MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1958-63 (NIE 11-4-58)

Created: 12/23/1958

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3 December 5

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER

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MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

IN FULL

Submitted try the

DIRECTOR Or CENTRAL INTKLL ID EN CE

Tha tollntolng Intelligence organizations %ai tic tinted in the preparation oi [his trtfnute The Central litetnaen.ee Agency and the intenigence orya.iUa.unns of the Deya'tmente of State the Army, the Nuiy.arce The htm Stall. De tame, and thrbr.cgi

Concurrede UNITED STATUS INTELLIGENCEI) Oil ISS. Concurring were The Qlrttlar ol in tetligence and Research. Department ol State, the AwWani Chieftaff for InteUigence. Department of the Arm, the Assistant Chief Ol Nepal Operations /or Intttlinenee.ol the Ss-.y. the Asmtant ChUI ol Staff, filial IVSAW. the Director lor mteUlocr.ee. The Joint Staff- the Assistant to the Secretary ol Defense. Special Operations: and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to thc USIIJ The Director ol the National Secuniy Agency end the Aistitant Direclor. Fetttrat Bureau of Investigation,the subject being outtute ol thii- luristltction

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE

SUMMARY

I. INTERNAL POLITICAL

Ascendancy of

Role of the

Issues In Soviet

Attitudes in Soviet

The Longer

II. TRENDSE SOVIET

Shifts In Economic

Prospects for Economic

Trends In Defense

Industrial

Agricultural

Trends In

Foreign

IU. TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Scientific Manpower. Training and

Soviet Capabilities in Major Scientific

Space

Nonmilifary Applications of Atomic Energy

Physics and

Cnetnistry and

Medical

Biological and Agricultural

Industrial

IV. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SOVIET MILITARY

Soviet Military Thinking and

Major Objectives of Military

Soviet Altitudes Toward Limited and General War .

Policy on Stxe and Types of

Military Policy Toward Other Bloc Nations

Special Weapon

Nuclear Weapons

Guided

Intercontinental Ballistic

Chemical and Biological

Electromagnetic

f

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Strengths and Capabilities of Soviet

High

Long-Range Striking

Long-Range

Inter continental Ballistic

Other Long-Range Ballistic

MIssOe-Launchlng

Capabilities for Long-Range

Air Defense

Air Defense

Air Defense Radar and Control. 42

Air Defense

Passive

Air Defense

Ground Forces and Tactical Air

Capabilities for Major Land

Against Western Europe andreece, Turkey, and the Middlethe Far

Naval

Submarine 47

Capabilities for Naval

V. TRENDS IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER

Relations with the

Bloc Relations with

Relatlona with Communist

VL TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN

IntroductionTlie Current Conduct ot Soviet Policy

Current Soviet Objectives and Main Lines of Policy .

Attitude Toward

A Posture for

The Underdeveloped Countries in Soviet Strategy

Trade and

Attitude Toward the

Soviet Policy in Particular

The Middle

A"Jfa

Western

Latin

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

THE PROBLEM

To review significant developments affecting thc USSR's internal politicaleconomic developments, military programs, relations with other Bloc states, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through'

SUMMARY ESTIMATE

New tendencies have appeared on the Soviet political scene during the past year. Externally, tlie lines of conflict with the West have been drawn more sharply once again, and "reduction of tensions" no longer is thc major theme of Sovietpolicy. Internally there has been both in tho USSR and in the Bloc an attempt to consolidate and stabilize, to check the pace of change, lo curb the expectations and discipline the unruly tendencies aroused among the people by the milder policies of the post-Stalin years. There haseturn to arigor in policy and in ideology.the changes which affected almost every aspect of Soviet internal and external policy in the years after Stalin's death have for the most part not been reversed. The flexibility and pragmatism of the current leadership continues;in policy may still be forthcoming, particularly in internal affairs.

"The referenceive-year period IsThe economic eakulaUoru cany through IMS. to conform to the Soviet Seven-Tear Plan;ot tha politicaln the other hand, pertain to period! of less than five yeara.

Trendj in Foreign Policy

During the course of the last year there hasistinctly hardening tone in Soviet foreign policy. It Is true that many of the new features introduced after the death of Stalin remain in force. Thc claim to be pursuing policies in theof esUblishing "peaceful coexistence" is still made; programs of culturaland generally freor contact with the outside world have been continued.ew militancy and asscr-tiveness in Soviet policy has emerged more and more clearly. This has been most strikingly manifest in the Quemoy and Middle East crises, and in the developing crisis over Berlin,

The Soviet leaders probably decided that thc special emphasis they had given to "peaceful coexistence" and easing of tensions had out-lived its usefulness. It had not had the anticipated effect of weakening Western alliances. Someof the relaxationnewto Yugoslavia, the repudiation of Stalin, and the leeway given for some

national autonomy in theproved dangerous to Soviet authority in Eastern Europe. A return toarder course probably seemed desirable on those grounds alone. But at the same time, lt appeared Justified by thc Soviet leaders' belief that, in power terms, there had been an enhancement of thc Bloc's positionecline in that of the West. This belief probably was based in the first place on Soviet weapons advances andachievements. There waseeling that thc outlook was good for new advances in Bloc economic strengtheriod of some difficulty, while at the same time Western economies were believed to be showing symptoms of economic crisis. Then, too, the Soviet leaders considered that Communistwas generally growing stronger in underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, while Westerncontinued to decline. Theof the Soviet leaders that they were enteringromising phase In the "struggle against imperialism" has been articulatedew doctrine, namely, that an irrevocable shift in the relation of forces in thc world has taken place to the advantage of the Communist Bloc.his more confident and militanton the part of the Soviet leadership does not mean that it has revised itstoward war as an Instrument of policy. Wc continue to believe that the Soviet leaders have no intention ofinitiating general war and still wish to avoid serious risks ofar. They almost certainly believe that, even with the acquisition of long-rangecapable oi striking the US, the scale of damage they would suffereneral nuclear war would threaten the survival of their regime and society. Moreover,

they regard the final victory of as inevitable, and to be achieved mainly through political forms of struggle. The maintenance andstrengthening of great military power is primarily intended toesort to force by the "Imperialist" enemy, and to counteighty factor inhim to submit peacefullyuccession of political reverses as the revolutionary tide advances. Situations might arise, however, in which the Soviets would judge that military force could be used without unacceptable risk or that an imminent threat left them with no recourse but to Initiate military action.urrently, while the Soviets still wish to avoid serious risks of general war, they probably believe that the Bloc canits pressure on the West and can exploit local situations more vigorously, perhaps .even through the use of Bloc armed force, without incurring theegree of risk as they would haveWhile wc have always considered it possible that Bloc forces would be used in overt local aggression if this could be done without much risk of seriouswith Western forces, we do not believe that the likelihood of suchhas increased. The Soviets may even believe that the West, also conscious of Soviet gains in military power, will be more and more disinclined to react Consequently, they now seemto lest Western firmness and probe for weaknesses in the hope that some key position may be abandoned withoutresistance, or that the Westernwill split over some such issue.

n employing pressures against the West, the Soviet leadership doubtlessto proceed with care. But itswith calculations of power.

its evident confidence in the strength of the Communist position, may lead it to underestimate dangers. We believe that if the current attitude of theleaders persists, the danger of war arising from miscalculations will be

he USSR hasajor effort over the last several years towardcountries. Its trade and aid programs, propaganda and culturalare intended to displace Western influence, and to orient thc policies of such states increasingly loward theBtoc. The Soviet leaders believe that if they can associate tho aspirations of underdeveloped peoples with their own cause they can increasingly constrict the political maneuverability of their main enemies, the Western Powers. Wethat thc Soviet leaders will continue to regard the effort to develop Communist influence in underdeveloped countriesajor facet of their policy. The USSR's targets among the underdevelopedmay shift considerably, lnwith changing opportunities and local setbacks. In those countries where its efforts arc most successful, tho USSR may increasingly be tempted to support local communists in attempts to seize power. But the Soviets would carefully weigh such gains against the harmful consequencesolicy wouldevoke elsewhere. They willgenerally maintain the pose ofcooperation. Since tho claimpeace-loving" policy is one of theelements of the Soviot appeal to the neutralist states, tbe desire to sustain the plausibility of this claim will impose some restraint on the hard andtone of Soviet policy toward the West.

The major Soviet effort to extendIn underdeveloped areas has been made in the Middle East, where the West has Important economic and strategicTlie USSR will continue itsof economic and military aid to Arab states, hoping to deepen tho conflict of Arab nationalism with tho West. The initial aim of this policy ls to displace Western and increase Soviet influence, and to make Western access to theof the area precarious. Theleaders probably also contemplate thc eventual achievementong-sought Russianaccess to the strategic areas of the Middle East. To this end, they will continue to encourage and support such movements as that for an independent pro-Soviet Kurdish state andro-Communist government in Iraq, and will also continue pressures against Iran and Turkey.

The Soviets also hope that radical anti-Western nationalism Ln the Middle East can eventually beevolutionary turn toward Communism. While they probably intend for the present to support Nasser's claim to leadership of the Arab nationalist movement, they regard himbourgeois nationalist" whose roleransitory one.avorableLn some Arab country, they may encourage local Communists tothe nationalist movement anda seizure of power. An openbetween Soviet revolutionary policy and Nasser's claim to leadership of the Arab nationalist movement may occur during the period of this estimate.

South Asia and tho Far East,and Chinese Communist policycontinue to emphasizecontacts, supported byeconomic aid and cultural exchange

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an active propaganda,iew to encouraging neutralist policies and where possible openly an ti-Western ones. Shortavorable opportunity to establish Communist powerey country, the Chinese and Soviets will probablyto put their main reliance onaction intended to influencerather than to overthrow them, and if possible to associate them with the Bloc against the Western Powers. As regards Africa and Latin America, the Soviet Government apparently views with optimism its prospects for successfuland economic penetration and, in keepingurrent trend, can be expected to intensify its efforts in these areas.

oviet policy in Europe appears to be aimed more at consolidating the USSR's position In Eastern Europe than at an early expansion of Soviet power beyond the frontiers of the bloc. Soviet policy toward Western Europe is concerned mainly with breaking up the NATOand military alliance and thestructure located in that area. Tills is the main purpose of their maneuvers and proposals aimed atpart from the ever-present aim of creating discord among the NATO allies, the more immediateobjectives are to prevent an increase of West German military strength and to prevent the cstablishmentof additional missile bases in Western Europe

he current Soviet diplomaticover the status of Berlin is the most striking example of Khrushchev's activist foreign policy. It appears designed to strengthen the East Gorman regime as well as toore receptivefor other Soviet proposals on Germany and to create divisions among

the NATO allies. The Soviet leadersIntend to be cautious and tactically flexible. We believe that they will try to direct Soviet and Eastanner which will avoid military conflict with the Western allies, while at the same time they will be prepared to take advantage of any signs of weakness on the part of the West, or of inclinations to compromise on major issues.they have already committed themselves considerably, and we believe that the crisis may be severe, withchance of miscalculation by one or both sides. We do not believe that thc Soviets intend to modify the main lines of their policy on thehole, but will continue to insist on maintaining tho present division of Germany. They regard the preservation of Communist control in East Germany as essential to the maintenance ofpower in Poland and Eastern Europehole. They hope totheir control of that area and to force Western recognition of theand permanence of the Communist regimes there.

oviet disarmament policy, which has at times shown some flexibility,inimum to earn credit for the USSR as the leading proponent ofctual Soviet proposals are aimed mainly at the withdrawal of US military power from Western Europe and other bases, and also at discrediting and inhibiting US reliance on nuclearWhile it ts possible that the USSR would accept some limitations on its own military posture in order to further these objectives, the Soviets would almostnot consent to any very extensive scheme for mutually inspected Wc believe that there is little like-

that the Soviets willroad disarmament agreement strongly enough to move their policy significantly in the direction of thc positions now held by the Western Powers.

InlrO'Bloc Relations

In the lastajor effort has been undertaken Ui consolidate the unity of Bloc states. The conference ofparties in7 launched thc so-called anti revisionist campaign in order to curb deviatlonist tendencies which threatened6 to eliminateinfluence from Poland and Hungary. The latter regime Ls again effectively under Moscow's control and the Gomulka government in Poland, while stillParty autonomy and some degree of independence in its internal policy, is showing itself more deferential to Soviet guidance. As compared with Stalin's methods. Moscow's authority in thewill continue to be exercisedout of deference to nationalin the very long run, wethere willendency for direct Soviet control over these states to bePopular dissatisfaction will remain widespread in Eastern Europe, but we believe that thc recurrence of popularor of an attemptatelliteParty to defy Moscow on vital issues is unlikely at least over the next few years.

Tlie scale oi China's power and thc fact that the Chinese Communist Party has long been organizationally independ-entof the USSR has made the Sino-Soviet relationship more nearly one of equality. The parallelism of material, strategic, and ideological interests will continue to weigh decisively in favor of cementing the alliance of Lhe two countries, even though

frictionsariety ofissues, economic and militaryby the USSR to China, competition for influence in other Communistfrom time to time make theensitive and difficult one. We believe that Communist China will attain over the next several years aninfluence on general Bloc policy and Communist ideology. However, so long as the struggle against the Western Powers remains the principal concern of both regimes, there ls unlikely to be any serious split between them.

Soviet Internal Polilical Situation

Khrushchev's leadership of the Soviet regime does not seem likely to be seriously challenged so long as his health remains vigorous. In the absence of such aor of any major setback to liishe does not seem Likely toeturn to the terroristic methods ofemployed by Stalin. Heto recognize that the abandonment of such methods has Improved theclimate within the country.the regime is now againiUs valance against dissenters, and would probably not hesitate to use more severely repressive measures if it judged this to be necessary. We believe that, even though the regime continues tomany, especially amongand thc youth, it has gained wider acceptance among the populationThis is due mainly to theof police terror, to improvements in material standards, and to pride in the power, world position, scientific andachievements of the Soviet state.

We believe that, although there will be differences within the Sovietover certain Issues of policy, and dls-

contents within some groups of thethe regime will seldom bein major foreign policy decisions by concern for Internal poliUcalShould Khrushchev die, there would probably againeriod ofjockeying for the leadership. It is unlikely that this would basically affect the continuity of the regime's policies or its ability to carry them out, buteriod might diminish thc authority of the Soviet Party within the Bloc and lead to divisions within and amongParties. Over the very long run, loss of belief in thc ideological doctrine the regime imposes, and the Increasingof professional elements who arc not ideologically inclined, may moderate the Soviet outlook. At present, however, we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project Its rapidlypower externally.

Trends in lhe Sovietoviet economic policy continues to aim primarilyapid expansion of the economic bases of national power. We believe that the goals laid down in the new Seven-Ycar Plan, which beginsre in the main feasible, except for those In agriculture, and that the USSR's gross national product <GNP) will grow at an average annual rate of about six percent during the plan period.that the US maintains an average rate of growth ofercent per year, Soviet GNP5 will be, in dollar terms, about half that of the US, aswith aboutercent at present. Despite the smaller size of its economy, the dollar value of the USSR's defense expenditure Is about equal to that of the

US. Our estimates of thc probable trend of military expenditures Indicate that3 these willercent greater thanince growth of GNP in this period is estimated atercent, the defense burden may thus be slightly heavier3 than at present Despite this, we estimate that Soviet industrial production will grow over the new plan period at an average annual rate of about nine percent, and that per capitawill be about one-third higher5 than it was

eyond what they contribute to Soviet military power, the achievements of the Soviet economy haveitallyclement In thc impact whichpolicy has on the world situation. First is the direct politico-economicarising from the ability of the USSR to Initiate and support programs ofaid or credit to foreign countries, to import goods from countries which would otherwise be hard-pressed to find, markets, and to export various materials in quantities which (if the Soviet leaders so desired) could disrupt previouslypatterns of world trade. In this connection, manipulation of pricesey weapon of the USSR. Second is the political and psychological effect oncountries of the successful and rapid economic development achieved by Soviet and Chinese methods. Theand Chinese Communist leadersgreat importance to the possibility of convincing these countries that only by adopting Communist methods andCommunist assistance can they too achieve rapid economic growth. Third is the economic impact In asense, arising inevitably from the appearance in thc worldreat new producing and trading unit, the mflu-

TOP

of which could not fail to be great even if it were not dehberately used for political purposes by the Soviet leaders. In all three ways the Soviet economy willrowing challenge to theworld.

Dovolopmonts Affecting fhe Soviel Military Posture-

The Soviets will almost certainlyto believe that they mustarge and diversified militarydesigned to meet contingencies up to and including general war. Thus they will at all times maintain substantial forces-in-being. Meanwhile, they will press ahead with research andprograms in order to acquirecapabilities with advanced weapon systems, and if possible to achieve clear military superiority over the US.

The present Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile could include weaponsange of yields fromT toT. The USSR probably possessesnuclear weapons toajor attack by its long-range striking forces, but the supply of fissionableis probably insufficient for large-scale allocation of such weapons to alr defense and tactical uses as well. Since woubstantial and highSoviet program for the expansion of fission Able material production and considerable further improvement inweapons technology, we boliove that current limitations will ease.

The principal Soviet militarypresently capable of long-rangeattack is Long Range Aviation, withombers (includingmong which

areet medium bombers andet and turboprop heavy bombers. Thissuited for attacking targets in Eurasia and itscapable of large-scale attacks against the US only through theuse of medium bombers on one-way missions. While the size of the long-range bomber force will probably declino gradually, Soviet long-rango striking capabilities will increase markedly as the stockpile of nuclear weapons grows,bombers are Introduced, theand proficiency of the bomber force increases, and especially as the Soviet capacity to deliver nuclear weapons by missiles expands.*

he USSR will rely increasingly upon missiles as nuclear delivery systems. Present operational weapons include ground-launchedmissiles with ranges upndautical miless well as bomber-launched air-to-surface missiles suitable for use against ships and

'The Assistant Chief of SUff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, doti not concur In Uie list lenience of this paragraph. Be agree* that Soviet loEg-range sUlklng capabilities will Increase markedly bul believe, lhal this Increase cannot be allrttuled lo the latroducUon ofbombers of Um types and within lhalevels estimated, or lo continuedof bombern hlathe eaUmated acquisition by lhe USSRubstantial ICBM capability, along with lhe anticipated Increase In the Soviet nuclear wcapona stockpile, are lactois which far outweigh comparatively routine Improvements to the existing force. Therefore, he believes that the last sentence of thinshould read as follows: The Soviets can be expected to Introduce Unproved bombers and to Increase the readiness and proficiency of Long Range AvlaUon units, but the ttw of this force and its significanceong-range attack role wiU gradually decline during the period.Soviet long-range atrlklng capabilitiesIncrease markedly as Ibe Soviet missile dellTerr capability expands and aa Lhe stockpile of nuclear weapons grows."

ilHOHEV

otherewsubmarines have probably been converted to. cruise-type missiles. The USSR will probablyirst operational capability withrototype ICBMs. range at some timehile it is possibleimited capability with comparatively unproven ICBMs might have been establishede believe this to be unlikely. We believe thatplanners intend toizeable ICBM capability as soon as practicable.

defense capabilities willimprovements in thecharacteristics of weaponsa higher proportion offighters, further incorporationmissiles in the defenses oftargets, and especially throughof semiautomatic aircontrol. But the Soviets willto have difficulty in opposingaltitude attack, the air defensewill still be subject to disruptionand thc problem ofwill become more critical.will probably not have awith even limitedballistic missiles3

ground forces, estimated tomechanized or motorizedifle divisions,irborne divisions, have beenmodernized and reorganized,with revised Sovietwhich supplementsand training with thoseconditions of nuclear warfare.are closely supported byconsisting of fighters trainedground attack role (In additionair dofense role) and light and

medium bombers trained in groundbombing techniques. Withair and naval support, Soviet ground forces are capable of conducting large-scale operations on several fronts into peripheral areas, separately orThe Increasing availability of nuclear weapons and guidedill bring furtherchanges, but probably no major alterations in size or deployment of forces. Tactical and naval air units, some of which have already received jet medium bombers, will probably receive newfighters and bombers. Increasing attention is being paid to theof airborne forces and air transport capabilities.

The present Soviet force ofubmarines includesong-range craft of postwar design andecent slowdown inhift to new types,nuclear-powered submarines anddesigned specifically to employ guidedubmarine-launched ballistic missile systemissile range of, will probably be available for flrst operational use. Construction of conventional submarines will probably continue, but the greater complexity ofand missile submarines willrestdtotal annual production rate considerably below the high levels of recent years.

Space Programs. We believe that thc USSR is presently capable of orbiting earth satellites weighing on the orderounds, of launching lunar probes and satellites, and of launchingprobes to Mars and Venus. Its space program could also Include: surveillance satellites and recoverable aeromcdical

soft landings" by lunar rockets and recoverable manned earthanned glide-type high altitude research; earth satellites weighing as much0 pounds and manned cir-cumlunar. While each of these individual achievements appears feasible as to technical capability and earliest date attainable, we doubt that the USSR could accomplish all of these space flight activities within the time periods specified. If the Soviets desire to do so, an earth satellite could be launched from the territory ofChina within the next year or so.

