CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW: SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PEIP

Created: 10/8/1959

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

SJ SS

9

CONTROL

No.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

(MM

Office of Current

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 'S'

DOCUMfcH) CONTAf

'OK WORD MATERIAL

Thla document contains classified Information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaningof the espionage laws, US Code.. The law prohibits Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to anperson, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detri-menl of the United States.

DATE: UMI

FOP,2

IASSifJi

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

K IMMEDIATE INTEREST

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OK PEIPING'S TENTH

1

Developments in connectionOirunhebe*'s visit to Pulping for tho tenthnl versarf ol the Chinese regime suggest that difference! tn views on foreign policyand Ideological Matter* remain as Irritants In the Slno-Sovlet relationship. The Chinese have publicly ballad Khrushchev's vlalt to tbe United States and bis disarmament proposals. However, tbey apparently have reservations about tbe long-tern effects of tbe USSR's present posture toward the United Statea. The Chinese also strongly reafflra Peiping's position tbat tbe communeill be China's basic social unit after "enteringespite the Soviet statement tbat tbe iis "impossible" Id the future Communist society. Present Cblneaa propaganda acknowledging dependence oo tbe Slno-Sovlot alliance, however, reflects Peiping's desire tohowdown with Moscow.

i '

THE WEEK IN BRIEF

TT "irrnn-

PARTF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN TBE LIGHT OF PEIPING'S TENTH ANNIVERSARY

Inwith Khrushchev's visit to Peiping for the tenthcelebration of the Chinese regime suggest that differences in views onpolicy tactics, methods of "socialistnd Ideological natters remain as Irritants In the Slno-So-vlet relationship. Mao and Khrushchev, who held several days of well-publiclzed talks during the visit, failed to issue the customary Joint It seems probable that their views differed so much that compromise language could not be agreed upon.

While Peiping Iswilling to publicly endorse Khrushchev's visit to the US and his disarmament proposals, its foreign and domestic apparently require it to maintain that the threat of American "aggression" remains. In contrast to SovietForeign Minister Chena special articlefor Izvestla for theanniversary--complained that "so far" the United States has not "repudiated its policy of aggression andsby its "continuation" of the cold war, continuedof foreign military bases, "active" rearmament of Japan, and "continuingOf Taiwan."

Khrushchev completelythe USSR from this line in his statement onPeiping, declaring that "Communists of the Soviet Union consider It our sacred duty and primary task" to end the cold war and guarantee the "triumph of the cause of peace."

The Chinese leadersview their policythe United States astactics significantly different from those now being pursued by Khrushchev. That American hostility to theregime must be met with "tension" rather than aof "weakness" Is aprinciple of the Chinese leaders, who have said that the

United States will not change Its policy toward China "of Its own accord." In his Isvestta article, Chen Yi reaffirmed the central theme of Peiping's"The people of the world still have to wage long-term struggles again and again against

SECIttT

ror neater

CURRENT IHTELLIGEKCE WEEKLY9

imperialism In order to achieve the relaxation of international tension."

The Chinese arethat friendlier US-USSR relations will proveto their interests, which are opposed to the maintenance of the status quo In the Far East. On the Taiwan andissues, the Chinese have directed their principalagainst the United States as the "aggressor."in the belief that consistent opposition topolicy will eventually leadeduction of Awerlcan Influence In the area. This line probably Is also useful in Peiping's domestic program, as the Chinese have stated that "face to face with the American aggressor, the Chinese people are forced to Intensify their work wnd build economically backward China Into an advanced, industrialized, and socialist power."

Khrushchev's failurethe celebrations Into support publicly the Chinese on the specific Issue of Taiwan reflects his desire to avoid issues which run counter to bis posture ofcoexistence with the United States. This silence, however, does not 4mply repudiation of Moscow's commitment in8 that any attack onCblna would be regarded as an attack on the USSR.

The Chinese leaders felt the need at ajor regime celebration to reaffirm their long-termtoward the offshore islands and Taiwan. Peiping, however, has shown noto develop the "liberate Taiwan" theme into a major

propaganda campaign for the present. Present Chinese statements speak ofTaiwan "In one way orut Imply no sense of urgency.

Despite the difference In Sino-Soviet views, Chinese statements during Khrushchev's visit suggest that the Chinese are aware of their dependence on the USSR and do not wish to push present differences to the point of Impairing tbe alliance. An editorial In People's Dallyctober stated that TnT Chinese people regard the steady strengthening of their unity with the USSR, "their greats an important guarantee of the "prosperity and strength of their country as well as their sacredduty."

Central committeeGeneral Tang Hslao-plng. in an anniversary article for Pravda, revived Mao's own for-rauiatlon on the leadershipof the Soviet Communist party as well as the Soviet Government. Teng stated that "the unity of the socialist carap headed by the Soviet Union, and the unity of the'ln-if inational Communist movement with the Communist party of the Soviet Union at its center, form the core of even moreInternational unity."

Khrushchev's failure to endorse the communes andpolicies connected with Peiping's "leap forward" shows that the two leaders were to find a formula to bridge their differences and that these Issues will continue to harass Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet propagandists are still attacking the commune concept, and one writer has recently

TOP SECIWT

CURRENT IHTELLIGEKCE WEEKLY9

that the comaune la "impossible" In the futuresociety.

The Chinese leaders,appear deeply committed to the concept and,in the face of Soviet and domestic arc insisting on the "superiority" of the communes over the former cooperatives. Government chairman Liu Shao-chl and Teng Hslao-plng have recently stated that thewill be the best form of social organisation for the future "gradual transition to tho Communist society."

As In previous Sino-Soviet ideological differences over tbe pastears, the Chinese are again indicating theirto manipulate for domestic purposes

and in order to increase tbelr prestigecreative"party. Liu Shao-chl stated in his anniversary article for the October Issue of the bloc's theoretical journal. Problems of Peace and Socialism" that' although "revolution and in China havepeculiar to thist is also "possible that some of these Important specialstay reappear In some other countries." Liu concluded, "In this sense, Chinese experience isertain degree ofsignificance."

Liu avoided saying that the communes and the "leappolicy were what he had In mind, but he apparently felt that his readers could easily draw their own conclusions.

TOI- SECUST

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA