OCI No.
Copy No.
89
SOVIET STAFF STUDY
PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE USSR AND
THE FALL OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV (Reference Titles: nd
Office of Current Intelligence
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(0)
This working paper Is another study ln the series prepared under Project CAESAR. Project CARSAB Is designed to provideanalyses frost all Intelligence sources of developments affecting leading members of the Soviet hierarchy, their political and personal associations, policies with which they have been identified, and politicalchanges which affect the Soviet leadership situation.
While the papers ln this series areand checked for factual accuracy within OCX, the interpretations and those of the authors and do not represent the official views of CIA.
PARTY-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE USSR
AND
THE FALL OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV
PAGE
X.
II. ZHUKOV AND PARTY CONTROL XN THE
Zhukov's attitude toward political training
in the armed forces not
Antlparty or
Zhukov and party
Zhukov vs. the GPU in orders and
How much politics for the
The contrast in political methodology,
Zhukov and one-man
Zhukovhe chief of the
III. ZHUKOV AND THE CULT OF
The art of making enemlos: party
Tbe art of making enemies: Zhukov vs.
his comrades at
IV. ZHUKOV AND THE CHARGE OF
V. THE MECHANICS AND TXMIRG OF ZHUKOV'S
The tine required to remove
The transfer of Marshal
VI. AFTER
The transfer of
Military
Military-party
The ultimate product:
VII.
I. INTRODUCTION
The removal of Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov from his post as USSR minister of defense onctober7 was unexpected. When Zhukov left Moscoweremonial visit to Yugoslavia at the beginning of the month, he appeared to be at the poak of his popularity and prestige. istinguished wartimeand four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Zhukov had been elevated to full membership In the party presidium following7 June purge of the "antiparty group." In manycircles it was believed at that time that zhukov had saved Khrushchev from the machinations of the "antiparty group" by dramatically throwing his weight, and that of the four-mion-man army, behind the party leader, and that thiswas rewarded by his promotion to full presidium membership.
The announcement of Zhukov's release as defense minister was terse and gave no clue as to his future. Observers indiffered as to whether he would be promoted to minister without portfolio, "kicked upstairs" to some honorific post, or demoted. The last was proved correctovember when acommittee resolution removing Zhukov from both the party presidium and central committee was made public.
Speculation continued as to why Khrushchev had turned against his ally of June. Khrushchev's advancement to power since Stalin's death had been accompanied by Zhukov's rise ln the Ministry of Defense and party hierarchy. The two appeared to be on the best of personal terms. Some observers felt that Khrushchev bad not taken the initiative, but that opponents of the party leader had forced the issue in order to deprive him of one of his loci of power.
Another serious question was the timing. Why had the leadership felt it necessary to drop Zhukov from its ranks when the Syrian-Turkish crisis was at its height and on the eve of the celebration ofh anniversary of the Bolshevikat which emphasis on party unity would have been most desirable?
The central committee's resolution7 accused Zhukov of three serious "violations of Leninist, party principles": liminating party control and opposing the work of party organizations in the armed forces; a "cult of his own personality" in the Soviet Army, a
result of hla loss of "party modesty" which permitted him to belittle the "tremendous efforts of the Soviet people (ln World Warhe heroismhe armed forces, the role ofand political workers, the military skill of theof fronts, armies and fleets, and the leading androle of the Communist party of the Sovieteing politically deficient and disposed to "adventurism both in his understanding of the major tasks of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and in his leadership of the Ministry of Defense."
The following re-examination of these charges against Zhukov and of the events which preceded and followed his ouster is intended to clarify somehese problems. The full story of the Zhukov case is not and probably never will be known outside the Soviet hierarchy. Therefore, lt will be necessary to fill in several gaps with speculation which we shall try to keep consistent with the known facts of the case.
-2-
segrex.
IX. ZHuKOV AND PARTY CONTROL IN THB ARMY
Zukoy's Attitude Toward Political Training In the Armed Forces Not'New. Tne removal of Marshal zhukov from bisand party posts in October and7 focused attention more sharply on military-party relations in theUnion than at any time since the end of World War II. This event has been widely interpretedogical climax of widespread and deeply rooted army-party policy clashes dating back to the demise of Stalin, but this explanation umber of unanswered questions. The problem of maintaining political control in the armed forces without reducingefficiency has faced the Soviet Communist party since the army was first established.
Zhukov was held personally liable in7 fortbe authority of political workers relative to that of military commanders. Yet, before Zhukov returned to prominence from the obscurity Stalin prepared for him after World War II, authoritative statements had been made which inflated the prestige of command personnel and Ignored political workers, and Marshal Vasllevsky, then minister of war, spoke In the same vein ath party congress in the same sentiments reappeared In the partyear after Zhukov's second fall from grace. According to the doctrine propagated in the fallolitical work In the armed forces was to be directed toward raising discipline, increasing tbe authority of "one-man command"nd ensuring fulfillment of the combat training mission.
Antlparty or promtlltary. Zhukov never challenged the pre-eminent authority of the Communist party over theestablishmenthole, but he wanted the same control over the work of the political organs in the armed forces that he bad Over all other arms and services of his Defense Blm purpose appears to have been to Improve thereadiness of his command. In treating the ChiefDirectorate (GPU) of the Defense Ministry, which also functionsepartment of tbe party central committee,taff organization literally subordinate to hisflat, hovever, Zhukov In effect reached for more political power than the party was willing to allow any Communist leader who also controlled the Soviet military machine.
Xt does not appear that Zhukov consciously sought lo this way to aggrandize his personal power positionis his colleagues in the party presidium. Apparently he did assume, however, that the prerogatives of his ministerial rank were genuine, and after his elevation ln7 to fullin the party presidium he began to assert them more strongly against the GPTJ. The actual power relationshipthe Ministry of Defense and its technically subordinate Chief Political Directorate, which wasepartment of the party apparatus, had not previously been tested: noleader had ever risen to full membership in the party presidium and therefore beenosition to demand that the role of the GPU be clarified (Trotsky as war commissar was ln Lenin's politburo, but he hadolitical leader ln his own right previously;ase washukov's apparent feeling that as long as the GPU was ln his ministry he could run lt as he saw fit was to be the chief reason for his downfall.
The need to reform the Inefficient, nonproductiveapparatus in the army and make lt more effective appears to have been Zhukov's chief concern. He insisted time and again that the existing political apparatus ln the armed forces did not seem to him to contribute anythingto Increased training efficiency, better discipline, or mastery of the new techniques of modern warfare. On thethe Ineffectual putterlngs of the political organs hamstrung his commanders ln their efforts to attain thegoals assigned them by the Defense Ministry.
Neither the central committee's indictment7 nor subsequent attacks by high-level party and military functionaries Imputed any "antiparty" motives to Zhukov. (During the Ukrainian party congress lnarshal Chuykov charged him withut this charge has not been repeated and the Zhukov case was not mentioned att all-union party congress.) Zhukovong-time Communist party member as well as an old soldier, and his speeches and articles were replete with references to "the wise leadership of the glorious Communist party and Itscommittee." By using his own position ln thatto tighten his control of his ministry, however, Zhukov eventually antagonized all Important elements within Soviet officialdom, and the summation of this hostility finally caused his downfall. By7 he had lost the support of the
very people on whom he relied for professionalhis political deputy, the top Military echelons, and finally Khrushchev.
d Party Control. As already suggested, It was not party control to which Zhukov objected, but the Mechanics of Its application to the armedmechanics of troop indoctrination. Against the charge that be sought theof party control and opposed the work of partyin the armed forces must be placed extracts from the military press and radio calling for Improvement in both the quality and method of political work. On5 Red Star, the Soviet Army newspaper, published an exposition of Defense Ministry thinking on the subject of political work under the title, "Raise the Ideological Level of Political Information." This piece urged that political Information sessions be held "not less than threeeek" andthat attendance at these sessions by enlisted personnel was mandatory. Tbe paper noted that "In many units the value of political Information is underestimated, gatherings are held Infrequently, and the content of the talks is one-sided or superficial. Political Information periods should not be used for other purposes such as current militaryn tone and contont this item might have been extracted from any of the hundreds of exhortations to improve politicalwhich filled tbe military press after Zhukov's ouster.
