NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
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POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
To assess prospects for political stability within the European Satellites and in the over-all Satellite structure during the next few years.
A considerable degree of stability has been established in the Satellite area6 and the Soviet leaders now appear determined to pressaster pace of socialization in Eastern Europe. While we do noteturn to Stalinistand exploitation is likely,almost certainly will seek over thc next fiveteady though gradual growth in Satellite-wide conformity and adherence to the Soviet model.emphasis will be placed on efforts to coordinate Bloc economies, to complete thc socialization of agriculture in all the Satellites except Poland, and, in general, to attain at least the outward formsfor their "transition to socialism"
hough pressures on the Satellite peoples may increaseesult of these developments, and may sharpen general antipathy toward the regimes, widespread popular uprisings arc unlikely. Factions within the various parties will almostcontinue toperhapsbecomesuchwill, for tlic most part, probablyhidden and kept under control by
the dominant, Khrushchev-approvedProspects for economic growth are good and there will probably be small but cumulatively significantin living standards. For these reasons, most of the Satellite regimes will probablyair degree ofstability and achieve at least limited success ln fulfilling theirplansapid speedup of
uch successes, however, will probably fall short of Communisf hopes. The anti-Communist and nationalisticof the Satellite peoples, certain weaknesses within the Satellite parties and shortcomings in the Satellitewill remain major problems which will,inimum, retard Communist progress throughout the area. There are, inumber of possiblefactors, including events within the USSR itself (suchuccessionrictions between the USSR and Communisthe divergencies of Gomulka's Poland, which couldthe stability of the Bloc structure.
he working relationship between Gomulka und Khrushchev now seems to be operating smoothly. Nevertheless, the moderate "Polish road to socialism" Iswith Khrushchev'sto accelerate Communist progress in thc USSR and socialist progress tn the Satellites. The Poles may lag farther and farther behind developmentsin thc Bloc and therebyore and more disturbing clement; the Oomulka-Khrushchev modus vivendi may become increasingly strainedesult. We do not expect any dramatic developments in Soviet-Polish relations over the next year or so, in part because of some Polish willingness to respond to Soviet pressures, in part because ofSoviet caution. Yet over the long run tensions could slowly build up, possiblyoint of crisis.
urther strengthening of its position last year, the East Germancontinues to suffer, from popular antipathy, party factionalism, anddisrespect, and still depends on the presence of Soviel forces. These facts, together with the divisionhole, make East Oermany the Satellite most likely to be directly affected by major changes in Soviet or Western policies. Its future is inextricablyin the Soviet attitude toward all Germany and toward thc" BerlinA resolution of the Berlin crisis along lines favorable to the USSR would strengthen the GDR regime. On the other hand, should thc Soviets fail in their efforts respecting Berlin, the political weaknesses of East Germany wouldbe perpetuated for the foreseeable future.
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE SATELLITEShe attitude ol the USSR toward itsln Eastern Europe Is basediend of power politics and Communist Ideology. The Soviet Communists have the imperialist's normal reluctance to surrender territory, and they view thc control of Eastern Europe as contributing to the security of the USSR. In addition, they are unable lo admitountry once under Communist control and on the road toould revert to non-Communist status. This would seriously chaUenge their conviction thai the Ude of world history is inevitably on their side. The loss of East Germany to the West, forwould not only reduce the Bloc's total assets and be dangerous In terms ofm thc olher Satellites, but would also challenge thc validity of lhe whole faith.
Since the death of Stalin, and particularly since thc events6 in Ppland andthe Soviet leaders seem to havethat: (a) beneath the surface in all of the Satellites are powerfulasare capable ofsoviet hegemony, <b) ruthless colonial exploitation of the Satellites by thereat nation chauvinism" ln Communist lerms) Is dangerous; but (c) any failure to give clear direction to policy In theas was Uie case after the death ofis also dangerous.
During the year or so following thcrevolution thc Communists seemed to temporize in Eastern Europe while seeking to repair the damage to the Bloc stability caused by the eventslthough efforts were made to halt thehere was no return to Stalinism. Emphasis was on assuaging
popular discontents, particularly in thefield. This period was also one of some Ideological confusion arising from therole of Yugoslavia, the deflationistin Poland, and the brief episodeelaxed course in Communist China. The failure of Soviet policy tolearmay have in part been the resulttruggle within the Soviet leadership.
By thc endhrushchev had clearly overcome the diverse tendencies in the Soviet leadership and established his ownInonference of Communist parties held in Moscoweclaration which dealt firmly with some of the ideological confusions to which the events6 had given rise. It reduced thewhich would be tolerated for separate national parties on the "road to socialism" and made clear that the experience of the USSR provided the model for the Satellites to follow. In8 andat the XXI Party Congress, the Soviet leadership became more specific, calling for increasing Satellite adherence topeedup in the Satellite advance to socialism.
The previous bases of Soviet policy toward the Satellites have not been abandoned. The Soviet desire for faster "socialization" does not necessarily conflict with Khrushchev'sapproach which allows the Blocto advance with due regard for localNevertheless, notice was served at the XXI Party Congress that Khrushchev's ideas are applicable throughout the Bloc. Further, through his callocialisthis declaration that all socialist states will achieve communism more or lessand his recent suggestion thatbetween Bloc states are destinedto disappear, the Soviet dictator has callededuction in Satellite divergenciesommon advance toward conformity. The final year of the ambitious Soviet Seven-Yearow seems to be the target date for all thcto attain at least thc outward forms required for their "transition to socialism."
This distinct hardening of Soviet policy was probably thc result of four broad(a) Moscow believedooser association involving more autonomy would at some juncture risk the loss of control over populations essentially hostile to the USSR and that stability could best be assured throughb) The Sovietbelieved that there waseed and an opportunity to expand the power and to revitalize the morale of the Soviet and Bloc Communist parties, in part through moreand energetic programs; (c) Thesealso felt that thereeed to reinforce Moscow's damaged position -as the political and ideological leader of the Communistln the face of revisionism, polycentrism, dogmatism, and, most Important, thepretensions of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Tse-tung; (d) The Soviethave become increasingly self-confidentesult of growing military and economic strength, scientific triumphs, and thethat the balance of world power is shift-big ln their favor. The Soviets thusfelt it both desirable (perhaps evenin terms of the Communist world) and feasible (ln terms of relations with the West and with the Satellites themselves) to workuller realization of theirin the European Satellites.
Though the Soviet approach to thehas become more militant andnd particularly sincehere willumber offrom thc methods and intentions prevalent under Stalin. Politically.plans almost certainly call for some emphasis on incentives and persuasion; the systematic use of terror will be avoided as far as possible. Khrushchev will also be willing when necessary to adjust his demands and goals to meet specific situations. Hcalso intends toelativelyapproach to the Satellite parties. The Stalinist attitude toward subordinate parties in Eastern Europe will probably not beThere almost certainty will be noto reinstitute the system ol Sovietempowered to direct the course ofaffairs.
In the economic field, the USSR has not reverted to Stalin's policy of exploiting the Satellites indeed, the Sovieiseriod In which the USSR may occasionally have to extend somecredits to thc Satellites as well asthemuaranteed market and an assured source of raw materials. During the past year orajor effort haa been made to invigorate the Council for EconomicAidhe instrument designed to improve Bloc economic coordination andeconomic specialization. Particularhas been given the machinery,and chemical Industries. Indetailed plans have been worked out for the linking of electrical power systems, and advanced planning Is underway for ato deliver Soviet crude oil to Eastrefineries. Though nationaland specific economic problems will continue to retard CBMA's progress, economic interdependence within the Bloc, especially among the Satellites, can be expected toTo the extent that CEMA Increases efficiency and Improves planning in theit will not only increase the USSR's gains from intra-Bloc trade, and reduce theof emergency demands on the Soviet economy (such as those made6, but will also benefit the Satellites
Khrushchev, in March, referred lo thc eventual virtual disappearance of boundaries between Bloc stainsoncomitant of the achievement of communism. But the achievement of communism is, at best, far off and we do not believe any significantwill be taken over the next several years to cause borders lo "wllher away."
II. SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN THE SATEl-LITES
The Speedup in "Building Socialism"
the Satellite regimes except themade vigorous moves during theto accelerate socialization andBulgaria last fall declaredgreat leap forward."regime In East Oermany purged the
party of its moderate opposition and at the party congress ln8 announced the adoption of more rigorous policies.and Rumania boosted their economic goals and speeded up collectivization Even the Hungarian leader, Kadar. while declaring his parly's unwillingness to "run" while still learning to "walk" moved to the offensive by collectivizing peasantsrand scale and heightening pressure for increasedand industrial production.
