GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

Created: 4/1/1959

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STUDIES IN

INTELLIGENCE

A collection ol articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol mteUigence.

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are ihose of the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations

Difficulties jxnd_new proposal/fields.

GEOGRAPHIC INTEMJt.KNCF.unean

Geographic mteUigence is one of the oldest forms ofIntelligence, and one of the most important Fromtimes, when man first conspired against man, through ancient history and mediaeval conflict to the most recent wars of our own time, an accurate knowledge andof geographical factors has been an essential part ol strategy and tactics. But today, instead of merely giving some simple Information on what lies beyond thehill, geographic intelligence Is required toorld-wide basis and in infinitely greater variety, detaQ, and (above all) precision than ever before.

In the face ofconceivable demands fromand operational staffs It Is essential that our geographic activities should be carefully guided and controlled, so that none may be wasted on aspects which, though previouslyin military thinking, have now lost their Importance in modern strategy and tactics. It Is tn the light of this thesisroposeeveral fields of geographicand discuss problems encountered In

Cron-Ccmntry Terrain

Assessing the suitability of terrain for cross-countryhasajor problem tn modern warfare. .Of the many Instances when failure to arjpredate this factor has proved disastrous, one Is perhaps outstanding.7 Lord Haig launched his Flanders offensive In disregard of hatrers* warning that the ground would revert to boghe necessary preliminary bornbardrnent and his weatheradvice that tha autumn rains, then doe, would further aggravate coodltkau. His failure to take Into ItwawJal the tatxain requirements for cross-country movement kd.to, the

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Weffiflertce

cacUlest battle In British rnWtary history. Passchendaele. in volving the sacrifice ofen.1

Tbe suitability of crosscountry terrain Is today In some ways more critical than ever because of heavier equipment, Increased speed and mobility, and probable need for dispersal off surfaced roadsrecaution against tactical nuclearIts assessment, however,oost difficult matter,atching of the characteristics of various types of military vehicleide range of detailed Information on theor seasonal variations of bearing capacity, width and depth of water obstacles, height and steepness of their banks, and the effect of day-today or seasonal climatic influences. Tbe task to rendered especially difficult when no practical precedent exists: take for example the movement of aMsaVHflptanks across riceflelds.

The military geographer really has two majorto acquire and collate the necessary mass of factual data on the terrain, and second, to apply those data to foreseeable military operations on the basis of proved vehicleForuggest, careful liaison with planning staffs la essential It to beyond our resources to acquire and collate detailed Information on all areas; we must concentrate on areas where the planners consider movement most likely to occur, and we must keep aware of movement plans forvehicles in order to spot the need for experimental maneuvers as basis for an adequate assessment of tbeof these movements.

Forts and Beachet

An outstanding feature of Worldilitarywas the extensive use of beaches for landing troops with their arms and supplies. New techniques led to operations of this kindar greater scale than had previously been thought possible. It became the policy to by-pass the sea-portfl In the opening stages of arelying oneaches until harbors were captured and reopened to thef conventionalas foundo land stores and equipment on beaches and dear them Inland atrates, averaging WOO tons per day per mile of beach. Tfaraa pqfuimanceood beach compares favorably with

1 of.wolrr. in nmUri ridd,, is of tha Utot

Geographic fnfellf'offnn

thatidlum-slzed seaport, and in some cases can beon the basis of the wartimewo-mile stretch of beach vest of Tourane, In South Vietnam, wouldapacityons per day, as against onlyor the port.

The Importance of beaches for military operations hasIncreased since the war. Modem weapons seem likely to damage seaports more effectively and thus delay theirfor longer periods, while Improved equipment for beach landings will probably permit the movement of tonnages far in excess of the figures achieved In World War TX In theseuggest that our organizations shouldcarefully whether they are over-concentrating onstudies of ports and their capacities to the neglect of beaches.

We should at least aimigh standard in respect of those beaches which the planners consider may be used inExperience In Melbourne Indicates thatbeach Intelligence Is generally sufficient as ft guide to planners, but lacks tbe detail required for mounting specific operations with confidence. Itallacy to suppose that observations made years ago are necessarily accurate today and adequate for present requirements. Theof some beaches can change surprisingly overnighttorm, and the heavier equipment available today posesnot previously encountered. Factors such as bearing capacity (involving assessment of thelope at various fides, variations of surface and slope at differenteffects ot tide and local currents on Inshoreare typically deficient In our present

These deficiencies could beuggest, by carrying oat special technical reconnaissance, whenever practicable. In respect of those beaches which are of Interest to ourplanners on the evidence of present information.iance Is not prwrTMebeach.es inenemy territory) cur procurement channels should be aco- -vated far more than at present If this Is not done, we can only continue to plan on Imperfect data, risking uncertainties and perhaps Jeopardising the success of vital amphibious op-

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Railway*

An Important problem In the study of railway* Is tbeof route capacities. In ideal circumstances this assessment would be made by analyzing the physicalof tbenumber of tracks, weight of rail, length and spacing of passing loops, speed or weightand soarriveheoretical physicalThe practical operational capacity would then be determined by such factors as size and type of locomotive and rolling-stock park, fuel availability, quality and location of repair shops and engine sheds, etc.

In foreign countries, however, particularly those which arecquisition of all the detailed Information necessary for these analyses is most difficult, and presentof the practical capacities of railways In those countries can at best be regarded as approximations based on very Imperfect data. Unfortunately, there Is little prospect of obtaining the detailed information required to fill our gaps, and it Is therefore worth considering whether some short-cut method might improve our assessments.

