FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET MISSILE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT

Created: 8/11/1959

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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X. Presaot Statue of Soviot HI00lie Production

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8. Alr-to-Surfece

F. feral

U. Kcocoalc Ltpllcetiooa of Soviet Missile Production

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FACTORS AFFECTLHa SOVIET MISSILE PRQIXJCTIOH AHD DEPLOTMKTO

(CW/AFCIH COimaBUllON TO OMAIC for)

CIA/FK ORH Project)9

CSffiXAL ICTEUJGEHCB: AGEKtT Office of Reseai ch and Repoi-te

SOP SSCBET

resent Status of Soviet Missile Production- GcnereJ.

Sue pi-eeezit status of Soviotproduction programscticated as etotm In the folloiflng UbJe:

SYSTKM

flOmOTIOtI STATUS

Production '

led-launcher.

4 .

6

Si-i

A-3

Productlou concluded X

Alr-Lauacbe.';

[tavid.-launched

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8. Surface-to-Surface Mloallcs'.We believe that' the'OSSH^W'the^lrkuiatilal capability to" produce inide variety of balliatic ElaslleG, including the ICBM. Tbe USSR baa already desaccuitrated tbat lt possesses tbe Indus-trial sod acleiitific skills, facilities end resources to carry oat u< extensive aad, on tbe whole, highly successful miouile test progran vhlch has expeided large uiasbers of belli otic ;dloallea over canyirect ovldeiico ou the serial production and operatioi.nl deploynent of ballistic niselle system contlauea to be vljtualJj ro<*xiotort

refjird the status(dividualrfoce-tc-ourfaca ballietic alec lieto be as

A. . aad leaa)

There is evidence tbat operational productionhort-range ballistic elseileinllar in range and cbaracterletics to 'theype, ;raay have boguu uo early1 ot the foracr ItoerpropotroviJt Automotive Plantlthough ve kavc uo lUKwledge of too current statue of the production pro-ran for thia decile. we estimate that operational production. ballietic)horter range (upalllatlc alr-slle (SS-l) boomU. Thereowever, no direct evidonce on the current status of, or facilities ^related to, serial productioo prccra.tr. for theodissile cyotems.

.

'roduction of. mieolle Is eatliratod

current status of the production program for this rolosllo Is

. unknown.

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Deliveries. mlsslleo arc estimated to have becun at tho end3 or Available evidence, supported by known philosophy, practices, and organlration of Soviet missile production, leads to the belief that Plant, Dnepropetrovsk is the final assembly facility for> missile. There are also limited Indications suggestinglant in Stalingrad is Involved in the productionajor component for this missile, possibly engines.

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In the light of So>lot militaryfor improved

long-range attack capabilities, cubotantial progress In the nuclear weapons field, and probable Soviot awareness as early. ICEM development was being undertaken seriously, we must conclude that the USSR probablyery high value, and corresponding priority, on the attainment of an initial ICBM capability nt the earliest practical date. These factors, lu turn, vould have governed the Soviet philosophy and approach toward the oorlal production and operational deployment unpecta of this program.

. 1A.

Soviet plaanere undoubtedly recognised thet au earlyCBM capability could not be acquired unless many basic decisions egarding ocrlal production mad operatlooal deployoent vere made well before ell technical aspects of tbe oyotem bad beeu fully proven. Prior to the Initial flight teatsoualderable planning vould have taken place vhlch would fora the basis for subsequent dedolooe. With the rcQulred lead tlmeo probably on the orderonths.

veil as complete tbe preparation of oome launching facilities.

There have been aevexsl official Soviet Gtateoeutc vulcb-alleged that the Soviet ICBM bad been placed into serial production and was in the bauds of lallitary unite by Although tbeeo statements cannot be oubsteiitlated by direct evidence, they are, ncvcrtbeleea, consistentogical Soviet courno of

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Because of the prior planning for production and deployment vhlch taunt have accompanied tbe earlier developmental phases of the ICBM program, together with our beliefigh priority has been accorded this program, we conclude that the deciolou to organise the serialreparation of launching facilities probably was made concurrently with or shortly after the initial ICBM tost fliguto and orbiting ofnd II. Although technical difficulties have undoubtedly occurred during the testing program, ve do cot believe

oufflcient mgnltudo to interrupt or delay, significantly the buildserial.production-aad deployment^ ' v