The European Satellites have also been called upon to Join thc Soviets in the race to catch up with Western economics. Several of the Satellites have announced plans tothe lead of various Western countries in the per capita production or consumption of selected commodities Most notably. East Germany has announced that it will catch up with West Germanyer capitaof certain goods (chiefly meal1 and in general consumption per capitahile East Germany will probably succeed In matching West German per capita consumptionew consumer goods by thes, Uie gap ln over-all consumption will probably not be appreciably reduced unless the SovieU are willing toextensive aid for this purpose.
Bulgaria's "leap forward" has included the formulation of astronomic economic goals, an adminlstraUve-cconomlc organizationfeatures from both the Soviet savnar-khoz and the Chinese commune, and, inan ideological militancy unequalledelse in thc Satellites Though stillInfluenced by the Soviet model, the Bulgarian leaders have been, to oneor another, Inspired by the Draconian methods and ambitious programs of theCommunists which seemed to offer solu-Uons for some particular Bulgarian problems, including unemployment Habitually over-zealous, they have also been affected by their desire to demonstrate their superiority over the other Satellites In building socialism. It is probable Uiat. at least until the Soviettoward the communes was clarified inome Bulgarian leaders wished actively to follow Pelping's lead. Bui since
last December, thc Bulgarian party hasalluded only to the Soviet model.
remain major differencesvarious Satellites. Bulgaria hasthe socialisation of agricultureamalgamation of collectives. Poland,other hand, has as yet to revive itsprogram (though the firstin this direction have beenthc degree of socialization inranges from overercent inand Czechoslovakia toungary and the ODR. The latitudeprivate enterprise and privatepractice and thc attention devotedmanifestations of democracyminority parties) also vary considerably.
avowed determination to speedprogress Implies the eventualof major differences between theand probably foreshadows in alla series of economic and politicalwhich the USSR hasor has underway. Such formsindependence as non-Communistparties will probably bethe next several years. Privateand business activities willeliminated. Agriculturalprobably be largely completedhc Satellites except Poland. Duringthis process, collectives willbe merged, as they already have beenand, depending onthe USSR, some experimentalcities) may be formed. Aof developments already underway inthe Satellites, such as the'reform, will probablyemphasis. Thc power oforgans, such as thc trade unionsworkers'moreto party orders than is the probably be such measures, the regimesstep-up essentiallyintended lo achieve better workand to maintain popular These and other measures areexpand and insure Ihr effectivenesscontrols
There was no significant speedup Indevelopments in the Satellitese-equipment of thc Satellite armed forces continued; strengths remainedconstant except that there was aexpansion of the small Satellite naval forces There Is no evidence Uiat satellite forces received either surface-to-air ormissiles. Soviet divisions stationed in Rumanln since World War Ii were withdrawn, and Soviet forces in East Oermany andwhich had little If any military significance. There"was noof Soviet forces stationed in Poland.
Although the Soviels probably do notany significant expansion of the Satellite armed forces, they will continueto Improve their reliability andItnlikely that Soviet planners would count on East European forces into make an Important contribution to Soviet military operations, except perhaps in air defense and In maintaining security for lines of communication. The reliability of Satellite forces in any conflict would dependreat number ofthe degree of Soviet success and immediacy of Soviel control, the cause and nature of the war, or the nationality of the forces against which particular Satellite units were engaged. Geographically speaking, thc Satellite areaite for medium range ballisticwill continue to be useful to thc Soviets as an advanced posiUon for Soviet military forces, and will remain highly Important to Soviet air defense
Stability of lhe Satellite Regime*
ability of the Satellite regimesaheadaster pace reflectswithin the parties andin the passivity of thcfactionalism, rampantasbrought under control Activehave been purged or forced toSo-called dogmatists (Stalinists),whom still occupy positions ofto some extent probably beenthc growing militancy and. in anyhad little choice but to adapt themselves
to the situation. Thc (tropic, despitehostility and sporadic signs of resistance (worker protests in Czechoslovakia over changes In wage scales, an outbreak ofviolence ineem on thc whole to be resigned to their fate, at least so long as outside events do not appear to offer them some feasible alternative. Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolutiono the Satellite peoples the futility of large-scale rebellion without external
Thus we,do not foresee any dramatic rise in popular resistance or party factionalism as thc result of the socialist speedup. Where the Satellite regimes encounter stiff opposition in one form or another they arc likely to take such resistance Into account and to revise the timetable somewhat, while dealing harshly with individual offenders. Within theparties, opportunities for omnipresent anti-Soviet and nationalist sentiments tothemselves will probably not increase so long as Soviet policies are firm and explicit
The general hostility of the Satellite peoples toward the USSR and the local regimes will, however, continue to place limits on Communist policies and could delay theirSuch hostility willotential threat tocontrol and must be taken into account by the various regimes. Peasant opposition to collectivisation may temporarily reduce agricultural output but lt probably will not prevent the final socialization of agriculture more or less on schedule. The paucity of real talent in many of the Satellite party cadres, and continued, if submerged, factionalism in these parties, will also place restraints on the execution of policy And. in addition to such objective factors, the traditions and national characteristics of the various Satellites will tend to exercise atsychologicallyinfluence on contemplatedWe believe that these factors could inhreat to theseand will almost certainlyrag on "socialLste do nothowever, that any major disruptions are likely over the next few years.