Moreover, on5 Radio Volga, the Defense Ministry's transmitter servicing the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, sharply criticized shortcomings in political work in the armyanner which graphically Illustrated the point that the target of the Defense Ministry's attack was not political work per se, but the manner In which lt was
Political workers do not teach the greatof the Soviet people In matters of industry, agronomy, orittle concern Is shown for the theoretical and methodological preparation of political group leaders. Only very few seminars pay attention to methodical lecturing, thereading of literature, the organization of individual work with Instructors, and the correct utilization of clearly understandable visual aids. There are still few qualified lecturers, and hardly
any lectures are given by the supervisor oflecturesspecially on theof history, theory of the Soviet Communist party, or questions of the foreign and domestic policy of the Soviet The change ln political training methods called for by theMinistry requires all commanders and party and Komsomol organisations of units and subunits to supervise daily the political training of all personnel.
In no objective sense could this spurring of political organs to greater efforts be termed an attempt to "eliminate party control."
Another demonstration of Defense minister Zhukov's "party-mindedness" is manifested by the conduct of political worktoh party congress held in onth before tbe congress convened, all elements of the armed serviceseriod of intensive study and discussion of the central committee's draft of the Sixth Five-Tear Plan. Meetings were held at division level and higher to plan tbe Indoctrination of troops on the announced agenda on the Onhukov and the head of the Defense Ministry's Chief Political Directorate Jointly signed adirective setting forth the lessons derived from tho congress and how they were to be taught. This document was distributed to every major command of the Soviet armed forces.onference of senior political officers of the armed forces vas held In Moscow ln early April at the height ofagitation in the defense establishment for Improvement in the quality of political Instruction.
The foregoing illustrates two Important factors in the Zhukov case: e recognized that deficiencies intraining existed,e was determined to correct them in his own way.
It is interesting to note that none of the aboverefers to theolitical officerbut lt was on this crucial Issue that Zhukov's fate hinged.
-6-
Zhukov vs. the GPU In Orders and Directives. Evidence of the cleavage of Interest which developed between theatlnlster and his Chief Political Directorate IsIn the ministry's written orders and directives on political work daring the Zhukov period. Soon after bedefense minister Inhukov apparentlyecret order forbidding criticism of service duties of military commanders at party meetings. On at learnt two subsequent occasions commanders cited an order of this nature in quashing criticism of their actions by political officers In their commands.
The Defense Ministry directive on the results ofh party congress called the attention of all elements of the armed forces to the primary role of political organs in the militaryand assistance forofficers. The document directed that "the study and preparation of the decisions and Materials of the congress are to be directed to strengthening one-man leadership, to increasing military discipline, and to Mastering combat technology and weapons."
Zhukov also took steps in6 to subjectworkers in the armed forces to additional training in purely militaryroject hinted atpeech he delivered to political workers in April. efenseorder made tactical commanders personally responsible for the military training of their political workers anda report on the status and nature of such training froa each Major headquarters in the armed forces. This note had been sounded earlier when Soviet Fleet, the Soviet navy's newspaper, editorialized in5 that "all political workers Must be expert on naval as well as political affairs, for without such knowledge they cannot effectively assist others." The campaign toell-rounded politicalfficer is also an Important requirement In post-Zhukov policy.
How Much Politics for the Troops? Tho difference in the attitudes of Zhukov and his successor toward politicalas opposed to basic military training,omparison of two articles, published twoalf years apart, on the conduct of political studies in the army. Red Star announced on5 that "the subjects
of political studies have been changed. The number of themes on questions of military education, as well as the timeto them, Is being Increasedhe platoon leader himself will personally conduct political studies with all the soldiers of his platoon, and he will answer not only for their military education but for their political
naj. Gen. N. M. Klronov, head of the propaganda and agitation department of the GPU, wrote the second article, which appeared in Bed Star on Mirooov wasted no words: "In this new educational year theand method of political instruction is being changed. The emphasis is to be on politicalttendance at lectures is compulsory." Thus,5be emphasis shifted sharply from military to political themes as the basis of political work in the services.
The Contrast in Political. Tho Important role of company officers in stressing the military aspects of political training was emphasized consistently in the military press The term "unified proceas" was used increasingly in reference to military-politicaland training of troops. This concept corresponded roughly to the long-established "integrated training"of Western armies. Subjects which formerly had been consideredcourtesy and discipline, traditions of the service, Sovietnow taught in conjunction with other purely military subjects. Simultaneously, the amount of time allotted to formalln purely theoreticalpolitical economy, and the history of the communistwas rednced.
Immediately after the Zhukov ouster, however, measures were instituted to Increase formal political schooling for soldiers, particularly for officers. The GPU announced lnor example, that because of suggestions "from the officer corpshe number of hourstoInstruction for officers lntheory would be "more than doubled" At the present time all officers are compelled to attend theminimum ofours of political lectures yearly.
Zhukov and One-Mag Command. Tha principle of "one-mum command"taple of Leninist administrative theory. this was declared to be the norm for tbe Red Army, although political commissars continued to conduct the political indoctrination of troops. ommanders vho were bona fide party members also assumedfor political training. Daring the purges of theight party controls were again imposed, and one-man command was pushed into the background. 2 to the present, however, despite temporary periods ofcontrol measures, the clamor for more vigorous assertion of tbe yedinoaacballye principle has Increased.
Zhukov's attitude toward one-man command was dramatically definedpeecharty conference of the Moscow Military District ln On this occasion heassigned political organs ln the armedole subordinate to commanders:
In the district there have been noted separate attempts to subject the performance of service duties (sluzhobnaya deyatelnost) of commanders to criticism at party meetings. Any suchdeserve condemnation. Our task la to strengthen the authority of commanders ln every way and to support exacting officers and generals...
Zhukov's injunction restraining political workers'of commanders' "service duties" was, for practicalwithout precedent. Neither the party statutes nor1 Interior Service Regulations of the Soviet armed forces contain any suggestionommanding officer is to be considered immune from criticism by party organizations and political organs. Both documents stress the commander's responsibilities and his obligations in carrying them out, rather than his personal immunities.
Faced vith this hazardous dichotomy in interpretation of the "one-man command" principle, the party central committee on7ev set of "Instructions to the Organizations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Onion in the Soviet Army and Navy." It is probable that Zhukov himself took the initiative in requesting writtenof hla position on army-party relations, and Khrushchev may have approved these instructions ln an attempt to define
SE6REX.
relations between bis defease sinister and the Chief Political Directorate. At any rate, the instructions seened to grant the defense minister the essence of what he had been publiclyover the political organs within his command. The document Instructed party organs to increase their efforts to "rally" the armed forces around theparty and the Soviet Government, but it interpreted yedlnonachallyo as precluding criticism of "the orders and com-mands oft party meetings."
The fine distinction posed between Zhukov's "service duties" and the central committee's "orders and commands" Involved much more than semantics. In the days Immediately prior to Zhukov's removal, official party organs emphasized the point that the phrase "orders and commands" applied only to those formal written and verbal ordersommander Issued in performance of his most literal command functions. Thus the commander remained liable to criticism for deficiencies and errors of omission and commission by his unit In the course of Its training. In other words, orders as enunciated by tbe commander were exempt from criticism, but tbe effects of tbe orders were fair game for party snipers.
