centbal intelligenceffice of national esthetes
SUBJECTi Meeting of the Consultants at Princeton,ndovember
Fiah Armstrong Cyril E. Black Calvin B. HooverKlaus Knorr George a. Lincoln Harold Linder hilip E. Hosely Joseph Strayer t. Cvyler Young
Allen W. Dulles Abbot Smith (Chair) Allen Evans William P. Bundy Robert Matteaon
K. v. BurKseRoy Karlatrcm Robert Miller
Papers presented for discuasioni
Chapter VI of NIEoviet Foreign Policy
Chapter II ofevelopments in the Soviet EconoEy
[HEEstimate of the World Situation"
In general, there vas some foeling among the consultants that the Chapter on foreign policy might be too optimistic. Certain of the group tended to press home the probability of a
Rissllo gapnd to question whether,oneoquenco of this *ap, Soviet foreign policy slight not, tw> yoers or so noncearder lino than presontly estimated in Chapter VI.
Iho Xisallo Cap, Tha burden of thla argument was carriedS1X, who appeared to feol more strongly on the issue than the other consultants. STRAIEfi and KNCRj* indicated general agreement with MOSSLlie position. announced his intentionUSoviet Capabilities For Strategic Attaek Through
OSELI asserted, the Soviet Union mightlear qualitative superiority over the US in strategio waspecs. Amerloan missile sites would still be soft and American missiles liquid-fueled. The location of these sites would be available to the Russianseading of the US press. The USSR, on the other hand, might have manufactured and deployed as manyCBMs. Since American observers would not have inspected more than five percent of Soviet territory, the location of those sites would be unknown to tho -oerlcan military.
oviet advantage of this sort would begin to diminishs the Americans developed solid fuels and hardened sites.
in the1 the Soviet leader* Right cose to believe that theyecisive superiority. They might believe that,ingle salvo, they oould virtually destroy thecapability for atrattgio attack, without in turn receiving unacceptable damage from American counter blows. In this circumstance the Soviet leaders might very well consider launching general war. Or they could attempt to profit froa this unicni* and transitory advantage through blackmail. bither aotion could have been prefaced or, more accurately, camouflaged,ong period of relaxed tension and growing cultural exchange. Conaaquentlyf ia KOSEXJ's view, th* estimate of Chapter VT according to which Soviet foreign poll ay over th* next five years will elternaU between efforts at conciliation and llaitod aggressive actions should ba revised to tax* these nor* dour poasibllities into account*
Froa tine to Una some consultants attempted to pierceMGBBH argument with doubts and reservations. IINCOLK, for oxamplo, wos strongly of the view that it wjuliwell-nigh impossible for theto gotroperly oiaed salvo of SCO siasilea within thoinutes necessary tc avoid the alerting cf SAC. Ho military operation in history has been
oorriod off on schodulo with the precisionalvo would require. Even at'Uast Pointun salutes rarely go offi toft. If SIS wore on air alort, moreover, tho lapaot of the first sis siles would send those bombers already in the air oourrylng for Soviet targets. Tha Russians could never bo sure of destroying tha amerioan nuclear capability without receiving unacceptable damage in return.
To this KOSELT replied that the Russians could prepare the salvo at their leisure,hey could take into account such footors as imdOight failure by increasing tho weight of the aalvo, and that BAND Corporation studies had shown that the USSR would not necessarily receive unacceptable damage fron an American ocunter-attack. What the Kremlin would be willing to regard as acceptable damage waa probably for more extensive than anything our planners had in clod. E1Y. argument appeared to impress many consultants, though support was more general for the probable use of blackmail thanossiblesalvo.