Neither do wc believe that economicare likely to Jeopardize.SatelliteGiven Soviet backing, the economic outlook for these countries over the next few years lsapid growth of national incomeercentllocationreater proportion of GNP to investment, small but cumulatively significantin living standards, and growing intra-Bloc trade and interdependence. By Western standards, the rate of industrial growth will probably be high, even If short of announced goals. Agricultural output will probably grow slowly. Some economic -goals almost certainly will not be met (Bulgaria's great leap forward appears to be highly unrealistic) and major problems. Including low worker morale, will almost certainly continue to plague the regimes. But most of theplans for economic growth can probably be fulfilled.
There are,umber of factors which are more likely to affect Satellitethan any basic weaknesses or dramatic events within the orthodox SatellitesThe anomalous position of Poland within the Bloc may prove to beactor. Should the USSR continue to sanction Polish deviations, for example, it may become more difficult to impose conformity in otherparticularly If the orthodox regimesmajor obstacles. On the other hand, should Moscow decide to move against Polish heterodoxy, ft would run the risk ofwidespread disorders in Poland which, in turn, could stimulate similarn East Germany. Yugoslavia's influence on internal Satellite developments and on Soviet policy has declinedsince the disruption in the spring8 of the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. Nevertheless, Tito's program retains ils appeal among some Satellite party elements, and Yugoslav influence may againhreat to Satellite stability. Communist China is emergingival Communist center and frictions will almost certainly accompany its further growth of strength andThese frictions between Moscow and Peiping might alsoisturbingon Soviet plans for rapid and smooth
pragma in Eastern Europe, finally,within the USSRsuccession crisis following the death ofailure of one key policy orsomeday be responsible for conflicts within the Satellites or between thc Satellites and the USSR
arring major changes In the nature of East-West relations, the trend of events in Eastern Europe over the next severalwhether favorable or unfavorable from the Western point ofprobably bein the main by developments within thc Bloc itself. Though Satellite nationalism is. and will probablyisruptive force, its ability successfully to expressas It did in Poland Inis likely to result only from fortuitous circumstances, such as strains within the USSR itself. Thus thewill probably remain under Soviet hegemony so long as Soviet power does not decline or Soviet policies do not fundamentally change. It is true that the West'srefusal to accept Soviet domination of the area. Its economic aid to Poland andand its interest in and sympathy for the Satellite peoples, probably does help topirit of opposition. At athe Satellite populations know that, should their situations somehow bein the manner of Poland or Yugoslavia, they could probably expect Western support similar to that already given those countries.
The Special Case olomulka seems to have succeeded inthc situation in Poland. The Polish economy operated more smoothly8 than it had for many years and prospects for continued improvement are good.1 Gomul-
NIEThe Outlook In Poland." IS8
:US Ud to Poland, consisting of three long-term credit* InMS, and 1MBlargely lor grain andu Men aa relaUvely imatlPolish economic proereu This aidome-what greater Increase in peraonal coniumpUon than would otherwise have Wen pom Mr and provided lhe economy wllh rcteive xtocki whlrli could he used In case of need.
ka's insistence on Polish party autonomy, his reallsUc attitude toward the peasants and the Church, and his emphasis on-"soclalistand popular welfare, have made itfor him to maintain at least theof the people. While sporadicare still possible. It ls unlikely that either the party or the people will engage in opposition serious enough to disrupt hisWithin Poland. Gomulka has worked out what appears lo be an uneasy compromise between the requirements of Soviet foreign policy and doctrine and the intereststubborn Polish nationalism, which continues to retain an important element of Western tradition and culture.
