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19
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE9
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL LVTELIJGBNCE
Th* foUotcing InUlltgenee orffanaaOont pcstielpaUd In the preparation of tkUThe Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the tnteOlgence organization* of the Deportments ot StaU, the Army, the Navy, the Atr Force, The Joint Slag, Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by the OMTIID STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD on ISoncurring uxre The Director of inteUt-gence and Research. Department of StaU; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Amy; the Assistant Chief of Navel Operations for Intelligence. De-partment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff,USAF; the Director for InteUigence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Specialthe Atomic Energy Commission Rcv'ftentative to the USIB; and the Director of the National Security Agency. Tlie Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Invettlgatton, abstained, the subject being outside of the furUdlctlon of his Agency.
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Copy
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estimate was disseminated by the Central mtelligence Agency. Thisfor the information and use of the recipient Indicated on the front cover and ofunder his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essentialbe authorized by the following officials within their respective departments.
of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
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for Intelligence, Jointor the Joint Staff
of Intelligence, AEC. for tbe Atomic Energy Commission
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to tbe Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for theDefense
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This copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning In accordance with applicable securily regulations, or returned to the Central mtelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
When an estimate Is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain Iteriod not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should beof the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with2
title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should be classified;
, ,wan>Tir?o
This material contains Information affc tbe National De funic of the within tbe meaning of^JJwr'eaplonaBo laws.SOJfloesr-"rt3, the trans-mlsslon^ps-rctmallon ot which In any manner unauthorised person li prohibited by law.
DISTKlilUTION: While House
NaUonal Security Council Department of SUte Department of Defense Operations Coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of investigation NaUonal Security Agency
TOP I 0II DT
NATIONAL INTEUIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
99
Tills estimate supersedes
This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligencewhich Is composed of representatives of the Departments of State. Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission, The Jointhe National Security Agency, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the Central Intelligence Agency. See appropriate footnotes, however, for the dissenting views of the Army, Navy, Air Force, The Joint Staff and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations. The FBIthe subject being outside of Its Jurisdiction.
A group of expert consultants working with the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee has reviewed this estimate and generally concurs with it. The estimate, with footnotes, was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on
TOI'o HUT
TABIE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE 1
SUMMARY AND
I.
It ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY
HI. SOVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES LN NUCLEAR
SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTOR
Status of Reactor
Development
Research Reactors and Reactor
Power Reactors and Reactor
Production
Propulsion and Special-Purpose
SOVIET CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR
VI. THE SOVIET NUCI-EAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION
Soviet Uranium Ore
Uranium
Heavy
Margins of
Plutonium Equivalent
Plutonium Equivalent Production
Margins of
top OBOnnT TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
VIL THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Soviet Proving
Nuclear Weapons Test
Weapon Development
Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Weapons Capabilities.
Current
Weapon Development by
Requirements In Future
Stockpiling of Nuclear
National Assembly and Stockpile
Regional or Forward Storage
Operational Nuclear Storage at
Other Operational Storage
Soviet Atomic Energy Detection
VIII. POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLOCATIONS OF FISSIONABLE
MATERIALS TO WEAPON9
Ilustrative Stockpile Allocations,nd
General
lustrative Allocations .
llustrative
Calculations of Feasible Weapons
IX. THE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AID ANDPROGRAM
X. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR
ENERGY
TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
Figure 1 Estimated Cumulative Production of Fissionable
Table 1 Major Organizational Relationships of the Soviet
Atomic Energy 11
rganisational History and Selected FunctionsPrimary Agencies of the Soviet Atomic 14
FigureNuclear Research
FigureNuclear Research Reactor
TableResearch Reactors and Reactor
Electric Power Reactor Sites
TableNuclear Power Stations and Experimental
22
Figure 6 Map -The European Soviet Satellites: Principal
Uranium Mining 28
Figure 7 Principal Uranium Mining Areas
follows 28
TableSoviet Dloc Uranium Ore ProdueUon up
4 28
TableHeavy Water 29
Figure 8 Materials Production Sites . follows 30
Table 7 Estimated 32
Table 8 Estimated Soviet Production of Nuclear Materials,
35
Figure 9 Map- -Nuclear Weapons Test. follows 36
Table 9 Soviet Massive Underground Explosions,High 40
Table 10 Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear 41
13
Table 14
Breakdown of
Comparison ot Capital Investment In Nuclearto that In Selected Industries,.
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the current status and probable future course of thc Soviet atomic energy program to
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The referenceve year period LiFor example, wc have presented roughon the cumulative production of rtulonablethroughn order to provide aindication ol what levels of production may be attained Weaponsn the other hand, extend only lo
n contrast with Khrushchev'sstatements of nuclear sufficiency, there is substantial evidence that the USSR isigh priorityof its atomic energy program. Although the atomic energy effortoriented primarily toward military applications, emphasis on non-military uses has continued to increase since the formation6 of the Chief Directorate for the Utilization of Atomic Energy. However, centralized control of nearly all aspects of the program has beenunder the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, one of three industrial ministries which were allowed to retain all-union status in spite of the general Soviet program for decentralization of industrial control.
TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES
emphasis on nuclearthe Soviet Union has continuedpast year with steady pressureall scientific frontiers.stemmed both from the USSR'sand from prompt andof open WesternNevertheless, it is estimatedbasic research in nuclearwhile highly competent infields, is not comparable inscope to that of the US.
PROPULSION REACTORS-Naval and Marine Application*
first Soviet nuclear poweredship, the icebreaker LENIN, willinto operation during theased on the status ofevidenced in the LKNINnuclear electric power plants,ubmarine propulsionhave been available late inno firm evidence of theof Soviet nuclear submarines has
ononng
been obtained to date, we estimate tbat one or possibly as many as three nuclear powered submarines could have gone into operation by the endnd that byhe Soviets could have aboutuclear powered submarines.
Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion
lthough we have no firm evidence, wc estimate that the USSR has beenin the development and testing of aircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP)and sub-systems for some time. We believe that at any Ume the USSR coulduclear testbed with at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrust during some phase of therototype reactor system suitable for subsonic cruise propulsion on nuclear heat alone could become availableut it would4 before reliable reactor systems could begin to become available for operational use.1applications of ANP wouldong test and development program, and wc estimaterototype will not be achieved until
NUCIEAR ELECfRIC POWER REACTORS
'The Assistant Chief of Stan. inUUlcence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint StaU; and the Assistant to the SecrcUrj of Defense for Special Operations do not agree with the first Uiree sentences of paragraphbove, and believe Instead tbat the USSR has been engaged In the hlfrli priority development and testing ofcomponents and sub-systems for some time, andeactor system sol table for nuclear propulsion of subsonic aircraft could be available to the Soviets
he USSR is exploring the advantages of various types of power reactors in an effort to obtain competitive nuclear power and Is constructing several large plants. It is also certain tbat they will fail by at least two years to reach the objectives laid down6 In their sixth five-year plan. However, they have madeprogress, and it is estimated that they willlectrical megawatts (EMW) of installed nuclear generating capacity
CONTROILED THERMONUCLEAR REACTIONS
oviet research on controlledreactions appears to have begun ineriod, and the present scope of its program Is comparable to and almostar with that of the US and UK_ This program could be successful inontrolled thermonuclear reaction as soon as any other group in the world, but the production of useful energy cannot be expectedong time.
FISSIONABU MATERIALS PRODUCTION Uranium Ore
he avalLability of substantia!ore reserves within the Soviet Bloc and particularly the USSR Indicates that the amount of uranium ore production is limited only by the investment the Soviets wish to make in the program and notcarcity of exploitable ore deposits. Tlie exploitation of these resources is being steadily expanded. We estimate Utat0 metric tons of recoverable uranium will be minedf whichetric tons will come from the USSR andetric tons from the Satellites. These amounts are in excess of that required to support the current estimates ofmaterials production.
e have firm evidence that there are gaseous diffusion plants at Verkhney-vinsk and Tomsk which have been ln
ODQRE-T-
operation since thehird plant, near Angarsk, may have gone into operation during the first halfhere is evidence of continuingof the capacities of these three
estimate that the Soviets willthe equivalent0yhis cumulative amount willtog.nresentscumulative production atuphe actualup1 could range withinthc stated values, with even greaterafter that year.'
Phi ionium Equivalent*
eriod,put plutonium productionoperation at sites located inof Kyshtym, Tomsk, and prob-
In order lo accept the estimate or cumulative productionFigureie Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence.ot the Navy, finds that he would have to accept major factors of Soviet capability since IBM which are In his opinion not sufficiently supported by available evidence. These factors Include: (a) Initial operauoo dates of new plants. <b> decree of enrichment and depletion ofproduced, (cl useew diffusionand new equipment, and (d> over-all plant efficiency. However, hehat Uie assumpUon Uiat an improved technology and improved plant efficiency have been developed and Incorporated In new plants Installed) is consistent with known Sovietcapabilities. The Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUons for Intelligence. Department of the Navy, believes that thc lower limits of the estimated values for the cumulaUve productionJl are Uie more nearly correct The producUon of plutonlum and all otherisotopes Is of necessity esUniaied coUecUvcly In terms of equivalent quanUUea of plutonlum ably Krasnoyarsk. We have evidence of continuing expansion at these sites.
'In view of the uncertainty of Information as to the possible form and itae of stockpiled uranium, as well as the uncertainty of Information as to the Input of uranium metal Into productionoperaUon. the Assistant Chief or Naval Operations for intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that the lower limit of thc esU-mate represents the most probable value tor plutonlum producUon.
Wc estimate that the Sovietproduction of plutonium equivalent will haveotal of0 kg. byhis amount willhave increased to something in the order0 kg. bynresents the estimated cumulative production at each mid-year uphe actual production up1 could range from one-third to twice the stated values, with even greaterpresent after thate estimate that as muchf thc total plutonium equivalent produced would be in the form of tritium up toith this percentageafter that date.
The Soviets probably had strongincentives lo process fully allore. However, if this course were followed andstimate iscorrect, the actualof plutonium equivalent would be substantially greater than the mostvalues indicated above. On the othereliable minimum estimate amounts to about one-third of the stated values.
Our estimates of the Sovietmaterial production made in8 have not materially altered, but additional information obtained over the past year has increased our confidence in
'POP DHOR fl-T-
estimated Soviet productionp
NUCLEAR WEAPONS Test Program
Soviet nuclear weaponprogram has growngreat progress in weaponsand included the test of aof devices from whichplanners can draw inrequirements. Soviet testsconducted with yields ranging1 kiloton (KT) tomegatons
J
of theoviet
Jwere conductedhis effortarkedin their test program and wasdesigned to exploit, in the faceossible test ban, the several avenues of investigation which emerged fromtest series. We have evidencethat some relatively low-yield tests were conducted by the USSRf
j
analyses of theSoviet tests conductedoncertedcontinued on thermonuclearYieldsT
]
Soviets further developed
less thanT)
weapons possibly for air defense oruse.
Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
We estimate that9 the Soviets have the capability to produce nuclear missile warheads with weightsounds. These same devices could be used in bombs ifweight is allowed for the bombThe Soviets could also9 fission weapons with yields of from one toTariety of weights and dimensions. If no further nuclear testing occurred, thesecould only be marginally improved. However, with continued unlimitedthe Soviets could improve tbematerial economy of these weapons, increase the rnaximum yield, and develop still further weapons toide variety of military requirements.
In theeriod, we do notthe advancement of Soviet nuclear weapon development to be as rapid as in the past, since we believe that they havetate of the art where major improvements in performance are difficult to achieve.
Although no major changes have been made in the Soviet weapons development capabiUties from those estimated innalyses of the Soviet tests8 Indicate that[
]
Nuclear Weapons Stockpiling
e believe that extensive long-range plansispersed assembly andsystem were under way at least as
GEOHlrr-
earlyhe development andof these long-range plans have been closely integrated with the growth of Soviet nuclear weaponcapacity, and the design andof the physical facilities have paralleled specific requirementsfrom developing nuclear weapon designs.
e believe that at least threeassembly and stockpile sites were built by, and possibly are operated by, the Ministry of Medium Machine[
]They are believed to be the central part of the Sovietweapons logistics system and are designed to supply weapons for all types of military nuclear delivery systems.
ALLOCATION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
We have insufficient evidence toa firm estimate of the Soviet weapons stockpiles by number, by type, byor otherwise. Accordingly, insuch an estimate we are forced to rely on our general assessments of over-all Soviet military policy and strategy and on our estimates of the types of weaponand missions which might employ nuclear weapons wholly or in part.
To derive Illustrative weaponwe have combined our specificof Soviet development andof nuclear weapon delivery systems, studies of probable targets for nuclear weapon systems, the estimatedof fissionable materials, andinformation on stockpilingand doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons. All of the above factors are subject to appreciable margins of error.
]
ur knowledge of tho location and nature of storage facilities available to the military is amfined principally to two types of operational storage sites located at airfields of Long Range Aviation. We estimate that, in addition to these sites, facilities for nuclear weapons storage exist at several naval airfields andof the Tactical Aviation. Although no nuclear weapon storage facilities have been identified at naval surface facilities or co-located with ground force units, we believe that appropriate storagefor them probably cdst.