A tendency to "water down" the implications of the new instructions was actually noticeable in tbe press shortly after the7 purge of the antiparty group. Amid the welter of words aimed at the "plotters andhe opinion was frequently expressed that all Communists,of rank or position, shared "equal rights and The military press In particular stressed that commanders should not only tolerate, but actively solicit party criticism of their personal and professional shortcomings.
a single example of the new tone In the press willto show which way the wind was bloving In MaJ. Gen. A. Shmelov, chief of the Par Eastern military District's Political Directorate, lauded party criticismommander in Bed Star on Among otherhe officer had summoned subordinatesarty meeting "without any special need for it." Retribution quickly befell the errant commander, however: "Hot long ago Comrade Silantevesson. arty meeting tbe Communists subjected him to sharp and just criticism for his rude attitude toward party discipline. They reminded the comrade that in the eyes of the party all are equal and that no one Is permitted to violate the norms of party life."
After tbe7 session of tbe party centrallt vas claimed that the Instructions badirect result of Zhukov's excesses ln shielding military personnel from party criticism and that they were designed to correct the harm done by him. For example, Bed Star7 reportedpeaker at themeeting; of the Moscow Military District party aktlv called to endorse the central committee's action charged, "Until the issuance of the central committee's Instructions, partyvers deprived of rights provided for in the party statutes and were pushed aside from active participation ln the solution of the problems of military training."
adio Volgapeakereeting of the GSFG party aktlv as saying that "untilon the order of Comrade Zhukov (underlinesormer minister of defense, the role of the party and politicalln tbe armed forces had been Until the publication of the instructions to party organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, approved by the party central committee, the party organizations did not ln fact carry out their tasks as stipulated in the party statutes."
There vas no evidence in the spring or early summerowever, tbat either the Defense Ministry or tbe party central committee interpreted the instructions as more or less than confirmation of the Zhukov doctrine on the primacy of command. The narrow interpretation of the "orders and commands" sanction came later. The immediate victory seemed to be Zhukov's.
Zhukov vs. the Chief of the GPU. Zhukov and hiedeputy. Col. Gen. Aleksey Zheltov, clashed head-on over the nature of tbe delicate political-military relationship. Zheltov, as head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Defense Ministry, headed an organization which was technically an organic part of the parent ministry but vhichfunctionedepartment of the party's central This latter status endoved the GPU with far-reaching immunities from ministerial control. Zhukov was unhappy over this circumstance, and his public utterances leave little ground for doubting that Zhukov and Zheltov were atas early as the beginning
Zhukov's dissstisfaction with the GPU was evident in his speech in6 before an all-union conference ofworkers in the armed forces, referred to aboveh congress indoctrination. The address is aindictment of the structure and functioning of the political apparatus in the military establishment. In his opening remarks, which set the tenor of the entire speech, Zhukov attacked the GPU for not having assembled leadingfigures during the previous seven years to discuss with them the status and problems of party-political work in the armed forces and measures to improve political work. Zhukov left the clear impression that the head of the GPU was guilty of gross indifference toward the most pressing political problems of the day in the military, establishment.
As for political work, Zhukov found "serious deficiencies" In the political training of some units; these, in turn, had resulted In "intolerable laxities In the state ofn the armed forces." He calledfundamental rebuilding of the entire system of political and militaryew and more effective methods of party-political work." Zhukov defined the goals of this reorganized system asigh quality of military and political training, an improvement in combat readiness, organization anduperior knowledge of military equipment and armament, and the proper performance of duty by all personnel." These goals in turn were to be attained through four major steps: iscontinue studying the state of affairs and conditions in units from papers and reports;top bureaucratic direction of units frome closer to the troops, examine the commandand then replace unsuitable workers with morepersons;o to the masses, eliminate existing deficiencies, and mobilize every Communist and Komsomol, every soldier, sailor, and officer, for the active andsolution of problems.
Current political propaganda, continued Zhukov, was "unrealistic and separated from the actual conditions of the troops and the practical problems facing every unit and formation." Reforms in both "content" and "method" ofwork were essential, he admonished, in order toour military thinking from that inflexible narrowmlnd-edness which was born of the cult of the individual and to awaken creative thinking, which is based not on quotations serving the cult of the Individual but on the objectiveof reality, on the entire wealth of ideas of Marxist-Leninist theory, and on military science."
Turning to tho crucial Issue of the mission of political and party organs in tho armed forces, Zhukov assigned thorn the task of "strongly supporting theo prevent the loverlng of the prestige of command personnel, including noncommissioned officers."
The deficiencies noted, Zhukov said, necessitatedajorf the structure and staffing of the political organs in the armed forces." Specifically denouncing over-staffing of political sections, he found evidence of "great excesses in the organizational field which unnecessarilyumber of fields of endeavor where the party and Komsomolould apply themselves with greater
*party work and control functions in the Soviet armed forces are performed by two different groups: heofficers (zampolity) he unit party organizations. The political officer is at once the unit representative of the Chief Political Directorate and the deputy commander for political affairs (zampollt) of his unit. He is appointed from above and in torn appoints tho zampolity at the next lower echelon. Be is ultimately responsible to the Chief Political Directorate for all political affairs in his unit, and this responsibility plus bis dualthe zampollt of the next higher echelon as well as to theofficer of hisleads him toin the work of that commander, particularly in matters of training.
Party organizations in the armed services are roughly equivalent to those in civilian life, except that they aro set up according to military units (battalion, regiment, division) instead of geographical areas (city or rayon,republic.) They "elect"are nominated by thedelegates to party conferences at higher echelon levels and, under the direction of the zampollt, carry out propaganda work among the troops, strengthen discipline, care for the welfare of the soldiers, etc. Although the zampollt may encourage thorn to do so at times, they have no right to "check on the execution" of orders received by the commander, in contrast to party organizations in civilian enterprises which havo as one of their chief tasks chocking on execution by the management of party and governmentand plans. (Footnote continued,
Moreover, Zhukov scored Zheltov's administration of the GPO. e concluded, "that the Chief Political Directorate and the political directorates of all branches of the armedilitary districts andill close the gap which now separates the directing political organs from the groups, military districts, fleets, armies, and flotillas which they supervise."
Lessear later, inhukov againcensured Zheltov for undue delay in convening an important meeting, this time an all-army conference of outstandingof the armed forces. Thuspan ofonths theminister had twice reprimanded his political deputy for inefficiency and irresponsibility, firstasicallyaudience and thenilitary gathering. There could be no doubt that there was conflict between the military and political wings of the ministry, nor that Zhukov had been unable, or unwilling, to settle the differences in private and had chosen to humiliate his technical subordinate publicly.
Sometime during the summerelationsand Zheltov became so strained that the top partyhad toMoscowthat the two clasnvn in Alignstoflectures and conferences to explain the June plenum to Zhukov charged Zheltov with insubordination, andcomplained to Khrushchev, who asked Suslov to lookmatter. Zhukov thereupon told Suslov to keep out ofaffairs. The correspondent also heard about athe party presidium and the high command :at which
(Footnote continued from
Zhukov evidently felt that zampolit staffs (and their higher echelonsections at corps and division level and political directorates of militaryshould be cut and more responsibility given to the regular party organizations. Since party organizationshad neither the right nor the ability to interfere with or question command decisions, Zhukov wanted their role to be enhanced for improvement of propaganda and troop discipline, and he wished to weaken the role of the zampolit, who could question decisions of commanders. No one questioned theof improving the work of party organizations. lans for reducing the zampolit, however, were to get him into serious disagreement with the regime, because the ultimate effect would be to make the Chief Political Directorate subordinate to the Ministry of Defense alone and to reduce Its role as aof the central party apparatus.
