TITLE: The GuidingIntelligence Collection
AUTHOR: William P. Bundy
VOLUME: 3 ISSUE: Winter
A collceUon of ot tides on the historical, operational, docifin.il, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion oi analysts expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the authois They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency oi any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations.
tortureapTogreuomplex organism in getting its food from hand to mouth.
TJIryGUIDING OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
In tackling the subject labelled "Procurement" in thefor this conference, It seems most appropriate to discuss, for an audience predcmlnantly of researchers or mtelligence producers, not the whole range of collection activities, but simply the link between the people who use raw intelligence on the one hand and collectors of raw intelligence (orayn the other. To make even this restricted subjectave confined my illustration almost entirely to tbe procurement of positive intelligence on the Sino-Sovlet Bloc, excluding other geographic areas andalso the effort In support of intelligence collectionthemselves.
The essential problem is of course simply one ofbetween human beings. No one who has ever done research on his own will have the slightest doubt that the ideal unit issingle person doing his own collecting and producing with no Intermediaries whatever. Or one might grudgingly acceptodel Mark Hopkins' picture of the truecollector on one endog and the producer on the other.
If these be onlyo still recall one actual largethat seemed to me to approach the Ideal During the lastaslace called Bletchley In England.
There, In three low brick wings of the same building, side
poetically enough,houseda final producer apparatus, an intermediatepparatus,ollection control apparatus. They were within easy walking distance, and the people in them knew each other by their first names and had been tn their Jobs long enough to havenowledge of each other'sThe resultremendously efficient collection oper-
Guiding Of Intelligence CoHecfion
ation, which balanced mteUigence priorities and needs fully against the need to maintain assets lor stand-by purposes, and all with whatby Britishof red tape.ecall, the weekly so-called control meeting used to take about an hour to dispose of all itsIncluding discussion and action on newad never seen anything like It.
ont really expect to again. For that guidancehad two great advantages unlikely ever again to exist in combinationarge-scale effort.elatively limited focus, almost whoUy military, within which the basicpriorities were largely self-explanatory and seldom con-troverslaL Andingle collection system, and that ofature that Its capabilities, though flexible to degree, were limited and readily tested for possible expansion. You knew pretty weU what could be done, and if you didn't know you could find out fairly quickly. In other words, both the miermedlate processor and the collector knew what thewanted, and both the producer and the mtermecUatc processor knew what the collector could do. Where these conditions exist, and where you have continuity of first-class people, it wouldost imaginative managementtoystem that could gum the works.
There are in in teUlgenceery few areas thusself-contained. Maphink, is one. But by and large we are nowituation where the demands are manifold, the priorities difficult to keep clear, and the coUec-tion capabilities variable, hard to appraise and extremely limited relative to the demands. In these circumstancesbecomes one of our major problems, one testing theexperience and knowledge of our people, and testing also our capacity to devise adrnlnlstrative methods than can assist the infirm and the temporary while not blocking theof the sophisticated and Imaginative professional.