Soviet Scientific Achievements

he USSR's achievements during the last year, including earth satellite Jaunch-

ings, weapons development, and the scale of Its efforts in the IGY program, have strikingly demonstrated that the USSR hascientific establishment of the rank.esultustained effort over the last three decades, the number of graduates in scientific and technical disciplines has steadilyresearch facilities have been greatly expanded, and the quality ofscientific 'raining has improved. Soviet scientists have made markedin many areas of fundamental and applied research and in some fields rank among thc best in thc world Wc believe that significant Soviet advances in science and technology are likely to occur in thc future with greater frequency than in tbe past.

-'POP on CRET

DISCUSSION I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

of Khrushcliov

Khrushchev's position as thefigure on the Soviet scene appears to be well established. There does not appear to be any other leader or any group able or willing seriously to challenge his position. The Twenty-First Party Congress, scheduled foray install still more of his followers in the highest Party organs and further dramatize his personal and Ideological authority. Thus, It is likely to bewho will preside over the Sovietthroughout the period of this estimate, assuming that ho retains his health and vigor. However, Khrushchev's policies will probably continue to arouse concern among certain elements of the Party, and an attempt to reduce his authority cannot be entirely

Although ho Isense Stalin's heir, Khrushchev will almost certainly not rule as Stalin ruled. The style of his leadership Is characteristic of his own personality, and is reflecteduitable myth: the new leaderregarious man of tho people, and"close to theeough and practical-minded man, but his political Judgment Is unerring, and like Lenin hethe Party by the persuasive force of his arguments rather than by the fear heThis Image probably reflects theIn which Khrushchev prefers to rule; he fancies himself as the popular boss-persuader. Hla method of leadership Is also consistent with the needs of the post-Stalin period.he will be disposed to avoid the use of terrorain instrument of rule, though the police will be kept strong and employed es necessary. Errors In judgment, evenon some issues, will not generally be treated as poutlcal crimes. Tlie Centraland Party Congresses will probably continue to meet regularly. There will be greater representation of outlying regions at

the center, and more concern displayed for local Interests. In short, the consolidation of Khrushchev's power will probably noteturn to dictatorship of the Stalinist type.

there will continue to beon Khrushchev which will work toexercise of dictatorial power. Sinceunlike Stalin's, does not rest onof terror, Khrushchev must to adegree seek to win and hold thoof groups within the PartyParty maneuvcrings are complicatedfact that greater account must bepopular sentiment than was trueKhrushchev's position in particularbecause he Is identified withsocial programs which havedesires for further materialand he is thusood record ofrelation to promises. At some pointperiod of this estimate Khrushchevthe dilemma cither of toleratingviews within the leadership,his control, or of attemptingopposition tendencies, at the costreturn to terror. If, although we thinka serious challenge toposition should arise, not all ofand associates who supported himhis rise to power would necessarilyto him.

ebullient personality ofbeen considered by some observersto give Soviet foreign andan erratic and unstable course.this is unlikely. Ills public mannerin large part that of thetic lan, intended to confound hisand to impart vigor to thehis policies. His advocacy of certaindepartures in Soviet policies lnwas probably not unrelated to effortsa march on hla competitors ln the

11

struggle. We think that thoas distinguished from the style, ofpolicy Is likely to be little affected by Khrushchev's idlosyncracles.

Roto of the Party

he victory of Khrushchev has beenby an Increasing use of the Partyin all aspects of control andAt the top, to the Party Presidium, the majority now consists of Khrushchev's followers who were elevated from theand of important regional Partythe former overwhelmingof men In leading government positions has been drastically reduced* Partyeither preside over or play Important roles In the regional economic councils which now administer the economy In place of tbe former central ministries. Local Partyhave also been brought Into the district military councils, giving theloser hold on military administration. In rural areas measures have been taken to give the local Party more effective control over

M. This Increased role of the Party at all levels of administration was probably Intended In part to Insure Khrushchev's firm control over the country, since the Party apparatus was his principal instrument of power. But thc reforms in industry and agriculture which he has sponsored in recent yearsall Involving decentralizationuller reliance on local Initiativehave also made closer Partymore necessary In order to combat local violations of the Parry's economicUnder Khrushchev much moro willon morale and discipline within the Party .it local levels than has been the case to the past

present.f theull members of th* Party's Presidium nold key potts In the Parly apparatusf thcndther than Khrushchev himself hold leading governmental positions. By contrast, at the Uim of UalenkoVs removal int thefull members of theere In ItMllDg eovemrncntal positions, and only Khrusbctiavull time official In the Party apparatus.

he Increase In authority ot tho Party apparatus has taken place at the expenso of the various interest groupings which compete for place and Influence behind the facade of totalitarian Party unity. The professional military opposes the system of politicaland, despite Zhukov's removal forto reduce Party control over the armed forces, this attitude will persistadministrators and economicwill continue to resent what they regard as the bumbling Interference of Party hacks In their technical spheres.writers, artists, scientists, studentswill continue to pressreater area of freedomoosening ot the Party'sstrait-Jacket While each of these groupstake to the success andof the Soviet state, each bas alsoInterests to further. One purpose of Khrushchev to elevating the PartyIs to prevent the hardening of these professional interests into self-contained,groups which might ultimately have Independent political Importance.

t has been suggested by some Western observers that, as the Soviet economy matures and becomes more complex, as the needs of society come to be met by more specialized administrative skills, as education ts extended and diversified, the totalitarian character of the regime will be diluted. The dictator or the Party as the single focus of power. It has been argued, will give way to autonomy In areas of less immediate political significance. Even in the political field, institutionalwill have to be found formany diverse Interest groups: It was possible to see signs otendency In thc post-Stalin period of confusion occasioned by the succession struggle. On occasion, thc Central Committee of the Party became an arena of political decision with factional and policy differences represented within it In the post-Stalin period the rulers have also seemed to think It necessary lo take account of public opinion generally to framing their policies. Such tendencies to dilute arbitrary power and to broaden participation to policy-

12

beyond the narrow circle of the Parly presidium may reappear at the tunc ofdeath or at some other period of weakened authority. For the present,Khrushchev's restoration of one-man leadership. Mid his manner of achieving It through the Party apparatus, hai maintained Soviet society firmly In thc totalitarian mold.

Ii'.ues in Soviet Politics

his development does not mean that there will not continue to be group pressures nnd much pulling and hauling over issues of policy. Even under one-man leadership the normal play of politics is not adjourned, though it may become less visible. Thereumber of Issues over which lines are likely to be drawn behind thc facade of unity, for example, whatever the degree of Its practical success, the economic reorganization scheme Is laden with political significance. It calls for the removalost of bureaucrats from Moscow to theate little relished by the migrants. The reorganization could leadegionalism which wouldew source of tension, although thc revitallied Party must, In Khrushchev's calculation, serve as thc cement which binds the periphery to the center. This reorganization, Uke the ideologically controversial measureshas sponsored Ln agriculture, has yet to be fully proved in practice. Khrushchev may yet be driven to some agile maneuvering to defend his Innovations.

lso among the issues likely to affectParty politics are those related to Soviet economic growth. The growth achieved may not be high enough to attain all tho goalshigh rales of investment, increase In agricultural output, rising living standards, modern armamentswhich now haveln Party programs. Cutting back on any of these objectives could lead to dispute. The leaders of the armed forces, for example, would not willingly accept either acut En the military budget or reducedfor Industries of militaryThe Party apparatus itself. Influenced by the lower ranks where there Is directwith popular pressures, would be re-

luctant to sacrifice prospective gains In living standards. Failure to achieve satisfactory rates of growth could produce resistance to further outlays In foreign aid or bring into question Khrushchev's economic

here are likewise some purely political issues which may have divisive effects. The Soviet ruling groups would be reluctant toeturn to the systematic use of terror. The question of the control of the secret police Is of widespread concern and would become paramount In case Khrushchev's mastery were ever placed in doubt. There must be some In positions of Influence who arewith what seems to them theof Soviet authority ln the Bloc, as represented by toleration of the Gomulkain Poland and Lhe increasing weight ot China In Ideological and policy matters. There may be others who questionpolicy of alliance, with "nationalmovements" in underdeveloped areas on the ground thatolicy Increases the danger of war arising from clashes with Western Interests, and Involves support of bourgeois movements wlilch cannot be used -to promote Communism.

late arrival at(he isill make thea new successionively, iffactor in inner Partyhe grows older It will be difficult topolicy Issues like those discussedthe succession question. Thuswill probably continue lo bethe Soviet body politic despiteof power at the top, andfrom time to time affect the facepolicy presents to the outside world.

Altitudos in Soviet Society

post-Stalin leadership set out toa basic improvement In the attitudeSoviet people toward the regime. Theof police terror and the greaterto living standards served thisgreatest material gains so far haveby the peasantry,ontinuingof urban standards over the next

K*f

years, particularly In housing. Is also promised. In terms of Its standing with the populationhole, the regime Is probably stronger now than It was five years ago. We believe that thc measures which havethis Improvement will be continued.

Soviet society continues nevertheless to be marked by substantial areas of discontent. There exists, and will probably continue to exist, considerable disaffection amongparticularly among Soviet writers and university students. It ls significantItighly vulnerable area, the regime's Ideological authority. Intellectuals are aware of the discrepancies between the MarxUt-Leninist ideal and Soviet reality and they also resent the regime's encroachments on private life and professional Interests. They doubt that adequate safeguards exist to prevent the repetition of Stalinist terror. They feel contempt tor Party careerists. They resent restrictions on travel abroad, andon access to Western publications and broadcasts. These discontents do not take the form of active opposition but are limited for the most partetreat Into an inner world so ns to minimize the degree ofwith thc Party and the slate.

There continues also to be dissidence among some national minorities. Theof the old Baltic states harbor vigorous Russophobe feelings. They feel strongly that they are exploited and that their homelands lag far behind their prewar culturalonsiderable residue of anti-Russian sentiment is also to be found in the western Ukraine, as well as In Georgia, where the downgrading of Stalin and the loss of its former privileged status also rankle, It seems probable, furthermore, that many of the two million Jews In the Soviet Union would like to emigrate. Because many Jews hold keypositions and have connections abroad, the regime probably regards themontinuing security problem.

Wc do not believe that any of theand tensions described above are likely

to have major political significance during the period of this estimate, although they will place restrictions on the regime's ability to mobilize tho population for Its own purposes. The regime will deal with them by Its well-practiced methods of concession andMoreover, Its success In Identifying with Itself Uie sense of national pride and power, extending even to chauvinism,ormidable asset with which lo counterThe Soviet people are well aware that under Communist rule Russia has been transformedackward, agrarian,nation Into the world's second most powerful state, perhaps, they would liko to believe, thc most powerful. Thc Russiantakes lt for granted that government is by nature tyrannical, arbitrary, andIf lt fulfills the aspiration to national power, it can be forgiven much.

The Longer View

ave the processes of change which have operated so broadly and visibly in Sovietsinco the death of Stalin opened upfor more fundamental change In the long run? It seems undeniable thatossibility exists. One source of such change couldailure by the totalitarian Party repeatedly to renew its vitality; this might resultilution of Its monopoly ot power in favor of other Interest groups upon which the functioning ot the society willdepend as lis Industrialization proceeds. Another could be inability of the Party to maintain Its intellectual and Ideologicalas awareness of the gap betweenand Ideologyrocess which will be accelerated as contacts with the West are extended. We consider that the effect of factors like these cannot now be reckoned to have any assured outcome. At present, we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, wiU, or capacity of the regime to project Its rapidly growing power externally.

II. TRENDS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Thc performance of the Soviet economy hasitally important element In the Impact which Soviet policy has on the world situation. This importance derives from an extraordinary record of growth over the lastrowth which ls certain to continueate faster than that of thc U3 economy. The strength of the Soviethasoundation of greatpower for Soviet policy, first andmilitary power: the USSR has had available tlie means to maintain militaryand to develop advanced weaponscale which no other state except tho US can undertake.

However, apart from its functionasis for Soviet military power, there are three other ways in which the impact of the Soviet economy on the world situation is already observablereater or lesser degree, and is certain to increase. First Is the direct politico-economic impact, arising from the ability of the USSR to Initiate and support programs of economic aid or credit to foreign countries, to import goods from countries which would otherwise be hard-pressed to find markets, and to export various materials in quantities which (if thc Soviet leaders so desired) could disrupt previously existing patterns of world trade. In this connection, manipulation of pricesey weapon of the USSR Second is thc political andeffect on underdeveloped countries, achieved through the exhibition ofand rapid economic development bymethods, and tluough thcof such countries to do likewise under Soviet advicelhc Soviet leaders attach great importance to this aspect Third Is theimpactarrower sense, arising Inevitably from the appearance in the worlda great new producing and trading unit, the Influence of which could not fail to be great even IX It were not deliberately used for political purposes by the Soviet leaders. In

all three ways the Soviet economy willrowing challenge to the Western world.

Shifts in Economic Policy

Soviet economic policy continues to be markedpirit of innovation andWith the announcement early8 of the program to abolish the Machine Tractor Stations, the present leadership added another to the series of major measures of change it has undertaken In recent years. Most of the steps taken. In particular thescheme7 Involving theof central ministries andegional economic councils, have figured as issues to the political struggle for Stalin's succession. Khrushchev's rise to power was probably due at least in part to his Initiative in sponsoring novel measures to cope with the problems of economic policy with which the regime found itself confronted at Stalin's death.

These problems arose to part because of the great growth and tocreasing complexity of thc Soviet economic system and the failure of the Soviet leadership to adapt its planning and control mechanisms to theseDifficulties were aggravated during Stalin's later years by his unwillingness to countenance any departures from the pattern Of economic policy laid down during tho early Flvc-Ycnr Plans. Concentration on heavyled lo Imbalances to the economy; agriculture and housing were deniedand Generally neglected. When tholeaders turned to reforming measureshe problems which immediately confronted them included the increasedof planning and adrninistratlon asoutput became more varied andlhc need to employ labor andresources more efficiently as these came to be more fully utilized, higher Investment requirements to maintain gains in output, and the necessity to provide greater material Incentives in order to improve labor discipline and obtain higher labor productivity.

TOP sconiiT

attack on these problems hasariety of measures over the last five years. First, therehange In tho poUticalthe easing of police terror and penalties for economic dereliction. Thewas to Improve the conditions for managerial initiative in enterprises and to aid the campaign for faster growth of labor productivity. Second, changes In Investment priorities were made In order to alleviate the desperote situation In housing, to liftoutput out of Its stagnation, and to overcomo the failure of basic materials output to keep pace with the requirements ofIndustry. These changes also reflected the regime's desire to improve livingIn the expectation that poliUcal and economic benefits would flow from Improved attitudes on the part of the Soviet population. Finally,, the regimeweeping reform of economic administration In an effort to overcome the Impediments which bureaucracy had como to put In the way of efficient operation of the economy.

The economic reorganization scheme has been describedecentralisation plan, but It was this Inmtttd sense. There never was any intention to weaken thc basic apparatus of centralized planning or to give up the political determination of economic priorities In favor of decision-making at lower levels according to economic criteria alone. The plan aimed at eliminating the top-heavy vertical administration of the Moscowministries It was hoped that this would resultore efficient response to central plan directives. The theory was that, bya greater degree of local Initiative and by placing the administrators hi the regions close to the enterprises they were supervising, the implementing of decisions would be more realistic and less wasteful.

The results obtained thus far probably have Included some gains of the kindbetter use of local resources, fuller use of transportation facilities, less delay on routine decisions. But thc new systemdangers of its own, which have been heavily attacked in the Soviet press under the name ofo thc extent that freedom to dispose of resources locally has

been allowed it has been difficult to prevent decisions from being taken In local rather than national Interests. There evidently hasendency, aside from some cases of outright corruption, for the local authorities to divert resources to plans of their own for the greater development of their regions, sometimes to the neglect of centrally imposed plans and priorities. The chronic problem of obtaining conformity to economic goalsby political flat from the center, with little regard for local desires or the economic criteria which appeal to the managers of enterprises, seems to persist. We believe, therefore, that the regime will continue to experiment with new techniques of economic planning and administration.

he Soviet leadership under Khrushchev seems confident nevertheless that It hasovercome the difficulties which emerged6 when cumulative mistakes in planning caused shortages In basic materials and forced abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The regime hasew Seven-Year Plan whleh again sets ambitious goals. It reaffirms the traditional emphases upon the rapid growth of heavy industry, and upon maintaining large military programs. But tho Plan also provides for other keyto which the regime has committed itself In recent years. The Soviet leadersto go forward with Increasing living standards. Programs of lesser cost willmaintaining Soviet power in Eastern Europe by supporting the Satellite economies as needed, assisting the industrialization of Communist China, and backing up Soviet political objectives In underdevelopedwith trade and aid programs. The main question affecting Soviet economic policy over the next five years Is whether these multiple priorities, all of which bear on the competitive struggle with the West in which the Soviet leaders see themselves involved, can be met simultaneously. On the whole, we believe that the Seven-Year Plan production goals are feasible, except In agriculture, but that their achievement will Impose considerable strains on thc economy, and that some programs may have to be modified as the plan period

CR-BT

16

for Economiche Soviet economy will grow less rapidly during the next seven years than It did during the last seven. Soviet gross national product (GNP) increased at an average annual rate closeercent0nd atercent5his slight slackening in the rate of growtha decline In the growth of Industrial production from an annual rate of aboutercent toercent,early offsetting acceleration ln the growth ofBecause of favorable weatherarge agricultural output the rate of growth of GNP8 has apparently again risen somewhat. Over thecthat GNP will probably grow at anannual rate ofercent. At this figure, assuming that the US achieves an average annual rateoviet GNP5 will be, in dollar terms, about half that of the US, as compared with aboutercent of US ONP at present.

"This projected rate ot the US is approximately midway between the postwar rate and tbe long ran trend.

s Soviet GNP continues to gain tn size relative to US ONP, the differences between Soviet and US use of national product will continue to be marked.NP only about two-fifths the size of US ONP. thevalue of Soviet defense expenditure Is approximately equal to that of theinvestment, in dollar values currently around two-thirds as great as U8 Investment, will grow more rapidly than Soviet GNPthe next seven years, and will approach still closer the absolute size of US Investment. Investment ln Industry alone was aboutercent of US Investment ln Industrymining, and utilities)he dollar value of Soviet total consumption is less than one-third that of the US. Soviet consumption, on the other hand, will Increaselower rate than total GNP duringeriod, thusmaller share of the latter. (See graph below.)

"The dollar value referred to here was derived by valuing manpower at appropriate U3 pay rates and other Items of military significance at comparable US costs.

CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT, AND DEFENSEERCENTAGE OF7 (Measured in Comparable Prices)

US USSR

- -

he slightly reduced pace of Sovietgrowth anticipated In this estimateIncreasing difficulties In obtaining labor, material, and machinery. The economy may be better able to cope with such difficultiesesult of recent changes In the planning, organization, and Implementation of economic activity, but the benefits from these changes will be offset by other factors. Agriculture will tend to grow more slowly following the period of sharp output gains. Industrial growth will be affected by rising investment requirements per unit ofoutput and by continuing difficulties In supplying adequate quantities of key material Inputs, especially ferrous metals. In addition, there willeduced rate of growth of the labor force, owing to the growing Impact of the decline In the birth rate during World War n,ime when tlie Introductionhorter work week In Industry maythe need for new industrial workers.

Trends in Defense Expenditures*

Our estimates of the probable trend of military expenditures3efense allocation in thatercent greater than7 level. Achievement of therowth in Soviet GNP would mean that thc defense burden, taken In the aggregate, would be slightly heavier3 than at present, though still not as heavy as in the years Immediately priorefense requirements will Impose burdensome claims upon various types of resources needed forand economic growth.

Most of the Increase In defensewill result from Increasing allocations to more costly aircraft, to guided missiles,research and development, and nuclear weapons. These programs together probably account for about one-third of totalat present.3 they are expected to require about twice as much In resources aspresent and to account for aboutercent of total defense programs.

'Estimates ol Soviet drfemeare subjectider margin of error than otherestimates in this section and should therefore be used with greater cauUon.

defense expenditures Inwhen converted Into dollar values,to be of roughly the same magnitudedefense expenditures. As statedUSSH.uch smaller GNP thanproduces military goods and servicesdollar value roughly the same It Isdo this primarily because in the USSRend-Items are less expensive, relativeItems, than they are In thebecause thc average level of real payprovided Soviet militaryIs much lower than In the US.

Industrial Prospects

The eventual aim of overtaking USIn per capita production continues to dominate Soviet planning for Industry. Shifts In the allocation of resources during Ihon support of the economic Innovations of thc post-Stalin regimefirst Malenkov's broad consumer goods program and then Khrushchev's agriculturalgoods and housingoderate decrease In the rate of growth of heavy Industry. Heavy Industry was expected to benefit, however,ew program of automation and re-equipment and from changes In Industrial management, planning and control, Introduced during this period. But6 the failure to provide sufficient new capacity in the raw materials industriesevere shortage ofraw materials, particularly steel, coal, and cement

The leadership's response to thisduring the lost two years has been to abandon the Sixth Five-Year Plan, cut back industrial output7nd to order the formulationew Seven-Year Plan for the. It alsoemedial investment program which was to increase capacity In raw materials industries while stillambitious programs in agriculture and housing. The reorganization plan ofs already Indicated, was also Intended toetter utilization of materials by permitting greater leeway for local decisions.

ndustrial growth was claimed by theto beercent7 and for the first three quartersnd wbUe this claim was probably somewhat overstated, It indicates that the reduced goalsercent for these years were set too low. These rates of increase, however, obscure the continuing poor performance of some basic Industries, particularly ferrous metallurgy. Moreover, in spite of the remedial Investment program, additions to production capacity In these industries continued to fall short of planned goalsnd probably8 also. Production goals5 Ln the basic materials Industries indicate that they must continue to receive priority treatment if planned rates of increases are to be achieved. Substantial overfulfilment of presently planned goals tn these Industries, although not likely to occur, would be necessary totheercent annual increases in Industrial production which we believe were achieved during the Fifth Five-Year. However, we believe thatercent average annual rate of growth given in the present version of the New Seven-

Year Plan Is feasible (See table belowist of some Soviet Industrial output goals,)

ne of the factors affecting futuregrowth will be the Impact of rawconstraints on the machinery and metal fabricating sector. Despite the current effort being directed Into raw materials it Isthat the rate of growth of metals will fall from5 percent annual average of the past seven years toercent per year for the. This slower growth of metals output will have aeflect on the growth of the machinery and metal fabricating sector. Even so, the Seven-Year Plan targets In many of the metalsare impressive even in terms of past Soviet accomplishments. The5 goal for steel, stated asoillion tons, suggests uncertainty as to what can be achieved in this industry. Even the lower figure represents an Increase ofillion tons over the present level of output,ain ofillion tons.

