MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES 1958-1963

Created: 12/23/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

B'p-TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TUB

SUMMARY

I. INTERNAL POLITICAL

Ascendancy of

Role of the

Issues In Soviet

Attitudes In Soviet

The Longer

II. TRENDS IN THE SOVIET

Shifts in Economic

Prospects for Economic

Trends in Defense

Industrial

Agricultural

Trends in

Foreign

III. TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Scientific Manpower. Training and

Soviet Capabilities In Major Scientific

Space

Nonmilitary Applications of Atomic Energy

Physics and

Chemistry and

Medical

Biological and Agricultural

Industrial

IV. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SOVIET MILITARY

Soviet Military Thinking and

Major Objectives of Military

Soviet Attitudes Toward Limited and General War .

Policy on size and Types of

Military Policy Toward Other Bloc nations

Special Weapon

Nuclear

Guided

Intercontinental Ballistic

Chemical and Biological

Electromagnetic

TOP e-P.

-'v-o

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

Strengths and Capabilities of Soviet

High

Long-Range Striking

Long Range

Intercontinental Ballistic

Other Long-Range Ballistic

Missile-Launching

Capabilities for Long Range

Air Defense

Air Defense

Air Defense Radar and Control Equiptnent .

Air Defense

Passive

Air Defense

Ground Forces and Tactical Air

Capabilities for Major Land

Against Western Europe and Scandinavia

Against Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East

In the Par

Naval

Submarine

Capabilities for Naval

V. TRENDS IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER

Relations with the

Bloc Relations with

Relations with Communist

VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN

Current Conduct of Soviet Policy

Current Soviet Objectives and Main Unes of Policy .

Attitude Touxxrd

A Posture for

The Underdevelopedoviet Strategy

Trade and

Attitude Toward the

Soviet Policy In Particular

The Middle

Asia

P7ejfern

Latin

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

THE PROBLEM

To review significant developments affecting the USSR's internal politicaleconomic developments, military programs, relations with other Bloc states, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action through'

ew tendencies have appeared on the Soviet political scene during the past year. Externally, the lines of conflict with the West have been drawn more sharply once again, and "reduction of tensions" no longer is the major theme of Sovietpolicy. Internally there has been both in the USSR and in the Bloc an attempt to consolidate and stabilize, to check the pace of change, to curb the expectations and discipline the unruly tendencies aroused among the people by the milder policies of the post-Stalin years. There haseturn to arigor In policy and in ideology.the changes which affected almost every aspect of Soviet internal and external policy in the years after Stalin's death have for the moat part not been reversed- The flexibility and pragmatism of the current leadership continues;in policy may still be forthcoming, particularly in internal affairs.

'The referencevo-Tcur period IsThe economic calculations carry through lBflS, to conform to the Soviet Seven-Year Plan; aoiac ot tbe political JudrmenU. on the other hand, pertain to periods o( leas than five yean.

ESTIMATE

Trends in Foreign Policy

During the course of the last year there hasistinctly hardening tone in Soviet foreign policy. It is true that many of the new features introduced after the death of Stalin remain in force. The claim to be pursuing policies in theof establishing "peaceful coexistence" is still made; programs of culturaland generally freer contact with the outside world have been continued.ew militancy and asscr-tiveness in Soviet policy has emerged more and more clearly. This has been most strikingly manifest in the Quemoy and Middle East crises, and in the developing crisis over Berlin.

The Soviet leaders probably decided that the special emphasis they had given to "peaceful coexistence" and easing of tensions had out-lived its usefulness. It had not had the anticipated effect of weakening Western alliances. Someof the relaxationnewto Yugoslavia, the repudiation of Stalin, and the leeway given for some

2

autonomy In the Satellites-proved dangerous to Soviet authority In Eastern Europe. A return toarder course probably seemed desirable on these grounds alone. But at the same time, it appeared justified by the Soviet leaders' belief that, in power terms, there had been an enhancement of the Bloc's positionecline In that of the West. This belief probably was based in the first place on Soviet weapons advances andacliievements. There waseeling that the outlook was good for new advances in Bloc economic strengtheriod of some difficulty, while at the same time Western economies were believed to be showing symptoms of economic crisis. Then, too, the Soviet leaders considered that Communistwas generally growing stronger in underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, while Westerncontinued to decline. Theof the Soviet leaders that they were enteringromising phase In the "struggle against imperialism" has been articulatedew doctrine, namely, that an irrevocable shift In the relation of forces in the world has taken place to the advantage of the Communist Bloc.

his more confident and militanton the part of the Soviet leadership does not mean that it has revised itstoward war as an instrument of policy. We continue to believe that the Soviet leaders have no Intention ofinitiating general wax and still wish to avoid serious risks ofar. They almost certainly believe that, even with the acquisition of long-rangecapable of striking the US, the scale of damage they would suffereneral nuclear war would threaten the survival of their regime and society. Moreover, they regard the final victory ofas inevitable, and to be achieved mainly through political forms of struggle. The maintenance andstrengthening of great military power is primarily intended toesort to force by the "imperialist" enemy, and to counteighty factor inhim to submit peacefullyuccession of political reverses as the revolutionary tide advances. Situations might arise, however, in which the Soviets would judge that military force could be used without unacceptable risk or that an imminent threat left them with no recourse but to Initiate military action.

urrently, while the Soviets still wish to avoid serious risks of general war, they probably believe that the Bloc canits pressure on the West and can exploit local situations more vigorously, perhaps even through the use of Bloc armed force, without incurring the same degree of risk as they would haveWhile we have always considered it possible that Bloc forces would be used in overt local aggression if this could be done without much risk of seriouswith Western forces, we do not believe that the likelihood of suchhas Increased. The Soviets may even believe that the West, also conscious of Soviet gains in military power, will be more and more disinclined to reactConsequently, they now seemto test Western firmness and probe for weaknesses in the hope that some key position may be abandoned withoutresistance, or that the Westernwill split over some such issue.

n employing pressures against the West, the Soviet leadership doubtlessto proceed with care. But itswith calculations of power,

its evident confidence in the strength of the Communist position, may lead it to underestimate dangers. We believe that if the current attitude of theleaders persists, the danger of war arising from miscalculations will be

he USSR hasajor effort over the last several years towardcountries, Its trade and aid programs, propaganda and culturalare intended to displace Western influence, and to orient the policies of such states increasingly toward theBloc. The Soviet leaders believe that if they can associate the aspirations of underdeveloped peoples with their own cause they can increasingly constrict the political maneuverability of their main enemies, the Western Powers. Wethat the Soviet leaders will continue to regard the effort to develop Communist influence in underdeveloped countriesajor facet of their policy. The USSR's targets among the underdevelopedmay shift considerably, inwith changing opportunities and local setbacks. In those countries where its efforts arc most successful, the USSR may increasingly be tempted to support local communists in attempts to seize power. But the Soviets would carefully weigh such gains against the harmful consequencesolicy wouldevoke elsewhere. They willgenerally maintain the pose ofcooperation. Since the claimpeace-loving" policy is one of theelements of the Soviet appeal to the neutralist states, the desire to sustain the plausibility of this claim will Imuose some restraint on the hard andUme of Soviet policy toward the West.

The major Soviet effort to extendin underdeveloped areas has been made in the Middle East, where the West has Important economic and strategicThe USSR will continue itsof economic and military aid to Arab states, hoping to deepen the conflict of Arab nationalism with the West. The initial aim of this policy Is to displace Western and increase Soviet influence, and to make Western access to theof the area precarious. Theleaders probably also contemplate the eventual achievementong-sought Russianaccess to the strategic areas of the Middle East. To this end, they will continue to encourage and support such movements as that for an independent pro-Soviet Kurdish state andro-Communist government In Iraq, and will also continue pressures against Iran and Turkey.

The Soviets also hope that radical anti-Western nationalism in the Middle East can eventually beevolutionary turn toward Communism. While they probably intend for the present to support Nasser's claim to leadership of the Arab nationalist movement, they regard himbourgeois nationalist" whose roleransitory one.avorablein some Arab country, they may encourage local Communists tothe nationalist movement anda seizure of power. An openbetween Soviet revolutionary policy and Nasser's claim to leadership of the Arab nationalist movement may occur during the period of this estimate.

South Asia and the Far East,and Chinese Communist policycontinue to emphasizecontacts, supported byeconomic aid and cultural exchange

-

and an active propaganda,iew to encouraging neutralist policies and where possible openly anti-Western ones. Shortavorable opportunity to establish Communist powerey country, the Chinese and Soviets will probablyto put their main reliance onaction intended to influencerather than to overthrow them, and if possible to associate them with the Bloc against the Western Powers. As regards Africa and Latin America, the Soviet Government apparently views with optimism its prospects for successfuland economic penetration and, in keepingurrent trend, can be expected to intensify its efforts in these areas.

Soviet policy in Europe appears to be aimed more at consolidating the USSR's position in Eastern Europe than at an early expansion of Soviet power beyond the frontiers of the bloc. Soviet policy toward Western Europe is concerned mainly with breaking up the NATOand military alliance and thestructure located in that area. This is the main purpose of their maneuvers and proposals aimed atpart from the ever-present aim of creating discord among the NATO allies, the more immediateobjectives are to prevent an increase of West German military strength and to prevent the establishment of additional missile bases in Western Europe.

The current Soviet diplomaticover the status of Berlin Is the most striking example of Khrushchev's activist foreign policy. It appears designed to strengthen the East German regime as well as toore receptivefor other Soviet proposals on Germany and to create divisions among the NATO allies. The Soviet leadersintend to be cautious and tactically flexible. We believe that they will try to direct Soviet and Eastanner which will avoid military conflict with the Western allies, while at the same time they will be prepared to take advantage of any signs of weakness on the part of the West, or of inclinations to compromise on major issues.they have already committed themselves considerably, and we believe that the crisis may be severe, withchance of miscalculation by one or both sides. We do not believe that the Soviets intend to modify the main lines of their policy on thehole, but will continue to insist on maintaining the present division of Germany. They regard the preservation of Communist control in East Germany as essential to the maintenance ofpower in Poland and Eastern Europehole. They hope totheir control of that area and to force Western recognition of theand permanence of the Communist regimes there.

oviet disarmament policy, which has at times shown some flexibility,inimum to earn credit for the USSR as the leading proponent ofctual Soviet proposals are aimed mainly at the withdrawal of US military power from Western Europe and other bases, and also at discrediting and inhibiting US reliance on nuclearWhile it is possible that the USSR would accept some limitations on its own military posture in order to further these objectives, the Soviets would almostnot consent to any very extensive scheme for mutually inspected We believe that there is little like-

that the Soviets willroad disarm anient agreement strongly enough to move their policy significantly in the direction of the positions now held by the Western Powers.

Infra-Bloc Relations

n the lastajor effort has been undertaken to consolidate the unity of Bloc states. The conference ofparties In7 launched the so-called antirevisionist campaign in order to curb deviationist tendencies which threatened6 to eliminateinfluence from Poland and Hungary. The latter regime is again effectively under Moscow's control and the Gomulka government in Poland, while stillParty autonomy and some degree of independence in its internal policy, is showing itself more deferential to Soviet guidance. As compared with Stalin's methods, Moscow's authority in thewill continue to be exercisedout of deference to nationalIn the very long run, wethere willendency for direct Soviet control over these states to bePopular dissatisfaction will remain widespread in Eastern Europe, but we believe that the recurrence of popularor of an attemptatelliteParty to defy Moscow on vital issues is unlikely at least over the next few years.

he scale of China's power and the fact that the Chinese Communist Party has long been organizationallyof the USSR has made the Sino-Soviet relationship more nearly one of equality. The parallelism of material, strategic, and ideological interests will continue to weigh decisively in favor of cementing the alliance of the two countries, even though frictionsariety ofissues, economic and militaryby the USSR to China, competition for influence in other Communistfrom time to time make theensitive and difficult one. We believe that Communist China will attain over the next several years aninfluence on general Bloc policy and Communist ideology. However, so long as the struggle against the Western Powers remains the principal concern of both regimes, there is unlikely to be any serious split between them.

Soviet Internal Political Situation

leadership of thedocs not seem likely to beso long as his healthIn the absence of such aor of any major setback to hishe does not seem likely toreturn to the terroristic methods ofemployed by Stalin. Heto recognize that thesuch methods has improved theclimate within the country.the regime is now againits vigilance against dissenters,probably not hesitate to userepressive measures if itto be necessary. We believethough the regime continues tomany, especially amongand the youth, it has gainedamong the populationThis is due mainly to theof police terror, to Improvementsstandards, and to pride inworld position, scientific andachievements of the Soviet state.

believe that, although theredifferences within the Sovietover certain issues of policy, and flis-

-TO p_

contents within some groups of thethe regime will seldom bein major foreign policy decisions by concern for interna) politicalShould Khrushchev die, there would probably againeriod ofjockeying for the leadership. It is unlikely that this would basically affect the continuity of the regime's policies or its ability to carry them out, buteriod might diminish the authority of the Soviet Party within the Bloc and lead to divisions within and amongParties. Over the very long run, loss of belief In the Ideological doctrine the regime Imposes, and the Increasingof professional elements who arc not Ideologically inclined, may moderate the Soviet outlook. At present, however, we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project Its rapidlypower externally.

Trends in the Soviet Economy

oviet economic policy continues to aim primarilyapid expansion of the economic bases of national power. We believe that the goals laid down In the new Seven-Year Plan, which beginsre in the main feasible, except for those in agriculture, and that the USSR's gross national product (GNP) will grow at an average annual rate of about six percent during the plan period.that the US maintains an average rate of growth ofercent per year, Soviet GNP5 will be, in dollar terms, about half that of the US, aswith aboutercent at present. Despite the smaller size of its economy, the dollar value of the USSR's defense expenditure is about equal to that of the

US. Our estimates of the probable trend of military expenditures Indicate that3 these willercent greater thanince growth of GNP in this period is estimated atercent, the defense burden may thus be slightly heavier3 than at present. Despite this, we estimate that Soviet industrial production will grow over the new plan period at an average annual rate of about nine percent, and that per capitawill be about one-third higher5 than it was

eyond what they contribute to Soviet military power, the achievements of the Soviet economy haveitallyelement in the impact whichpolicy has on the world situation. First is the direct politico-economicarising from the ability of the USSR to Initiate and support programs ofaid or credit to foreign countries, to import goods from countries which would otherwise be hard-pressed to find markets, and to export various materials in quantities which (if the Soviet leaders so desired) could disrupt previouslypatterns of world trade. In this connection, manipulation of pricesey weapon of the USSR. Second is the political and psychological effect oncountries of the successful and rapid economic development achieved by Soviet and Chinese methods. Theand Chinese Communist leadersgreat importance to the possibility of convincing these countries that only by adopting Communist methods andCommunist assistance can they too achieve rapid economic growth. Third is the economic Impact in asense, arising inevitably from the appearance in the worldreat new producing and trading unit, the Influ-

8EC-RBT

top oacrtEiT

of which could not fall to be great even if it were not deliberately used for political purposes by the Soviet leaders. In all three ways the Soviet economy willrowing challenge to theworld.

Dovolopments Affecting the Soviet Military Posture

he Soviets will almost certainlyto believe that they mustarge and diversified militarydesigned to meet contingencies up to and including general war. Thus they will at all times maintain substantial forces-in-being. Meanwhile, they will press ahead with research andprograms In order to acquirecapabilities with advanced weapon systems, and if possible to achieve clear military superiority over the US.

he present Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile could includeange of yields fromT toT. The USSR probably possessesnuclear weapons toajor attack by Its long-range striking forces, but the supply of fissionableis probably insufficient for large-scale allocation of such weapons to air defense and tactical uses as welL Since weubstantial and highSoviet program for the expansion of fissionable material production and considerable further improvement inweapons technology, we believe that current limitations will case.

he principal Soviet militarypresently capable of long-rangeattack is Long Range Aviation, withombers (includingmong which arcet medium bombers andet and turboprop heavy bombers. Thissuited for attacking targets in Eurasia and ItsIs capable of large-scale attacks against the US only through theuse of medium bombers on one-way missions. While the size of the long-range bomber force will probably decline gradually, Soviet long-range striking capabilities will Increase markedly as the stockpile of nuclear weapons grows,bombers are Introduced, theand proficiency of the bomber force Increases, and especially as the Soviet capacity to deliver nuclear weapons by missiles expands.1

he USSR will rely increasingly upon missiles as nuclear delivery systems. Present operational weapons include ground-launchedmissiles with ranges upndautical miless well as bomber-launched air-to-surface missiles suitable for use against ships and

"ThoChief of 8US (or Intelligence, Department of the Army, dMi not concur in the last sentence of this paragraph. He agree* that Soviet long-range striking capabtUUca will Increase markedly but believe* that this increase cannot be attributed to the tclroducUon ofbomber* of tbe types and within the strength level* estimated, or to continuedof bomber crews. In his view, tbe estimated scquirtUoo by the USSRubstantial 1CBM capability, along *ltb the anticipated Increase In the Sorlet nuclear weapons stockpile, are factors which far outweigh comparatively routine improvements In the saasttgj force. Therefore, be believes that tbe last sentence of thisshonld read as follows: "Tbe Soviets can be eipected to introduce Improved bombers and to Increase the readiness and proficiency of Long Range AviaUonut Uie aUe of this force and Its significanceong-range attack role will gradually decline during the period.Soviet long-range striking capabUIUes will Increase markedly as the Soviet missile delivery capability expands and as tbe stockpile of nuclear weapons grows."

EGRET

otherewsubmarines have probably been converted to. cruise-type missiles. The USSR will probablyirst operational capability withrototype ICBMs. range at some timehile it is possibleimited capability with comparatively unproven ICBMs might have been establishede believe this to be unlikely. We believe thatplanners intend toizeable ICBM capability as soon as practicable.

Air defense capabilities will increase through improvements In thecharacteristics of weapons andigher proportion of all-weather fighters, further Incorporation of guided missiles in the defenses oftargets, and especially through wide employment of semiautomatic aircontrol. But the Soviets willto have difficulty in opposing very low altitude attack, the air defensewill still be subject to disruption and saturation, and the problem of warning time will become more critical. The USSR will probably noteapon system with even limited effectiveness against ballistic missiles3 or later.

The ground forces, estimated to haveechanized or motorizedifle divisions,ank divisions, andirborne divisions, have beenmodernized and reorganized, in accordance with revised Soviet tactical doctrine which supplements standard tactics and training with those designed for conditions of nuclear warfare. These forces are closely supported by tactical aviation consisting of fighters trained in the ground attack role (in addition to their air defense role) and light and medium bombers trained in groundbombing techniques. Withair and naval support, Soviet ground forces are capable of conducting large-scale operations on several fronts into peripheral areas, separately orThe increasing availability of nuclear weapons and guidedill bring furtherchanges, but probably no major alterations in size or deployment of forces. Tactical and naval air units, some of which have already received jet medium bombers, will probably receive newfighters and bombers. Increasing attention is being paid to theof airborne forces and air transport capabilities.

The present Soviet force ofubmarines includesong-range craft of postwar design andecent slowdown inhift to new types,nuclear-powered submarines anddesigned specifically to employ guidedubmarine-launched ballistic missile systemissile range of. will probably be available for first operational use. Construction of conventional submarines will probably continue, but the greater complexity ofand missile submarines willresultotal annual production rate considerably below the high levels of recent years.

Space Programs. We believe that the USSR is presently capable of orbiting earth satellites weighing on the orderounds, of launching lunar probes and satellites, and of launchingprobes to Mars and Venus. Its space program could also Include: surveillance satellites and recoverable aeromedical

SEOn-EJp-

soft landings" by lunar rockets and recoverable manned earthanned glide-type high altitude research; earth satellites weighing as much0 pounds and manned cir-cumlunar. While each of these individual achievements appears feasible as to technical capability and earliest date attainable, we doubt that the USSR could accomplish all of these space flight activities within the time periods specified. If the Soviets desire to do so, an earth satellite could be launched from the territory ofChina within the next year or so.

Soviet Scientific Achievements

he USSR's achievements during the last year, including earth satelliteweapons development, and the scale of its efforts in the IGY program, have strikingly demonstrated that the USSR hascientific establishment of the first rank.esultustained effort over the last three decades, the number of graduates in scientific and technical disciplines has steadilyresearch facilities have been greatly expanded, and the quality ofscientific training has improved. Soviet scientists have made markedin many areas of fundamental and applied research and in some fields rank among the best in tho world. We believe that significant Soviet advances In science and technology are likely to occur in the future with greater frequency than in the past.