Zhukov was alleged to have tartly reminded Khrushchev that he, Zhukov, knew how to run the military establishment. Zhukov apparently left for Yugoslavia before the conflict was resolved but not without promising Zbeltov that he would fire him.
ariant of this Ecury to tne eirect tnat ZbUKov objected to the reading of the letter on the antlparty group to occupation troops as dangerous to morale and discipline. igh-ranking subordinate presumably Zbeltov, ordered that the letter be read. Zhukov, angered, dismissed the subordinate. The latter complained to the central committee, with Suslov handling thecene between Zhukov and Suslov ensued. At meetings of the Moscow Military District party organization on Khrushchev charged Zhukov with having tried toZheltov and with "conspiring by dishonest means" tothe latter's electionandidate member of the central committee.
Once the quarrel between Zhukov and Zheltov became so bitter it had to be settled in the presidium, the outcome was almost inevitable. Old party apparatchik Zheltov had direct access to and long personal association with the party who comprised the bulk of tho presidium. Thefor reasons to be discussed in the next chapter, were prob ably having second thoughts about the marshal-minister who was taking hie presidium membership too seriously and was trying to change their system of control over his military Thus the reason for Zhukov's ouster taking place when it did appears to have been the urgent need to solve the problemefense minister who could not work in harness with the head of the Chief Political Directorate, whose post was more significant from the party point of view. That Zheltov stayed on as GPU chief until the Initial confusion had ended and then was transferred to another responsible party post Indicates the leadership was not dissatisfied with the way he bad conducted himself.
HI. ZHUKOV AND THE CULT OF PERSONALITY
The second charge against Zhukov was that he hadto buildcult" of his personality and tothe importance of his personal role during World War II. This contrasted sharply with the picture generally drawn, in the West at least, of the marshal as Stalin's victim and therefore the antithesis of dictatorship, as an apolitical career soldier Interested only in military science, anderson popular with both the public and his colleagues.
The Art of making Enemies: Party Loaders. Prior to the events of latehukov appeared tolose working alliance with Soviet leaders In general and with Hlkitain particular. After being exiled by Stalin, Zhukov supposedly owed his rehabilitation and his lofty rank in the Soviet hierarchy to Khrushchev's intervention on his behalf. One competent Western diplomatic observer noted the fact that whenever the two appeared together, Zhukovlook of prldo and almost adoration" and conducted himselfanner which clearly deferred to Khrushchev's seniority and authority.
Information on the Soviet political scene In thepostwar years is sketchy. Zhukov's transfer first to the Odessa and then to the Urals Military District has beento Stalin's fear that the popular marshal mighthim in prestige or evenhreat to his power. Inowever, during the victory celebrations ina friendly relationship existed between Stalin and Zhukov. General Eisenhower (in his book Crusade in Europe) described lt as follows: "At that tine Marshal Zhukov was patently
a great favorite with Stalin The two spoke to each other
on terms of Intimacy and cordiality." Yet In lessear, during most of which Zhukov was stationed in Germany, he was removed from the party central committee and as commander of the ground forces and sent to Odessa. The parallel6ncluding rumors at the latter date that he would beesser job, possibly as commander of adistrict, is noteworthy. Pravda ommenting on the Zhukov removal, said that the marshal considereduperior Soviet leader, put his personal ambitions above the party and army, and "repeated his mistakes" Whether or not theroarallel between Stalin's and Khrushchev's treatment of Zhukov will probably never be established. The matter Is raisod here merely to point out
that relations between Soviet leaders cannot soundly be determined by their attitudes shown toward each other in public.
In any event, Zhukov's exile cannot be attributed to lasting enmity on Stalin's Zhukov undoubtedly held such feelings towardZhukov returned to Moscow, probably as commander of the ground forces orgeneral, sometime Furthermore, Zhukov was elected andidate member of the central committee ath party congress in Thus he was bothand politically rehabilitated during Stalin's
There is evidence that Zhukov wasuthless and overly strict disciplinarian by his subordinates. One effect of his removaleduction in the stringency of military discipline, including the repeal of Order Mo.probably issued ln March or Aprildisciplinary procedures. This decree was described as being too severe. As an example of Zhukov's arbitrariness, thereeport that heolonel on the general staff because the latter was overweight and failed to attend physical culture classes. After Zhukov's removal, Khrushchev restored the colonel to duty.
Thereonsiderable body of evidence suggesting that Zhukov's elevation to full membership ln the presidium in7 went to his head. One of his first official acts in this capacity was to deliver speeches In Leningrad onndhortly after the purge of the antiparty group. He entered the city on the crestave of spontaneous hero worship; all strata of Leningrad society voluntarily turned out to cheer him. Zhukov's speeches, the most politically weighted discourses in his repertory, were hardly calculated to conciliate either his military contemporaries or bis peers in the party presidium. On the one hand thereonspicuous lack of self-effacement in describing his own contributions to thedefeat in World War II, and on the other hand he carried his attack on the antiparty group to political extremes.
Speakingeningrad factory onhukov charged: "The antipartytubbornly resisted thepursued by the party for liquidating the consequences of the personality cult, particularly the disclosure and calling to account of those mainly responsible for allowing the law to be violated." He exceeded the previous limits of abuse of
"SfiCfHrv-
tho Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich clique by Intimating that they should be expelled from the party. Not only had the anti-party group "lost the right to pretend to the role of leaders of the party ande said, "but even to the name of legitimate members of our great Communist party." It Is probable that Zhukov carried his attack even further. The Soviet press, after reporting tbat he had deliveredongelatively brief textual versionuneven in its transitions fron one topic to another.
These were not the wordsilitary commander in chief butolitician, and they may well have caused Khrushchev and the other presidium members to take another look at their newly acquired colleague.
Several diplomatic and press observers ln Moscowduring the summer7 that Zhukov was becomingcocky and that he behaved as if he were second only to Khrushchev.' During his trip to Yugoslavia he also created the impression that he was the second-ranking man ln theUnion.
Tho Art of Making Knomlos: Zhukov vs. Bis Comrados in Arms. 'Zhukov was charged botharty meeting of tho Mos-
cowMllitary District on7 and in Marshal Konev's article in Pravda ovember with having wished toortrait of himself, mountedhite charger, in the act of liberating Berlin.
Several reports following Zhukov's downfall indicated that he bad blocked appeals to the central committee bywithin the Defense Ministry. The Moscow correspondent of the London Dally Worker, at times an unusually well-informed source on the soviet hierarchy,tory from Moscow on7 that political workers ln particular were denied access to the central committee, and that Zheltov himself hadrotest to that body which precipitated the special plenum. William J. Jorden of the New York Timesfrom Moscowovember that "some informed sources"Zhukov's removal had been caused by pressure fromthe military Itself. Zhukov, he noted, had becomeeven insulting, to old comrades. Jorden also noted accounts that Zhukov had blocked appeals to the central committee.
Marshals Malinovsky and Sokolovsky and Admiral Gorshkov were members of the central committee and could not be denied access to it, but no military-political officers had beento the central committee ath congress. This fact would tend to support the London Daily Worker story that Zhukov had attempted to limit direct access by political officers to the leading organs of the party. At tho same time, however, thoy did have an alternate its chief, Zheltov, apparently used it very effectively to present his side of the case.