SOVIET INDUSTRIAL

utputs

as Percent

US

Power

ffWH

OU

Tons

Tons

Steel

Tons

Copper

Tons

Alunilaum

Tons

Tons

Tools

Units

for

& Hydraulic

KW

Vehicles

Units

Acid

)

Fabrics

Meters

Footwear

Pairs

Machines

Units

tonnage figures in metric tons.

' Except for primary aluminum and copper, which are estimated, the production data are based on official Soviet announcements and arc accepted as valid. 'Includes automobiles.

' Since no official goal has been published, this flgure represents our estimate.

LS

The slower natural Increase of the labor (orce during tho period of this estimate may alsoimiting factor on the rate of Soviet Industrial growth. Population Increaseontinuation of past school programs would provide an estimated Increase of only about seven million men In the total civilian labor force over the next seven years. The Seven-Year Plan requires an Increase of aboutillion men in the nonagricultural labor force. Moreover, the regime Is heavily committed to reduce hours of work And has reaffirmed such an Intention In Its SevcnYear PlanThe goals for gains In productivity reflect the regime's recognition that the labor supply Isimitation on the rate ofexpansion. One of the alms of current programs in agriculture Is clearly to Increase productivity in this area so as to permit the release of workers to industry. Moreover,and prospective changes In thesystem are In part designed to free additional young people for employment In Industry; these changes might release aa many as one million to the nonagricullural labor force over the seven-year period.

Agricultural Prospecti

n thcgriculturewhich had remained largely stagnant during Stalin's lastrapidTills was due both to the programs for cultivating the new lands and planting corn, and to other less spectacular but no less Important measures such as increased farm supplies and greater financial incentives. In the new lands the weather was better than average. No slackening ot attention lsin thc Seven-Year Plan and thehigh levels of agricultural Investments of Uie last several years are scheduled toHowever, the growth rate gains In agricultural output of recent years cannot be maintained. Total acreage Is expected toduring the next seven yearsate only about one-fourth of Uie earlier period. Most of Uie future Increase will have to come JWn Increased production per unit of land. This Is more difficult to achieve, parUcularlythc unfavorable effect of indiscriminate "creoge expansion will manifest Itself. Never-

theless, the existing potential Is by no means exhausted,umber of measures such as soli improvement will be undertaken.

ecent organizational changes and better prices In agriculture probably have softened thc criUcal attitude of Uie peasant toward Uie regime, as have other earlier measures which were focused upon tax. product procurement, and Income conditions In agriculture. State control over agricultural activity, however, has not been weakened. The central organs continue to determine state procurement goals even though tho enterprise manager In Soviet agriculture Ls likely to exercise more choice over what and how he will produce. Collective farm control over most of Uieformerly under Uie MTS may also prove of some significance in increasingby eliminating conflict between the col-IccUve farm chairman and the MTS director concerning day-to-day operations of thofarm. Proposals have also beenrecenUy to Introduce more rigorous cost accountability on Uie collecUve farms. If carried out. these procedures, taken In con-JuncUon with the gradual introductionuaranteed cash wage, wu) Increase Uieof collecUve farm operations, andpermit the release of fann workersndustry. Moreover, the improvement In peasant attitudes brought about by theof the MTS and the effect8 reforms in raising the income of the poorer collective farms will probablyosiUve effect on peasant work habits.

Seven-Year Plan carries angoal0 percent Increase InWe believe that the actual increaseless than half of this. Dissatisfactionprogress of agriculture is likely to leadlo continue lis experimenting Infield.

Trends in Consumption

Soviet consumer will not enjoyan increase In over-allUie next seven years as he didlost seven, when per capitaby approximatelyercent.be true despite recently announced pro-

20

to provide more meat,ousing, furniture, and clothing. But per capitaIs still likely to be as much as one-third higher5 than It wasith some qualitative Improvement In consumer goods. However, except probablythe USSR will not succeed ln Itseffort to match US per capitaol meat and other selected food products In the time periods set. Even If It Is able to do so eventually, otber areas ofsuch as consumer durable goods and housing, will continue to lag far behind US levels.

The Increase in the level of consumption anticipated ln this estimate should beto keep the population reasonably well satisfied with thc regime's efforts to provide higher living standards. The regime willto exploit the propaganda value ofconsumption levels. The dollar value of Soviet total consumption Is less than one-third that of US consumption, ander capita basis only about one-fourth that of the US. The Soviet consumer occupies only about one-fifth the housing space enjoyed by thc US consumer. Khrushchev's muchhousing program will continue toising share of investment for the next two years and then may level offolume of construction which should provide anof about one-third In per capita living space over the next seven years.

The post-Stalin leadership has sought to make the most out of Increases lnby selectively raising the money Incomes of particular groups in the population while holding retail prices relatively stable.both rural and urban workers have received increases ofn total real Income during the, rural workers gained relative to urban workers during the earlier part of the period and urban workers received the greater share of their Increase during the latter partthe period. In Industry, wages andhave been adjusted with the aim ofIncomes more closely to productivity In different occupations and In different indus-

tries. Continuation of this policy during the period of this estimate should bringImprovement to the Soviet wage

Foreign Trade

Soviet foreign trade policy will continue to subordinate short-run economic gains to the furtherance of national political objectives. Trade will continue to be utilized In an effort to strengthen Satellite ties with the Soviet Union, to provide capital goods for Chinese Communist industrialization, and to promote Soviet relationships with underdeveloped non-Bloc countries. Trade with the Industrialized countries of the non-Bloc world will probably grow somewhat, and economic considerations will be the governing factor affecting such trade.

The maintenance of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the alliance withChina, as well as trade policy toward the underdeveloped areas, will require exports of raw materials and capital equipment which otherwise would be used by the USSR toits own economic growth, but the burden Imposed upon the domestic economy by this policy will not affect significantly the planned rate of Soviet internal economic growth. On the other hand, internal forces affecting domestic growth will provide Incentive for an increase of Soviet trade with the West,such trade will continue to account for only about one-fourth of total Soviettrade. Tbe aggregate Impact of Soviet foreign trade upon the domestic economy is slight because exports and imports together amount to only approximately eight billion dollars or less than five percent of Soviet ONP. However, the export of scarce resources or the Import of advanced design machinery and equipment for use as prototypes can be of greater significance to the economy than the total value of foreign trade would suggest.

Future developments in Soviet-Satellite trade will be influenced by the outcome of recent attempts to increase Intra-lilocintegration and specialization but the effect wiU probably not be large. Although Bloc economic integration is expected to In-

21

the benefits will be of greaterto the smaller Satellite economies than to the USSR. The Soviet Union Importsfrom the Satellites, though theto the Soviet economy of machinery imports from the Satellites will continue to

be offset by tha necessity of exporting scarce Soviet raw materials. The Soviet exportln its trade with the European Satellites will be reduced if repayments of credits granted to Satellite countries, scheduled to beginre carried out.

III. TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Thc USSR haa for many years placed great emphasis on science and technologyiew toorps of superior personnel andcientific establishmentto support Its aspirations to national power. Soviet scientific effort has beenpreponderantly on thc buildingtrong Industrial base and the development of modem weapons.onsequence, the USSR's achievements In areas of criticaland Industrial significance areto, and hi some cases exceed, those of the US. During the past year, the Soviet Union has strikingly demonstrated to the world Its maturity In science and technology. Earth sateUite launchlngs, striking progress in weapons development, and fundamentalof military and economic significance attestapidly Increasing Soviet capability whichrowing challenge to thc Western World.

e believe that the rate of advance ofscience Is accelerating in consequence of the building over the past three decadesroad scientific and technical foundation. During this period, the number of graduates of scientific and technical curricula hasincreased, research facilities have been greatly expanded, and the quality ofscientific training has improved. The size of the Soviet research and development effort, In absolute terms, has been smaller than that of thc US. However, the Soviet effort has been far more highly concentrated on fields related to national power, whilein consumer products has beenmuch less. Soviet expenditures on science and technology are increasing yearly and probably permit full utilization of new personnel and facilities. Consequently,Soviet advances In science and tech-oology are Likely to occur In the future with greater frequency than In the past

he reorganization of7 has probably beenby Improved planning andof science, especially In the formulation

of long-range and nation-wide scientificNew scientific coordinating bodies have been established with authority to cut across administrative barriers, and planning Iscentralized under the State Planning Cornmittce, which heretofore has hodassive role In science planning. Scientists are being given more voice In planning and Soviet policies In science and technology are likely to reflect their point of view more fully. Concurrently with the centralization of planning and coordination, operationalover research is being decentralized and directors ot institutes are being given more administrative authority.

research will continue toemphasis In the USSR, althoughot adequate fundamentalIs well understood at theHighest priority will continue tolo inuliary-industrlal researchbut the rapid expansion ofscientific resources will nowflexibility. Greater Individualwithin assigned tasks of researchbe encouraged, basic researchfields undertaken, and somewhatand technical effort allocated tosector of the economy.

Scientific Manpower, Training and Facilities

number of scientifically andtrained people to the Soviet Unionapproximately three-fold Inperiod. We estimate that asraduates olscientific and technical curriculaemployed in all scientific andfields, aboutercent more thanUS. Although US graduations Inand technical fields are expected tothe USSR will continue to enjoyadvantage. Based3 the USSR willercent more graduatesscientific and technical work than the US,

23

indicated by the accompanyingt should be noted that the bulk of Sovietsuperiority will continue to derive from graduates employed in Industrial and agricultural production. The number ofscientists engaged In research and teach* lng In the physical sciences has remained sub-

stantially smaller than In the US, and Ishalf the US total at present. However, Soviet emphasis on research In military and basic Industrial fields probably resultsear numerical equality between the two countries In scientific manpower devoted to these critical activities.

COMPARISON OF MAJOR SCIENTIFICSSR AND US* {la thousands)

Estimated Numbers ol Graduates of Higher EducaUonal InsUtuUons Employed In Scientific and Technical Fields *

us ussr US

Engineering

Agricultural Sciences

Health Sciences

Physical Sciences l

Biological Sciences 79

Total

Estimated Numbers of Soviet Kandldals and American PhD.'s In Scientific and Technical Fields *

Engineering

Agricultural Sciences

Health Sciences

Physical Science*

Biological Sciences

Total

' Estimates of the current total of Soviet scientific personnel arc believed towithin plus or minusercent Tho probable error of certainmay exceed this*

In the physical sciences, engineering, and the health sciences, the quality of the Kandldat degree is roughly equivalent to or slightly below that of the US Ph.D. to agricultural and biological sciences It Ls closer to thatS Master's degree.

In the postwar period the quality of Soviet scientific training has been high.training, while not as broad as that given

'Such numerical comparisons provideough measure of relative sclcnUOe andstrength, since:thc professionalare not precisely equivalent In the two countries; (b) the figures do not reflect the broader US supply of scientific and technical personnel who hold no degrees; and (c> they pve no weight to qualitative differences in

'training and experience.

an engineer in the West, Is good within the particular field of specialization. Somecontinue in the practical andaspects of training, particularly in some fields of biology and engineering. Recent changes in higher school curricula, intended to overcome these deficiencies.requirements for more laboratory and Independent experimental work outside the classroom, as welllan to allow superior students to follow individual study schedules.

G I'-HBGRKT-

USSR Is not as well supplied as theIndustrial nations with nonprofessional technicians, mechanics, and maintenance men. Shortages of skilled technicians will persist, but the number available shouldsignificantlyesult of the high proportion of scienlific and technical subjects In the lower grades and the current emphasis on specialized training after lower school.

SO. Soviet scientific facilities, ln terms ofsupport, organizational direction, and number and quality of laboratories, areadequate for thc utilization of scientific talent.ew fields the USSR has facilities which are comparable, if not superior, toinstallations In the West. The continued expansion of these facilities, as welloviet attempt toroader geograpliic base for research activities, isby the establishment of new scientific centers In Siberia. Announced plans call for completion0ew "scientific city" near Novosibirsk, consisting ofesearch Institutesniversity now underAnother center near Irkutsk,of eight research institutes. Isfor completionhe regime Isajor effort to attract competent scientific personnel to the new centers byfavorable living conditions, establishing excellent research facilities, and assigning certain eminent scientists to these locations.

ome shortages of complex researchare believed to exist, particularly in low priority fields, but they probably do not significantly hamper research programs of major Importance. For example, although the USonsiderably larger number of high speed electronic computers than the USSR, the number of computer hours actu-sdly utilized for high priority research isnearly the same since Soviet computers are not called upon to serve routine business and government functions. Although Soviet-produced equipment ls often the equal of foreign-produced equipment and occasionally Its superior, the USSR will probably continue .to^lmport equipment for reasons of During the next five yearsR

will continue to Improve Its capabilities ln scientific Instrumentation. Increasingof highly qualified engineers willbe made available for the development and production of scientific equipment, and an increasing amount of equipment will reflect original design concepts. However, we believe that the West will continue to lead In the development of scientific equipment except In fields given very high priority by the Soviets.

The Satellites have made significantcontributions to Soviet technologicalInew areas, principally in optics, electrical measuring Instruments,equipment, synthetic fibers and pharmaceuticals. We expect an Increase In Soviet use of Satellite resources tn some basic theoretical and experimental fields. The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) recently expanded the scope of its activities to include greater coordination and exchange in research and developmentCEMA member-nations are assigned major research, development, and production responsibilities for the entire Soviet Bloc in specified fields.

The USSR has become progressively less dependent on Western research andNevertheless, the Soviet leaders haveolicy of acknowledging foreign achievement and encouraging maximum use of foreign experience. The USSR presently has an outstanding program for collection and dissemination of scientific and technical Information. Thc Ail-Union Institute ofand Technical Information of tho Academy of Sciences publishes and circulates extensive abstracts of foreign Journals and, at least in high priority fields, Soviethave access to the full range ofresearch published throughout the world. Evidence of Soviet work on such new methods as machine translation, data searching, and data processing suggests that Soviethandling facilities probably will improve during this period.

The Soviets have evidently profited from espionageew key fields. However, on an overall basis the performance of Soviet scl-

-

especially thc number of originaland discoveriesreinforces our belief that the aggregate contribution of espionage to Soviet scientific progress has been far less Important than the USSR's own

he USSR Is clearly anxious to takeof the possibilities In International scientific exchange, Soviet participation In international scientific meetings andhas Increased markedly during the last year, primarily In connection with theGeophysical Yearutother scientific fields as welL The Soviet IGY program has been well-executed and comparable to lhe US program In scope. For the most part, the Soviets probably will live up to their agreements to exchange IOYbut are likely to withhold theof related Investigations outside the formal IGY program. They are believed to have witliheld considerable data derived from their earth satellites. The USSR probably will continue its active participation In thc various International committees andwhich are planning to extendbegun under the IGY.

Soviet Capabilities in Major Scientific Fields

he USSR's achievements during the last year. Including earth satellite launchlngs, weapons development, and the magnitude of IU efforts In the IGY program, provideevidence of the present high level of Soviet scientific capability. Animatedpirit of Intense competition with the US. Soviet scientists have made striking progress over thc last year in many areas ofand applied research. Inmany fields of physics,ew fields of chemistry, fundamental research appears to be comparable in quality to that performed in leading nations of the West In some fields. Soviet scientists are among the best In the world; their potential for wholly newmust be considered equal to that of Western scientists.

Space program* The establishment of the Interagency Commission forCommunications, announced by the USSR Inndicated the existencerogram with manned Interplanetary travel as Its stated ultimate objective. The program Is supported by extensive Sovieteffortsumber of related fields, Including rocket propulsion, electronics,space medicine, astroblology,and geophysics. Activities to tho present appear to be directed toward theof scientific data and experience to provide the basis for future space programs, and to advance basic knowledge In the above fields. Since some satellite vehicles have probably employed basic ICBM hardware and some future space vehicles may also utilize ICBM components, the two programs are to some extent complementary.

Soviet successes with ballistic missiles and earth satellites pointonsiderablefor early accomplishments In space. Wo believe that the USSR Is presently capable of orbiting earth satellites weighing on thc orderounds, of launching lunar probes and satellites and of launching planetary -probes to Mars and Venus. Its space program could also Include: surveillance satellites and lecovcrable aeromedlcal; "soft landings" by lunar rockets and recoverable manned earthanned glide-type high; earth satellites weighing as much0 pounds and manned clrcumlunar. While each individual achievement appears feasible as to technical capability and earliest date attainable, we doubt that thc USSR could accomplish all of these space flight activities within the time periods specified.

Communist China has announced Itsto launch an earth satellite, and there arc indications that Chinese personnel arc studying rocket technology with Soviet The Chinese would value highly the

ore detailed dUcunion o( the Sovietprogram. see NIK. -So.uiIn Oalded ftdlulles and Space98 (TOP SECRCT).

E^P

and propaganda gains resultingaunching, and we believe that an attempt in Chinaossibility within the next year or so. Using Soviet equipment, and withdirection throughout the project, theCommunists could probablyuccessful earth satellite launching in about one or two years after Initiation of Die project. The USSR itself probably has the capability, with about six months' preparation, to place an earth satellite in orbit from ChineseThere is as yet, however, no firmof the initiation of any projects to launch earth satellites from the territory of Communist China,

Nonmilitary applications ojatomic energy. There is evidenceurther reduction In the ambitious Soviet nuclear power program announced in6 as part of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. At that time, the USSRoalegawatts of nuclear-electric generatingoviet replyN questionnaire in7rogram which couldotal capacity ofby that date. Recent statements by Soviet officialslanned capacity ofegawatts inethat anegawatts or more could be obtained from dual-purpose reactors installed at plutonium production sites, giving theotal of ategawatts byf the latest plansContinued references toegawatt goal by leading Sovietindicate that the progressive decrease in nuclear generating capacity planned0lippage in Soviet plans rathereduction in the Soviet nuclear powerThe USSR is conducting extensiveon controlled thermonuclear reactions.

Soviet employment of radioactive isotopes and radiological techniques in medical,metallurgical, biological, andresearch lags behind that of the US by up to five years. While the USSR has been actively employing these means in research investigations, little originality has beenand only recently has the quality of this type of research shown improvement.

Despite this lag, tho USSR hasizable technical assistance program Inenergy within tho Bloc and has offered aid in this fieldumber of non-Bloc countries. To encourage collaboration among nuclear scientists within the Bloc, the USSR establishedoint Nuclear Research Institute near Moscow. Although the USSRember of International Atomic Energy Agency, its attitude toward the agency has been passive. Future Soviet activities outside of the Sino-Soviet Bloc probably will continue to be largely Uroited to unilateral offers of aid to non-Bloc nations. However, visits by Soviet scientists to Western nations andparticipation In International conferences may be Increased.

Physics and mathematics. Some Soviet scientists In the various fields of physics and mathematics are the equals of those in the leading nations of the West. Greatestare exhibited ln theoreticaland physics, high-energy nuclear physics, low temperature physics, solid state physics, and acoustics. Research during this period will probablyumber of studies related to the Soviet missile and spaceand will also Include theoretical anti-gravity investigations, work in plasma physics, and elaboration of present theories of Ion, photon, and free radical propulsion. Of great aid to research ln physics and mathematics ls the considerable Soviet capability in thedevelopment and application ofwith larger memory capacity andoperation speeds, as well as smallsuitable for mass production andin small computation centers.

Geophysics, Soviet performance in the geophysical sciences Is believed to beequal to that of the US, and superior In some fields, particularly polar geophysics. The large and comprehensive Soviet IOYIs expected toonsiderable effect on thc development of geophysics in the USSR The orbiting of earth satellitesheavy payloads of complexprobably has already given theead In these methods of upper atmosphere and space research. The USSR probably will

27

advances comparable- to those of the US ln meteorology and oceanography. It will probably continue to be among the worldIn seismology, gravlmetry, geomagnetism and geoelectrlclty, and will add to its already considerable achievement In permafrostand geochemJcal prospecting.

Chemistry and metallurgy. The USSR lags behind the US In thc magnitude and level of research effort ln most fields of chemistry and metallurgy; however, Soviet research In certain areas continues to be of highajor strength will continue to be in the theoretical aspects of some fields of chemistry. There will probablyajor expansion of all chemical research, with particularon fields where the West now leads, such as In petrochemicals, new plastic materials, and synthetic fibers. In metallurgy, research will be especially pushed In the highHeld and In those areas of metallurgy related to solid state physics, particularly in semiconductors and thermoelectric power generation.