For the reasons outlined, wo believe that froa among alternatives, and in the absence of direct evidence to the contrary, wo oust estimate tbat by3 the USSR probably bad begun toesources to serial luroductiou and the,ta*eparatioh of some launching facilities. On this basis the first deliveries of serially produced ICSes to the military forces could have "ccrsaeoced in Byerial production rates vould still have been quite lev, perhaps on the order of several per month, and, at most,ew ICBMs would have been on launchers. *

Bo production facilities have, as yet, been positivelyICBM production. There lo some Indirect evidence, however,that, in addition to Moscow developmental facilities,in Sverdlovsk and Kuybyshev may be engaged in major aspectsICBM

C. Surface-to-Air Missiles

There Is considerably more inforuatiooJ

on the production aspects of the early Soviet surface-to-air

missiles than on any other Soviet system. Production of operational olssiles for the single stage surfaco-to-etir missile (SA-l) deployed at tb? sites around Moscow io believed to have begun inndUSSR apparently conaltted resourons to serial prediction of this .lystea veil before all technical aspects of thebad been

proven fully.

, Khimki,

engaged larototype production In By tbe endlantusltlno and possibly Plant, Dolgcprudnaya were producing production-engineered missiles for the teat program at Kapuntln Tax. Stabilization and control components. Including gyro assesblleB for toeere produced at the Moscow Aircraft Instru-

ment Plant Ho.plant, although

not operating at full capacity, vasets ofco nth Tho missile timer vac produced at MoscowSo. 2. Plant, an electronlca plant In Koecov,to bare been producing anissllq gn^nit

Mieslie transport and

erector equipment for tbeere probably produced at tbe Moscow Pdctcry "Meshlnootroitel" and at Plant, Saratov.

Production of panela for tbe coordinates cabinet ofystem, olQctronlcs ground environment for theeported at Plant# Kuntaevo. Relays and transmitters foryateii vere produced In plants in Leningrad.

The Initial observation of possibleQuldelene) doployaent at the Moocov aitoo Innd the estimated tiuM-paaalng of thuystem, have led to tbe conclusion thatroduction probebiy had cooucd Wa bolleve that the production of thaissile, as veil ns tha production of subcoeenblle* and cospooent partEi, vould probably take place nt the formerroductionbecause or the sjrjarent relationship between the two lUsslleo.

Theoloalle appearsevelopment resulting,

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basic components

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Baring acquired conaidarable experience lasystem production with thoe, we bellovo that'roudd not have encountered serious productionystem. There la evidence to Indicate thatissile have been emplaced at several locations la theare now boing constructed in East Germany. We conclude that3ystcm has probably been under continuous production sinceand probably la now available for tbe defense of anumber of key Soviet targets, as veil as for deploymentground

0. Air-to-Air Kiss lion x.

Vhilo ww bare no direct evidence that tbe USSB is nowand deploying air-to-air missiles, there have been Indications since World War II of tbe existenceoviet alr-to-alr program. Considering tbe nllltary need far such systems and the knovn Soviet technical capabilities. It in estimated that there are several air-to-air systems in operational production at the present tino. Tbe USSR ass produced and hits available substantial umbers of fighter aircraft, airborne Intercept radars, and associated early uernlns and

capability with air-to-air aioaile systems.

Gsrerally, there are no significant factors which would limit or materially delay an air-to-air ml sella production program. The earlier air-to-air missile programs vould require relatively ninor

modifications of, existing Soviot aircraft. Although the more sopfals-

tlcatod air-to-air systems estimated to ba available later in the time period vould requrec specially doslgned aircraft, it lo expected that these would be designed and produced simultaneously vith the mlsslleo end associated equipment.

B. Air-to-Surface Missiles

tfe believe that the. alr-to-surface missile, AS-1,

entered sarles production6 and continues to be In production at the present time. There is some evidence tbat tbe First Experimental Plant at Podbereu'ye and Plantn Hoecov may bo engaged in this program. Tbe primary director-boobcr for this system ic believed to be the Badger Jet medium' bomber, which the USSR has produced in considerable numbers. Production of the ussoclated navigation and electronic guidance equipment for this oysters should not luposo scrlois production probleso on too Soviet electronics industty. ?. naval Missiles

There is no direct, evidence of production ordevoted to naval-launched missiles at the pise out tlaa.

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would appear that the Soviets have produced at least limited quantities of hordvore fcr several naval missile systems. Statements in the Soviet press by high level officials vould also support this conclusion.

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cruise type) Is estimated to have become operational sometime It is believed, however, thatimited number of submarines have teen equipped with this missile. Therefore, present production of theissile probably vould be limited to production for stockpile maintenance and tooting.