DISCUSSION I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

of Khrushchev

Khrushchev's position as the dominate ing figure on the Soviet scene appears to be well established. There does not appear to be any other leader or any group able or willing seriously to challenge his position. The Twenty-First Party Congress, scheduled foray Install still more of his followers in the highest Party organs and further dramatize his personal and ideological authority. Thus, It Is likely to bewho will preside over the Sovietthroughout the period of this estimate, assuming that he retains his health and vigor. However, Khrushchev's policies will probably continue to arouse concern among certain elements of the Party, and an attempt to reduce his authority cannot be entirely

Although he Isense Stalin's heir, Khrushchev will almost certainly not rule as Stalin ruled. The style of his leadership is characteristic of his own personality, and la reflecteduitable myth: the new leaderregarious man of the people, and"close to theeough and practical-minded man, but his political Judgment Is unerring, and like Lenin hethe Party by the persuasive force of his arguments rather than by tho fear heThis Image probably reflects theIn which Khrushchev prefers to rule; he fancies himself as the popular boss-persuader. His method of leadership is also consistent with the needs of the post-Stalin period.he will be disposed to avoid the use of terrorain Instrument of rule, though the police will be kept strong and employed as necessary. Errors in Judgment, evenon some Issues, will not generally bo treated as political crimes. The Centraland Party Congresses will probably continue to meet regularly. There wiu be greater representation of outlying regions at the center, and more concern displayed for local interests. In short, the consolidation of Khrushchev's power will probably noteturn to dictatorship of the Stalinist type.

Moreover, there will continue to beon Khrushchev which will work to limit his exercise of dictatorial power. Since his authority, unlike Stalin's, does not rest on the use of terror, Khrushchev mustar greater degree seek to win and hold theof groups within the Party apparatus. Inner Party maneuverlngs are complicated by the fact that greater account must be taken of popular sentiment than was true under Stalin; Khrushchev's position In particular Is exposed because he is identified with economic and social programs which have stimulated popular desires for further materialand he is thus personally accountable forood record of performance In relation to promises. At some point within the period of this estimate Khrushchev may face the dilemma either of tolerating radically opposing views within the leadership, thus imperiling his control, or of attempting to suppress opposition tendencies, at the costeturn to terror. If, although wo think Iterious challenge to Khrushchev's personal position should arise, not all of the allies and associates who supported himhis rise to power would necessarily remain loyal to him.

The ebullient personality of Khrushchev has been considered by some observers as likely to give Soviet foreign and domestic policy an erratic and unstable course. We think this Is unlikely. His public manner Is probably in large part that of the conscious actor-politician, intended to confound hisand to impart vigor to the execution of his policies. His advocacy of certaindepartures in Soviet policies in recent years was probably not unrelated to efforts toarch on his competitors In the

cession struggle. We think that theas distinguished from the style, ofpolicy Is Ukely to be little affected by KhrushchcT's IcUosynciacles.

Roto of tho Party

he victory of Khrushchev has beenby an increasing use of the Partyin all aspects of control andAt the top. in the Party Presidium, tho majority now consists of Khrushchev's followers who were elevated from theand of important regional Partythe former overwhelmingof men in leading government positions has been drasticallyartyeither preside over or play important roles in the regional economic councils which now administer the economy In place of the former central ministries. Local Partyhave also been brought into the district military councils, giving theloser hold on military administration. In rural areas measures have been taken to give the local Party more effective control over

his increased role of the Party at all levels of administration was probably intended in part to Insure Khrushchev's firm control over the country, since the Party apparatus was his principal instrument of power. But the reforms in Industry and agriculture which he haa sponsored in recent yearsall Involving decentralisationuller reliance on local initiativehave also made closer Partymore necessary in order to combat local violations of the Party's economicUnder Khrushchev much more willon morale and discipline within the Party at local levels than has been the case In tho past.

present.fall members of tbe Party* Presidium bold key potts In the Party apparatusf thendther than Khrushchev himself hold leading governmental positions. By contrast, at the urn of afalenkov's removalfull members of theere Is leading governmental poslUons. and only Khrushchevull time official In tbe Party apparatus.

Trie increase In authority of the Party apparatus has taken place at the expense of the various Interest groupings which compete for place and influence behind the facade of totalitarian Parly unity. The professional military opposes the system of politicaland, despite Zhukov's removal forto reduce Party control over the armed forces, this attitude will persist.administrators and economicwill continue to resent what they regard as the bumbling interference of Party hacks In their teclinical spheres.writers, artists, scientists, studentswill continue to pressreater area of freedomoosening of the Party'sstrait-Jacket While each of these groupstake in the success andof the Soviet state, each has alsointerests to further. One purpose oflevating the Partyis to prevent the hardening of these professional Interests into seU*-contalaed,groups which might ultimately have Independent political importance.

It has been suggested by some Western observers that, as the Soviet economy matures and becomes more complex, as the needs of society come to be met by more specialised administrative skills, as education is extended and diversified, the totalitarian character of the regime will be diluted. The dictator or the Party as the single focus of power, It has been argued, will give way to autonomy In areas of less Immediate political significance. Even in the political field, institutionalwill have to be found formany diverse interest groups: it was possible to see signs ofendency In the post-Stalin period of confusion occasioned by the succession struggle. On occasion, the Central Committee of the Party becamo an arena of political decision with factional and policy differences represented within It In the posts tal In period the rulers have also seemed to think It necessary to take account of public opinion generally In framing their policies. Such tendencies to dilute arbitrary power and to broaden participation In pollcy-

KOB-B?

beyond the nanow circle of the Party presidium may reappear at the time ofdeath or at some other period of weakened authority. For the present,Khrushchev's restoration of one-man leadership, and his manner of achieving it through the Party apparatus, has maintained Soviet society Armly in the totalitarian mold.

Issues in Soviet Politics

This development does not mean that there will not continue to be group pressures and much pulling and hauling over Issues of policy. Even under one-man leadership the normal play of politics Is not adjourned, though it may become less visible. Thereumber of Issues over which lines are likely to be drawn behind the facade of unity. For example, whatever the degree of its practical success, the economic reorganization scheme is laden with political significance It calls for the removalost of bureaucrats from Moscow to theate little relished by the migrants. The reorganization could leadegionalism which would,ew source of tension, although the revitalized Party must, in Khrushchev's calculation, serve as the cement which binds the periphery to the center. This reorganization, like the Ideologically controversial measureshas sponsored in agriculture, has yet to be fully proved in practice. Khrushchev may yet be driven to some agile maneuvering to defend his Innovations.

Also among the issues likely to affectParty politics are those related to Soviet economic growth. The growth achieved may not be high enough to attain all the goalshigh rates of Investment, Increase in agricultural output, rising living standards, modern armamentswhich now havein Party programs. Cutting back on any of these objectives could lead to dispute. The leaders of the armed forces, for example, would not willingly accept either acut In the military budget or reducedfor industries of militaryThe Party apparatus itself. Influenced by the lower ranks where there Is directwith popular pressures, would beto sacrifice prospective gains in living standards. Failure to achieve satisfactory rates of growth could produce resistance to further outlays in foreign aid or bring Into question Khrushchev's economic

There are likewise some purely political Issues which may have divisive effects. The Soviet ruling groups would be reluctant toeturn to the systematic use of terror. The question of the control of the secret police Is of widespread concern and would become paramount In case Khrushchev's mastery were ever placed in doubt. There must be some in positions of Influence who arewith what seems to them theof Soviet authority In the Bloc, as represented by toleration of the GomulkaIn Poland and the Increasing weight of China In Ideological and policy matters. There may be others who questionpolicy of alliance with "nationalmovements" in underdeveloped areas on the ground thatolicy increases the danger of war arising from clashes with Western interests, and Involves support of bourgeois movements which cannot be used to promote Communism.

Khrushchev's late arrival at supreme power (he isill make the prospectew successionively, if seldom discussed, factor In Inner Party maneuverings. As he gtows older It will be difficult topolicy Issues like those discussed above from the succession question. Thus major tensions will probably continue to be present within the Soviet body politic despite the stabilization of power at the top, and these will from time to time affect the face which Soviet policy presents to the outside world.

Attitudes in Soviet Society

post-Stalin leadership set out toa basic improvement in the attitudeSoviet people toward the regime. Theof police terror and tbe greaterto living standards served thisgreatest material gains so far haveby the peasantry,ontinuingof urban standards over the next

few years, particularly In housing, Is also promised. In terms of Its standing with the populationhole, the regime Is probably stronger now than It was five years ago. We believe that the measures which havethis improvement will be continued.

oviet society continues nevertheless to be marked by substantial areas of discontent. There exists, and will probably continue to exist, considerable disaffection amongparticularly among Soviet writers and university students.ignificantItighly vulnerable area, the regime's Ideological authority. Intellectuals are aware of the discrepancies between the Marxist-Leninist ideal and Soviet reality and they also resent the regime's encroachments on private life and professional Interests. They doubt that adequate safeguards exist to prevent the repetition of Stalinist terror. They feel contempt for Party careerists. They resent restrictions on travel abroad, andon access to Western publications and broadcasts. These discontents do not take the form of active opposition but are limited for the most partetreat Into an inner world so as to minimize the degree ofwith the Party and the state.

There continues also to be dissidence among some national minorities. Theof the old Baltic states harbor vigorous Russophobe feelings. They feel strongly that they are exploited and that their homelands lag far behind their prewar culturalonsiderable residue of anti-Husslan sentiment Is also to be found In the western Ukraine, as well as in Georgia, where the downgrading of Stalin and the loss of Its former privileged status also rankle. It seems probable, furthermore, that many or the two million Jews In the Soviet Union would like to emigrate. Because many Jews hold keypositions and have connections abroad, the regime probably regards themontinuing security problem,

We do not believe that any of theand tensions described aboveikely to have major political significance during the period of this estimate, although they will place restrictions on the regime's ability to mobilize the population for Its own purposes. The regime will deal with them by Its well-practiced methods of concession and Moreover, its success in identifying with Itself the sense of national pride and power, extending even to chauvinism,ormidable asset with which to counter The Soviet people are well aware that under Communist rule Russia has been transformedackward, agrarian,nation Into the world's second most powerful state, perhaps, they would like to believe, the most powerful. The Russiantakes It for granted that government Is by nature tyrannical, arbitrary, and exact-big. If It fulfills the aspiration to national power. It can be forgiven much.

The Longer View

ave the processes of change which have operated so broadly and visibly In Sovietsince the death of Stalin opened upfor more fundamental change in the long run? It seems undeniable thatossibility exists. One source of such change couldailure by the totalitarian Party repeatedly to renew Its vitality; this might resultilution of its monopoly of power in favor of other Interest groups upon which the functioning of the society willdepend as its Industrialization proceeds. Another could be inability of the Party to maintain Its Intellectual and Ideologicalas awareness of the gap betweenand ideologyrocess which will be accelerated as contacts with the West are extended. We consider that the effect of factors like these cannot now be reckoned to have any assured outcome. At present, we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project Its rapidly growing power externally.

II. TRENDS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY

The performance of the Soviet economy hasitally important clement in the Impact which Soviet policy has on the world situation. This importance derives from an extraordinary record of growth over the lastrowth which Is certain to continueate faster than that of the US economy. The strength of the Soviethasoundation of greatpower for Soviet policy, first andmilitary power: the USSR has had available the means to maintain militaryand to develop advanced weaponscale which no other state except the US can undertake.

However, apart from its functionasis for Soviet rnilitary power, there are three other ways in which the impact of the Soviet economy on the world situation is already observablereater or lesser degree, and is certain to increase. First is theiitico economic impact, arising from the ability of the USSR to initiate and support programs of economic aid or credit to foreign countries, to import goods from countries which would otherwise be hard-pressed to find markets, and to export various materials In quantities which (if the Soviet leaders so desired) could disrupt previously existing patterns of world trade. In this connection, manipulation of pricesey weapon of the USSR. Second is the political andeffect on underdeveloped countries, achieved through the exhibition ofand rapid economic development bymethods, and through theof such countries to do likewise under Soviet advicethe Soviet leaders attach great Importance to this aspect. Third Is theimpactarrower sense, arising Inevitably from the appearance in the worldreat new producing and trading unit, .the influence of which could not fail to be great even if it were not deliberately used for

..political purposes by the Soviet leaders. In

all three ways the Soviet economy willrowing challenge to the Western world.

Shifts in Economic Policy

Soviet economic policy continues to be markedpirit of innovation andWith the announcement early8 of the program to abolish the Machine Tractor Stations, tbe present leadership added another to the series of major measures of change it has undertaken In recent years. Most of the steps taken, to particular thescheme7 Involving theof central ministries andegional economic councils, have figured as Issues in the political struggle for Stalin's succession. Khrushchev's rise to power was probably due at least in part to his Initiative In sponsoring novel measures to cope with the problems of economic policy with which the regime found Itself confronted at Stalin's death.

These problems arose in part because of the great growth and increasing complexity of the Soviet economic system and the failure of the Soviet leadership to adapt its planning and control mechanisms to theseDifficulties were aggravated during Stalin's later years by his unwillingness to countenance any departures from the pattern of economic policy laid down during the early Five-Year Plans. Concentration on heavyled to Imbalances in the economy; agriculture and housing were deniedand generally neglected. When theleaders turned to reforming measureshe problems which immediately confronted them included the increasedof planning and ao^ministraUon asoutput became more varied andthe need to employ labor andresources more efficiently as these came to be more fully utilized, higher investment requirements to maintain gains in output, and the necessity to provide greater material Incentives In order to Improve labor discipline and obtain higher labor productivity.

is

attack on these problems hasariety of measures over the last five years. First, therehange in the politicalthe easing of police terror and penalties for economic dereliction. Thewas to Improve the conditions for managerial initiative in enterprises and to aid the campaign for faster growth of labor productivity. Second, changes In Investment priorities were made in order to alleviate the desperate situation In housing, to liftoutput out of Its stagnation, and to overcome the failure of basic materials output to keep pace with the requirements ofindustry. These changes also reflected the regime's desire to improve livingIn the expectation that political and economic benefits would flow from Improved attitudes on the part of the Soviet population. Finally,, the regimeweeping reform of economic acunlnlstratlon In an effort to overcome the impediments which bureaucracy had come to put In the way of efficient operation of the economy.

The economic reorganization scheme has been describedecentralization plan, but It was this inimited sense. There never was any intention to weaken the basic apparatus of centralized planning or to give up the political determination of economic priorities in favor of decision-making at lower levels according to economic criteria alone. The plan aimed at eliminating the top-heavy vertical administration of the Moscowministries. It was hoped that this would resultore efficient response to central plan directives. The theory was that, bya greater degree of local Initiative and by placing the adnunlstrators In tbe regions close to the enterprises they were supervising, the implementing of decisions would be' more realistic and less wasteful.

The results obtained thus far probably nave Included some gains of the kinduse of local resources, fuller use of transportation facilities, less delay on routine decisions. But the new systemdangers of Its own, which have been heavily attacked in the Soviet press under the nameo the extent that freedom to dispose of resources locally has been allowed it has been difficult to prevent decisions from being taken in local rather than national Interests. There evidently hasendency, aside from some cases of outright corruption, for the local authorities to divert resources to plans of their own for the greater development of their regions, sometimes to the neglect of centrally imposed plans and priorities. The chronic problem of obtaining conformity to economic goalsby political flat from the center, with little regard for local desires or the economic criteria which appeal to the managers of enterprises, seems to persist. We believe, therefore, that the regime will continue to experiment with new techniques of economic planning and administration.

he Soviet leadership under Khrushchev seems confident nevertheless that It hasovercome the difficulties which emerged0 when cumulative mistakes in planning caused shortages In basic materials and forced abandonment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The regime hasew Seven-Tear Plan which again sets ambitious goals, it reaffirms the traditional emphases upon the rapid growth of heavy Industry, and upon maintaining large military programs. But the Plan also provides for other keyto which the regime has committed Itself in recent years. Tbe Soviet leadersto go forward with increasing living standards. Programs of lesser cost willmaintaining Soviet power In Eastern Europe by supporting the Satellite economies as needed, assisting tho industrialization of Communist China, and backing up Soviet political objectives In underdevelopedwith trade and aid programs. Tbe main question affecting Soviet economic policy over the next five years Is whether these multiple priorities, all of which bear on the competitive struggle with the West In which the Soviet leaders see themselves Involved, can be met simultaneously. On the whole, we believe that the Seven-Year Plan production goals are feasible, except In agriculture, but that their achievement will Impose considerable strains on the economy, and that some programs may have to be modified as the plan period

Prospect* for Economiche Soviet economy will grow less rapidly during the next seven years than It did during the last seven. Soviet gross national product (GNP) Increased at an average annual rate closeercent0nd atercent5his slight slackening in the rate of growtha decline in the growth of Industrial production from an annual rate of aboutercent toercent,early offsetting acceleration In the growth ofBecause of favorable weatherarge agricultural output the rate of growth of GNP8 has apparently again risen somewhat. Over theethat GNP will probably grow at anannual rate ofercent. At this figure, assuming that the US achieves an average annual rateoviet GNP5 will be. In dollar terms, about half that of the US, as compared with aboutercent of US GNP at present

'This projected isle of thepproximately midway between the postwar rate and the long run trend.

s Soviet GNP continues to gain In size relative to US GNP. the differences between Soviet and US use of national product will continue to be marked.NP only about two-fifths the size of US GNP, thevalue of Soviet defense expenditure is approximately equal to that of the US.'Investment, in dollar values currently around two-thirds as great as US investment, will grow more rapidly than Soviet GNPthe next seven years, and will approach still closer the absolute size of US Investment. Investment in Industry alone was aboutercent of US Investment In Industrymining, and utilities)he dollar value of Soviet total consumption is less than one-third that of the US. Soviet consumption, on the other hand, will Increaselower rate than total GNP duringeriod, thusmaller share of the latter. (See graph below.)

'The dollar value referred to here was derived by valuing manpower at appropriate US pay rates and other Items of military significance at comparable US costs.

CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT, AND DEFENSEERCENTAGE OF7 (Measured In Comparable Prices)

U

-TO

The slightly reduced pace of Sovietgrowth anticipated in this estimateincreasing difficulties In obtaining labor, material, and machinery. The economy may be better able to cope with such difficultiesesult of recent changes In the planning, organization, and implementation of economic activity, but the benefits from these changes will be offset by other factors. Agriculture will tend to grow more slowly following the period of sharp output gainsndustrial growth will be affected by rising investment requirements per unit ofoutput and by continuing difficulties in supplying adequate quantities of key material Inputs, especially ferrous metals. In addition, there willeduced rate of growth of the labor force, owing to the growing impact of the decline In the birth rate during World War II,ime when the Introductionhorter work week in industry maythe need for new industrial workers.

Trends in Defense Expenditures'

Our estimates of the probable trend o! military expenditures3efense allocation in thatercent greater than7 level. Achievement of therowth In Soviet GNP would mean that the defense burden, taken in the aggregate, would be slightly heavier3 than at present, though still not as heavy as In the years Immediately priorefense requirements will Impose burdensome claims upon various types of resources needed for in. vestment and economic growth,

Most of the Increase In defensewill result from mcreaslng allocations to more costly aircraft, to guided missiles,research and development, and nuclear weapons. These programs together probably account for about one-third of totalat present3 they are expected to requiro about twice as much In resources as at present and to account for aboutercent of total defense programs.

defense expenditures inwhen converted into dollar values,to be of roughly the same magnitudedefense expenditures. As statedUSSR,uch smaller GNP thanproduces military goods and servicesdollar value roughly the same. It isdo this primarily because In the USSRend-items are less expensive, relativeItems, than they are In thebecause the average level of real payprovided Soviet militaryis much lower than In the US.

Industrial Prospects

The eventual aim of overtaking USin per capita production continues to dornlnate Soviet planning for industry, Shifts In the allocation of resources during then support of the economic innovations of the post-Stalin regimefirst Malenkov's broad consumer goods program and then Khrushchev's agriculturalgoods and housingoderate decrease in the rate of growth of heavy Industry. Heavy industry was expected to benefit, however,ew program of automation and re-equipment and from changes in industrial management, planning and control, introduced during this period. But6 the failure to provide sufficient new capacity In the raw materials industriesevere shortage ofraw materials, particularly steel, coal, and cement

The leadership's response to thisduring the last two years has been to abandon the Sixth Five-Year Plan, cut back industrial output goals7nd to order the formulationew Seven-Year Plan for the. It alsoemedial investment program which was to Increase capacity in raw materials industries while stillambitious programs In agriculture and housing. The reorganization plan ofs already indicated, was also Intended toetter utilization of materials by permitting greater leeway for local decisions.

ndustrial growth was claimed by theto beercent7 and for the first three quartersnd while this claim was probably somewhat overstated, It Indicates that the reduced goalsercent for these years were set too low. These rates of increase, however, obscure the continuing poor performance of some basic Industries, particularly ferrous metallurgy. Moreover, In spite of the remedial investment program, additions to production capacity in these industries continued to fall short of planned goalsnd probably8 also. Production goals5 In the basic materials Industries indicate that they must continue to receive priority treatment if plaiuied rates of increases are to be achieved. Substantial over fulfillment of presently planned goals In these industries, although not likely to occur, would be necessary totheercent annual increases In Industrial production which we believe were achieved during the Fifth Five-Year. However, we believe thatercent average annual rate of growth given In the present version of the New Seven-

Year Plan is feasible. (See table belowist of some Soviet industrial outputne of the factors affecting futuregrowth will be the Impact of raw ma-lerial constraints on the machinery and metal fabricating sector. Despite the current effort being directed into raw materials It Isthat the rate of growth of metals will fall from5 percent annual average of the past seven years toercent per year for the. This slower growth of metals output will have aeffect on the growth of the machinery and metal fabricating sector. Even so, the Seven-Ycar Plan targets In many of the metalsare Impressive even In terms of past Soviet accomplishments. The5 goal for steel, stated asoillion tons, suggests uncertainty as to what can be achieved In this Industry. Even the lower figure represents an increase ofillion tons over the present level of output,ain ofillion tons.

