Current Intelligence Weekly Summary
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
PARTP IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PETPlNG'd TKilTII ANNIVERSARY
Inwith Khrushchev's visit to Peiping for the tenthcelebration of the Chinese regime suggest that difference* In view* oapolicy tactics, methods of "socialistnd Ideological matters remain as irritants In therelationship. Mao and Khrushchev, who held several days of wall-publicized talks during the visit, failed to issue the customary joint It seems probable that their vl*ws differed so much that compromise lsnguage could not be agreed upon.
Voile Peiping Iswilling to publicly endorse Khrushchev's visit to the US and hlB dissrtnament proposals. Its foreign and domestic apparently require it to maintain that the threat of American "aggression" remains. In contrast to SovietForeign Ministerpecial articlefor Izvetls for tbeannlversary--complalned that "so far" th* Doited States has oot "repudiated Its policy of aggression andsby its "continuation" of the cold war, continuedof foreign military bases, "active" rearmament of Japan, and "continuingof Taiwan."
Khrushchev completelythe USSR from this line tn his ststement onPeiping. declaring that "Communist* of the Soviet Onion consider It our sacred duty and primary task" to end the cold war and guarantee the "triumph of the cause of peace."
The Chines* leadersviewllcythe United States as tactics significantly different from those now be log pursued by Khrushchev. That American hostility to theregime must b* met with "tension" rether than aof "weakness ' is aprinciple of the Chinese leaders, who have sold that the
United States will not change its policy toward China "of Its own accord." In his Izvestla article. Chen Yl reaffirmed the central theme of Peiping's"The people of the world still have to wage long-term struggles again and again against
Imperialism In order to achieve tbe relaxation of International tension."
The Cbtnese arethat friendlier US-USSR relations will proveto their interests, which are opposed to the maintenance Of the status quo In the Par East, On the Taiwan andleeuea, the Chines* have dlrscted their principalagainst the United States as the "aggressor."in the belter that consistent opposition to Awer-lcsn policy will eventually leadeduction of American influence In the area. This line probably Is also useful In Peiping's donestlc program, as the Chinese have stated that "face to face with the American aggressor, the Chinese people are forced to intensify their work end build economically backward Chins Into an advanced, industrialized, and socialist power."
Khrushchev's failurethe celebrations tn Pol-ping to support publicly ths Chinese on tbe specific lssus of Taiwan reflects his desire to svold issues which run counter to his posture ofcoexistence with the United States. This silence, however, does not Amply repudiation of Moscow's commitment in8 that any attack on China would be regarded as an attack on the USSR.
The Chinese leaders felt the need at ajor rsglme celebration to reaffirm their long-termtoward the offshore islands snd Taiwan. Peiping. however, has shown noto develop tbe "liberate Taiwan" theme into a major
propaganda campaign for the present. Present Chinese statements speak ofTaiwan "in on* way orut imply no sense of urgency.
Despite the difference in Sino-Soviet views. Chinese statements during Khrushchev's visit suggest that tbe Chinese are aware of their dependence on the USSR and do not wish to push present differences to the point of Impairing the alliance An editorial In People's Dailyctober stated that Che Chinese people regard the steady strengthening of their unity with the USSR, "their greats an important guarantee of th* "prosperity and strength of their country as well as th*lr sacredduty."
Central committeeGeneral Teng Hsiso-plng. in an anniversary article for Pravda. revived Mao's ownon the leadershipof the Soviet Communist party as well as the Soviet Government. Teng stated that "the unity or th* socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, and ths unity of theCommunist movement with the Communist party of the Sovdet Union at Its center, form the cor* of even moreinternational unity."
Khrushchev'k failure to endorse the communes andpolicies connected with Peiping's "leap forward" shows that the two leaders were to find a formula to bridge their differences and that these Issues will continue to harass Slno-Sovlet relations, Soviet propagandists are still attacking th* commune concept, and one writer has recently
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
stated that tbe commune la "impossible" In the future Com-munlat aoclety.
The Chinese leadera.appear deeply committed to tbe concept and,in tbe face of Soviet and domestic are insisting on tbe "superiority" of the communes over tbe former cooperatives. Government chairman Liu Shao-chl and Teng Hslao-plng have recently stated that thewill be the best form of social organization for the future "gradual transition to the Communist society."
As in previous Sino-Soviet Ideological differences over tbe pastears, tho Chinese aro again indicating theirto manipulate for domestic purposes
and in order to Increase their prestigecreative"party. Liu Sbao-cbl stated In hie anniversary article for the October Issue of the bloc's theoretical journal. Problems of Peace and Socialism" that although "revolution and in Cblna havepeculiar to thist Is also "possible that some of these Important specialmay reappear in somo other countries." Liu concluded. "In this sense. Chinese experience isertain degree ofsignificance."
Liu avoided saying that tbe communes and tbe "leappolicy were what ho had In mind, but he apparently felt that his readers could easily draw their own conclusions.Original document.