One such method might be to make an nil out effort toworking timetables of those lines which havetn planning. These workingto bewith passengerdeballs of all classes of traffic, both passenger and freight, and are available in one form or another on all railways. An analysis of them tn conjunction with other textual and photographicmight give reasonable accuracy tn the assessment of practical capacities. It would not be easy, but If oaragreedtandard approach ft seems likely that the assessments achieved would be more soundly based andat least for the purposes of war potential appreciations.

Roods

great effort devoted to reporting on roads hasunalderable amount of Information, which,n certain technical aspects critical for accurateof road potential This deficiency fit due chiefly to tbe tact that reports corns from nontechnical ubaeima,ontributing cause ts thai reporting ofTicers not unnaturally tend to Judge the condition of roads tn foreign countries on

Geographic Intelligence

the basb of road standards In their own, so that theirtend to vary inversely with these standards.

The effect of Inaccurate reporting can best be shownpit Let usoad across undulatingwith an overall width ofeetaterboundsurface In bad condition. Applying tbe standard NATO Road Capacity Table to these details, we arrive at an estimated capacity:

ehicles per hour.

on vehicles are usedhour running day, thecapacityons per day.

But If the reporting officer, because of the bad condition of the surface, mistakes the waterbound macadam for crushed rock, our calculations would be:

hides per hour.

on vehicleshour running day, the estimated capacity isons perimple mistake on the nature of the surface has thus resulted tn an errorn the capacity of this particular road. Cumulative errors In the NATO Table factors, appliedumber ofiven area, might seriously affect logistic planning.

But the full assessmentoad's potential requires also consideration of the awaatwMMI live-load capacity, te. the weight of the heaviest vehicle that can use it This Involves other technical reporting, in particular on the strength of bridges and culverts, which not Infrequently Impose strict limits on traffic. In the example we gave Justssumedon vehicles were used, but planners might well want to know whether they couldton trucks orton tanksiven road. This problem Is one of educating reporting officers so that the technical detafia they supply are tar more accurate than at present, or at obtaining this -necessary mfcarnauon tn some other- --

A secondary problem tn this field, as tn many others, l* to ensure that procurement and research are conducted Inwith the priorities ofpg HBsaBMntih for the potential areas to be covered an so vast that with the

Geographic InteU'igcncm

Urnlled resources available we cannot bope to achieve detailed results on everything.his control Is not exercised, thereeal dancer that essentia] work wfll be neglected.

Inland Water Transportation

Compared with railways and roads. Inland waterIs being neglected by Intelligence.elieve, stems largelyatural tendency to think first of rail and road transport for military movement because of their cheater speed. Moreover, railways and roads, being able to traverse natural obstacles such as mountain ranges, can link widely separated regions and provide local access tn any direction. Rivers and canals cannot provide the same through access or choice of direction, and the capacity of rivers normallyas one proceeds upstream. Another reason for the preoccupation with rail and road transportation systems has been the relatively large reporting on them in connection with Western aid to backward countries. In which theor rehabilitation of these systems has loomed large.

This neglect ol waterways has meant that we have acquired Insufficient detail toational reconsideration of the validity of our preferential emphasis on railways and roads. The situation. In short,icious circle. Theof rail and road transportation networks, particularly around major cities and ports, to modern techniques of attack suggests that greater attention should be paid to theof waterway systemseans of moving supplies inland They merit at least sufficient procurement and research that their role may be more accurately assessed In those areas which have tbe highest priority tn over-all planning.

The baste problem of airfield Intelligence is the assessment of the capsdrnitiesiven airfield, te. to decide what aircraft '. can operate from it, and in what clrturrurUnces. Before thiscan be made It Is necessary to know tn detail such physical characteristics of the airfield aa theur-face, and weight-hearing capacity of the runways, taxi-tracks,innrsali_ the nature and disposition of supporting fcaflr* Oca. the location ainl bright ol obatrucuonspproaches,

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Gtographic Inlelligenc*

the altitude, and the temperature. It is necessary to know, too, tbe seasonal variations in some of these factors.

Except when photoreconnalssartce and detailed reporting are available. It Is extremely difficult to get this Information with the required accuracy, and evenull knowledge of bearing capacity Is practically Impossible. Detailed tests have been conductedegligible proportion of tbe airfields in which we are Interested, and we are therefore compelled to base our opinions largelynowledge of what aircraft have operated from the fields, without any real means to assess their surplus of bearing capacity. In addition, we all too often have no knowledge ofunway will stand up toor prolonged usage, or of how its capacity will vary at different seasons.

The rated requirements of aircraft which use the field, moreover, may bearery indirect relation torequirements. ForLaWsaiSH|^HflP

fH^^pUbllcatlons state that theequireseet to take off and cleareet Tet intelligence research shows clearly that the Communists, having built theirfor these aircraft to an original lengtheet subsequently lengthened them to at. For the aCQ-lfl the technical handbooksequirement

JHSr*eet JK/j, whereas research Indicates that the Communists are lengthening some runways foreet to at. There iside margin between tbe minimum length of take-off run and the length of the runway Itself.