Medical sciences. With some exceptions, Soviet medical research Is still behind that of the US. Soviet research assets, however, arc expanding rapidly and will continue to be concentrated in areas of high economic and military priority. Tlie Soviets are conducting an advanced program in space medicine and astrobiology. The availability of rocketand effective propulsion systems has enabled the Soviets to use animals to test life-sustaining systems In space and under space equivalent conditionsreater degree than has been possible in thc US. We believe that they lead the US In rocket flight physiology, studies of possible forma of life on other planets, and in the techniques and equipment for recovery of test subjects from extremeHowever, there are no indications that they have conducted prolonged space equivalent work similar to the US manned

balloon experiments. The USSR will expand Its Intensive research program Ln the control of human behavior, especially intechniques. In addition, the Soviets will probably maintain their lead In research on the effects of radiation on the nervousIt ls possible that they will attain the lead In the study of the effects of cosmicon organisms.

iological and agricultural sciences. There hasotable Improvement In the quality of Soviet research In certain areas of the biological and agriculturalew specific fields, however, the USSR still lags behind most Westernln these sciences. Although Lysenko retains some limited political support.theories are probably no longerto interfere with sound research In biology and agriculture, and Soviet genetics research should Improve markedly. Wethat agricultural research aridwill receive Increasing support, which should assist thc Soviet effort to increase lood supplies.

SS. industrial technology. For thefuture, we estimate that the general level -of Soviet industrial technology will remain below that of the US. However, the most modern Soviet plants are alreadyar with those in the US, and the average level of heavy industrial lechnology will probablyStriking progress has been made over the last few years In the theory and practice of automation. Additional semiautomatic and possibly fully automatic production lines will be established during tbe period of this estimate. There will probably be Increased emphasis on engineering process research and on shortening the lead times necessary to bring developed Items Into production.research and technology in consumer goods fields will continue to lag far behind that of the US.

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IV. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

MILITARY THINKING AND POLICY

Major Objectives of Military Policy

military thinking and policyend of World War II, andthe death of Stalin, haverowing appreciation ofInherent in nuclear war andthreat to the USSR's objectives andposed by Western nuclearSoviet leaders have madeubstantial offensive nuclearof their own and to improve theirindeed, to buildroad rangeand defensive capabilities, bothand nonnuclear. At the samepolitical activity has aimed atmilitary and poUtical usefulness ofcapabilities by attempting to makebases untenable and to increaseattached to any use of

We believe that despite these efforts the Soviet leaders appreciate that if theyeneral war at present, even with surprise nuclear attacks, the USSR would suffer un-acceptable damage from US nuclearOn the other hand, they are probably confident that their own nuclear capabilities, even though not as great as those of the US, have grown to thc point where theya powerful military deterrent to the US. It is therefore probable that in the Soviet view both sides are now militarily deterred from deliberately Initiating an all-out nuclear war or from reacting to any crisisanner which would gravely riskar, unless vital national hi teres ts at home or abroad were considered lo be in Jeopardy.

The Soviets probably see this situationreat improvement over the relation of forces which existed some years ago. Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviet leaders will con-ttoue to seek ways to achieve. Iflear military superiority over the US. To this end they will continue their Intensive weapons research and development,in such fields as long-range missiles, air-

craft and ralssllc-launchlng submarinesof attacking the continental US, air defense weapons and associated equipment. But despite further Improvement In Soviet capabilities over the next five years, we believe that the USSR will still not become confident that it can attack the US without receiving unacceptable damage In return. Thisassumes the maintenance andof US armed strength and the absence of an unforeseen Soviet technologicalof major military significance.

strengthening their capabilitygeneral war, the Soviets willmaintain forces which they considerto insure military superiority Inshort of general war. To the extentinhibitions against vigorouslocal situations are increased by thecapability for general war,forces for local conflict will enable theto exert greater political pressure Inand even give them greateruse force In such situations. In sum,leaders will view large deterrentmilitary capabilities as an essential sup-"to their foreign policy and toeading world power.

Soviet Attitudes Toward Limited andWar

indicated elsewhere (Chaptere believe that thedo not at present intend to pursueby employing their own forceslimited or general. But they willthat, particularly in consequencepolicies they are pursuing to compelof Western power bysituations might arise In whichof forceocal scale would seemto one side or the other. In suchthe SovieU would prefer to provideand other support for local operationsonly non-Soviet forces participatedTheir objectives In suchbe limited, and they would seek toSoviet involvement, to limit the geo-

area of engagement, and to prevent thc use of nuclear weapons by cither side.

oviet planners probably consider,that such limitations might be Impossible In some Instances, and that encounterstheir own and Western forces might result. They would prefer to minimize the amount of force employed In such situations, In order to limit the scale of conflict and the degree of their own involvement as much as possible. For example, they would almost certainly wish to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. In deciding whether to employ their own forces In any particular localtbe Soviets would have to balance the risk ofrain of counteractions, possibly leading to general war, against the stakes Involved In the area of local conflict. They probably believe that thc West's military posture and doctrine rest Increasingly upon the use of nuclear weapons, even in limited wars. But they probably also view their own nuclear deterrent capabilities as alreadyraised the threshold at which thc West. would react inanner.

t Is impossible to forecast how thewould behave in all the situations of local conflict which might arise. Despite thethey evidently now have In the power ot their own deterrent, we believe that they would handle such situations with the greatest caution. They would realize that the dangers of miscalculation would mount as each side Increased the scale of Its Involvement.we believe that the Soviets would seek to prevent any crisis from developing Inay as to leave themselveserious reverse and taking action which would substantially Increase the likelihood of general war. Thc Soviet leaders would almost certainly not decide togeneral war unless they concluded thatosilion to the West would sooner or later threaten the survival of their. Wc believo that the Sovietshat very great advantages would accrue to the side striking the first blow In on all-out nuclear war, and that therefore. In the event that they decided on general war. they would themselves Initiate it by strategic nuclear attacks. The primary objective of such attacks would be to

destroy or neutralize Western nuclearat any rate to achieve the maximum possible reduction In the weight of Western retaliation that would have to be met by Soviet air defenses. To an extentwith this first priority, other key US war-making capabilities would probably also be attacked.

he outbreak of general war wouldfind the USSRtate of military readiness beyond that of ordinary peacetime, but short of what Soviet planners mightbest for the most rapid exertion ot their total military effort. During any local war or crisis which they viewed as likely to become Increasingly serious, Soviet planners would almost certainly prepare againsteneral conflict. However, they would not want to push preparations so far as to convince the US that general war waslest this lead the US to strike the first all-out nuclear blow. The probability ofWestern readinessrisis, together with the normally widespreadof Western nuclear striking forces In the US and overseas, would make it doubtful that the Soviets could count on achieving surprise against all of these forces, but they would-almost certainly attempt to do so.

oviet recognition of thc importance of surprise In modem military operations has been reflected in articles and statements over the last few years, but It Is evident that Soviet military theoreticians do not regard surprise as the decisive factor in the outcomeajor war between great powers. In fact, tbey hold that inar the strategic attackof both sides might expend themselves and'leave eventual victory to the side with the greatest residual strength, capacity forand ability to occupy territory. They visualize an important role for their ground, tactical air, and naval forceseneral war, which in their view would probablyrotracted war of attrition.'

' The Assistant Chief ot Staff, Intelligence. USAF. believes that as written this paragraph does not correctly reflect thc Soviet Judgment of Uie role of surpriseeneral war. He believes It Isthat Soviet mlUUry theoreticians consider surprise probably would be the decisive factor In the outcomear between great powers.

TOP -SBeft&f

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the event of general war, Soviet ground, tactical air, and naval forces would probably be launched ln major campaigns against Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, in order to defeat those Western forces within reach and to seize military objectives in those areas as well as their industrial and economic resources. Thc USSR wouldplan to commit Its ready forces to anagainst NATO, especially through Western Germany, as soon as possiblewith its attempt to achieve surprise for its Initial assaults against the US, overseas US and allied nuclear bases, and naval striking forces. Campaigns In other areas would be of lesser priority, but we believe thateneral war situation they would probably be initiated with Uttle delay.

In addition to participation in initalattacks and support of other major Soviet campaigns, the major offensive efiort of the Soviet Navy in general war would be themtcrdiction of Western seaand reinforcement, Intended to Isolate overseas theaters from the US. The major defensive effort of Soviet naval forces would be to prevent Western carrier strikes andmissile attacks against Bloc targets.

Policy on Sizo and Types of Forcos

assessing the size and types ofwhich would best fulfill theirthe Soviets will almostto believe that they must keep adiversified military establishment,to meet various contingencies, upIncluding general war. While theylo acquire additional capabilitiesweapon systems, they will atmaintain substantialthere will be increasingamong military requirements ofand between military requirementsdemands of higlily Importantresulting in part from the costof new weapons anddeciding whether to produce complexsystems In quantity, the USSRapply Increasingly severe tests as to

whether these would add greatly to current capabilities or tend significantly to alter tha world balance of forces, and as to whether costs were Justified by likely periods of use before obsolescence. There may thereforerowing tendency Ln some fields to make do with existing equipment until significantly advanced weapons can be acquired.

Wc also believe that for several years the Soviet leaders have been interested In finding ways to reduce the number of men under arms. The reasons for doing this will continue to apply, and In the future may become more compelling. An Important factor will be the pressure Imposedhortage of manpower for thc rapidly growing Soviet economy (see Chapter II,. Other reasonsthc desire for economies in order to ease the burden of increasing costs of newand the propaganda value of forceThe Importance of the last of these factors has been evident In the USSR's well-publicized announcements of militarycuts over the last three years. Reductions amounting toillion men Ineriod have been claimed, and inurther planned reductionen was announced, bringing the tolal to moreillions.

On the basis of Soviet conscription trends, published labor statistics, and other Indirect data, we believe that there has in factubstantial reduction in the number of men in service since the peak reached during the Koreanonsiderable portion of this reduction apparently occurred prior to the first Soviet announcement of cutseductions are known to have been made in nonessential supporting and administrative elements. It is probable that other reductions were accomplished by cutting down the strength of certain units and by the transfer of labor iroops from miliiary to nonmilitary status. On thc other hand, we have acquired no evidence of the deactivation of any major units and we are fairly certain that most of the units withdrawn from satellite areas in recent years were merely moved to locations within the USSR.

a:

evidence suggests that In theirtho Soviets took propagandaof fairly substantial reductions made after thc Korean War, and that additional reductions were tn fact begun but wereor cancelled entirely. The apparent failure to carry out the announced cuts may have been due tn part to Increased tension in the satellites, and In the world situationbeginning in thc fallt may also have resulted In part from Sovietthat reductions tn some elements werearge extent olfset by thc Increased need for technically-qualified personnel to serve new and more complex equipment,

On the basis of available order-of-battle information, wc estimate present Sovietmanpower strength at somewhat moreillion men, of whomre in ground force units,re In the air forces (includingaval avialionre In naval units, and0 are in air defenseand warning. In addition, we carryen in border guard andhile there has been noevidence of reductions over the last year, we do not exclude the possibility that thcleaders believe that some additional cuts can be made without danger to Soviet security. But we think it unlikely that In the present state ot ihc Bloc's relations with the West further reductions of substantial size would be made.

Military policy toward other blocThe Soviet leaders view the Eastarea as vital to the military posture ot the USSR, both as an extension of the defense perimeter of the homeland andase for offensive power; Communist China and North Korea similarly strengthen the strategicof the USSR. The Soviets will therefore continue to provide substantial military aid to thc Satellite and Chinese Communistestablishments, Including weapons, equip-

"For moreestimates ot the personnel slrenalli of Soviet and oUier Bloc forces, see Annex,ndt should be understood that these figures are only approximate and that there Is considerable uncertainty Inherent In this type o* cainnate.

ment, and training assistance. They will continue their efforts under the Warsaw Pact to develop and maintain reliable and effective forces In the East European Satellites, but they probably do not contemplate anyexpansion of these forces. It Is unlikely that Soviet planners would count on East European forces In general to make ancontribution to Soviet militaryexcept perhaps In air defense and in maintaining security for lines of

he Soviets probably regard themilitary capabilities of Communist China with mixed feelings. While Chinese military strengthaluable addition to the power of the Communist Bloc, as this strength grows it will also give China Increasing weight within thc Bloc. It will be many years before the Chinesearge and modem arms Industry of theirevelopment themight view with misgivings In any case, and in the interim the Chinese will press for Soviet aid toosily modernization of their forces. We believe that the Soviets will probably try to restrain the pace ofmilitary development In order to prevent the Chinese from achieving tooegree ot military independence. But they will prob--ably also feel that they have no choice but to support such development. It ls probable therefore that they will continue lo assist the Chinese in developing and producing certain types of modern equipment. They will also probably begin to supply such Soviet-made weapons as >et medium bombers, advanced fighters and guided missiles for air defense, andshort-range miss ties for offensive use as well The USSR would probably retain control uvci any nuclear weapons based In the territory ol Communist China or olherliens

SPECIA'. WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS Nucleor Weapons

hc USSR is known to have conducted more lhanuclear tests since9 In its program toariety of nuclearwo test series were conductedu the first series,ests were conducted at two widely separated

H'i-

proving grounds during the three monthsthe USSR's announcement ol atest suspension onhe Soviets resumed testingecond series which began lnxplosions In the latest series have Included two of about seven megatons, about twice the yield of the largest Soviet explosion detected previously. The latest two tests were of low yield and were conducted ln the general vicinity of Kapustln Yar. From thc present technical evaluation of8 tests. It appears that the Soviets made further advances In the development of high yield weapons suitable for use In bombs or missile warheads. They also apparently sought to Improve low yield weapons from the standpoint of size and economy of fissionable materials, probably in order to meet airas well as other requirements.

e estimate that at present the Soviet stockpile could Include nuclear weaponsange of yields fromT toT; wc do not exclude thc possibility that untested bombs with yields of as much asT could be In stockpile on an emergency or provisionale have insufficient evidence toa firm cslimate of the numbers and types of nuclear weapons in the Soviet stockpile. There Is. however, considerable evidence from the Soviet nuclear test program and from other intelligence sources, providingas lo what types of weapons the USSR may be stockpiling and on what deliveryIt contemplates. Based on an analysis of various factors Involved, we believe that:

nuclear weapons, including high-yield weapons suitable for bomber delivery, are now widely deployed to ixmg Range Aviation units, and the Soviets will seek to provide such weapons for all bombers of this component which are designated for weapons delivery;

nuclear warheads are being and wilt be produced in numbers sufficient to equipaij operational submarine-launched missiles, and ground-launched ballistic. range and greater;

"Cstlmat* of the present andpotential.

. see. -The Soviet Atomic Energy 8 (LimitedC-Bec also the forthcoming.

Soviet doctrine contemplates thouse of nuclear weapons by ground, tactical air, and naval forces, and some such weapons are probably now available for this purpose;

the Soviets" emphasis on air defense will lead them to provide nuclear warheads for some proportion of their surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles,izable aUocation for such purposes has probably not yet been made.

Considering the estimated availability of fissionable materials and the level of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, we believe that at present the USSR probably possesses sufficient nuclear weapons toajor attack by its long-range striking forces, but thatstockpiles are probably Insufficient for large-scale allocation to air defense anduse. Weubstantial and high priority Soviet program for the expansion of fissionable material production through the period of this estimate, and we believe that the USSR is capable of considerable furtherin nuclear weapons technology. Thus, by the end of the period the current limitation on thc aUocation of nuclearto air defense and tactical operations wiU have eased, although even then andonger period, limitations imposed by theof fissionable materials will still be felt."

Prior to ils suspension of testing inhe USSR had probably developed types of nuclear weapons which could meet most of its major requirements for suchHowever, strong technical motivations have continued to exist for further testing, for example in the categories of lighter-weight, more efficient warheads for air defense and other purposes, higher yield warheads, and antimissile defense techniques. The USSR's reasons for conducting nuclear tests in the fall8 probably included the desire to

-For estimates or present and future cumulative availabilityissionable material in the USSR sec2 5S. For theoretical ranges of mixed nuclear weapon stockpiles, as well as lllustraUve stockpUcs .showing reasonable maximum and minimum limits for certain categories ofsee lhe Supplement to. "Possible Soviet Allocations of Fissionable Material to Weapons.8 (Limited IMslrlhuUon).

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technlcnl requirements and,esser extent, tbe desire toituation In which there would be Increased world pressurean on further testing. Considering the achievements of the Soviet nuclear testto date and the broader advantages the USSR may feel it can achieve byultilateral test cessation, we believe that technical requirements alone would notthc USSR from joiningest ban. We also believe that If an agreed banuitable control system were negotiated, the Soviets would bo unlikely to attempt to carryoncealed test or nbrogala theat least for some time, but wouldInto their weapons program such refinements as could be nchleved without new test explosions.

wc do not know the Sovietof minimum stockpile requirementsmaterials, we doubt that suchhave been met and we knowfacilities are expanding.while the USSR might entercessation of weapons materialbelieve It would neither unilaterallyproduction nor agree to mutualln the near future.

Guided Missilos

USSR continues to press aheadextensive research and developmentembracing all major categories ofSoviet achievements Inballistic missiles have beenand substantial success hasaclUeved in developingWhile available evidence Is notto indicate comparable emphasisIn other Soviet missile programs,thc USSR nowariety ofavailable for operational use. Itof developing advanced systems Induring the period of thisthe experience It has already acquiredproduction, troop training,deployment procedures will facilitateof its operational capabilities."

On the basis of considerable evidence concerning the research and development

program, we believe that for several years the USSR has had available for operational useballistic missiles with msud-mum ranges ofm. It has also beenand probably now has availableallistic missile. maximum range. Inery short range antitank missile Is probably now

nfcrconf inert frd ballistic missile. Since the completion of, we havean intensive reexamination of the Soviet ICBM test firing program and Its On tho basis of sufficientcoverage to establishigh degree of confidence tho number of Soviet ICBM test firings, it Is clear that over the past year this number has not been as great as we had Nevertheless, considering theprogress In the whole field of missiles and the capabilities demonstrated in their ICBM. earth satellite, and other ballisticlaunchings. we continue to estimate that the USSR will probablyirstcapability withrototype ICBMs at some time during the While it Is possibleimited capability with com-paraUvely unproven ICBMs might have been establishede believe this to be unlikely."

-For in extended discussion of theuided missile development program, and of factors likely lo affect Its acquUlUon of substantialcapablllUes. see. -Soviet Capabilities In Guided Missiles and space9 August ivlfl (TOP SECRET).

Some statements by high Sovieto IndJcaUd that the USSR already possessed, or at least wished us lo think Itonsiderable operational ICBM capability.apability cannot be ruled out as Impossible If tbe Soviets haveest philosophy involving fewer long-range tests and more reliance upoo compon.nl tots at Kapus'.lnUlan we think likely.hlteiophy would run greater risks of failure and provide less assurance of accuracy and reliability but also (If all went well) much more rapid achievement of operational capability Themay have believed the pollUeal andvalue of icbmj Is so great asJustify extreme measures toubslaaUal and CArly deployment.

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When it first becomes operational, the Soviet ICBM system will probably be capable ofuclear payloadaximum range ofith an accuracy (CEP) of.eliability of aboutercent after launching. (Somepercentage of missiles, which we are unable to estimate, would prove unserviceable beforee estimate that theICBM Is designed touclear pay-load ofounds, although thereossibility that It is designed to carryounds. Reliability will probably be considerably improved by the. At the beginning of the, the CEP could boo. with radio com-mand/lnertlal guidance, and could beton. later In that period., an all-lnertlal systemEPum. will probably be available.

For air defense, the USSR now hastwo different types of surface-to-airone of which is employed in the fixed missile complex around Moscow and the other of which Is probably suitable for employment with the Moscow system oremimobile system. These missiles have greatestagainst aircraft at altitudes00 feet; they are relatively short0nd almost certainly neither Is effective at very low altitudes (below, surface-to-air systems with increased range and improved high and low altitude capabilities willbecome operational for defense of fixed targets, field forces, and naval vessels. Short-range air-to-air missiles (upuitable for employment with currently operational Soviet fighter aircraft types are probably also available,onger-rangeill probably be developedhe USSR will probablyirst operational capabilityurface-to-air system of limited effectiveness against ICBMs and possibly against IRBMs.

For employment by submarines, the ysSR probably now hasjise-type missile system capable of deliver-mg;,nuclear warheads against land targets

within. of the launchingThese missiles could be launchedubmarine only after surfacing.he USSR will probably have available for first operationalubmarine-launched ballistic missile system capable of delivering nuclear warheadsange of. It Is also possible that the USSR will. crulsc-type system for first operational use

A Soviet alr-to-surface missile system Is now capable of carrying nuclear warheads at subsonic speedange of about. against ships and other targets clearlyon radar. The USSR will probably have operationalupersonic alr-to-surface missileange of atuitable for employmentide variety of targets-Chemical and Biological Warfare

Current Soviet tactical doctrinethe potentialities of CW and BW ascomplements to other weapons. Soviet military forces receive thorough training in the offensive use of CW as well as In defense againsttockpile of CW agents Isto be maintained at the World War II level and may have been Increased. Itconsists of the nerve agents, principally Tobun (GA) and In lesser quantity Sarins well as standard agents such asA nerve agent of the "V" type, far more persistent and toxic than the "G" agents, may have been In production In the USSResearch Is probably also under way In the field of nonlethal, incapacitating agents.