INDUSTRIAL

Outputs7

USSK

oals

Kloctrtc Power Crude OU Coal

Crude Steel Primary Copper Primary Aluminum Cement Machine Tools Oenerators for

ydraulic

Turbines Commercial Vehicles Sulfuric Acidather footwear Washing Machines

Billion KWH Million Tons Million Tons Million Tons Thousand Tons Thousand Tons Million Tons Thousand Units

Million KW

J

Units

)

Meiers

Pairs

Units

slower natural Increase of theduring Uie period of thisimiting factor on the rate ofgrowth. Population Increasecontinuation of past school programsan estimated increase of onlymillion men In the total civilianover the next seven years. ThePlan requires an increase of aboutmen In the nonagricultural laborthe regime is heavily committedhours of work and has reaffirmedIntention In its Seven-Year PlanThe goals for gains inthe regime's recognition that theIsimitation on the rate ofexpansion. One of the aims ofin agriculture is clearly toin this area so as to permitof workers to industry. Moreover,and prospective changes In thesystem are in part designed toyoung people for employmentthese changes might releaseas one rrtilllon to theforce over the seven-year period.

Agricultural Prospects

thegriculturehad remained largely stagnantlast yearsunderwent rapidThis was due both to thecultivating the new lands andand to other less spectacular but nomeasures such as Increasedand greater financial incentives.new lands the weather was betterNo slackening of attention Isin the Seven-Year Plan and thehigh levels of agriculturalthe last several years are scheduled toHowever, the growth rate gainsoutput of recent years cannotTotal acreage is expected toduring the next seven years at aabout one-fourth of the earlierof the future Increase will have toIncreased production per unit ofla more difficult to achieve,the unfavorable effect ofexpansion will manifest itself.the existing potential Is by no means exhausted,umber of measures such as soli Improvement will be undertaken.

Recent organ!national changes and better prices in agriculture probably have softened the critical attitude of the peasant toward the regime, as have other earlier measures which were focused upon tax, product procurement, and Income conditions In agriculture. State control over agricultural activity, however, has not been weakened The central organs continue to detennlne state procurement goals even though the enterprise manager In Soviet agriculture Is likely to exercise more choice over what and how he will produce. Collective farm control over most of theformerly under the MTS may also prove of some significance in Increasingby eliminating conflict between thefarm chairman and the MTS director concerning day-to-day operations of thefarm. Proposals have also beenrecently to introduce more rigorous cost accountability on the collective farms. If carried out. these procedures, taken in con-Junction with the gradual introductionuaranteed cash wage, will increase theof collective farm operations, andpermit the release of farm workers to Industry. Moreover, the improvement in peasant attitudes brought about by theof the MTS and the effect8 reforms in raising the Income of the poorer collective farms will probablyositive effect on peasant work habits.

The Seven-Year Plan carries angoal0 percent increase InWe believe that the actual Increase will be less than half of this. Dissatisfaction with the progress of agriculture Is likely to lead the regime to continue its experimenting In the agricultural field.

Trends in Consumption

Soviet consumer will not enjoyan increase in over-allthe next seven years as he didlast seven, when per capitaby approximatelyercentbe true despite recently announced pro-

grams to provide more meat, milk, housing, furniture, and clothing. But per capitaIs still likely to be as much as one-third higher5 than It wasith some qualitative Improvement In consumer goods. However, except probably In milkthe USSR will not succeed in itseffort to match US per capitaof meat and other selected food products In the time periods set Even if It is able to do so eventually, other areas ofsuch as consumer durable goods and housing, will continue to lag far behind US levels.

Increase In the level ofIn this estimate should beto keep the population reasonablywith the regime's efforts toliving standards. Tbe regime willto exploit the propaganda value ofconsumption levels. The dollar valuetotal consumption Is less thanthat of US consumption, and on abasis only about one-fourth that ofThe Soviet consumer occupiesone-fifth the housing space enjoyedUS consumer. Khrushchev's muchhousing program will continue toa rising share of investment for theyears and then may level off at aconstruction which should provide anof about one-third in per capitaover the next seven years.

post-Stalin leadership has soughtthe most out of increases inby selectively raising the moneyparticular groups in the populationretail prices relatively stable.both rural and urban workersIncreases ofn total real Income during therural workers gained relativeworkers during the earlier part ofand urban workers received theof their increase during the latterthe period. In Industry, wages andhave been adjusted with the aim ofincomes more closely to productivityoccupations and In differentContinuation of this policy during the period of this estimate should bringImprovement to the Soviet wage

Foreign Trade

Soviet foreign trade policy will continue to subordinate short-run economic gains to the furtherance of national political objectives. Trade will continue to be utilized in an effort to strengthen Satellite ties with the Soviet Union, to provide capital goods for Chinese Communist Industrialization, and to promote Soviet relationships with underdeveloped non-Bloc countries. Trade with the Industrialized countries of the non-Bloc world will probably grow somewhat, and economic considerations will be the governing factor affecting such trade,

The maintenance of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the alliance withChina, as well as trade policy toward the underdeveloped areas, will require exports of raw materials and capital equipment which otherwise would be used by the USSR toits own economic growth, but the burden Imposed upon the domestic economy by this policy will not affect significantly the planned rate of Soviet internal economic growth. On the other hand, internal forces affecting domestic growth will provide incentive for an increase of Soviet trade with the West,such trade will continue to account for only about one-fourth of total Soviettrade. The aggregate Impact of Soviet foreign trade upon the domestic economy is slight because exports and imports together amount to only approximately eight billion dollars or less than five percent of Soviet GNP. However, the export of scarce resources or the Import of advanced design machinery and equipment for use as prototypes can be of greater significance to the economy than the total value of foreign trade would suggest

uture developments in Soviet-Satellite trade will be influenced by the outcome of recent attempts to Increase intra-Blocintegration and specialization but the effect will probably not be large. Although Bloc economic integration Is expected to in-

the benefits will be of greaterto the smaller Satellite economies than to the USSR The Soviet Union importsfrom the Satellites, though theto the Soviet economy of machinery imports from the Satellites will continue to be offset by the necessity of exporting scarce Soviet raw materials. The Soviet exportIn its trade with the European Satellites will be reduced if repayments of credits granted to Satellite countries, scheduled to beginre carried out

T-Of-SECflRT

'P

III. TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

USSR has for many years placed great emphasis on science and technologyiew toorps of superior personnel andcientific establishmentto support Its aspirations to national power. Soviet scientific effort has beenpreponderantly on the buildingtrong industrial base and the development of modem weapons.onsequence, tbe USSR's achievements In areas of criticaland industrial significance areto, and in some cases exceed, those of the US. During the past year, the Soviet Union has strikingly demonstrated to the world Its maturity in science and technology. Earth satellite launchlngs, striking progress in weapons development, and fundamentalof military and economic significance attestapidly Increasing Soviet capability whichrowing challenge to the Western World.

We believe that the rate of advance ofscience is accelerating in consequence of the building over the past three decadesroad scientific and technical foundation. During this period, the number of graduates of scientific and technical curricula hasIncreased, research facilities have been greatly expanded, and the quality ofscientific training has Improved. The size of the Soviet research and development effort. In absolute terms, has been smaller than that of the US. However, the Soviet effort has been far more highly concentrated on fields related to national power, whileIn consumer products has beenmuch less. Soviet expenditures on science and technology are Increasing yearly and probably permit full utilization of new personnel and facilities. Consequently,Soviet advances in science andare likely to occur in the future with greater frequency than in the past.

reorganization of7 has probably beenby improved planning andof science, especially In thelong-range and nation-wide scientific poll-cies. New scientific coordinating bodies have been established with authority to cut across administrative barriers, and planning Iscentralized under the State Planning Committee, which heretofore has hadassive role In science planning. Scientists are being given more voice In planning and Soviet policies In science and technology are likely to reflect their point of view more fully. Concurrently with the centralization of planning and coordination, operationalover research Is being decentralized and directors of Institutes are being given more administrative authority.

research will continue toemphasis in the USSR, althoughof adequate fundamentalIs well understood at theHighest priority will continue toto military-industrial researchbut the rapid expansion ofscientific resources will nowflexibility. Greater individualwithin assigned tasks of researchbe encouraged, basic researchfields undertaken, and somewhatand technical effort allocated tosector of the economy.

Scientific Manpower, Training and Facilities

number of scientifically andtrained people in the Soviet Unionapproximately three-fold Inperiod. We estimate that asraduates ofscientific and technical curriculaemployed in all scientific andfields, aboutercent more thanUS. Although US graduations Inand technical fields are expected tothe USSR wfll continue to enjoyadvantage. Based3 the USSR willercent more graduatesscientific and technical work than the US,

as Indicated by the accompanyingt should be noted that the bulk of Sovietsuperiority will continue to derive from graduates employed In Industrial and agricultural production. The number ofscientists engaged In research andIn the physical sciences has remainedsmaller than In the US, and Ishalf the US total at present. However, Soviet emphasis on research In military and basic Industrial fields probably resultsear numerical equality between the two countries In scientific manpower devoted to these critical activities.

COMPARISON OF MAJOR BCrZNTlFIC OROUPS. USSRIn thousands)

FaUmated Numbers ot Graduates or Higher Educational InsUtuUoru Employed la Scientific and Technical Fit Ida *

SW

Sciences

Sciences

Sciences

Selene**

Kjtl mated Numbers of Soviet Kandldais and American PhD.'a In Selcntirie and Technical Fields

Agricultural

Health

Phjaleal

Biological

* EsUmaUs of the current total of Soviet sclenUflc personnel axe believed to be correct within plus or minusercent. The probable error of certain groups, however, may exceed this amountIn the physical sciences, engineering, and tha health sciences, the quality of the Kandldal degree Is roughly equivalent to or sUghUy below that of the USn agricultural and Mc-loalcal sclencealoser to trialSegree.

In the postwar period the quality of Soviet scientific training has been high. Engineer-bag training, while not as broad as that given

'Such numerical comparisons provideough measure of relaUve sclenUOe andstrength, slnee: (a) the professional cale-forlea are not precisely equivalent In the two countries; (b) the figures do not reflect the broader US aupply of aclenUflchnlcal personnel who hold no degrees; and le)ve do weight to quailtaUve differentes to

' training and experience.

an engineer in the West, Is good within the particular field of specialization. Somecontinue in the practical andaspects of training, particularly in some fields of biology and engineering. Recent changes in higher school curricula, intended to overcome these deficiencies,requirements for more laboratory and Independent experimental work outside the classroom, as welllan to allow superior students to follow individual study schedules.

The USSR la not as well supplied as theindustrial nations with nonprofessional technicians, mechanics, and maintenance men. Shortages of skilled technicians will persist, but the number available shouldsignificantlyesult of the high proportion of scientific and technical subjects in the lower grades and the current emphasis on specialized training after lower school.

Soviet scientific facilities, In terms ofsupport, organizational direction, and number and quality of laboratories, areadequate for the utilization of scientific talentew fields the DSSR has faculties which are comparable, if not superior, toInstallations In the West The continued expansion of these facilities, as welloviet attempt toroader geographic base for research activities. Isby the establishment of new scientific centers In Siberia. Announced plana call for completion0ew "scientific city" near Novosibirsk, consisting ofesearch institutesniversity now underAnother center near Irkutsk,of eight research Institutes, Isfor completionhe regime Isajor effort to attract competent scientific personnel to the new centers byfavorable living conditions, esUblishlng excellent research facilities, and assigning certain eminent scientists to these locations.

Some shortages of complex researchare believed to exist, particularly in low priority fields, but they probably do not signlficanUy hamper research programs of major importance. For example, although toe USonsiderably larger number of high speed electronic computers than the USSR, the number of computer hoursutilized for high priority research Isnearly the same since Soviet computers are not called upon to serve routine business and government functions. Although Soviet-produced equipment is often the equal of foreign-produced equipment and occasionally Its superior, the USSR will probably continue

.tp; import equipment for reasons of During the next five years the USSR will continue to improve Its capabilities In scientific instrumentation. Increasingof highly qualified engineers willbe made available for the development and production of scientific equipment, and an Increasing amount of equipment will reflect original design concepts. However, we believe that the West will continue to lead In the development of scientific equipment except in fields given very high priority by the Soviets.

The Satellites have made significantcontributions to Soviet technologicalInew areas, principally In optics, electrical measuring instruments,equipment, synthetic fibers and pharmaceuticals. We expect an Increase In Soviet use of Satellite resources In some basic theoretical and experimental fields. The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CKMA) recently expanded the scope of its actlvlUes to include greater coordination and exchange in research and developmentCEMA member-nations are assigned major research, development, and production responsibilities for the entire Soviet Bloc in specified fields.

The USSR has become progressively less dependent on Western research andNevertheless, the Soviet leaders naveolicy of acknowledging foreign achievement and encouraging maximum use of foreign experience. The USSR presently has an outstanding program for collecUon and dissemination of scientific and technical Information. The AU-Unlon Institute of*nd Technical Information of the Academy of Sciences publishes and circulates extensive abstracts of foreign journals and, at least In high priority fields, Soviethave access to the full range ofresearch published throughout the world. Evidence of Soviet work on such new methods as machine translation, data searching, and data processing suggests that Soviethandling facilities probably will Improve during this period.

The Soviets have evidently profited from espionageew key fields. However, on an over-all basis the performance of Soviet

encethe number of originaland discoveriesreinforces our belief that the aggregate contribution of espionage to Soviet scientific progress has been far less important than the USSR's own

he USSR Is clearly anxious to takeof the possibilities in International scientific exchange. Soviet participation In International scientific meetings andhas Increased markedly during the last year, primarily In connection with theGeophysical Yearutother scientific fields as well. The Soviet IGY program has been well-executed and comparable to the US program In scope. For the most part, the Soviets probably will live up to their agreements to exchange IGYbut are likely to withhold theof related Investigations outside the formal IOY program. They are believed to have withheld considerable data derived from their earth satellites. The USSR probably will continue its active participation in the various international committees andwhich are planning to extendbegun under the IGY.

Soviet Capabilities in Major Scientific Fields

he USSR's achievements during the last year. Including earth satellite launchIngs. weapons development, and the magnitude of Its efforta In the IGY program, provideevidence of the present high level of Soviet scientific capability. Animatedpirit of Intense competition with the US. Soviet scientists have made striking progress over the last year In many areas ofand applied research. Inmany fields of physics,ew fields of chemistry, fundamental research appears to be comparable In quality to that performed In leading nations of the West. In some fields, Soviet scientists are among the best in tho world; their potential for wholly newmust be considered equal to that of Western scientists.

program* The establishmentInteragency Commission forCommunications, announced byInndicated thea program with mannedas its stated ultimate objective.Is supported by extensive Sovieteffortsumber of relatedrocket propulsion, electronics,space medicine, astroblology.and geophysics. Activities toappear to be directed toward theof scientific data and experiencethe basis for future spaceto advance basic knowledge in theSince some satellite vehiclesemployed basic ICDM hardwarefuture space vehicles may alsocomponents, the two programs areextent complementary.

successes with ballistic missilessatellites pointonsiderablefor early accomplishments in space.that the USSR Is presently capableearth satellites weighing onounds, of launching lunarsatellites and of launchingto Mars and Venus. Ita spacealso Include: surveillance satellitesaeromedlcal satellites"soft landings" by lunar rocketsmanned earth satellitesa manned glide-type high; earthas much0 poundscircumlunar flightseach Individual achievementas to technical capability andattainable, we doubt that tbe USSRall of these space flightthe time periods specified.

ommunist China has announced itsto launch an earth satellite, and there are indications that Chinese personnel are studying rocket technology with Soviet The Chinese would value highly the

ore detailed discussion of the Sovietprogram, weS-SS. "SovietIn ooided Mluues and Space8 (TOP SECRET).

political and propaganda gains resultingaunching, and we believe that an attempt In Chinaossibility within the next year or so. Using Soviet equipment, and withdirection throughout the project, theCommunists could probablyuccessful earth satellite launching in about one or two years after initiation of the project. The USSR itself probably has the capability, with about six months' preparation, to place an earth satellite In orbit from ChineseThere Is as yet, however, no firmof the Initiation of any projects to launch earth satellites from the territory of Communist China.

onmllitary applications o] atomic energy. There is evidenceurther reduction In the ambitious Soviet nuclear power program announced In6 as part of the Sixth Flve-Year Plan. At that time, the USSRoalegawatts of nuclear-electric generatingoviet replyN questionnaire In7rogram which couldotal capacity ofby that date. Recent statements by Soviet officialslanned capacity ofegawatts in Wethat anegawatts or more could be obtained from dual-purpose reactors Installed at plutonium production sites, giving theotal of ategawatts byf the latest plans Continued references toegawatt goal by leading Sovietindicate that the progressive decrease in nuclear generating capacity planned0lippage In Soviet plans rathereduction In the Soviet nuclear powerThe USSR Is conducting extensiveon controlled thermonuclear reactions.

oviet employment of radioactive isotopes and radiological techniques In medical,metallurgical, biological, andresearch lags behind that of the US by up to five years. While the USSR has been actively employing these means In research Investigations, little originality has beenand only recently has the quality of this type of research shown improvement.

espite this lag. the USSR hasizable technical assistance program Inenergy within tho Bloc and has offered aid In this fieldumber of non-Bloc countries. To encourage collaboration among nuclear scientists within the Bloc, the USSR establishedoint Nuclear Research Institute near Moscow. Although the USSRember of International Atomic Energy Agency, Its attitude toward the agency has been passive. Future Soviet activities outside of the Slnc-Sovict Bloc probnbly will continue to be largely limited to unilateral offers of aid to non-Bloc nations. However, visits by Soviet scientists to Western nations andparticipation in International conferences may be increased.

hysics and mathematics. Some Soviet scientists In the various fields of physics and mathematics are the equals of those in the leading nations of the West Greatestare exhibited In theoreticaland physics, high-energy nuclear physics, low temperature physics, solid slate physics, and acoustics. Research during this period will probablyumber of studies related to the Soviet missile and spaceand will also Include theoretical anti-gravity investigations, work In plasma physics, and elaboration of present theories of km. photon, and free radical propulsion. Of great aid to research In physics and mathematics Is the considerable Soviet capability In thedevelopment and application ofwith larger memory capacity andoperation speeds, as well as smallsuitable for mass production andin small computation centers.

eophysics. Soviet performance in the geophysical sciences Is believed to beequal to that of the US, and superior In some fields, particularly polar geophysics. Tbe large and comprehensive Soviet IGYIs expected toonsiderable effect on the development of geophysics In the USSR. The orbiting of earth satellitesheavy payloads of complexprobably has already given theead In these methods of upper atmosphere and space research. The USSR probably will

make advances comparable to those of the US In meteorology and oceanography. It will probably continue to be among the world lead-era in seismology, gravlmetry, geomagnetism and geoelectriclty, and will add to its already considerable achievement In permafrostand geochcmlcal prospecting.

hemistry and metallurgy. The USSR lags behind the US In the magnitude and level of research effort In most fields of chemistry and metallurgy; however, Soviet research In certain areas continues to be of highajor strength will continue to be In the theoretical aspects of some fields of chemistry. There will probablyajor expansion of all chemical research, with particularon fields where the West now leads, such as In petrochemicals, new plastic materials, and synthetic fibers. In metallurgy, research will be especially pushed In the highfield and in those areas of metallurgy related to solid state physics, particularly In semiconductors and thermoelectric power generation.

edical sciences. With some exceptions, Soviet medical research is still behind that of the US. Soviet research assets, however, are expanding rapidly and will continue to be concentrated in areas of high economic and military priority. The Soviets are conducting an advanced program In space medicine and astroblology. Tlie availability of rocketand effective propulsion systems has enabled the Soviets to use animals to test llfe-sustalnlng systems In space and under space equivalent conditionsreater degree than has been possible In the US. We believe that they lead the US In rocket flight physiology, studies of possible forma of life on other planets, and in tho technlq ues and equipment for recovery of test subjects from extreme However, there are no Indications that they have conducted prolonged space equivalent work similar to the US manned balloon experiments. The USSR will expand Its Intensive research program In the control of human behavior, especially Intechniques. In addition, the Soviets will probably maintain their lead In research on the effects of radiation on the nervousIt is possible that they will attain the lead In the study of the effects of cosmicon organisms.

iologicul and agricultural sciences. There hasotable Improvement In the quality of Soviet research in certain areas of the biological and agriculturalew specific fields, however, the USSR still lags behind most WesternIn these sciences. Although Lysenko retains some limited political support,theories are probably no longerto Interfere with sound research in biology and agriculture, and Soviet genetics research should improve markedly. Wethat agricultural research andwill receive increasing support, which should assist the Soviet effort to increase food supplies.

ndustrial technology. For thefuture, we estimate that the general level of Soviet industrial technology will remain below that of the US. However, the most modern Soviet plants are alreadyar with those In the US, and the average level of heavy Industrial technology will probablyStriking progress has been made over the last few years in the theory and practice of automation. Additional semiautomatic and possibly fully automatic production lines will be established during the period of this estimate. There will probably be Increased emphasis on engineering process research and on shortening the lead times necessary to bring developed Items Into production.research and technology In consumer goods fields will continue to lag far behind that of the US.

eordt-

IV. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

MILITARY THINKING AND POLICY Major Objectives of Militaryoviet military thinking and policy since the end of World War II, and particularly since the death of Stalin, have been strongly influencedrowing appreciation of the devastation Inherent in nuclear war and of the threat to the USSR's objectives andposed by Western nuclear capabilities. The Soviet leaders have made strong efforts toubstantial offensive nuclearof their own and to Improve their air defenses; Indeed, to buildroad range of offensive and defensive capabilities, bothand nonnuclear. At the same time, Soviet political activity has aimed at reducing the military and political usefulness of US nuclear capabilities by attempting to make US overseas bases untenable and to Increase the Inhibitions attached to any use of nuclear weapons.

e believe that despite these efforts the Soviet leaders appreciate that If theyeneral war at present, even with surprise nuclear attacks, the USSR would sufferdamage from US nuclear On the other hand, they are probably confident that their own nuclear capabilities, even though not as great as those of the US, have grown to the point where theya powerful military deterrent to the US. It Is therefore probable that In the Soviet view both sides are now militarily deterred from deliberately Initiating an all-out nuclear war or from reacting to any crisisanner which would gravely riskar, unless vital national Interests at home or abroad were considered to be in. The Soviets probably sec this situationreat Improvement over the relation of forces which existed some years ago. Nevertheless, we believe that the Soviet leaders willto seek ways to achieve, Iflear military superiority over the US. To this end they will continue their Intensive weapons research anduch fields as long-range nussflea, air-

graphic area of engagement, and to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by either side.