Assistant chlcl of Naval OperaUons (orDepartment of Uie Nary, believes that Uie range of possible Soviet quantltaUve allo-caUoru to weapons itockpUes Is so broad that, in Tie* of the status of available Intelligence on this subject (as Indicated In. an eaUmate of "possible allocations" Is unreallsUc and or doubtful usefulness. Therefore, he does not concur wilh the general methodology em-ploytd to derive this section or with Uie lllus-traOve allocations (paragraph
' Tbe Assistant Chief of Staff for mtelligence.of the Amy, does not concur with tho methodology emplorod to derive this secUon or with the -Tlluslrauve aUoeaUons" (paragraph Mt. In view of the Insufficiency of evidence on this subject (as Indicated In. he considers Unit the -Illustrative allocations" are merely highly speculative posslbUIUes selected arbitrarily from an almost Infinite number of alternaUve choices. At best such theorizing from unsupportednrealistic and of doubtful value; Itigh risk ofmisuse, for example, in briefings for budgetary or planning purposes, leading to the danger of miscalculation by those responsible for naUonal security.
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OIiK'Ji
varying the number ofallocated to the(LRA) wo have arrived atallocations. Alternativegreater emphasis on weaponsof ground forces andlaces dominanton long range strike forces.the total number. For Alternative Abefor the LRA and for missilesof employment against theAlternative B, there wouldigh-yield weaponsuses. Inhe numbervariesotal ofithhigh-yield weapons for the LRAmissiles capable ofthe US,otal ofithhigh-yield weapons for thesethe estimated availabilitymaterials and the levelnuclear weapons technology,that at present tlie USSRpossesses sufficientajor attack by itsstriking forces, includingwarheads for all of itslaunched missiles andballistic missilesand greater. At present theof fissionable material will limitof nuclear weapons availabledefense and tactical uses. Thiswill be considerably alleviated
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AID AND PROGRAM
Soviet Union apparently hasbehind her oilers oftechnical aid to other nations throughout the world. Tlie Soviets have used their aid and exchange program to improve and tighten their relationship with Bloc nations whileubstantial degree of control over the atomic energy activities in theseIn the offers to the Free World nations, the objective has been largely one of propaganda,
is little doubt that thehas the technical capability tothe offers of aid that have beenof equipment, radioisotopes,technical training to thebeen largely fulfilled. Offers tocountries, however,i-iateral basis, andnor Yugoslavia has aoperation at present. Sovietin exchange conferences withworld appears to be slantedpurposes and collectioninformation on westerndevelopments.
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM *
estimate that thecost of the Soviet nuclearthroughas been overrubles includinglant and equipment and aboutfor operating expenses. Totalhave been less thanfgross national product inIn monetary terms, Sovietin plant and equipment for fisslon-
Assistant Chief ofOoeraUow (orDepartment ot the Navy, does notIn the economic secUon because It Is baaedethod ol cost analysts that he docs not consider con be applied lo Uie USSR fissionable materials estimate.
encn
8
GIrORB-T-
materials production has beenf that of the US, but because of estimated low process efficiencies the estimated Soviet plant capacities arevery much smaller. These and other cost estimates must be considered as first approximations and are subject to wide margins of error; however, it is felt that they adequately reflect generaland relations.
INTRODUCTION
general nature and some of thethc Soviet atomic energy program canwith reasonable reliability.be no doubt that thc USSR isexpand its extensive atomic energy program
high priority basis and to direct Ittoward military applications.
Available information still does notprecise estimates of Soviet fissionableproduction. However, additionalhas been obtained over the past year which Increases our confidence in theSoviet productionp
Technical methods of collection continued to provide high quality coverage of Uicnuclear weapons test program. We have also achieved more understanding of Soviet weapon stockpiling practices from reliable In-formaUon received during the past year.
II. ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
tohe operation ofatomic energy program was thetwo chief directorates attached to theof Ministers. The First ChiefItself with fissionable materialsand with nuclear weaponproducUon. The Second Chiefwas responsible for raw materials.Uic development of new uraniummining, and ore concentration andboth inside and outside Uic USSRChief Directorate,was also attached to the Councilprovided supply andfor both the First and SecondL. P. Beriya was theChairman of Uie Council ofexercised over-all dirccUon of theof the Soviet atomic energy program.
After thc arrest of Beriya Inhe Ministry of Medium Machine Building was created with V. A. Malyshev as Uie minister. The new ministry gradually assumed all the functions of the three chief directorates and over-all control and direction of thc Soviet atomic energy effort.
The formationeparate "peaceful uses" atomic energy coordinating body, the Chief Directorate for the Utilization of Atomic Energy attached to the Council of Ministers, to be headed by Ycflm P. Slavskiy. wasby TASS inlavskiythis position until his appointment as Minister of Medium Machine Building tn7 Inhe USSRthe appointment of Dr. VasUly S. Yemcl'yanov to replace Slavskiy as Chief of the Chief Directorate, Ycmel'yanov. who has been Director of Research, for Uie atomic energy program, has headed the Sovietto both Geneva Conferences onUses of Atomic Energy.
This Chief Directorate was created toseveral announced functions: to develop coopcraUon between Uie USSR and other countries In the non-military uses of atomic energy; to make extensive use of atomic energy in Uie naUonal economy in coopcraUon with industry and to resolve problemswith this appUcallon; to designfor power stations and to developpowered engines for use Inlo build and operate experimentalto coordinate research inhe producUon and use ofand the effect of radiation on metals; and lo supply laboratories with experimental equipment such as counters, reactors, andThe Chief Directorate is alsofor Uie publicaUon of scientific and technical works on Uie uUlizaUon of atomic energy and for holding exhibits on peaceful uses of atomic energy both in the Soviet Union and in other countries.
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The third major organization concerned with atomic energy in the USSR is theof Sciences of the USSR. The role of the Academy of Sciences in the field of atomic energy has been changingthe Academy operated classified nuclear laboratories of the USSR which directlythe programs of the Ministry ofMachine Building and its predecessor, the First Chief Directorate.
The Ministry of Medium Machine Building Is responsible for all production aspects of the atomic energy program, tho Chief Directorate for the Utilization of Atomic Energythe application of non-military uses of atomic energy within the USSR and theof tho USSR with other countries in these matters, and the Academy of Sciences is apparently used to advise and conductresearch for both the Ministry and the Clilef Directorate. The majorrelationships of the Soviet atomic energy program are presented in Table 1.
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it
83
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he Ministry ol MediumBuilding has been gradually removing all classified work from several of thesensitive atomic energyubna, Moscow Atomic Energy Institute. Moscow Thermo technical Institute, Obninsk Reactor ResearchlngradInstitute. The Academy of Sciences isassuming more direct control over their activities, and il is apparent that the Academy now controls the following:
research which thewilling to release in tlie fields ofphysics and accelerators,reactions, researchreactor physics, and biology andand radioisotopes; and
respect to East-WestRussian participation inactivities and visits of Westerntbe USSR,
Nuclear research and developmentand institutes appear lo be grouped into several general areas according to theof the work conducted therein and their organizational subordination orThe USSR maintains that the Academy of Sciences controls all basic research in the USSR, operating the vast majority of theinstitutes and laboratories. However, we believe that the Minister of MediumBuilding controls al least theof nuclear fuels for peaceful uses and,trict security classification policy, nuclear research and technical aid.
Identification of the organizational rela-llonsliips affecting the research, uraniumfeed materials production, and fissionable materials production aspects of the Soviet atomic energy program has been based onfirm evidence. Organizationalaffecting the nuclear weapon design, development, testing, and storage aspects of the program are less well denned.
Very little is known of the Soviet nuclear weapons and research laboratories atmaterial production sites, either withto size, scope, manpower or past and present subordination. It is believed that these laboratories are under the directof and operated by tbe Ministry ofMachine Building. We believe that the principal Soviet weapons development center is located hi the vicinity ofubordination of this researchalso is believed to have been to the First Chief Directorate3 and to theof Medium Machine Building thereafter.
The nuclear wcajwris proving ground at Sermpalatinsk and Installations supporting the test area on Novaya Zemlya are probably under the operational control of the military. Test activity Itself Isoint effort by both the military and the scientificinvolved, with the Ministry of Medium Machine Building exercising technical
We believe that the Ministry of Medium Machine Building is responsible for theof national assembly and stockpile sites and that the Individual services arefor the operational storage of nuclear weapons. We have no information as to which Soviet governmental element isfor the allocation of nuclear weapons from the national stockpile to the individual services. We believe, however, that thismost likely restsommittee composed or the highest ranking members of the Soviet government, who represent jointly the economic, political, and military interests of the Soviet stale.
Recent evidence suggests that atomic energy has not been the sole concern of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building but that at least one Soviet missile designhas also been subordinate to thisLate3 the Uningradskoyc Shos-see Instituteoscow, was transferred to the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. LSI reportedly worked on guidance andsystems for air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surf ace-to air missiles. However, the extent of the association between the Ministry ofMachine Building and the Soviet guided missile program remains unknown.
t Is significant that the Ministry olMachine Building Is ono of tho three remaining all-union industrial ministries in the USSRn conformance with Khrushchev's decentralization program, lhe all-union industrial ministries have beengradually and their functionsto regional economic councils. Bythe Ministry of Medium Machine Building as an all-union ministry, thc USSR continues toigh degreetrict, centralised control orer at least all production phases of the atomic energy program. The organisational history of the Soviet atomic energy program isgraphically in Table 2.
top ononiiT
5
SOVIET TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES INENERGY
INTRODUCTION
emphasis on nuclear technologySoviet Union during the past yearwith steady pressure on nearlyfrontiers. Advances in Soviethave stemmed both from theefforts and from prompt andof open Western scientific work.
NUCLEAR PHYSICS
Significant advances in Soviet nuclear physics have been made during recent years. Among them areillion electron-volt (Mev) synchrocyclotron0 billion(Bev) proton synchrotron whichlimited operation7 but has only recently attained designed proton beamIn addition,ev prototype0 Bev proton synchrotron using strongis nearing completion at the Thermo-lechnical Laboratory, Moscow. Also under construction at the present limeyclotron specifically designed for acceleration of heavy ions,
Various sources reveal that Soviethave become competent in standard measurement techniques employed in nuclear spectroscopy. In addition. Ihcy have initiated their own refinements and innovations in this field. An intensive and competent Sovietappears to be directed toward theof high-resolution time-of-flightspectrometers. They are currentlya pulsed reactor design to supply high flux bursts of neutrons in conjunction with time-of-flight neutron spectroscopy.
However, the obvious priority accorded by the Soviets to their high energy nuclear physics research has probably diverted effort from the less dramatic but equally important low energy research. In general, it isthat the Soviet Union still lags behind the US substantially in basic nuclear research and that the deficiency lies mainly in the quantity and diversity of the research being performed.
The Soviets' open literatureigh degree of technical competence In most fields of nuclear chemistry. Various Soviet publicationsidespread and rapidly growing use of radioisotopes in research and industry. The Soviets have studiouslyany discussion In the open literature of uranium or heavy isotope separation.
In the last year and one-half the Soviets have started to publish on chemical,methods, particularly on solventIt appears that chemical separations technology in the USSR is fairly welland that the Soviet Union apparentlyorkable solvent extractionearlier than previouslyaboratory process described atonference on Peaceful Uses Included, according to the Soviet paper, provisions for removal of radioactive materials. Iodine,and xenon In order to facilitate the re-usc of nitric acid solvent.
The Soviet work which was revealed in papers presented at8 Genevaon Peaceful Uses indicates that theiron ion exchange techniques and on separation and identification of transuranium compounds may be lagging behind similarIn the US. Furthermore, they do not seem to have put much effort as yet into advanced separation techniques such asvolatility and pyrometallurgical
NUCLEAR METALLURGY
Soviet emphasis on the field of nuclear metallurgy continues to be very strong. The Soviet effort is being assisted slightly by the Satellite countries not only in coordinated production but also in coordinated research on such metals as lithium, beryllium,and thorium.
8 Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses indicated that the major research efforts in Soviet nuclear metallurgy have beenwith uranium, plutonium and There Is reason to believe tliat nearly
fp-
all the essential metallurgy of uranium and plutonium for weapons and for conventional reactors is now known to Soviet metallurgists. Soviet research on plutonlum alloys forsolid and liquid reactor fuels apparently has been more extensive than that in Western countries. It is very possible that In the area of fused salts they have advanced to the stage that would permit the preparation Inquantities of the extremely pure metals required in nuclear reactor construction.
exploitation of fundamentalbeen emphasized by the Sovietsregard to structural materials suchfor nuclear power reactors, Itthat the Soviets are making usebest features of both Soviet and USThey have concentrated theabout one hundred scientists onplutonlum and plutoniumlarge number for such aof science. We estimate that Sovietmetallurgy is quite sufficient todemandsrogressive nuclear program.
INSIRUMENrAflON
reactor control andis not as elaborate as that found inBecause the Soviet control systemsunder stringent safeguards criteria,easier to design and construct, and Itthat automatic and continuouscontrol has not been emphasized.
MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY
estimate that within about tenSoviets will have enlarged theirprogram to fill present gaps incoverage, and their work willsophisticated. They may utilizeanimal research facilities tolong-term radiationpecific field in which theforge ahead of the rest of theSoviets will continue to investigateof radiation on the centraland will retain their presentover the West. Tho Soviets willthc US in use of radioisotopes forand therapy, in general radiobtology, in tracer work, in theory of action of radiation, and in health physics.
use of radiological techniquesmaterials in biological andresearch lags behind similar effortsWest in both quantity and quality.some narrowing of this gap isthe period of this estimate.
LABORATORIES
laboratories throughout thehave contributed to the atomicalthoughew have borneweight of the work. The InstituteEnergy of the Academy of Sciences(formerly Laboratory U) hason heavy isotope separation anddevelopment and is now the centerControlled Thermonuclearwork. The adjacentas been responsible forof uranium ores; uranium andmetallurgy; and, with tho Radiumin Leningrad, for development ofseparations technology. Thc Radiumhas also contributed cross-sectionthe reactor program. The StateRare MetalsEDMET) has workedextraction and metallurgy ofzirconium, and othernecessary to the program. Inthe USSR Academy of Sciencesvast network of research institutes andsuch as the Tomsk Polytechnicwhich are engaged In the broadscience and technology or occasionallyfields, and at which some basicpertaining to nuclear energy isMany educational institutesMinistry of Education are also engagednuclear studies. Priority isto the nuclear sciences in thoof major new centers of scienceThe development of these largeand training centers willSoviet scientific capabilities.showing major Soviet nuclear3.)
TOP EliCnBT
THE SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
SrAIUS OF REACTOR TECHNOLOGY
The USSR has demonstrated excellentin reactor technology and has aand comprehensive reactor program, which has grown considerably during the last three years. The USSR has made the greatest advances In the important fields oi heatthe superheating of steam directly ln reactors, and the development of plutonium breeder reactors.
The present Soviet reactor capacity isalmost exclusively to plutoniumBoth graphite-moderated and hcavy-water moderated types arc in use. There Is reason to believe tliat Soviet technology has been conventional In this field and has shown no outstanding advances.
The USSR is not committedpecific power reactor type but Instead is exploring the advantages of various types in prototype reactors and reactor experiments in an effort to obtain competitive nuclear power.
the USSR, pressurized waterappears to be the most advanced. power reactors which the Sovietsbuild in the USSR in the nearwater as the coolant in eithervessel or pressure tubethe Soviets are definitelyboiling-water reactors, but they appearawaiting further development ofwater technology before utilizingof reactor. Little Soviet work hason organic moderated reactorsfueled reactors. Largereactors are being designed to userelatively low enrichmenturanium. Soviet scientists areto obtain high burnups (forMWD/ton In their pressurizedin fuel elements in order tocost of nuclear power. Sovietfor reactor safety are not stringentstandards; however, there isgrowing Soviet concern with reactorand controls.
is estimated that the Soviets areto overcome the materialsIn the construction ofreactors for aircraft and rocket
DEVaOPMfcNT HISTORY
There are three known major Installations for reactor development in the Soviet Union. Two are administratively subordinate to the Academy of Sciences, although their research programs are probably under the operational control of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. The first is the Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, which is directed by I. V. Kurchatov, and the second is the Thermotech-nical Laboratory. The third reactor research center is composed of the laboratories at Obninsk which have now been organized into the Institute of Physics under thecontrol of the Chief Directorate for the UUlizatlon of Atomicew large establishment for reactor experiments is now being set up near Kuybyshev Lake inOblast*.*
Tho first reactor built in the USSR was the so-called "Fursovhich Is believed to have gone criticalhis reactor was designed to demonstrate the feasibility of sustaining andhain reactionatural uranium-graphite pile. Thesecond experimental reactor, which was heavy-water moderated and cooled, went critical at the Thermotechnical Laboratory in Moscow Inoth these reactors furnished information which contributed to the final design of large plutonium production reactors.
The Soviets recognized early that they would have to build up their experimental facilities in order to develop more advancedtypes. The Reactor Physical Technicalhe Soviet equivalent of the USTesting Reactor, was brought up to its
locations of nuclear research reactor sites are Indicated In Fieure 4.
IE
power otegawatts latehis reactor gave the Soviets the means to test fuel elements, cooling systems, andmaterials under actual reactorand furnished information forlectrical megawatt (EMW) nuclear power station at Obninsk, which was put into operationhe RPT was precededank-typeand water-cooled research reactor (thehich was used for shielding studies. This type reactor is being exported to Ave of the satellite countries. At the same time, the Soviets were undoubtedly carrying outexperiments and critical assembly work on other reactor types. Known reactor experiments have included the construction and operationeryllium-moderated(theIF, gaseous reactor, and several fast reactors employing plutonlum as fuel (BR-I,nd
RESEARCH REACTORS AND REACTOR EXPERIMENTS
t8 Geneva Conference onUses, the Soviets demonstrated that they have made marked advances In their research reactor program. Whereas at Qcncva5 the Soviets revealed only two high-fluxreactors, the Reactor Physical(RPT) and the8 they revealed the existence of three more research reactorank-type research reactor, the WR-S.hermal neutron fluxeutrons/cmVsec has been exported to severalwimming-poolthc IRT. was developed and put into operation in7 at the institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow. This reactor Is the prototype for reactors which will be built at educational and research Institutes in Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Tashkent. Minsk. Tbilisi. Kiev, Leningrad and otherhart of research reactors currently In operation in the USSR Is shown in Table 3,
top oikjhbt
a s
5
)
* il
s 3
I
ill
a
O is
Ts7
-
o2 Sj"
8 S
8
ll
1
i1
F
S 1
o o o
J
In oi
P RBOliHf-
The Soviets are also making progress in the development of high flux research reactors of novel design, such as the flux-trap and pulsed types. They aremega-watt intermediate research reactor using the flux trap principle, which is expected to yield continuous duxes* neutrons/cmVulsed reactor is being built at Obninsk for the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research at Dubna. This reactor should also produce average fluxes in thc order. Such reactors are useful for radiation damage studies and large-scale production ofelements. The Soviet Union appears to be prepared to go ahead with such projects on the basis of very limited experimental data.
POWER REACTORS AND REACTOR EXPERIMENTS
t is almost certain that the Soviets will faileriod of at least two years to reach the nuclear power objectives laid down in the Sixth Five-Ycar Plan. This Plan called for the installationegawatts of nuclear generating capacity by the endt the present time, the USSR avoids mention of any fixed goal in terms of nuclear megawatts installedertain date. The Soviets are proceeding cautiously with the construction of power reactors of severaltypes to determine the economicof each. Wc estimate that they will obtain an additional amount of electric power from dual-purpose reactors.
he present plan for construction ofpower stations with sites and estimated dates of completion is shown in the chartt is estimated that the USSR willegawatts of installed nuclear generating capacityhe Soviets have indicated that they will review theexperience with their nuclear power stations and select particular reactor types for their "second-round" of large powerIt is Impossible to predict whichtypes the Soviets will select. However, the majority of large power stations under construction are of the graphite-moderated, pressure-tube reactor type, one of which uses nuclear superheat. The locations of present and planned nuclear-electric power reactors is indicated In Figure 5.
TOP 0
tnbee4
soviet npclbar foutr stations axp experimental ckhttm
nuelear power btattoaa
waur-coeaed.wt tab* coacfb-
poealbly tomik 6
1 water-moderated weier-cbofed,aura vmhi cce-
1
leningrad
i faet plutonium breeder
i package power.
t-
water-cooted, pr**-
i beiliac water ee-aetor
i orapblte-modexated. waier-coom. fma-aure tube cocsgu-relton
clyaao-rt
glee. power
l
power (total mw)
loading
ratio
annually (Kt)
(oo
toiu
ofetal
easuxed
iota of n% o
bmtel
at be-ginning alt end
e*oj
u* uo,oo* el naturalml
same aa voiionkzh station
1
to
kf ofetal
breed ing ratio claimed.
oj
3
assumed
date or
first reactor in oparatloa in
empljr, anelear aupar-
3Bdims.1st reactor probably la . 9 ar
0
let reaetor probably Id operation.
now in early planning
first soviet nuclear power station. prototype of beloyerek raaetora. usedfor *t> perbswata, ae weal aa power pro
wm betill forl obasaak aad probably moved i-
targe pwrs.
ill
mil!
bit
24
OEOBliT-
REACTORS
s stated Int Is believed that experience gained with the Fursov Pile at the Institute of Atomic Energy and the heavy-water reactor at the Thexmotechnical Laboratory contributed to the final design of early production reactors in the USSR. It is further believed that Soviet plutonium production reactors of both the graphite and heavy-water moderated types are still being built. The Second Geneva Conferencethat the large new Soviet dual-purpose reactor Is graphite-moderated andetailed discussion of Sovietproduction sites and productionis given in Section VI,.
PROPUISION AND SPECIAl-PURPOSE REACTORS
Naval and Marine Reactors
he Soviet Union hasefinite interest in nuclear propulsion for several types of merchant and naval vessels.
first Soviet nuclear-poweredship, tho Icebreaker LENIN,at Leningrad in Decemberin8 three nuclearof the pressurized waterwere installed In this ship.that the LENIN will be putduring the latter half
the past few years there hasincreasing number of reportsexistence and production ofsubmarines. However, we haveevidence that any are inWc estimate, based on the statustechnology evidenced in paperstho LENIN and the largeelectric power production, thatdateuclearubmarine could have beenfor installation wasndcould have had one or possiblyas three nuclear submarines inby the endeestimate that byhchave aboutuclear powered
c. All Soviet nuclear propelled2 will probably utilize the PWR with enriched fueLhc Soviets will have developed all of the following reactor types sufficiently to be able to apply them to nuclear propulsion:water, gas-cooled cycle, sodium-cooled, and homogeneous.
Aircraft and Rocket Reactors
lthough we have no firmhorough survey of the literature and current Soviet research and development indicates that the Soviets intend to develop an aircraft nuclear propulsion system. We estimate the Soviets are capable oflying testbed airborne at any time in the next few years with at least one nuclear power unituseful thrusthase of the flight. The results of this program are expected to leadseful nuclear propulsion system. We estimaterototype reactor system suitable for cruise propulsion on nuclear heat alone for subsonic aircraft could be available to the Sovietsut that it would4 before reliable reactor systems could begin to become available for operational use."
Supersonic applications of ANP wouldong test and development program, and we estimaterototype will not be achieved untilhey have probablyfeasibility studies on several possible reactor coolant systems for aircraft nuclear propulsion purposes. It is not known whether the coolant system to be finally utilized will be mated to either turboprop or turbojet alr-
-
B Tbe Assistant Chief of Stall, Intelligence, USAK; the Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff; and the Assistant to the Secretary ot Defense for Special Operations do not agree with the first four sentences ofnd believethat the USSR has been engaged In the high priority development and testuie of reactor components and sub-systems lor some time, andeactor system suitable for nuclearof subsonic aircraft could be available to thc Soviets In
TUP t-B
engines. The Soviet Union has also probably conducted feasibility studies onramjet engines.
It Is estimated that thc Soviet Union is at this time engaged inuclear rocket engine. Dr. Leonid I. Scdov was quoted at the International Astronautlcin Romo,s saying that Soviet atomic rocket research was progressing at various Institutes throughout the Soviet Union. Although the Sovietsell-rounded program of research Inrefractory compounds and high-flux reactor facilities are now under construction for materials testing within the Soviet Union, it is estimated that no more than preliminary constructionuclear rocket test facility has begun.
It ts known that the Soviet Union hasmetallurgical research which is also applicableuclear ramjet program.
Nuclear Propulsion for Land Vehicles
is estimatedrogram for thepropulsion of land vehicles begantime the USSR realised that suitabletypes were probably feasible.the Soviets have made manythe feasibility of nuclear propulsionvehicles and to the existence of aprogram. The announced SovietIncludes nuclear propulsion fortruck-trailer trains forhauling, and "commercialthe reactor types under study bywhich are potentially adaptablevehicles are the pressurized-water,boiling, end the liquid-metal reactors.
Small Power Reactors
nuclear power plants, bothand mobile, with military as well asconstruction and agriculturalhave been officially announced asthe Soviet reactor developmentmobile stations are to be mounted oncaterpillar, and special military typesunder study which willnormal" transport plane inway that the various reactor parts can be air-dropped and then reassembledery short time.
transportable station intended forIndustrial construction sites lackingsources of electrical energy wasat8 Geneva ConferenceUses. This package reactora pressurized-water reactor with acapacity assembledesselmeter in diameteretersWaterressureis used as coolant and moderator.was scheduled to be assembled atat the end8 to undergono scheduled dates are knownof other projects In theprogram, the announced goalsbe qualitatively consistent with theof Soviet reactor technology.