he estimative question is whether, given their new program of socialist acceleration, the Soviet leaders can long tolerateompromise. It Is true that the workingbetween Khrushchev and Oomulka now seems to be operating smoothly. during his recent visit lo Poland,and enthusiastically endorsedand. in eflect. sanctioned the moderate Polish road to socialism. Appreciatinginternal strength and the success of his program, Khrushchev In addition now seems lo be convinced thatadvancing in the desired Indeed. Gomulka may be viewed in Moscow as, on balance, more of an assetiability. But, assuming no radical changes in internal policies, the Polos may lag farther and farther behind developments elsewhere in the Bloc and may thereby become more and moreisturbing element; the Khru-shchcv-Gomuika modus vivendt may become increasingly strainedesult. Polandtonique position in thc Bloc. Despite Khrushchev's apparent satisfaction with Gomulka, the present arrangement still is primarily one of expediency and restson Moscow's belief that it now has little alternative to Gomulka other thanintervention.
e foresee continued, at least implicit, Soviet pressures against PolishWe do not. however, expeel any dramatic developments over the next year or so The Polish regime will probably continue to re-
In some measure to Soviet pressures, and. since the Soviets will almost certainly wish toituation which would require their military intervention, such pressures will probably be exercised with caution. Nevertheless, over the long-run. tensions may increase, particularly if Polish individuality has an unsettling ertcct on the otherThe situation could again slowly buildrisis.
East Germany and Iho Berlin Negotiation!
hc GDR regime has apparently overcome many of the economic weaknesses andshortcomings which have plagued it in the past. The effectiveness of its security forces has improved. The regime has at least temporarily been reinforced by the Sovietoffensive against the Allied position In West Berlin and strengthened economically by Soviet credits and by the elimination of occupation costs. Tangible accomplishments include the abolition of rationing, anin the quality and quantity of consumer goods, the defeattrong party (action opposed to party leader Ulbricht. thcof governmeni and industrymajor disruptions, and at least Initialin the struggle against the churches. Simultaneously, the regime was able tosubstantially thc proportion ofin the socialist sector (now about one-half ot the total) and lo expand statein the private sector of the economy.
evertheless, despite the realof the East German regime, popularthrough occasional demonslrations, various forms of passiveand theaproblem. The regime still depends on thc presence of Soviet forces Efforts to combat Internal instability have ranged fromlo repression and include lhc present plans to eliminate thc great disparity between East and West German living standards. Though the total number involved in the emigration has declined, the flight ofof East Germans each year to the West goes on Of late it has increasingly involved thc loss of badly needed professional persons,
most notably physicians. Basic economica worsening manpowernot likely lo be solved In thefuture.
he ruling parly (the Soclallsl Unityommunist) has been riddled with factionalism and, even at high levels, still appears to suffer from differences In altitude toward economic policy and tbe partyThe party leader sincealter Ulbricht, remains in power almost entirelyof Soviet support and it is unlikely that thc Soviets will remove him. If they should doove related to their policyis Westwould probably be followed by serious Internal party disputesajor change in policy, or both. All in all. East Germany, the only country in the Bloc undergoing andecline in population, suffers fromantipathy to the regime, partyand opportunism, and generaldisrespect. It also mustree and prosperous West Germany.
for the ruture, lhe results ofconcerning Merlinrofound effect on the courseIn the GDR. Results generallyto the Soviet side, such as someWestern recognition of the GDR orconcessions concerning Westshore up thc stability of theregime and improve the morale ofWhile there would be no gain Inpopularity, the people as aprobably tend more loward apathyCommunist controls wouldcertainly become more pervasive.circumstances such as these thebelieveas theof the GDR isIls armed forces in East Germany
the other hand, should there be aof the Berlin crisis generallyto be favorable to thc West,ontinuation of the AlliedWest Berlin and non recognition ofUie current poiilical weaknesses ofwould almost certainly bethe West appeared to haveictory,
the East German citizenry would be at least temporarily heartened and less prone towith the regime; simultaneously, party morale would deteriorate. We would not expect under these circumstances,any popular attempt to unseat the
nless thereairly dramatic victory for the USSR in the Berlin crisis, we do not foresee any major strengthening of the GDR regime during the next few years. Theof West Germany will probably not
diminish, though the ability of the localand the Soviets to apply counterweights might Increase. In the very longeasonable degree of stability may be achieved in the GDR, provided always that thcprogram of the regime is relatively successful and that there ls no major political disaster. Nevertheless, certain very grave problems, such as those posed by the division of Germany, would persist, and the presence of Soviet military forces would probably still be considered necessary.