HjWentificd Soviet guided missile destrcyers in tvo fleet areas. These vessels are apparently attached to op* rating fleet units and are estimated to be urmed5 to. cruise type missile, the SS-I. This missile Is therefore

. d to be in production for operational use at the present time, elthctgh the ccope and ciaracter of tho program are not known. ;a. KconceAc Icrolicatio-Ta of Soviet Missile Production Pre grigs

(siantlty production and deployment of guided raise lie systems In the U'HR vill involve directly theesources aid nsopover

There is some evidence revealing tbe existenceubmarine modified to launch miealle3. It Is estimated tbat this submarine carries the. ballistic type) missile nnd that this Biosllo vill be used in the first Soviet nuclear guided alsalle submarine. On this baaln theissile would be currently inicn for operational use.

reatIndustrial, occtoro of the Soviet economy/ The most

significant requiromonto'ieM. ouch on opecirOlxed metals, aechinery, electronics and electrical equipment, preclcilon instruments, cheatcala' aad chemical equipment, and railroad equip*mnt. In addition, the missile industry makes substantial demandn for vcjlous economic servlees, such aa transportation, construction and ccemnml cations.

Itrr tho most part, tbe requirements of tho mine Ho industry can probably be met by existing Soviet Industrial facilities, after the necescary expansion or conversion of Individual Installations, although soma new construction might be undertaken to meet the needs for finaly, engine, and engine test facilities for the larger ballistic missiles. The limited evidence which is presently available suggests that converted facilities are being used for Soviot missile production end ttat these facilities have been selected from several different Industries. Immediately after World War U, for example, tho Soviets centeredssembly program In aa arcs plant and the engine program In an airframe plant vhlch became disassociated froarcrcft industry. be Soviets placed their surface-to-slr missile fabrication and assembly In two former airframe plnutn. Atotor vehicle plant was probably being used for telliiitlc missile assembly.

"ho extent to which the Soviet missile production androem competes with other Soviet objectives, as wallo llliell-tood cf shortages of critical resouroas, products or macpoea- vhlch

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night delay seriously the program, will be determined primarily by tbe else apace of the program tbe USSR attempts to carry out. Oocaissile systems have been developed to the point of becoming available for series production, the problems associated with their production in quantity are not unlike those involved in tie production of any other new end complex occnanlon. These are principally concerned vith t'oe lead times required, the orginidation of the production processes, the coordination and time-phasing of the production efforts of several hundred participants, and feasible rates of production build up. All of these factors vill have been taken Into account and worked out in detail by Soviet planners veil before production actually begins, and the entire missile production program vill have boon Integrated vith o'lher Soviet industrial and military program* and requirements. Similarly, basic decisions will have been made vith respect to the priority to bo accorded the missile program relative to othernd the extent to which other activity ai(4it have to be curtailed If the Missile objectives ere to be met.

fchilo there vill undoubtedly be problems and difficultwithin individual ttisslb; production programs, it is doubtful that shortages cr bottlenecks vill exiut vhlch, given the high priority of the missile program, would delay production for any significant time period. He believe that the USSR possesses the necesssry industrial skills and material snd humoa reoo-rrceo to produce aiosUee, launching, handling sod aipport equipient ii quantity aud Uiateral tho USSut can proballv achieve sny civile prcductlon gcel vhlch Soviet lenders have

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as feasible without encountering InourtaountableIn the eventery large production program compressedbrief time period, particularly with respect to the ICBM, wouldbe likely to experience production problems of sum cleatto Jeopardise success of the program.

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factors apfectim soviet

hieshk raomcTioirnEPLonEm

(Supplementary CIA/AFCIH Contributionji-J'S'?

CIA/RRORB Project)

of Research and Reports. io .

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This paper contains estimates of the present status of the Soviet production programs for ICBMs and surface-to-air missile systems. These statements hove been prepared at the request of tbe Chairman, OMAIC, and are intended to replaceespectively, of thecontribution to GMAIC forated

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Our estimate of the etatus of the Soviet ICBM produc-

tion program ie based on indirect evidence

various statements of Soviet leaders

on the status of the ICEK program, our knowledge of Soviet industrial programs and practices, and our belief that the Soviets are following an orderly and effective ICBM program intended toubstantial capability at the earliest reasonable date.