Additional substance was provided to the speculation on Zhukov's negative personality traits by Marshal Biryuzov,in chief of the USSR's antiaircraft defenses, at aof the aktiv of the Moscov city party organization on Biryuzov told the aktiv that Zhukov "did not heed the opinions of others, did not consider lt necessary to seek advice or to discuss suggestions from below, seldom met vith military personnel, and tried to impress on each and every one that he was an outstanding man."
whatever the actual relations of minister andbeen before the October events, the military figuredIn the ouster actionaof senior military off ic<xbavingon the nightsndctober, aduring the central committee session after Zhukov'sas defense minister but before the announcement offrom the inner party circle.
The Soviet general staff seems to haveemarkably sanguine attitude toward the ouster, which again suggests that Zhukov was soldier's soldier" than had been generally assumed. The list of top-level officers who attacked him after the announcement of the central committee's action is striking, even if political pressure is conceded to have caused their According to an article in Pravdaarshals Malinovsky, Konev, Rokossovsky, Sokolovsky, Teremonko, Tlmoshenko, and Biryuzov, Generals of the Army Batov, Zakharov, Kazakov, Admiral Gorshkov, "and others" spoke against Zhukov at the plenum, "pointed out shortcomings, sharply criticized the mistakes and distortions he had permitted, and unanimouslyhis incorrect, nonparty behavior."
Moreover, there is no evidence of protest against the ouster by any major commander at the party aktiv meetings held after the plenum in all military districts to discuss the resolution. On the contrary, careerists such as Malinovsky, Konev, Moskalenko, and Biryuzov may have taken some pleasure in heaping coals of fire on the unfortunate one. The military officers present at the central committee meeting reportedly were polled separately on the ouster motion and voted unanimously against Zhukov.
IV. ZHUKOV AND THE CHARGE OF "ADVENTURISM"
The central committee's charge that Zhukov was politically deficient and disposed to "adventurism" in the fields of foreign policy and in the leadership of the Defense Ministry may also havo had some basis in fact. In this connection, however,"adventurism" must be Interpreted as the Soviet leaders themselves would interpretasolitical or military policy which could in any way be Interpreted as leaving the USSR in an exposed position.
At an embassy reception in Moscow inhukov stated that ho was prepared to open up the entire Soviet Union to International inspection If such action would contributeenuine disarmament agreement. One observer received the impression that the defenso minister's price for such awas opening up the rest of the world to Soviet inspection; nevertheless, no top-flight Soviet leader had ever before so much as Implied that physical inspection of the USSR bywould be acceptable under any circumstances.
Later in this conversation Zhukov displayed eithercandor or equally remarkable naivete in directly contradicting an earlier policy statement by Khrushchev. When the subject of the reduction of forces arose, Zhukov stated that the Soviet armed forces numbered far less than the four million men generally attributed to them by the West, and he added that he would like to release the actual figure but that Khrushchev and Bulganin did not agree to this.
The significance of this latter claim becomes clearer In the light of Khrushchev's diametrically opposed statement in the TV interview which he granted the Columbia Broadcasting Company for release on The party leader hadtouestion on the strength of Soviet forces on the grounds that ho had not expected the question and "had not asked his defensehukov, for the figure. He added, however, "We are always ready to answer this question."
Was this "adventurism"? Had Zhukov gone too far inpolitical Initiativeensitive area of Soviet diplomacy, as well as in compromising the leaders of theGovernment in the bargain? equel to this curious pattern of point and counterpoint Indicates that this mayhavo been the case. Six weeks after the Zhukov ouster
the sane observer who had talked to Zhukov la July hadto Inquire of Premier Bulganln what was meant by the term "adventurism" In the central committee's declaration on Zhukov. Bulganln chose to answer the question obliquely and launchedong dissertation on the disarmament problem, concluding with the statement that there were those ln theUnion who advocated inspection and control, but that these persons were guilty of "adventurism."
Under the circumstances it is clear that Bulganln had Zhukov in mind. .Even though Bulganln apparently expected that this conversation would be reported to Americanand therefore used lt to reaffirm the USSB's position on Inspection, ltogical conclusion to the beston what was meant by the charge of "adventurism" against Zhukov.
There isossibility that Zhukov opposedtacticsis the Turkish-Syrian crisislthough he rendered lip service to themajor speech during his visit in Albania. Zhukov may well have sought to restrain Khrushchev from taking risks ln the Middle East vhich could have Involved the USSR in war with the United States. These risks would have been considered "adventurism" in the Western sense, but, ln Khrushchev's vlev, Zhukov's opposition vlthln tbe presidium to such tactics or his failure to ready the military establishment to back up Soviet foreign policy maneuvering would have constituted "adventurism."
At an Iranian reception onctober, the day of's release as defense minister. Khrushchev related a
fable he story concerned a
"humble little Jew, Pinya"ho in time of danger proved more courageous than the "burly anarchist" (Zhukov?). This allegory could have referred to theoutlook on foreign policy of Khrushchev and Zhukov and/-or their attitudes tovard the Turkish-Syrian crisis ln Zhukov's remarks on inspection and control and his comments on the destructive force of nuclear war tend tothis theory. On ono occasion he stated that an article he had written was censored because his graphic description of the effects of atomic weapons might frighten people. ilitary commander, Zhukov may have recommended caution
in the Turkish-Syrian crisis and opposed any military postures or movements of troops,hich would aggravate the
Against this view it might be argued that Zhukov had acted quickly in Hungary and would have liked to have done so in Poland. These cases, however, were quite different. In Hungary the authority and prestige of the DSSR and the Soviet Army had been challengedebellious satellite people! in Poland, there was the danger that control of the Central European Plain, the traditional invasion route to the East, would be lost. Under these more directlycircumstances, no commander would hesitate to respond immediately and forcefully.
Despite the fact that, from the Soviet point of view, thereasis for the adventurism charge against Zhukov, this apparently was muchactor contributing to his downfall than the other two accusations. Even if Zhukov had had such tendencies in the field of foreign relations, there was little he could do about them without openly challenging Khrushchev and the presidium; and he was never accused of this type of "antiparty" activity.
-
"SE6REH
V. THE MECHANICS AND TIMING OF ZHUKOV'S REMOVAL
Zhukov left Moscow7 on ft ceremonial visit to Yugoslavia to reciprocate the June visit ofMinister of Defense-Ivan Gosnjftk to the USSR. En route he stopped off at Yalta to see Khrushchev, mho vasthere. While Zhukov may have related his side of theispute vith Zheltov, there are no clues as to whethercame up at the meeting which made Khrushchev decide that the marshal must be removed from his ministry. On the contrary, Khrushchev on his return to Moscov granted an intervlev with Jamos Reston of the New York Times, in which the Soviet leader on his own initiative expressed tbe DSSR's disappointment that the US hadisit by Zhukov. This could well have been dissimulation on Khrushchev's part, although the full story of the timing of the final decision on Zhukov is still somewhat murky.
Sometime between the Reston Intervlev, vhich took placectober, andctober, vhen TASS announced thatvould extend bis trip by visiting Albania, Khrushchevbecame convinced that the bitter dispute betweenand Zbeltov had not only not been resolved but in fact had been aggravated during the party leader's vacfttion. observers reported increasod traffic in the Kremlin area onctober, and rumors circulated ln Moscov that thecommittee vas In session. Apparently no plenum actually took place, but there were several high-level meetings at party headquarters. At the same time. Red Star onctober carried an editorial which stressed theole In guiding and supervising the military.
