Created: 12/1/1959

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


TITLE: Techniques Of Domestic Intelligence Collection

AUTHOR: Anthony P. Czajkowski




A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ot Intelligence.

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in arc those of

the authors They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.


The intelligence officer turns salesman to tap the potential ol big business and the suspicious-


The process of getting mtelligence Infonnaudo out of people Is normally associated with overseas operations, but It was demonstrated during World War LT. that this clandestinecan usefully be supplemented by collection Ln theown back yard. Potential sources of intelligence within the United States are myriad. US concerns have been active In various parts of the world tor many decades and their records often contain inlormationlandestine agent would have little hope of obtaining, especially in war-time. Representatives of industrial plants travel continually and compile expert reports and evaluations on foreign economic and financial affairs. The current Increase in East-Westhas sent thousands of US citizens as travellers toof the Soviet Bloc. Scientists and academicians attend International meetings and conferences, where they meet and exchange information with opposite numbers from all parts of the world. Refugees from the Soviet Union and Its satellite nations continue to enter the United States for permanent residence.

For more than ten years the Contact Division of CIA's Office of Operations, with Its network of field officesthe country, has been tapping this vast potential ofon behalf of the mtelligence community.8 over forty thousand individuals and companies have supplied information ranging into every field of mtelligence. Through this collection operation the community has at Its disposal the expert analysis and commentary of the most knowledgeablehe academic, scientific, professional and Industrial fields.


Coftecfton Techniques

Getting information from these Individuals calls fordlflerent from those employed In clandestine collection. The contact specialist, as the domestic field collector is known, has no control over his Source. The Source provides thevoluntarily, with no hint of pressure or threat, because be has been convinced that be can be of singular assistance to the US Government; but mere waving of the nag does not automatically trigger the cornucopia of Intelligence plenty. US citizens,ule, know little of intelligenceand intelligenceisitusinessmanovernment representative arouses instinctive fear that the company books are about to be examined for tax purposes, that an anU-trust suit Is pending, or that an investigation is being conductedriend. Academicians andare apprehensive that their cooperation with US Intelligence will become known and hinder theiroreign area. The alien, wise to the ways ofand security services, distrusts the contact officerare easily forged, ht claims) or fears for the safety of relatives still living behind the Curtain.

To convert the hesitant businessman or fearful alienooperative Source, the contact officer mustide diversity of skills. He mustalesman, selling his prospect on the importance of the Intelligence function; he must be an intelligence officer, knowing tho needs and the gaps In the community's information; he must play the practicalhandling dissimilar personalities with dexterity; and finally hekilled reporter, putting theoncise and readable intelligence report.

Locating and Contacting the New Source

Since the contact officer cannot hope to approach all the commercial, banking, educational, and scientific Institutions, as well as all the aliens. In his area, be must learn to select from among his possible sources. He obtains leads from trade Journals and directories, from established sources, from Agency headquarters, and from other government agencies.thene leads against hie knowledge ot current Intelligence

requirements, be trie* to pinpoint those Individuals andIn bis area which have the best potential for filling the


Domestic CollectionfrA?

Once he decides or Is directed by bis field chief to "openew company, institution, or individual, his first step Is to brief himself on the company and If possible on the" he Is to contact. At the same time he reviews intelligenceIn the prospective contact's field, makingexploration of its potential for bis purposes. He will offer no pretensions to expertise In the Source's field ofbut will be able to win confidence and rapport by recognising the Source's professional Interests andhis terminology. He cannot walk In coldew Source and hope to establish the proper rapport for acontact.

No security clearance Is required for Initial contactS citizen. The existence of the Central Intelligenceand Its general purposes are public knowledge, and no classified Information is discussed In the Initial interview Contact with an alien, on the other hand, must first be cleared with the FBIatter of Internal security.

Inew company or Institution, the contact officer always goes to the top man, to the president, theof the board, or whoever determines broad policy for the company. Once cooperation is obtained at the highest level, it Is assured at all subordinate levels. The president will not ordinarily have the Information intelligence Is seeking, but he will designate the official In the company who does have It and who will be the future contact.ubordinate is contacted first, experience has shown, an embarrassing situation can arise when the president Inquires why his company Is being "penetrated" by thevernment

To Interview the executive an appointment Is of courseand executives have secretaries whose function It Is to keep unwelcome visitors away end screen phone calls to thehe secretary wants to know who is calling and why. The contact officer gives her his name and Identifies himselfepresentative of tbe federal Government wbo wishes to speak to her bossonfidential matter. Few secretaries dare to blockall except in companies which havecontact with government agencies. The persistently inquisitive secretary is told that the caller will explain hisfully to the boss.