V. IHE SOVIET CONTROLlED REACTIONS PROGRAM
Soviet research on ControlledReactions (CTR) appears to haveIneriod with some basic theoretical work by I. Ye. Tamm and A. D. Sakharov. The Soviet program remained under tight security until6 when I. V. Kurchatov, the Director of the Institute of Atomic Energyoscow,aper at Harwell. England, which gave the technical details and recorded dataigh current dischargearefied gas in attempts to attain fusion of the deuterium atoms with resulting release of energy.
The original Soviet experimental work was carried out with equipment of straight tube geometry, with which they were able to obtain approximately one million degreesAlthough neutrons were detected, the Sovets realized that they were not oforigin.
oviet research on straight tube, dynamic pinch experiments continued but on ascale. At thc time of theConference on Ionization Phenomena
In Oases att was evident that the Soviets considered thisheld little promise or success.they obtained sufficient information at the Venice Conference to permit them tothis research with at least astabilized pinch discharge. This work was variedorus geometry wasAt the Venice Conference the Soviets also disclosed that they had independentlythe "magnetic mirror" and some of the other techniques known to thc West.
Information obtained at the SecondConference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.3ndicated that the USSR has an extensivecompetently staffed, which includes work on essentially all the known approaches to the problem of obtaining useful power from controlled thermonuclear reactions. Also at the Second Geneva Conference, thc Sovietsthe existence of their ALPHA. Tillsarge toruslightly larger copy of tho British ZETA, which was apparently constructed during the period when the United Kingdom was over-optimistteally announcing their success with ZETA. No results of work on this machine have been published.
Research has been carried out usinggeometries, or the so-calledate Inust prior to the opening of the Geneva Conference, the Soviets revealed their largest machine. OGRA. Thisarge "mirror" machine, making use of molecular beam injection and collision breakup scheme for productionlasma within the magnetic field. They failed to make use of tho much more favorable "arc-breakup" scheme but have Indicated that such amight possibly be made. OGRA had not yot then been operated owing to difficulty In obtaining the necessary vacuum.
Western scientists visiting Moscowmaller version of OGRA, this one called OGRfNA. Theyeam has never beeninjected into OGRINA. The reason for this difficulty is unknown. Construction of large, complex machines such as OGRA.first proving the principles Involved indevices. Indicates that the Soviet approach lo this problem follows the so-called "brute force" approach found In much oftechnology.
Research on stationary processes, quite similar to the highly published STELLE-RATOR process, is being conducted atunder the direction of R. Demlrkhanov.
There appear to be two major efforts In CTR research in the USSR, one of which Is under the direction of L. A. Artsimovich at the Institute of Atomic Energy. Moscow. M. A. Leonlovich, aidedew capable assistants provides the theoretical studies to support the experimental work of Artsimovich.. Golorin is in specific charge of the work on OGRA. Thc other, under Demlrkhanov at Sukhumi, was apparently unknown to the staff of lhe Moscow Institute until the advent of the Geneva Conference. Demlrkhanov gave the Impression that heairly large staff working on the problem at Sukhumi and that he was not mealing all the details of hisPractically all of thc publicationsto date by the USSR In thc field of CTR pertain to work done at the Institute of Atomic Energy, although there Is evidence of work being conducted at other locations.
here is evidence that the orer-all scope of the Soviet controlled thermonuclearprogram is comparable to and almostar with that of the Western powers. However, analysis of thc compiled evidencethat the Sovietsompleteof the problem of stabilization of thc pinch discharge but are well advanced in lhe confinement techniques and energy lossTheir research on mirror geometries appears less complex than that of the West; however, they have gone directly to theOGRA device in contrast to the Western approach to the problem. Their theoretical studies have indicated the possibilities ofin some approaches to controllednot previously recognized In the West.
n general, lhe Soviet program of research directed at obtaining controlled thermonu-
TOP CECnBT
reactions Is well staffed with capableand technical personnel, adequately supplied with money and equipment and pro-Tided with sufficient incentives and demand toell-rounded, progressive program.rogram Is deemed capable ofgood research toward attaining athermonuclear reaction as soon as any other group In the world, but useful energy cannot be expected to be obtainedong time.
VI. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALSPROGRAM
SOVIET URANIUM OBf PROCUREMENT Present Mining nnd Milling Activities
nformation on East German (GDlt) ore grades as well as increases in GDR uranium ore shipments to the USSR have caused us to raise slightly the estimates of containedin European Satellite ore. Theof tho Polish government production figures has caused us to lower somewhat the estimate of Polish production. We havedocumentary Information on Hungarian uranium mining operations whichominal production untilfter which production will gradually rise tohemical concentrating plant will be in operation ln Hungaryome new quantitative information is available on the other Satellites, notably Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria, and Rumania but the reliability of the information for these latter countries is considerably less. Reliable information lias been received indicating that ore procurement from the Chinese Peoples Republic, though now still small, will rise during the next few years.
The USSR has continued to exploit well-known deposits and develop new areasowever, quantitative Information on uranium ore production within the USSRto be limited for most uranium mining areas, although the situation Improved slightlye have obtained someon the Krivoy Rog district from awestern uranium geologist who visited one of several uranium mines there and was able toairly firm estimate of thefrom this one mine. Well-knownsuch as those ln tbe Fergana Valley were probably worked at the same rate asut there is some evidence that mininghave been curtailed In the low-yield,deposits of northeastern Siberia.
An analysis of ground photographsranium ore concentrating mill nearin the Caucasus built several years ago indicates that the Russians havemodern mills probably utilizing high yield recovery processes.
The estimated ore production by country for tho Soviet Bloc is presented in Tablehile the reliability of these estimates varies greatly from country to country, actual total cumulative production Is believed to be not moremallerreater than the estimated valueshese estimated amounts are more than sufficient to support current estimates ofmaterial production and allowof considerable tonnages of uranium oxide or metal (The location of Satellite and Soviet uranium mining localities Is shown in
Future Sources and Production
The US Geological Survey estimates that the Soviet Bloc has reserves ot severalthousand tons of uranium in medium grade ore deposits and an even greaterin low grade deposits. Many of theseare within the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic and could beby present ore recovery methods. By continuing present trends through thecountries of tho Sovieteasonable estimate can be made of future orealthough the possible error Inwill be necessarily very large.
There is reliable information that oreIn the GDR will begin to decreaserobablyew hundred tons per year. The level of prospecting in Easterna geologically promising area forsuggests an intention to increase or at least maintain production in that country. We judge by estimated reserves thatin Bulgaria may continue tohe USSR seems uninterested in Polish ore, which is believed to be of low grade, and at one time attempted to break thepurchasing agreement.Information indicates that the Poles would cease delivery of uranium ore8 and use their produeUon for domesticExtensive prospecting continues Inand new deposits are expected to beDetailed plans for2 suggest this country mayajor producereliable information indicates that tbe ChineseRepublic, with Soviet assistance. Is nowajor ore productionwith the possible implication that not all the resulting ore will go to the USSR.
In summary, while there is good reason forecrease in GDR ore production over the next ten years, the over-all BlocIs expected to increase considerably4anner similar to thatin Table 5.
Estimates beyond that date are somewhat speculative since actual production willupon Soviet policies and plans.our present analysis of trends Indicates that the total cumulative production will have
Total Cumula-Ure
top oncnKT-
toetric tons ofuranium by
URANIUM METAt
ranium metal ts producedarge scale at three known locations in the Soviet Union: Etektrostai'. near Moscow; aiazov, just west of the Urals; and Novosibirsk, In central Siberia. We have good information on aIncrease in production at Eicketween9 and7 andajor expansion in facilities which started at the Novosibirsk plant about two years ago.mtelligence on these three sites clearly indicates that their uranium metalcapacity is adequate to support the Soviet plutonium producUon program as esUmated herein.
UIMUH
HEAVY
imited producUon of heavy water started7 at the ChirchikCombine. Five additional facilitiesater electrolysis-catalytic exchange method went Into producUon8eventh plant, whichydrogen sulnde-watcr exchange method, went Into operation at Aleksln'*
ft
SOVIET HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION(Metric low of DrO)
Curaulalm Pro
SiO
]
t Is probable that Uie USSR has been producing enriched lithium isotopes insince atlthough the locations and capacities of Soviet lithium Isotopeplants are unknown. Substantialin thc production of lithiumwithin Uie USSR have occurred Inyears. Probable lithium productionthe amounts of natural lithium required for thc manufacture of the thermonuclear weapons. However, Bloc attempts in the last two years to procure major quantities ofore from thc West suggest that either the producUon of suitable lithium concentrates within the USSR is not yet at the desired level or that Us cost is considerably above the open market price outside Uie BIoc.
* Seeoraa the rdnluhty ot Umm Ocart*.
The Soviets recently disclosed that anscale plant using the hydrogenprocess had been built. There is fairly strong evidence thatlant had been Installed3 at the Chirchik heavy water plant which had beenaterexchange system. Totalof DjO would still be governed by Uie amount of electrolytic hydrogen available; however, the deuterium recovery therefrom could be increased by atecause of the greater efficiency of the distillation system.
By late7 work was also under way at Norilsklant using an ammoniasystem. This plant probably began
For the locations of Heavy Water Plants see He-are 8.
0 ItBT-
production abouto other heavy water plants have been identified ln the Soviet Union.
estimate the annual heavy waterol the known eight plants to bemetric tons per year. Because It isthat we are unaware of oneange of error of plusminusercent places the estimateprobable range ofo HO metric tons
URANIUM
>
Soviet Interest instarted aboutithpecial directorate for theirAlthough part of this interestthe requirement for lanthanum whichin thorium-bearing minerals andfor the Soviet plutoniumplant. German scientists atwere also required lo design athe production of pure thoriumthe USSR acquiredthorium stocks
r
iak-
appears probable that the Soviets are not mil ing important quantitiesor weapon stockpiling at present. The interest in breeder reactors using the thorium cycle in their power reactor program docs not necessarilyuture weapon utilization of the material.
TRinUM
he first known Soviet interest in tritium was revealed by the publication in8omprehensive review of the literature on tritium by M. B.taff member In the Soviet atomic energy program. Returned German scientists report that2 tritium was available in thoir laboratories forEvidence from weapon tests78 Indicates that there is an appreciable demand for tritium In the Soviet weapons program. Production of tritium up tos estimated at not moref the total plutonium equivalenLu Afterhis percentage Is expected to increase. This increase cannot be predicted but in any case would be limitedf productionandf power reactors" capacity for plutonium production.
RODUCTION
Background
he existence of large gaseousroduction plants at Verkhneyvinsk in the central Urals and near Tomsk ln central Siberia Is positively confirmed. Information from several sources on atomic energyactivities near Angarsk in the Jake Baikal region indicates the probable existenceaseous diffusion complex, althoughconfirmation has not yet been obtained. Thus, wc know therogramat least two and probably three large sites, as shown on the Map
Verkhneyvinsk plant startedplant productionearly plant wasotal failure.
There is good evidence of large-scale plant expansion since that time and of continuation of this expansion at least
Tomsk plantaroundnd expandedprobable capacityew plant constructionat Tomsk6 and willleast
'The term -plutoniumsed because our method of estimation does not permit us to distinguish between. tritium, or other reactor-produced Isotopes.
C The Angarsk plant probably started op- raUon during thc first halftomic energy associated power expansions In the area indicate that Its eventual capacity will be very large.
Basis forroduction
hiswas poor in both separating efficiency and pressure of operation, although thesewere somewhat offset by its very high porosity. [_
roduction on the basis of the quantity and quality of installed barrier are consistent, up to this time, with those based on power and efficiency calculations
For these reasons,stimates nre based upon power and efficiency calculations.
5 Planteturned scientist reported that the Sovietsar-gel figure ofegawatt days per kilogram (MWD/Kg) as the efficiency for thc gaseous diffusion cascade In3 when it was compared with competitive systems. That thc USSR could achieve this efficiency3 Is Indicated by the information on the technical capabilities and known research andwork on gaseous diffusion technology. Operation at this efficiency is consistent with estimates of the electric power and barrier available at Verkhneyvinsk In this period. We estimate that3 power utilizationgradually improved, primarily as aof Improved compressor performance, which Is In line with known Soviet technical achievements.
Powerelectric power supplied tobe closely estimated, first, on the basis of
the transmission line network leading to the site, and second, on the net generatingfeeding the network. Therearge body of information available on this subject. Including voluminous data gleaned piecemeal from Sonet electric power publications.publications,!"
Jhave confirmed these analyses. Moreover, independent power balances over the entire Urals region, based on publishedon unclassified consumers. Indicate an unexplained surplus usage which corresponds with lhe Verkhneyvinsk estimate. Thus, the power supplied to Verkhneyvinsk can beto the presentumulative error of plus or.
The Tomsk gaseous diffusion plantarge on-site thermal power plant now being augmented by both thermal and nuclear power plant additions. Reliablepermits estimation of power at Tomsk within an accuracy equal to that of the Verkhneyvinsk power estimate.
Much less information is available on Angarsk power. An on-site power estimateto be reliable within plus or
TOP OllORBT
has been made by combining generatingand transmission line information with power balances in Irkutsk Oblast and using power build-up rates comparable with those at Verkhneyvinsk and Tomsk.
actually usedbeen estimated by subtracting thefor other site functions from thesupplied. Except at Tomsk, thepower values must be assumed, butcase they would be small comparedtotal power available.
Related Economic Analysis
stimates based on sitehave been compared withderived estimates of uranium,nickel supplies available to theestimates of ruble costs andwith indications of economicimprove or alter productionindependently derived estimatesIndicate tbat budgetaryand required materials werefor the demands of the programherein, and in several cases appearexceed these demands.theroductionimproves rather slowly in the lightIncentive for Improvement. Inthis economic intelligence researchthat underestimationis more likely than overestimation.
roduction
roduction Isbelowho estimateprepared as follows:
Early pilotelectric power and plantestimates,!
Electricplant efficiency estimates have
Tabto 1
ESTIMATEDRODUCTION
milcd
(KG)fc
, pageor the limits ofaod validity ot these values.
fc ProdueUon of lea* Blshlya included as equivalent quantities of weapon grade material.
prior toas at enrichmentsweapon grade. Presumably tWa material was later brought up to weapoo grade.
Electricplant efficiency estimates haveand the power estimate is basedof generation andnow under construction in
Electricplant efficiency estimates havehowever, efficiency estimatesassumed incorporationuchbarrier In new plant sections.are based upon announcedexpansion of generation andpower usage for purposes otherenergy.
ontinued expansion afterhe Soviets couldroduction ofg of weaponyf the annual production remains constant afterhe cumulative production would
'Seeor the position of the Assistant Chief ot Naval Operations forDepartment of the Navy.
reachg byhese estimates are very uncertain since actualwill depend on future Soviet policies and plans.
Margins of Error
information has beenover the past year which IncreasesInstimate up toactual Soviet cumulativeup lo that year could rangeof the statedof error cannot be assigned
PIUIONIUM EQUIVALENT PRODUCTION Background
have established the existence ofplutonlum production reactor sites innear Kyshtym and in centralTomsk, and probably nearsites may also exist, but none have
a. Kyihtym. Construction of the first Soviet production reactor started atIn the Urals earlyome six months before the first research reactor In the USSR went critical In Moscow. There is good evidence that this first Kyshtym reactor was graphite moderated and water cooled, fueled withons of
" Into accept the estimate ol cumulaUve producUonTable fl) the Assistant Chief of Haval OperaUons for Intelligence.of the Navy, finds thai he would hart to accept major factors or Soviet capability3 which are In his opinion not sufficiently supported by available evidence. These factorsnitial opcraUon dales of new plants, (b) degree of enrichment and depletion of materials produced, (c) useew diffusion technology and new equipment, and (dl over-all plant efficiency However, be believes that the assumption that an improved technology and improved plant efficiency have been developed and Incorporated In new plants Installed durings consistent wilh known SovietciipablUtles.
The Assistant Chief of Haval Operations forDepartment of the Navy. bcUeves that tho lower limits of tbe eaUmaled values for the cumulative productionre thc more nearly correct.
uranium, and operatedhermal megawatts- Constructionhemical separation plant for processing spent reactor fuel wasew months after the first reactor went critical. Other reactors have been built at Kyshtym but their construction schedule is unknown. Estimated uranium metal and heavy water availability and site timetables arewith the construction of about six reactors at Kyshtymne or more of which were heavy water moderated. There is evidence of current continuing expansion at the Kyshtym site.
There Is gooda chemical separation plant wasin the area of Krasnoyarsk Inbyeactors to feedprobably went Into operationWc believe that expansionsite is currently under way.
The fissionablesite north of Tomsk Iilocation of the "Second USSRStaUon" described at thcConference on the PeacefulAtomic Energy. According tothe staUon will Includewhich wc believe arc dualreactor went Into operationhc existence of an earlierbuilding without an associatedand thc construcUon of aplant have been reliablyThe reactor bulkiing is believedstarted operation earlyreactor building is now underat Tomsk witheriod.
Sites. No other producUonsites have been Identified.role of Uie possible atomic energyat Nizhnyaya Tura remainsThc large power plant neartown probably exportsto the Nlshniy Tagiland to thc gaseous diffusionVerkhneyvinsk. Thus, theinstallation tslant, but
onnT
may be. among othereactor site.
c. Reactor Operating Practices.evidence suggests tbat Sovietreactor operations are conservative.
J Moreover, analysis of the published pictures and information concerning the Tomsk dual purposeindicates that these graphitewater-cooled reactors withon loading develop only0hermal megawatts. This thermal power level represents an improvement In specific power level over the firstactor of about two but is still far below the specific power that can be achieved with graphite-moderated water-cooled production reactors.
hemical Separation Processes.the Soviets separated plutonium from uranium and fission products by an oxidation reduction, co-precipitation process. It was evidently planned to recover uranium as well as plutonium, since the uranium metal plant at Glazov was designed to process reactor-depleted uranium as partial feed material. However, this Initial process apparently was unable to produce sufficiently decontaminated uranium. Soviet and Oerman research on solvent extraction and other methods laterIn better processes^
]
Alternate Methods of Estimating Plutonium Production
aterials Balance. Information onreactor construction and siteparticularlys Insufficient to permit use of reactor capacityasis for estimating plutonium equivalent production.easure of possible Sovietequivalent production can be obtained by converting to plutonium equivalent the excess of estimated amounts of uraniumover non-reactor usage. Except foron the form and size of any reserve stockpile of uranium that might beby the Soviets, all the necessarydata for such an estimate are either known or reasonably capable ofsage rates, flow patterns,lags.
conomic Factors. Economic studies indicate that there would have been economic incentives for the Soviets to have processed their above-ground uranium resources as fully as possible, at leasttockpile of uranium for emergency feed purposes were desired, they had strong incentives to Increase their productiony operating their cascade at very high tailsercent orolicy would have given them earlier productionarger quantity of weaponsower unit cost and would still haveeadily accessible stockpile. Available intelligence establishes an ample capability to have followed this course. However, we have evidence that the tails assay of Soviet diffusion plants dropped2S. indicating that the Soviets have not over-fedlants. Therefore, the only way the Soviets could have made more Intensive use of the uranium was by increasing plutonium androduction either by moreor by substantially improving theof existing plants. Assumingof reactorull response to economic incentives would have resultedumulative stockpile of plutonium
]
top ononBT
about one and one-hall times as great as that estimated by materials balance.
tockpiling ComideroXtons. Tho Soviets have maintained1 largereat many commodities on the basis of varying periods of future use of these commodities. Calculations for the period prior3 indicate that the 8ovlets were probably consistently maintainingwo-year stockpile of uranium throughout the period. Later reduction in stockpile levels is suggested by tho Increased feed requirements that would result from improved reactor power levels, by comparison of siteactivities with ore procurement rates, and by Increasing response to economicdemonstrated in other parts of the atomic energy program in theeriod. Complete elimination of thebyowever, would require more rapid construction and greater Improvement to plants than urc consistent with evidence of site construction activities, with estimates of electric power usage at reactor sites and with estimated production rates at uranium metal plants. In order toasis of calculation yielding results which arewith this Information, It Is assumed In this estimate that uranium stockpilesto an eighteen-month supply ineriod. It must be emphasized, however, that the supporting site data are rough estimates and that the particularassumption used is unsupported by other quantitative intelligence.
Plutonium Equivalent ProdueUon Estimate
everal different plutonium produeUon estimates were calculated using variousstockpiling assumptions. In the light of our best technical Judgment, the set of produeUon figures selected from theserepresents the most likely Sovietequivalent production up toTableoviet production fromp toill be heavilyupon future Soviet plans nnd policies
Table 8
ESTIMATED SOVIET PRODUCTION OP NUCLEARomuUUva Amount* In Kilograms, Rounded)
Available
KaUmated for Weapon Knu Production
.nd,or th* limit* of uncertainty and validity of these value*.
Predaetferi of lass highly enrichedU indoded a* equivalent quanUUes of weapon grade material
prior toas al enrichment* below weapon grade. Presumably thla material wa* later brought up lo weapon grsde-
s of plutonium equivalent areto be negligihk during tbe Ume period of this
dll-llV
and may be influenced by unpredictablein weapons design. We have,presented figures for this period Inn order to provide general guidance to the planners.
f continued expansion afters assumed, the Soviets could have aplutonium equivalent production of0 kg byf the annual production remains constant afterhe cumulative production would0 kg by
"Seeor the position of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations forDepartment of the Navy.
oh ht
Margins ol Error
Soviet cumulative productionequivalent up1 couldabout one-third to twice lheA meaningful margin of errorbe assigned
VII. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SOVIET PROVING GROUNDS
General
areas of the Soviet Unionused more than once for the testingdevices: (a) thc SemipalaUnskground where at leastests have(b) thc Novaya Zemlya arealeasthermonuclear and sevenhave been detected, andicinity of the Kapustin Yartest range where air defensemay have been tested on one.three occasions. One furthernuclear test may have been held Inand probably was associatedautical mileThe locations of Soviet nuclearare shown In Figureist ofnuclear tests detected to date isIn InteUigence sources^
]indlcate that the Soviet Union has conducted some nuclear tests of relatively low yield In addiUon to the74.
The Novaya Zcmlya Test Area
Novaya Zemlya area was firsta site for the testing of Soviet nuclear
" In view of the uncertainty ot Information as to the possible form and site of stockpiled uranium. ii* well aa Uie uncertainly of information oa to ihe Input of uranium motal into producUonoperaUon. tbe Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUons for Intelligence. Department of thc Navy, believes that tbe lower limit of the esU-mate represents tbe most probable value forproducUon weapons in5 when Uic firstumber of underwater, surface and low air-burst ennronmental effects tests was held off the southern end of the island. Inesting of thermonuclear devices began somewhat farther northorth latitude).
The assumed delivery aircraft for these operaUons. and possibly their crews, would logically have been acquired irom Soviet bomber units which have been trained Indelivery tactics. LogisUc supportalso has been provided by the military,thethe Soviet air forces and Navy. Technicalof the test program Itself undoubtedly has been exercised by thc Ministry of Medium Machine Building.
High-Yield Test Operations. This area appears to have been selected for the full-scale testing of thermonuclear devices because of its remoteness, its very low population density, and its proximity to well-establishedoperational bases. Novaya Zemlya Is not know to have any airfields capable of handling Soviet bombers such as the BADGER and BEAR; consequently, we believe that anyemployed in delivery operations arestaged from bases on Uic nearby main, land.
So far as can be determined, noproving ground, with elaborateand support installations, has been created In the Novaya Zcmlya area.(_
J Weaponsdata requiring more elaborateare probably acquired byInstrumentation and possibly by thc radiochemical analysis of nuclear debris.
oo-Yield Test Operations. Thc Novaya Zemlya area was first used for low-yieldtests on5 when
T device, was detonated under water atff the southern Up of the Island. In succeeding years, in this general area, six more devices of comparatively low yield have been tested, consisting of at least one additionalT underwater test, one test which detonated within one fireball radius of the surface, and four believed to have been air bursts. The yields of thesetests were derived from Information released by the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Experts ConferencefJ
xcept forhe area around Novaya Zemlya has been closed because of "naval maneuvers" during those test periods when low-yield devices have been tested off the southern end of the island. While we have no confirmation that such maneuvers were undertaken, there can be little doubt that Uic underwater bursts represented tests of naval devices. Furthermore, the similarity In locations and yields leads us to believe that some of the airbursts in this same general area were probably in support of navalto test the response of surface targets to nuclear effects or to develop naval nuclear warfare tactical doctrine.
underwater tests were almostdesigned to acquire basicon the response of naval targets toexplosions in such environments.
The Scmipalatinsk Proving Ground
The Scmipalatinsk proving ground,during the, has been the principal area in Uie USSR for the testing of nuclear weapons. It Is located In northeastern Kazakhstan,iles west of Uie city of Semipalatliisk. Forty-two of Uieoviet nuclear tests detected by the US have been held at this proving ground, whichear-round capability and has been used for tho full-scale testing of devices yielding upT.
Major logistic support areas for theground have not been identified.they must exist In the general area of
Uic proving ground In order to insure adequate support for test operations.
Uie majority of Sovietat the Scmipalatinsk provingground
been air bursts^
T These tests
have probably included the acquisition ofand basic blast effects data as well as comprehensive measurements of the response of equipment and structures to nucleareffects.
a large number of the testdetonated occurred as air bursts attoo great for accurate balloonbelieve that ground instrumentationHowever, where tower shots arethere presumably were heavilyarrays for Uie acquisition ofdata. Those experiments whichmeasurements of the responseand structures to nuclearwould probably have Includedrevetments for vehicles, tanks,bridges, buildings and other
Other Test Locations
Thc Soviet Union3 hasat least five nuclear tests at locations other Ulan the established testing areas at SemipaJatinsk and Novaya Zemlya. These tests occurred at) onrobably In Uie area north of the Aral Seand on7ithin an area northeast of the Kapustin Yar rangehead defined;.
Totskoye. The Totskoye armyand weapons effects test undoubtedly was designed both to test emerging Soviet Army nuclear warfare tactical doctrine and toa demonstration for officials of the Soviet Bloc and Communist Chinese militaryThe test appears to havearked influence on Soviet military doctrine,in changes In the recommended speed of deployment, grouping of forces, and Uie
bets and employment of atomic weapons under the controlront Commander. Some uncertainty exists regarding the type of weapon and delivery vehicle employed with the experiment However, availableindicates that thisTT device was air dropped.
apustm Yar Area. All nuclear tests conducted in tbe general area of the Kapustin Yar missile test range are believed to have been associated with missile delivery systems. However, ln none of the four experimentsbelow do we have direct and unequivocal evidence of the specific types of missilesor the character of the test operations. It has been necessary, therefore, to infer the most probable nature and purpose of these tests from the characteristics of the warheads and from our knowledge of the state of the missile development program.
a JOE2
confirmation of amissile launching sitef
1
statements by sources atConference of Experts inthat the Soviet Union badnuclear device yieldingn altitude ofilometersNone of theoviet teststo the time of the statement fitthe yield and environment oftest. However,e most nearly compatible with
c. JOEndI. Within the limits of the errors of the available geophysical data, the test sites for theseT eventswere the same as that for
Since analysis of the characteristics of the JOEevice indicates that it had af
Jyield much smaller than oxrwetod for the warhead in theautical mile surface-to-surface missile, wo believe that the test most likelyell-instrumented weapon system check-outuclear device of small mass and yield for range safety considerations.
b JOE.esult of new intelligence, this event Is nowto have involved the testissile nuclear warhead for use in an air defense system. Recent Information related to the JOEvent includes:
3 We believe
that the choice of the location for JOEndas dictated by the vehiclesrather than by the warheads and that the tests may have been associated with air defense missiles, either to acquire effects data or touclear weaponHowever, the possibility that other types of short range missiles may have been involved cannot be ruled out at this Ume. In any case, the timing of the experiments after the opening of the political phase of the Geneva Conference on theof Nuclear Weapons Tests suggests that some priority was associated with them.
Re-evaluation of the probable alti- nuclear weapons test program
tude of the detonation.!
Philosophy
hroughout the history of the Soviet nuclear weapons test program, there has been evidenceillingness to accept certain "1 risks and to forego the acquisition of sub-
TOP CCCRET
stantlal quantities of diagnostic data in order to achieve asace of weaponsas Soviet scientific capabilities would allow. This philosophy has been exemplified by tests in which several weapons parameters were changedingle experiment and by the use of aerial deliveryarge majority of the tests.
imilar example occurred with JOE. which was an air dropT mittod the testingeaponized device with an associated delivery vehicle. The use of full-scale explosions probably has alsoa check on the performance of aconfiguration of the device.
Test Instrumentation
ith respect to the quantity and quality of instrumentation used. Soviet nuclear tests may be divided Into threeower shots in which the tests arc heavily instrumented and extensive diagnostic data areir drops in which remotely placed ground instrumentation (and possibly some airborne instrumentation) Is used and limited diagnostic data oreir drops in which airborne Instrumentation Is probably relied uponrimary means of obtaining bomb performance data.f"
ore recently, continued Sovietof this philosophy is apparent in the use of the Novaya Zemlya area for the full-scale testing of new designs of thermonuclearIn this area we estimate that theprobably place primary reliance upon airborne Instrumentation.
hirty-one of theoviet nuclear tests
}were conductedhis effortarked acceleration in the Soviet test program and was probably designed to exploit, in the faceossible test ban. the several avenues of Investigation which emerged from previous test series. The pace of testing was unusually intense, with the spring test series beingsimultaneously in thc Scmipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya areas and two tests per day being conducted on four occasions during the year.
hc emphasis on aerial deliverythc Soviet program, thoughacrifice In tbe quantity and quality of purely diagnostic-lype data acquired, has had the advantage of simplicity and has probably per-
]Tcstre conducted at the Semipalallnsk proving ground, ands conducted at theZemlya proving ground.
Soviets probably rely on theirfew tower shots for theextensive diagnostic data. On thedata obtained from the air-burstare probably acquired primarilyor airborne fireball photography^
] However, we estimate that sufficient data are acquired by this method to satisfy thc basic requirements of the Soviet weapons development program.
Concurrently with their weaponsand development program, the Soviets have carriedeapons effectsprogram involving both basic physical measurements of blast, radiation and thermal Intensities, and comprehensive measurements of the response of military equipment and structures placed at varying distances from the fireball.
ew basic effects tests,by the use of yield-reliable stockpile de vices and vehicle and structural target arrays, have been observed. These include at least
two underwater tests and one test of an air-delivered device with which vehicle andtarget arrays have been associated.
Test Environments
Geophysical evidence Indicates that of theoviet tests detected, at least IS have detonated at heights of burst to achieveblast and thermal effectsbout two fireballwo In underwaterand at least eight within one fireball radius of the earth's surface. The two highest yield devices tested to date (JOEere apparently detonated at the lowestconsistent with prevention offallout, and to maximise the Ore ball-to-delivery vehicle slant range. There is alsothat the Soviets have detonated anumber of devices on towers at theproving ground. On at least onend possibly two other occasions (JOE, the Soviets may havetests of nuclear warheads in an air-defense role.
No underground Soviet nuclearhave been identified. However, between8 the Sovietseries of massiveTT) subterranean high explosive detonations In tho Soviet Union and Communist China in connection withprojects and scientific experiments, which probablyarge amount of data on tho feasibility of underground nuclear tests and the likelihood of concealing them from US detection. (See Tableoviet Massive Undergroundhe widespread pubheity given these explosions and Soviet announcements of the planned use of such massive explosions with future construction projects couldover for futureunderground nuclear tests.
theoviet nuclear testadate, none are believed lo have beenat altitudes greaterbelieve, however,onsiderablemotivation for such tests must exist,would expect any future Sovietprogram to incorporate one or moreexperiments in very high altitude
Ilroguing
all scries of high-yield testsZemlya has been analyzed forSoviet use of parachute retardation,technique, to increase firerange. We estimate on the basis ofand height of burst of the device andestimated operational characteristicsSoviet bomber aircraft, that on at
least two occasions {JOErogulng techniques must hare been utilized to insure aircraft escape.
Teat Failures
he Soviet test program has not been without Its failures, f
WEAPON OEVaOPMENT PROGRAM Introduction
he Soviet nuclear weapon development program has grown rapidly, achieved great progress In weapons design, and included thc testaried assortment of devices from which Soviet military planners can draw In meeting their requirements
16lf
Available evidence further suggests that on at least one occasion (JOEMT) the Soviets experienced cither thc failure of the fuzing system toest device at the desired altitude or the failure of device to perform as anticipated.
ableives the chronology of the test program.
reliminary analysis of the thirty-one Soviet tests conducted8 provides fairly good Insight Into the emphasis accorded by the USSR to various nuclear weaponsand the progress achieved. A
OF SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTS
I I
t
IS u
Semi
Sep SI
Oa si
i.
ep S3 M
1 Oct 64 Semi
sea. i
Btfltl
S
23
<"
30
Buntl
i.ooo
-
W 4
16
IT ll Sep Si
II Nov 48
TOP ODOflK^-
431
fiEOH-HT-
Owinurrf)
No
'. '
(kt)'
Nov 44
Mm 86
boh
Mm 50
nee
Aug 50
Aug M
Sep 56
Sep 34
Nov
Dm SO
57
Mm 57
Apr 57
Apr 57
Apr 57
Apr 57
Apr 17
Aug 67
57
6*i> 67
Hep 57
ooo
Sep 57
Oct 67
67
Doe 57
68
S i
58
<s
Feb SB
M 56
rat M
Mm 58
Mm 58
ot iu!>
Table ID (Continued)
f
'.
Mar 58
Mar S3
Mar 58
Mar 58
COOOK
Mar 58
Sep 58
Sep 58
SS
Ocl 58
57SOE
Oct 58
Oct 58
Oct 58
Oct 58
8
Oct 58
S5WE
Oct 48
Oct 58
Oct 58
BE
Oct 58
(?)
Oct SB
SMOE
Oct 58
SHOOK
Oct 58
NovSS
Yar
(7)
Nov 58
Yar
ft)
4BO0K
Zemlya
' Value* cJ burst hciftlil and^lekl arc best values
a range of veltrta have becahay arc written as minimum/mail mum.
Iftan: >. aappraHraatetyr
concerted development effort continued on thermonuclear devices, and yields upT were achieved.
only slight progress In thematerial economy ofIs apparent. Tlie Sovietsweapons yielding lessor air defense or tactical use.
Nuclear Weapons
The Soviets to date have not conducted any testsield range of fromoegatons. We have not detected the test of any devices readily capable of being scaled up to this high yield range. While we believe they have the tcclinical capability to develop large weapons in this yield range, we would expect them to have conducted tests of full scale or reduced yield versions if theyequirement for such weapons. In view of the absence of any such tests during the extensive scriese estimate that the Soviets do nottrong present requirement for weapons In this yield range.
We estimate that9 the Soviets have the capability to produce fission weaponsariety of types yielding from oneT.
I6C. During the, If notesting occurs, the above currentin fission and thermonuclear weapons could be only slightly improved.
If unlimited tests are conducted, we estimate that the major improvement will be shown in thermonuclear devices. Inwe would expect increases in fissionable material economy and ln ylcld-to-mass ratios.
Also, we believe that the Soviets wili dcvelop very low-yield devices and. if tbeexists, increase the yield in some of the available weapon weight categories at the expense of additional fissionable material. With those exceptions, we do not expect the estimated current designs of fission weapons to be Improved greatly during the period of this estimate.
Nuclear Weapons
In theeriod, wc do not expect the advancement of Soviet nuclear weapon development to be as rapid as In the past, since we believe that they havetate of the art where major Improvements in performance are difficult to achieve.unlimited testing, we estimate that the USSR will be capable of producing nuclear weapons in the range of yields andrequired for support of majorSoviet militaryew types of clean weapons may also become available.
In addition to thermonuclearide variety of fission weapons, including very small low-yield weapons, will be available to meet various requirements. However, no valid prediction can be made on the timing of such developments-Current Trends
of8 test programthat the Soviets are continuingdevelopmentide range of yields andfor both air and missile delivery.first time, yields upegatons(JOE. Five tests ofdevicesTemphasis on development ofthis yield range.
ight of theevices tested8 yielded less thanT. Some of theseappear to have been small ln size|_
J
probably represent the development of efense or tactical weapons.
I7*[
Development by Type
hermonuclear Devices
a. The Soviet weapon tests havetrong emphasis on thermonuclearsincef the total tests detected to date have been cither full-scale thermonuclear devices or experimental devices associated withdevelopment In theests conducted during the fallt leastf the devices were thermonuclear in nature.
c. During the fallhe Soviets' tested what isew class of thermonuclear weapons. JOEndT.f
]
d. The test of five TN devices8T indicates strong emphasis on this yield class.
Fission Devices. Wc have reasonablein our estimate of fission weaponfor yields greater thanT. However, information on lower yield Soviet tests Is very limited, and our estimate ofcapability in yield rangesoT Is much less complete.
At leastests are believed lo have been of fissionariety of yields,and physical sizes has beenIn test devices of this type. Wethat the current Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile could contain implosion fission *oaponsf_
fields up toilotons.
179
]
Weapons. AlthoughIs not known to have testedemploying gun-type assembly. Itthat, because of the simplicityweapons of this type could nowIn stockpile.
we estimate that if thestockpile gun assembly weapons atwould stockpile only smull quantitiesweapons. One possible version ofsuitable for artillery shellwould be eight Inchesounds.
Requirements In Future Tests
If more tests are conducted, we estimate that future Soviet tests would be primarily directed towardreater yield-to-mass ratio In all classes of thermonucleara continued reduction In weight and diameter for thermonuclear devices, and an effort to increase the economy of fissionable materials.
In addition, should Soviet mUitary policy require, we would expect tests of devicesin the order ofT andoviet Interest in such devices has not been demonstrated to date. However, the development of such high-yield devices might be achieved by the testing of reduced yield configurations, thereby avoiding the need for very high-yield tests.
-*PO P QUO HI)'I -
estimate that the Soviets willto develop and test low and verysmall-size weapons. We alsoSoviet requirement for effects tests Inatmosphere.eet or higher.
STOCKWUNG Of NUCIEAR WEAPONS General
availability of fissionableweapons uses and the progress ofand vehicle developmentthat there was no need for andispersed storage program untilDuring this early period we believeand storage of Sovieteapon design and fabrication
^facility which is nrobabiy in the Sarova area
Wc believe, however, that extensive long-range plansispersed assembly andsystem were already underway at least as earlyhe development andof these long-range plans have been closely Integrated with the growth of Soviet nuclear weapon producUon capacity, and Uie design and construction of Uiefacilities have paralleled specificemerging from developing nuclear weapon designs.
Wc believe that at least three national assembly and stockpile sites, wliich possibly are operated by thc Ministry of MediumBuilding, are the central part of the Soviet nuclear weapons logistics system and are designed to supply weapons for all types of military nuclear delivery systems.
Our knowledge of the location and nature of storage facilities available to thc military Is confined principally to two types ofstorage sites located at airfields of Long Range Aviation. We estimate that. Into these sites, facilities for nuclearstorage exist at several naval airfields and airfields of the Tactical Aviation Although no nuclear weapon storage faciliUcs have been identified at naval surface facilities or co-locatcd with ground force units, we believe that appropriate storage facilities for them probably exist.
]
National Assembly and Stockpile Sites
e believe that the first of the national stockpile sites were probably designed and under construcUon in the. It is likely that the location of these sites Is based on geographical and militaryso that they can serve all armed forces operational storage sites locatedpecificJ
jThe national sites probably containto assemble the weapon to stockpile configuration. In addition, they probably also have facilities to store thc weapons and to ship them to the operational storage sites.
Regional or Forward Storage Sites
t least two additional nuclear weapons storage facilities, which may be regional or forward storage sites, are believed to exist
Operational Nuclear Storage at Airfields
uring3 andite preparation and construction of Uie first of the Soviet dispersed operational storageprobably
J
r
41
Other operational Storage Faculties
e have very limited Intelligence onstorage facilities other than those at airfields. Nuclear weapons storagespecifically associated with units of the Soviet ground forces and navy have not been identified. However, nuclear tests specifically oriented to the requirements of these services, tactical nuclear exercises conducted sincend the development and dissemination of army nuclear warfare tactical doctrinell Indicate that such facilities must certainly exist. In the present time period it is not considered likely that the Soviets have elected to store nuclear weapons outside the borders of the USSR, although the capability to deploy them rapidly to Soviet forces In such areas certainly exists.
SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY DETECTION SYSTEM General
n the, the Soviet Unionoreign nuclear lest datasystem involving seismic, acoustic,and probably debris collection elements. Soviet capabilities ln geophysical detection techniques are believed to begood but not comparable to those of the US.
19C. The SoTict data collection system onnuclear tests consists of at least fourseismic, acoustic, electromagnetic and debris collection. These techniques areto have been within Soviet capability as early. but corulrmaUon of theof all four techniques was lacking until the Conference of Experts at Geneva In July andhe Oenevaalsonique opportunity forthe system and the men who appeared to be responsible for its operations.of the various elements appears to be divided, with geophysical activities probably under the leadership of M. A. Sadovskiy and debris collection under another, as yetdirector.
Debris Collection Program
The Soviets attending the Genevaof Experts confirmed the existenceebris collection activity by the USSR, but failed to Indicate its subordination. Of the Soviet delegation, only N. N. Semenov,of the Institute of Chemical Physics,of Sciences, and Genady Klrdln, from the Institute of Applied Geophysics. Academy of Sciences, appeared to be knowledgeable on the subject of debris collection and analysis.
Specifically, the Soviets acknowledged that they had employed airborne collection In the past, but stated they had since changed overround systemollectionemploying air filtering devices as well as passive debris collection on plates and rain water. They claimed that these techniques were fully as effective as the airborne filtering and less expensive to operate. Although the
KT-
political.motivations behind the Soviet desireround coUectlon component In aninspection system are understand-ablcj_
1
Soviet delegates at Genevasubject of radiochemical analysis ofHowever, since radiochemicaland dating have been mentioned inliterature, there can be little doubtare aware of the principles involvedprobably made use of at least UieThey appeared impressed byWestern scientists hadtheir analysis, and it appearsthe potentialities of radiochemicalto obtain in formation on weaponshave not been exploited in Uie USSRextent that they have been in theUK.
The Seismic Element
The seismic element of the data collection system Is under the direction of Ivan Pctrovlch Pasechnik, of the Institute of Physics of the Earth, Academy of Sciences, Moscow. The network of Soviet stations provides faciliUes at the east-west geographic extremes of the USSR, while two stations set up for theGeophysical Year at Mirnyy and Oazis in the Antarctic, which began operation78 respectively, could provide thc Soviet Union with information on UK tests In Australia, an area to which their domesticare denied access for geographical
Data presented by the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Conference of Experts revealed that the USSR employs throughout itsof stations high quality seismicDiscussions revealed, however, that the Soviets lacked experience In dlfTercntiating explosions from natural seismicact which would lower their capability to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions, especially in the lower yield ranges.
Confirmation of Soviet use of acoustic techniques was acquired at the Genevaof Experts. The Soviets at Geneva stated that ten stations were in operation at the end ofnd it appearsthat some, if not all, are co-located with seismic stations.
Of the delegates present at theK. I. Balashov appeared to be responsible for the operation of the Soviet acousticwith K_ E. Gubkln connected with its theoretical and analytical aspects, and L. M. Brekhovsklkh acting as an advisor.
In general, the Soviet experts appeared to have worked with less data than had their Western counterparts. They displayed ato draw conclusions more fromcalculations than from experience, but claimed lo have detected nuclearistance0 kilometers.
Electromagnetic Element
As in the case of the acoustic element, the existenceoviet electromagnetic (radio wave) activity was not verified until theConference, although it had beento be well within the capability of the USSR. Of the Soviet Conference delegates, Aleksandr Ustyumcnko appeared to be in charge of the Soviet electromagnetic element, with L. M. Brekhovskikh probably acting as an advisor.
Soviet discussions of the subject both in the conference sessions and In privateIndicated that Soviet work In the electromagnetic field had been vigorouslyand their techniques may well be more advanced than those of the West. Inthc Soviets advanced now theoretical methods for discrirninating natural and man-made electromagnetic disturbances. They further implied that work was In progress on developing some type of automaticfor the screening and identification of these signals.
TOP fihuiiiiT
POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLOCATIONS OF flS-SIONABIE MATERIALS TO WEAPONS STOCKPILES.
INTfcOWCTION
e lack sufficient evidence toirm estimate of the Soviet weapons stockpile by number, by typo, by mission, or otherwise. Accordingly we rely on the following general factors:
a Our assessments of over-all Sovietpolicy, and of Soviet strategy forand limited war. derived from our basic Soviet estimate., (Main Trends In Soviet Capabilities and3;
b. Estimates of the types of weapons tested by the Soviets and of relative Soviet emphasis on missions and weaponsthat might employ nuclear weapons wholly or ln part.
"The Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUons forDepartment of the Navy, believes that the range Of possible Soviet qunntitaUveto weapons stockpiles Is so broad that. In view of the status of available Intelligence on this subject (aa Indicated in1 an estimate of "possible allocations- is unreausUe and of doubtful usefulness. Therefore he does not concur wilh the general methodologyto derive this secttonC.
3
" The Assistant Chief of StaU for Intelligence.ol the Army, does not concur with the methodology employed to derive this secUorm.
^In view of the insufficiency of evidence on this subject (aa Indicated Ine considers that the TllustraUve allocattau" are merely highly specutnUve possibilities selected arbitrarily from an almost Infinite number of alternative choices. At best such theorising from unsupported conjeclures Is unrealisUc and of doubtful value; Itigh risk ofmisuse, for example. In briefings for budgetary or planning purposes, leading to Ihe danger of miscalculation by those responsible for national security.
The Assistant Chief of SUB for Intelligence,of the Army believes that, on the basis of available Intelligence, the mostdeflnlUve prea-enlaUon that can be made of the availability of nuclear weapons In the Soviet stockpile Is oneroad range of technoloclcal posst-blliuesfj
ith these factors as general guides, more specific factors bearing on weapons stockpile allocations at any selected period are:
specific estimates of Sovietand In some cases production,systems inighdelivery vehicles must be equippedweapons in order to performmissions with acceptable
studies of the major targetagainst which the Soviets wouldseek to employ nuclear weapons
& Assessment of technical factors,the balance of available fissionable(asndroduction rate and retrofitproblems, and the degree of Interchange-ability of weapons assemblies for various uses;
d. Intelligence information on stockpiling practices and doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons for various purposes.
THE SOVIET WEAPONS OCVHOf*MINI PROGRAM IN RELATION TO MISSIONS AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS
ho Soviet test program over the years since its inception has shown the development of nuclear weapons toide variety of military requirements. Including all the major categories ofbomberwarheads for long- and Intermediate-range guided missiles, air defense, support of naval and ground operations, and navalIn comparison with the USprogram, the Soviets have notlear interest in extremely low-yield (lessT) tactical weapons (on which, however. It Is possible that tests would not have beenery high-yield weapons (greater thanT) and, with one possible
Is donned as the modernization of atomic weapons and components, and related equipment, by applying changes In design and fabrication to stockpile weapons
50
g
"clean" weapons. Our estimate ot the various weapons types reflects these
Planned Long Range Aviation Employment"
emphasis on the developmentRange Aviation (LRA) throughoutperiod has indicated greatstrengthening their capabilities inWhile early medium-yieldwere an interim armament forforce, the Soviets clearly laid heavythe rapid development and continuedof thermonuclear weaponsbomber delivery. Confirmation ofweapons storage sites at longrange bomber bases demonstratespreparations for deployment andthat nuclear weapons are nowto Long Range Aviation forces,the Soviets will seek to providefor all LRA bombers intended tofor weapons delivery in the eventwar.
Planned Long-Range and Intermediate Range Guided Missiles Employment
is good evidence thatery high priority to theof land-basedhaving ranges of. We alsothe Soviets have developedsurface-to-surface missiles. Inof our estimate of the accuracy ofmissiles, their most effective usebe with high-yieldand Soviet emphasis on suchis confirmed by thc nature of thetest program, plus Soviet publicAccordingly, we believe thatwarheads arc being, and will be,In numbers sufficient to equip all mis-
"SeeStrength and Composition of thc Soviet Long Range Bomber
"As used In this ciUmate, the term high-yield weapons Includes all yields greaterT, medium-yield weapons Includes yields0 KT, and low-yield weapons Includes yields less thanT.
siles intended for operational use in0. categories, and substantially all in. category.
Planned Air Defense Employment
Soviets have placed strongair defense, and have developedmissiles now deployed in largeMoscow and possiblyew otherwith advanced types probablydevelopment. We believe thatwere originally designed towith HE warheads but thatarc adaptable to some modelsthe Soviets would seek to furnishfor some proportion of these atpractical date. Four to sixtests appear to be related to thcof air defense warheads or toapplications tn air defense systems.that9 the Soviets willwarheads to' surface-to-air missiles.
Planned Employment in Support of Ground Operations
onsiderable reliablecurrent Soviet army doctrine hasthe use of nuclear weapons in supportoperaUons is contemplated. Thisalso visualizes delivery ofariety of methods, includingfree rockets, missiles, andon Soviet training continuesthe planned employment ofweapons by Soviet forces.he Soviets conducted an airTotskoye of an estimatedin connection with Armya military effects test. Thisbefore communist Bloc militaryclearly associated with thenuclear warfare tacUcal doctrine. Amilitary delegation which visitedin8 was told thatarmy has in itsT5 KT rocket warheads,KT tactical bombs. Furthermore,some evidence that nuclear weaponsmay be located adjacent to certainairfields. Eight of theevices tested
8 were less thanT In yield. Some, by their small size and economy ofmaterial, probably represented the development of air defense or tacUcalWe do not believe that the presentfissionable material stockpile permits the use of very large numbers of low-yield nuclear weapons for tactical uses along with substan-Ual numbers of high-yield weapons.within the next two years presentlyrates of producUon of fissionablewill permit the Soviets to afford large numbers (In the thousands) of tactical weapons.
Planned Naval Employment
uring recent years, statements bypolitical leaders and senior naval officers have stressed Uie naval warfare requirements of the USSR in general war. limited war, or cold war, and have both stated and implied the necessity for possessuig nuclear weapons to wage present-day naval warfare Wethat certain naval aircraft units have been designated for nuclear delivery roles,the use of air-to-surface missiles. Moreover, we estimate that Uie Soviets willimited number of existingfor missile delivery and will probably also construct new submarines specificallyfor this purpose. Of the weapons tested by theumber of medium and low-yield weapons types would be suitable for use against naval targets. In addition, evidence of naval concern for nuclear weapons has been provided by tests conducted In north-em waters off Novaya Zemlya, once5 (under water) and twice In Uie fall7 (one under water, one airhichcertainly were related to naval effects. Pour additional tests during the fall8 were conducted ot the south end of Novaya Zemlya and may have had naval associations. In addition, tbe Soviets, at the Geneva Experts Conference during the summerhird underwater test, presumably nuclear,ieldT. In Uicthe evidence substantiates an allocation of fissionable material to naval missions.
PATTERN Of SOVIET MIUTARY ESTABUSHMENT
continue to believelinebasic estimates of Soviet militarythe concurrent developmenttypes of forces andcomponents of the Sovietundoubtedly have submittedfor nuclear weapons to carry outmissions. Available evidencethat the Soviet leaders would notto allocate all of the Sovietstockpile to any one of theseto Uie exclusion of the others.we estimate that, to the extent thatcontinues toizeableestablishment with extensiveand air components, availablewill be stockpiled tor use by eachmajor components.
DfirVEPY SYSTEM ESTIMATES
varying levels of confidence Inof future Soviet strength Insystems requiring nuclear weaponsimportant bearing on our estimates ofstockpiles. This is especially trueaviation and guided missiles,the latter our estimates presenUydates of development and potentialtotals, so that we are forced toassumptions only.
TARGET STUDIES
In preparing this estimate, we haveinto target studies directed in particular to targets related to US nuclear deliveryThc selection of these targets is not, in most cases, difficult. However, many and complexestimates of US operational capabilities obtained from non-intelligenceinvolved infrom the Soviet standpoint the number and yield of nuclear weapons In stockpileto attain, under estimated attackcertain probable damage levels ontargets.
Accordingly, wc recogruic that ourstudies are subject to substantial margins of error In Judgment, as well as to the effect of changes In US capabilities.
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STOCKPIlE ALLOCATIONS.
ANDeasibility of IUurtrativ* Allocations
the light of the range andthe factors discussed above, we do notit Is possible or desirable to arrive al"most probable" estimate of thestockpile at selected periods. Ithowever, to arrive atnd wc believe that,certain missions, these allocationsbe said to represent aand minimum.
Assumptions of Soviet Military Policy for Illustrative Allocations
the purposes of the illustrativeshown below, we have assumedof Sovlel strategic emphasis atextremes to which we believemight be pressed in the periodThe drat, Alternative A, stressesof forces tending to increase Sovietfor limited war while seeking toa deterrent to general war throughcapabilities adequate to threatenwltli majorhe second.B, is based on dominant emphasisstrike forces and isilitary policy of preparingIfeneral war whiledeter Its occurrence.
two alternative assumptionsparticularly the number ofallocated to Soviet Longnd the allocation ofto air defense and tacticalThese categories appear asvariables In our illustrative allocations.
General Caveat
making thesewe have postulated totalsmaterial for weaponsline
possibility oleterrent concept is discussed Inf. "Main Trends In Soviet Capabilities andated8 with the basic estimates shown in Tablef these totals were In fact in error within the possible margins stated In the estimatej to twice the stated plutonium-equiva-lenl values for% of thealues forith greater uncertaintieshen the totals shown in these illustrative allocations would of course be sharply affected. Moreover, the effect would be felt with greater acuteness in some of tho subtotals than in others, partly because of the variation In unit requirements of fissionable materials, but more especially because of possible differences in strategy and basic allocation policy if greater or lesser amounts of fissionable materials were It is conceivable, for example, that if the amounts were only half those postulated for ertain allocation categories might be reduced to nil. For this over-all reason, as well as for the reasons statedthese illustrative allocations must be treated with great caution.
onsidering the estimated availability of fissionable materials and the level of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, we believe that at present the USSR probably possessesnuclear weapons toajorby its long range striking forces,sufficient nuclear warheads for all of its operational submarine launched missiles and ground launched ballistic missiles. range and greater. At present the quantity of fissionable material will limit the number of nuclear weapons available for air defense and tactical uses. This shortage will bealleviated
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ix. the soviet international atomic aid and exchange program
OBJECTIVES AND CAPABIUTIES
he Soviet Union apparently has twobehind her offers of material andaid to other nations throughout the world. In making such offers to members of ihe Sino-Soviet Bloc, the objective is clearly to Improve and tighten the relationships be-
56
DIICHBT
the Soviet Union and her Satellites while at the same time maintaining adegree of control of the atomic energy activities in these countries. In the offers to the Free World nations, the objective has been largely the propaganda Impact that such offers are certain to produce. Offers to the underdeveloped nations have apparently been motivatedesire to picture the Soviet Union as the great world leader andin the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Offers have been made to such "neutral" nations as Yugoslavia and Egypt as part of more general proposals of economic aid with the obvious intent of luring them into the Communist camp.
Is little doubt that thehas the industrial, technical andcapability to fulfill such offers ofhave been made. The fissionableto meet the requirements ofunder construction, andother nations of the world does notany significant drain on theof this material In the Sovietpersonnel and laboratoryavailable to give the technicalto scientists and technicians ofand non-Bloc nations.
CURRENT AND FUTURE AID TO BlOC COUNTRIES
as earlyany of thenations have contributed extensivelySoviet atomic energy program.was mined and shipped to the USSRpayments from EastPoland, Rumania andshipped ore to the Soviet Uniongratitude foriberation."Soviet Union now pays these nationsore shipped, although strictmining, processing and shipment isby the Soviets. Communist Chinasupplied raw materials for theenergy program. Several of thehave supplied significant quantitiesand equipment.
for purely political reasons,to bind more closely aof uranium ore, Instruments andfrom the Satellites to the SovietSoviets announced5 anwhich they promisedesearch reactor,and technical training toeach of the European SatellitesThe USSR has largely fulfilledalthough some of the Satellitesimpatient with Soviet delays andto the high prices charged forResearch reactors having acapacity0 kilowatts are nowin Rumania, Czechoslovakia,and Poland, Communistank-type reactor with acapacity0 kilowatts. Inthey alsoW tank-typein operation. Research reactors ofkilowatt (thermal) capacity are dueinto operation90 inBulgaria. In addition to the reactorsand radioisotopes furnished tobasic technical trainingimited number of Satelliteat laboratories and universitiesSoviet Union and at home fromscientists. However, steps havelo insure that advanced nuclearwould take place in the SovietSatellite scientists would be subjecteffective control.
Soviet aid has beento several of the Satellite countries inof additionaleactor is already underIn East Germany and completionzechoslovakia Isstart constructionWreactor in the second halflannedoland hasaid in the construction of anresearch reactor and inower reactor. The powerbeen tentatively plannedungary has also beenin the constructionowerare indications that Communist China
for OEOREI'P
will be provided with two power reactorsthe Chinese Second Five-Year. Soviet controls over these powerprograms include retention of Satellite dependence on Soviet Isotope separation and spent fuel element processing facilities.
CURRENT AND FUTURE AID IOC COUNTRIES
To date, the only significant offers of aid to non-Bloc nations have been those made lo Yugoslavia and Egypt. While these offers were originally madeeither nation can yet point to an operating reactorfrom this Soviet aid. The reactor under construction in Yugoslavia Is similar in type and capacity to that built in Communist China. The Egyptian reactor is to be of the same type and size as those to be found In the European Satellites.
The past two years have seen adecline in the number and extent of Soviet offers of atomic aid to nations in the Free World. Tho Soviet-proposed General Regional Body for Peaceful Uses of Atomicwhich was to Include all the East and West European countries and the United States, has not materialized. The organ Iwas probably proposed to disrupt thewhich were being carried out in the formation of EURATOM. When EURATOM was successfully organized and the Western nations refused to enter into thegroup, no further attempt by theto fosterlan was made. Soviet overtures to Japanilateral agreement as noted6 were not followed up.
A large number of the offers made during the past year have been made to countries in the Asian area. An offer toeaceful uses of atomic energy exhibit was made to and accepted by Indonesia. Similar offers were made to Burma, Iran and India Inhe Soviets offered to exchange "know how" in the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy with countries of Asia and the Far East. They further suggestedody within the Economicfor Asia and the Far East to study the economic factors and facilitate theof Information on this subject.
A slight interest in the South American area was noted in an Interview between Brazilian newspapermen and Khrushchev lnn this interview,pronounced Soviet readiness towith Brazil In the atomic energy field through bilateral accord as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Inhe Soviets, through the UN, sup-plied the University of Chile with instruments for the Laboratory of Nuclear Physics.
There is no evidence that the Soviets are attempting or soon will attempt to compete in the Free World for agreements to build research reactors. The offers are vogue, such agreements as are completed are generally limited to basic technology, andof the agreements is slow. It can bethat in Individual cases bilateral-type agreements will be signed similar to those tn Yugoslavia and Egypt, but there is no evidenceidespread program approaching that conducted by the US or the UK.
JOINT INSTITUTE FOR NUClEAR RESEARCH. DU6NA
he Joint Institute for Nuclear Researchuona. USSR, was organized by the Soviets in6 lo encouragebetween scientists of different countries in theoretical and experimental research in the field of nuclear physics in order to widen the possibilities of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes."
Much research has been conducted at JINR usingov synchrocyclotron and theev proton synchrotron. Thishas been comparable in techniques and results to that of Western countries but has been somewhat lacking In originality. The research has little application to the nuclear power program for which the Satellitestrained scientists.
Additional research facilities being planned for JTNR include an experimental high-flux reactoryclotron formultiplechargcd ions This equipment is under construction but probably will not be completed for several years.
THE INIERNAIIONAl ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
o date, the Soviets have co-operated In the workings of the International AtomicAgency, although their attitude toward thc Agency might best be described as passive. They have offered scholarships through the Agency and have made atoken offer ot fissionable material. Yemal'yanov, themember on the Board of Governors, has slated privately that he Is not satisfied with the operations of the Board and that he feels that too many politicians rather thanhave positions of responsibility in the organization. There has beon furtherof tho lackirm program Tor the Agency.
o date, the Soviets have offered tothe Agency with onlygnd have announced the availability ofocholarships for study of peaceful uses of atomic energy in the USSR. However, none of the Soviet institutes offered for IAEAhaveignificant role. If any. In the Soviet atomic energy program.
are no indications that theIntends to drop out of thc IAEA,la believed that any significant Sovietunderdeveloped nations will be carriedbilateral agreements ratherany Agency program.
PArmOPATION IN INTERNATIONAI CONFERENCES
participation inthe USSR has carried outInformation collectioneak8 atInternational Conference onUses of Atomic Energy held inInt is alsothe USSR rapidly Integrates USthc Soviet program. Intelligencewell as evaluation of Soviet tactics atconferences, indicate thatell-organized,Intensive information collectiontheir participation in theseaimed at acquiring all availableInformation as well as Industrialtechnology and classifiedfrom the West, in many cases directed toward solving specific technological problems they have encountered in their own work.
USSR has attempted to set forthall of three main propaganda theories atscientific conferences relatedenergy both at the conferences andbroadcasts for domestic asforeign consumption:
'The Atom Must Serve Onlyofnd the USSR is thein this effort;
a primary goal of theIs to open up "possibilities for theof scientists and the exchangelatest knowledge and experiencecountries In the sphere ofandnd the USSR"great efforts in promotingcooperation in peacefulatomicnd,
the USSR, as with Sputniks.in atomic energy, primarily inthermonuclear reactions andpower reactors.
X. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SOVIETENERGY PROGRAM"
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
It seems probable that Soviet officials were willing to accept high-cost methods of plant design and operation during the earlier phases of their nuclear energy program in the interests of achieving an assuredmaterials production more quickly.
However. Intelligence strongly suggests that economic considerations exertedgreater Influences in the operation of uranium ore, mctnl, andfacilities throughouteriod.
Assistant Chief ot Naval OperaUom forrUnent of Uie Navy, docs not concur In the economic section becauseased uponmethod of cost analysts that he does not consider can be applied to th* USSR fissionable materials estimate
G
estimate that Soviet officials,limits of assigned production goals,noteconomic considerations, since atin the selection or operatingthe basis of which productioncarried out. This is lo say, wc feelmanagers of the Soviet programattempted to an even greater extentthe assigned output of fissionablewith the least possible expenditureresources; in contrast lo theof an assured production in theperiod. We feel, further, Lhatnear future, the determination of thefissionable materials production willimmune to economic considerations, ifthey are completely so at the
our present estimates offeed procurement and fissionableoutput arc inconsistent with theuse of Soviet resources. Wethat,hc Sovietsdiffusion plants and reactors onlyof thc uranium they procuredless than one kilogram ofand Pu) for each ton of uraniumSoviets have had strong economicto use their above-ground uraniummuch more intensively, at leastIf the Soviets had the plantstrip the economically recoverablesubstantially all of theirpotential production of fissionablewould have been about four timesestimated total. The productionfor which we have evidence,have produced no more than twiceestimated here, .even at thcof estimated size and efficiency.probable estimate of actualbased on evidence that suggests thatand efficiencies were considerablythe upper limits.
SIZE OF IHE PROGRAM
e estimate that the approximatecost of thc Soviet nuclear energythroughas been over 92
Table 13
O WN OF CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURES THROUGH9
Mtlbwiaoil Jury JOSS Rubles Total Optnrt
Pronurvmeol ana
Concentrating
Material!
ProdMUen
Production
Facility
and Dwlopnie.il
and-
Doen not iudutlo amorluatioa.
billion rubles of which aboutillion were expended for plant and equipmentillion rubles for operating purposes. These date are In terras5 ruble values and were derived from cost studies of the estimated Soviet nuclear energy program. Tablehows the estimated cumulative values in terms of Investment and operating expenditures by major functions. These and other cost estimates must be considered as first approximations and are subject to wide margins of error; however, It is felt that they adequately reflect general magnitudes and relations.
mitting Investment in uranium mining and ore concentrating, which are notas such In reported US-AECwc estimate that as ofhc Soviet program has spent approximately5r less% of thc gross national product of the USSR for the same period. Similarly, estimated average annual expenditures during this periodt of total Soviet budget appropriations for heavy industry
for comparison purposes the US procramomparable period has spent aboutollars.
'POP OLl'RDT
Original document.
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