The Soviets possess standard munitions for the dissemination of toxic agents byshells, and It Is probableupply of such munitions Is normally carried byunits. CW agent dispersion by bombs and aircraft spray Is also contemplated.aerosol-producing devices necessary to the effective employment of "V" agents are believed to be under development. It Is also possible that CW warheads have beenfor certain types of guided missiles.

existence of an active Soviet BWand development program has been confirmed, through identification of acenter and field test site as well as through extensive Soviet literature applicable to this subject. While most known SovietIs also applicable to public healthwc believe the Soviet program Includes research on antipersonnel, antUlvestock, and possibly antlcrop agents. There is no evidence of the existenceass-production facility for BW agents, but existing plants for the production of blologicals, together with other laboratories, could easily produce BW agents In quantities sufficient for clandestineand probably for larger-scale use.

In the Held of defense againat BW and CW, present Soviet capabilities are at least comparable to those of the major Westernand In the case of CW are probably superior. Soviet troops are well-equipped with satisfactory CW defense items, many of which are also suitable for use in defense against BW. The current issue gas mask affordsprotection against Inhalation of known toxic agents, and articles of protectiveIssued to all troops afford protection against toxic agent spray and areaExtensive programs continue tothe civilian populace as well aspersonnel in defensive techniques.

Electromagnetic Warfare

believe that at present the USSRappreciable capability for jammingradars at frequencies upossibly higher, and especially forat lower frequencies normally usedlong-range radioSoviets are now producingtraveling wave tubes suitable forthe microwave frequencies, andthis field Is continuing. They are alsoemploying passive detectioncapable of detecting signals fromlow frequencies up intohe USSR will haveuse equipment capable ofat frequencies fromhrough

c/s, including all frequencies likely to be employed by Western communications, radar, and navigation equipment.

recentrend towarddiversification In Soviet radarequipment has appeared. Inthe earlier concentration of frequenciesfew narrow bands. The USSR ls capableIncreasing the spread ofand of developing Improvedtechniques, butlectronic systems will probably stmto disruption by properly

STRENGTHS AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET FORCES

High command. Top control over alland operational activity in the Soviet military establishment Is vestedingle authority, the Minister of Defense.under thc Minister of Defenseingle general slaff, organized along functional lines Into operations, intelligence, communications, military transportation, organization andhistorical, and topographicalThe major administrative elements of the Soviet armed forces include thc chiefof ground, air, air defense, and naval forces, each.headedommander-in-chief who reports directly to the Minister of Defense. Operational control flowsirect chain of command from the Minister ofto the commanders of the majorelements: military districts, groups of forces, naval fleets, air defense forces, Long Range Aviation, and possibly airborne forces.

Despite extreme centralization ofthe Soviet command systemsufficient flexibility to effect Integrated employment of all types of forces In either large- or small-scale operations. Constantto new requirements will bring about significant changes In armament and someamong components, but weno radical alteration of the Soviet high command structure In the near future. In the following paragraphs, the different types

Soviet forces are discussed In terms of their capabilities to perform those military missions which we believe would be assigned by the Soviet highong-range attack, air defense, major land campaigns, and naval warfare.

Long-Range Striking Forces

Since the end of World War II thc USSR basajor effort to theof nuclear striking forces capable of attacking distant military, industrial, and other targets, not only in and near Eurasia but In North America as well. This effort has been dictated by the fact that the US, itself possessed of long-range* striking forces, lay beyond the range of traditional Sovietpower. The principal component ofmilitary strength presently capable of long-range nuclear attack ls Long Rangeequipped with medium and heavyThe medium bombers of Naval andAviation, as well as the light bombers of these components, contribute to the Soviet capability for attack on targets In Eurasia and Its periphery. Ground-launched andguided missiles probably now supplement the bomber capability.

Long-range bombers. We estimate the strength of Soviet Long Range Aviation, astincludingbsolete BULLmedium bombers,ADGER jet medium bombers, andISON Jet and BEAR turboprop heavy bombers. At least one-fourth of the BISON and BADGER regiments In this force have some aircraft of these types which are convertible tanker-bombers. Medium bombers have also been supplied to otherare nowADGERsew BULLs In Naval Aviation units andADGERs In Tactical Aviation units.

The capabilities of Long Range Aviation have been markedly Increased in the last five years, through the Introduction of largeof modern aircraft, more realistic and larger-scale training exorcises. Improvement

of potential staging bases In the Arctic,of Inflight refueling, andof electronic equipment for ECM,navigation and other purposes. Nuclear weapons storage sites have been Identified at many Long Range Aviation home bases, and we believe that nuclear bombs are now the primary weapons of thisew BADGER units of both Long Range and Naval Aviation are probably now trained and equipped to employ alr-to-surface missiles suitable for use against ships and other well-defined targets.

Despite these Improvements Soviet Long Range Aviation still consists primarily ofbombers, best suited for operations against targets in Eurasia and its periphery, and capable of attacking the continental US only through extensive use of one-wayThe history of the Soviet heavy bomber program leads us to believe that despite the efforts devoted to developing the BISON and BEAR, Soviet planners probably decided within the last year or two toapid build-up with present heavy bomber models. This decision may have been reachedesult of one or more of the following factors: dissatisfaction with the performance of BISON and BEAR; progress in developing new' or improved bombers; confidence In Soviet ability to acquire an ICBM capability at an early date. Contributing to the decision may haveoviet belief that the USSR'sbomber force, togethermall heavy bomber capability. Is at leastacceptableeterrent force, and for use against the US should general war occur.

The Soviets will almost certainlyto strive for technological superiority over the US in intercontinental weaponPresumably they set great store by the ICBM as posing an entirely new type of threat. But Soviet military planners almost certainly feel that even though they have goodofubstantial long-range striking capability with missiles, manned bombers will still be required. Manned bombers, especially advanced types, willthe Soviets with flexibility and dlversifi-

O

'1KH'

of attack capabilities, and will remain particularly applicable for attacks on small, hardened targets, damage assessment, and reconnaissance. We therefore believe that the USSR willarge force of long-range bombers throughout the period of thisalthough its size will probably decline gradually. Its inflight refueling techniques will probably be improved and extendedarger part of the force; however, there ls no present evidence of the development of an aircraft specifically for useanker.electronic and other supportingwill probably be provided.missile launching capabilities willbe augmented as more effective missiles are developed.

uture projections of the strength and composition of Soviet Long Range Aviation are complicated by the fact that at present the entire Soviet medium and heavy bomber industry istate of transition, involving considerably less current productionear or two ago. Production at BADGER plants now appears to be tapering off,it will probably be sufficient to provide moderate further increases In thc Jet medium bomber force. The one identified BISON plant, at Moscow, has continued to produce aircraft of this typeow and uneven rate, while its design bureau has been working toew type of largeotal ofozen BISONs have been completed sinceringing cumulativetoircraft. While considerably less evidence Is available on BEAR production, we believe it unlikely that any new BEAR bombers have been produced for wellear, or that more thanoere produced altogether. In the interim, the one identified producer has probably been overhaulingBEARs, modifying some aircraft ol this type for transport use, andew new transports of thc CLEAT type (similar to theespite the decline In long-range bomber production, the USSR's plant capacity suitable for production of large aircraft has been considerably enlarged over the last few years, and there Is some evidence to suggest

that several plants are preparing to produce large bombers or transports.

Research and development ln new bomber types has continued and we believe that it will be Intensively pursued throughout the period of this estimate. Considering the demonstrated level of Soviet technology in such fields as aircraft propulsion andand the normal development of these capabilities, we have estimated that within the next few years the USSR could probably place Into operational units: (a) improved versions ef the BISON and BADGER, at any time;ew subsonic heavy bomber with range and other performance characteristics somewhat better than those of an Improved BISON,9ew medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capabilitiesangethat ot an Improved BADQER,0

Since none of these aircraft types would add substantially lo Soviet capabilities for two-way intercontinental operations, we have reasoned that the USSR might proceedto more advanced types, sucheavy bomber powered by high-energyfuel, capable of supersonic speed and high altitude, orubsonic nuclear-powered aircraft capable of long endurance, even at low altitudes. We continue tothat some aircraft of either or both these types could probably be In operational units byc also believe thatthe next few years tho USSR could fly an airborne nuclear testbed. with at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrust during some phase of thche attainmentuclear propulsionfor operational use ln supersonicwould probablyong test and

Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUona torDepartment of the Navy, and the Director (or Intelligence. The Joint Staff, bellere that the USSR could flyestbedV. The Assistant Chief of Staff, indulgence, USAF.hat an aircraft nuclearsystem could now be undergoing flight testsrototype airframe.

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bc-hh-'p

program extending beyond the period ol this

Recent evidence of Soviet developmental efforts includes the observation at Moscowew bomber, designated BOUNDER, of targe size and heavy weight,odified delta-wing configuration apparently designed 'for supersonic flight. With the limitedavailable. It has not been possible to determine the BOUNDER'S Intended mission, but we believe It coulda significant step forward Inbomber design. Preliminary analysis Indicates BOUNDER to be powered by four turbojet engines. The use of conventional fuels would giveange marginal forbombing. The possibility for development of BOUNDERorepropulsion system exists, and theintentuclear-powered vehiclebe excluded at this time. However, present information is Inadequate to permit an estimate of BOUNDER'S probable

ur evidence also continues to support tho existence of one or more otherof new or improved long-range bombers. Past experience cautions that existingmay represent competitive designs. The Soviets may not yet have evaluated such prototypes in relation to each other or to

"See. "Possible Soviet Long Range Bomber*ndtrength and Composition of the Soviet Long Range Bomber8 (TOPor esU-mated performance characteristics of Soviet long-range bombers for operational useee Annex, Table 8.

their missile programs. Such evaluation will have an important bearing on the future strength and composition of Long Range Aviation.

We continue to project Soviet heavy bomber and tanker strength fors lying within the rangeThe high sideoviet option to produce additional aircraft of BISON and perhaps BEAR types, and perhaps toa fewew heavy bomber Intounits. The low side reflects their option tourther build-up ba heavy bombers throughelying primarily on their one-way medium bomber capability against the US for atittle longer. Our estimates of trends In Long0 are more uncertain, but reflect our belief that thc USSR willIntroduce new or unprovedbombers during the period of this estimate. Should Soviet plannersarge force of heavy bombers and tankers, there Is no question that they could have five or six hundred BISONs, BEARS, and new heavy bombers In units bys indicated in the table below, however, it seems to us more likely that the heavy bomber and tanker force will remainsmaller thanabout two or three hundred, Including some of new types.

/nferconfmenfal ballistic missiles. We believe that Soviet planners Intend toizable ICBM operational capability at the earliest practicable date. However, we have insufficient evidence to judge the magnitude and paceoviet program to produce

SOVIET LONGVIATION (Estimated Strength In Operational Units!

HEAVY BOMBERS AND TANKERS

MEDIUM BOMBERS AND TANKERS Jet Piston

TOTALS

ICO- SCO

9C0

i>3

1-

OQ

deploy ICBMs. Considerable preparationsulld-up of operational ICBM capabilities could already have been made withoutby Intelligence, as Implied byrecent statement that the production of ICBMs has been "successfully setn tbe light of such Indirect evidence as exists, we have considered those factors which would affect an operational ICBM bulld-up,the Soviet capacity to produce missiles and associated equipment, and concurrently to complete launching facilities, establish logistic lines, and train operational units.

Taking into account the complexities of the tasks which would have to bewc believe that the Soviets could achieve an operational capabilitybout three years after firstcapability date. Based on our estimateirst operational capability willbe achievedeapabilityCBMs could be achieved some timeithpriority and exceptional success In thc test and production program, this capability might be achieved In as little as two years after flr.it operational capabilityome timeulld-up In three years from first operational capabilityapabilityCBMs,CBMsould be achieved Inearalf;wo yearould be achieved Inear. Thc achievement of operationalsuch as these within the time periods estimated would require an extremely high order of planning and accomplishment, and would also require an increase In the average rate of ICUM firings for test and training purposes.

There Is evidence that mobility Ls nn Important consideration in Soviet ballistic missile development generally. For an ICBMegree of mobility could be obtained by use of rail transport to previously pre-

"These numberi of ICBMs are selectedIn order to provide some measure of the Soviet productiondeployment capacity; they do not represent an estimate of the probable Sovietor

pared launching sites, some of which would haveinimum of fixed equipment. This would provide flexibility and security through the use of relatively simple alternate launching sites which would be difficult to Identify and locate. Our estimate of thecapacity to acquire ICBM operational capabilities, given In the preceding paragraph, applies toall-transportable systemystem of moderately hardened fixed launching sites,ombination of thc two.

O/Aer long-range ballistic missiles. The Soviets probably consider ballistic missiles. maximum range asprimarily to their capabilities tonuclear payloads on distant, fixedin Eurasia and its periphery, although shorter-range ballistic missiles could also be employed for this purpose within their range. We estimate that nuclear warheads would be provided for virtually all missiles. range, but we do not exclude the possibility of CW use inn the basis of available Intelligence, wc cannot judge the present scale ofand we have not Identlflod any units equipped with these missiles. It Is possible that at present the USSR hasery-limited capability to employ them In military operations. But considering such factors as estimated Soviet requirements, nuclearavailability, and experience In shorter range missiles, we believe that the USSR may now have on operational capability with as many as several hundred ballistic missiles. range, and. missiles.

The wide availability of medium and light bombers capable of reaching Eurasian targets probably reduces Soviet requirements for missiles of these ranges. Sinceile missile has probably been operationale believe that thc Soviets may meet their requirements for this missile early In the period of thisuild-up. missiles would take longer. Missiles of these types are probably designed for road or rail mobility. They are probably not deployed in Satellite areas at present, but some operational units may exist within the USSR.

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ew conventional submarines have probably been converted for topside stowage and launching. cruise-type missiles. The Soviets couldarge number of existingbut the problems Involved lead us to believe that such conversion Is not likely to beotal of aboutong-range submarines could be convertedonthsecision to do so. The USSR ls probably also developing one or more new types of missile-launching submarines,for Internal missile stowage. These types will probably Include ballistic missile submarines for first operational use, and possibly cruise-type missileat an earlier date. If the latter are in fact developed and constructed, the USSR may have aboutubmarines, some nuclear and some conventional-powered, equipped for internal missile stowage by

Capabilities for long-range attack.Soviet capabilities for attack on theUS are limited by the relatively small numbers of operational heavy bombers, the requirement to stage most bombers through forward bases in the Arctic, and the lackubstantial inflight refueling capability. Nevertheless, by employing their entire heavy bomber force, many of their medium bombers, and their small submarine-launched missile capability, the Soviets could mount large-scale initial nuclear attacks againststrengths and other war-makingIn North America. The actual weight of attack launched against the US wouldupon the Soviet Judgment as to the optimum combination of surprise and weight of attack against all areas where US and Allied nuclear retaliatory capabilities and other essential targets are located. Against those Western capabilities deployed on the periphery of the Bloc, the Soviets couldmedium bombers, light bombers, and ballistic missiles with ranges upnd. Bombs andmissiles could be employed against West-em naval forces possessing nuclear strike capabilities. All Western targets of Impor-

tance in North America and overseas, as well as major naval operating areas, are within range of one or more of the Soviet weapon systems described above, although most of the Soviet bombers would have to beon one-way missions to reach targets in the continental US.

oviet long-range striking capabilities will increase markedly as the stockpile ofweapons grows, Improved bombers are Introduced, the readiness and proficiency of the bomber force increases, and especially as the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear weapons by guided missileshe USSR will rely mcreasingly upon missiles as long-range delivery systems as the periodWhile Soviet planners almostrecognize that ballistic missiles can impose maximum surprise and difficulty of interception, they probably consider that for some years the accuracy and payload capacity of such missiles will be inferior to those of manned aircraft of comparable ranges. We therefore believe that through the period of this estimate. Soviet long-range strikingwill lie primarilyixed force of-manned bombers (probably equippedwith air-to-surface missiles) and ballisticmissiles. The Soviets may consider thatmissiles can best be employed toWestern retaliatory and othertemporarily in an initial blow, relying upon bombers for follow-up attacks ofweight. In any event, effective Soviet employment of long-range strikingagainst Western retaliatory and othertargets will still face great difficulties of timing and distribution of attack against widely deployed, mobile, and ready Western strengths. The USSR's missile-carryingwill contribute further to itsbut the scale of their use in an Initial attack would depend upon the Sovietof the risk of premature disclosure of intent.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, does not concur In this sentence. See his footnote to paragraphf The Summary.

41

Defcruo Forces

All Bloc forces useful for air defense are organized for participation in an Integrated system which places primary emphasis on providing defense in depth for keyindustrial, and military centers within the USSR. We believe that air defense will continue to be given high priority.

r defense weapons. The principal current weapon system for defense of Sino-Soviet Bloc targets against hlgh-altltudeIs the high-pcrformanco jet fighter, of which there arc0 in operational units throughout the Bloc. More0 of these fighters are In Soviet units,f them in units whose sole mission Is air defense and the remainder in units with air defense as one of their primary missions. The principal day fighter In Soviet forces ls the subsonic FRESCO, althoughFARMER day fighters were in units aslso in service are the FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighter, as well as the" and FARMER "B" withall-weather capabilities, but theirhas proceededelatively slow pace. Total Soviet strength In theand FRESCO "D" types wassith some FARMER "B" types also in operational units.

Most Bloc jet fighters In operational units have combat ceilingseet: FARMER and certain FRESCO versionshave combat ceilings on the order0 feet.he USSR will probably introduce new day and all-weather fighter types, whose characteristics willspeed and altitude at the expense of combat radius.2 the latest operatlona! Soviet fighters will probably be capable of operating at altitudes up0 feet, and of climbing0 feet In less than twoAir-to-air missiles are probably now available to improve the kill capabilities of Soviet interceptors, allhough we have nothat they have as yet been supplied to operational units. Total numerical strength

-For estimated performance characteristics of Soviet flEhlcr aircraft, tee Annex, Table 9.

In fighters will probably decrease after another year or two, because of the growingpower of Individual Interceptors, greater demands on industrial capacity resulting from the advent of more complex fighters, and the increasing availability and capabilities ofmissile systems.

missiles designed foreffectiveness at altitudes otfeet and probably having0 feet are now ln operationdense and costly complex ofitesThis complex, which couldlimited number of missiles with nuclearcan probablyery high rateagainst multiple targets under allIt is probably InefTectlvelow altitude attack, however. WeUSSR may have altered an earliertoomewhat similarmissile complex around Leningrad,the missile defenses of this andSoviet targets will employ systemsflexibility and less cost than thatThere is now some evidence ofof surface-to-air missile sites lnother key areas, such as Baku. We believemore such sites will be built throughof this estimate as Improvedboth high and low altitude defenseand that surface-to-air missiles will

be provided for numerous Soviet fixed targets as well as field forces and naval vessels. Sur-facc-to-alr defenses in key areas will probably become effective both at very low altitudes and up0 feet during the period.

Soviets continue to employguns for defense of field forces andIncluding airfields. More thanand medium antiaircraft guns areto be available to Soviet forces atin addiUon.re availableEuropean forces andoChina. North Korea, and NorthLarge numbers of automaticmachine guns are also available toAs suitable surface-to-air missilesavailable inarge portionmedium and some light antiaircraftprobably be phased out ot the airstatic targets in the USSR.

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defense radar and control equipment, Badar coverage now extends over the entire USSR and East European Satellite area,for certain Inland portions of central and eastern Siberia; coverage also extends along the entire coastal region of Communist China. The long-standing gaps In radarIn the Soviet Arctic are now believed to have been Oiled, although this deployment ls probably not as extensive as In many other areas.eavy prime radars,of thc TOKEN type, andight auxiliary radars are employed In various combinations atadar sites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Under average conditions, TOKEN radars can probably detect jetbomber aircraft, penetrating at altitudes up to their combat ceilings, at distancesaboutnd, from radar sites. New radars of much higher quality,radars capable of moro accurate height-finding, are already in service and will probably be widely deployed

For several years the Soviets have been developing computers and other components suitable for data-handling use. Tlie use of such equipment willarked effect in Increasing traffic-handling capabilities,system reaction time, and Improvingwithin the Soviet air defenseFor example, it Is expected that data-handling equipment will increase the traffic capacity of each Soviet radar reporting site to at leastimultaneous tracks. We believe that an air defense system with somefeatures,ata-linkfor vectoring interceptors, Is being widely deployed bt western USSR in association with early warning and OCX sites. This system is believed to be similar In concept to tlie US SAGE system, but less complex. It willcome Into use throughout the USSR and East Europeew years. The Soviets are alsoew IFF system which will probably be fully operational

Air defense concentrations. The areas of highest concentration of Bloc air defense

" Estimated performance characteristics of Soviet early warning and ground-controlled intercept radars arc given In Annex,

weapons and associated equipment Include that portion ot European USSR from the Kola Peninsula to the Caspian Sea, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Maritime and Sakhalin areas of the Soviet Far East. High defense concentrations are also found at some specific locations outside these areas, such as Tashkent, Novosibirsk, and Khabarovsk. The approaches to Moscow are by far the most heavily defended of these areas, Including (In addition to the surface-to-air missile complex mentioned above)ayll-weather fighters as well asguns. We believe thenique case, dictated by theof that area to the USSR

Passive defense. large passive defense organizations contribute to the air defense readiness of both military personnel and the civilian population. Civil defense trainingormal part of the program of DOSAAF, the Soviet paramilitary mass organization whose recruitment has been stepped up markedly in recent years. The Incorporation of air raid shelters into newly constructed buildingsrogram of long standing In the USSR This program probably now affords some degree of shelter for roughly one-sixth of the urban population of the USSR, and this proportion will probably rise considerably duringlthough most existing shelters were not designed for protection against blast from nuclear weapons, some newer building shelters are of heavier construction. It is probable that up-to-date protection Isto selected elements of the government, but the general population is Inadequately prepared against large-scale nuclear attack.

Air defense capabilities. Present Soviet air defense capabilities against attack byand cruise-type missiles can beIn general terms as follows:

Against penetrations conducted during daylight and in clear weather, ateet and0 feet, capabilities are greatest.

At altitudes above0 feet, capabilities would decrease progressively as altitude increased, except In the limited areas equipped with surface-to-air missiles where

TOP SEC-RE-T-

would be unimpaired to at0 feet

At attitudes beloweet, capabilities would decrease progressively as altitude decreased, and would probably bereduced at altitudes beloweet.

Against penetrations conducted at night and under conditions of poor visibility, the capabilities of the system would be greatly reduced because of the limited availability of all weather fighters and surface-to-air

Against varied penetration tacticsaltitude stacking, diversionarydecoys, and electronic counter/measures, thc capabilities of the system would bethrough disruption and saturation.

The amount of warning time available significantly affects the capabilities of airin various areas of the Bloc. Early warning radar could now give Moscow and many other targets In the interior more than one hour's warning of attacks made withWestern bomber types. The more limited early warning time available In Bloc border areas would reduce the effectiveness of theof even heavily-defended targets In such areas. As the speeds of Western deliveryincrease, the problem of warning lime will become more critical, despite probableemployment of picket ships, airborneand other extensions of warning

Over-all Bloc capabilities against aircraft and cruise-type missiles will Increase, however, tlirough Improvements In the performance characteristics of most Soviet air defense equipment and especially through the wide employment of semiautomatic air defense con-trol Air defense guided missile capabilities will increase. Higher-performance fighters will be employed, and the proportion of all-weather fighters in Soviet forces may increase to aboutercent. But the Soviets willto have difficulty In opposing very low altitude attack and air defense electronicwill still be subject to disruption and saturation. The USSR will probably not have an operational weapon system with even lim-

ited effectiveness against ballistic missilesthe very end of this period or later.

Ground Forcos and Tactical Air Forces

The Soviet ground forces represent thc largest part of the Soviet militaryand are closely supported by tactical aviation, consisting of fighters trained In the ground attack role (In addition to their air defense role) and light and medium bombers trained in ground support bombingThese forces are well-balanced, ably led, and equipped for the most part withmateriel of modern design. Units are distributed amongilitary districts In the USSR and three groups of forces in theSatellites. The strongest concentrations are in East Germany, tlie western andborder regions of the USSR, and thearea of the Soviet Far East. Stockpiles maintained In these areas are believedto support large-scale ground combat operations for several months withoutfrom current production.

The order of battle of Soviet Army ground forces Is estimated atine divisions plus supporting units. These divisionsbly average aboutercent of authorized wartime strength, although the manning level In some Interior districts may be as low asercent All units probablyigh proportion of authorized officer strength, how-ever, and full equipment is believed to be kept locally available. These peacetime manning practices, together with standard conscription and stockpiling programs, would probablyall Soviet line divisions to be brought to full strengthonversionar footing could be executed rapidly, anddditional line divisions could be mobilized

There has been an extensive program over the last several years lo modernize and reorganize thc Soviet ground forces to meet the requirements of modem warfare. More advanced designs oi practically all types of equipment have appeared. The firepower of Individual units has been Increased markedly, additional vehicles (including amphibious ve-

-

have been provided, andequipment has been augmented.

A reorganization in tho Group ot Soviet Forces, Germany,7ew type ot Soviet linemotorized rifleappears well-adapted for fast, hard-hitting action. The mechanized divisions were converted to the new motorized type by removing heavy tank and assault gun units, and the rifle divisions were converted by addition of medium tanks, armoredcarriers and rocket launcher. During Uie sameesubordinatlon of divisions resulted in thc creation of "tank armies'*exclusively of tank divisions to provide for rapid, deep exploitation In enemy rear areas. The other units remain grouped into "combined arms" armies, now composed of motorized rifle and tank divisions. Wethat similar developments have beenway6 throughout the Soviet ground forces.

These changes are in line with revised Soviet tactical doctrine which emphasizes the need to supplement standard ground force tactics and training In order to meet theof nuclear warfare. New doctrine stresses firepower, mobility andgreater initiative, deeper objectives,reconnaissance and the protection of Individuals and units against the effects of atomic and chemical weapons. It alsothe tactical use of nuclear weapons in support of Soviet field force operations.

Surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with rangesm. have probably been available for operational usec believe these missile types are intended for mobile use In support of field forces, and for attacking fixed targets such as air bases. Depending upon operationaland the availability of nuclearmaterials, nuclear. HE, or CW warheads could be employed. We havemall amount of evidence of military units equipped to launch ballistic missiles, and it is possible that at present the Soviet capability tothem In military operalions is quite small. On the other hand, the Soviets have had experience In producing missiles in. range class, probably have an

extensive production capacity, and have had ample time to train troops in their use. Very recent evidence Indicates that Soviet missile units equipped. missiles may have been deployed to East Germany, It Is possible therefore, that the USSR's present operational capability Inun. range class comprises as many as severalmissiles, although In view of otherrequirements for nuclear materials It Is unlikely that many would be equipped with nuclear warheads at present. Missiles of these types may now be held in the highreserve, but as their availabilitythey will probably be organicallyto field armies.. missiles may also bo allocated to the support of Soviet field forces.

Air support for ground operations Ismainly by Tactical Aviation, the largest single component of the Soviet air forces. Its units arc assigned to the military districts and groups of forces. Tactical Aviation hasat least some nuclear deliveryIt Is now equipped (asith jet aircraft estimated to Includeightersight bombers. The fighter units are predominantly equipped with FAGOTs andowever, the more advanced FARMER day fighter andall-weather fighter are also in service. Tactical bomber units ore still equipped with the obsolescent BEAGLE,ew units have received BADGER jet medium bombers. Prototypes of several new fighter types and two new Jet light bombers have been displayedut none of these aircraft has been Identified in an operational unit,

The Increasing availability of nuclear weapons and guided missiles3 will bring further changes in equipment and organization of Soviet ground and tactical air forcesteady improvement In theirWe believe that these changes will be evolutionary In nature, and do notany major alterations In size orWhile nuclear weapons and guided missiles probably will be used in support of tactical operations, conventional field artillery and un guided rockets will continue to provide the major direct fire support for units In close

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Tactical Aviation will probablynew supersonic fighters and bombers, but both fighters and bombers are expected to decline in numbers as Increasing reliance Is placed on guided missiles.

he USSR has sizable airborne forces, estimated ativisionsotal strength ofen. Airborne troops are well-equipped, but the air transporthas lagged fax behind combat air units ln the Soviet aircraft re-equipment program. Aviation of Airborne Troops now comprisesight transports of the CAB, COACH, and CRATEULL medium bombers converted to transportelicoptersliders. This strength could be augmented substantially by other military and civil transports.

17S. The appearance of new transports and air-transportable equipment Indicates that the USSR is now paying Increasing attention to the development of Its airborne forces.airlift capabilities will probably Increase considerablys additional helicopters and transports are introduced. The BULL will probably be employed as an Interim medium transport until late In the period, when it will have been replaced by the CAMP twin-turboprop assault transport (which has, however, not yet appeared in units) and possibly other advanced types. Better auxiliary transport will also become available as Improved aircraft are Introduced into civil aviation.umber of new transports were displayed, Including the CAT and COOT turboprop mediumour turbojet transport designated COOKER,urboprop heavy transport, the CLEAT. Of these aircraft, only the COOT ls now in service, and there Is some evidence thatdifficulties have caused the transport program to proceed more slowly thanestimated."

Capabilities for Major Land Campaigns

oviet ground forces arc capable oflarge-scale operations on several

"For estimated performance characteristics of Soviet transport aircraft, nee Annex, Table 8.

fronts Into peripheral areas, separately orThese operations could beby the large available air forces, but the high priority assigned to air defense would limit the availability of fighter aircraft for such support operations in the initial phaseeneral war. Surface naval vessels, naval aircraft and submarines would be available for operations In Bloc coastal areas ln support of ground campaigns. The logistic environment Is an Important limitation on theseand the capacities of militarysystems have been considered In theestimates ot Soviet offensiveagainst selected land areas. Thesedo not take into account the effects ofan Initial nuclear exchange, of direct Western opposition to advancing Soviet forces, or of Western interdiction of essential logistic lines. Moreover, these are not estimates of theof divisions the USSR, would consider it tactically feasible or necessary to employ in the areas discussed.

gainst Western Europe andWithout prior build-up, Soviet forces in East Germany and Poland could initiate an offensive campaign Into Western Europe withine divisions, half tank and half motorized, supported byactical aircraft. To augment the strength of the Initialaximum simultaneous airlift of two lightly-equipped airborne divisionsen each-could be mounted by Aviation of Alrbome Troops based in Western USSR. If approximately one-half of the civil transport aircraft normally in the area also participated In the airlift, the equivalent of anivisions could be liftedne-dayHowever, we doubt that the Soviets would risk loss of strategic surprisearge number of civilprior to an initial attack. In addition to airborneaximum of four divisions could be lifted in merchant ships across the Baltic Sea. Aircould be drawn from theircraft of Tactical Aviation units In West-em USSR, and ground reinforcements from theivisions In Western USSR could be brought up rapidly. Lines of communication through the northern satellites are estimated

46

be capable ofheoreticalmaximum ofivisions.

Soviet campaigns to seize Norway and Sweden could be launched from northwestern USSR through Finland and from west central Europe through Denmark. Forcesavailable in northwestern USSR consist of nine line divisions andactical and naval aircraft. Operations againstwould be limited Ioglstlcally In the north to four divisions over Finnish land routes plus one water-borne division, and in the southaximum of five divisions water-lifted from Denmark. If Sweden were also attacked, as many as six additional divisions could be moved across Finlandaximum of nine divisions could be ferried from Denmark to southern Sweden. Additional reinforcements might be water-lifted across the Baltic from thc USSR to Sweden, and airborne forces could be used in securing debarkation

Against Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East. Forces available for operations in this area includeine divisionsand naval aircraft In southern andUSSR. For operations west of the Black Sea, lines of communication would be adequate to support as many asivisions against Greece or as many asgainstbut not moreotal ofould be supported concurrently. At most,f these divisions could be supported In an extension of this campaign Into northwestern Anatolia, while seven divisions from the Caucasus could move against eastern Turkey. Threedivisions could be water-lifted to the northern Turkish coast, provided that port facilities could be secured. One or twodivisions could be employed in the area. Lines of communication couldorceivisions in offensive operations against It an.

In Ihe Far East. The USSR hasine divisions,actical and naval ati craft and sizable naval forcesIn this area. These forces could renew hostilities in Korea, either alone or Inwith North Korean and Chinese forces. One airborne division could be employed

againsteaborne force equivalent to three lightly-equipped divisions could be launched against Japan,ixed group of ships and other craft. Provided portcould be secured, fully-equipped forces equivalentivisions could be landedimmediatelyollow-up operation. Thc same technique could be used in other areas of the Far East within range of land-based aircraft. Adverse climate, terrain and logistic environment would probably limitin Alaska to one airborne divisioneaborne force ofroops.

No vol Forces

uring the postwar years, Soviet naval forces have been greatly strengthened by an Intensive building program concentrated on light cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The Soviet submarine force is the largest ever assembled by any single power; over half of its present strength consists of long-range craft of postwar design and construction. Dueecent slow-down in the navalprogram, which included ahalt in submarine production, there has been little quantitative change In Soviet naval forces since last year. We estimateaval strength as8 atruisers,estroyers andestroyer escorts, andubmarines. Those totals include vessels of postwarightleet destroyers,estroyer escorts,W" class) and aboutedium range"hey are grouped In four major forces: the Northern Fleet, located In the Barents Sea area; the Baltic Fleet; the Black Sea Fleet; and the Pacific Fleet, concentrated largely at Vladivostok.

he surface forces are supported byNaval Aviation, which comprises more tlianercent of total Soviet air strength and is now ihc second largest naval air force in the world.ircraft arc assigned to the Soviet fleets, includinget lightet medium bombers andtypes. Thc combat aircraft are the

e-n

types aa are assigned lo TacticalFAGOTs. FKESCOs. FARMERS. FLASH-UOIITs, UEAOLEs. and BADGERs. Wethat selected naval bomber units have been assigned an atomic delivery role and there is evidenceeveloping alr-to-surface missile capability In naval BADGER units. Lack of aircraft carriers limits the operational effectiveness of Soviet Naval Aviation to thc combat radius of its shore-based aircraft,

Thc operating efficiency and equipment of Soviet naval forces, while still below US standards In some fields, are quite high and will continue to Improve. The great increase in world-wide unidentified submarine contacts In recent years probably reflects the intensified training of the Soviet subniarine force,In long-range operations. In the naval weapons field, in addition to theof submarine-launched guided missUes. thc Soviets have vigorously pushed theof more effective mines with magnetic, acoustic and pressure actuated firing devices. Wc estimate that the USSR has stockpiled mines of advanced types as well asmines. It Is technically capable of adapting nuclear warheads to mines, torpedoes and depth charges. Nuclear tests In the No-vaya Zeralya area have probably Included the testing of naval weapons. The Soviet Navy has become Increasingly aware of its Initial failure lo keep pace with the rapid postwar technological advances In antisubmarineIn recent years there hasteady Improvement in its ASW tacticsajor effort has been made in the construction of escort ships In order to overcome this deficiency. The Soviet Navy is also quite Umltcd as to amphibious capability. To meet the lift requirements ofunlti lhc USSR would have to rely almost exclusively upon merchant ships.

Several Important developments In Soviet naval forces are likelyesult of changing weapon systems and new concepts of naval warfare. In addition to conversion of some submarines for theof surface-to-surface missUes, newspecifically designed for this purpose probably will enter service. Some Soviet

cruisers and destroyers will probably be equipped with dual-purpose surface-to-air/ surface-to-surface missiles. Nuclearwill be appUed to submarines, andIn submarine huU design areearly In thc period. We believe that antlsonar coatings have probably been applied to some Soviet submarines. To meet the threat from US mlssUe-launchlng submarines, the USSR probably will continue to emphasize Improvement of Its anlisubmarlno warfare capabUity. This could Include construction of new and better antisubmarine vessels"killer" submarines, use of specialized aircraft and helicopters, development ofdetection systems (both sonar andand more sophisticated antisubmarine weapons Including guided missiles. Naval Aviation will probably receive aircraft ofperformance as they become available, as well as Improved air-to-surface missiles.

Submarine construction. The USSR win probably continue to place primaryon submarines In its naval construction program.0 the Soviets have builtubmarines of the medium-rangelass and the long-range "W" and "Z"onstruction of "Z" classendedut the "W" class and "Q" class programs continuedheir termination probably marked theof new submarineew class of conventionally-powered long-rangehas been in production at Leningrad since the beginninghis class (designatedsorpedo-attack type, larger than the "Z" class and with improved sonar. Four "F" class submarines areto have reached operational status. Additional submarine programs believed to be under wayuclear-propelled type and submarines specifically designed to cm-ploy guided missiles.

Although the evidence Is not firm, we believe that the USSR may already haveone or more nuclear-powered Soviet capabilities In this field have

" For esumated chxrMterUUcj and performanceine submarines, see Annex. Table 11

-TOP SPOUHf

TOP CGGRfif

indicated by the development of the icebreaker Lenin, which will probably become operationalhe Lenin Is powered by three nuclear reactorsype which would be suitable, with some redesign, for useubmarine. We estimate that byhe USSR will have aboutuclear-powered

Construction of conventional submarines will probably continue but, because of the greater complexity of nuclear-powered and missile submarines, annual submarinealmost certainly will not reach the high levels of recent years. Considering suchas the decommissioning of obsolete boats, the possible conversion of some additionalto missile use, and the development of new propulsion and weapons systems, wethat thc total force willubmarines in

Capabilities for navalrave threat to Allied naval forces and merchant shipping is posed by the soviet submarine force, which is about eight times the size of the submarine force with which Germany entered World War II. In the event of war, Soviet submarines could conduct intensive operations against Allied sea communications in most of the vital ocean areas of the world. Mining could be undertakenarge scale and woulderious threat to Allied sea communications. Tills threat is greatest in waters relatively close to Soviet-controlled air and naval bases, but Soviet submarinesistant minelaying potential of major proportions. Soviet Naval Aviation couldAllied naval forces, shipping and port facilities within range using bombs, mines,and air-to-surface missiles. Soviet Long Range Aviation probably would alsoattacks on naval targets, but itsat the outsetar presumably would be limited to missions of the highest priority. Although the primary threat tonaval forces In the Atlantic, the Pacific and the peripheral seas of Eurasia would come from Soviet submarines and aircraft, thenavy wouldole in preventingforces from operating with impunity

close to Soviet shores. Naval exercises of thc last several years, stressing defense of the sea approaches to the USSR,trong defensive capability In the fleet operating areas.

The Northern Fleet, with moreong-range submarines and direct access to the open Atlantic, is considered the mostof the Soviet fleets. Northern Fleetcould deliver attacks throughout the North Atlantic and the large "Z" classcould operate In the Caribbean. seizure of Norway would greatly extend the submarine and air offensive capability of this force. Thc geographic position of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets limits theircapabilities. Seizure of the Baltic exits would allow the Baltic Fleet submarine force to Join in the interdiction of Allied seaIn the North Atlantic and would increase the potential of Baltic Fleet surface forces for operations in thc North andSeas. Sirnilarly, seizure of theStraits would permit submarines of the Black Sea Fleet to range throughout theand threaten Allied seain that area. Submarines from bothaltic and Black Sea Fleets might also beoutside of home waters prior to theof hostilities. Aircraft andof the Soviet Pacific Fleet could attack Allied sea communications in the North Pacific and adjacent Far Eastern waters from theof hostilities.

Thc capabilities of Soviet naval forces will improve steadily throughout this period with the acquisition of more advancedaircraft, and naval weapons. Theweaknesses of the USSRaval power will continue to derive from the wideof its sea frontiers and its inability to control the sea routes between these areas, although improvements in inland waterways will increase its ability to Interchange smaller vessels including submarines. The lack of adequate supply lines to Its Northern and Far Eastern Beet areas and the land-lockedof Its fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas are additional handicaps.

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V. TRENDS IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST STATES

USSR's relations with other Bloc states continue to be of pressing concern to the Soviet leaders. During the past yearhas moved energetically to repair the damage done to its political control andauthority by developments of the last several years. To this end, it sponsored an international Communistas thc most significant in more thanearsbroke the three-year oldwith Yugoslavia, ordered the execution of Imre Nagy,ual CEMA and Warsaw Pact meeting ln Moscow, and beganof an international Communist periodical designed to replace the defunct Comlnform Journal. The Moscow conference ofparties in7odification of nine fundamental Marxist-Leninist "laws" to which ali true (Soviet-oriented) "socialist" states must adhere. It was the signal for an intensified drive against "revisionism" calculated to inhibit departures from the approved norms, by member parties, especially those which might be infected by the spirit of nationalism.

These efforts have been intended to cope with what has become one of the fundamental problems in the Communist world: how to preserve ideological conformity and political unity. The Communist parties in the various states are confronted with quite diverse local conditions in "buildinghey are tempted to resort to practical expedients which have no counterpart In Sovietand require ideological justification In terms close ton addition, as parties now possessing state power they are bound to think in terms of their own state interests, not always identical with those of the Soviet state, and to show some deference to the national sensitivities of their peoples. Consequently, there are present within the Communist parties elements and factions which harbor latent or open resentment of Moscow's domination, and they areby the knowledge that within the gen-

eral population anti-Soviet sentimentto be vigorous and widespread.

The tradition of thc Communisttook little account of locailst proclivities or the autonomy of national parties; it was "internationalist" and centralist. Thiswas enormously reinforced during the period of Stalin's ascendancy. He rose tomastery of the Soviet partyime when other Communist parties were weak and had little prospects of attaining power. His organizational controls, his unquestionedauthority made him as much thedictator over them as he was ln the USSR itself. Only the Chinese Communists,in the interior reaches of China,organizational and even some degree of ideological autonomy. In the postwar period, after the Communist parties gained power in Eastern Europe and China, Stalin hadowering historic figure in the Marxist-Leninist hierarchy. Even where Moscow had other and more direct "means of control over Satellite parties, its authority rested to adegree on the magic of Stalin's name and myth. Only the Yugoslavs challenged his' authority and survived the assault of the whole Communist world, though they had to pay the price of exclusion. The Chinese,able to go their own way, nevertheless accepted the ideological authority of Stalin.

Stalin's deathegacy in Easternof Inefficient maladjusted economies and of hatred for Soviet domination; Moscow's ideological and organisational control was crippled. The confusions resulting fromwithin the Soviet leadership, Moscow's modification of Stalin's oppressive controls and policies, thc attempts to redefinepositions under new conditions, and the partial repudiation of Stalin himselfto factionalism in the Eastern European parties and facilitated the overt expression of latent popular hostility to Soviet domination. Communist China, which Initially at leastto view with sympathy the desire of

some Satellite regimes for greater localemergedecond Ideologicalwithin the Bloc. Since the events8 in Poland and Hungary, thc Communistof all Hloc states, Including especially thc Chinese, have presumably recognized that the Interests of all in the struggle against the non-Communist world depend uponunity on essential Issues. In Communistecessary means of enforcing such unity is conformity to ideological programs. This was the point ofparlyof7 and subsequenton ideological conformity.

the surface, unity has beenthe leading position of thc USSR hasBut thc unity ofwas achieved by collectivewhich at least some of the partiesan Independent role, howeverhave been the weight of Soviet viewsfinal outcome. We believe that thcunityideologically and in termspolicy on the international stageeffectively preserved for someonger period the divergence ofand the need to develop policieswith local conditions andsentiments will tend IncreasinglyMoscow's control over the

Relations with (ho Satellites

Soviet approach to theduring the past year represents,an attempt to synthesize thetrend toward greaterfforts lo re-establish thcof the Bloc structure. While thisrenewed emphasis on Soviethas not ledeneral resumption ofnor has it involved an abandonmenteconomic aid and equitable tradeFurther, the Soviet leadersplaying down the possibility oftoconcedeof action to Satellite leaders andcertain divergenciesthe casesubstantial onesonconditions.

The Soviet leaders thus appear to retain their belief that Stalinist methods wereand dangerous; even If they should want to return to Stalinist policies toward the Eastern European Satellites, the example of Communist China's relative independence and the special position of Poland would makeove exceedingly difficult. The Sovietstill have not discovered any definitive answers to the bask questions concerning lntra-Bloc relations: How best to reconcile the contradictionsolicy towardEurope which ls at once "soft" (designed to insure the Satellites economic and political growth) and "hard" (Intended to guarantee stability and Sovietnd how best to adjust to the changes3 ln the USSR's position as Bloc leader.

With the excepUon of Gomulka Inand possibly Kadar in Hungary, all of the Satellite leaders have responded with vigor to the Soviet call for ideologicaland fealty to the USSR. Needing no encouragement to combat "revisionist" trends, they have been able to thwart those elements which have sought basic reforms. Moreover, their efforts to assuro internal security have been successful; there has been no serious threat to the stability of any of these regimes during the past year.

Popular hostility to the Communistand to the USSR has probably not been reduced, however, although there may have been some diminution In public resentment in countries where there hasradualIn living standards. Populardoes not appear to be an Immediateexcept In Poland, where It still could lead to strikes and riots, and in East Oermany. where continuing emigration to Westreflects active discontent andeemingly insoluble problem.

ontinuation of the current pattern of Soviet policy toward the Satellites for the next few years Is probable so long as outside events or developments within the Satellites themselves do nothange. Ih .general, the USSR Is likely to limit Its direct interference In Satellite affairs as much as it believes feasible, striving to give these

BP

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the appearance ot" full sovereignty. Most of the orthodox Satellite leaders will probably bo allowed to exercise day-to-day control over Internal affairs, provided theycontrol over their own parties andto Soviet-established guidelines. The fact that these leaders depend on Sovietfor their position and share many of the same Interests tends to reduce the risk for the USSH inolicy. The apparent right of Woe leaders lo speak relatively freely and frankly to the Sovicls about their own problems and about lntra-Bloc economicwill probably be maintained, although this right is undoubtedly viewed In Moscow solelyonsultative one. The renewed Soviet effort to push Bloc economicand toetter division of labor will receive continuing emphasis. But past resistance to this program, based on theeconomic Interests of the Individual Satellites, has been stubborn and persistent and will almost certainly not be eliminated over the next few years.

We believe that the recurrence of popular revolt or of on attemptatelliteparty to defy Moscow on vital Issues Is unlikely at least over the next few years. Such developments are possible, however, and even probable If Soviet policies should againIndecisive, or If, because of Sovietor foreign policy considerations,should be significantly relaxed. In the eventebellion In the Satellites beyond the capacity ot the local regime to repress, the Soviet leaders would almost certainlymilitarily. Soviet reaction to an attemptatellite to secede from the Bloc would probably be the same. In the event ofSatellite party "coup" like that In Polandaimed at greater autonomy rather than secessionthe Soviet response would be dependent on the particular local andcircumstances of the moment. One of the alms of the current "antlievislonist" campaign is to prevent any disaffected inner parly faction fromhallenge lo the official leadership.

Wc believe that the Soviet Union willcertainly maintain or Increase its efforts

to reduce or eliminate the distinctive features of thc Polish regime. But, since Qomulka would almost certainly resist pressures on any fundamental aspects of his policies and would have the suppori of the Polish people In doing so. we think that the Soviet approach will be cautious. If moderate pressure proveshowever, the USSR might work for Gomulka's ouster. Even In this case, we think that the USSR would resort to military intervention only II developments In Poland were likely to Jeopardize the political orsecurity of thc Bloc"

East Germany, thewill almost certainly continueto build up the GDR as ansovereign power. Internally, theeconomic weakness of the Eastwill contuiue to pose majorthe Soviets. Attempts to giveto the ODR through more Liberalpolicies would involve poliUcal riskprobably require greater economicfrom the Soviet Union, somethingleaders would be reluctant to give.other hand, turning up the screws topopular submisslveness and to makemore economically self-dependentto the moss flight of key professionals,lead to other serious losses. Thustactical approach to the ODRprobably continue to show signs ofand uncertainty.

Bloc Relations with Yugoslavia

over their position as Blocprime center of Communist doctrine,that the acceptance of Yugoslavia asCommunist power was ata serious danger to thatprobably the principal causes of theleaders' decision to break off thewith Yugoslavia. Theto re-establish close rclationi withthe summer and early fallt inducing Yugoslavia towith the Soviet camp. When Itas It evidently did at the Intema-

-Sec9 SB; 'The Outlook Inated

Communist conference In Moscow Inhat Tito was unwilling to so align himself on Soviet terms, the break ln the rapprochement was probably inevitable. The appearance of the "revisionist" Yugoslav Party program the following spring probably only helped to shape the nature and timing of the subsequent Soviet campaign.

the foreseeable future, the USSRto attempt any essentially newto its Yugoslav problem. Thethe Bloc anti-Yugoslav campaign,probably vary somewhat with timethe greatest weight being given to itBulgaria, and Communistevidently does not intend toprogram of development credits forand will probably also hamper theflow of trade from time to time,that these measures are intendedsanctions. Though it wishespressure on Yugoslavia in order toindependence-minded andin Poland and the otherit ls fearful that dramaticmeasures would do real harmrelations with the uncommittedHowever, the USSR will continueto discredit Yugoslav foreignin the Middle East and Asia,try to Unk Tito with thc colonialthe minds of Afro-Asian leaders.

Relations with Communist China

China over the pasthas emergedearly-equalthe USSR within the Cornmunlstpreponderant influence ls still inbut this appears to operate throughand persuasion rather than byof authority or control. Theof the alliance remain unimpaired:Ideology, which charts theof domestic developments andtoward the capitalist enemy; adependence, economic and militarycase of China, political and strategiccase of the USSR;haredthat any major disruption of theprobably have catastrophic effects on

tbe future of the entire Communist movement. We thus believe that the bases for the Slno-Sovlet partnership are compelling, that the two regimes will remain closely allied over the period of this estimate, and, Indeed, that neither regime is likely to believe that it couldreak even if serious divergencies arose.

We also believe, however, that there are certain differences between them which have perforce led to compromises or which have been glossed over. Such divergencies are moro likely to grow than to dirninish over the next few years and we believe that because of them, and because of its growing power and prestige, the Peiping regimeotential threat to the kind of Sino-Soviet Bloc which the Soviet leaders would like to envisage for the future. Although the USSR will retain its seniorIt Is possible that the process ofdifferences between the two mayinvolve compromises on the part of the USSR, with corresponding adjustments In Soviet policy.

Possible Chinese Communist differences with the USSR in policy or tacticalnot ultimate goalsthe doctrinal Innovations67 concerning0 flowers" concept and the possibility of "contradictions" between the party and the masses; and the apparent sentiment6 that the USSR hadits role ot Bloc leader and was, In fact, guilty ot "great powert present Peiping and Moscow may viewwith the West somewhat differently; the Chinese Communists appear to be morethan the Soviets and less fearful of the consequenceshigh risk" policy. Inthere have been differences at least in propaganda emphasis concerning variousquestions.

In the future, areas of friction may arise from the general question of Communist China's influence as an Ideological andforce within the Blochole. The unprecedented Chinese organization ofmustevelopment Ideologically embarrassing to the Soviets, since it Implies that the Chinese are advancing toward Com-

53

more rapidly than the SovietsThere may also be Soviet concernhinese tendency toward "adventurism" in pushing for Communist advances, and over the role to be played by Communist China In those areas of the Par East where It hasinterests. Thus far these matters do not seem to have occasioned seriousalthough even if they had every effort would certainly be made to conceal the fact. Peiping has been In the forefront InSoviet leadership of the Bloc, the USSR has acknowledged Communist China's high place in Bloc councils and Its ability to make independent contributions toand to date Sino-Soviet interests in the Far East apparently have not clashed.

roblems associated with Sino-Sovietand military relations could also lead to friction. However, Soviet aid programs have apparently gone forward on the planned scale, and there Is no evidence that the Chinese have sought more aid than they ore getting; Pei-plng's desire for more assistance probably has been counterbalanced by Its wish to limit the degree of its economic dependence. Theof nuclear weapons mayelicate one; the Chinese have presumably sought them

from the USSR, or will do so. The USSR is probably reluctant to supply them because of unfavorable repercussions on the Sovietposition, the attendant loss ofleverage over Communist China, and the potential military risks Involved. We believe that nuclear weapons have not been given to China, but that the Soviets may make them available In thc future under some form of Soviet control,

n sum, we believe mat Communist China will attain over the next several years an increasing Influence on general Bloc policy and Communist Ideology. The Soviet leaders themselves are almost certainly aware ot this likelihood and probably view lt with concern. Moscow will wish to retain its preeminent position in the Bloc and, to the extent that lt fears the eventual emergence of an actual rival, will attempt cautiously to minimize Pel-ping's Influence within the Bloc. On the other hand, Pelplng's growing stature strengthens the Bloc both Internally and externally and In this respect Is welcome In Moscow.both partners recognize the Importance of solidarity to over-all Communist objectives and realize that mutual adjustments areconsequences of the alliance.

n BT

VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Current Conduct ofPolicy

Soviet foreign policy, over thc more than five years since Stalin's death and increasingly since thc consolidation of Khrushchev'spower, has acquired certainwhich are Important to note ln gauging the threat posed to US security. Though they relate more to manner than to content, these characteristics taken together are revealing as to thc development of Soviet policy Inyears, and as to the changingabout thc world situation whichit.

Most striking perhaps has been the fact that thc conduct of Soviet foreign policy has shown itself moro energetic, assertive, and rapid both ln response and in seizing theIn part, of course, this reflects the impress of Khrushchev's personal style of leadership, in part also Soviet consciousness of thc USSR's growing military and economic power. Rut It also reflects the Soviet belief, first,ore dynamic posture would be effective in the present world situation, and second, that the main struggle with the West lies at present In the world political arena, rather than at the military frontiers between the power blocs. Soviet policy has come to employ Its propaganda weapons with greater aggressiveness and shrewdness, attempting to build the imagepeace-loving" yetpower, confident that by so doing it can effectively alter the alignment of political forces In tho world.

Tactical and ideological flexibility hasanother hallmark of current Sovietpolicy. The Soviet leaders have shown themselves willing toariety of new policies without regard to positions taken up earlier and have accommodated Ideology more and more to the changingolicy. Thusn support of the tactics of peaceful coexistence, theya major revision In Communist doctrine:

they found that war with capitalist states was no longer "fatallyhey also found it expedient to abandon Stalin's rigid division of the world Into the socialist camp nnd tho capitalist encirclement; instead of assuming that all countries beyond the Dice were tools of world Imperialism, they came to discriminate various shades of politicaleven among allies of the US.

There has also been an extension oi the scope of Soviet foreign policy. There are no longer any neglected areas In the world as there were In Stalin's time.5 the Soviet leaders have taken major initiatives ln the Middle East, and have become far more active In Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviet press frequently tells lis readers that no longer can any Issue ln the world be resolved without taking account of Soviet views. Doubtless there is an element ofbravado for domestic consumption In this, but It also reflects an increasingto regard the USSR as now one of two great world powers, and therefore entitled to have global concerns. In situations of crisis everywhere there hasendency to put forward the Soviet view assertively and to refer to the factor of Soviet military powerore blunt fashion.

Finally. Soviet conduct Is marked by an apparently high and genuine confidence. The Soviet leaders evidently believe that, despite the many and serious problems which face them, the movement of events increasingly Justifies their long-held hopes for the ultimate triumph of "world socialism" under Soviet leadership and tutelage. This mood probably reflects satisfaction with Soviet economic and scientific advances, and with the growth of Soviet military power, as well as gratification over the sharpening difficulties for Western Interests In certain areas of the world. While we do not conclude that the Soviet leaders are so overconfident that they would be tempted to Incautious behavior, this Is one

of the hazards which might attend anynew advance of Communist power or reversal for the West,

Current Soviet Objectives ond Main Lines of Policy

How do the Soviet lenders view theover the next several years and what are the immediate objectives which they consider feasible to pursue in moving toward anof Communist power? In broad terms, they probably believe that there ls an accelerating trend toward enhancement of the world power position of the Communist Blocorresponding decline In that of the US and Its allied states. This Is the traditional view which springs from Marxism-Leninism, but which they will see as confirmed recently by their own gams In economic power, their weapons advances, and the sharp poUtical disturbances In the non-Communist world. At the same time, they appear to believe that the strength of the Western states continues to be formidable and that it should not be frontally challenged.

Consequently, the main strategy ofpolicy continues to be that of reducing the Western power posilion by gradualist means and enhancing that of the Bloc. The Soviet leaders probably list their principal objectives over the next fow years as follows: (a) reinforcing the unity of the Communist Bloc and pushing rapidly its growth Inand economic power; (b) encouraging political divisions within the non-Communist world, particularlyiew to isolating the US and constricting the deployment of IU military power and the extent of its political Influence; (c) seizing whatever opportunities may offer for alignment of non-Communist states with the Bloc, and. where expedient, for outright territorial expansion of Communist power.

Thc means which the Soviet leadersto employ in pursuing these objectives are various. As indicated, they will of course push the actual expansion of their ownand military power base as rapidly as they can. They see this as the foundation

of their policy. But they will also use all tho means at their command to make It widely believed that Communist power Is great and growing, that In some Important respects it already outpaces the West, and that thebelongs lo their kind of society and their power system. To project this Image ofand of the world siluotlon they will press thc programs they have developed in recent years: an activearge-scale propaganda effort, trade and aid, and cultural exchanges.

Attitude louard war. We believe that at least for the period of this estimate the Soviet leaders will continue to put their rrtaln reliance In the struggle with tho West on such political weapons. Despite thegrowth of their ro Hilary power. In particular their acquisition of growingfor nuclear attack on the US, weto believe that they will not deliberately initiate general war. They will probablythat evenead In long-range missiles, they could not be certain ofeneral war, and that the scale of damage Inar would threaten the survival of their society.

In the Soviet conception, military power should be used In the first instance and by preferenceolitical weapon. The enemy should be maneuvered Intoulnerable rnilitary-polltical situation that he forfeits key positions without military resistance. Actual use of military power Is envisaged only If there Is confidence both that the gains will outweigh the losses, and that the risks are acceptable. Therefore, the Immediateposed by the growth of Soviet military power Is whether the Soviets will betempted over the next several years to use the threat of their military power more overtly and boldlyeans of pressure on the West

Another serious question arises from the Increasingly aggressive conduct of Soviet foreign policy on the one hand and thegrowth of Soviet military power on the other: will the Soviets employ their own or other forces controlled by them In local military actions, estimating that the US will

7 *. 4J A

deterred from making an adequateresponse by fear of general war or of adverse political consequences?

ational Estimates have statedover the last several years that theleaders would try to avoid general war and that they would seek to avoid situations which in their view involved serious risk of general war. We believe that this estimate can be reaffirmed. However, we also believe that the Soviet judgment with respect to the kind of situations which do Involve serious risk may be changing. The advance of their own military power, together with thepolitical vulnerability of key Westernwill probably lead the Soviet leaders to increase their general pressure on tbe West and to exploit local situations moreWhile we have always considered It possible that Bloc forces would be used In overt local aggression if this could be done without much risk of serious involvement with Western forces, we do not believe that the likelihood of such aggression hasHowever, we do believe that thewill combat more actively than hitherto the presence of Western influenceareas, relying upon threats to prevent the West from taking counteraction toits influence. In this sense, we believe that there isendency on thc part of the Soviets to view the risksore aggressive policy as less serious than In the past. This tendency could be reversedesult of Western actions or as the resulthange in the Soviet leadership. But so long as this tendency persists we believe that the danger of war by miscalculation will be Increased. At present, we believe that this danger Is somewhat greater than ourIn recent years have Indicated.

osture torven if Soviet political warfare does become more vigorous and increasing pressure Is applied against the West, Soviet policy will continue to garbwith the slogans oft will not go over to an overtly and franklyposture. Rather It will continue to present Itself as still striving for "peaceful coexistence" and as leading the "struggle for

he Soviet leaders recognize that the world-wide fear of war is so Intense that great political strength ls added to that side In the power struggle which can capture the force of this sentiment, and thus align large bodies of opinion with its own cause. Identification of the USSR with hopes for peace and the US with war and aggression will remain aaim of Soviet propaganda strategy.

To some extent, the desire to maintain the plausibility of this posture Imposeson the use of force; this Is one reason for regarding open aggression by Bloc forces across state frontiers as unlikely. In general, Soviet leaders, believing they canto reap rewords with their "coexistence" tactics with little risk, are likely to view open military aggression as politically undesirable and unnecessary. Instead It will bo their alm to create, mainly by political means, situations in which the West must eitherommunist advance or resort to the use of force under unfavorableWestern concessions could then be construed by Soviet propaganda as bowing to the Soviethe West elected to use force, it would be compelled to do so under political and perhaps militaryIn either case, the Soviets wouldto intensify divisions within freealliances and to align the uncommitted more closely with the Communist camp.

Tho Soviets will probably continue also to display an apparent readiness to engage ln direct negotiations to settle outstandingProposals for high level talks willbe renewed at any Juncture the Soviet leaders And favorable to themselves. They will regard such meetings as primarilyemonstrative character. Intended not toln freely negotiated settlements, but rather to force the Western Powers under pressure of world opinion to accede tos. They will attempt to pose the alternatives ot "peaceful coexistence" on the one hand, or of tensionsising danger of nuclear war on the other, hoping by occasional measured reminders of the latter to stimulate acceptance of the former on Soviet terms.

he underdeveloped countries in Soviet strategy. The elTort to align the USSR In apparent support of broadly held populartakes Its most general form, other than In peaco propaganda. In identification with various "national liberationeople In underdeveloped countries are being told that thc USSR champions peace, progress, ond national Independence, while the West stands for war, reaction, and colonialism. Moscow clearly sees the underdevelopedtheir weak economic and political systems, strong nationalist and antJcoloniollst sentiments, neutralist tendencies, andat past and present domination by Western Europeanthe most susceptible ground for expansion of Sovietat Western expense. It is thiswhich underlay the Soviet attack in recent years on Western interests In the colonies and former colonial countries of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

n port this campaign ls intended to deny resources and bases in these areas lo Western use. But the Communists hovecome to believe also that it isin underdeveloped and colonial areas that the best prospects for Communistnow lie inimum, they hope to bring national movements and states In these areas under Soviet diplomatic and economic Influence. By thus entering into what inSoviet parlance Is called the "zone of peace" these peoples would enhance thc weight of the Bloc In the world political balance.aximum, tho Soviet leaders hope that antt-Westem national movements can wtth native Communist participation beradually more radicalrocess which would result ultimately In theof Communist orparties In power. They anticipate that rising expectations In these areas wlil farthc possibilities of fulfillment, thus giving theharto seize theinitiative. We believe that the effort Joominant position inareas of the world will continue through she period of this estimate to be one of the main preoccupations of Soviet policy.

