Created: 9/8/1959

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by the DIRECTOR OK CKNTRAL INTELLIGENCE Tit foUatotng tntemgenet orge*uatlons parlldpcltd In Ihe prepa'atlon ol thu ctttmatt: Tht Central ImttUlgenet Agency and the tnletUeence organltattoni of the ol Stale, the Army, tht Itavy. the Air Force, and The Joint Slat


Uf rtavy; the

oncurring vere the Director of Intelll-gtnct and Retearch. Department ol Stale; the Assistant Chief ol Staff lor Intelligence. Department ol the Army; the Asslsr-ant Chief of naval Operation* for InteUlgtnce. Department

Chief ef Staff, tnteltlgenet. USAF;

the Director lot Intelligence. The Joint Staff; theEnergy Commtuwn rUfntntottK lo the VSIB; the Attlttant to the Secretary of Detente, Specialnd the Director of the A'afWnol Security Agency. The Antttant Director, Federal Bureau of tnueitlgatlon, abstained, tht tub-feet being cudide of his Jurisdiction




estimate was disseminated by (hc Central Intelligence Agency. Thislor Lhe inlormation and use of Lhc recipient indicated on thc front cover and ofunder his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essentialbe authorized by the following officials within their respective departments.

of Intelligence and Research, lor the Department of State

Chief of Staff lor Intelligence, Department of the Army

Chief ol Naval Operations for Intelligence, for thc DepartmentNavy

of Intelligence, USAF, lor the Department of the Air Force

for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

of Intelligence, AEC, for thc Atomic Energy Commission

Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau ol Investigation

to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for theDefense

of NSA for the National Security Agency

j. Assistant Director for Central Reference. CIA, for any other Department or Agency

This copy may be retained, or desli-oyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Cpntral Intelligence Agency by arrangement with thc Office ol Central Reference, CIA.

When an estimate Is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain iteriod not In excess of one year. At thc end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to lhe forwarding agency, or permission should bo requested of the forwarding agency lo retain it in accordance with2

The title of this estimate when used separately irom the text, should be classified; CONFIDENTIAL


This material eoniFIonnatloii aflecilnc the National DetenscVsT the United Slate, within Uie meaning* ttut espionage laws. Title IS. OBC,. theor revelaffon ot wilch in any mannerlo im unnuthorJred personV prohibited by la*.


National Security Council Department of Stale Department of Dufeuw Ooerailona Coordination Boatu Atomic Energy Commission Fedrrul BuriMijInvnlifatiot





This advance portion of the forthcoming national intelligence estimate on all Soviet missile development programs has been prepared to meet the immediate needs of intelligence consumers and to facilitate work by the intelligence community on certain parallel estimates and projects. It will be incorporated into the final version ofdue in, subject to any further modification or revision which may be required by additional evidence or reanalysis in the interim. This text supersedes those portions ofelating to the missiles discussed herein.


To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the developmentautical mileautical mile ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and fleet ballistic missiles, Including their major performance characteristics and dates of operational availability.



he USSR hasamily ofballistic missiles through an intensive and well conceived programat high priority since shortly after World War II. Missiles known to have been developed or to be under development atinclude those with maximum ranges of aboutautical milesnd interconti-

nental ballistic missilese have more extensive information on the ballistic missile program than on any other Sovietprogram. We therefore estimate this program with considerable assurance,our confidence in the details varies.

'ule ofalllsUc missile can be considered capable ol firing to about one-third o( maximum opcraUonal range without serious degradation in accuracy, and to even ahorter ranges with degraded accuracy.

A substantia) body of evidence supports our belief lhat lhc Soviet ballistic missileprogram hasumber of years been well coordinated, extensively supported, and conducted by qualified personnel with access to excellent facilities. It has resulted in the development of operational missiles whoseaccuracy and other performance characteristics meet high standards.

Wc believe thai in the development of longer range systems, maximum use has been made of proven components. On the basis of indirect evidence and the logic of adevelopment program, we consider it reasonable to conclude that the two active Soviet ballistic missile test ranges (Knpustin Yar for missiles up. range, Tyura Tarn for ICBMs and space vehicles) have been mutually supporting with respect totesting and shared experience.