There is evidence that, in addition to Moscow, the city of Sverdlovskenter of some activity of major significance to the Soviet ICBM and/or space flight programs and that this activity probably began In

Thin

Information indicates that Sverdlovsk has been closely linked to the Tyuratam Missile Test Range since7 (before the range vashat there hasontinuing and growing asso-elation betveen Sverdlovsk and Tyuratam throughout this period.

onclusionenerally consistent with information

-hat missile production began

at armaments plantn Sverdlovsk: in7 and reached the serial production stage The latter information, however, reportedlyedium or intermediate range ballistic missile, whereas f-

clearly indicate the

involvement of Sverdlovsk in the ICBM/space program at Tyuratam.

is also evidence

that

second

Kuybyshev, may be engaged in some major aspect of the Soviet ICBM/space program.

An in the

case of Sverdlovsk, there also appears to be an association between

Kuybychcv and Dneprop^wwyumiyj6.

If our belief Is correct that the activity at Sverdlovsk and possibly at Kuybrshev is concerned vlth ICBM production, either of the missile or some major component, the dates at vhlch this activity began vould reflect an early Soviet decision to establish their production facilities. Moreover, the timing of this activity is entirely consistent vlth the statements mode by Soviet leaders in tbe past year regarding the status of the Soviet program. Rotable among these have been the official statements dealing with ICBM production made by Khrushchev in8 andnhrushchev stated that "in the Soviet Union the production of Intercontinental ballistic rockets has been set up successfully". Inn discussing the final draft of the Seven Tear Plan beforet Party Congress, this wording was altered to state: "In the Soviet Union the serial production of tbe intercontinental ballistic rocket has been organized". In his concluding remarks to the fortyew days later.

Khrushchev added this statement: "When we say that ve have begun serial production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is not Just to hear ourselves talk. And we do not say this to threaten anyone, but in order to clarify the true state of affairs".

Another Important statement was made by Mallnovnky at the forty Congress. He stated: "We joyfully applaud our scientists, engineers and technicians, all the workers and toilers who created the cosmic Soviet rocket and who have equipped tbe armed forceshole series of military ballistic rockets of Intercontinental,

Ve are unable to determine from the foregoing the specific production philosophy the USSR has selected for production of its ICBM system, nor con this be Judged from examining either

at Tyuratam or post Soviet practices. Further,

there Is nothing in official Soviet statements vhlch Implies the production rates anticipated in the future, or the over-all stockpile objective the USSR may have established for this system. of the production concept and the over-all program objective, hovever, vc believe that the USSR has had ample time to organize aad Initiate serial production of ICBMs and that the first such missiles could have been delivered to operational unite.

Two basic production philosophies might be employed by the USSR. (For comparison, these philosophies vould correapond roughly to the US Atlas, Titan and Thor programs on the one hand, and to the Jupiter on the other.) The first of these assumesasic decision vould be made very early in the programs that

quantity production and operational deploymentefinite objective vhlch vould be implemented as soon as possible. It vould, therefore, call for committing resources to future serial production and operational deployment from the beginning of the program. All production, whether for research and development or for operational purposes, vould take place at the come facility or facilities, vith the first missiles and equipment coming off production lines being designated for initial developmental testing and flrlug, and the later missiles and equipment being earmarked

for delivery to operational units-: Tbe Alternative concept calls for production of Initial research and development hardwarepecial facility or design bureau,eparate facility (or facilities) organised and tooled for serial productionater date.

Both of these alternative philosophies are consistent with known Soviet industrial practice In producing modern weapons systems. We have firm evidence, for example, that inurface-to-air and shorter range ballistic missile programs, the Sovieto have organized their developmental and quantity production programs in separate facilities. In both cases, however, the development facility supplied precision design drawings to the production facility priorystem or even missile flight test program. Thus the serial production facilities were started up and tooled at an early stage and la fact appear to have provided many of the missiles used in the research and development test programs. This concept of concurrent development ond serial pro-

duction facilitlea, therefore, permits reductions in lead times in much tbe same manner as tbe single facility concept. Under either concept, the principal distinction between serial production and earlier production phases is the intended use of the missilesserially produced missilos are intended primarily for delivery to operational units rather than test firing or other developmental purposes. Moreover, short of majorin the test program which affect the basic design of the nissile system, the pace and scale of the parallel serial production

is not significantlyy test range results. In the Soviet aircraft Induetry there are numerous examples of tbe otherwherein plants producing the prototypes of bomber aircraft subsequently carried tbe aircraft directly into serial production. In some cases second and third plants tooled up and vent into serial production in parallel with the lead plant.