:>7

lie USSR's targets among thecountries may shift considerablythc period under consideration. Inwith changing opportunities and local Communist successes and reverses. Frictions between Moscow and Afro-Asians will tend to arise In manythey have already arisen in somethe first bloom of friendly cooperation wears off. Moreover, the basic rationale for Moscow's present collaboration with most Afro-Asiancommon anti-Westerneven be somewhat eroded as some of the current points of difference between the rising nations and the former Imperial powers diminish. At the some time, Moscow will seek out new areas for the expansion of its political and economic influence,in Latin America and Africa. In those countries where Its efforts are most successful, the USSR may Increasingly be tempted to resort to more direct means, that is, support of local Communists in attempts to seize power. But the Soviets wouldweigh such gains against the harmful consequencesolicy would inevitably evoke elsewhere.

rade and out Soviet trade and aid programs ore the economic adjunct to the strategy of penetrotlon in underdeveloped areas. Thc underdeveloped countries, many of which are also politically uncommitted, are generally receptive to Soviet otters of aid and offer the prospect ot high political gains In return for comparaUvely small economic investment. Rather than being widelyoid has been concentrated onwhich are especially susceptible toInfluence and also in most cases are of political or strategic Interest to the. From4 to8 the USSR extended2 billion In credits to underdeveloped countries in the free world, of0 million has already been used. Credits and grants by other Blocbring thc lotal lo more thanillion, of whichillion has been obligated0 million has been expended. About three-flfths of the total Bloc credits expended have been In the form of arms deliveries to Syria,

60GRW

Yemen, Afghanistan, and Indonesia. These same countries plus Ceylon, India, Burma, and Cambodia have received thepart of thc economic aid, During the first half8 there were at one time or another anloc technicians (Including military specialists, totaling about one-third of this number) Innderdevelopedrepresenting an Increase of more thanercent over the preceding six months. In magnitude these programs ore relatively small compared with Western effortslobal basis, and the burden they Impose on the Soviet economy Is slight, annualthus far beingew tenths of one percent of Soviet national product

Attitude toioard the UN. To the extent that the Soviets succeed In gaining influence over the policies of underdeveloped andcountries, and as the number of Afro-Asian members Increases, the UN willore attractive forum for them They probably expect ultimately to find issues on which they can align majorities against the US and obtain endorsement of Soviet policies. They calculate thatemonstrativeof the US would disturb US-alliedand curtail US influence In many areas. If the UN then become on Issue In USpolitics, the repercussions abroad would compound the Soviet advantage. We believe that the Soviets consider the chances forwarfare victories within the UNto be sufficiently promising so that they will continue to give that body major

Disarmament. The Soviet leadersbelieve that by showing an activein disarmament they can enhance their claim to leading In the cause of peace. More specifically, they hope to neutralize Western nuclear striking power by Intensifying the stigma attached to nuclear weapons and thus Inhibiting their actual or threatened use by thc West. They may nlso believe thatnegotiations can help to reduce the chances of nuclear war. They will almost cer-talnly, when circumstances seem to thempressontinuation of such negotiations.

Is possible that the Soviets willlimited agreements In tho field ofeven if these Involve someon their own military capabilities,to gain what they would consider tonet advantage. Probably they have noton the precise shape ofwould meet this prescription. Wothat their deep suspicion of the Westaversion to extensive inspection Inwill forbid their acceptance of anydisarmament scheme, andnegotiations on even the mosthighly complicated and drown out.

Soviet Policy in Particular Areas

The Middle East. This area has offered5 the most striking example of the attempt by Soviet policy to support ontlcolo-nialism and nationalist movements against Western Interests and Influence. The USSR did not create the Arab nationalist movement, but in providing the political backingreat power, together with substantialand economic assistance, It hasincreased the power and effectiveness of the movement.

The immediate Soviet aim Is to deny this area to the West and to expand Sovietthere, rather than to gain direct control of it. If Soviet policy can deepen the.between Arab nationalism and the West to the point of irreconcilability, several results follow: closer association of Arab states with the Bloc tends to alter thc world political alignment in the litter's favor; Weslernbases in the Arab states ore eliminated; Western control of the oil resources becomes tenuous. Consequently, we believe thatpolicy will continue to present Itself In the Middle East as the friend and supporter of Arab nationalism in the latter's struggle against Westernnd morewin for the present support Nasser as leader of the Arab nationalist movement. Further military and economic assistance will be made available to the United ArabUAR positions on Jordan, Lebanon, the Aden Protectorate, and other trouble spotsArab-Western conflict will beIn Soviet propaganda and In the UN.

e-H-

Soviet leaders probably believesome stage the Arab nationalistbeevolutionary turn towardand brought under Sovietbelieveharpening ol* thcwith the West, to which theirand Communist subversive elementsarea can contribute, will facilitate To the extent that such aturn towards Communismplace, the basic incompatibility ofwith those of the present leaders ofwhom the Communists regardnationalists" playing arole, will emerge. Communistand subversion of thc nationalistmay occur unevenly In differentand the Soviets may at sometempted to abandon their restraint anda Communist takeover in somestate, provided they consider theenough to compensate for theto Moscow's relations with otherneutrals.

as Western Influence isfrom the area the Soviets will seekNasser's pretensions and to maketheir prisoner. They will tryhim the opportunity to pursue apolicy In which he tries to keepto both power blocs. They will seekhis influence over other ArabIheir own and to prevent theof Arab unity under his aegis. Theyhis suppression of localand try to bring these Into theleaders of the nationalistare already some signs, in Iraq forthat the Soviets are opposingof the Arab nationalistthese ways. We believe, however, thatbo extremely cautious In their effortsNasser and, before movinghim, willime when theylhat the local Communists haveof the mass movement or whenso isolated himself from the West thatno longer hope to get Its supportSoviets and the Communists. Anbetween Nasser ism andseems unlikely In the Immediate

future, but It might develop during the period of this estimate.

he Soviet leaders must be aware that the Western Powers are bound to attach theImportance to the protection of theirIn the Middle East. How do theythe possibility that their pledges ofto the leaders of the Arab nationalism, who cannot be fully controlled by them, may entrain the USSR ln situations of great risk? Developments in the area over the past few years have probably led Moscow to placeconfidence ln theoviet deterrent against Western use of force to overthrow an Arab government friendly to the USSR. The Soviet leaders probably also believe that the Western Powers In most instances would be restrained from such action by the unfavorable politicalthat would follow, both In the area and in the neutralist countries throughout Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, the intervention of tho US and UK In Lebanon and Jordanthat there are circumstances in which Western powers would be willing to use military force. If the Western Powers became involved In conflict in the area, the Soviet leaders would probably not engage Soviet forces openly or take other actions whichin their view serious risk ot expanding hostilities. However, we believe that theEast is one of the areas where the danger of war by miscalculation has increased.

hile Soviet policy In the Middle East Is not aimed primarily at military gains, the Soviet leaders probably view the developing situation there as offering opportunities to build potential military assets. Theycalculate that ln the event ofmilitary operations in this area they would benefit from their earlier peacetimeof military technicians, Soviet typefuel and materiel, from their increased capabilities for espionage and subversion, and from the improvements which have been made in local airfields, harbors and other facilities. The Soviet leaders probably also contemplate thc eventual achievementong-sought Russianaccess to the strategic areas of the Middle East. To this end. they

GO

continue to encourage and support such movements as that for an independent pro-Soviet Kurdish state andro-Communist government in Iraq, and will also continue pressures against Iran and Turkey.

Asia. The USSR will probably rely on Its currentabout the successes of Communism, support of national independence against Western Imperialism, and offers of trade, aid, and culturalsustain and deepen neutralism, promote pro-Soviet alignments, and gradually to erode Western influence In Asia. Further increase In the strength of the Communist parties In Indonesia and India might induce the Soviet traders to switch to open support of them, but it is more likely, In the case of India at least, that for the next several years Soviet policy will find greater advantage In cultivating .the existing governments. In Asia, It Is probably these two countries which are of primary Interest to Communist policy at present.

Policy toward Japan will probablyalong the routine line laid down over the last severalto stimulate Japanese neutralism, disturbrelations, and maintain pressure for denial of bases to the US. The Soviet leadersdo not believe that they have the means to alter the situation In Japan In anyway for thc present. Likewise, theyregard the situation ln Korea asallhough they will continue to agitate for withdrawal of US forces.

Soviet policy in Southeast Asia appears to operate jointly with that of Communist China on the principle of shared Influence. The Soviets will probably coniinue to giveemphasis to cultivating closer relations with neutralist governments In the area. They will maintain their effort to disrupt SBATO and to align uncommitted states with the Sino-Soviet Bloc on all broad International Issues. They will also stress their willingness to extend economic aid to tlie Southeast Asian states and will tout the value of Communist methods as the best way to achieve thedevelopment these countries soseek. However, we believe that, should

favorable opportunities arise and ohould they estimate that the gains would outweigh the losses, the two Communist powers mighta local Communist party In an attempt to seize power. At present, Indonesia or Laos seem the most likely places forevelopment eventually to occur.

Attica. As part of Its effort ln the underdeveloped areas, the USSR will almost certainly Increase Its activities in Africathe next five years. It ls alreadydiplomatic and economic relations with the newly Independent states ot Morocco, Tunisia, and Ghana, and Is devotinggreater efforts lo Libya and the Sudan. It has offered trade, aid, technical assistance and, ln some cases, arms. Although Soviet policy Is somewhat constrained by the desire not to appear to compete too obviously with Nasser In the primarily Arab and Moslem areas ln which he hopes to extend histhe USSR will almost certainly expand its efforts to establish its diplomatic andpresence on the continent, tonationalist and antlcolonlal movements, and to attempt to end the excluslvcness of Western influence In most of the area.

Up to thc present the USSR hasolicy of restraint toward North Africa, largely out of regard for Soviet relations with France and for the position of the French Communist Party. At some point, however, the USSR may abandon this policy. Internal developments in France or in Algeria might convince the Soviet leaders that they would gain more from open support of North African nationalism. In any case, material support may be given to the Algerian nationalists, though probably through Egypt rather than directly. Arms and economic aid offers will probably be pressed on the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments.

Western Europe. Current Soviet policy in Europe appears to lie aimed more atthe USSR's position in Easternthan at an early expansion of Soviet power beyond the present frontiers of the Bloc In order to achieve greater security for Communist control of Eastern Europe, as well as to weaken the position of Western Europe,

i-T

SovieU arc bound to regard theot the NATO alliance and the withdrawal of US military power from Europe as basic objectives of their policy. These are the main purposes of all their maneuvers and proposals aimed at achieving "Europeanhe more immediate Soviet objectives are toan Increase In West German military strength and the establishment of additional missile bases In Western Europe. Sovietpolicy and Its attendantIs directed largely at these targets. Moreover, the Soviet policies In the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, apart from theirImportance, are themselves calculated to impose material and political losses on Western Europe ond to encourage divisions there.

he current Sovlot diplomatic offensive over the status of Berlin ls the most striking example of Khrushchev's activist foreign policy. The Soviet leader must be aware that there is virtually no point of controversyEast and West on which the West has so thoroughly committed itself, and that there can scarcelyore dangerousissue to push to the point of crisis. In raising the Issue, the Soviets have had in mind the achievementumber of major objectives. They seek to compel the Western Powers to deal with East Germany and thus to accord at least tacit recognition to the GDR. Tills In turn would constitute anstepatification of the status quo In Easternevelopment which the Soviets havo long sought. Further, the removal of tho Western presence from Berlin would permit the Soviets to handle the escapee problem and generally to reinforce thesecurity of their East German Satellite. They probably further calculate that theInitiative, even If only partially successful, willore receptive atmosphere for other Soviet proposals on Germany,disengagement and peace treatyIn addition, the Soviets probably expecterious Western retreat onwould bring Into question for many West Germans thc desirability of the NATO

Is not clear why the Sovietsthe present moment to raise theIssue, but their action Ls certainly inwith the generally hardening toneforeign policy. This In turn lstheir growing conviction, manifest overyear or so, that their relative powerhas Improved. They are presumablyon the assumption that what theyashift In the relation ofthe world arena" in their favor givesopportunity to test the solidarity ofAllianceajor Issue.leaders probably Intend to betactically flexible. We believe thattry to direct Soviet andanner which willconflict with the Westernat the same time they will betake advantage of any signs ofthe part of the West, or ofcompromise on major issues.they have already committedand we believe that thebe severe, with considerable chanceby one or both sides.

do not believe that the raising ofIssueovietettlement ofhole on other thanWe foresee no change at presentUSSR's adamant opposition todespite the handicaps thison Soviet maneuverability tnThe Soviet leaders cannotabandonment of East Germanythe threat which would probablytheir whole position In Easternwith Poland. Over the longermajor political change In Westas might develop after the deathAdenauer, could leadewmore flexible Soviet and Eastapproach to Bonn and to thcproblem. The SovieU probablya period of political uncertaintyand that party reallgnmenUthem new opportunities to promoteseparation from NATO andof Allied military forces, to achieve

tot ccc ivk-t

recognition of East Germany, andeunification schemeto the USSR.

Moscow probably has come to view the Communist Parties In Western Europe moreehicle for propaganda and agitation than as the basis for revolutionary action, at least for the next several years. While the long-range subversive and politicalof these Parties will be cultivated, their present role ts mainly to support Sovietpolicy objectives, such as arousingconcern against West German nuclear armament and the stationing ot missiles ln Europe.

Latin America. The trend noticeable In the last year of increased Soviet attention to Latin America will continue during the coming five years. The USSR apparentlythat current economic and political

differences between the US and Latin America and the elements of political Instability ln certain countriesromisingto expand Soviet Influence. In the immediate future, Moscow will concentrate on broadening its diplomatic and cultural relations and on trade or economic assistance offers ln selective, politically sensitivein order to expand Soviet Influence on the governmental level and to facilitate both the overt and the subversive activities of local Communists. The most significant recent Soviet economic moves In Latin America have been the conclusion ln80 million credit to Argentina for theof Soviet peLroleum equipment (the largest Soviet credit offer extended to any non-Communist country outside tho Afro-Asianarge-scale Soviet purchases of Uruguayan wool, and the conclusionarter deal with Brazil.

-

TABLE |

ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENOTH OP BLOC ACTIVE MILITARYctober ISM'

FORCES

DEFENSE

GROUND

Including Navel

AND

hiding

FORCES

|

(Rounded totals)

iRou-aed totali)

n

-

HI

:

n

u: m

>>:

I

m

Asia (Rounded totals)

unlit Cfiln*

Korea

:

Vietnam

TOTALS Rounded)

in this table are based on eitlmalM order o( battle Estimates o( this type yield approximate rather than precise measures of strength at any given time, and can lag considerably behind change! In actual strength.

figures do not Include ground, naval, and air forces personnel permanently assigned to the air defense forces (PVO) withcontrol and warning as their primary duty.

'For purposes of this table, anaval Aviation personnel ant Included In total Soviet air forces personnel strength.Dots not include KGB naval forces which In this Uble are carried in Soviet security fortes total.aval air.aval air.

-

TABLE I

ESTIMATED STRENOTH OFOUND FORCXS IN UKECTOBER lift* 1

Motorized Bin.

Divisions

DMstau

Divisions

Actual

| '.

carta.

xc

ceo

*

Actual itrenrthi of divisions vary. Thc flfum shown represent estimated average*,

Additional Soviet corctMt uniu are estimated lo includertilleryrtUlcrybrigadesdisposiuons o( Soviet Hoc divisions: Occupiedorthwestern USSR.estern USSR, SI.USSR Mj Southernentralovlci Far East, II.

'The total of Chinese Coraraurust dlvUlceuntil cavalry divisions

HuccarUn Armed Forces not now considered lo be effective: (round force In process of formation win amount toivisions 'Estimated breakdown by major poagtaup:: Communist Chins. IO: European Satellites,North Korea, and North Vietnam. JI

m to c;

SIS

II IS 3M| 'PHi

3? I

2 3 8 ,3

i

I d

i "SB i

I mi m

il

is

ss

3 5 2 ||

ssi iss iss 8

si ai 33

ill iil

s a bb o

183

w it B)

T-

TABLE 5

ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OP SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS.

1 OCTOBER 1BSS

FIGHTER

Jot

Jet>

ATTACK Jet (Fir)

UOHTBOMBER Jet

MED. JET BOMBER and TANKER

MEDIUM BOMBER

Prop

HEAVY BOMBER and TANKER

TRANSPORT

Prop (Lt)

Prop (Med) HELICOPTER

Light

Medium

RKCONN AISS ANCE Jet (Ftr) Jet (LtBinr) Prop (Ge&pln)

ON Jet (Ftr) Jet (LtBmr) Prop (Mlse) TRAINER Jet (Ftr)

ROUNDRD TOTALS

TACTICAL AVIATION

325

US

TSO

FIGHTER AVIATION OP

AIR DEFENSE

110

280

LONG-RANOE AVIATION

520

275

OF NAVAL AIRBORNE AVIATION TROOPS

<S5

250

15

110

SO

0

115

SO

110

S50

TOTAL

325

435

0

0

Combat Hadlua/Rnngc (nm)

0 lb. bombload

onab. bombload

oneJVX Ik. baeabVotd

one refuel' Speed/ABltadwaaiausn apeed at

b Target apeed

target . -Combat CeObM IfU' Terminal Target AlUtade.(fU

lb bombload

lb bombload

lb. bombload

S

ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBERS For Operase to 1M1

IIADOP'.U

FILION

BULL

(Calculated in accordance with USOllA Spec except that fuel raervt* are reduced toaximum ollnaUa loiur at na Iml and aircraft operate et altitudes permltUrg maxtmnrn radius/range)

POSSIBLE rUTLTRS DEVELOPMENT'

H0

CURRENT MODELS

0

0

0

M

II *MM

IMvMM

MM VIM MM/MI.

M

MMM MM

HMUM

Ml MJM

HM

4 MO

mm m

MlMl

0S00

0

0

soo

OD

MJM

MJM

O

0

0 ol

'

O'

MJM

ononng-

TABLE 7

ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LIGHT BOMBERS

Combat Radius/ Ranee (njn.)

I tomb! cad (lbs)

Maximum Speed at Optimum Attitude (Kls/m

Target Speed/ Target Altitude (Kts/ft)

Combal Celling

HKAOI.E MADGE'

3.GO0

L

BSAOLE_ BOSUN (Turboprop)

0

Tactical

O0

JCO

0 with

May also be used In antisubmarine warfare.

Includes SO run. supersonic dash.

sn. supersonic dash.

Expected to become operational In theeriod.

-

TABLE

ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (Calculated In accordance withpec)

Operations! Date

Soviet Designation

Power Plants Number Type

Combat Radius/Range

Pay load Troops or Passengers or Cargo (lbs)

6peed/Op,Kts/tt)

CruiseKts/ft)

Service Celling

Remarks

9

9

9

9

Tii-llO

IMS (Moskva)

Lijalr.a)

0

Tn-U4 (Rosslya)

Piston

230

175

78

5

C00

Turboprop Turboprop Turboprop Turbojet Turboprop 0 0

C0

125

oo

0

0

Prototype not

observed

0 0 0 0 0

ew

transport based on BEAR

Transport of BULL

0 0 0 0

Assault Transport called Whale by Soviets

Normal rated power. 'Constant altitude mission.

'i*

TABLE 10

ESTIMATED PERFORM AN CE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET EARLY WARNING AND OCI RADARS

In

WARNING RADAR

CONTROL INTERCEPT RADAR

Range

Range Ism.)

Coverage

Bomber

[f. .

Bomber

Ml

CAKE

REST

CAKE

M

MESH

OUT

OUT/

CAKE

Type

SO

0

Type

0

All radars Hated aa currently operational are believed to have helgh'.-nndlng capabilities tjMM tbe eKepUon of OAOE end STRIKE OUT BMda early warning rota.

X With the exception ol DUMBO. aU of these radari art believed to be equipped with antijamming devices.

3 All of these current types arc believed to be mobile except for the DUMBO, the OAOE and the OAOE-PATTY CAKE coablnatlor..

ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL

FLEET AREA

COUNTRY

Major Surface Snips1

Heavy Cruisers Old Heavy Cruisers Light Cruisers Old Light Cruisers Oulded Missile Cruisers Destroyers Old Destroyers Guided Missile Destroyers Escorts Total

Submarines *

Mld-1SS1

Total All Fleet?

Total All Fleets

Pacific

Baltic

Mld-

: October

Com.

Northern Blact Sea

Com.

USSR

China

-

Range New

59 58 7

Long Range New

(Nonnuclear)

Other Long 13 2 4

15 3 9

Nuclear

Nuclear (Guided Missile)

Oulded Missile

(Conventional Power)

Oulded Missile2lass) now converted. Wheneverto doSoviets could

to Topsideup tof this typeonths.

40

2!

73

.

Ii r, I

TABLEContinued)

M!d- Mid- Mid- Mid-

October 9 0 1 IK2

FLEET Black See, AllAll Fleets

Sat*

Sal USSR Sal USSR Sal USSR China USSR Sat China USSR USSR USSR USSR USSR China

aarlr.es' (Continued)

MedUn Range New

Com; '

Medium Range1

Medium Range

Range'

_

Short Range

addition to tho major surface ships shown, we estimate Inhereinor surface ships In tha Soviet service,n the Satellites and Communist China. Minor surface ships Include amphibious, mine warfare, and patrol ships. "Old" surface ships are those more lhanears old.

submarines areears

submarines or post-World War II design and construction, Including"I" and "F" Class long range. "Q" Class medium range,ew medium range submarine.

' New Soviet submarine programs now under way will probably Include ballistic missile submarine systems, and possibly also submarines designed fortowaga of crulae-type missiles. While there Is little evidence on the progress of such programs, the figures given here take account of both possibilities For further information as to types, see Chapter IV,.

older tlian post-World War II but less than if years old.

"A

table :a

E5TTMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIETW" ANDCLASS SUBMARINES

Armament

Class Beam(ft) Torpedo/Mine

"t"

-W rente)

2

(Med. range)

Performance(KU)/EnduranceRadii *

on HaUon

Maximum

Cruising

Maxim an

Cruising

Maximum

Cruising

TABLE 13

ESTIMATEDOF BLOC MERCHANT FLEETSndOcean-goingRT and up)

>WT

33

Original document.

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