Soviet planners probably consider,that such limitations might be impossible in some instances, and that encounterstheir own and Western forces might result. They would prefer to minimize the amount of force employed in such situations, In order to limit the scale of conflict and the degree of their own Involvement as much as possible. For example, they would almost certainly wish to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. In deciding whether to employ their own forces In any particular localthe Soviets would have to balance the risk ofrain of counteractions, possibly leading to general war, against the stakes Involved in the area of local conflict. They probably believe that the West's military posture and doctrine rest Increasingly upon the use of nuclear weapons, even in limited wars. But they probably also view their own nuclear deterrent capabilities as alreadyraised the threshold at which the West would react Inanner.

It Is impossible to forecast how thewould behave in all the situations of local conflict which might arise. Despite thethey evidently now have In the power of their owne believe that they would handle such situations with the greatest caution. They would realize that tbe dangers of miscalculation would mount as each side increased the scale of Its Involvement.we believe that the Soviets would seek to prevent any crisis from developing Inay as to leave themselveserious reverse and taking action which would substantially Increase the likelihood of general war. The Soviet leaders would almost certainly not decide togeneral war unless they concluded thatosition to the West would sooner or later threaten the survival of their regime.

believe that the Soviets recognizegreat advantages would accrue tostriking the first blow In an all-outand that therefore, in the event thaton general war, they wouldIt by strategic nuclear attacks.objective of such attacks would beor neutralize Western nuclearat any rate to achieve the maximum possible reduction In the weight of Western retaliation that would have to be met by Soviet air defenses. To an extentwith this first priority, other key US war-making capabilities would probably also be attacked.

The outbreak of general war wouldfind the USSRtale of military readiness beyond that of ordinary peacetime, but ahort of what Soviet planners mightbest for the most rapid exertion of their total military effort. During any local war or crisis which they viewed as likely to become increasingly serious, Soviet planners would almost certainly prepare againsteneral conflict. However, they would not want to push preparations so far as to convince the US that general war waslest this lead the US to strike the first all-out nuclear blow. The probability ofWestern readinessrisis, together with the normally widespreadof Western nuclear striking forces In the US and overseas, would makeoubtful that the Soviets could count on achieving surprise against all of these forces, but they would almost certainly attempt to do so.

Soviet recognition of the Importance of surprise in modem military operations has been reflected In articles and statements over the last few years, but It is evident that Soviet military theoreticians do not regard surprise as the decisive factor In the outcomeajor war between great powers. In fact, they hold thatar tho strategic attackof both sides might expend themselves and' leave eventual victory to the side with the greatest residual strength, capacity forand ability to occupy territory. They visualize an Important role for their ground, tactical air, and naval forceseneral war, which In their view would probablyrotracted war of attrition.'

Assistant Chief ofnteUlsence, "SAP. believes that as written this paragraph doe* not correctly reflect the Soviet Judgment of the role of surpriseeneral wax. He believes It Uthat Soviet military theoreticians consider surprise probably would be the dedslTt factor In the outcomear between peat po*

SBCltKT

SEG-RIS*

the event of general war, Soviet ground, tactical air, and naval forces would probably be launched In major campaigns against Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East. In order to defeat those Western forces within reach and to seize military objectives in those areas as well as their Industrial and economic resources. The USSn wouldplan to commit Its ready forces to anagainst NATO, especially through Western Germany, as soon as possiblewith Its attempt to achieve surprise for its Initial assaults against the US. overseas US and allied nuclear bases, and naval sinking forces. Campaigns In other areas would be of lesser priority, but we believe thateneral war situation they would probably be Initiated with little delay.

In addition to participation In Inltalattacks and support of other major Soviet campaigns, the major offensive effort of the Soviet Navy In general war would be theInterdiction of Western seaand reinforcement, Intended to Isolate overseas theaters from the US. The major defensive effort of Soviet naval forces would be to prevent Western carrier strikes andmissile attacks against Bloc targets.

Policy on Size and Typos of Forces

assessing the size and types ofwhich would best fulfill theirthe Soviets will almostto believe that they must keep adiversified military establishment,to meet various contingencies, upIncluding general war. While theyto acquire additional capabilitiesweapon systems, they will atmaintain substantialthere will be increasingamong military requirements ofand between military requirementsdemands of highly importantresulting In part from the costof new weapons anddeciding whether to produce complexsystems In quantity, the USSRapply Increasingly severe tests asthese would add greatly to current capabilities or tend significantly to alter the world balance of forces, and as to whether costs were Justified by likely periods of use before obsolescence. There may thereforerowing tendency In some fields to make do with existing equipment until significantly advanced weapons can be acquired.

We also believe that for several years the Soviet leaders have been Interested In finding ways to reduce the number of men under arms. The reasons for doing this will continue to apply, and In the future may become more compelling. An important factor will be the pressure imposedhortage of manpower for the rapidly growing Soviet economy (see Chapter II,. Other reasonsthe desire for economies In order to ease the burden of Increasing costs of newand the propaganda value of forceThe importance of the last of these factors has been evident In tho USSR's well-publicized announcements of militarycuts over the last three years. Reductionstoillion men ineriod have been claimed, and inurther planned reductionen was announced, bringing the total to moreillions.

On the basis of Soviet conscription trends, published labor statistics, and other indirect data, we believe that there has In factubstantial reduction In tbe number of men in service since the peak reached during the Koreanonsiderable portion of this reduction apparently occurred prior to the first Soviet announcement of cutseductions are known to have been made In nonessential supporting and administrative elements. It Is probable that other reductions were accomplished by cutting down the strength of certain units and by the transfer of labor troops from military to nonmilltary status. On the other hand, we have acquired no evidence of tbe deactivation of any major units and we are fairly certain that most of the units withdrawn from satellite areas In recent years were merely moved to locations within the USSR.

The evidence suggests that in theirthe Soviets took propagandaof fairly substantial reductions made after the Korean War, and that additional reductions were In fact begun but wereor cancelled entirely. The apparent failure to carry out the announced cuts may have been due In part to increased tension In the satellites, and in the world situationbeginning In the fallt may also have resulted in part from Sovietthat reductions In some elements werearge extent offset by the Increased need for technically-qualified personnel to serve new and more complex equipment.

On the basis of available order-of-battle information, we estimate present Sovietmanpower strength at somewhat moreillion men, of whomre In ground force units,re in the air forces (includingaval aviationre In navat units, and0 are In air defenseand warning. In addition, we carryen in border guard andhile there has been noevidence of reductions over the last year, we do not exclude the possibility that theleaders believe that some additional cuts can be made without danger to Soviet security. But we think it unlikely that in the present state of the Bloc's relations with the West further reductions of substantial size would be made.

Military policy toward other bloc,The Soviet leaders view the Eastarea as vital to the military posture of the USSR, both as an extension of the defense perimeter of the homeland andase for offensive power; Communist China and North Korea similarly strengthen the strategicof the USSR, The Soviets will therefore continue to provide substantial military aid to the Satellite and Chinese Communistestablishments. Including weapons, equip-

"For more detailed estimates ol the personnel strength of Soviet and other Bloc forces, see Annex,ndt should be understood that these figures are only approximate and that there Is considerable uncertainty Inherent In this type of estimate.

ment, and training assistance. They will continue their efforts under the Warsaw Pact to develop and maintain reliable and effective forces In the East European Satellites, but they probably do not contemplate anyexpansion of these forces. It is unlikely that Soviet planners would count on East European forces in general to make ancontribution to Soviet militaryexcept perhaps in air defense and in maintaining security for lines of

he Soviets probably regard themilitary capabilities of Communist China with mixed feelings. While Chinese military strengthaluable addition to the power of the Communist Bloc, as this strength grows it will also give China increasing weight within the Bloc. It will be many years before the Chinesearge and modem arms Industry of theirevelopment themight view with misgivings in any case, and In the Interim the Chinese will press for Soviet aid toostly modernization of their forces. We believe that the Soviets will probably try to restrain the pace ofmilitary development in order to prevent the Chinese from achieving tooegree of military Independence. But they willalso feel that they have no choice but to support such development. It is probable therefore that they will continue to assist the Chinese in developing and producing certain types of modern equipment. They will also probably begin to supply such Soviet-made weapons as Jet medium bombers, advanced fighters and guided missiles for air defense, and possibly short-range missiles for offensive use as well The USSR would probably retain control over any nuclear weapons based In the territory of Communist China or other Bloc nations.

SPECIAl WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS Nuclear Weapons

he USSR is known to have conducted more thanuclear tests since9 in Its program toariety of nuclear weapons. Two test series were conductedn the first series,ests were conducted at two widely separated

proving grounds during the three monthsthe USSR's announcement of atest suspension onhe Soviets resumed testingecond series which began Inxplosions in the latest series have included two of about seven megatons, about twice the yield of the largest Soviet explosion delected previously. The latest two tests were of low yield and were conducted In the general vicinity of KapusUn Yar. From the present technical evaluation of8 tests, it appears that tbe Soviets made further advances in the development of high yield weapons suitable for use In bombs or missile warheads. They also apparently sought to improve low yield weapons from the standpoint of size and economy of fissionable materials, probably In order to meet airas well as other requirements.

e estimate that at present the Soviet stockpile could Include nuclear weaponsange of yields fromT toT; we do not exclude the possibility that untested bombs with yields of as much asT could be In stockpile on an emergency or provisionale have Insufficient evidence toa firm estimate of the numbers and types of nuclear weapons In the Soviet stockpile. There Is, however, considerable evidence from the Soviet nuclear test program and from other Intelligence sources, providingas to what types of weapons the USSR may be stockpiling and on what deliveryit contemplates. Based on an analysis of various factors Involved, we believe that:

nuclear weapons, including high-yield weapons suitable for bomber delivery, are now widely deployed to Long Range Aviation units, and the Soviets will seek to provide such weapons for all bombers of this component which are designated for weapons delivery;

nuclear warheads arc being and will be produced In numbers sufficient to equipall operational submarine-launched missiles, and ground-launched ballistic mis-slles. range and greater;

Soviet doctrine contemplates theuse of nuclear weapons by ground, tactical air, and naval forces, and some such weapons are probably now available for this purpose;

the Soviets' emphasis on air defense will lead them to provide nuclear warheads for some proportion of their surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles,uable allocation for such purposes has probably not yet been made.

Considering the estimated availability of fissionable materials and the level of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, we believe that at present the USSR probably possesses sufficient nuclear weapons toajor attack by its long-range striking forces, but thatstockpiles are probably Insufficient for large-scale allocation to air defense anduse. Weubstantial and high priority Soviet program for the expansion of fissionable material production through the period of this estimate, and we believe that tbe USSR is capable of considerable furtherIn nuclear weapons technology. Thus, by the end of the period the current limitation on the allocation of nuclearto air defense and tactical operations will have eased, although even then andonger period, limitations Imposed by theof fissionable materials will still be teit."

Prior to Its suspension of testing inhe USSR had probably developed types of nuclear weapons which could meet most of its major requirements for suchHowever, strong technical motivations have continued to exist for further testing, for example In the categories of lighter-weight, more efficient warheads for air defense and other purposes, higher yield warheads, and antimissile defense techniques. The USSR's reasons for conducting nuclear tests In the fall8 probably Included the desire to

Tor estimates of present and future cumulative availability of fissionable material in tbe USSR, sec. For iheoreUcal ranges of mixed nuclear weapon stockpiles, as well as lllustraUve stockpiles showing reasonable maximum and minimum limits for certain categories ofsee the Supplement to, "Possible Soviet Allocations of Fissionable Material to Weaponso8 (limited DUUIbuUon).

technical requirements and.esser extent, the desire toituation In which there would be increased world pressurean on further testing. Considering theof the Soviet nuclear testto date and the broader advantages the USSR may feel it can achieve byultilateral test cessation, we believe that technical requirements alone would notthe USSR from joiningest ban. We also believe that if an agreed baituitable control system were negotiated, the Soviets would be unlikely to attempt to carryoncealed test or abrogate theat least for some time, but wouldInto their weapons program such refinements as could be achieved without new test explosions.

lthough wc do not know the Sovietof minimum stockpile requirements for fissionable materials, wc doubt that suchhave been met and we know that production facilities are expanding.while the USSR might enter negotiations on cessation of weapons material production, we believe It would neither unilaterally cease such production nor agree to mutualIn tbe near future-Guided Missiles

he USSR continues to press ahead with an extensive research and developmentembracing all major categories of guided missiles. Soviet achievements, in surface-to-surface ballistic missiles have been especially Impressive, and substantial success has also been achieved In developing surface-to-air missiles. While available evidence Is notto Indicate comparable emphasis and success In other Soviet missile programs, we believe the USSR nowariety of missile ayaterns available for operational use. It Is capable of developing advanced systems In all categories during the period of this estimate, .and the experience it has already acquired In rnlsstle production, troop training, logistics, and deployment procedures will facilitate the expansion of Its operational capabilities."

On the basis of considerable evidence ig the research and development

program, wo believe that for several years the USSR has had available for operational use surface-to-surface ballistic missiles withranges ofun.m. It has also beenand probably now has availableallistic missile. maximum range. Inery short range antitank missile Is probably now

n extended discussion of the USSR's guided missile development program, said ol futon lito affect Its tTi'T"VM* of subalaaUal opcr-aUonal capabilities, see. -Soviet Capabilities In Guided Missiles andugustTOP SECRET).

"NOTE: Some statements by high Soviet orflelals during the past year have Indicated that the USSR already possessed, or at least wished us to think Itonsiderable operational ICBM capability.apability cannot be ruled out as Impossible if the Soviets haveest philosophy involving fewer long-ranga tests and more reliance upon component testa atTar than we think likely.hilosophy would run greater risks of failure and prOTSde less assurance of accuracy and reliability but also (If all went wall) much more rapid achievement of operational capability. Themay have believed the political and psyeho-lofiea] ralueRMs is ao great aa to justify extreme measures toubetanUal and early deployment.

nferconfmen/al ballistic missile. Since the completion, we havean Intensive re-examination of the Soviet ICBM test firing program and Its On the basis of sufficientcoverage to establishigh degree of confidence the number of Soviet ICBM test firings. It Is clear that over the past year this number has not been as great as we had Nevertheless, considering theprogress in the whole field of missiles and the capabilities demonstrated In their ICBM. earth satellite, and other ballisticlaunchlngs, wo continue to estimate that the USSR will probablyirstcapability withrototype ICBMs at some time during the While it Is possibleimited capability withur.proven ICBMs might have been establishede believe this to be unlikely.1*

When It flrat becomes operational, the Soviet ICBM system will probably be capable ofuclear pay loadaximum range ofith an accuracy (CEP) of.eliability of aboutercent after launching. (Somepercentage of missiles, which we are unable to estimate, would prove unserviceable before launching.) We estimate that theICBM Is designed touclear pay-load ofounds, although thereossibility that It Is designed to carryounds. Reliability will probably be considerably Improved by thes. At the beginning of the, the CEP could be. with radio com-mand/Lnertial guidance, and could betoater In that period.n oll-inertlal systemEPun. will probably be available.

or air defense, the USSR now hastwo different types of surface-to-airone of which is employed In the fixed missile complex around Moscow and the other of which Is probably suitable for employment with the Moscow system oremlmobOe system. These missiles have greatestagainst aircraft at altitudes00 feet; they are relatively short0nd almost certainly neither Is effective at very low altitudes (beloweet). , surface-to-air systems with Increased range and improved high and low altitude capabilities willbecome operational for defense of fixed targets, field forces, and naval vessels. Short-range air-to-air missiles (upm) suitable for employment with currently operational Soviet fighter aircraft types are probably also available,onger-rangeill probably be developedhe USSR will probablyirst operational capabilityurface-to-air system of limited effectiveness against ICBMx and possibly against IRBMs.

or employment by submarines, the USSR probably now hasubsonic cruise-type missile system capable ofuclear warheads against land targets

within. of the launchingThese missiles could be launchedubmarine only after surfacing.he USSR will probably have available for first operationalubmarine-launched ballistic missile system capable of delivering nuclear warheadsange of. It is also possible that the USSR will. cruise-type system for first operational use

Soviet alr-to-surface missile systemcapable of carrying nuclearsubsonic speedange of aboutships and other targets clearlyon radar. The USSR will probablyIna supersonicmissileange of at leastsuitable for employment against aof targets.

Chemical and Biological YVarfaro

Soviet tactical doctrinethe potentialities of CW and BW ascomplements to other weapons.forces receive thorough trainingoffensive use of CW as well as InIt.tockpile of CW agents Isto be maintained at the World Warand may have been increased. Itconsists of the nerve agents,(OA) and in lesser quantityas well as standard agents sucherve agent of the "V" type, farand toxic than the "O" agents,been ba production In the USSR Research Is probably also under wayfield of nonlethal, incapacitating agents.

he Soviets possess standard munitions for the dissemination of toxic agents byshells, and It Is probableupply of such munitions Is normally carried byunits. CW agent dispersion by bombs and aircraft spray Is also contemplated.aerosol-producing devices necessary to the effective employment of "V" agents are believed to be under development. It Is also possible that CW warheads have beenfor certain types of guided missiles.

h-fr*

The existence of on active Soviet BWand development program has been confirmed, through Identification of acenter and field test site as well as through extensive Soviet literature applicable to this subject. While most known SovietIs also applicable to public healthwc believe the Soviet program Includes research on antipersonnel, anUllvestock, and possibly antlcrop agents. There is no evidence of the existenceass-production facility for BW agents, but existing plants for the production of biologlcals, together with other laboratories, could easily produce BW agents in quantities sufficient for clandestineand probably for larger-scale use.

the field of defense against BWpresent Soviet capabilities are atto those of the major Westernand In the case of CW areSoviet troops arc well-equippedCW defense Items, many ofalso suitable for use In defenseThe current Issue gas mask affordsprotection against Inhalation ofagents, and articles of protectiveissued to all troops affordtoxic agent spray and areaExtensive programs continue tothe civilian populace as well aspersonnel In defensive techniques.