The Hydra-Headed VS. Consumer and Collector
The complexity of the problem of guidance is indicated by the variety of consumers and of collection mechanisms to then teUlgence community.m using the termto the broadest sense, to order to avoid shades ofamong the various stages of processing or toteUi-
clpal units are:
CIABloc economic and worldwide geographic matters
CIAbasic scientific matters
CIAcurrent intelligence at the national level, toduding Indications, and for research in support of current intelligence
IAnational Intelligence estimatesone of the other
On the collection side, the list is even more extensive. The collection activities can usefully be broken down Into two categories: first,hall call "self-contained" systems, such as the Foreign Service (including foreign aid andpeople) and the system of military attaches, which work primarily for their own parent organizations, andarger number of "common concern" systems, servicewhich work primarily for others. Of thesesome use technical methodslassified nature, forthe Atomic Energy Detection System and FT.TNT. Others, who make use of unclassified technical methods or simply "people andnclude the following:
OO/Contact (for domestic collection)
OO/FBLD (for foreign broadcasts)
OO/FDD (for material that comes by subscription)
OCRollection (representing governmentnot directly connected with mtelligence) Clandestine Services '
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In addition some "common concern" services are notorganizations, but make use ot tbe facilities of oneof the
Defectors and returned German scientists East-West Exchanges Trade Fairs
International Conferences Graphics
It would be pleasant to report the hitherto undisclosed existence of an. or Hollerith Hurricane, that handled all requirements and steered them effortlessly to the right collectors. Alas, this is not the easel There Is no central mechanism that attempts tohorough policing andJob on the requirements any one producer may choose to levy on collection. Basic to our enure system, in fact, is the principle that the individual producingfor its aspect qf total intelligencelevy upon any one, or upon all, of the collection facilities to meet Its nceds-
Wh ether this right is.iven case, any more effective than Owen Olendower's ability to "call spirits from the vasty deep" is, of course, another matter. But at least thecan be levied, and unless patently outrageous it will reach tbe designated collectors. For almost all requirements levied by one agency on the collection faculties of another, this wOl be via the good offices of our CIA Office of Centralwhich while not policing does fulfill an ImportantIn registering, numbering, and transmitting requirements for most of the non-technical forms of collection.
In thfo, as In many other respects. It iskeep in mind the distinction between those collection systems that are organic parts of operating and intelligence producing"self-contained"those that exist fee: the benefit entirely of others. Foreign Service reporting and the attache operations of the military services historically antedate the existence of any overall intelligence framework. An ambassador today hardly thinks of his reporting work as being the fulfillment of
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and Indeed In the formal sense It seldom Is, for our senior department Is understandably reluctant to tell Its top people abroad ,what they should look for, at least In the political sphere, by the historic overt methods ofAs for the attache system, the intimate lies between the attach* and his base are such that, armed as he may be with an apparatus of guides and requirements, most of his reporting is done, to practice. In accordancefeltderived from dally cable erchanges
Not so with the other collectionand Increasingly the variousatter of "commonhese nave no direct base to report to (even those sharing CIA parenthood withoffices must and do serve other masters with at least equalnd they must hence be governed by an unruly flow of requirements from their many consumers, and must make shift with this as best they can.
To help reduce this state of potential anarchy to relative order,. community hasommonly agreed framework for the overall intelligence effort at allset of Priority National Intelligence Objectives. These PNIO's hare developedlow start Originated inargely on the initiative of the military services, they consisted at firsthort statement of about eightof key Importance. Alonghis statement seemed Inadequate to cover the breadth of factors Involved In tbe cold war, and It was decided that the Board of National Estimates, from Its Olympian vantage point, shouldan effort to setonger list with more clearly defined categories. Substantively, the aim was to Include political and economic objectives in perspective with military-related ones, and to separate the really crucial military-relatedfrom those of more routine nature.
Since that time, the Estimates Board has continued with the assignment, revising the list annuallyar-from-per-
Thit termrecise statutory meaning in our National Security Act ofrom which many functional charters derive. It Is used here more broadly, to cover all collection work not donelor the account of the collecting agency Itself.
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functory exercise culminating lo review at tbe toplevel and circulation for Information to top policy-masers as well. The document now consists of threeof priorities,otal listing of abouttems. The PNIO's set priorities (or all intelligence activity,as well as collection. Their greatest weight, however, is almost certainly In the collection field, where they serveasis for adjusting major priority questions, especially in the guidance and direction of the "common concern" collection systems.
But there are also many things the PNIO's do not do, things that no document of the sort can well do. One is to forecast what may turn out to be crisis areas at any given time.ommunist revolt breaks out in Ruritanla. common sensea top-priority effort which In practice would beirrespective of Ruritanla'i normal statushirdThe PNIO's cannot select the Ruritanias of the year toat least they haveneached that point yet, in spite of their being drafted In the Estimates shop.