Soviet planners undoubtedly recognized that an early operational ICBM capability could not be acquired unless many basic decisions regarding serial production and operational deployment were made well before all technical aspects of the system had been fully proven. Prior to the initial flight testsonsiderable planning would have taken place which would form tbe basis for subsequent decisions. In accordance with our belief that the USSR intends toubstantial capability at the earliest reasonable date, wo conclude that the decision to organize aerial production and preparation of launching facilities probably vas made concurrently with or shortly after the Initial ICBM test flights andnd II launchings. Although technical difficulties have undoubtedly occurred during the testing program, we do not believe, on tbe basis of current evidence, that these difficulties have been of sufficient magnitude to interrupt or delay significantly the build up toward serial production and deployment. With the required lead times probably on tbe orderonths, the USSR has thus bad ample time to organize serial production of ICBMs, as well as to complete the preparation of some launching facilities.

We consider that an inn

tlomJTcapablMty (IOC) with.

issiles narks the beginning of tbe planned build up of the intended operational forco and represents the firsteries of deployed, fully operational ICBM units, ratherapability established primarily for final proving of all elements of the missile system ond for troop training and familiorlration purposes. Accordingly, we consider it highly probable that the Soviet IOC will be (or has been) established with serially produced mine lien, rather than prototypes. The lead time required from the production of tbe first missile intended for an operational unit to the deployment ofperational missiles on site would probably be on the orderonths, taking into account slow Initial rates of production build up and diversion of some missiles to other uses, transportation and handling times, depot checkout requirements, and emplacement of the operationally approved missiles on launchers.esult, even If the IOC does not occur until wellt is probable that series production Is already underway, in the sense that one or more missiles intended for operational use hove been produced at the final assembly facility. On the other hand, if the IOC has already occurred or is about to occur, scries production must have started in8 or

In view of the Soviet statements on the status of the program and the early dates suggested by our indirect evidence and our knowledge of Soviet philosophy, together with the high priority which wo believe tho ussr attaches to attainment of an earlycapability, we must estimate that by7 or early

he USSR hod began wresources xo tVSQ production and the preparation of eoae launching facilities and that-serial production of ICBMs probably was underway by Brerial production rates uould still have been quite low, perhaps on the order of several per month, and, at most,ew- ICBMs would have been on launchers. C. Surface-to-Air Missiles

There is virtually no current evidence on the production of surface-to-air missiles for operational deployment in the Soviet Union and the Satellites. The missile currently being deployed in both the Soviet Union and East Germany has been estimated to be the same missile as that appearing in tbe7 Moscow parade. Ho production information on thin missile (designatedr on the twin-boosted version reported ins available. In the summerhe Guideline missilo was also reported on the ring road near one of tbe Moscow herringbone Sites.

report conclusively

To date there has not been a

dcDouatrating the presence or sightingnown Soviet surface-to-air mlBsile

has been estimated, however, thatSA-l) missile

deployed

on the Moscow sites beginning iohere iothe production

program organization forlectronic ground environment andissile than on any other Soviet system. The

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is knowu to km

to this

well before all technical aspects of the system had been proven fully.

Plant, Khimki was

engagedrototype production ofissile In By tbe endlantushinoecond production plant, probably Plant No. kCk, Dolgcprudnaya were producing production-engineered missiles for the flight testat Kapustin Yor. At the same time the Soviets vere testing

many of the same basic control components us, structurally integrated into the newer missile.

Stabilization and control components. Including gyro assemblies forissile, were produced at tho Moscow Aircraft Instruments Plant. The missile timer was produced at Moscow Clock Plant Ho. 2. Plant, an electronics plant in Moscow, was reported to have beenissile guidance

and erector equipment for the Moscow herringbone sites was probably produced at Moscow Factory "MASBTBOSTROITEL" and at Plant, Saratov. Production of panels for the coordinates cabinet ofystem, electronic ground environment for theas reported at Plant Ho. JQk, Kuntsevo- Relays and transmitters forystem were produced in plants in Leningrad.

It has been estimated thatlectronic ground

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environment andissile were produced" fror deployment on the Moscow herringbone sites, althoughissile has never been identified on any of the sites. It is believed thatissile vas not placed in production for operational deployment and may haveevelopment forerunner of the later Ouideline missile.

It is estimated that theuideline missile probably went into production6 and probably was first deployed in the USSB We believe that the production of theissile, as veil as the production of subassemblies and component parts, would probably take place at tbe formerroduction facilities-Having acquired considerable experience in surface-to-air missile production with theissile, we believe that the USSR probably vould not encounter serious production difficulties with theissile.

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