Domcriic CoWecMon Techniques

Once he has been put through lo the executive, the contact officer identifies himself more fully by revealing hiswith TJS intelligence or, if pressed, with CIA. Helines briefly why heersonal interview. Mostwhen first approached,overnmentwith one of the enforcement agencies, and the contact man therefore seeks an early appointment.

The First Interview

Since the contact officer's objective is to convertontinuing and cooperative Source, he must take especial care to make the best Initial impression.and social customs vary In different parts of theand the officer must comport himself according to the Source's taste.en-gallon hattring tie may be acceptable In Texas or in Arizona, they cause raisedin Boston and New York. It has become axiomatic that the contact man should dress as conservatively as the most conservative of his contacts for that day. Religious orpins are better not worn. In callingissionary or religious source discussion of religion Is avoided Theofficer cannot allow himself the liberty of drawing racial, color, or religious lines.

When, promptly at the Ume of bis appointment, tbe contact officer arrives and Is ushered into the Source's office, heshows his credentials and underscores hiswith CIA to emphasize that he does not represent the FBI or any other federal agency. The Source is naturally curious about the visit, and may even have been troubled since the first phone call. The officer tries to put him at caseThe approach will vary, depending onon the personality of the Source, and even on the area. In the North and West, and to some extent on the West Coast, the typical Sourceusy man who has sandwiched this appointmentight schedule. The contact officer must talk fast and convincingly,usiness-like manner, to win his cooperation. In the South and theertain amount of pleasantry or chit-chat may be in order before getting down to the issue at hand.

Whatever approach he uses, the contact man mustthree things during his Initialthe lutelil-

Domestic Co//edion Techniques

gence mission, assess the potential of the company for his purposes, and show the Source how he or his company can be of assistance to the cause of national security.

Private citizens have varying amounts of knowledge about intelligence, and the first task is to orient the Source onIntelligence purposes and Its place in the federalThe contact officer brings out the Director's advisory function to tbe National Security Council headed by the President, stressing bow necessary It is for policy makers to be weU informed on conditions and events throughout the world. Ho also explains that he represents all theagencies In the Government, so that needlessin visits by other intelligence representatives can be avoided- Tbe Source can contribute to the welfare of the country, he says, by making available whatever Information on foreign plants, research and development, or other matters be may possess or acquire.

The assessment of the company's potential then follows naturally. The Source is usually willing to cooperate but may fail to see how any information be has will be of value to the intelligence effort. The contact man then introduceson the company's foreign branches or affiliates, theof its foreign business, and the degree to which the home office Is kept aware of conditions in areas hi which theoperates.

At this point the 8ourcc may become apprehensive that any Information he provides may boomerang against bisthrough punitive action by another federal agency, through revelation of proprietary information to aor through embarrassment of his future dealings with foreign companies or governments. The contact manreassures himuiding principle of allwith Informants Is Source protection. The name of tbe Source is never connected with bis information. Nor Is data providedource ever turned over to another federal agency for any regulatory or punitive action Information given by the Source is circulated only In mtelligence channels within the United States, and tbe Source need not have any apprehension that his name or his Information will get Into unauthorized bands. His cooperation with mtelligence, as well as the information provided by him, is kept classified.


Collection Technique*

Conteriely. the Source Is requested to treat the contact as classified and not to reveal to anyone the purpose ol the visit. It Is pointed out that the need (or security ts mutual Further, since this confidential contact may be followed by other visits In which classified requirements may be used, biographic Information on the Source for security assessment Is requested. Ordinarily, If the contact officer has laid the proper basisontinuing contact with the Source, whether tbe top executive or one of his subordinates, be has no difficulty In securing biographic data.

The officer cannot rely on his memory to retain thedivulged during the Interview. He inquires whether the Source has any objection toinquiryenerally academic, for It adds to the Source's feeling that he Is doing something Important if his words are taken down. On biographic and technical data note-taking isatter of course.

The length of the first interview Is governed by the time available to the Source and the contact officer's estimate of the Source's intelligence potential. The experienced contact man can assess the company's potentialhort time, and If his assessment is negative he arrangesraceful exit as soon as possible. If he believes that the company does have access to useful information, he explores the possibilities as completely as tune and circumstance allow. In this case, the length of Interview must be gauged by the Source's attitude and his appointment book. It sometimes happens, on the other hand, that the Source has time on his hands andhaving the earovernment representative Into which to pour all his ideas on what he thinks is "wrong withHere the contact officer politely steers theto the purpose of his visit, creating the impression that he himselfusy man.