There Is no easy solution,eel that considerablewould be achieved if our respective air forcesintelligence could reach some agreement on theof runway from which enemy or friendly forcesprepared to conduct both sustained and limitedIf lists could be agreed, showing on abasis the run runway reoxurementa'for the.various aircraft Ukdy to be used by that country, thenmteUigence branches would at leastasisassessments and could write with far greaterat rjresent, .

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Geographic /nfefligenc*

Climate

Climate of course affects most other aspects of geographic Intelligence, but' some applications of Its study In modernmay not yet be generally appreciated. Forun knowledge of local wind variations Is necessary for tbe study of the movement of radioactive fallout from nuclearImportant as this Is In strategic nuclear attack, it Is even more so In tactical applications, when friendly forces are relatively close to tbe point of Impact or may have totowards it. The same principle applies to chemical or bacteriological warfare. The study of local temperatureand local rains will also be very Important should gases be used by either sideuture war.

You will note my repetition of the word "local"Is on the whole fairly well provided with generalized data on climate, normally based on long periods of observation, whicheasonably accurate basis for regionalWhat IsI suggest it is the mainin this branch of geographicon local peculiarities or variations within the broadpattern.

Mapping

The need tor accuracy in mapping has always beenbut today this need Is greater than ever before. Whereas minor inaccuracies can reasonably be corrected by visualin conventional air operations, the concept of gnlded-misslle warfare highlights problems which havebeen only marginal One of the greatest limitations to ICBM accuracy is the present Inadequacy of intercontinental geodetic survey. The use of any guided missile which is not equipped with some terminal-guidance system requires precise knowledge of the relation between launching point andand though some margin of error may be allowed where area carnage la acceptabkyno such margin.is permissible if it is desired toingle objective with them age to surroundings.erminal-guidance system is fitted to theuereqriishe isncr*ledge of the radar return from the target area. In peacetime or tn the early stagesar, when It may not be rmaxfbat to acquire tab

Geographic Intelligence

knowledge by prior reconnaissance, tbe only alternative Is tbe simulation of tbe returnareful analysis of maps.

Since mapping represents graphic collation of manyof in teUlgence, It Is pertinent to examine briefly our roseis that of the map-producing authorities. Procedures no doubt vary between our countries, but certainprinciples are valid Irrespective of their detailedFirst, there mustystem for feeding ourto tbe map producers, and for checking their drafts. This assumes particular Importance when no recent photography Is available to the mappers, but even when it Is, there isa tans-bur between It and the map compilation, and In that Interval changes mayap becomes out of date all too quickly; we must at least ensure that It Is asas possible when issued

Second, there mustystem for informing the mappers of inaccuracies detected after issue, and for letting tbem know when certain series or Individual sheets have become obsolete. Many of us, noting Inaccuracies on maps, have done nothing to draw attention to them because there was no routinefor doing so.this applies primarily to areas over which peacetime photo reconnaissance Is notmustystem whereby doubtfulveryday research are recorded, so thatagencies may be briefed to check them.

Fourth, there mustystem whereby mappingare related to planning. This isatterbetween planning staffs and the mappers; tbeof Intelligence organizations ties mainly Into the deficiencies and Inaccuracies ta existingthe priority areas so that new editions may be put in

Photographyade requirement ta.mapping, tn moat forms of Intelligence research, and hi operational planning; and any deficiencies of photography most-adversely afteet these activities Of the two forms of photographic coverage, print coverage and negatives backing it up, the need for tbe former is well rarngntxad. bat tbe need for film ts not soappreciated Film is required to meet the demands of various sections and organisations In peacetime and law;

GO+eHOTHTTA*

fntelugenc*

and that sJternative of copying from prints, besides being slower and more costly, does not provide first-class quality, especially when, as frequently, the original prints havethrough age.

II seems somewhat Illogical that whereas tbe exchange of textual Information between our agencies has been developedleb degree, the exchange of photographic prints and film has been comparatively neglected. In addition to the direct advantages of sueh an exchange to peacetimeresearch, we should not overlook its importance In those "hot" situations which occur from time to time and In the period of extreme military activity which wouldprecede the next war. At such times It isBksamadtssatPeJerdjbe obliged to signal

for urgently required

photographs and film, ana wenwait their arrival "by best possiblence the war had started. It Isto suppose that fresh photographs would becomebut tn the pressure periods In the mean tune we have to depend on existing holdings.

and this has been of paxtkauaron-romanormrrrird TXmcxuhei are stm ewountered by the m-

One appreciates, of course, that clauses in peacetimecontracts may preclude the exchange of tbe resultant photography, but this restriction appliesery small proportion of overall available holdings and does not Invalidate my thesis that muchiii* *tMi avwwfcd wm done In the

Geographic Intelligence

teUlgence community, however, in applying the authorities' decisions.

The main difficulty arises from the fact that the decisions, being based on academic principles, are sometimes ahead of popular usage, and In such cases the "preferred" (or decision) name tends to rnake tbe text less readily Intelligible to the non-specialist reader. In current intelligence reporting, It to desirable totyle which permits theide range of usually high-level generalists; any irritant which interrupts their concentration on the subject matter to undesirable, and might even result In failure to appreciate the Importance of theew examples oferm irritating preferred names are Krung Thepuang-chouhin-men Tao (Quemoyulawesiben-yang (Mukden) and Hsla-men Tao (Amoyhere are many others which, being less common, are perhaps all the more irritating when they are encountered.

Tbe problem to complicated by the fact that some of these preferred names may, In course of time, become moreaccepted in dally usage throughout the world. This raises the question whether we are to concentrate on ease of comprehension at lbs present time or should toleratenames with the object of gradually educating ourselves and our readers to accept the academic decisions. Theof tbe two boards are progressively being Incorporated in new map series, and therefore confusion to likely to arise In basic or long-term reporting If we do not adhere rigidly to them. One can Imagine, for example, the frustrationommander in the field when he realizes that he has the task of reconciling the "preferred" names used on his basic maps and the "conventional" namesetailed study of the region's'

Another aspect of the decisions which brings complications to the retention of many Indigenous generic terms foropographical features as capes, rivers, tobxnds, mountains and lakes. The topography of foreign lands to athneJenttyfor ganerabsts to comprehend without the addedcaused by the use of these terms, and there wouldtotrong ease for tbe substitution ofequivalents Ahhough we. the peacetime elite of|flP

InfeWgfKm

Intelligence activities, can perhaps overcome the difficulties by acquiring familiarity with new terms, the problem would assume Increased significance In wartime,arge body of untrained recruits would be unfamiliar withargeting

While the production of air targets material Iservice responsibility, tbe Intelligence organizations must provide the basic Information required and play an Important part In writing the appreciations on which the priority of target systems and individual targets are based It Isrelevant to examine whether we are devoting our resources to any non-vital aspects of targeting, or on the other hand are neglecting others of Importance.

Let us look first at strategic targeting. In Worldhe basic documents for operations were detailed information sheets and annotated photographs of Individual targets, and similar, usually more generalized, graphics on Importantof targets. These were necessary for attacks by manned aircraft, since visual recognition of the target and of the selected detailed aiming point within itajor part to such attacks. With the concept of nuclear and guided-mlssfie strategic attack. It should be examined whether It Is stm necessary toajor part of our targetingto detailed graphics on individual targets; In view of the area damage attainable by modern weapons,reater proportion of effort be devoted to urban and Industrial

There Is probably no aspect of aerial warfare on which more has been written than target selection. It Is fairly easy to be wise after the event, as we hare seen from the spate ofof allied bombing policy published since World WarIs very difficult to be equally wise before the event, and to be sure that, the golden role of targeting Isthe enemy where It hurts turn mostuture war, because of the striking power of weapon* Ukely to oe held by both tt la more than ever essential that target selection be

rUrht, and from the very begtardng of hostilities. There may bo no cirportunlty to exr*rtoent with prioritieshe last war. We tn tatelrlger.ee have,eeporudrsTity to

Geofl'ophic Jrrlefli'genw

ensure that our recommendations In this field are based on sound principles.

The discharge of this responsibility is rendered moreIn my opinion, by the lack of any sound system forthe relative priority of complexes as targets. This Isifferent task from assessing the priorityingle installation relative to others of like function. One complex may, for example,ransportation target of major Importance to tbe country's warteel plant and oil refinery of medium importance, and so on. How can the priority of this complex be determined in relation to that of other complexes which contain various other combinations of mstallatlons, each with their own relative Importance within their functional systems? This is too critical ato be left to haphazard methods, and merits some close examination.

I have long felt that the solution may lie In some sort of point system.ave In mind is that within eachfor which strategic targeting Isactor should be agreed on for each functional system. ofl-refln-lng, transportation, steel industry,hebeing based on the characteristics of the war potential of tbe particular country. Then within eachactor should be agreed on for Individual installations In accordance with their various degrees ofombination of the two factors wouldoints value for each Installation, and the sum of these values would give the total value' of each complex, thus providing an Indication of its relative priority for attack. It would, of course, be necessary to keep all tbe factors under periodic review, and to adjust them to the light of changes in the war potential of the countryWhile this method would not be without Itsit provides tbe basisositive approach to the matter anduggest, be Investigated.

One important aspect of graphics on complexesrptc-aenbstion. of the anticipated,radar return from'the various installations, buildings and natural features. In the absence of actual radarscope photos and this most at present apply to vast areas which might be attacked Inis necessary to simulate the return, Iksatog the atptdatjop on an analysis of such factors as the height of buildings, their type of corn

UJIIIIII-Jllff

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fiic Irrfeiligtrtce

rtruction. their lay-out, the density of built-up areas, and the configuration of such features as rivers, lakes, and woods, all this information must be provided by the mteUigence agendes.

I doubt whether our procurement policies take sufficientof this requirement, are we equipped to provide such Information with the degree of detailed accuracy which is required? In respectountry such as China, form fairly sure we are not, particularly when tbe constant development of existing and new centers Is borne tnuggest that this deficiency Is worth examination,iew to the better briefing of procurement agencies active In the field.

In World War II probably as much activity was devoted to tactical targeting as to strategic, and the allied tactical air forces played an important part in the victory. Today, the tendency to talk In termshort, decisive nuclear attack or at least an air offensive conducted at long range with guided mlssnes has given riseeeling that in the next war little hi the way of tactical bombing will be needed. But this is not necessarily so. In some areas where our forces might be engaged it is still probable that for various reasons tactical attacks would be required, even if they did notpredominate- Because of this, same effort directed towards the preparation of tactical target material can stiU be Justified, but we must ensure that tbe effort iswith the use that wfll be made of the material, bearing In mind that on the outbreak of war photo reconnaissance would quickly provide completely up-to-date Information.

Cow-fusion

The field ofer.ee. as we have seen,ery wide one, affecting either directly or indirectly most forms of military operations and planning. If there Is any factor in theaveelieveto be this:'priorities for procurement sod reaearch must be more closely related to planning requirements than they are at nrcswnt, not only to reaped of the degree of detail bat also tn respect of the areas covered Far geographic ta teUlgence Is not an end tn Itself; Iteans to an end -militaryenViency.

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Difficulties and new proposals from down underozen military geographic fields.

GEOGRAPHIC IWTEIXIGENCE K- C. Duncan

Geographic intelligence la one of the oldest forms of mili-tary lnlelllgence, and one of the most Important. Fromtunes, when man first conspired against man, through ancient history and mediaeval conflict to the most recent wars of our own time, an accurate knowledge andof geographical factors has been an essential part of strategy and tactics. But today, instead of merely giving some simple Information on what lies beyond thehill, geographic intelligence is required toorld-wide basis and in Infinitely greater variety, detail, and (above all) precision than ever before.

In the face of unlimited conceivable demands fromand operational staffs it is essential that our geographic activities should be carefully guided and controlled, so that none may be wasted on aspects which, though previouslyin military thinking, have now lost their importance in modern strategy and tactics. It is In the light of this thesisropose to examine several fields of geographicand discuss problems encountered in each.

Crott-Country Terrain

Assessing the suitability of terrain for cross-countryhasajor problem in modern warfare. Of the many Instances when failure to appreciate this factor has proved disastrous, one is perhaps outstanding.7 Lord Haig launched his Flanders offensive in disregard of biswarning that the ground would revert to bog under the necessary preliminary bombardment and his weatheradvice that the autumn rains, then due. would further aggravate conditions His failure to take into account the terrain requirements for cross-country movement led to the

CONFIDENTIAL

/nfelligence

costliest battle in British military history, Passchendaele.the sacrifice ofen.'

The suitabUity of cross-country terrain is today in some ways more critical than ever because of heavier equipment, increased speed and mobility, and probable need for dispersal off surfaced roadsrecaution against tactical nuclearIts assessment, however,ost difficult matter,atching of the characteristics of various types of military vehicleide range of detailed information on theor seasonal variations of bearing capacity, width and depth of water obstacles, height and steepness of their banks, and the effect of day-to-day or seasonal climatic influences. The task is rendered especially difficult when no practical precedent exists: take for example the movement of Centurion tanks across rlceflelds.

The military geographer really has two majorto acquire and collate the necessary mass of factual data on the terrain, and second, to apply those data to foreseeable military operations on the basis of proved vehicleForuggest, careful liaison with planning staffs Is essential. It is beyond our resources to acquire and collate detailed information on all areas; we must concentrate on areas where the planners consider movement most likely to occur. And we must keep aware of movement plans forvehicles in order to spot the need for experimental maneuvers as basis tor an adequate assessment of theof these movements.

Ports and Beaches

An outstanding feature of Worldilitarywas the extensive use of beaches for lauding troops with their arms and supplies. New techniques led to operations of this kindar greater scale than had previously been thought possible. It became the policy to by-pass thein the opening stagesampaign, relying on the beaches until harbors were captured and reopened to the use of conventional vessels. It was found possible to land stores and equipment on beaches and clear them inland atrates,ons per day per mile of beach Thus performanceood beach compares favorably witn

'C/.Leon WoWS In Planter* Fields, reviewed on pp.f this

Geographic Intelligence

thatedium-sized seaport, and In some cases can beon the basis of the wartimewo-mile stretch of beach west of Tourane, in South Vietnam, wouldapacityons per day, as against onlyor the port.

The Importance of beaches for military operations hasincreased since the war. Modern weapons seem likely to damage seaports more effectively and thus delay theirfor longer periods, while Improved equipment for beach landings will probably permit the movement of tonnages far in excess of the figures achieved in World War U. In theseuggest that our organizations shouldcarefully whether they are over-concentrating onstudies of ports and their capacities to the neglect of beaches.

We should at least aimigh standard in respect of those beaches which the planners consider may be used inExperience In Melbourne indicates thatbeach intelligence is generally sufficientuide to planners, but lacks the detail required for mounting specific operations with confidence. Itallacy to suppose that observations made years ago are necessarily accurate today and adequate for presentheof some beaches can change surprisingly overnighttorm, and the heavier equipment available today posesnot previously encountered. Factors such as bearing capacity (involving assessment of tbelope at various tides, variations of surface and slope at differenteffects of tide and local currents on inshoreare typically deficient in our present

These deficiencies could beuggest, by carrying out special technical reconnaissance, whenever practicable, in respect of those beaches which are of Interest to ourplanners on the evidence of present information. Where this reconnaissance is not possibleeaches in potential enemy territory) our procurement channels should befar more than at present. If this is not done, we can only continue to plan on imperfect data, risking uncertainties and perhaps jeopardizing the success of vital amphibious

CONFIOrfJTiAL

intelligence

Railways

An Important problem in the study ol railways Is theof route capacities. In ideal circumstances this assessment would be made by analyzing the physicalof thenumber of tracks, weight of rail, length and spacing of passing loops, speed or weightand soarriveheoretical physicalThe practical operational capacity would then be determined by such factors as size and type of locomotive and rolling-stock park, fuel availability, quality and location of repair shops and engine sheds, etc.