Zhukov went to Albania from Belgrade onctober,
spend 6hly onetill not known why or bov bis visit vas extended, but Zhukov eventually spent more time in Albania than he had ln Yugoslavia. It is possible thatof the Turkish-Syrian crlslB, the regime did not vant to announce its decision on the Zhukov-Zheltov problem and notified the marshal to extend his stay in Albania, during which time he gave his hard-line speech on the Near East. It is also possible that Zhukov, whose self-confidence hadnoticeably during the previous fev months, extended bis trip himself, refusing to return to Moscov until the final decision was reached.
-SECfcmX
Byctober tbe central committee hadetter criticising the leadership of the Ministry of Defense forpolitical training In the armed forces. Zhukov's name, hovever, vas notfact which suggestedinal decision as to his future had not been reached. Theto relieve Zhukov as defense minister probably occurred immediately prior to or onctober. The previouslyreport that large numbers of high military personnel were seen entering and leaving the Kremlin fromould tend to confirm this date. At meetings of the Moscow Military District party organization onhrushchev criticized Zhukov for overvaluing tho role of one-man command, for petitioning for the removal of Zheltov, for failing to inform the central committee of his activities, and for refusing to allow bis subordinates to contact the central committee. Agreement on Zhukov's release as sinister of defense had evidently been reached by this time, although lt is possible that discussion continued as to vhat bis nev post vould be. It is unlikely, in vlev of the seriousness of these charges, that he vould have been [permitted to retain his party positions.
Zhukov returned to moscov onctober and wentfrom the airport to the Kremlin, where he was officially Informed of his release. Tho session apparentlytormy one. Tho party leaders postponed the time of their arrival at an Iranian reception that night, originally scheduled0 hours,0 and actually did not arrive
The Time Required to Remove Zhukov. The most puzzling aspect of Zhukov's final fall is that it took so long. In the interval between tbectober announcement of Zhukov's release as defense minister andovember announcement that he had lost his party posts, there was considerable speculation on the meaning of his removal.
The simplest explanation for the delay, of course, is that it took time to prepare party meetings which would have to be held to get out the authoritative line on Zhukov's ouster. The central committee meeting to discuss the Zhukov affair convened onctober and probably lasted throughht, forovember the central committeeetter describing the plenum. The officialof the charges was releasedovember.
sbgrez.
were flagrantly Interfering in purely command Batters andfunctions. Ond the papor asserted that, while honest criticism does not damage the authority of the commander, and while subordinateshief who listens to critical remarks Intended to eliminate shortcomings, "lt Is understood that the orders of the commandor must not be criticized at party meetings."
soliciting their suggestions clsm and self-criticism.
About this time, the7 central committeewere revised. As in the case of the originalthe full text of the charges was distributed only to the military-political organs concerned and has never been Onowever, Red Star released extracts from the new version In an editorial captioned, "To Fulfill Consistently the Requirements of the CPSU Central Committeehich dwelt at length on the interdependence and need for cooperation between party organizations,officers, and commanders. Tho political organs were to improve their direction of party organizations; partyvere to vork more actively to eliminate deficiencies in their units, but not by assuming the functions of higher command authority and calling commanders to account. Both political officers and party organizations were to doto assist commanders In successfully performing their military tasks, fulfilling plans for military and political training, and strengthening military discipline. Commanders In turn should rely on their political officers and party organizations, keeping them fully informed of all theirheir susgestions, and encouraging principled crltl
In the context of strengthening party discipline, the editorial referrednow order of dealing vith partyspelled out In the nev instructions as follows:
Cases of party offenses of Communists are dealt with In the primary party organizations. Cases of party offenses of Communists who areof regiments, ships, separate units, and their deputies for political matters, of chiefs of the political departments of units, members of the military councils of armies, flotillas, okrugs, fleets, and groups of forces, are dealt with directly by party committees of the higher political organ at the decision of the chief of this political organ.
Inabsence of the full text of the new Instructions It is not possible to be categorical, but this "new order" apparently limits the partial veto power which militaryhad over disciplinary actions levied by partyagainst officers and noncommissioned officers who were party members. The7 instructions provided that penalties prescribed by party organizations against their members for "party offenses" had to be approved by theofficer and the commander of the officer's military unit. It is not clear whether this approval Is still required, but the emphasis on the "new order" suggests that it has been at least limited. If so, it would appear that party disciplineiven military unit has been strengthened, since the unit party organization can discipline for party offenses all its members except the commander and political officer.
At the same time, the commander's position and maintenance of military discipline within his unit has been strengthened by the fact that only higher party echelons can discipline him for party offenses. Furthermore, the stricture against the criticism of commanders' "orders and commands" laid down in the7 Instructions has not only remainedbut has subsequently been referred to frequentlyuide to proper army-party relations.
The ultimate product: Tactician-Politician. So far as commander and political officer are concerned, nothinghas Indicated any de Jure changes in their Articles written iny chief politicalof military districts continue to define the relations of commanders and party organizations in military units. the role of arbiters, these officers warned partytherefore the political officers who direct these partyto interfere with or usurp the functions of the commanders. They also criticized commanders who refused to accept justified criticism, avoided their party responsibilities, or pulled their military rank on party secretaries. During the latter halferies ofwas issued to clarify the regime's demands thatpolitical officers, and party organizations workto strengthen both party leadership and military
In addition to the revision of7 central committee instructions to party organizations, discussed above, there were
instructions to Komsomol organizations of the army and navy; regulations on Military Councils; regulations for Marxist-Leninist evening universities, party schools, and schools for advanced students Including generals and admirals; andfor political organs of the army and navy. The full texts of these documents have not beenignificant "gap in Intelligence." Extracts andin the press, hovever, indicate that vhlle considerable effort has been expended to define precisely the roles of the various organizations Involved in political training for the armed forces, the personal attitudes of and relationshipsthe Individual commander and his political deputy are still all-Important. To moot this problem of human relations, the successors to Zhukov and Zheltov have increasinglya nev dialectical approach which suggests bow tbey Intend ultimately to solve this problem. The end product is toniversalommander who Isompetant political officerolitical officer with the leadership traits and military skills necessary for assignmont tocommand posts.
The campaign to aiake political cadres militarilyhas already been referred to in connection with Zhukov's program of providing support for his commanders. The regime Itself espoused this policy after Zhukov'sobvious effort toepetition of army-party squabbling by eliminating potential points of friction. Zhukov tried to train political workers to an understanding of the commander's point of view; the party now seeks tothe two functions, political and military.ove vhlch vould for the first time give real meaning to the principle of "one-man command.1'
The appointment of Col. Gen.versatilevho has had line, staff, diplomatic, and trainingzheltov's old post as bead of the Chief Political Directorate symbolized this approach, and both he and Zhukov's successor as defensesupported it. In bis first major article, "Party-Political Work In the Army and Navy," which appeared in Pravda ofugust, Golikov wrote:
In tbe Interest of the cause one must actively and systematically assign commanders towork and political workers to command posts.
Several other explanations, however, have been offered for Zhukov's fall end Its timing. One theory wasonapartlst coup, had to eliminate Zhukovhreat to his power. This thoory was based primarily on overemphasis of Zhukov's personal role in the June purge of the "antipartyhich was considerably exaggerated at that time, as was the amount of personal support Zhukov commanded In the armed forces. It also disregarded the extent tb which the military forces are penetrated at all levels by party and state security agents for the purpose of keeping the military establishment out of politics and forestalling the possibilityoup.
Thereumber of Indications that, insteadival,is extremely conscious of the prestige of thehaving an Internationally recognized hero In his entourage. If this was tbe case, the time lag aftorctober may have resulted from Khrushchev's attempts to persuade the marshal to remain In the governmentesser position. Such an offer would have been In accord with Soviet practice- since Malenkov's removal from Onctober, Khrushchov Indicated that Zhukov would be given another post "in accordance with bisand experience," echoing what had been said about Molotov in July. The TASS announcement of Zhukov's release contained no reference to "other work" for the marshal, but It Is possible that one or more respectable positions were offered hla and that he refused thea. In its resolutionovember, the central committee instructed the party"to provide Zhukov with another Job." It is still not clear what Zhukov has done since his removal, although rumors porsist that he has rotirodension.