The type of warhead employed with Soviet ballistic missiles will vary with the specific mission of the missile- Tn general, however, wc believe that for missiles with maximum ranges of less. high explosiveuclear, or chemical warfare (CW) warheads will be employed in accordance with Soviet military doctrine, depending uponstockpiles, missile accuracy, character of the target, and results desired. We estimate that for missiles with ranges. and over, only nuclear warheads will be employed, although wc do not exclude the possibility of CW use. missiles for certain limited purposes. We believe that the USSR isof developing techniques for missileof biological warfare (BW) agents, although we have no specific evidenceBW and missile research andIn view of operational considerations we consider BW use in ballistic missilesalthough possible for certain special purposes.

Mobility appears toasicin Soviet ballistic missile design and we have good evidence of road mobility on some systems with ranges. and less. The size and weight of. missile may be such as to limit its road mobility to selected first class road nets; in view of this

limitation, we believe it may be road and/or rail mobile. In the case of road mobileII is probable lhat missile cairirrs and support vehicles arc readily adaptable for rail transport Mobility as it applies to an ICBM system Is discussed below in.

autical Mile BoHiuk Missile System (SS-4)

Is considerable evidence,"

^That a

missile which would meet the. range weapon has been under test at Kapustln Yar for many years. We believe that test firings began Inn average of about two per month have occurred sincee estimate that this system has been available for operational use sincelthough no operational sites or units have been identified.

Until recently we were unable to determine whether the largest missile in7 Moscow Parade (nicknamed SHYSTER for recognition purposes) was. missile or. missile.evidencetogclher with statements and photographs re> leased hy the USSR, has provided sufficient data to permit the determination that SHYSTER is probably missile Analysis of this evidence has caused us to change our previous estimate of maximum warhead weightounds toounds.

We continue to estimate that prior8 this missile utilized radio/inert ial guidance and that commencingn all inertial system would become available. There arc some indicatlonsQ

^Jthat Inertial components were being tested inissiles already produced and equipped with the radio/Inertial system will not necessarily undergo retrofit to the all inertial system.

3 We do notecondmissile of this range Is yet being devel-

There ate Indication* that. missile has contributed lo the development ol other missiles, but the exact nature of this contribution cannot be determined.

US Designation IOC DateMaximum Range




e estimate that Ihis missile system is operational and In production In the USSR, and that It probably has the following

. CS feet



Single thrust chamber. Jet vane controlled (no.0 lbs. thrust, liquid oxygen/ kerosene, two atep thrust cutoff.

Single stage ballistic. Integral

adio/In rrtUI.-


ll Inertia) (retrofit

. CKPm.

under average operational

Maximum Warhead

Weight Ground Environment

condiUona.n a

separating noseeone. Road Mobile

autical Mile Ballistic Missile System (SS-5)

issile of. maximum range has been under test at Kapustin Yar for over two years: since7 more thanuchhave been test fired. There have been periods of high firing rate as well as periods of inactivity, the latter Including one as long as nine months.^

. missile could have become operational In8 orno operational sites or units have been identified

'For esUmatei of reliability and reaction times under various conditions for this and other systems discussed herein, seend B.

at which one or more missiles could have been placed In the hands ot trained personnel In one operational unit


3 There areof inertial components, of engine burning time, and of four combustionin thc engine. Likend. missile, this engine shuts down in two steps. Jet vanes are probably used forstabilization and control. We no longer believe that. missile isa. missile, although it would be in keeping with Soviet practice for this system to make maximum usage of proven components and designs from other progrnms.

n the basis of all available evidence, we estimate thatm. system Isand in production In the USSR, and that It probably has the following


Late ISM orjn.

Pour combuiUon chambers, liquid oxygen/kerosene, two step thrust cutoff. JettabllliaUon and control.

Single stag* ballistic

Radto/lnertlal or all lncrUal

2 njn. CEP. under average operational condl-Uons.

n a

separating nosecone. Road and/or rail mobile .