The first interview is terminated with the understanding that the officer will probably return to explore the company's Information further.eturn Is actually contemplated, heersonal card which bears bis name, his field office's postoffice box number, and his {unlisted) office telephoneThe name of the Agency does not appear on this card.eek or ten days later be writes the Source to thank

|IIIII Ml Iff"

Domestic Collection Techniques

him (or his cooperation, mentioning that he is looking forward to another visit. The letter serves to remind the Sourcentelligence interests and gives him again the officer's name and phone number, should he have misplaced the calling-card.

After the initial Interview the contact officer mustthe future usefulness of the Source and his company. Should he follow up or not? If after consultation with his field office chief he decides that the company has Insufficient potential to warrant further expenditure of time and effort, heomplete account of his visit, plus the biographic data be has obtained on the Source, to Division Headquarters,otation that further contact is notopy is of course retained In the field office, for the guidance of other contact officers who may some dayead on the same company. If, on the other hand, he decides that the company and the Source can and will supply intelligenceof value, he submits to Headquarters not only an account of his visit butequest for security clearance on the Individuals with whom he will be dealing. Theif she Is witting to the intelligence contact, may also have to be cleared.

Conffnufnp Contact

How often the contact officer callsompany depends on severalamount and type of Information it has available, its distance from his field office, his own work-load, the Source's own preferences and schedule If the contact officer has determinedompany has Informationhe makesoint to pay it severalear, even though each visit may not produce InteUigence. An Ideal Source is one who has been "trained" tooint that he will telephone when he has information of interest orompany official has returnedrip abroad. But the contact man Is well awareompany official thinks in terms of bis own daily business needs and tends to forget intelligence needs. Like the salesman, thespecialist must periodically revive interest In his product.

Subsequent visitsompany are relatively easy to handle.arge company the contact officer utilizes as principal Source the person designated by tbe president, but also continually attempts to become acquainted with the


Collection Tecnniqoes

head of every department In which foreign Intelligence may be found This intelligence may take the form of reports from

managers of overseas branches or affiliates, contracts oraq-

uations with foreign companies or countries, or

with returning officials. Travellers abroad are an important font of Intelligence, and the officer tries to arrange for regular lmmedlate notification when such travel takes place.

When the contact officer learnsleared company official Is about to travel on company business abroad, he is faced with the often difficult question of whether to brief him, that is, to Instruct him beforehand In specific intelligence Interests In the areas to be visited. The decision to brief,security and psychological hazards, is an infrequent one. Sometimes the business traveller is outraged at anto recruit himut if the officer has workedource for some time, considers him reliable, and is confident that he will not interpret the briefing as ato engage in cloak-and-dagger activity, then he requests the enure intelligence community, through his headquarters channels, to provide questions for which the Source may be able to obtain answers. If be decidespecificof tateUigence gaps Is not desirable, he reminds thetraveller of the general needs of the community and suggests that whatever Is of interest to himpecialist In his field will be of Interest to Intelligence as well. In either case the Source must be discreetnot all business travellers haveavoid advertising abroad that he to out to get "Inside dope for CIA."

After the traveller has returned, the contact officerInterview as soon as mutually convenient. If there wasthe same questions may be used In debriefing.Source was not specifically primed with requirementstrip, community requirements may be obtained forFormal requirements, however, are only guidesinterview rather than limitations on it. Thetries to get as much detail as possible on all itemsthe Source may have encountered. Since a

interview takes Ume and the returned traveller Iswith business matters that have piledopy of the trip report which he must

write for his company may be helpful. This report,

i^qi iripci WW *-

Domestic Collection Techniques

will deal exclusively with his company's business, andwill still be necessary to explore any other^ubjccts or areas on which the Source rhay be competent to report **

Mechanical aids are occasionally used to expedite theprocess. Although the modern businessman is well acquainted with the tape recorder or dictaphone and generally has no objection to their use, the contact man rnakesoint to get advance permission for them. Some Sources, suggesting that an outline of the type of information desired be left with them, offer to dictate the answers as tune permitsape recorder. Under this procedure tbe Source must be reminded to specify which questions he Is answering and to spell out proper names.

Intelligence collected Is not limited to the spoken and written word, but often includes maps, flow charts, photographs, graphics, floor plans, etc. These items are of most use to mtelligence analysts when they are obtained for permanent retention, preferably in the original copy; but tbe Source usually hasew copies and may balk at providing any for retention. Here the persuasiveness of the contact man must again prove itself. If be cannot talk the Source outopy, he tries at least to obtain the item on loan forays so he can send it to Washington for reproduction.

Intelligence collection isne-way street, with the Sources giving and the collector receiving, butource requests reciprocity. The contact officer does have such unclassifled items as the FBIS daily report on foreign broadcasts and translations of Soviet scientific abstracts at his disposal for distribution to selected Sources, and this quid pro quo helps toordialreater strain on the relationshipirm occurs when the Source requests specific information inompany may beew branch overseas and desire information as to whether Its proposed indigenous branch manager is pro-Communist or unreliable in some other way.irm may request assistance in arranging for the Immigrationkilled worker. Such requests are especially embarrassing when they comeompany which has been thoroughlyand which may Itself have provided covert support to the Agency. The contact man extricates himself from such situations by referring the requestor whenever possible

Domeitic Co/lccffon Technique!

to the appropriate federal agency. If that does not work, he agrees to take the matter up with his Washingtonand throws on Washington the blame for inability to comply with the company's request.

The many foreign specialists who visit US firms andalso have Information of InteUigence Interest. These, however, the collector cannot talk to directly; Intelligence policy forbids interviewing aliens In the United States onvisits. II time and occasion permit, the contact officer enlists the aid ot an established Source within the firm visited to actutout or middleman. He briefs the cut-out an InteUigence Interests and encourages him to intertwine InteUigence questions Into his conversations with the visitor. The cut-out Is alsoood position to assess the visitor's technical competence and personal ldiosyncracies. Interviewingut-out, even more thanthrough an interpreter, is less satisfactoryirect encounter, but is preferable to creating an impression that visitors are invited to the United States only forexploitation.

University Exploitation

Thus far we have dealt almost exclusively with commercial or Industrial firms as sources of InteUigence. Other fruitful Sources are found in universities, research institutes and hospitals, pharmaceutical houses, etc. The contact officer often finds that he must approach these Sources somewhat differently than he approaches industrial ones. In thefirm he deals with Sources as officials of tbe company. In universities and similar institutions he deals withand researchers as Individuals.

The basic approach Is nevertheless the same. The president of the university is the initial point of contact; the contactor needs his blessing for the exploitation of university personnel and records. Lesser officials and faculty members also tend to be more cooperative when they know that the president is aware of the intelligence collection activity and approves of It The deans of the schools, the dean of students, andchairmen are worth cultivating, for most of the day-to-day activity of the university filters through thelr ofDces. They can, for instance, provide Information on special


Domestic Collection Technique*

research projects, foreign travel of faculty members, visiting foreign scholars, foreign graduate students, and other points of Intelligence Interest.

But the best Source Is usually the individual professor who has just travelled abroad, attended an internationalororeign visitor. like the businessman, the professor must be convinced that his Information willthe highest degree of protection.

The contact officer finds it rewarding toho's Who or some other reference work to obtain personal data and to determine the Source's professional stature andfield of research interest. The Source is usually flattered that his professional competence Is knownayman. At the same time the officer must not pretend to knowledge he does not haveechnical subject, forham is easily and quickly detected by the Source. Every man, anda professor, likes to talk about his work; and themanifested interest In learning moreubject of which he knows little usually kindles the academic spark.ovice In the subject, the contact officer has ample excuse to ask for explanation and detail on each point made, even though the information may appear elementary to the Source. The officer must, however, take especial care tofaithfully this kind of data, for technical Information has little value unless it is accurate. This may require another visit to the Source to verify the accuracy of the officer's report after he has finished writing It

A problem tbe contact officer may encounter in his visitsniversity Is the lack of privacy. Few universities have individual offices for all members of the faculty. Doubling-up Is frequent, and in some schools general faculty rooms orartrnental offices are used in common. The officer makes every effort toeeting in private, soliciting the aid of the professor himself in trying torivate spot.uiet corner of the cafeteriaeeting in the officer's automobile Is preferable to oneoom where tbe Interview can be overheard by other Individuals. The professor is usually Impressed by the officer's Insistenceecure meeting, and the confidential nature of the relationship Is thus underlined.

Domestic Collection Techniques

The Alien

Getting information from the alien involves techniques vastly different from those used in dealing with US citizens. For collection purposes an alien Is dennedecent arrival for permanent residence in this country, as opposed to the visitor or foreign student In practice, alien Sources have been refugees from eastern Europe,mall sprinkling of lrnrnigrants from the Far Bast Initially the displacedof World War n, driven or escaping from lands occupied by the German military forces, were exploited for theirof areas which were under Communist rulehe Influx of Hungarians after the events ofnother golden opportunity to collect currenton an inaccessible area. More recently the increased travel between tbe Soviet Bloc and the United States and the greater emigration of Satellite nationals to visit or rejoinhere have given Impetus to the alien exploitation

Because techniques In contacting and exploiting aliens are so different from those used in dealing with industrial orSources, alien specialists with language ability and particular adaptability and perseverance have been assigned to field offices where alien concentrations are needed because of the varied types of alien with whom the contact officer must deal, rangingormerin an exiled government to the janitorunitionsPerseverance is required to spend the tune and effort needed to track an alien as he moves from one address to another. The interviews must usually be conducted in the evening or on weekends, since the alien in most cases cannot be interviewed at his place of employment

In addition to the difficulty of locating the alien, and the odd hours Involved, the contact officer faces the much greater problem of eliciting the cooperation of the Source. Thebarrier Is the alien's suspicion. He ts likely to have lived by his wits almost continuallynd to have been interrogated and retoterrogated by variousand security services, not always in friendly fashion; bis instinctive reaction is to have nothing to do withecond barrier is the language, for few

Domestic Collection Technique!

aliens speak enough English lo carryetailed interview. The contact officer's language ability may overcome this handicap, but he should be aware of the dangerative fluency may cause the Source to suspect him as the agentoreign security service. Frequently the alien has greater trust and confidenceontact man whose crude working knowledge of the foreign language betrays him as obviously American. If there Is no mutual language in which toan interpreter must be obtained. Field officeslists of cleared Sources who can act as Interpreters, but here again the alien may doubt tbe bona fides of theHe may trust the contact man but be suspicious of bis co-national.

The contact officer tries to make an appointment with the alien, by telephone If any, or by letter. Often, though, he must knock on the door without previous appointment, hoping that his prospect is at home. The scene that greets him when he enters the alien's home is that of the entire family arrayed behind the man of the house, who, they fear, is in trouble. He realizes that he cannot possibly speak to tbe alien In private, for any attempt to lead him away from the family group confirms their suspicion that something Is wrong. He Is forced to present tbe purpose of his trip to the entire family in an effort to allay their fears. Most aliens are quick to grasp the needs of an mtelligence service but they must still convince themselves that their caller Isepresentative of the US andoreign mteUigenceTbe officer tells them that if they have any doubt about the authenticity of his credentials they should call the local office of the FBI. He stresses very emphatically, however, that he Is not an FBI agent, but represents an mteUigence organisation interested only tn foreign mteUigence,

Once the hard sheU of suspicion and distrust Is pierced, tbe alienost cooperative source. He is nattered that the US Government has sought him out and pleased that he can contribute to the Oght against Communism. He Is useful both fn supplying information from his own knowledge andand in giving leads on co-nationals who may haveinformation. Aliens also correspond and send pack-


Domestic Collection Technique!

ages to relative abroad and the correspondence may be ofinterest, but the contact officer must first overcome their fear'that harm may comeelative if they reveal too much.

The officer is very often the federal Government's only contact with the alien, who therefore tends to look to himeneral father confessor, employment counsellor,and sounding board for pet ideas or pet peeves. His Immigration and citizenship problems, obstacles to theof his relatives, or his dissatisfaction with hisbe presents to the contact man for solution, since la his mind an intelligence service is above the laws and regulations established for ordinary citizens. Tbe contact officer is careful not to make any commitments, rciemng the alien to the appropriate federal agency. He must also take care not to Involve himself ta the politics of ethnic groups, for most of them are split Into hostile camps.

The matter of payment sometimes arises here. The vast majority of alien Sources are happy to make available whatever Information they haveontribution to their new country. Occasionally, however, havingonsiderable amount of time taetailed and important report, an alien mayesire for compensation. The contact officer must obtain an evaluation from Headquarters before be can make such compensation; and even with Headquarters' approval he Is treading on dangerous ground, for there Is an effective grapevine within the nationality groups, and hisrequests for cooperation from others may be met with similar demands for payment. In general, an occasional lunch or dinner should constitute the extent of financialon an alien.


This discussion of domestic collection techniques has of necessity been cast in terms of averages and stereotypes. Every contact specialist ta the field could point out manyto the generalizations here drawn and show theof dealing with Sources ta bis own area. Thewhich have been developed remain individual and flexible, varying with three variable factors, the collector,

Domestic Collection Techm

tbe Source, and the material to be collected. Each collector applies those personal techniques, gained through experience which are called foriven situation to extract the greatest amount of raw intelligence from his Source; but his methods are likely to fall roughly into the patterns outlined above.

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