Another suggestion was that the removal of Zhukov was engineered by Khrushchev's opponents in tho leadership in order to Isolate the party leadertrong source of In this case, the time required to effect the ouster would have resulted from Khrushchev's own attempts to fight back. As has been Indicated, however, events have proved that Zhukov's control of the armed forces was not so great as had been supposed. Furtheraore, his successor, marshal Malinovsky,trong supporter-of Khrushchev.
The nature of the so-called opposition is difficult to establish. Of the full members of tho presidium at that time,
-
Mikoyan and Suslov have shown little. If any, inclinationinvolvoatenttruggle for personal power; Bulganln, as has since been established, had been discredited by hiswith the "antiparty group" in June; neither Voroshilov nor Shveraik were strong enough to trouble Khrushchev, and the remainder were Khrushchev proteges or members of his hand-picked secretariat.
On balance, lt would appear that the removal of Zhukov from his government post was necessitated by his own arrogance and his refusal to share his command of the military with the party apparatus. While this would seem to have ledto loss of his party posts as well, the fact that this was not announcedeek later may Indicate that the cause was Zhukov's refusal toecondary Job to save theface on the eve ofh anniversary of theRevolution.
The Transfer of Marshal Rokossoysky. One curious event which became interwoven with the Zhukov ouster was theof Marshal K. K. Rokossovsky as commander of theMilitary District. The announcement was made by Tbilisi radio and Zarya Yostoka, the Georgian newspaper, onctober; the central press did not mention the appointmenthen Pravda cited the provincial paper as Its source.
After Zhukov's removal was made public, speculation arose as to whether Bokossovsky had been transferred either because he supported Zhukov or because he had been embarrassed tohis former comrade. In fact, Bokossovsky apparently did not go to Tbilisiovember, when he appeared there at October Revolution anniversary celebrations. He spoke inat the central committee plenum which began ohctober and againeeting of the Moscow Oblast party aktivovember.
On balance, then, it would appear that Rokossovsky's "transfer" to Tbilisi had little, if anything, to do with the Zhukov case. Rathor, it was another Kremlin tactic to keep up pressure on the Turks, along with such measures as talk of "volunteers" and increased air activity in the border areas.
In this connection, however, the timing of the Zhukov ouster and the "adventurism" charge against him may have
-
ole. miling Khrushchev and Hike-van unexpectedly dropped lnurkish Embassy reception In Moscownd, in the presence of many Western correspondents, abruptly ended Soviet pressure oh the Turkish-Syrian crisis. On 2'November the Soviet press and radio'carried'the charge against Zhukov of "adventurism" in foreign policy. Although no Soviet source has linked Zhukov's "adventurism" to the Near East situation, lt Is quite possible that, having had to support Zheltov against an adamant Zhukov and oust the latter, the party leadership decided to let Western observers infer that its adventuristic tactics ln the Near East were those of Zhukov.
VI. AFTER ZHUKOV
The transfer of Zheltov. In the period7 andol. Gen. A.heltov was transferred from his post as head of the Chieforresponding position as'chief of thedepartment of the party central committee. His successor in the GPU was Col. Gen. F. I. Gollkov, asoldier not previously assigned to the upperechelon.
Several hypothoses have been advanced to explain Zheltov's lateral transfer. One theory holds that the shift constituted the party's tacit recognition of Zheltov's personalat the lover levels of military command. Anotheris that the moveesture to Indicate that some blame for the Zhukov affair may have lain vith the political apparatus, and that the October plenum vas not the heraldeneral purge of career officers. The appointment ofGollkov vould serve to strengthen this reassurance.
Still anothera combination of the abovethat Zheltov's transfer was another example of Khrushchev's pragmatic approach to organlzational-jurisdlctlonal problems. The anomalous position of the GPU, which servos twothe Defense Ministry and the party central committee, while ultimately responsible only to theexacerbated army-party relations acutely. The ill-defined prerogatives of political officers and line commanders at lower echelons in political matters, the murklness of "one-man command" as it pertained to political training, vere only reflections of this overlapping dualism at the top.
Zheltov and Zhukov, both strong personalities, had clashed violently over this question on which no one has ever come uponsistent clear-cut policy. Zhukov,ombination of the pressing reasons shown above, lost out and was retired. Zheltov may also have appeared ln an unfavorable light for having failed to resolve the conflict quickly and without furor. Its timing, on the eve ofh anniversary of theRevolution, was particularly bad. Therefore it may have been decided to appoint to the Chief Political Directorate Gollkov, the highly respected head of the armorod forces academyront-line commander in World Warman who could more
effectively maintain the respect of the military whileout tho now central committee directives than could Zheltov. The latter, an apparatchik of unquestioned ability andcould use his administrative talents as head of the administrativevery important position (itcadres and checks on the work of the security organs, border guards, the procuracy,ut one in which there is little room for ln-flghtlngwhich Zheltov bad evidently resorted as head of the Chief PoliticalIn his fight with presidium member and Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov. The regime in the past had resorted to this typo of personnel shift when it was unable to come upirm policy decision on thorny questions.
One organizational solution would have been to remove the Chief Political Directorate from the party central committeeconfine it to the Ministry of Defense andthe dual subordination which so complicated the relations between commanders and their political deputies. Theof Golikov and the transfer of Zheltov suggestedthat this may have been done and that the latter may have taken central party supervision of political work in theinto the administrative department with him.
Another theory is based on the change, made sometime4 and7 while Zhukov was out of the country, of the title of tbe GPU from "Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense" to "Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy." This change has been interpreted to mean that the GPU had been removed from Ministry ofjurisdiction, and that Zhukov's refusal to accept this fait accompli necessitated his removal. Golikov thus would have been appointed to bead the GPU in order to make this transfer of jurisdiction more palatable to the armed forces. Subsequent protocol listings, however, have listed Golikov ahead of higher ranking generals and also of Zheltov,that the GPU has retained its former status. This also indicates that the regime Is still not ready to considerermanent solution as abolishing political organs in the militarywas done with those in theministries and the militia followingh partyentrusting political-organizational work to the regular party organizations in military units.
Military Districts. Tho secret letter of7 of the central committee reportedly directed that tbe chief of the GPU be included in the composition of the SupremeCouncil of the Ministry of Defense. It appears likely
that this took place,military-district and group-of-forcesposts of member of the Military Council and of chief of the Political Directorate were merged approxl mately at the time of the Zhukov dismissal. The-first identi ficationmember of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate" occurred onhen Lt. Gen. H. M. Aleksandrov of the Kiev Military District was so described. Since then this designation has been given to the top political officers in other military districts.
During the year following the Zhukov ouster, anlarge number of leading political officers were released from their Jobs and not reappointed. Some of them may have been replaced as Zhukov supporters, but when the jobs of mom-ber of the Military Council and chief of the Politicalwere merged, leaving one post where two had existed before, at least half of tbe top political officers in the districts and groups of forces had to be relieved in any case. Since identifications of Soviet military, andof political-military, personalities are spotty at best it Is impossible to determine why the generals In question were removed, but it appears this was the result of anreorganization rather thaneneral purge.
A large-scale turnover also occurred among Military District commanders after Zhukov's dismissal. Here thepoints to normal replacements and rotation rather thanhake-up. Col. Gen. Pukhov, the commander of theMilitary District, died. Marshal Grechko's return from Germany to assume command of tbe ground forcesacancy which sethain of transfers.