Inlermcdiale Missile Systems of longer Range

ssuming deployment within.. missiles arc capable ofarge majority of critical targets in Eurasia and its periphery. It Is possible that the USSR intendsater date toallistic missile system with maximum range of. to supplement existing target coverage and to permit deployment in more secure areas.airly early in the USSR'* ballisticprogram, the Soviets instructed German missile specialists to make design studies on missiles with ranges aa great. We know of no further developmental work


such missiles, and wc do not helieve there have been any test firings or preparations for firings Lo intermediate ranges of greater. We conclude that anmissile of longer range hasairly low priority. In any case, the initiation of test firings would probably precede firstcapability byonths to two years.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System (SS 6)

In our most recent estimate on Sovietof ICBMse considered itthat thc USSR would achieve an initial operational capability withrototype ICBMs at some time during thee also held it to be possible,imiled capability withunproven ICBMs might have beenabllshcdhese conclusions restedariety of factors, including thevery high priority the USSR placed on achieving an ICBM capability for bathand military purposes, the estimatedof Soviet planners to acceptrisks in initiating ICBM production and deployment, and the available evidence on Soviet test firings and capabilities in ballistic missile development.

We now have considerable additional knowledge of the ICBM test firing program,

This evidence shows that

9 the test program has proceeded in an orderly manner which we believeomplete ICBM system. There is good evidence that from the beginning of the test firing program7 until thcthere have been wellozen ICBM testigh percentage of which have been successful in traveling from thc Tyura Tarn rangeheadistance. to the terminal end of the range in the Kamchatka Peninsula area. In the test program, since its inceptione have observed periods ofactivity and inactivity, but the evidence is not sufficient to determine whether this was

dueetback in the program, Heanalysis of lest firing patterns for both ICBM and shorter range missile systems leads us tothat this periodicity of test firing activity is the Soviet method of conducting an orderly program. In any event, both the rale and number of ICBM test firings are lower than we had expected by this time.

Operational Capability Dates.all the evidence, we believe it is now well established that the USSR Is not engagedcrash" program for ICBM development. We therefore believe it extremely unlikely that an initial operational capability (IOC) was established early in the program withmissiles or with missiles of very doubtful performance characteristics.

On the other hand, we stuTconsiderogical course of action for the USSR toa substantial ICBM capability at the earliest reasonable date. (The IOC for the ICBM marks the beginning of the planned buildup in operational capabilities andthe date when the weapon system could be counted on to accomplish limited tasks in thc event ofhe hard evidence at hand does not establish whether or not scries production of ICBMs has actually begun, nor docs it confirm the existence of operational launching facilities. However. Khrushchev's statements of the winterthe establishment of ICBM seriesare consistentogical decision to tool up for series production and to begin preparation of operational units and facilities before all technical aspects of thc system had been fully demonstrated. Considering that production lead times are probably on thc orderonths, we believe the USSR has had sufficient time to begin turning out series produced missiles.

In light ol all thc evidence, we believeoviet IOC with aICBMs is at least imminent, if in fact it has not already occurred. The evidence Is insufficient, however, toreciseof IOC date. We believe that for

planning purposes it should be considered that0 lt will have occurred.*

hc rate ol operational buildupto IOC date would depend not only on the priority assigned, but alsoreaton the planned force level. This will be discussed in the forthcomingSoviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through

CBM Performanceis no direct information on theof the Soviet ICBM and nointelligence regarding ICBMtesting, although Soviet statementsa positive relationship betweenspace vehicles, and provenAnalysis of possible vehiclesSputnikIndi-

cates that the ICBM couldne and one-half or parallel stage configuration but is probably not tandem. At this time we do not believe there is sufficient evidence to permit selectioningle most probable ICBM


3 Variations in the performance of Soviet ICBMs and spacecould be accounted for by modifications of one basic type of vehicle to accomplishpurposes. It Is also possible that some or all of the space vehicles do not specifically represent the basic ICBM, but were special purpose vehicles. While we cannot firmlyany of these vehicles to the ICBM, the energy they required can be correlated to

' The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Special Operations; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; thc Chief of Staff lorDepartment of the Army; and thc Assistant Chief of Naval Operations forDepartment of the Navy, believe that. In view of the orderly conduct of the Soviet ICBM test program, as opposedcrash" program. and In view ol the fart that both thc rate and number of ICBM

than the Intelligence community expected by this Ume (paragraphhe IOC will probably occur In thc first halfossibility of ii. occurring In lhe latter part

alternative ICBM warhead weights. An ICBMize sufficient to orbitnd II wouldross takeofl welghl ofounds and could carryoundseat-sink nosccone. An ICBMize sufficient to propel Sputnik III or Lunik wouldross takeofT weight ofounds and couldarheadounds.

hile the evidence is not conclusive and we cannot eliminate the possibilityighter warhead, wc believe the current Soviet ICBM is probably capable of delivering aofoundsange in warhead welghl from that used. would permit an increase in range. Forange ol. could be achievedarhead ofounds with the same noseconc configuration. Since there is no firm evidence on whether the Soviet ICBMeat-sink or ablative type nose-cone, it must be noted that the ablative type would permit an even heavier warhead orrange. Although we believe them to be within Soviet capabilities, neither radar camouflage of nosccone nor decoys have been detected in ICBM test firings to date.

e estimate ICBM guidance at IOC date

ombination of radar track/radio/inertial, although an all inertial system

possible (see. Soviet "state o( then precision radars, gyros and ac-ccleromcters leads us to estimate aCEP of. at IOC. range Under operational conditions theCEP will be degraded by numerous factors, such as geodetic errors, insufficiently known weather and wind conditions in thc target area, the inability of equipment toal peaked efTcctlveness for prolonged periods, variations in the tolerances ofinexperienced personnel (especially at IOC and at new sites) and the pressure of combat conditions on the personnel. The

TOP eg

of degradation which would beby auch factors Is unknown, but we estimate that CEP under operationalwould be no greaterm. at IOC date.

Thc guidance system and other factors would be Improved so that under operationalEP.3.6 is estimated as feasible. We have no knowledge as to Soviet intentions to retrofit inertial systems into ICBMs fabricated prior to operational adoption of an all Inertialwhich could probably occur in

Available evidence does not support the testing of more than one basic type of ICBM at Tyurapossible variations in range and warhead weight discussedculd be accomplished with one basicikewise, there Is no evidence to Indicate developmentecondICBM to replace that now being tested. If developed and tested in the future,issile would probably be designed tocertain operational difficullies and to permit simplified logistics. It mightbe considerably smaller than the current

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF believes that the ICBM currently undergoing tests at Tyura Tamollow-on weapon.ossible correlationm. missile tests at the Kapustin Yar missile teat center and ICBM/space vehicle firings at Tyura Tam can be made. Chronologicallym missile firings, tht carry Soviet spacendand the successful ICBM firing! from7 to May 1KB. could be related to the objective of developing an 1CUMross weight of approximatelyounds,ound warheadange.imilar chronological correlation emergen from analysis of the test firings ofm. missile, the later Soviet space ventures (Sputnik III and Lunik) and the most recent run of successful ICBM test firings9 to date) If the Initial success of the ICBM were derived fromm subsystem tesUng and experience gained Iromnd II. the similar pattern of activity withlo KftpuaUn far test nrlngi oljn. missile. Sputnik in. Lunik, and the most recent successful run of ICBM firings wouldollow-on RAD programissile designed for greater warhead weight and accuracy.

system, taking advantage of Improvements in the technology of construction, component design, warhead efficiency, fuels, and

Ground Environment. There isevidence to indicate the SovietICBM deployment or thc nature oflaunching sites. From othersystems it appears that mobility isSoviel design consideration. Thecomplexity and mission of thebring new factors to bear onsystem and site parameters.

opposed to the advantages of hardfixed siteobile systemvulnerability by making siteidentification more difficult. road mobile systems as being infeaslblcSoviet ICBM, weail mobileusing special railroad rolling stockand preconstructcd sites, toadvantages and disadvantages.ultiplicity of sites existed, asystem would increase flexibility,vulnerability and reduce thefor enemy knowledge of occupiedthc other hand, missile systembe reduced and sizable specialbe required. The number and typewould depend on the size andof the missile and the amount ofinstalled at each of the The permanent Installation atsite inail system couldmoreoncrete slab on abut might include other facilitiesa small liquid oxygen facility, missilebuilding, missile erecUng equipment, etc.

The available evidence suggesLs that the Soviet ICBM could be rail mobile; it Islo establish whether the systemhole will consist of rail mobile units, fixed installations,ombination of lhe two. Whatever ground environment Is selected, however, the Soviet rail network willentral role in the operational deployment and logistic support of the ICBM system.

ICBM System Summary. In summary, we estimate that an ICBM is probably now in

O f OftO

US DesignaUon .

IOC Date

Maximum Range

series production in the USSR, and that an IOC witli aproducedis at least imminent- Probableof Lhe system are estimated as

Accuracy .

Bee Paragraphjn.oo lb.

Liquid oxygen/kerosene,gle-step final stage ahutotT, and largo verniers.

One and one-half or parallel staging

Probably radarand/In crtlaL Allcould probablyIn

CEP not greater.CJ run. under average operational conditions at IOC date; Improvablem.3jn. In

Maximum Warheadbs.


nvironment Rail mobile and/or fixed

SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILEhere is little evidence of research and development associated with specific missile systems for Soviet naval application, although there have been sporadic reports of possible launchings of missiles or rockets in theSoviet fleet areas. Q


5 there have been sightings of "W" class and smaller submarines withand/or launcher-like structures on their decks. These Included an excellent sighting in Leningrad6ubmarineapsule and launching ramp. It Is prob-

US Designation

IOC Date

Maximum range



ableew "W" class submarines have been converted to carry subsonic cruise type missilesaximum operational range.ow altitude cruise capability. Some smaller submarines have possibly been converted as well. Two such missiles can be carriedeck capsule and launchedamp. Characteristics of the system are approximately as follows:




Programmed with doppler assist, possibly with homing

jn. CBPeet with homing.


Maximum Warhead Weight

here haveewphotographs of "Z" classgreatly enlarged sails.submarines have been observeddome-shaped covers in the afterthe enlarged sail. These submarinesbeen modified for carrying andballistic missiles. If so, an initialcapability with at least threehas existed since of modified "Z" class submarinesin both the Northern and Pacific Such submarines could carryeach, but could probably launchwhile fully surfaced. The missilea range ofounds, and aaverage operational conditions ofal maximum range.

is Inconclusive evidence thatare developing an advancedine /ballistic missile system. None ofamount of evidence availableof an associated missilemainly on estimated Sovietand technical capabilities, we believe


USSR will probably develop amissile system having thecharacteristics:

US Designation


Maximum range

Number per

Launchingor surfaced

or storable liquid


njn. CEP under <



o una*



For several years after an IOC, the reliabilityissile system will probably improve and then level off. Although we have little information on which to base an estimate of the operational reliability of Soviet missiles, the following are considered reasonable estimates.






IOC plus 3


IOC plus 3



IOC plus 3

1 Percentage or naUonal operaUonal inventory considered "good enough to try"

to launch at any given Ume. 'Percentage of those missiles In operaUonal units considered "good enough to

try" to launch that wiU actually get off the launcher whenercentage of those missiles that get off the launcher that will actually reach

the oldnlts of the target.perform within the designed speclflcaUons of the

missile system.

' In these categories, only those missiles considered "good enough too launch will be loaded on submarines.



reaction times of Soviet missile units would vary according to the type of missile, the location (on or offnd degree of alert. In the absence of information wethe following are reasonable estimates: Reaction Times, Ground-launched Systems

units ln transit at the time offollowing times arc estimated forof the first missile after thearrived at the prepared launching site:



following reaction times arefor thchroughhenunit is ln placeaunchingthe alert condition indicated:

Case I on routine standby,equipment cold, missiles not fueled but could have been checked out recently. Reactionours

Case non alert, electricalwarmed up, missiles not fueled.

nfictioninutes Caseon alert, electricalwarmed up, missiles fueled and occasionally topped. This ready-to-flre condition probably could not be maintained for moreours.

ReactionS minutes Naualon station the reaction time for shipboard surface-to-surface missiles would be short. We estimate aboutinutesubmarine that must launch surfacedith aninutes toecond missile, aboutinutes or lessubmarine that can


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