vehicles are probably two stagealthough we cannot yet eliminate the possibility that the launching vehicles may be one and one-half stages or employ parallel staging-

Thc Soviet ICBM test firing program, as Indicated by the number of ICBM test vehicles launched to date, has not proceeded asas Implied in our estimate of" Based on knowledge of the Soviet state-of-the-art and their alreadycapability in test launchings, we now estimate that the USSR will probablyirst operational capability with ten prototype ICBMs some time during the calendarhen il first becomes operational, the system will probablyeliability of aboutaximum range.EP of. The possibility should not bethat thc Soviets may establish in the

measurements (Sputnik Iroufhlv SO feet excluding the Instrumented aatellll*;Uroueblyeet including thcoot aat-ellltc; nnd Sputnikdetermined as abouteet excluding the satellite),Indicate lhat these arc not third atages. The variations In length. If correct. Indicate that the lastot the same In all these cases. Available measurements suggest that the carrier rocket approximates the slieOO run. mla-slle, although measurement Inaccuracies are too great to permit positive idenUfieaUon.

he Soviel ICUM

latter part8 an ICBM capability with missiles of comparatively unproven accuracy and reliability.

Available evidence Is Inconclusive as to the designed payload-carrylng capacity of the Soviet ICBM, which we have previouslyasounds. Recentand re-analysls may Indicate that the USSR Is developing an ICBMound payload. Serious logistical andproblems are associated with missiles of the sizes necessary tooundsangehesewould be greater In the case of the heavier payload. In lhe light of thiswe estimate that the Soviet ICBM is designed touclear payload ofounds, although thereossibility that it Is designed to carryounds.

A radar track-radio command/lnertial guidance system will probably be employed in the first generation ICBM system. Wethat by thceliability will be considerably Improved. Refinementsinto the original guidance system could result in CEP improvement to about three rxm. at the beginning ofime period, and further improvement to about. later in the period.0oviet guidance technology willhave advanced lo the point where an all-inertial system will be available for use in the ICBM. Reliability, operational simplicity, and the requirement for less complex ground support will probably override thc slightlyaccuracy, which we estimate. CEP.

Cruise-fype missiles. Considering the meager evidence on the development of crulse-lype missiles and lhe success of the Soviet ballistic missile program, we estimate that at present the USSR has no active surface-to-surface cruise-type missile development for ground-launching. We do, however, believe that it basrogram for naval purposes (see Naval Launched Systems, below).

The Soviets are capable ofruise-type dccoy.ofjn. range should they so desire. ecoy would

T-

C n

have only very minimal guidance and no appreciable payload capability, and therefore would have llttlo or no effectivenesseapons delivery system. We believe that the USSR will not considerecoy sufficiently Important to warrant Its

Factors AfTacting Operational Capabililies

believe that the USSR has theto produce Inideballistic missiles, Including thc ICBM.possesses the skills, facilities andresources required to carry out aprogram of ballistic missiledeployment throughout the period ofNewly acquired evidencethc USSR may possess considerablyin the actual production ofmissiles than we have estimatedWe now believe that the USSRinitiated series production of asurface-to-surface ballistic missileas early

view of our estimate of Sovietcapabilities, the principalthe scope and character of themissile production6 will be the natureof decisions made by SovietUSSR must make basic decisionsthe size of the operational capabilityconsiders necessary to have In being atand thc investment which It isto make In initial productionof missile systems andwith more advanced types.will have to be modified in thea result of progress in the developmentmissile systems, as well as changingand internal conditions. Wethe USSR has already decided tosizeable ICBM operational capability atdate practicable. Other ballisticsystems, some of which the USSRto be of less critical importance,be produced In large quantitiesthe costs involved and thc rapidity of Wc lack Information on Uie con-

cepts which govern Soviet decisions on the production and deployment of ballistic missile systems, and on the timing of these decisions. Therefore, wc are able to estimate Sovietonly In general terms, and must select from among several feasible programs those which appear to be most favorable from the Soviet point of view, particularly In the case of the ICUM.

. syttems. We have nointelligence on any Soviet. ballistic missiles displayed at the Moscow Paradelthough the USSR Is capable of producing such missiles In quantity. Observations of these missiles at the parade itselfrobable Soviet philosophy to adapt to guided missile use, wherever possible, equipment which is already available. The trackedcarriers were adaptations of existing equipment also used with more conventional armaments. This adaptation minimizes the number of new design, production, andproblems which must be solved, thereby facilitating production andof the missile system.

esult of recently acquiredwhich sheds new light on older evidence, -wc now believe that1 the USSRthe former DnepropetrovskPlant to the production of modifiedallistic missiles, withpartial conversion to tractor production startinguch roissile production1 would be several years earlier lhanestimated. Although we have noevidence, we believe that thefacility is currently producing.issile, or perhaps longer range missiles. These missiles, or their components, could probably be produced without drastic changes In the production processes formerly employed onype missiles.arge portion of the facility has been allocated lo tractor production, wo believe Ihat missile production is continuing and that an expansion in production rates may now bo planned. There is evidence that thc plant has been undergoing an expansion and Is cur-rcnUy operatingulti-shift basis.