In foreign countries, however, particularly those which arecquisition of all the detailed information necessary for these analyses is most difficult, and presentof the practical capacities of railways in those countries can at best be regarded as approximations based on very imperfect data. Unfortunately, there is little prospect of obtaining the detailed information required to fill our gaps, and it is therefore worth considering whether some short-cut method might improve our assessments.

One such method might be to make an all-out effort toworking timetables of those lines which havein planning. These workingto bewith passengerdetails of all classes of traffic, both passenger and freight, and are available In one form or another on all railways. An analysis of them in conjunction with other textual and photographicmight give reasonable accuracy in the assessment of practical capacities. It would not be easy, but If ouragreedtandard approach it seems likely that the assessments achieved would be more soundly based andat least for the purposes of war potential appreciations.

Roods

The great effort devoted to reporting on roads hasonsiderable amount of Information, which, however, isto certain technical aspects critical for accurateof road potential. This deficiency is due chiefly to the fact that reports come from nontechnical observers,ontributing cause Is that reporting officers not unnaturally tend to judge the condition of roads in foreign countries on

Geographic Intelligence

the basts of road standards In their own. so that theirtend to vary inversely with these standards.

The effect of inaccurate reporting can best be shownractical example Let usoad across undulatingwith an overall width ofeetaterboundsurface In bad condition. Applying the standard NATO Road Capacity Table to these details, we arrive at an estimated

capacity:

2 vehicles per hour.

on vehicles are usedhour running day. thecapacityons per day.

But if the reporting officer, because of the bad condition of the surface, mistakes the waterbound macadam for crushed rock, our calculations would be:

enicte5 P" nour-

on vehicleshour running day. the estimated capacity Isons perimple mistake on the nature of the surface has thus resulted In an errorn the capacity of this particular road. Cumulative errors in the NATO Table factors, appliedumber of roadsiven area, might seriously affect logistic planning.

But tbe full assessmentoad's potential requires also consideration of the maximum live-load. the weight of the heaviest vehicle that can use it. This Involves other technical reporting, in particular on the strength of bridges and culverts, which not infrequently impose strict limits on traffic. In the example we gave justssumedon vehicles were used, but planners might well want to know whether they couldton trucks orton tanksiven road. This problem is one of educating reporting officers ao that the technical details they supply are far more accurate than at present, or of obtaining this necessary information In some other way.

A secondary problem In this field, as in many others, ts to ensure that procurement and research are conducted Inwith the priorities of planning requirements, for the potential areas to be covered arc so vast that with the

CONFlDPfjTIAL

intelligence

limited resources available we cannot hope to acnieveJe^ results on everything.his control Is not exercised, thereeal danger that essential work will be neglected.

Inland Water Transportation

Compared with railways and roads, inland water trarisporto-Uon is being neglected by Intelligence.eheve stems iargelyatural tendency to think first of /aU andfor military movement because of their^-rreater speed. Moreover, railways and roads, being able to traverse natural obstacles such as mountain ranges can lins widely separated regions and provide local access in any direction Rivers and canals cannot provide the same through access or choice of direction, and the capacity of rivers normallyas one proceeds upstream. Another reascm fo the preoccupation with rail and road transportation systems has been the relatively large reporting on them m, connectlon with Western aid to backward countries, in which theor rehabilitation of these systems has loomed large

This neglect of waterways has meant that we have acquired insufficient detail toational reconsideration of the validity of our preferential emphasis on railways and roads. The situation, in short,icious circle. The vulner-abillty of rail and road transportation networks, particular^ around major cities and poris. to modern techniques of attack suggests that greater attention should be paid to theof waterway systemseans of moving surmlies inland They merit at least sufficient procurement and research that their role may be more accurately assessed in those areas which have the highest priority in over-all planning.

Airfields

The basic problem of airfield intelligence is the assessment of the capabilitiesiven. to decide what aircraft can operate from it, and ta what circumstances. Before this assessment can be made it is necessary to know in detail such physical characteristics of the airfield as the dimensions,and weight-bearing capacity of the runways, taxi-tracks, and dispersals, the nature and disposition of supportingthe location and height of obstructions to the approaches,

Geographic Intelligence

the altitude, and the temperature. It is necessary to know, too. the seasonal variations in some of these factors.

Except when photoreconnalssance and detailed reporting are available, it is extremely difficult to get this information with the required accuracy, and evenull knowledge of bearing capacity is practically impossible. Detailed tests have been conductedegligible proportion of the airfields in which we are interested, and we are therefore compelled to base our opinions largelynowledge of what aircraft have operated from the fields, without any real means to assess their surplus of bearing capacity. In addition, we all too often have no knowledge ofunway will stand up toor prolonged usage, or Of how Its capacity will vary at different seasons.

The rated requirements of aircraft which use the field, moreover, may bearery indirect relation torequirements. For example, both Air Ministry and USAF publications state that theequireseet to take off and cleareet. Yet intelligence research shows clearly that the Communists, having built theirfor these aircraft to an original lengtheet, subsequently lengthened them to at. For thehe technical handbooksequirementRAF)eethereas research indicates that the Communists are lengthening some runways foreet to at. There iside margin between the minimum length of take-off run and the length of the runway itself.