Electromagnetic Warfare

believe that at present the USSRappreciable capability for jammingradars at frequencies upossibly higher, and especially forat lower frequencies normally usedlong-range radioSoviets are now producingtraveling wave tubes suitable forthe microwave frequencies, andUua field Is continuing. They are alsoemploying passive detectioncapable of detecting signals fromkm frequencies up Intohe USSR will haveuse equipment capable ofat frequencies fromhrough

c/s, including all frequencies likely to be employed by Western communications, radar, and navigation equipment

n recentrend toward greater frequency diversification in Soviet radar and radio equipment has appeared, In contrast to the earlier concentration of frequenciesew narrow bands. The USSR Is capable of further Increasing the spread of frequencies employed and of developing Improved anti-Jamming techniques, butlectronic systems will probably still be subject to disruption by properly employed techniques.

STRENGTHS AND CAPABILITIES OF SOVIET FORCES

igh command. Top control over alland operational activity in the Soviet military establishment is vestedingle authority, the Minister of Defense.under the Minister of Defenseingle general staff, organized along functional lines into operations. Intelligence, communications, military transportation, organization andhistorical, and topographicalThe major administrative elements of the Soviet armed forces Include the chiefof ground, air, air defense, and naval forces, each headedommander-in-chief who reports directly to the Minister of Defense. Operational control Sowsirect chain of command from the Minister ofto the commanders of the majorelements: military districts, groups of forces, naval fleets, air defense forces. Long Range Aviation, and possibly airborne forces.

espite extreme centralization ofthe Soviet command systemsufficient flexibility to effect Integrated employment of all types of forces in either large- or small-scale operations. Constantto new requirements will bring about significant changes In armament and someamong components, but weno radical alteration of the Soviet high command structure In the near future. In the following paragraphs, the different types

of Soviet forces are discussed Ln terms of their capabilities to perform those military missions which we believe would be assigned by the Soviet highong-range attack, air defense, major land campaigns, and naval warfare.

long-Rango Striking Forces

ince the end of World War ii the USSR hasajor effort to theof nuclear striking forces capable of attacking distant military, Industrial, and other targets, not only In and near Eurasia but In North America as well. This effort has been dictated by the fact that the US, itself possessed of long-range' striking forces, lay beyond the range of traditional Sovietpower. The principal component ofmilitary strength presently capable of long-range nuclear attack is Long Rangeequipped with medium and heavylite medium bombers of Naval andAviation, as well as the light bombers of these components, contribute to the Soviet capability for attack on targets In Eurasia and Its periphery. Ground-launched and guided missiles probably now supplement the bomber capability.

ATng-range bombers. Wc estimate the strength of Soviet Long Range Aviation, astincludingbsolete BULLmedium bombers,ADGER jet medium bombers, andISON Jet and BEAR turboprop heavy bombers. At least one-fourth of the BISON andegiments in this force have some aircraft of these types which are convertible tanker-bombers. Medium bombers have also been supplied to otherare nowADGERsew BULLs In Naval Aviation units andADGERs In Tactical Aviation units.

he capabilities of Long Range Aviation have been markedly increased In the last Sve ^years, through the introduction of large num-tbers of modern aircraft, more realistic and ^larger-scale training exercises, improvement of potential staging bases In the Arctic,of Inflight refueling, andof electronic equipment for ECM,navigation and other purposes. Nuclear weapons storage sites have been identified at many Long Range Aviation home bases, and we believe that nuclear bombs are now the primary weapons of thisew BADGER units of both Long Range and Naval Aviation are probably now trained and equipped to employ air-to-surface missiles suitable for use against ships and other well-defined targets.

espite these improvements Soviet Long Range Aviation still consists primarily ofbombers, best suited for operations against targets in Eurasia and Its periphery, and capable of attacking the continental US only through extensive use of one-wayThe history of the Soviet heavy bomber program leads us to believe that despite the efforts devoted to developing the BISON and BEAR, Soviet planners probably decided within the last year or two toapid build-up with present heavy bomber models. This decision may have been reachedesult of one or more of the following factors: dissatisfaction with the performance of BISON and BEAR; progress In developing new or unproved bombers; confidence in Soviet ability to acquire an ICBM capability at an early date. Contributing to the decision may haveoviet belief that the USSR'sbomber force, togethermall heavy bomber capability, Is at leastacceptableeterrent force, and for use against the US should general war occur.

he Soviets will almost certainlyto strive for technological superiority over tbe US in Intercontinental weaponPresumably they set great store by the ICBM as posing an entirely new type of threat. But Soviet military planners almost certainly feel that even though they have goodofubstantial long-range striking capability with missiles, manned bombers will still be required. Manned bombers, especially advanced types, willthe Soviets with flexibility and dlversin-

cation of attack capabilities, and will remain particularly applicable for attacks on small, hardened targets, damage assessment, and reconnaissance. We therefore believe that the USSR willarge force of long-range bombers throughout the period of thisalthough its size will probably decline gradually. Its Inflight refueling techniques will probably be Improved and extendedarger part of the force; however, there Is no present evidence of the development of an aircraft specifically for useanker.electronic and other supportingwill probably be provided,missile launching capabilities willbe augmented as more effective missiles are developed.

uture projections of the strength and composition of Soviet Long Range Aviation are complicated by the fact that at present the entire Soviet medium and heavy bomber Industry Istate of transition, Involving considerably less current productionear or two ago. Production at BADGER plants now appears to be tapering off,it will probably be sufficient to provide moderate further Increases In tbe jet medium bomber force. The one Identified BISON plant, at Moscow, has continued to produce aircraft of this typeow and uneven rate, while its design bureau has been working toew type of largeotal ofozen BISONs have been completed sinceringing cumulativetoircraft. While considerably less evidence is available on BEAR production, we believe It unlikely that any new BEAR bombers have been produced for wellear, or that more thanoere produced altogether. In the interim, the one identified producer has probably been overhaulingBEARs, modifying some aircraft of this type for transport use, andew new transports of the CLEAT type (similar to theespite the decline In long-range bomber production, the USSR's plant capacity suitable for production of large aircraft has been considerably enlarged over the last few years, and there Is some evidence to suggest that several plants are preparing to produce large bombers or transports.

Research and development In new bomber types has continued and we believe that it will be Intensively pursued throughout the period of this estimate. Considering the demonstrated level of Soviet technology In such fields as aircraft propulsion andand the normal development of these capabilities, we have estimated that within the next few years the USSR could probably place into operational units: (a) improved versions ef the BISON and BADGER, at any time;ew subsonic heavy bomber with range and other performance characteristics somewhat better than those of an unproved BISON,9ew medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capabilitiesangethat of an improved BADGER,0

Since none of these aircraft types would add substantially to Soviet capabilities for two-way Intercontinental operations, we have reasoned that the USSR might proceedto more advanced types, sucheavy bomber powered by high-energyfuel, capable of supersonic speed and high altitude, orubsonic nuclear-powered aircraft capable of long endurance, even at low altitudes. We continue tothat some aircraft of either or both these types could probably be in operational units bye also believe thatthe next few years the USSR could By an airborne nuclear testbed, with at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrust during some phase of the flight" The attainmentuclear propulsionfor operational use In supersonicwould probablyong test and

- Th' Assistant Chief ol Naval Operations forepartment of the Havy. and the Director for In kingoo Joint SUJf. believe that the USSR could flystbed daring ISM. The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence.elieves that aa aircraft nuclearsystem could now be undergoing flight testsrototype airframe.

relopment progrBm extending beyond the rtod of this estimate.1*

ecent evidence of Soviet developmental efforts includes the observation at Moscowew bomber, designated BOUNDER, of large size and heavy weight,odified delta-wing configuration apparently designed for supersonic flight. With the limited ln-formation available, It has not been possible to determine the BOUNDER'S Intended mission, but we believe It coulda significant step forward Inbomber design. Preliminary analysis Indicates BOUNDER to be powered by four turbojet engines. The use of conventional fuels would giveange marginal forbombing. The possibility for development of BOUNDERorepropulsion system exists, and theintentuclear-powered vehiclebe excluded at this time. However, present information is Inadequate to permit an estimate of BOUNDER'S probable

ur evidence also continues to support the existence of one or more otherof new or improved long-range bombers. Past experience cautions that existingmay represent competitive designs. The Soviets may not yet have evaluated such prototypes in relation to each other or to

"See, Toulble Soviet Lone Range Bomber8nd. -Strength and Composition of the Soviet Long Range Bomber8 (TOPorperformance characteristics of Soviet long-range bombers for operational useee Annex, Table 4.

their missile programs. Such evaluation will have an important bearing on the future strength and composition of Long Range Aviation.

e continue to project Soviet heavy bomber and tanker strength for0 as lying within the rangehe high sideoviet option to produce additional aircraft of BISON and perhaps BEAR types, and perhaps toa fewew heavy bomber Intounits. The low side reflects their option tourther build-up in heavy bombers throughelying primarily on their one-way medium bomber capability against the US for atittle longer. Our estimates of trends In Long0 are more uncertain, but reflect our belief that the USSR willIntroduce new or Improvedbombers during the period of this estimate. Should Soviet plannersarge force of heavy bombers and tankers, there Is no question that they could have five or six hundred BISONs, BEARS, and new heavy bombers in units by As indicated in the table below, however. It seems to us more likely that the heavy bomber and tanker force will remainsmaller than this--say, about two or three hundred, including some of new types.

nferconftnenfal ballistic missiles. We believe that Soviet planners Intend toizable ICBM operational capability at the earliest practicable date. However, we have Insufficient evidence to Judge the magnitude and paceoviet program to produce

SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION (Estimated Strength In Operational Units)

lOctM

HEAVY WOivtllERS

OMBERS

AND TANKERS

and deploy ICBMs. Considerable preparationsuild-up of operational ICBM capabilities (joold already have been made withoutby Intelligence, as implied byrecent statement that the production of ICBMs has been "successfully setn the light of such Indirect evidence as exists, we bave considered those factors which would affect an operational ICBM build-up.the Soviet capacity to produce missiles and associated equipment, and concurrently to complete launching facilities, establish logistic lines, and train operational units.

Into account the complexitiestasks which would have to bewe believe that the Sovietsan operational capability with" about three years after firstcapability date. Based on oura first operational capability willbe achievedeapabilityCBMsachieved some timeithpriority and exceptional success inand production program, thisbe achieved in as little as twofirst operational capability date. Le.,

, some timeuild-uphree years from first operational capabilitya capabilitytyould be achievedearalf;earould be achieved In abouta year. The achievement of operationalabUltlcs such as these within the time periodsstimated would require an extremely high order of planning and accomplishment, and would also require anhe average rate of ICBM firings for test and training purposes.

is evidence that mobility Isconsideration In Sovietdevelopment generally. For ana degree of mobility could beuse of rail transport to previously pre-

These numbers of ICBMs are selectedIn order to provide some measure of the Soviet production and deployment capacity; they do not represent an estimate of the probable Sovietor stockpile.

pared launching sites, some of which would haveinimum of fixed equipment. This would provide flexibility and security through the use of relatively simple alternate launching sites which would be difficult to Identify and locate. Our estimate of thecapacity to acquire ICBM operational capabilities, given In the preceding paragraph, applies toail-transportable systemystem of moderately hardened Axed launching sites,ombination of the two.

Other long-range ballistic missiles. The Soviets probably consider ballistic missiles. maximum range asprimarily to tbetr capabilities tonuclear payloads on distant, fixedIn Eurasia and Its periphery, although shorter-range ballistic missiles could also be employed for this purpose within their range. We estimate that nuclear warheads would be provided for virtually all missiles. range, but wc do not exclude the possibility of CW use inn the basis of available Intelligence, we cannot Judge the present scale ofand we have not Identified any units equipped with these missiles. It is possible that at present the USSR, hasery limited capability to employ them In military operations. But considering such factors as estimated Soviet requirements, nuclearavailability, and experience In shorter range missiles, we believe that the USSR may now have an operational capability with as many as several hundred ballistic missiles. range, and. missiles.

The wide availability of medium and light bombers capable of reaching Eurasian targets probably reduces Soviet requirements for missiles of these ranges. Sinceile missile has probably been operationale believe that the Soviets may meet their requirements for this missile early In the period of thisuud-up. missiles would take longer. Missiles of these types are probably designed for road or rail mobility. They are probably not deployed in Satellite areas at present, but some operational units may exist within the USSR.

issile-launchingew conrentional submarines have probably been converted for topside stowage and launching. cruise-type missiles. The Soviets couldarge number of existingbut the problems involved lead us to believe that such conversion Is not likely to beotal of aboutong-range submarines could be converted within monthsecision to do so. The USSR is probably also developing one or more new types of missile-launching submarines,for Internal missile stowage. These types will probably include ballistic missile submarines for first operational use, and possibly cruise-type missileat an earlier date. If the latter are In fact developed and constructed, the USSR may have aboutubmarines, some nuclear and some conventional-powered, equipped for Internal missile stowage by

apabilities for long-range attack. Soviet capabilities for attack on theUS are limited by the relatively small numbers of operational heavy bombers, the requirement to stage most bombers through forward bases In the Arctic, and the lackubstantial Inflight refueling capability. Nevertheless, by employing their entire heavy bomber force, many of their medium bombers, and their small submarine-launched missile capability, the Soviets could mount large-scale initial nuclear attacks againststrengths and other war-makingin North America. The actual weight of attack launched against the US wouldupon the Soviet judgment as to the optimum combination of surprise and weight of attack against all areas where US and Allied nuclear retaliatory capabilities and other essential targets are located. Against those Western capabilities deployed on the periphery of the IJloc, the Soviets couldmedium bombers, light bombers, and ballistic missiles with ranges upnd. Bombs and alr-to-sur-face missiles could be employed againstnaval forces possessing nuclear strike capabilities. All Western targets ofin North America and overseas, as well as major naval operating areas, are within range of one or more of the Soviet weapon systems described above, although most of the Soviet bombers would have to beon one-way missions to reach targets In the continental US.

oviet long-range striking capabilities will Increase markedly as the stockpile ofweapons grows, improved bombers are introduced, the readiness and proficiency of the bomber force Increases, and especially as the Soviet capability to deliver nuclear weapons by guided missilesThe USSR will rely mcreaslngly upon missiles as long-range delivery systems as the periodWhile Soviet planners almostrecognize that ballistic missiles can impose maximum surprise and difficulty of interception, they probably consider that for some years the accuracy and payload capacity of such missiles will be inferior to those of manned aircraft of comparable ranges. We therefore believe that through the period of this estimate, Soviet long-range strikingwill lie primarilyixed force of manned bombers (probably equippedwith air-to-suxface missiles) and ballistic missiles. The Soviets may consider thatmissiles can best be employed toWestern retaliatory and othertemporarily in an initial blow, relying upon bombers for follow-up attacks ofweight. In any event, effective Soviet employment of long-range strikingagainst Western retaliatory and othertargets will still face great difficulties of timing and distribution of attack against widely deployed, mobile, and ready Western strengths. The USSR's nilisilc carryingwill contribute further to Itsbut the scale of their use In an initial attack would depend upon the Sovietof the risk of premature disclosure of Intent.

Assistant Chief of Staff for IntelllBence Department of the Army, docs not concur In tfab

1*flO li

Defense Force*

All Bloc forces useful for air defense are organized for participation in an Integrated system which places primary emphasis on providing defense in depth for keyIndustrial, and military centers within the USSR. We believe that air defense will continue to be given high priority.

Air defense weapons. The principal current weapon system for defense of Sine-Soviet Bloc targets against high-altitudeIs the high-performance Jet fighter, of which there are0 In operational units throughout the Bloc. More0 of these fighters are In Soviet units,f them In units whose sole mission Is air defense and the remainder in units with alr defense as one of their primary missions. The principal day fighter In Soviet forces Is the subsonic FRESCO, althoughFARMER day fighters were in units aslso In service are the FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighter, as well as the FRESCO "D" and FARMER "B" withall-weather capablbtles, but theirhas proceededelatively slow pace. Total Soviet strength In theand FRESCO "D" types wassith some" types also In operational units.

Most Bloc jet fighters In operational units have combat ceilingseet; FARMER and certain FRESCO versionshave combat ceilings on the order0 feet.he USSR will probably Introduce new day and all-weather fighter types, whose characteristics willspeed and altitude at the expense of combat radius.2 the latest operational Soviet fighters will probably be capable of operating at altitudes up0 feet, and of climbing0 feet In less than twoAir-to-air missiles are probably now available to improve the kill capabilities of Soviet interceptors, although we have nothat they have as yet been supplied to operational units. Total numerical strength

"For estimated performance characteristics of Soviet nghter aircraft, ice Annex. Table

In fighters will probably decrease after another year or two, because of the growingpower of Individual Interceptors, greater demands on industrial capacity resulting from the advent of more complex fighters, and the Increasing availability and capabilities ofmissile systems.

Surface-to-air missiles designed foreffectiveness at altitudeseet and probably having0 feet are now in operationense and costly complex ofites around Moscow. This complex, which couldimited number of missiles with nuclearcan probablyery high rate of fire against multiple targets under all weather conditions. It is probably InefTectlve against very low altitude attack, however. We believe the USSR may have altered an earliertoomewhat similar surface-to-air missile complex around Leningrad, and that the missile defenses of this and other critical Soviet targets will employ systems with greater flexibility and less cost than that at Moscow. There is now some evidence of the installation of surface-to-air missile sitesew other key areas, such as Baku. We believe that more such sites will be built through the period of this estimate as improved systems for both high and low altitude defense become available, and that surface-to-air missiles will be provided for numerous Soviet fixed targets as well as field forces and naval vessels.defenses in key areas will probably become effective both at very low altitudesp0 feet during the period.

Tbe Soviets continue to employguns for defense of field forces and fixed targets, including airfields. More0 light and medium antiaircraft guns areto be available to Soviet forces atIn addition,re available to East European forces andoChina, North Korea, and NorthLarge numbers of automaticmachine guns are also available to field forces. As suitable surface-to-air missilesavailable Inarge portion of the medium and some light antiaircraft guns will probably be phased out of the air defenses of static targets In the USSR.

Air defense radar and control equipment. Radar coverage now extends over the entire USSR and East European Satellite area,for certain Inland portions of central and eastern Siberia; coverage also extends along the entire coastal region of Communist China. The long-sUndlng gaps In radarIn the Soviet Arctic are now believed to have been filled, although this deployment is probably not as extensive as In many other areas.eavy prime radars,of the TOKEN type, andight auxiliary radars are employed In various combinations atadar sites In theoviet Bloc. Under average conditions, TOKEN radars can probably detect Jetbomber aircraft, penetrating at altitudes up to their combat ceilings, at distancesaboutnd. from radar sites. New radars of much higher quality,radars capable of more accurate height-finding, are already In service and will probably be widely deployed

For several years the Soviets have been developing computers and other components suitable for data-handling use. The use of such equipment willarked effect in Increasing traffic-handling capabilities,system reaction time, and Improvingwithin the Soviet air defenseFor example, it Is expected that data-handling equipment will Increase the traffic capacity of each Soviet .radar reporting site to at leastimultaneous tracks. We believe that an air defense system with some seml-autoo/ttlc features.ata-linkfor vectoring Interceptors, Is being widely deployed in western USSR in association with early warning and OCI sites. This system is believed to be similar in concept to the US SAGE system, but less complex. It willcome Into use throughout the USSR and East Europeew years. The Soviets are alsoew iff system which will probably be fully operational

Air defense concentrations. The areas of highest concentration of Bloc air defense

perform.nee characteristic* of Soviet early warning and ground-controlled Intercept radare arc given In Annex,

weapons and associated equipment Include that portion of European USSR from the Kola Peninsula to the Caspian Sea, East Germany Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Maritime and Sakhalin areas of the Soviet Far East. High defense concentrations arc also found at some specific locations outside these areas, such as Taslikent, Novosibirsk, and Khabarovsk. The approaches to Moscow are by far the most heavily defended of these areas. Including (In addition to the surface-to-air missile complex mentioned above)ayll-weather fighters as well asguns. We believe thenique case, dictated by theof that area to the USSR.

assive defense. Large passive defense organizations contribute to the air defense readiness of both military personnel and the civilian population. Civil defense trainingormal part of the programAAF, the Soviet paramilitary mass organization whose recruitment has been stepped up markedly in recent years. The incorporation of air raid shelters Into newly constructed buildingsrogram of long standing in the USSR. This program probably now affords some degree of shelter for roughly one-sixth of the urban population of the USSR, and this proportion will probably rise considerably duringlthough most existing shelters were not designed for protection against blast from nuclear weapons, some newer building shelters are of heavier construction. It Is probable that up-to-date protection Isto selected elementa of the government but the general population is Inadequately prepared against large-scale nuclear. Air defense capabilities. Present Soviet air defense capabilities against attack byand cruise-type missiles can bein general terms as follows:

Against penetrations conducted during daylight and In clear weather, ateet and0 feet, capabilities are greatest.

At altitudes above0 feet, capabilities would decrease progressively as altitude increased, except in the limited areas equipped with surface-to air missiles where

TOP SECRET-

would be unimpaired to at0 feet.

At altitudes beloweet, capabilities would decrease progressively as altitude decreased, and would probably bereduced at altitudes beloweet.

Against penetrations conducted at night and under conditions of poor visibility, the capabilities of the system would be greatly reduced because of the limited availability of all-weather fighters and surface-to-air

Against varied penetration tacticsaltitude stacking, diversionarydecoys, and electronic countermeasures, the capabilities of the system would bethrough disruption and saturation.

The amount of warning Ume available significantly affects the capabilities of airin various areas of the Bloc. Early warning radar could now give Moscow and many other targets in the Interior more than one hour's warning of attacks made withWestern bomber types. The more limited early warning time available In Bloc border areas would reduce the effectiveness of theof even heavily-defended targets in such areas. As the speeds of Western deliveryincrease, tho problem of warning time will become more critical, despite probableemployment of picket ships, airborneand other extensions of warning

Over-all Bloc capabilities against aircraft and cruise-type missiles will Increase, however, through Improvements In the performance characteristics of most Soviet air defense equipment and especially through the wide employment of semiautomatic air defenseAir defense guided missile capabilities will increase. Higher-performance fighters will be employed, and the proportion of all-weather fighters In Soviet forces may Increase to aboutercent. But the Soviets willto have difficulty in opposing very low altitude attack and air defense electronicwill still be subject to disruption and saturation. The USSR will probably not have an operational weapon system with eveneffectiveness against ballistic missilesthe very end of this period or later.

Ground Forces ond Tactical Air Forces.

The Soviet ground forces represent the largest part of the Soviet militaryand are closely supported by tactical aviation, consLstbig of fighters trained in the ground attack role (in addition to their air defense role) and light and medium bombers trained In ground support bombingThese forces are well-balanced, ably led, and equipped for the most part withmateriel of modem design. Units are distributed amongilitary districts In the USSR and three groups of forces In theSatellites. The strongest concentrations are In East Germany, the western andborder regions of the USSR, and thearea of the Soviet Far East. Stockpiles maintained in these areas are believedto support large-scale ground combat operations for several months withoutfrom current production.

The order of battle of Soviet Army ground forces is estimated atine divisions plus supporting units These divisionsaverage aboutercent of authorized wartime strength, although ttie manning level in some Interior districts may be as low asercent. All units probablyigh proportion of authorized officer strength,and full equipment is believed to be kept locally available. These peacetime manning practices, together with standard conscription and stockpiling programs, would probablyall Soviet line divisions to be brought to full strengthonversionar footing could be executed rapidly, anddditional line divisions could be mobilized

There has been an extensive program over the last several years to modernize and reorganize the Soviet ground forces to meet the requirements of modern warfare. More advanced designs of practically all types of equipment have appeared. The firepower of individual unlta has been Increased markedly, additional vehicles (including amphibious

hides) liave been provided, andequipment has been augmented.

A reorganisation in the Group ol Soviet Forces. Germany,7ew type of Soviet linemotorized rifleappears't II-adapted for fast, hard-hitting action. The mechanized divisions were converted to the new motorized type by removing heavy tank and assault gun units, and the rifle divisions were converted by addition of medium tanks, armoredcarriers and rocket launcher. During the sameesubordinatlon of divisions resulted in the creation of "tank armies"exclusively of tank divisions to provide for rapid, deep exploitation in enemy rear areas. The other units remain grouped Into "combined arms" armies, now composed of motorized rifle and tank divisions. Wethat similar developments have beenwayB throughout the Soviet ground forces.

These changes are in line with revised Soviet tactical doctrine which emphasizes the need to supplement standard ground force tactics and training In order to meet theof nuclear warfare. New doctrine stresses firepower, mobility andgreater initiative, deeper objectives,reconnaissance and tho protection of individuals and units against the effects of atomic and chemical weapons. It alsothe tactical use of nuclear weapons in support of Soviet field force operations.

Surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges. have probably been available for operational usee believe these missile types are intended for mobile use In support of field forces, and for attacking fixed targets such as air bases. Depending upon operationaland the availability of nuclearmaterials, nuclear. HE, or CW warheads could be employed. We havemall amount of evidence of military units equipped to launch ballistic missiles, and It Is possible that at present (he Soviet capability to cm-ploy them In military operations Is quite small. Cm the other hand, the Soviets have had experience In producing missiles In. range class, probably have an extensive production capacity, and have had ample time to train troops In their use. Very recent evidence Indicates that Soviet missile units equippedm. missiles may have been deployed to East Germany. It Is possible therefore, that the USSR's present operational capability In. range class comprises as many as severalmissiles, although In view of otherrequirements for nuclear materials It Is unlikely that many would be equipped with nuclear warheads at present Missiles of these types may now be held in the highreserve, but as their availabilitythey will probably be organicallyto field armies.. missiles may also be allocated to the support of Soviet field forces.

Air support for ground operations Ismainly by Tactical Aviation, the largest single component of the Soviet air forces. It* units are assigned to the military districts and groups of forces. Tactical Aviation hasat least some nuclear deliveryIt Is now equipped (asith jet aircraft estimated to includeightersight bombers. The fighter units axe predominantly equipped with FAGOTs and FRESCOs; however, the more advanced FARMER day fighter andall-weather fighter are also in service. Tactical bomber units are still equipped with the obsolescent BEAGLE,ew units have received BADGER Jet medium bombers. Prototypes of several new fighter types and two new Jet light bombers have been displayedC, but none ot these aircraft has been identified In an operational unit

The increasing availability of nuclear weapons and guided missilesill bring further changes in equipment and organization of Soviet ground and tactical air forcesteady Improvement in theirWe believe that these changes will be evolutionary In nature, and do notany major alterations in size orWhile nuclear weapons and guided missiles probably will be used in support of tactical operations, conventional field artillery and ungulded rockets will continue to provide the major direct fire support for units In close

combat. Tactical Aviation will probablynew supersonic fighters and bombers, but both fighters and bombers are expected to decline In numbers as Increasing reliance Is placed on guided missiles.

he USSR has sizable airborne forces, estimated ativisionsotal strength ofen. Airborne troops are well-equipped, but the air transporthas lagged far behind combat air units in the Soviet aircraft re-equipment program. Aviation of Airborne Troops now comprisesight transports of the CAB, COACH, and CRATEULL medium bombers converted to transportelicoptersliders. This strength could be augmented substantially by other military and civil transports.

appearance of new transportsportable equipment IndicatesUSSR is now paying Increasingthe development of Its airborne forces.airlift capabilities willsand transports areBULL will probably be employed asmedium transport until late Inwhen it will have been replaced bytwin-turboprop assaulthas, however, not yet appearedand possibly other advancedauxiliary transport will alsoas improved aircraft axecivil aviation.umber ofwere displayed, Including theCOOT turboprop medium transports,turbojet transport designateda turboprop heavy transport, thethese aircraft, only the COOT Is nowand there Is some evidence thatdifficulties have caused theto proceed more slowly thanestimated.*"

Capabilities for Major Land Campaigns

ground forces are capable oflarge-scale operations on several

estimated performance characteristics of Soviet transport aircraft, see Annex, Table 8.

fronts Into peripheral areas, separately orThese operations could beby the large available air forces, but the high priority assigned to air defense would limit the availability of fighter aircraft for such support operations In the Initial phaseeneral war. Surface naval vessels, naval aircraft and submarines would be available for operations In Bloc coastal areas In support of ground campaigns. The logistic environment Is an Important limitation on theseand the capacities of militarysystems have been considered In theestimates of Soviet offensiveagainst selected land areas. Thesedo not take into account the effects of an Initial nuclear exchange, of direct Western opposition to advancing Soviet forces, or of Western Interdiction of essential logistic fines. Moreover, these are not estimates of theof divisions tbe USSR, would consider it tactically feasible or necessary to employ in the areas discussed.

gainst Western Europe andWithout prior build-up, Soviet forces in East Germany and Poland could Initiate an offensive campaign into Western Europe withine divisions, half tank and half motorized, supported byactical aircraft. To augment the strength of the Initialaximum simultaneous airlift of two lightly-equipped airborne divisionsen each could be mounted by Aviation of Airborne Troops based In Western USSR If approximately one-half of the civil transport aircraft normally in the area also participated In the air lift, the equivalent of anivisions could be liftedne-dayHowever, we doubt that the Soviets would risk loss of strategic surprisearge number of civilprior to an Initial attack. In addition to airborneaximum of four divisions could be lifted In merchant ships across the Baltic Sea. Aircould be drawn from theircraft of Tactical Aviation unit* inUSSR, and ground reinforcements from theivisions In Western USSR could be brought up rapidly. Lines of communication through the northern satellites are estimated

to be capable ofheoreticalmaximum of about ISO divisions.

Soviet campaigns to seize Norway and Sweden could be launched from northwestern USSR tluough Finland and from west central Europe through Denmark. Forcesavailable In northwestern USSR consist of nine line divisions andO0 tactical and naval aircraft. Operations againstwould be limited loglstlcally in the north to four divisions over Finnish land routes plus one water-borne division, and In the southaximum of five divisions water-lifted from Denmark. If Sweden were also attacked, as many as six additional divisions could be moved across Finlandaximum of nine divisions could be ferried from Denmark to southern Sweden. Additional reinforcements might be water4ifted across the Baltic from tbe USSR to Sweden, and airborne forces could be used In securing debarkation

Against Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East. Forces available for operations In this area Includeine divisionsand naval aircraft In southern andUSSR. For operations west of the Black Sea, lines of communication would be adequate to support as many asivisions against Greece or as many asgainstbut not moreotal ofould be supported concurrently. At most,f these divisions could be supported In an extension ot this campaign into northwestern Anatolia, while seven divisions from the Caucasus could move against eastern Turkey. Threedivisions could be water-lifted to tbe northern Turkish coast, provided that port faculties could be secured. One or twodivisions could be employed In the area, lines of communication couldorceivisions In offensive operations against Iran.

In the Par East. The USSR hasine divisions,actical and naval aircraft and sizable naval forcesIn this area. These forces could renew hostilities In Korea, either alone or Inwith North Korean and Chinese forces-One airborne division could be employed againsteaborne force equivalent to three lightly-equipped divisions could be launched against Japan,ixed group of ships and other craft. Provided portcould be secured, fully-equipped forces equivalentivisions could be landedimmediatelyollow-up operation. The same technique could be used in other areas of the Far East within range of land-based aircraft. Adverse climate, terrain and logistic environment would probably limitIn Alaska to one airborne divisioneaborne force ofroops.

Naval Forces

During the postwar years, Soviet naval forces have been greatly strengthened by an intensive building program concentrated on light cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The Soviet submarine force is the largest ever assembled by any single power; over half of its present strength consists of long-range craft of postwar design and construction. Dueecent slow-down In the navalprogram, which Included ahalt In submarine production, there has been little quantitative change In Soviet naval forces since last year. We estimate Soviet naval strength as8 atruisers,estroyers andestroyer escorts, andubmarines. These totals Include vessels of postwarightleet destroyers.estroyer escorts,W" class) and aboutedium range"hey are grouped in four major forces: the Northern Fleet, located In the Barents Sea area; the Baltic Fleet; the Black Sea Meet; and the Pacific Fleet, concentrated largely at Vladivostok

The surface forces are supported byNaval Aviation, which comprises more thanercent of total Soviet air strength and Is now the second largest naval air force In the world.ircraft are assigned to the Soviet fleets, Includinget lightet medium bombers andtypes. The combat aircraft are the

same types as are assigned to TacticalFAGOTs, FRESCOS, FARMERS,BEAGLEs. and BADGEHs. Wethat selected naval bomber units have been assigned an atomic delivery role and there Is evidenceeveloping alr-tc-surface missile capability in naval BADGER units. Lack of aircraft carriers limits the operational effectiveness ot Soviet Naval Aviation to the combat radius of its shore-based aircraft

The operating efficiency and equipment of Soviet naval forces, while still below US standards in some fields, are quite high and will continue to Improve. The great increase In world-wide unidentified submarine contacts in recent years probably reflects the intensified training of the Soviet submarine force,In long-range operations. In the naval weapons field, In addition tovil.marine-launched guided missiles, the Soviets hate vigorously pushed theof more effective rnlncs with magnetic, acoustic and pressure actuated firing devices. We estimate that the USSR has stockpiled mines of advanced types as well asmines, it Is technically capable of adapting nuclear warheads to mines, torpedoes and depth charges. Nuclear tests In the No-vaya Zcmlya area have probably included the testing of naval weapons. The Soviet Navy has become Increasingly aware of Its Initial failure to keep pace with the rapid postwar technological advances In antisubmarineIn recent years there hasteady Improvement in Its ASW tacticsajor effort has been made in the construction of escort ships In order to overcome this deficiency. The Soviet Navy is also quite limited as to amphibious capability. To meet the lift requirements of dlvisional-sizc units the USSR would have to rely almost exclusively upon merchant ships.

Several Important developments in Soviet naval forces are likelyesult of changing weapon systems and new concepts of naval warfare. In addition to conversion of some submarines for theof surface-to-surface missiles, newspecifically designed for this purpose probably will enter service. Some Soviet cruisers and destroyers will probably be equipped with dual-purpose surface-to-alr/ surface-to-surface missiles. Nuclearwill be applied to submarines, andIn submarine hull design arcearly In the period. We believe that antlsonar coatings have probably been applied to some Soviet submarines. To meet the threat from US muslle-launching submarines, the USSR probably will continue to emphasize improvement of its antisubmarine warfare capability. This could include construction of new and better antisubmarine vessels"killer" submarines, use ot specialized aircraft and helicopters, development ofdetection systems (both sonar andand more sophisticated antisubmarine weapons including guided missiles. Naval Aviation will probably receive aircraft ofperformance as they become available, as well as Improved alr-to-surface missiles.

Subjnarine construction. The USSR will probably continue to place primaryon submarines in its naval construction program.0 the Soviets have builtubmarines of the medium-range "Q" class and the long-rangend "Z"onstruction of "Z" classendedut the "W" class and "Q" class programs continuedheir termination probably marked theof new submarineew class of conventionally-powered long-rangehas been In productionuhgrad since the beginninghis class (designatedsorpedo-attack type, larger than tho "Z" class and with Improved sonar. Four "F" class submarines areto have reached operational status-Additional submarine programs believed to be under wayuclear-propelled type and submarines specifically designed toguided missiles.

Although the evidence Is not firm, we believe that the USSR may already haveone or more nuclear-poweredSoviet capabilities In this field have

For esUmatcd chartcterUUci and performance of these submarines, see Annex,

been Indicated by the development of the icebreaker Lenin, which will probably become operationalhe Lenin la powered by three nuclear reactorsype which would be suitable, with some redesign, for useubmarine. We estimate that byhe USSR will have aboutuclear-powered

Construction of conventional submarines will probably continue but, because of the greater complexity of nuclear-powered and missile submarines, annual submarinealmost certainly will not reach the high levels of recent years. Considering suchas the deconunlsslonlng of obsolete boats, the possible conversion of some additionalto missile use, and the development of new propulsion and weapons systems, wethat the total force willubmarines In

Capabilities for navalrave threat to Allied naval forces and merchant shipping is posed by the Soviet submarine force, which is about eight times the size of the submarine force with which Germany entered World War II. In the event of war, Soviet submarines could conduct Intensive operations against Allied sea communications In most of the vital ocean areas of the world. Mining could be undertakenrge scale and woulderious threat to Allied sea communications. This threat is greatest In waters relatively close to Soviet-controlled air and naval bases, but Soviet submarinesa distant mlnclaying potential of major proportions. Soviet Naval Aviation couldAllied naval forces, shipping and port facilities within range using bombs, mines,and air-to-surface missiles. Soviet Long Range Aviation probably would alsoattacks on naval targets, but Itsat the outsetar presumably would be limited to missions of the highest priority. Although the primary threat tonaval forces in the Atlantic, the Pacific and the peripheral seas of Eurasia would come from Soviet submarines and aircraft, thenavy wouldole In preventingforces from operating with Impunity close to Soviet shores. Naval exercises ofseveral years, stressing defense of theto the USSR, Indicate acapability in the fleet

Northern Fleet, with more thansubmarines and direct access toAtlantic, is considered the mostof the Soviet fleets. Northern Fleet sub-

Ehout the North AtlanUc and the large "Z" classcould operate in the Caribbean seizure of Norway would greatly extend the submarine and air offensive capability of this force. The geographic position of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets limits theircapabilities. Seizure of the Baltic exit, would allow the Baltic Fleet submarine force to Join in the Interdiction of Allied seain the North Atlantic and would Increase the potential of Baltic Fleet surface rorccs for operations In the North andSeas. Similarly, seizure of the Turk-ish Straits would permit submarines of the Black Sea Fleet to range throughout theand threaten Allied seaIn that area. Submarines from both the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets might also beoutside of home waters prior to theof hostilities. Aircraft andof the Soviet Pacific Fleet could attack Allied sea communicationshe North Pacific and adjacent Far Eastern waters from theof hostilities.

capabiUUea of Sovietmprove steadily throughout thisthe acquisition of more advancedaircraft, and naval weapons. Theweaknesses of the USSRavalcontinue to derive from the wideof its sea frontiers and its inabilitythe sea routes between theseImprovements in inlandincrease its ability to Interchangeincluding submarines. The lacksupply lines to its Northern andfleet areas and the land-lockedof Its fleets in the Baltic and Blackadditional handicaps.

-

V. TRENDS IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST STATES

The USSR's relations with other Bloc states continue to be of pressing concern to the Soviet leaders During the past yearhas moved energetically to repair the damage done to ita political control andauthority by developments of the last several years. To this end. it sponsored an international Communist conferenceas the most significant In more thanears--broke the three-year oldwith Yugoslavia, ordered the execution of Imre Nagy,ual CEMA and Warsaw Pact meeting In Moscow, and beganof an international Communist periodical designed to replace the defunct Comlnform Journal. The Moscow conference ofparties In7odification of nine fundamental Marxist-Leninist "laws" to which all true (Soviet-oriented) "socialist" states must adhere. It was the signal for an intensified drive against "revisionism" calculated to inhibit departures from the approved norms by member parties, especially those which might be Infected by the spirit of nationalism.

hese efforts have been intended to cope with what has become one of the fundamental problems in the Communist world: how to preserve ideological conformity and political unity. The Communist parlies in the various states are confronted with quite diverse local conditionsuildinghey are tempted to resort to practical expedients which have no counterpart in Sovietand require ideological Justification In terms close to "devlatlonlsm." In addition, as parties now possessing state power they are bound to think In terms of their own stale interests, not always identical with those of the Soviet slate, and to show some deference to the national sensitivities of their peoples. Consequently, there are present within the Communist parties elements and factions which harbor latent or open resentment of Moscow's domination, and they areby the knowledge that within thepopulation anti-Soviet sentimentto be vigorous and widespread.

he tradition of the Communisttook little account of locallst proclivities or the autonomy of national parties; It was "Internationalist" and centralist Thiswas enormously reinforced during the period of Stalin's ascendancy. He rose tomastery of the Soviet partyime when other Communist parties were weak and had little prospects of attaining power. His organizational controls, his unquestionedauthority made him as much thedictator over them as he was In the USSR Itself. Only the Chinese Communists,in the interior reaches of China,organisational and even some degree of ideological autonomy. In the postwar period, after the Communist parties gained power In Eastern Europe and China, Stalin hadowering historic figure In the Marxist-Leninist hierarchy. Even where Moscow had other and more direct means of control over Satellite parties. Its authority rested to adegree on the magic of Stalin's name and myth. Only the Yugoslavs challenged his authority and survived the assault of the whole Communist world, though they had to pay the price of exclusion. The Chinese,able to go their own way, nevertheless accepted the ideological authority of Stalin.

talin's deathegacy In Easternof Inefficient maladjusted economies and of hatred for Soviet domination; Moscow's ideological and organizational control was crippled. The confusions resulting fromwithin the Soviet leadership, Moscow's modification of Stalin's oppressive controls and policies, the attempts to redefinepositions under new conditions, and the partial repudiation of Stalin himselfto factionalism in the Eastern European parties and facilitated the overt expression of latent popular hostility to Soviet domination. Communist China, which initially at leastto view with sympathy the desire ot

ae-it ht

Satellite regimes for greater localemergedecond ideologicalwithin the Bloc. Since the events6 in Poland and Hungary, the Communistof all Bloc states. Including especially the Chinese, have presumably recognized that the Interests of all in the struggle against the non-Communist world depend uponunity on essential Issues. In Communistecessary means of enforcing such unity Is conformity to Ideological programs. This was the point ofpartyof7 and subsequenton ideological conformity.

the surface, unity has beenthe leading position of the USSR hasBut the unity ofwas achieved by collectivewhich at least somo of the partiesan independent role, howeverhave been the weight of Soviet viewsfinat outcome. We believe that theunityboth Ideologically and In termspolicy on the international stageeffectively preserved tor someonger period the divergence ofand the need to develop policieswith local conditions andsentiments will tend IncreasinglyMoscow's control over the

Relations with the Satellites

Soviet approach to theduring the past year represents,an attempt to synthesize thetrend toward greaterfforts to re-establish theof the Bloc structure. While thisrenewed emphasis on Soviethas not ledeneral resumption ofnor has It Involved an abandonmenteconomic aid and equitable tradeFurther, the Sovietplaying down the possibility ofto socialism*'still concedeof action to Satellite leaders andcertain divergenciesIn the casesubstantial onesbased onconditions.

The Soviet leaders thus appear to retain their belief that Stalinist methods wereand dangerous; even if they should want to return to SUIlnlst policies toward the Eastern European Satellites, the example of Conununlst China's relative independence and the special position of Poland would makeove exceedingly difficult The Sovietstill have not discovered any definitive answers to the basic questions concerning lntra-Bloc relations: How best to reconcile the contradictionsolicy towardEurope which Is at once "soft" (designed to Insure the Satellites economic and political growth) and "hard" (Intended to guarantee stability and Sovietnd how best to adjust to the changes3 In the USSR's position as Bloc leader.

With the exception of Oomulka Inand possibly Kadar In Hungary, all of the Satellite leaders have responded with vigor to the Soviet call for Ideologicaland fealty to the USSR. Needing no encouragement to combat "revisionist" trends, they have been able to thwart those elements which have sought basic reforms. Moreover, their efforts to assure internal security have been successful; there has been no serious threat to the stability of any of these regimes during the past year.

Popular hostility to the Communistand to the USSR has probably not been reduced, however, although there may have been some diminution In pubbc resentment In countries where there hasradualIn living standards. Populardoes not appear to be an immediateexcept In Poland, where it still could lead to strikes and riots, and In East Germany, where continuing emigration to Westreflects active discontent andeemingly Insoluble problem.

ontinuation of the current pattern of Soviet policy toward the Satellites for the next few years Is probable so long as outside events or developments within the Satellites themselves do nothange. Th general, the USSR Is likely to limit Its

direct interference in Satellite affairs as much as It believes feasible, striving to give these

-TOP

the appearance of full sovereignty. Most of the orthodox Satellite leaders will probably be allowed to exercise day-to-day control over Internal affairs, provided theycontrol over their own parties andto Soviet established guidelines. The fact that these leaders depend on Sovietfor their position and share many of the same Interests tends to reduce tho risk for the USSR Inolicy. The apparent right of Bloc leaders to speak relatively freely and frankly to the Soviets about their own problems and about intra-Bloc economicwill probably be maintained, although this right Is undoubtedly viewed in Moscow solelyonsultative one. The renewed Soviet effort to push Bloc economicand toetter division of labor will receive continuing emphasis. But past resistance to this program, based on theeconomic Interests of the individual Satellites, has been stubborn and persistent and will almost certainly not be eliminated over the next few years.

e believe that the recurrence of popular revolt or of an attemptatelliteparty to defy Moscow on vital Issues Is unlikely at least over the next few years. Such developments arc possible, however, and even probable if Soviet policies should againIndecisive, or If, because of Sovietor foreign policy considerations,should be slgnlflcanUy relaxed. In the eventebellion In the Satellites beyond the capacity of the local regime to repress, the Soviet leaders would almost certainlymilitarily, Soviet reaction to an attemptatellite to secede from the Bloc would probably be the same. In the event ofSatellite party -coup- like that in Polandaimed at greater autonomy rather than secessiontbe Soviet response would be dependent on (he particular local andcircumstances of the moment One of the aims of the current -antlrevislonlst" campaign Is to prevent any disaffected Inner party faction fromhallenge to the official leadership,

e believe that the Soviet Union willcertainly maintain or Increase Its efforts to reduce or eliminate the distinctive features of the Polish regime. But, since Gomulka would almost certainly resist pressures on any fundamental aspects of his policies and would have the support of the Polish people in doing so. we think that the Soviet approach will be cautious. If moderate pressure proveshowever, the USSR might work for Gomulko's ouster. Even In this case, we think that the USSR would resort to military intervention only If developments In Poland were bkely to jeopardize the political orsecurity of the Bloc."

East Germany, thewill almost certainly continueto build up the GDR as ansovereign power. Internally, theeconomic weakness of the Eastwill continue to pose majorthe Soviets. Attempts to giveto the GDR through more liberalpolicies would Involve political riskprobably require greater economicfrom the Soviet Union, somethingleaders would be reluctant to give.other hand, turning up the screws topopular submissiveness and to "makemore economically self-dependentto the mass flight of key professionals,lead to other serious losses. Thustactical approach to the GDRprobably continue to show signs ofand uncertainty.

Bloc Relations with Yugoslavia

over their position as Blocprime center of Communist doctrine,that the acceptance of Yugoslavia asCommunist power was ata serious danger to thatprobably the principal causes of theleaders' decision to break off thewith Yugoslavia. Theto re-establish close relations withthe summer and early fall ofat inducing Yugoslavia towith the Soviet camp. When itit evidently did at the Interna-

- See: The Outlook inatedeptember IBSfl,

Communist conference In Moscow Inhmt Tito was unwilling to so align Idrnself on Soviet terms, tho break in the rapprochement was probably inevitable. The appearance of the "revisionist'" Yugoslav Party program the following spring probably only helped to shape the nature and timing of the subsequent Soviet campaign.

the foreseeable future, the USSRto attempt any essentially newto its Yugoslav problem. Thethe Bloc anti-Yugoslav campaign,probably vary somewhat with timethe greatest weight being given to itBulgaria, and Communistevidently does not intend toprogram of development credits forand will probably also hamper theMow of trade from time to time,that these measures are Intendedsanctions. Though It wishespressure on Yugoslavia in order toindependence-minded andin Poland and the otherit Is fearful that dramaticmeasures would do real harmrelations with the uncommittedHowever, the USSR will continueto discredit Yugoslav foreignIn tbe Middle East and Asia,try to link Tito with the colonialthe minds of Afro-Asian leaders.

Relations with Communist China

China over the pasthas emergedearly-equalthe USSR within tbe Communistpreponderant influence Is still inbut this appears to operate throughand persuasion rather than byof authority or control. Theof the alliance remain unimpaired:ideology, which charts theof domestic developments andtoward the capitalist enemy; adependence, economic and militarycase of China, political and strategiccase of the USSR;haredthat any major disruption of theprobably have catastrophic effectsfuture of the entire Communist movement. We thus believe that the bases for Uie Slno-Soviet partnership are compelling, that the two regimes wUl remain closely allied over the period of Uus estimate, and, indeed, that neither regime Is likely to believe that it couldreak even if serious divergencies arose.

We also believe, however, that there arc certain differences between them which have perforce led to compromises or which have been glossed over. Such divergencies are more likely to grow than to diminish over the next few years and we believe that because of them, and because of its growing power and prestige, the Pelplng regimeotential threat to the kind of Sino-Soviet Bloc which the Soviet leaders would like to envisage for the future. Although the USSR will retain its seniorit is possible that the process ofdifferences between the two mayinvolve compromises on the part of the USSR, with corresponding adjustments in Soviet policy.

Possible Chinese Communist differences with the USSR in policy or tacticalbut not ultimatethe doctrinal Innovations67 concerning0 flowers" concept and the possibility of "contradictions" between the party and the masses; and the apparent sentiment6 that the USSR hadIta role of Bloc leader and was, In fact, guilty of "great powert present Peiping and Moscow may viewwith the West somewhat differently; the Chinese Communists appear to be morethan the Soviets and less fearful of the consequencesnigh risk" policy. Inthere have been differences at least In propaganda emphasis concerning variousquestions.

n the future, areas of friction may arise from the general question of Communist China's Influence as an Ideological andforce within the Blochole. The unprecedented Chinese organization ofmustevelopment Ideologically embarrassing to the Soviets, since It implies that the Chinese are advancing toward Com-

more rapidly than the SovictaThere may also be Soviet concernhinese tendency toward "adventurism" In pushing for Communist advances, and over the role to be played by Communist China In those areas of the Far East where It hasinterests. Thus far these matters do not seem to have occasioned seriousalthough even if they had every effort would certainly be made to conceal the fact Pelping has been In the forefront inSoviet leadership of the Bloc, the USSR has acknowledged Communist China's high place In Bloc councils and Its ability to make Independent contributions toand to date Slno-Sovkct interests In the Far East apparently have not clashed.

roblems associated with Sino-Sovlctand military relations could also lead to friction. However, Soviet aid programs have apparently gone forward on the planned scale, and there is no evidence that the Chinese have sought more aid than they are getting: Pel-ping'a desire for more assistance probably has been counterbalanced by lis wish to limit the degree of Its economic dependence. Thoof nuclear weapons mayelicate one; the Chinese have presumably sought them from the USSR, or will do so. The USSR Is probably reluctant to supply them because of unfavorable repercussions on tbe Sovietposition, the attendant loss ofleverage over Communist China, and the potential military risks involved. We believe that nuclear weapons have not been given to China, but that the Soviets may make them available in the future under some form of Soviet control.

n sum, we believe that Communist China will attain over the next several years an increasing Influence on general Bloc policy and Communist Ideology. The Soviet leaders themselves are almost certainly aware of this likelihood and probably view It with concern. Moscow will wish to retain its pre-eminent position In the Bloc and, to the extent that It fears the eventual emergence of an actual rival, will attempt cautiously to miiumlze Pel-ping's Influence within the Bloc. On the other hand, Peiping's growing stature strengthens the Bloc both internally and externally and in this respect Is welcome In Moscow.both partners recognize the importance of solidarity to over-all Communist objectives and realize that mutual adjustments areconsequences of the alliance.

VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Current Conduct ofPolicy

Soviet foreign policy, over the more than five years since Stalin's death and Increasingly since the consolidation of Khrushchev'spower, has acquired certainwhich are Important to note in gauging the threat posed to US security. Though they relate more to manner than to content, these characteristics taken together are revealing as to the development of Soviet policy Inyears, and as to the changingabout the world situation whichIt.

Most striking perhaps has been the fact that the conduct of Soviet foreign policy has shown itself more energetic, assertive, and rapid both In response and In seizing theIn part, of course, this reflects the Impress of Khrushchev's personal style of leadership. In part also Soviet consciousness of the USSR's growing military and economic power. But It also reflects the Soviet belief, first,ore dynamic posture would be effective in the present world situation, and second, that the main struggle with the West lies at present In the world political arena, rather than at the military frontiers between the power blocs. Soviet policy has come to employ its propaganda weapons with greater aggressiveness and shrewdness, attempting to build the imagepeace-loving" yetpower, confident that by so doing It can effectively alter the alignment of political forces In tho world.

actical and ideological flexibility hasanother hallmark of current Sovietpolicy. The Soviet leaders have shown themselves willing toariety of hew policies without regard to positions takenearlier and have accommodated Ideology Zw and more to the changingolicy. Thusn support of the tics of peaceful coexistence, theya major revision In Communist doctrine: they found that war with capitalist states was no longer "fatallyhey also found It expedient to abandon Stalin's rigid division of the world into the socialist camp and the capitalist encirclement; Instead of assuming that all countries beyond the Bloc were tools of world imperialism, they came to discriminate various shades of politicaleven among allies ot the US.

here has also been an extension of the scope of Soviet foreign policy. There are no longer any neglected areas In the world as there were In Stalin's time.5 the Soviet leaders have taken major Initiatives In thest, and have become far more active In Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviet press frequently tells its readers that no longer can any Issue In the world be resolved without taking account of Soviet views. Doubtless there Is an element ofbravado for domestic consumption In this, but It also reflects an Increasingto regard the USSR as now one of two great world powers, and therefore entitled to have global concerns. In situations of crisis everywhere there hasendency to put forward the Soviet view assertively and to refer to the factor of Soviet military powerore blunt fashion.

inally, Soviet conduct is marked by an apparently high and genuine confidence. The Soviet leaders evidently believe that, despite the many and serious problems which face them, the movement of events Increasingly Justifies their long-held hopes for the ultimate triumph of "world socialism" under Soviet leadership and tutelage. This mood probably reflects satisfaction with Soviet economic and scientific advances, and with the growth of Soviet military power, as well as gratification over the sharpening difficulties for Western interests in certain areas of the world. While we do not conclude that the Soviet leaders are so overconfident that they would be tempted to Incautious behavior, this Is one

-SECRET-

the hazards which might attend anynew advance of Communist power or reversal for the West.

Current Soviet Objectives and Main Linei of Policy

How do the Soviet leaders view theover the next several years and what are the Immediate objectives which they consider feasible to pursue in moving toward anof Communist power? In broad terms, they probably believe that there Is an accelerating trend toward enhancement of the world power position of the Communist Blocorresponding decline In that of the US and Its allied states. This Is the traditional view which springs from Marxism-Leninism, but which they will see as confirmed recently by their own gains In economic power, their weapons advances, and the sharp political disturbances In the non-Communist world. At the same time, they appear to believe that the strength of the Western states continues to be formidable and that It should not be frontally challenged.

Consequently, the main strategy ofpolicy continues to be that of reducing the Western power position by gradualist means and enhancing that of the Bloc. The Soviet leaders probably list their principal objectives over the next few years as follows: (a) reinforcing the unity of the Communist Bloc and pushing rapidly Its growth Inand economic power; (b) encouraging political divisions within the non-Communist world, particularlyiew to Isolating the US and constricting the deployment of Its military power and the extent of Its political Influence; (c) seizing whatever opportunities may offer for alignment of non-Communist states with the Bloc, and, where expedient, for outright territorial expansion of Communist power.

The means which the Soviet leadersto employ in pursuing these objectives are various. As Indicated, they will of course push the actual expansion of their ownand military power base as rapidly as they can. They see this as the foundation of their policy. But they will also use all the means at their command to make It widely believed that Communist power Is great and growing, that In some Important respects It already outpaces the West, and that thebelongs to their kind of society and their power system. To project this image ofand of the world situation they will press the programs they have developed In recent years: an activearge-scale propaganda effort, trade and aid, and cultural exchanges.

Attitude toward war. We believe that at least for the period of this estimate the Soviet leaders will continue to put their main reliance In the struggle with the West on such political weapons. Despite thegrowth of their military power. In particular their acquisition of growingfor nuclear attack on the US. weto believe that they will not deliberately Initiate general war. They will probablythat evenead in long-range missiles, they could not be certain ofeneral war, and that the scale of damage Inar would threaten the survival of their society.

In the Soviet conception, military power should be used In the first Instance and by preferenceolitical weapon. The enemy should be maneuvered Intoulnerable military-political situation that he forfeits key positions without military resistance. Actual use of military power is envisaged only if there is confidence both that the gains will outweigh the losses, and that the risks are acceptable. Therefore, the immediateposed by the growth of Soviet military power is whether the Soviets will betempted over the next several years to use the threat of their military power more overtly and boldlyeans of pressure on the West.

nother serious question arises from the Increasingly aggressive conduct of Soviet foreign policy on the one hand and thegrowth of Soviet military power on the other: will the Soviets employ their own or other forces controlled by them In local military actions, estimating that the US will

be deterred from making an adequateresponse by fear of general war or of adverse political consequences?

ational Estimates have statedover the last several years that theleaders would try to avoid general war and that they would seek to avoid situations which in their view Involved serious risk of general war. We believe that this estimate can be reaffirmed. However, we also believe that the Soviet Judgment with respect to the kind of situations which do involve serious risk may be changing. The advance of their own military power, together with thepolitical vulnerability of key Westernwill probably lead the Soviet leaders to Increase their general pressure on tbe West and to exploit local situations moreWhile we have always considered it possible that Bloc forces would be used In overt local aggression If this could be done without much risk of serious involvement with Western forces, we do not believe that the likelihood of such aggression has However, we do believe that thewill combat more actively than hitherto the presence of Western Influence mareas, relying upon threats to prevent the West from taking counteraction toits influence. In this sense, we believe that there isendency on the part of the Soviets to view the risksore aggressive policy as less serious than in the past. This tendency could be reversedesult of Western actions or as the resulthange In the Soviet leadership. But so long as tbit tendency persists we believe that the danger of wax by miscalculation will be Increased. At present, we believe that this danger is somewhat greater than ourIn recent years have Indicated

osture forven if Soviet political warfare does become more vigorous and increasing pressure is applied against the West, Soviet policy will continue to garb ft-with the slogans oft will go over to an overtly and frankly ag-lve posture. Rather it will continue to Itself as still striving fornd as leading the "struggle forhe Soviet leaders recognize that the world-wide fear o( war is so intense that great political strength Is added to that side In the power struggle which can capture the force of this sentiment, and thus align large bodies of opinion with Its own cause. Identification of the USSR with hopes for peace and the US with war and aggression will remain aaim of Soviet propaganda. To some extent, the desire to maintain the plausibility of this posture Imposeson the use of force; this la one reason for regarding open aggression by Bloc forces across state frontiers as unlikely. In general, Soviet leaders, believing they canto reap rewards with their "coexistence" tactics with little risk, are likely to view open military aggression as politically undesirable and unnecessary. Instead it will be their aim to create, mainly by political means, situations In which the West must eitherommunist advance or resort to the use of force under unfavorable Western concessions could then be construed by Soviet propaganda as bowing to the Soviet deterrent If the West elected to use force.lt would be compelled to do so under political and perhaps military In either case, the Soviets wouldto Intensify divisions within free world alliances and to align the uncommitted more closely with the Communist camp.

he Soviets will probably continue also to display an apparent readiness to engage In direct negotiations to settle outstandingProposals for high level talks willbo renewed at any Juncture the Soviet leaders find favorable to themselves. They will regard such meetings as primarilyemonstrative character, intended not toIn freely negotiated settlements, but rather to force the Western Powers under pressure of world opinion to accede to Soviet-proposed formulas. They will attempt to pose the alternatives of "peaceful coexistence" on the one hand, or of tensionsising danger of nuclear war on the other, hoping by occasional measured reminders of the latter to stimulate acceptance of the former on Soviet terms.

he underdeveloped countries in Soviet strategy. The effort to align the USSR In apparent support of broadly held populartakes Its most general form, other than In peace propaganda, in Identification with various "national liberationeople In underdeveloped countries are being told that the USSR champions peace, progress, and national Independence, while the West stands for war, reaction, and colonialism. Moscow clearly sees the underdevelopedtheir weak economic and political systems, strong nationalist and anUcoloniallst sentiments, neutralist tendencies, andat past and present domination by Western Europeanthe moat susceptible ground for expansion of Sovietat Western expense. It Is thiswhich underlay the Soviet attack In recent years on Western Interests in the colonics and former colonial countries of the Middle East. Asia, and Africa.

n part this campaign Is Intended to deny resources and bases in these areas to Western use. But the Communists havecome to believe also that it isIn underdeveloped and colonial areas that the best prospects for Communistnow lie. inimum, they hope to bring national movements and states In these areas under Soviet diplomatic and economic influence. By thus entering Into what InSoviet parlance Is called the "zone of peace" these peoples would enhance the weight of the Bloc In the world political balance.aximum, the Soviet leaders hope that anti-Western national movements canative Communist participation beradually more radicalrocess which would result ultimately In the estab--llshmcnt of Communist oron-troUed parties in power. They anticipate that 'rising expectations In these areas will farthe possibilities of fulfillment, thus giving thehance to seize theinitiative. We believe that theominant position Inareas of the world will continueeriod of this estimate to be one of the preoccupations of Soviet policy.

he USSR's targets among thecountries may shift considerablythe period under consideration, Inwith changing opportunities and local Communist successes and reverses. Frictions between Moscow and Afro-Asians will tend to arise in manythey have already arisen in somethe first bloom of friendly cooperation wears off. Moreover, the baste rationale for Moscow's present collaboration with most Afro-Asiancommon anti-Westerneven be somewhat eroded as some of the current points of difference between the rising nations and tlie former Imperial powers cUmlnish. At the same time, Moscow will seek out new areas for the expansion of Its political and economic Influence,In Latin America and Africa. In those countries where Its efforts are most successful, the USSR may increasingly be tempted to resort to more direct means, that Is, support of local Communists In attempts to seize power. But the Soviets wouldweigh such gains against the harmful consequencesolicy would Inevitably evoke elsewhere.

rade and aid- Soviet trade and aid programs are tho economic adjunct to the strategy of penetration In underdeveloped areas. The underdeveloped countries, many of which are also politically uncommitted, axe generally receptive to Soviet offers of aid and offer the prospect of high political gains in return for comparatively small economic investment. Rather than being widelyaid has been concentrated onwhich are especially susceptible toinfluence and also In most cases are of political or strategic Interest to the. From4 to8 the USSR extended2 billion In credits to underdeveloped countries In the free world, of0 million has already been used. Credits and grants by other Blocbring the total to more thanillion, ofillion has been obligated0 million has been expended. About three-fifths of the total Bloc credits expended have been In tho form of arms deliveries to Syria,

-

Yemen. Afghanistan, and Indonesia. These same countries plus Ceylon. India. Burma, and Cambodia have received thepart of the economic aid. During the first half8 there were at one time or another anloc technicians (Including military specialists, totaling about one-third of this number) Innderdevelopedrepresenting an Increase of more than SO percent over the preceding six months. In magnitude these programs are relatively srnall compared with Western effortslobal basis, and the burden they Impose on the Soviet economy Is slight, annualthus far beingew tenths of one percent of Soviet national product.

Attitude toward the UN. To the extent that the Soviets succeed in gaining Influence over the policies of underdeveloped ondcountries, and as the number of Afro-Asian members Increases, the UN willore attractive forum for them. They probably expect ultimately to find issues on which they can align majorities against the US and obtain endorsement of Soviet policies. They calculate thatemonstrativeof the US would disturb US-alliedand curtail US Influence in many areas. If the UN then became an issue in USpolitics, the repercussions abroad would compound the Soviet advantage. Wc believe that the Soviets consider tho chances forwarfare victories within the UNto be sufficiently promising so that they win continue to give that body major

Disarrnament. The Soviet leadersbelieve that by showing an activeIn disarmament they can enhance their claim to leading In the cause of peace. More apeciflcaUy, they hope to neutralize Western nuclear striking power by intensifying the atigma attached to nuclear weapons and thus Inhibiting their actual or threatened use by the West. They may also believe thatnegotiations can help to reduce the chances of nuclear war. They win almostwhen circumstances seem to them ap-

. propriate, pressontinuation of such negotiations.

Is possible that the Soviets willlimited agreements in the field ofeven if these Involve someon their own military capabilities.to gain what they would consider tonet advantage. Probably they have noton the precise shape ofwould meet this prescription. Wethat their deep suspicion of the Westaversion to extensive inspection inwill forbid their acceptance of anydisarmament scheme, andnegotiations on even the mosthighly complicated and drawn out.

Soviet Policy in Particular Areas

The Middle East. This area has offered5 the most striking example of the attempt by Soviet pobcy to support antlcolo-nlalism and natlonabst movements against Western Interests and influence. The USSR did not create the Arab nationalist movement but In providing the poUtlcal backingreat power, together with substantialand economic assistance, it hasincreased the power and effectiveness of the movement

The Immediate Soviet aim li to deny this area to the West and to expand Sovietthere, rather than to gain direct control of it If Soviet policy can deepen thebetween Arab nationalism and the West to the point of Irreconcilability, several results foUow: closer association of Arab states with the Bloc tends to alter the world political alignment In the latter's favor; Western mili-tary bases In the Arab states are eliminated; Western control of the oil resources becomes tenuous. Consequently, we believe thatpolicy will continue to present itself in the Middle East as the friend and supporter of Arab nationalism In the latter's stniggie against Westernnd more par-UcuUuiy, win for the present support Nasser as leader of the Arab nationalist movement Further military and economic assistance will be made avaUable to the United Arab Repub-Uc; UAR positions on Jordan, Lebanon, the Aden Protectorate, and other trouble spotsArab-Western conflict win beIn Soviet propaganda and In the UN.

> t? *V

Soviet leaders probably believesome stage the Arab nationalistbeevolutionary turn towardand brought under Sovietbelieveharpening of thewith the West, to which theirand Communist subversive elementsarea can contribute, will facilitateTo the extent that such aturn towards Communismplace, the basic Incompatibility ofwith those of the present leaders ofwhom the Communists regardnationalists" playing arole, will emerge. Communistand subversion of the nationalistmay occur unevenly In differentand the Soviets may at sometempted to abandon their restraint anda Communist takeover In somestate, provided they consider theenough to compensate for theto Moscow's relations with otherneutrals.

as Western Influence Isfrom the area the Soviets will seekNasser's pretensions and to maketheir prisoner. They will tryhim the opportunity to pursue apolicy in which he tries to keepto both power blocs. They will seekhis Influence over other Arabtheir own and to prevent theof Arab unity under his aegis. Theyhis suppression of localand try to bring these Into theleaders of the nationalistare already some signs, In Iraq forthat the Soviets are opposingof the Arab nationalistthese ways. We believe, however, thatbe extremely cautious In their effortsNasser and, before movinghim, willime when theythat the local Communists haveof the mass movement or whenso Isolated himself from the West thatno longer hope to get its supportSoviets and the Communists. Anbetween Nosserism andseems unlikely in thebut It might develop during the period of this estimate.

he Soviet leaders must be aware that the Western Powers are bound to attach theImportance to the protection of theirIn the Middle East. How do theythe possibility that their pledges ofto the leaders of the Arab nationalism, who cannot be fully controlled by them, may entrain the USSR In situations of great risk? Developments In the area over the past few years have probably led Moscow to placeconfidence In theoviet deterrent against Western use of force to overthrow an Arab government friendly to the USSR. The Soviet leaders probably also believe that the Western Powers in most Instances would be restrained from such action by the unfavorable politicaltlmi would follow, both In the area and In the neutralist countries throughout Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, the intervention of the US and UK In Lebanon and Jordanthat there are circumstances In which Western powers would be willing to use military force. If the Western Powers became Involved In conflict In the area, the Soviet leaders would probably not engage Soviet forces openly or take other actions whichIn their view serious risk of expanding hostilities. However, we believe that theEast Is one of the areas where the danger of war by miscalculation has Increased.

hile Soviet policy In the Middle East Is not aimed primarily at military gains, the Soviet leaders probably view the developing situation there as offering opportunities to build potential military assets. Theycalculate that In the event ofmilitary operations in this area they would benefit from their earlier peacetimeof military technicians, Soviet typefuel and materiel, from their increased capabilities for espionage and subversion, and from the Improvements which have been made In local airfields, harbors and other facilities. The Soviet leaders probably also contemplate the eventual achievementong-sought Russianaccess to the strategic areas of the Middle East To this end, they

will continue to encourage and support such movements as that (or an Independent pro-Soviet Kurdish state andro-Communist government in Iraq, and will also continue pressures against Iran and Turkey.

sia. The USSR will probably rely on its currentabout the successes of Communism, support of national independence against Western imperialism, and offers of trade, aid, and culturalto sustain and deepen neutralism, promote pro-Soviet alignments, and gradually to erode Western Influence in Asia. Further increase In the strength of the Communist parties In Indonesia and India might Induce the Soviet leaders to switch to open support of them, but it is more likely. In the case of India at least, that for the next several years Soviet policy will find greater advantage in cultivating the existing governments. In Asia, it Is probably these two countries which are of primary interest to Communist policy at present.

olicy toward Japan will probablyalong the routine line laid down over the last severalto stimulate Japanese neutralism, disturbrelations, and maintain pressure for denial of bases to the US. The Soviet leadersdo not believe that they have the means to alter the situation In Japan In anyway for the present. Likewise, theyregard the situation In Korea asalthough they will continue to agitate for withdrawal of US forces.

oviet policy in Southeast Asia appears to operate jointly with that of Communist China on the principle of shared influence. The Soviets will probably continue to giveemphasis to cultivating closer relations with neutralist governments In the area. They will maintain their effort to disrupt SKA TO and to align uncommitted states with tho Slno-Soviet Bloc on all broad international Issues. They will also stress their willingness to extend economic aid to the Southeast Asian states and will tout the value of Communist methods as the best way to achieve thedevelopment these countries soseek. However, we believe that, should favorable opportunities arise and should they estimate that the gains would outweigh the losses, the two Communist powers mighta local Communist party In an attempt to seize power. At present, Indonesia or Laos seem the most likely places forevelopment eventually to occur.

frica. As part of Its effort in the underdeveloped areas, the USSR will almost certainly increase Its activities in Africathe next five years. It Is alreadydiplomatic and economic relations with the newly Independent states of Morocco, Tunisia, and Ghana, and Is devotinggreater efforts to Libya and the Sudan. It has offered trade, aid, technical assistance and, in some cases, arms. Although Soviet policy is somewhat constrained by the desire not to appear to compete too obviously with Nasser in the primarily Arab and Moslem areas in which he hopes to extend histhe USSR will almost certainly expand its efforts to establish Its diplomatic andpresence on the continent, tonationalist and antlcolonial movements, and to attempt to end the exclustveness of Western influence In most of the area.

p to the present the USSR hasolicy of restraint toward North Africa, largely out of regard for Soviet relations with France and for the position of the French Communist Party. At some point, however, the USSR may abandon this policy. Internal developments In France or In Algeria might convince the Soviet leaders that they would gain more from open support of North African nationalism. In any case, material support may be given to the Algerian naUonalists, though probably through Egypt rather than directly. Arms and economic aid offers will probably be pressed on the Tunisian and Moroccan Governments.

estern Europe. Current Soviet policy In Europe appears to be aimed more atthe USSR's position in Easternthan at an early expansion of Soviet power beyond the present frontiers of the Bloc. In order to achieve greater security for Communist control of Eastern Europe, as well as to weaken tho position of Western Europe,

Soviets are bound to regard theof tho NATO alliance and the withdrawal of US military power from Europe as basic objectives of their policy. These are the main purposes of all their maneuvers and proposals aimed at achieving "Europeanhe more immediate Soviet objectives are toan Increase in West German military strength and the establishment of additional missile bases In Western Europe. Sovietpolicy and Its attendantIs directed largely at these targets. Moreover, the Soviet policies In the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, apart from theirImportance, are themselves calculated to impose material and political losses on Western Europe and tb encourage divisions there.

he current Soviet diplomatic offensive over the status of Berlin Is the most striking example of Khrushchev's activist foreign policy. The Soviet leader must be aware that there Is virtually no point of controversyEast and West on which the West has so thoroughly committed itself, and that there can scarcelyore dangerousIssue to push to the point of crisis. In raising the Issue, the Soviets have had in mind the achievementumber of major objectives. They seek to compel the Western Powers to deal with East Germany and thus to accord at least tacit recognition to the GDR. This In turn would constitute anstepatification of the status quo In Easternevelopment which the Soviets have long sought. Further, the removal of the Western presence from Berlin would permit the Soviets to handle the escapee problem and generally to reinforce thesecurity of their East German Satellite. They probably further calculate that theinitiative, even if only partially successful, willore receptive atmosphere for other Soviet proposals on Germany,disengagement and peace treatyIn addition, the Soviets probably expecterious Western retreat onwould bring into question for many West Germans the desirability of the NATO

It Is not clear why the Soviets have chosen the present moment to raise theIssue, but their action Is certainly Inwith the generally hardening tone of their foreign policy. This In turn Is related to their growing conviction, manifest over the last year or so. that their relative powerhas Improved. They are presumablyon the assumption that what theyashift In the relation of forces In the world arena" In their favor gives them an opportunity to test the solidarity of the Western Allianceajor Issue. The Soviet leaders probably Intend to be cautious and tactically flexible. We believe that they will try to direct Soviet and East German maneuveringanner which will avoid military conflict with the Western allies, while at the same time they will be prepared to take advantage of any signs of weakness on the part of tbo West, or of Inclinations to compromise on major Issues.they have already committed themselves considerably, and we believe that the crisis may be severe, with considerable chance of miscalculation by one or both sides.

We do not believe that the raising of the Berlin issueoviet willingness to moveettlement of the German problemhole on other than Soviet terms. We foresee no change at present in the USSR's adamant opposition to German reunification despite the handicaps thison Soviet maneuverability in Western Europe. The Soviet leaders cannotabandonment of East Germany because of the threat which would probably develop to their whole position in Eastern Europe, beginning with Poland. Over the longerajor political change in West Germany, such as might develop after the death of Chancellor Adenauer, could leadew and seemingly more flexible Soviet and Eastapproach to Bonn and to theproblem. The Soviets probably believeeriod of political uncertainty would ensue, and that party realignments would give them new opportunities to promote West Germany's separation from NATO and the withdrawal of Allied military forces, to achieve

f2

recognition of East Germany, andeunification schemeto the USSR.

Moscow probably has come to view the Communist Parties In Western Europe moreehicle for propaganda and agitation than as the basis for revolutionary action, at least for the next several years. While the long-range subversive and politicalof these Parties will be cultivated, their present role Is mainly to support Sovietpolicy objectives, such as arousingconcern against West German nuclear armament and the stationing of missiles In Europe.

Laim America. The trend noticeable In the last year of Increased Soviet attention to Latin America will continue during the coming Ave years. The USSR apparentlythat current economic and political differences between the US and Latin America and the elements of political instability In certain countriesromisingto expand Soviet Influence. In the Immediate future, Moscow will concentrate on broadening its diplomatic and cultural relations and on trade or economic assistance offers in selective, pollUcaUy sensitiveIn order to expand Soviet Influence on the governmental level and to facilitate both the overt and the subversive activities of local Communists. The most significant recent Soviet economic moves In Latin America have been the conclusion In80 million credit to Argentina for theof Soviet petroleum equipment (the largest Soviet credit offer extended to any non-Communist country outside the Afro-Asianarge-scale Soviet purchases of Uruguayan wool, and the conclusionarter deal with Brazil.

p

_

I

1 Figures In this Uble are baaed on estimated order of battle. Estimates of this type yield approximate rather than precise measures of strength at any given time, and can lac considerably behind changes In actual strength.

"These figure* do not Include ground, naval, and air forces personnel permanently assigned to the air defense forceswithcontrol andheir primary duty.

'For purposes of this table, anaval Aviation personnel are Included in total Soviet air forces personnel strength. 'Does not Include KOB naval forces which In this Uble are carried In Soviet security forces total.aval air.aval air.

Mounted Rifle Divisions

Tank Divisions

Rifle Divisions

Mechanized Divisions

ESTIMATED STRBNOTH OP BLOC GROUND FORCES IN LINE

Airborne Divisions Total

Country

unlit

strengths of divisions vary. The figures shown represent estimated average*.

'Additional Soviet combat units ara estimated to Includertillery divisions,ntiaircraft artillery divisions,eparate brigades.dispositions of Soviet flue divisions: Occupiedorthwestern USSR.esternouthwesternouthernentraloviet Far East, Si.

'The total of Chinese Communist divisionsmall cavalry divisions.

'Tha Hungarian Armed Forces not now considered to be effective; ground force In process of formation will amount toivisions. 'Estimated breakdown by major groupings:; Communist; Europeanorth Korea and North

mm

ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF* SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY8

WIS

3H

H

IM

30

M

lit

Eastern

FIOHTER

(Dayi

)

(Fir)

BOMBER

BOMBER'

BOMBER

(Lt)

(Mad)

(Ftr)

lUBmr)

(Seaplane)

(Lt Bmr)

<Mlse)

(Ftr)

USSR'

75

0 to 50

S is: 10

l

ITS

T7C0

Wert Central

r/Bttt'

0 to 80

375

N

M

Caucasus USSR'

75

m

a to Two

East Central USSR'

Far East USSR'

174

3

o 15

485

30

3"TfT

329

0

H

MS

N9

Tilco

East Germany, Poland. Hungary.and Leningrad MXrs.

Baltic. Belorasslan, Carpathian. Klav. and Odessaoscow. Volga, Voronezh, and Ural MD's.

Caucasus and Transcavicasus MD's. 'Turkestan and Siberianar East and Transbalka] MD's.

'Includes medium bombers assigned to Naval and Tactical Aviation.

TABLE 5

ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OP SOVIET AIRCRAFT BY HOLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS.

1 OCTOBER 1SS8

FIGHTER Jet (Day) Jet)

ATTACK Jet (Ftr)

LIGHT BOMBER Jet

MED. JET BOMBER and TANKER

MEDIUM BOMBER Prop

HEAVY BOMBER and TANKER

TRANSPORT Prop (Lt) Prop (Med)

HELICOPTER Light Medium

RECONNAISSANCE Jet (Ftr) Jet (LtBmr) Prop (Seapln)

UTILITY/LIAISON Jet (Ftr) Jet (LtBmr) Prop (Mlsc)

TRAINER Jet (Ftr)

ROUNDED TOTALS

TACTICAL AVIATION

325

115

730

365

FIGHTER AVIATION OF

AIR DEFENSE

110

LONG-RANGE AVIATION

560

420

looioias

275

AVIATION OF NAVAL AIRBORNE AVIATION TROOPS

455

350

15

140

SO

185

120

1

10

850

TOTAL

325

435

0

765

ii li- T-

TABLZ 8

ESTIMATED OPTIMUM PBRPORMANCE Or SOVIET MEDIUM AND HEAVY BOMBERS For Operational Use1

(Calculated In accordance withA Spec except that fuel rtservei are reduced toaximum ofinute* loiter at sea level, and aircraft operate at altitude* permitting maximum radius/range)

MODELS

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT'

Comsat Radius/Range (nm)

Id.refuel'

lb,refuel'

ibrefuel"

Bpeod/Altltude (kts/tU

speedaltitude'

altitude'

Combat Celling ffLl' Terminal Targf. Amtude.'ft,)'

lb. bombload

lb. bombload

lb. bombload

:eoo/3ico

0

0

BADOER

0

0

BISON

Mi 4K:

0

0

0

0

'37M

0

0

turn

0

0 nrsoN

CO

mi

SC0

0

'

possible developments during the period of this estimate, for which no detailed performance charactertaUca have been estimated, areIn the Discussion, Chapter IV..

estimates based upon use of compatible tankera which provideercent Increase in radius/range.

Improvements of BISON and BADOER aircraft are based on normal expected Improvement* through0 period: In particular, replacement of the0 lb. thrust engines with thosehrust of0 lbs.

medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capability.

' Capable ofun. range ASM, ofb. groat weight

'm. "dash" at.

0 lb bombload unleas otherwise indicated,

'b bombload.

'Seme* celling at maximum power with one hour fuel reserves plus bombload aboard. No range figure Is associated with this altitude.

t

TABLE 7

ESTEMATBD OPTIMUM PERTORMANCE OT SOVIET LIGHT BOMBERS

Combat Radius/ Range (ntn.)

Bombload (lbs)

Maximum Speed at Optimum Altitude (Kts/IU

Target Speed/ Target Altitude {Kta/fH

Combat Celling

HF-AGI Jt MADGE '

EAGLE

BOSUN (Turboprop)

0

O0

M

0 0 0

Tactical

0 with afler-bumlnf)

ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVEBT TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (Calculated in accordance with USpec)

Operational

3

5

9

MM

I960

Designation

(MosKva)

Rosslya)

(Ukraine)

2

Platan

2

Turbojet

4

Piston

PiltOQ

0

Power

21MM

0

a-

50

O0

Combat Radlui/Ranrre 5 (no.)

Payload

Troopa

Passengers

Cargo

Speed/Op. AX(Kte/ft)

Crulae Speed/Alt' (Xta/ft)

Service Cellini

rfca

0 L

Soviet version of DC-2

0 0

based

O

0

75

Turboprop Turboprop 0

Now

transport based on BEAR

0

Assault Transport called Whale by Soviets

Normal rated power. 'Constant altitude mission.

TABLE 10

ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET EARLY WARNING AND OCI RADARS

in Service

Frequent'/ (met.)

WARNING RADAR

Detection Rangeedium Bomber Fishier

OROUND CONTROL INTERCEPT RADAR Tracking Range Altitude Coverage Medium Bomber Fighter

0

0

:.coo

oronDT

TABLE II

ESTIMATED BLOC NAVALCTOBER

FLEET AREA

Blacic Sea

AO Fleets

All Fleets

Ma; or Surf act Shlpi' Heavy Cruisers Old Heavy Cruisers light Crulieri Old light Crullers Guided Missile Cruisers Destroyers

Old Destroyer*

Oulded Missile Dutroyari

Escorts

Total

Submarines'

H m .

tablecontinued)

mid-1mj

mid-

area

country

submarines* (continued)

medium rung* new

ther medium range' oid medium range short range' old short range total

ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET"W* ANDCLASS SUBMARINES

Class "Z"

(Long ranga)

*w

(Long range) "Q"

(Med. range)

Length/ Beam (ft)

radii are based upon the following arbitrary patrol conditions; Each day of transit consists ofours of surface running atnots during hours of twilight and darkness andours of snorkel running during the daynots. Fuel consumption on station Is based upon submerged runningnots with sufficient snorkeling to maintain batteries.

TABLE 13

ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BLOC MERCHANT FLEETSndOcean-goingRT and up)

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA