NUCLEAR TEST CESSATION

Created: 4/30/1959

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

pril

IMS) (s)

Nuclear Test Cessation

haracteristically bold maneuver to divide his opponents and extricate himselfifficult position,in letters to Prime Minister Macmillan and President Elsenhower onpril,uggestion by Macmillanredetermined number of annual on-site inspections of suspected nuclear explosions. This shift in the Soviet position wasas an effort to break the deadlock on the crucialof inspection procedures and pave the way for anto halt all tests.

Khrushchev rejected the American and British proposalhased approach, beginning with suspension of atmospheric tests, as an "unfair deal"to mislead public opinion and enable the Western powers to continue their nuclear* development programs. The Western proposal, advanced onpril, had thrown the USSR on the defensive, and Khrushchev probably believed acceptance of Macmillan's compromisewould not only enable him to regain the initiative in the nuclear test talks but also to exploit any Western differences on this issue.

Soviet delegate Tsarapkin at Geneva is resorting to the

time-honored Soviet tactic of demanding that the West must first accept Khrushchev's new proposal in principle before details can be discussed. Onpril, however, he clarified the Soviet position by stating that the USSR will dropeto on the dispatch of Inspection teams if theof Inspections of suspected nuclear explosions to beeach year is agreed on ln advance. He also announced that Moscow would agree toa "permanent inspection team located somewhere" and to permit automatic inspection whenInstrumentsuspicious event.

Tsarapkin made it clear that the USSR contemplatedmall number oftatement by Khrushchev in his letter to President Eisenhower. Moreover, Tsarapkin insisted that thequota must be fixedpoliticalotechnical basis, and that the three nuclear powers must now workpolitical comprof mise."

The political objectives of dividing the United States and Britain underlying this latest Soviet move were evident in Tsarapkin's remark that he expected the American and British delegates to support Khrushchev's new proposal, in view of the fact that tbe original suggestion for an inspection quota had been made by Macmillan. Khrushchev also expressed confidence in his letter to tbe prime minister that the British delegate at Geneva would be Instructed to workolution on this

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basis, "taking into account the considerations you (Macnlllan) expressed in Moscow."

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IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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