There is no easy solution,eel that considerablewould be achieved if our respective air forces and airfield intelligence could reach some agreement on the total lengths of runway from which enemy or friendly forces would be prepared to conduct both sustained and limited occasional operations. If lists could be agreed, showingountry-by-country basis the full runway requirements for the operation of various aircraft likely to be used by that country, then the airfield intelligence branches would at leastasis for their assessments and could write with far greater unanimity than at present

CONRT^TTM

Intelligence

Climate

Climate of course affects most other aspects of geographic intelligence, but some applications of its study in modernmay not yet be generally appreciated. Forull knowledge of focal wind variations is necessary for the study of the movement of radioactive fallout from nuclearImportant as this Is in strategic nuclear attack, It Is even more so In tactical applications, when friendly forces are relatively close to the point of Impact or may have totowards ii The same principle applies to chemical or bacteriological warfare. The study of local temperatureand local rains will also be very Important should gases be used by either sideuture war.

You will note my repetition of tbe word "local."is on the whole fairly well provided with generalized data on climate, normally based on long periods of obesivatson. whicheasonably accurate basis for regionalWhat isI suggest It is the mainin this branch of geographicon local peculiarities or variations within the broadpattern. Mapping

The need for accuracy in mapping has always beenbut today this need is greater than ever before. Whereas minor Inaccuracies can reasonably be corrected by visualin conventional air operations, the concept of guided-misslle warfare highlights problems which havebeen only marginal. One of the greatest limitations to ICBM accuracy Is the present inadequacy of Intercontinental geodetic survey. The use of any guided missile which is not equipped with some terminal-guidance system requires precise knowledge of the relation between launching point andand though some margin of error may be allowed where area damage is acceptable, no such margin is permissible if It Is desired toingle objective with the minimum ofto surroundings. erminal-guidance system Is fitted to thererequisite isnowledge of the radar return from the target area. In peacetime or in the early stagesar, when it may not be possible to acquire this

CONFlOWriAL

Geographic Intelligence

knowledge by prior recorinaissance. the only alternative is the simulation of the returnareful analysis of maps.

Since mapping represents graphic collation of manyof Intelligence, it Is pertinent to examine briefly our roleis that of the map-produdng authorities. Procedures no doubt vary between our countries, but certainprinciples are valid irrespective of their detailedFirst, there mustystem for feeding ourto the map producers, and for checking their drafts. This assumes particular importance when no recent photography is available to the mappers, but even when it is. there isa time-lag between It and the map compilation, and in that interval changes mayap becomes out of date all too quickly; we must at least ensure that It Is asas possible when issued.

Second, there mustystem for Informing the mappers of inaccuracies detected after issue, and for letting them know when certain series or Individual sheets have become obsolete. Many of us, noting inaccuracies on roans, have done nothing to draw attention to them because there was no routinefor doing so.this applies primarily to areas over which peacetime photorecormalsaance is notmustystem whereby doubtful mapnoted in everyday research are recorded, so thatagencies may be briefed to check them.

Fourth, there mustystem whereby mappingare related to planning. This isatter for liaison between planning staffs and the mappers; theof Intelligence organizations lies mainly In drawing attention to the deficiencies and inaccuracies in existing maps of the priority areas so that new editions may be put in hand. Photography

Photographyasic requirement in mapping, in most forms of mteUigcnce research, and in operational planning; and any deficiencies of photography must adversely affect these activities. Of the two forms of photographic coverage, print coverage and negatives backing It up, the need for the former is well recognized, but the need for film is not soappreciated. Film is required to meet the demands of various sections and organizations in peacetime and in war,

/nfel.-oeoce

and the alternative of copying from prints, besides be ng slower and more costly, does not provide first-class quality, especially when, as frequently, the original prints havethrough age.

It seems somewhat illogical that whereas the exchange of textual information between our agencies has been developedigh degree, the exchange of Photographic prints and film has been comparatively neglected. In addition to the direct advantages of such an exchange to peacetime inteUi-gence research, we should not overlook its importance ta those -hot" situations which occur from time to tunc and in the period of extreme military activity which would imme-dlau-iv precede the next war. At such times It Isomplicated and inefficient procedure to be obliged to signal from. say. Washington to Melbourne for urgently irequired photographs and film, and then to await their arrival by best possiblence the war had started. It isto suppose that fresh photographs would becomebut in the pressure periods in the meantime we have to depend on existing holdings.

One appreciates, of course, that clausesceUrnecontracts may preclude the exchange of the resultant photography, but this restriction appliesery small proportion of overall available holdings and does not invalidate my thesis that much more could, and should, be done in the matter oflan has been started for comparing the print and film holdings of the UnitedRAF/TEAFnd JIBnd it has been agreed that the respective deficiencies revealed should be made good as quickly as possible. But. as farm aware, the survey has not yet been extended to the United States, and It would seem that such an extension would be of mutual benefit to all our agencies.

Geographic Kama

Much paimUking work has been done by. Board on Geographic Names and. Permanent Committee on Geographical Names towards the standardization of place names and generic terms, and this has been of particular value where transliterationon-romanomaniscd form is required. Difficulties are still encountered by the In-

CONHDfcNTIAl

Geographic Intelligence

community, however, in applying the authorities' decisions.

The main cUfflculty arises Irom the fact that the decisions, being based on academic principles, are sometimes ahead of popular usage, and in such cases the "preferred" (or decision) name tends to make the text less readily intelligible to the non-specialist reader. In current mteUigence reporting, it is desirable totyle which permits theide range of usuaUy high-level gencraUsts; any irritant which interrupts their concentration on the subject matter is undesirable, and might even result in failure to appreciate the Importance of theew examples oferm irritating preferred names are Krung Thepuang-chouhm-men Tao (Quemoyulawesihenyang (Mukden) and Hsia-mcn Tao (Amoyhere are many others which, being less common, are perhaps all the more irritating when they are encountered.