There is only one case in which the replacementis trict commander appears to be directly connected with Zhukov* ouster. In speeches at meetings of the Moscow Militaryparty organization onndctober, Khrushchev charged that Zhukov bad incorrectly influenced the attitude of other senior officers. One example given was that of the commander ofentral Asian Military District" who refused to return from vacation to disseminate the central committee letter ofctober and ordered his chief political officer to do nothing about it. The person in question was probably General of the Army A. A. Luchinsky, who was replaced asof the Turkestan Military District after Zhukov's.
- 31
Khrushchev also said that Col. Gen. S. If. Shtemeoko, the ups and downs of whose careeriddle, had beenas chief of military intelligence because he hadonly to:n the whole, however, the Soviet high command has remained remarkably stable both during and after the Zhukov dismissal. This gives additional support to the theory that Zhukov did not enjoy the wholehearted support of his subordinates.
Military-party relations. 8 tho regime once again took steps to resolve the built-in conflict between political officers and military commanders. Whereas Zhukov had boen consistently critical of political workers and had generally strengthened the role of his commanders, the new line called for denunciation of both categories for past lax-ness in fulfilling political responsibilities. As if to warn them not to take Zhukov's fatearte blanche totheir prerogatives too strongly, political officers at first bore the brunt of the sharpest attacks. Both groups, however, were castigated in the press for indifferenceideological education and the political indoctrination of troops. Soviot Fleet, for example, on8 chided both "dry-land political workers" In the navy who had never beenangplank and negligent commanding officers who had avoided their responsibility for the politicalof the sailors whom thoy commanded.
A series of party conferences was conducted in alldistricts and fleets in January and8 to discuss tbe results of the October plenum and to recommend ways of Implementing the central committee decree onpolitical work in the armed forces. In effect, thetold political officers and commanders to stop feuding and to start working together on all problems of military and political training. The political officer should "point out shortcomings" to the commander and recommend correctivein matters of morale, training, discipline, and thecomplex of military life. Then, ideally, commander and
*Shtemenko was Identified in the DOSAAF journal Za Rulem,s havingudgeecent civilian motorcycle race in Kuybyshev.
political officer should take Joint action to eliminate these deficiencies. The political officer should conduct unit meetings to solicit the Ideas of party members forspecific defects In training, and the commander shouldand accept Justified criticism from below, as this would not undermine the principle of "ono-man command."
These party organizations, however, appear to havoa problem ln relations between commanders and political officers during this period, particularly in lower military units. While the "ideal" solution for the problem was being worked out at the center and military-district levols, itincreasingly apparent tbat the party organizations ln some companies and battalions were going too far ln asserting their rightsis their commanders on the basis of "party responsibility." This could probably be explained partlyeaction to the strict military discipline of the Zhukovsome sources have given as one explanation of why there was so little support by the military for Zhukov at the time of hisan expression of resentment by the troops against their commanders who had enforced that It is also likely that while many members of these party organizations in lower military units simply exulted in and took advantage of the post-Zhukov situation, othors were still being used by their political officers aa weapons against the commanders. In both cases the result was that commanders, as party members, were required to appear at party meetings, account for their activities, and be criticized on tho basis of "party equality."
In the spring and summer8 there were many press accounts of commanders having to submit reports to the party buroaus of their units and be criticized as party members. Onor example. Red Star cited one party bureau which heard reportsompany commander on the results of his unit's gunnery practice and "decided to giveeprimand with an annotation on his record." arch theajor, deplored the practice ofunit commanders to submit general reports to party bureaus, since thisrespass on the inviolable "orders and directives" of commanders which, according to the7 instructions of the central committee, were not subject to criticism.
By8 tbe regime was taking steps to clarify the Situation. Onay, Red Star charged that party organizations
It Is also necessary more freely to assignholding command, engineering-technological, and staff posts to positions as secretaries of party bureaus.
With regard to commanders, he charged:
There are still some loaders who try to reject criticism or who accept It only in words. These comrades must be reminded once more of the fact that criticism and self-criticism is, even under armyonstantly effective weapon against routine, conceit, and self-complacencyshortcomings in work and conduct.
Turning to political workers, Golikov stated:
The central committee requires from allworkers considerable improvement of their style of work. The political department must be closely linked with the personnel, mustinfluence tho course of militaryand skillfully delve into the tasks ofpreparedness of the units. The conditions of modern warfarearticularly high training level of the soldiers. Spocialmust be paid to questions of tacticalto improved organization of gunneryand to training under conditions of the application of the most modern type of weapons. In this connection political organs must pay considerably more attention to the fieldof troops, take an active part inwork, and improve their own qualifications as specialists, to abandon for all time the bureaucratic style of work and concentrate their work in the field and on the ships at sea.
In an article In Red Star on 1anniversary of zhukov's removal from the party centralMalinovsky backed up Golikov as follows:
In addition to supervising combat training, many commanders have acquired significantin political work. Many political
seqret
workers in turn have acquired necessarytraining and experience in training and educating cadres. In this connection we must more boldly place politically trainedin supervisory party-political work and political workers with appropriatein command work. This work must boconstantly and systematically, not
It is still too early to tell how- seriously the regime is going about creating such "tactician-politicians" among its military officers. Aside from Golikov himself, no high-ranking military commanders have been named politicaland no political officers at military district level havo been transferred to command posts. It would be more logical, however, to expect this toradual development beginning at lower echelons.
Only time will tell whether this solution will bein .the long run. It is likely that political officers would have more difficulty In making the shift to command posts than vice versa. It is also likely that suchwould make political officers moro sympathetic to the commanders' problems and, because of the much larger number of military as opposed to political officers, the latter would become "militarized"roup far more quickly than commanders would become "politicized." For this very reason the regime may come to regard thisangerous weakening of party control of the military andalt before it goes that far. On the other hand, if this method ofthe problem is pushed to the point of effectively resolving built-in commander-political officer hostility, then the role of political officer Itself can be abolished as no longer necessary, and party leadership in military units will be left to tho party organizations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
causes of the Zhukov ouster appear to havedevotion to his duty as he saw it, his lack ofand his insistence on genuinely assumingull member of the party presidium and It was never alleged that he was hostile toof the Communist party, and thero Is no reason tothat he was lessonvinced Communist. is no good evidence that Zhukov was removedconsideredhreat to his power orunnamed opposition to Khrushchev was trying tolatter's position.
In retrospect, it appears that there was some basis of truth in all the charges against Zhukov. His sternness and arrogance had alienated his military and political colleagues. He probably had disagreed with Khrushchev on certain areas of foreign policy, but what probably made his removal urgently necessary was his clash with GPU chief Zheltov over political training and specifically his threat unilaterally to remove the party's top representative in the armed forces. Thistep the party could permit no minister toeven one whoember of the party presidium.
the disgrace of Zhukov and the centralpublic repudiation of hishread oflinks his tenure with current party policy onrelations. Zhukov believed, as the partymaintains, that political education andthe armed forces is an aid to the commander inquality of the combat training and discipline of his Tho crux of the disagreement between Zhukov andtheir divergent approach to the methods bestattain the desired end. Zhukov demanded that duty hours
be devoted to practical military training, that during this time the political officers concentrate on assistingby improving military discipline and morale, and that they and the party and Komsomol organizations instilltheory in troops and officers during off-duty hours. Thus he felt that unnecessarily large staffs of politicalshould be pruned and more political work entrusted to unit party.organizations. Zheltov, the political commissar and party apparatchik who had never had any field experience, could only regardolicy as one which would weaken central
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: