NA TIONAL INTELLIGENCE EST!MAj
outlook for the
NOTE' Thisen advance copy ol th* conclusions ol this estimate as approved by the United States Intelligence Board The complete taxi will be citcuIo'mH within fave days ol this issuance.
Character of the new regimeProspects *br Its stability
Central Intelligence Agency
Sudtis'i probable foreign
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The foTknolng intelligence organizations participated tn the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
oncurring were The Director ofand Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the VSIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
SUBJECT: : OUTLOCK FOR TK5 SUDAai/
To HMi the situation la the Sudan resulting free, the reC.rt coup, aodloate tbe outlook for Sudanese lirternal stability and foreign re Lit lone.
he group of senior edlltary aTfleere under General Ibrahla Abbo-ad -bleb took over toe Sudanese Oorerraeat onovenber vill probably provide .ore effective leederehlp than it* predecessors. In general, the Junta leane toward conaervatlre In doaertlcto avoid .Ugnmot with any regional or great power bloc, and appear, determined to preserve Sudanese independence. )
3 Outlook for tbe
tbe abort run, at least, Abboud's ratline cob probablyita authority through iti control of tbe any and through thasow enjoys froa eooearrativ- political and religioustfccae cf the Oaaaa Party and the powerful An Mr aact. ISserious opposition any develop. The regime will find itsatisfy both ita conservativeportere and theJunlet amy officers ard is the Rational union Party.
To tbt extent that it ooves to placate one group, it is likely to aota-goolss tbe other. Thaw tanslona could lead to splits within the junta vfaleb aight eventually reeult in tbe breakup af the Abboud government.)
nev regime will probablyincere effort tovith fester. In particular, both governorots are moreundertake serious negotiations for an agreement on division ofvaters than Prime Klnirter Kballl and Hotaer vere prepared tothe seme time, Abboud's gcrrertnent will be jealous ofand unlikely to let dovn its guard agaloat the UAR. Itcontinue Kh*Ill's policy of developing ties vith other It is likely toolicy of benevolent neutralityaffairs cot directly affecting the Sudan and to avoidEthiopia or Israel in anAR frost. )
h. The regdae will seek to cantlnue good relations with the Wert, though It will almost certainly avoid tha outspokenly pro-Vestem
policies of Ehalil. It will preae for wubstantlal and continuing atUK aid, vhlle rcnloloB aensltlra about but/ coodlticca attacbad to such asalstanee. it tha aaawradual exteoalca of Budnnea* relation* vith the Bloc appeare aLaoat certain, particularly through bloc barter deals for Sudanee* cotton vhlcb tbe Sudan hao trouble die-poalng of Id the Vert> va rood Dt will probably also be Bare re-aeptlTa then previous regiwa to Soviet economic and technical aid offara. (Paxaa. )
policies of Ehalil. It will prtaa for substantial and continuing Tat and DE aid, vhlle reaalning acnsltlva about any conditions attached to such assistance, it the aaawradual extension of Sudanese relations vith the Bloc appeare aLaoat certain, partlculsrly through Bloc barter deals for Sudanese cotton vhlcb the Sudan bac trouble dla-poalng of In the Vert> va rood Dt will probably aleo be Bare re-oeptlva then previouso Soviet economic and technical aid offers. (Paxaa. )Original document.