T-

estimate that the USSK now possesses an extensive short range ballistic missilecapacity and trained labor force In reserve, possiblyumber of facilities, and that the USSK is capable of mass producingm.m. ballistic missile systems If it chooses. Furthermore, wethat thc USSR has military manpower with experience and training In' the use of short range ballistic missiles, and has had sufficient time to train operational unitsigh degree of proficiency In the employment of the newer systems which could now be operational.

We have no information on theof thc short range ballistic missiles we believe have been produced. Some of these missiles almost certainly have been expended in Iraining troops, and to some extent, others may have been modified to incorporate more advanced components. Numerous reports have been received from various sourcesdeployment of ballistic missiles in thc Satellite countries. However, reliablewho has investigated these areas report that no guided missiles or supporting facilities have been identified. Short range missileare designed for mobile operations, and could be deployed rapidly into Satellite or other forward areas.

.e estimate that the USSR probably nowallistic missiles,on the basis of available uiteMgcnce, we cannot Judge the present scale ofor thc number of operational units so equipped. Production, operatlona] troop training. logistics and deployment associated with these missile systems would be facilitated by proven methods previously developed for the shorter range ballistic missiles. We have no evidence on which toudgment of the scale of Soviet production or deployment ofm.allistic missileIf. as we have estimated, this missile systemodification ofhe USSK probably would (ace no serious problems In ils production and deployment.

ICBM. We do not know what production facilities are now devoted to the Soviet ICBM

program, nor have we any direct evidenceSoviet preparations to produce ICBMs and systems equipment ln quantity. We do know, however, lhat the USSRighly developed industrial base which in: eludes all the skills and facilities necessary for quantity production of successfullymissile systems. Furthermore, asabove, wc estimate that tho USSRackground of valuable experience In the production, logistic and training aspects of ballistic missile systems acquired as early. The centralized planning of the Soviet economy will permit the USSR to marshal economic resources very rapidly for the quantity production of ICBMs andequipment.

The USSR will determine the peakrate (or ICBMs on thc basis of Soviet planneis' Judgments, primarily with respect to Soviet requirements for various numbers of missiles at selected points in time. Thesewill include not only theof ICBMs but also construction of launching facilities, production andof equipment, training of troops, andof logistic lines.

There are Indications that mobilityonsideration in the Soviet ICBM systems. Mobility as applied to ICBM systems would comprise rail transport to previously prepared sites, some of which would have only aof fixed equipment We believe that planning for deployment was carried outwith the preliminary and detailed design of the ICBM and associated ground equipment; hardware concepts could have been sufficiently firm6 to permit the USSR lo make basic decisions regardingICBM deployment. Such decisionsthe location of operational launch points, general operational concepts, and logistics At that time many elements ofaunch system could have beenand the Implementation ofrogram could have been initiated. Wethat the USSR will have had ample lime to complete the preparation of launching facilities needed for deployment

Bi*

ho economic resources requiredail system would come principally from the heavy machinery sector of the Soviet economy. We believe that this sector Is capable ofa program of this magnitude andwith only minor delays In the over-all heavy machinery Investmentoviet ICBM production andprogram of the scope necessary to achieve an operational capability rapidly would require the highest order of planning and accomplishment. Considering the.factors discussed above, we estimate that the USSR has the technical and industrial capabilily to produce ICBMs, complete launching facilities, and train operational unitsate sufficient to have ancapabilitybout one year after its first operational capability date. sometime, andwo or at most three years after firstcapability date. sometimer at the This Implies lhat the USSR could achieve an operational capability with ten or mote, but lessCBMs at the endepending upon whenthe calendarirst operationalis achieved.

NAVAL-IAUNCHEO SYSTEMS

believe that the Soviet navyissile-equippedwith emphasis on Lhe submarineexisting information is meager astypes of missile systems involved andof their development. It doesnaval-launched missile programsIne do not,that the Sovietsajorwith submarine-launched missiles allime.

Special Problems Affecting Naval-Launched Missile Capabilities

and handling problemsconsiderations in shipboardDepending on the desiredIt may be possible to designcompatible with existing ships or it may

be necessary lo embarkuildingtohip which willthe missile.hort range cruise-type missile is readily adapted to launching from existing Soviet ships. issile could be accommodatedurface ship ofsine or larger, as well as in tank-type external stowageonventional Required alterations to the launching vessel would Include provision for stowage of the missile, missile fuel, warhead andcheckout equipment, and Installation of guidance equipment and launcher. This would necessitate removal of some original equipment or weapons for weight and stability compensation. In order to provide storage and launching facilities for cruise-typewith ranges ofherequired to existing submarines would be extensive if not impracticable In largeand prohibitive in smaller ones. Adaptability of destroyer typesissile withange ls For cruisers, the problem of. cruise-type missiles would be little more difficult than lhe installation of shorter-range cruise-type missiles.

o accommodate ballistic missiles inange category, alteration ofsubmarines is Impracticable. The missile configuration wouldetermining factor in the sire of theonsiderably larger submarine is indicated, regardless of theers of weapons to be carried. We believe that submarines specially designed to employmissiles will be nuclear-powered forradius of operation, endurance and concealment Because of thcubmarine, it is consideredimpracticable to use liquid rocket fuels which require onboard manufacture or transfer.

hip-launched surface-to-surface missilesore severe accuracy problem than do those launched from the ground. Thc princi-

These numbers of ICBMs are selected arbilrmrtlr In order lo provide Kino measure of the Soviet rapacity to produce and deploy ICBMs; they do not represent an csUmnlc of probable Soviet rr-iulrcinenls or stockpile.

23

difficulty Is In determining the position of Uie ship or submarine In relation lo the target. At present, with varying degrees of precision, thc Soviets could determine launch position by celestial navigational methods or fixes on known landmarks (including radioFuture solutions to the guidancewhich would provide better concealment for submarines would involve Incrllalsystems and the development of anknowledge of sea bottom configurations as well as gravimetric and magneticTho increased Soviet Interest In ocea-nogTaphic survey, including equippingubmarine for this purpose.oviet intention to acquire these data.

For cruise-type missiles, which must be guided all the way to the target, practical guidance range is limited lo. whenadar track-radio commandyperbolic system Is used. In thc latter case, either transmitting buoys or other ships must be accurately positioned for guidance. In bothissile can be launched atgreater distances and then passed to the control of down-range guidanceprovided such stations are no more. from the target. Considering both Soviet technical development capabilities and the nature of operational conditions, theproblem is one of the Important factors in our estimate of the range of the first Soviet operational ship-launched missile.

A more difficult guidance development, suitable for cruise-type missiles of any range. Is the combination use of ratherinertia! guidance up to thc coast line and radar map-matching over land to give the required accuracy at thc target. Only the launch ship Is involved regardless of Uie range to thc target. The development of radar map-matching guidance for cruisc-lypc missiles wouldengthy and difficult effort of little. If any. applicability to any other type of Soviet missile system. Naval-launchedmissiles, on the other hand, couldguidance systems developed for theground-launched ballistic missileIncluding an all-lnertlal system.

Capabilities and Programs

One of the major Soviet post-war naUonal protects was to restore and greaUy expand Uie shipbuilding industry. The entirewas devoted for thc first several years to naval construction. Beginninghis high construction rate began to decrease and at the present time appears to betate of transition. Cruiser constructioneaving several uncompleted hulls in Uie shipyards. Submarinehas virtually stopped, but there areof more advanced boats in thestage.

SubiTiarirte launched missile development. Soviet submarines with missile(including missile-like, tank-like, and launcher-like objects onere first sighteduggestingrogram toubmarine guided missile system was initiated sometimevailableindicates that these initial efforts were probably undertakenelatively unsophisticated cruise-type missile Whether or not this development program wascannot be ascertained. We believe thathe USSR could havefor operationalruise-type missile capableange of upm. at high altitudepeed of Machthe technical and operationalof achieving an acceptable CEP at this range would have presented variousWe believe that the Soviets would have been able to achieve an acceptable missile accuracy,nlyudar-track/radio command guidance system. The guidance range of this system would beby Une of sight and the submarinesize lo. This could have led the Soviets toissile of onlyr range capability. On tne other hand, this same guidance system could be utilized with the same degree of accuracy at missile ranges of up. but only by use of an additional forward guidancestationed. of the target. Such operational employment would, bydoubling the number ofrequired, greatly Increase Uie risk of dis-

24

any Intended attack but would afford the launching submarine greater physical security through Increased stand-on distance. Considering these factors, we estimate that thc USSR probably developed and now hasubsonic cruise-type missileapable of. maximum range, to be guided by the launchingelatively simple system of this type, which can be employed with converted submarines,ogical first step In the development of an operational submarine-launched missileHowever, it does not satisfy estimated Soviet requirements.

n order to provide for increased range capabilities up tohe USSK could pursue thc development of one orboth of two advanced missile systems for submarine use. although there Is no evidence of the development of either system.

. range supersonic (about) cruise-type system could probably be developed and become operationalonversion of existing Soviet submarines to accommodateissile Is impractical,ystem would probably findonlyew construction submarine. Because of the problems inherent in other guidance systems, we estimate. cruise-type missile system, if developed, would probablyombination inertia! and radar map-matching guidance system and be capable ot deliveringound payload with about. CEP.

Alternatively, the USSR has theto developour-year developmentubmarine-launchedompatible submarine. To achieve maximum operational concealment of thc submaruie,allistic missile would probably be designed for submergedExtremely accurate underwaterwould be required. We estimate that the first operational capability forystem (SSill probably be inime period. The missile system would probably employ solid or storable liquid propellants and Inertial guidance,EP of. Warhead weightritical factor In determining the size and. hence, theof missiles that can be carriedub-

marine; the system would probablyow-weight payload,ounds Until the launching subs arewe cannot estimate with anytlie number of missiles that would be carried, although we believe it might be.

In view of the very extensive Sovietwith ballistic missiles and theproblems inherent in long-range cruise-type systems, we believe that of thedescribed above, the USSR would elect to develop the ballistic missile system. We do not, however, exclude the possibility that the USSR may. cruise-type system.

Operational capabilities. We believe that two separate guided missile submarineof different magnitudes must bewhen assessing the potential Soviet capability with this type of weapon. The first is associated with initial Soviet effortselatively short-range and unsophisticated cruise-type missile, capable of externalon converted submarines of existing classes. There is some evidenceew conversions may have already taken place. In view of the existence ofoviet long-range submarines, it is clear that the USSR Is potentially capable of converting large numbers to crulsc-typc missileHowever, external tank stowage is not the most desirable solution to the stowage problem, since It Imposes rather severeon speed, stability, andof the launching submarine.onversion may be impracticable or Impossible for large missiles. Internal stowage wouldsuch extensive conversion to present submarinesarge conversion program would not be practicable. We thereforethat to date the USSR hasew conventional submarines to guided missile employment, and that it Isto convert large numbers In the fuiure.

Termination of construction of existing Soviet submarine types probably marked the initiation of new submarine programs These programs will probably Include theof submarines specifically designed aa bal-

Ilstic missile submarines, and possibly some as cruise type missile submarines with internal stowage.

urface ships. Several cruisers were launched by the Sovietsut were not completed. Removal of the forwardand Are control tower from one of these ships has been noted, but in general they have lain idle. It is possible that these vessels will be completed as missile ships sometime In the future. It is also possible that other Soviet light and heavy cruLsers could be converted for launching surface-to-surface and/or dual purposec-to-surf ace/surf ace-rThere is no evidence of the modification of merchant ships for launching missiles,the possibility of such modification cannot be excluded.

nti-submarine warfarehile wc believe that the Soviet navyequLrc-

H

ment for advanced ASW missile systems, there ls no evidence that such systems are being developed in the USSR at the present time. Since thc primary advantage of ASW missile systems is the extended range at which an attack can be launched, effective usage Is heavily dependent on capabilities for long-range detection, tracking, and Identification ot submerged submarines. The USSR has the basic scientific and technical capabilities to develop ASW missile systems as well as thedetection and tracking equipment. We believe that the USSR will probably developissile for operational use. Thelines of development availableomplete lack ot evidence on Sovietofissile system precludes an estimate of specific missile characteristics. We believe that an ASW guided missile system will probably not be in operation until the tatter part ol thc period of this estimate.

IV. SPACE PROGRAM

SCOPE OF PROGRAM Objectives

Soviet objectives relating,to spacecannot be regarded as requirements In the usual sense of weapons systems neededppose or counterbalance an enemy'STTilirtary capabilities. In (act, immediate or known military considerations may have no bearing on thc decision to develop certain types of space vehicles, although the successfulof these vehicles could result inapplications.

We believe that the ultimate foreseeable objective of the Soviet space program is the attainment of manned space travel on anscale. At present the program appears to be directed toward the collection of scientific data which would be applicable to Soviet space activities, ICBM program and basic scientific research. While the Sovietprogram was undoubtedly initiated to serve scientific purposes, an Immediate aim was to achieve political and propaganda gain. Soviet earth satellite launchlngs to date have ostensibly been In support of thc IGY,the USSR has revealed almost nodata to the West. Future Sovietprobably will be established for fairly specific scientific and/or military purposes in accordancelanned, step-by-stcpfrom one achievement to the next. We believe that the Soviet space program alms to acquire greater knowledge of the earth and the universe, together with thc national advantages to be derived from this knowledge.

e estimate that thc Soviet spacewill be directed toward the following specific objectives:

Unmanned satellites. There wiUontinuing requirement during this period for unmanned instrumented satellites lo accumulate scientific data on space, as well as surveillance satellites to obtain weather data, geodetic Information, and other Information of Intelligence value.

rockets. An Important Sovietis to acquire scientific data on the moon. This data can be collected byrockets launched to the vicinity of the moon (lunary unmanned

_ _Junar satellites, ond by soft or hard Impacts on the moon.

Recoverable satellites. Successfulwith recoverable satellites.those containing animals, areto the attainment ot subsequent objectives.

Manned earth orbital flights. Test flights with manned high altitude research vehicles (rockets or boost glide) probably will be required to obtain necessary data on the environment of outer space. Manned flights will probably increase In alUtude andprior lo the orbitingecoverable manned satell Ite. In recent months, several Soviet sources have statedanned space vehicle Is feasible and is one of the USSR's prime objectives.

Planetary probes. Rocket probeswill be launched toward Mars and Venus in order to obtain scientific data not otherwise available from earth satellites and lunar rockets.

Manned lunar flights. Circumlunar flights by manned space vehicles andlunar landings.

Manned interplanetary flight. This is the announced ultimate goal of the Soviet space flight program.

Orgomixoiion and Priority

fter aboutears of general scientific interest in astronautics and space Right, and governmental interest beginninghe first consolidated attack on the problem by thc USSR was announced In5 with the establishment of thc Interagencyfor Interplanetary Communications. There are some Indications that thismay have been In existence and active

as early as lhe falla charterthai one of thc Commission's first tasks would be to organize work on Uie creation of an automatic laboratory for scientific research in cosmic space (an artificial earthills was to be the first step In solving the problems of interplanetary travel and to allow Soviet scientists to probe more deeply into thc secrets of the universe.

here is no direct evidence on the priority assigned to the Soviet space program. From thc launchings of the Sputniks, fromby Soviet scientists and highofficials and from the fact that hard-ware was diverted from the high priorityprogram, we believe the Inference can be drawn that the Soviet space explorationhas beenery high priority, ln many respects Soviet space programs and military missile programs arc complementary; we believe, for example, that thc Soviet space program has thus far primarily utilizedunits developed for the ICBM. There is no evidence to indicate that this hasaffected the ICBM program, and we believe that the space flight program will not be permitted to Interfere with the early achievement of an ICBM capability.

FACTORS AFFECTING ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PROGRAM

HI. Prerequisites to the initiation of anspace program are the development of large, reliable propulsion units and anelectronics program necessary forcommunications, guidance, tracking and data handling. We have estimated thatarge extent, the USSR has alreadythese capabilities in the field ofmissiles. By utilizing military missile development in the launchings of the first three Sputniks, the USSR lias attained ansuccess in Its program of spaceFurther successes In the Soviet space program depend upon capabilities In thefields of scientific and technical en-deavor

locket propulsion. The weights of the three Soviet satellites as announced by thc USSR (successively0

learly demonstrate Soviet capabilities for development of high thrust rocket engines. Soviet Interest In development of higher thrust rocket engines, higher energy fuelsolid propellants and advanced type propulsion systems has been indicated. These arc desirable for future launchings of larger satellites and necessary for mannedspace travel.

Guidance, tracking, andWe believe that the USSR ts currently capable of placing unmanned vehicles into orbital nights around the earth with certain elements of the orbit approximatelyAchievement of moreunar shots) can be expected to evolve from current capabilities. The USSR has an extensive detection, tracking and data handling network for use in its earth satellite program.

All three Soviet earth satellitessignals on publicly-announcedC

3 The Soviets havethat Sputnik III was equipped with memory devices lo store collected dala;

:

We also have good evidence lhat the Soviets are making Impressive progress In the field of radio astronomy. Allhough firmhave not been noted, such Soviet effort can be applied lo problems ofand of tracking and navigation of space vehicles.

Space medicine. The Soviets arean advanced research program In space medicine They have made particular progress In studying rocket flight physiology and in developing space fllghl equipment. Advanced investigations arc reported from the Institute of Biological Physics and theScientific Research Institute of Avialion

In Moscow and at leasttherInstitutes with an unknown number of subordinate laboratories. Atoviet scientists hove been Identified as the authors of significant papers in the field.

depth and scope or the Sovieteffort in space medicine indicatesto master Lhe fundamentalshuman performance and behaviorWe believe that high attitudewith animals have beenfor several years as announced byand additional medical andreportedly have been obtained fromin Sputnik IT. Research Is alsoon thc effects of accelerationsuper saturation of theoxygen, "sealed cabin" experiments,problems relating to manned

Astroblology. This field, dealing with the study of possible living organisms on other planets and of the adaptability of earth forms of life to conditions on other planets, is aresearch area In any space program directed toward manned Interplanetary flight. Soviet Interest In astrobiology is Indicated by the assignment6 of researchin this area lo the Interagencyfor Interplanetary Communications, whichcientific council ofmedical scientists to deal with this subject.

Celestial mechanics. This highly complex subject, which deals with studies of theof bodies in outer space under theot their mutual gravitationalhas an essential role In space flightThe Soviet Institute of Theoretical Astronomy, the largest of Its kind In the world, devotes much of its effort lo research inmechanics. There is evidence to indicate that Soviet scientists have made extensiveof moon flight trajectories

Astrophysics and geophysics. Theare highly competent In the field ofand In those aspects of geophysics relating to space travel. In general, thedata obtained from satellites or other

space vehicles will have significant value lo the USSR, not only In the furtherance of its space research activities, but In thcof its scientific and technological knowledge.

CAPABIUTIES TO ACCOMP1ISH SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

c believe thc Sovieis intend lo pursue an active space flight program designed to put men .into space for scientific and/or military purposes We also believe they Intend tofurther scientific research utilizing unmanned earth satellites, lunar rockets, and probes ol Mars and Venus. The dates given for Soviet space activities estimated in this section represent the earliest possible time periods at which wc believe each specific event could be accomplished. We recognize that the space flight program Is in competition with many other programs, particularly the missile program, and that the USSR probably cannot successfully accomplish all of the space flight activities described below within the Ume periods specified. We cannot at this time determine which specific space flight activities enjoy the higher priority and will be pursued first.

nmanned earth satellites" We believe that Uie USSR could orbit scientific satellites weighing on the orderounds within Uie next several months. The USSR could probably continue to place Into orbit more and perhaps even larger satellites throughout .Uie period of this estimate. As additional scientific data is obtained, the USSR could

-Reported characteristics of Soviet satelliteslaunched to date:

I

U

in

pounds

pounds

pounds

i'V,

8fc-

inches

plus feet

t base

min-

min-

months

months

months

refine or develop new scientificto be placed into satellites. Early In the period of this estimate1 could place Into orbit and recover aeromedlcal specimens from satellites, to provide essential Soviet knowledge of recovery techniques and ofeffectspace environment for man.

USSR could probably orbitsatellites capable of loweel) atwithin the next year, lo obtainand perhaps some additional dataintelligence value, such ason fleet movements. Withinor two. the USSR could developsurveillance satellites,photographic or TVphotography and/or ELINT.could provide more diverseand military information. Thealsoommunicationswithin the period of thisthey eleel to do so.

Lunar rockets. As far as propulsion and guidance requirements are concerned, the USSR has had thc capability ofrobe to the vicinity of thc moon since the falloviet program of lunar probes could commence with experimental rockets followed by rocket landings on the moon.atellite Into orbit around the moon requires the useetro-rocket and more accurate guidance We believe the USSR could achieve an unmanned lunar satellite innd an unmanned lunar soft landing using retro-rockets about six monLhs thereafter.

Manned earth satellites Sufficientdata could probably have been attained and recovery techniques perfected to permit the USSR toanned satellite Into orbital flight and recovery by. Recovery techniquesanned satellite, by both capsule and glide vehicle, appear to be feasible and within Soviet capabilities. In view of the wealth of Soviet experience with

29

ballistic missiles and earth satellite vehicles, we believe lhat the capsule will be used In the first Soviet attempt toan from orbit.

Planetary probes. Planetary probecould utilize existing Soviet ICBMunits for the first stage and presently available guidance components. We believe the USSR could launch probes toward Mars and Venusood chance of success. Tlic first launchings toward Mars could occur inhen Mars will be In the most favorable position relative to the earth. More sophisticated probes could be launchedhen Mars will again be In aposition relative to the earth. Similarly, the first launchings loward Venus couldoccur innd moreprobes could be launched In

Manned circumlunar flights.upon successes with manned earththe developmentew. large booster engine, and concurrent advances In scientific experimentations with lunar rockets, thc USSR couldapability for manned circumlunar flight with reasonable chance for success in.

Manned lunar landings. Wc believe that the USSR will notapability for manned lunar landings until sometime

Space platforms. There is Insufficient information on the problems involved Inplatforms In space to permit us to estimate Soviet capabilities In this regard. We believe, however, that the USSR would be capable ofery large satellite (say0 pounds) Into orbit.ehicle could serve some of thc(unctionspace platform without the difficulties of joining and constructinglatrorm in space from parts separately orbited.

r>

ANNEX A

TABLE !

probable sovtet development program tor surtacs-to-air missele stanns1

arbitrary cap ABILITY feet)

Qraund

U'-mched SA-1

Optimum design

Limited effKUre-ctss0

HORIZONTAL ACCURACY RANOE (nm) tCEP in feet)

(lbs and type)

Track-whlle-scan ra- Single stage(US deilpia- deployed^ InYO-YOi. ra- arounddesignation

B-2CO.

Oiler,WQ-

m.oco

Limited ss3

Radar track/radio command

BooiledoscowCould bewith ground-guidance system' coverage capabilitymobility. Could also be adspted withdifficulty toystem.

Optimum Osier.

altitude SO it. to

t. Limited effeetlve-

neai0

iflSBMWO

Seml-acUve conllnu- Basic low al'Jtudewith growtn po-

ror longer

CO

ranges and higher aiutuO*.

ISM-lSfll

command. Provides improved

terminal capabilities

defense of criti-

cal areas. Ramjet engines could be used although solid propellant would be preferable.

CptraV.or.al missile system with limited capacity against ICBMsM, capable of sobsecurnt Improvement.characteristic! of this lystem cannot be estimated. This system could possibly have some effectivenessitflMs. Byp,cr missile, the original system couldapability oBMnit hlgn altitude aircraft and cruise-type missiles

TABLE 1continued

PROBABLE BOVTET DEVELOPMENT PROORAM FOR QURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEM3 1

ARBITRARY CAPABrLTrr feel)

HORIZONTAL ACCURACY RANOE >CEP in feeli

t^unthed BA-4

after.

altitude so rv io

fl Limited effrtuve-nfiiO

M1 UptoHOOO

eor.UaO- Base- or

with dual ca-

pability agaliultargets.

Mid-course command. Basic SA-4eerUIn modi-

homlns;for ship-

board use Capable of dual employment against surface tar-

program as -probable" with varying degrees of confidence concemins* delated characteristics Caenisted tr.a

o icrcign vancv* itagn ofhich are not necessarily refiecied in this table For discussion of Soviet eapabii-'ties to develop an antl-saUiUla sjaiem. considered aspossloiniy, ace

'Data at which one or more mlaalies could have been plated In tha hands of trainee personnel In one operational unit

'Maximum altitude Is not neceaaally achieved at maximum honsoola! range

'Payload Includes tha erpieelv* device and its associated fusing and Brine mechanisms

Those missTe types for which Mran supported by significant current intelligence are indicated by an astensk following

" Nuclear warheads would Increase the kill probabilities achievable with these missiles and willequirement for effective use of the missiles under some conditions. However, HE warheadj will be effective in most applications.

TABLE 2

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS

MATH COMPATIBLE AIRCRAFT

RACY PAYLOAD* OR06S

I CEP In (lbs and

AA-1*

(HE)

A Modified Flashlight

quarter 2V,* Head-on)

vtetM"

fared homing

(HE)

Fresco

aceplate Fitter

fighter

byrangem

to tall-cone attack in good weather

D.

all-weather

tried

Flashlight Fishpoi

weather

ra. dar homing

(HE)

Dlashlight

Tat 11

homing

FlShpOE

IHead-

Talti

Infrared homing

(Tall Only)

Halted

semi-actlve radar and passive homingor ECM)

Tall)

All angle attack

go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected In this table. "The date at which one or more missiles could have teen placed in the hands of trained personnel Li one operational unitincludes the explosive device and its associated fusing andring mechanism

Jidieated on the chart.lus the speed of the Uunchlng aircraft is eonr-deredipeedhe missiles estimated except forhich probablyelocity of Mach

aSgna?on.:eMU,MlMalanine* nt intelligence are Indicated by an asterisk following the missile

probabilities achlevablewllh these missiles and willequirement for effective use of the missiles under some conditions. However. HE warheads will be affective In some applications.

PRG3ABLE SOVIET DEVELO PMENT PROGRAM FOR AIR-TO SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS '

as-:

arbitrary operational maximum reference capability operational

DESIGNATION (nm)

ACCURACY (CEP)

OUIDANCE

ARKS '

lbs and type)

leam-ridtrNuclear, Launched from aircraft at a>

HE Utudei0OI0

radar Mlullr filesancle

approach againstradar targets such as ships. Soviet designation -Komet-

Alternate guidance by use of radar track/radio command guidance system for cm againit leu wellEP cfeet

of several

f

jldar.ee systems Deluding radar or IncrUal typei with or without terminal homing

nm depending on guidance ayi-tem. Terminal homing canccuracyeel.

Naclear Oeniral un miuile Thewil! be dependent upon urge:ell aa type of guldanc*

We evaluate this program as -probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics.

which are not necessarily rt$0Mftt

Tne USSRlj probably developing and may now have operational an air-launched decoy to simulate medium or heavy bomben

_ Each missile Usled

probably go through various stages of developmentre not necessarily re Reeled In this table.date al which one or core missiles could have been placed In the hands of trained ptraoeinel In one operational ur.il

includes the explosive dev.ee and Its associated rosing aad firing mechanism

ype* for whleh our estimates art supported by significant current lnUlliger.ee are indicated by an asunak

"Some of these missiles could be modified to home on air defense radar.

3-1

5

s i

o 0

91

5*

I

11

P

SO

frail

SiKk

TOP .

TABLE 4continued

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROORAM FOR GROUND-LAUNCHED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE OUIDED MISSILES'

C3M

arbitrary operational capability operation

m

SS-antl-tank prior6 OO yards

adarInn

3nm

allrot* men l.

l wire

Unk.

PAYLOAD' cttype)

CONTTOU

S.OM possibly Probably two The possibility 1* bal- excluded ihat a

operaOonal

capability win be established in6 with missile! comparatively un-proven as toand Ity.

haped Single charge KE

stage There Is nolo support estimate oi this missile, which ls based on logicalto meet an estimatedrequirement

evaluate ihll program ai "probable- with varying degrees cf confidence concerning detailed characteristics Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected In this table. We estimate that considerable energy win be expended in second generation longer-range missiles, particularly on an ICBM o( greatly improvediscussion of ground-launched cruise-type missiles and decoys ice0 nm ballistic mlaslles.ery short range tactical missiles,

' Date at which one or more missiles could have been placed In the hands of trained personnel In one operational unit.

'In the Initial versions of thehrough SS-S. the guidance system may not be solely electronic, but may Include some menialFor thisadar track-radio commana/inertial guidance system li Indicated.

'CEP ls the radiusircle in whleh. statistically, one-half of the Impacts wtil occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhat better than the accuracies specified In tbe table which take Into consideration average degradation factors.

* Payload includes the explosive device and IU associated fusing and firing mechanism. The weight of the structure and the heatof the nosecone are not included Inor missiles upautical miles range, we believe HE. Nuclear or CWemp-oyed in accordance with Soviet military policy and dependent upon nuclear stockpiles, missile accuracy, character of Useresults desired We estimate lhal for miuilri with rangesautical miles and over, only nuclear warheadsewe do not exclude the possibility of CW use Inm

'For discussion of Soviet ICBM payload-carrying capacity, see paragraph 79

missile types for which our estimates are supported by significant current Intelligence STe indicated by an asterisk following the missile designation.

TABLE 4

PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROORAM FOR NAVAL-LAUNCHED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE GUIDED MISSILES'

ARBITRARY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE(nm)

UpUtM

RsGsr Uaek/radio command from sub-

marlr

ACCURACY' <CEP in nnii

uclear Crulee-type

Subsonic missile tor launch I<

' marines Currantlor emplcv mcnt with Broiled number of converted submarines. Alio torn, paubie forhij i

launched from surface orSolid orliquid missile pro-MM

in the period of thU eaUmaU. the USSR will probably hareuided missile lyitem for uae la anti-submarine warfare Characteristic! cannot be estimated at present

evaluate this program aa "probable" with varying degree* of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile Listed Mlo through various lUm or development which are not necessarily reflected In this tableiscussion of them naval-launched cruise-type missile see.

' Dale al which one or more missiles could have been placed In the hands of trained personnel In one operational unit. 'CEP Is the radiusircle In which, statistically, one-half of the Impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhatihan the accuracies specified In the table which take Into consideration average degradation factor*.

Includes theIt* "ioclaied firing and fusing mechanism. In the case of SS-S. the weight of thethe heat protection of the noaecont are not Included In

TABLE 6

POSSIBLE SOVIET SPACE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

P'tOORAM OBJECTIVES

Unmanned Satellites IOY"

Aeromedlcal (recoverable!

Surveillance (weather and limited military appllcaUc-n)

Lunar Rockets

Exploratory probes and Impacts Lunar satellite Soft landlnes

TOSS IB LE CAPABILITY DATS 1

carIy

Earlh Satellites IRccovetabjel

Capsule-type satellites

Glide-type vehicles

Heavyounds I

etary Probes Mars Venus

89

Cii lunar Flights

Lunar landings

dates represent the earliest possible Umc period In which each specific event could be successfully accomplished. However,etween thc space program and Ihc military missile program as well as within the space program Itself makes It unlikely that all of these objectives will be achieved within thc specified time periods.

'We estimate that the USSR couldcientific satellite weighing on the orderounds within the next several months.

Original document.

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