The problem is complicated by the fact that some of these preferred names may, in course of time, become moreaccepted In dally usage throughout the world. This raises the question whether we are to concentrate on ease of comprehension at the present time or should toleratenames with the object of gradually educating ourselves and our readers to accept the academic decisions. Tbeof the two boards are progressively being incorporated In new map series, and therefore confusion Is likely to arise in basic or long-term reporting if we do not adhere rigidly to them. One can imagine, for example, the frustrationommander in the field when he realizes that he has the task of reconciling the "preferred" names used on bis basic maps and the "conventional" names usedetailed study of the region's topography.

Another aspect of the decisions which brings amplications is the retention of many indigenous generic terms for such topographical features as capes, rivers, islands, mountains and lakes. The topography of foreign lands is sufficientlyfor generallsts to comprehend without the addedcaused by the use of these terms, and there wouldtotrong case for the substitution ofequivalents. Although we. the peacetime eUte of allied

Geographic Intelligence

inteUlgenec activiUes, can perhaps overcome the difficulties bv acquiring familiarity with new terms, the problem would assume Increased significance in wartime,arge body of untrained recruits would be unfamiliar with ourAtr Targeting

While the production of air targets material iservice responsibility, tbe in teUlgence organizations must provide the basic Information required and play an Important part in writing the appreciations on which the priority of target systems and individual targets are based. It is there-tore relevant to examine whether we are devoting our resources to any non-vital aspects of targeting, or on the other band are neglecting others of Importance.

Let us look first at strategic targeting. In World War II the basic documents for operations were detailed information sheets and annotated photographs of Individual targets, and similar, usually more generalized, graphics on importantof targets. These were necessary for attacks by manned aircraft, since visual recognition of the target and of the selected detailed aiming point within itajor part in such attacks. With the concept of nuclear and guldcd-misslle strategic attack, it should be examined whether It Is still necessary toajor part of our targetingto detailed graphics on individual targets; In view of the area damage attainable by modem weapons,reater proportion of effort be devoted to urban and industrial

There Is probably no aspect of aerial warfare on which more has been written than target selection. It Is fairly easy to be wise after the event, as we have seen from the spate ofof allied bombing policy published tine* World War II it Is very difficult to be equally wise before the event, and to be sure that the golden role of targeting Is observed -hit the enemy where It hurts him mostuture war. because of the striking power of weapons lately to be held by both sides It Is more than ever essential that target selection be right, and from the very beginning of hostilities. There may be no opportunity to experiment with priorities as In the last war. We In Intelligence have,esponsibility to

Geographic Intelligence

ensure that our recommendations in this field are based on sound principles.

The discharge of this responsibility is rendered morein my opinion, by the lack of any sound system forthe relative priority of complexes as targets. This isifferent task from assessing the priorityingle installation relative to others of like function. One complex may, for example,ransportation target of major importance to the country's warteel plant and oil refinery of medium importance, and so on. How can the priority of this complex be determined in relation to that of other complexes which contain various other combinations ofach with their own relative Importance within their functional systems? This is too critical ato be left to haphazard methods, and merits some close examination.

1 have long felt that the solution may lie in some sort of point system,ave In mind is that within eachfor which strategic targeting isactor should be agreed on for each functional systemransportation, steel industry,hebeing based on the characteristics of the war potential of the particular country. Then within eachactor should be agreed on for individual installations in accordance with their various degrees ofombination of the two factors wouldoints value for each Installation, and the sum of these values would give the total value of each complex, thus providing an indication of its relative priority for attack. It would, of course, be necessary to keep all the factors under periodic review, and to adjust them in the fight of changes in the war potential of the countryWhile this method would not be without itsit provides the basisositive approach to the matter anduggest, be Investigated.

One important aspect of graphics on complexes is aof the anticipated radar return from the various installations, buildings and natural features. In the absence of actual radars copethis must at present apply to vast areas which might be attacked inis necessary to simulate the return, basing the simulation on an analysis of such factors as the height of buildings, their type of con'-

Geo grophrc Intelligence

struciion. their lay-out, the density of built-updmc

srrsisf saws ass

Tdoubl MM our procurementSTiS

to the better brloQng of procurement agencies active in the

fl1n' World War IX probably as muchcvoW to tacucal targeting as to strategic, and the allied tactical ah Srces puyrcl an Important part in the victory. Today, the tendency to talk in terms* fjj*least an air offensive conducted at long range with gUedlntiles has given riseeelinghe next war btue In the way of tactical bombing will be neededo. in some areas where ourtill probable that for various reasons attaSTwould be required, even it they did not acU, any predominate. Because of this, some effort ducted towards the preparation of tactical tarf* aafcerAtl eta stfl riusUfled. but we must ensure thatrate with the use that will be made of theS mind that on the outbreak of warwould quickly provide completely up-todate information.

Conclusion

The field of geographic mtemgence as we ^iS^Zl very wide one. affecting cither directly or forms of military operations and" ^ZLTIt common factor In theaveelieverTthls priorities for procurement and resewch must be more closely related to planning reoulrements than the,Rt nresent not only to respect of the degree of detail but alsoresp^'oTthc areaa^ed- For

is not an end in itself; iteans to an end-militaryefficiency.

Original document.

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