NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 9
SPECIAL ASPECTS CF THE KATO SETUATIOH
Submitted by the DIRECT CR C? CENTRAL Il^IXIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estlrata: The Central Intelligence Agency end the intelligence or conizations of the Deportwnts of State, the Amy, tbe Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the UNITED STATES EyTSJJJ:GERCE BOARD
onoveaber Concurring were tbe Director of Intelligence and Research, IfcTxirtoeBt of State; tbe Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Departoent of the Amy; the Asflietant Chief of Noval Cparutions for Intelligence, Departoent of tbe Navy; tbe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelllgence, The Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretory of Defense, Special Operationa; end the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atonic Energy Ccanlssion Representative to tbe USID, and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau ofabstained, the subject being outside of their Jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: : SPECIAL ASPECTS OF TEE NATO STTUVTICN
To eotirjQte the protable lapoctubstantial unilateral reduction, within the near future, of US NATO forces in the European nrea on: (o) tbe political attitudes and defense policies of Europeau NATO nernbers, and (b) tbe over-all Western nesotlatinc position on Berlin, Gercary, and disarDaoer.t.
1. For scce years, the NATO neobero have been agreedtrategic coacepthased buildup of forces to support tbat strategy. Aa recently as October, in its NATO Annual Revievthe US stated its intention of fulfillinc itson-ndtnaatB for tbe next year. The US as leader of tbe nlliaoce, and
General Norstad as SaCEUR, hove consistently urged thatof agreed HATO force goals Is essentiol to the military effectiveness of the alliance. Although amy other KATO Efidbers have follen short of ccqpliance with SATO force goals and standards, tbe US bos with rdnor exceptions consistently fulfilled its ova cccnitDents. Consequently any substantial unilateral reduction of US rftTO forces in Europe within tbe next few Donths would be regarded as an abrupt withdrawal fron firo cccnitDents to NATO.
2. Tbe reduction would coneire of considerable European concern over Soviet nissile and space advances and the unresolved Berlin situationwith new East-West negotiations irmediately in prospect or already underway. It would also coreeriod narked not only by French efforts topecial role in NATOontinuing deBlre by the British and others to reduce their own defense expenditures, but also by grow-lng European concern about the future role of the US in world affairs. This has been particularly true since the Khrushchev visit to the US. These developosnts hove already led to scoe publicover tbe future direction of the alliance.
ii. BEAcnoHS wrruiH nato
3. Although the lnpact la Europe of an early reduction of US forces would depend primarily cc tbe DOfpltude and nature of the reduction. It would be conditioned to sone decree by the corner in which it becore known to our European allien. The adverse reaction toward the US would be Increased if the US appeared to be reticent about acquainting its allies with the facts, or if the reduction was announced abruptly without prior dlploaatlc Aay substantial reduction at this tlos, would, however, lend substance to fears that have long prevailed in sore European quarters that the US would ultimately abandon its bnsic corcdt-nents to Europe. The adverse inpact on the Dorale of the West Berlin people would be particularly great. Tbo reduction would
also encourage the fear that the US was jreparing to settleissues directly with tbe USSR over the beads of its
I*. Diplcoatic preparation and explanation cculd cdtlgate the worst effectsnilateral US reduction. Since tbe nilitary reduction Is assured to be substantial, however, it would be very difficult to convince our allies that NATO bad not been weakened. We do not believe that tho caronrking for NATO of forceswould be regarded as an equivalent for forces actually in Europe. Explanations of the US action ia terns of the US financial position and the needs of other US defense rjogrons,pece and oieslles) night have sore weight, but would not be syrrcatbetically received.
X/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF considers that this sentence places undue enphasls upon "fears" that the US,onsequence of its NATO force reductions, would be preparing to settle outstanding issuesilateral basis with the USSR. Such "fears" per se do not now appear prevalent in Europe. This has been due principally to the fact that the US has, over tbe past several norths,assured Western European loaders that critical issues would net be settled "over tho bead} of tbe allies." So long as such assurances continue, the Assistont Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that US NATO forces structure reductions thus far proposed will not, of themselves, arouse Western Europe to tho point of reviving such "fears."
5- In anyS decision toact ledof its forces in Europe would be widely interpreteda Growing US preoccupation with ecoaccic andconcernsecreased sense of urgency aboutThere wouldecline la confidence in tbe USgrowth in neutralist sentinent and of efforts fortho Bloc. Thero wouldeeling oraong Wentern EuropeansUS was taking tbe first steprogressive reduction ofln Europe. Stellar adverse reactions would alnootinegrees Dittos the ether allies of the US lnof the
Assistant Chief ofice, USAF would delate tho wordsecreased sense of urgency about European security." As noted elsewhere in the ostinate the principal deterrent to Soviet ollitary adventures in Western Europe rcDalns thotrategic capability. In evaluating the US decision to cake certain force reductions in its NATO cccrjitDBnts, coat Western Europeans would be unlikely to view tbe coutecplated cuts as touching the principal USto deterring the Soviets. Inonvincing case night bo code for the orgunent tbat Western Europeans would regard the propooedcuts as an Indicationore realisticof the current Soviet threat, and that the reduction inplied US ocknwledgecent that certain NATO comitDsatsreasseascent, especially in the light of weapons develop-nsct, and did notdecreased" sense of urgency.
AjMb is/US'- 3(
Effect Scfer;ao Fl'IIcIus
wlllingnoss of NATO countries to sup-port NATOhas already fallen behind the generally rapidof NATO necbers. At the present tioo tho publiccountries is uncertain as to current trends inand the danger of hostilities in Europe. In thisa substantial unilateral reduction in US forcescertainly operate, at least in the short run, towillingness to support contributions to NATO otlevel, Present and planned defense contrlbutlcas cfcountries would be forced downward by political pressures.
Reactions of Partlcul-q- Cove rare utn
Cemany. Tho Federal Republic would probablyNATO Governcect noot seriously concerned over theand political effocts of the reduction. The Westbuildup is pre al sod heavily on tbe validity of tbestrategy and tbe presence af US farces. Greatwould be attached to the cut. It would tc costto persuade the Pernors that this was not tbe first lnof US cuts gradually reducing the US presence In Europe.
It would reowokon Adenauer1fear, oost strikingly decccotrated by hlo reaction during6 scare created by allegations that the US contemplated withdrawal frca Europe. While Adenauer hinoclf would endeavor to Dointain his close association with the US, he would, however, feel that West Qeroan security was dininished. Therefore be would consider ways to increase West Gorman military strength and influence. At the sore tloo he would nove forward toward closer cooperation with the French on military and other natters involving tbe creation cf closerties within KATO. On tbe other hand encouragement would also be given to those neutralist and other forces in tbe Federal Sepublic whicheorientation of current West German foreign policy. At the least, Adenauer's basic policy would come under heavy fire and questioning, both frca other parties and from some elements of his own party.
8. France. Tbe French military leaders would beby the weakening of shield forces. However, tbecharacter of tbe US reduction would probably bo ^qZ ty de Gaulle7 :rt nls nrr^nts fOfetermination by the KATO countries cf their defense
arrangementseeds. Thus, tbe effect would bo to encourage de Goullfl ln hie efforts to take the leadcctlncntal grouping to natch tbepartnership, and at the saas tint pernlt bin to cite tbe US reductioneason for requiring closer political ard nilltary coca-dlcotlon anong the najor NATO partners before mjcr strategic decisions are nade.
9. The UK. British leaders, already on record asthe "tripwire" concept, would seize on the US reduction to Justify conpleting the planned reductions in the British ground farces stationed in Vest Gernany. These reductions hove been delayed prlnnrily because of US objections. Furthernight also take place. Tbe British would renew their pressure within NATO to re-exanlne SATO plans or at least to construe present NATO farce goals as rnxinun targets rather than as nlnlnun roqulrenents. More broadly, tho US reductions would further etlnulate the tendency of British leaders in both parties tocqpronlse with tbe Soviets on specific ioouos such as Berlin and Gernany, and toane of dlsarnanent in Europe.
NATO forward strategy wouldoncept on which NATO nilltarybe realistically based. In light of tha abovenotably the divergent reactions of West Cemany andit seeas clear tbat NATO cohesion would also be While the reduction would probably not lead tosplit within NATO, it would Intensify thewithin the alliance.
III. EFFECTS CM TEE WESTERN BARGAINING POSITION
tbe light of tbeubstantialreduction of US forces in Europe at this tirothe Western bargaining position on Berlin, Gernany, The Western delegates would be confronting tbe
Soviets ln an atmosphere of greatly increased misgivings about the nilltary prograo on which NATO is based and about NATO's ability to naintain its positionis the Bloc. Existing strains between West Gernany and tbe UK over the degree ofwhich the West could effectively naintain on Berlin and tbe
German problem would prcbc'jly be Increased. Even those Europeans who basicallyeduction of arnnnents would believe that the US, by its substantial unilateral reduction, bod thrown away assets which night have been uoed to extractfree tbe USSR. The divisions or islng in KATOesult of the reduction of forces would not only complicate the foroula-tlor. of agreed Western positions for East-West talks but would also be subject to Soviet exploitation.
12. The Soviet leaders would probablynilateral reduction of forcos as an indication that the US was less able or willing totrong military position in Europe.ttempt by the US to represent tbe actionesture toward relaxation of tensions would be unlikely tooreSoviet position in East-West negotiations. The Soviets would probably believe that the US move hodivisive fcrce in KATO and that,esult, the Soviet bargaining position on Eerlin and Germany had been greatly strengthened. In disarmament talks, Moscow would probably be encouraged to believe that the chances tad been improved of reaching csreeoentoviet sponsored European security plan providingisengagement of forces in Isolation from the question of German unity.
13* arger sense, tbe Soviet estlnate cf tbo KATOposition vould depend upon the total ol litany and political posture of the Wost. The principal deterrent to Soviet oilitary adventures in Europe remains the US strategic capability, the Soviet leaders know that there is ouch controversy in
US and in Europe over current Westorn security concepts, and
they have already seen NATO declining in unity becauseeries of unilateral declsioca token by Its principal mercers. They would probably believeubstantial reduction of US forces in Europe would reinforce those tendencies.