More generally, the PNIO's are only statements of oftjec-tives. In themselves, they areost general guide and framework within which individual levies or major collection projects can be Judged. Many stages of translation arebefore they can become anything like true guidance, in any specific sense, for collection effort. One of those stages, for certain areas of Intelligence, Is provided within the PNIO framework Itself,cries of Annexes dealing with the priority economic, scientific-technical, atomic energy, guided missile, and international communism objectives, andrucial field which Mr. Pattern will describe, onethe General Indicators List.
These subordinate annexes, drawn up by tbe severalof USDS charged with the respective subjects, vary greatly in bite and effect. Those on atomic energy and guided missiles get pretty well down to cases,ave no doubtarked effect on the allocation of effort. The scientific and technical one reads largely In generalities, but doeshighlight some of the Important technical breakthrough issues. There Is similar generality In the economic one, though it too has useful specifics on the Soviet penetration problem. Clearly any document of this sortajor risk
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of boring the collector with what eecrrts to him largelyand thus getting no effective impact
So much* for attempts to state objectives, Whetf&e
nd from the historical files, many powerful voices were raised prophesying nothingaste ofhink it has not turned out so: certainly the blood on our Estimates conference tables every year looks real, so somebody must be getting hurt; and thatood sign. Nonetheless, there are clear limits to what can be done along these lines.
Generic practical Problems
There are certain problemsay-to-day nature In the consumer-collection relationship common to most forms of collection which It will be worth while to look at one by one. They seem to be associated mainly with five steps in the process of levying requirements:
Defining the requirement, or locating intelligence gaps.
Stating the requirement for the collector.
Selecting the appropriate collection system.
Servicing the return, including supplemental
Making specific evaluations and appraising thereporting.
1 should say, by the way,hall be talking solely about
consumer-originated requirements, leaving out the handling
of requirements originated by collectors themselves for the
purpose of testing orource, or to take advantage
of spot opportunities. This latter type of self-levy Is common
and often very importantfor example,
when our overt collectors learn of projected travel behind the
Curtain by knowledgeable legalit raises no
real nuuminery problem. Defining the requirement. In the field of modern history
writing,m sure other areas of scholarship as well, it
ommonplace that the great bulk of writers choose abecause the available materials are ample, rather than
ask what the key questions are and then seek out and work on materials however slender. Thisatural humanand In scholarship the immediate cost may be no worse than massive cases of publisher's Indigestion. In intelligence.
Guiding Of /nfclligence Collection
however, the tendency can be fatal, with the massivefalling to the pohey-rnalring reader, while tbe poor collec-^ goes about his business with no help from the producer
Making the producer stress bis gaps rather than hisis of courseroblem in education of the todividual, and toward this education the various priority lists certainly make some contribution. Yet something more intensive and specific is needed. In essence, the Intelligence analyst must be taught not to begrudge time spent in pointing out gaps In information (and how they might be met) as an essential part of bisone to be done as early asIt seems to me that the difficulty in educating the analyst varies directly as the amount of material available to him, Our scientific analysts, having lived for yearsery thin diet Indeed, seem to become collection-minded very easily. So too with our economic analysts In earlier years. But our political analysts, and lately, with the flood of publishedour economic ones as well, need fairly constant tending and reminding of this aspect of their Jobs.
Weumber of devices on this score that may be worth mentioning Our current intelligence office has long had Its meneriodic four-month review of priority re-qulrements (called Periodic Requirements List, or PRL) which for economic matters draws heavily on the Bloc economic analysts In ORR and which Is also now reviewed to draft by State. In our estimative process, we have had for someystem of post-mortems, to which the estimate writers state to broad brush terms where they thought the availablewas inadequate to support good answers to keymore realistically, as good answers as they thought might be obtainable by more or different effort These are then taken by each agency and, we hope, made the basis ofcollection.
Recently our Bloc economic analysts have instituted aprocedure under which each division is responsible forstatement of its gaps in intelligence. These must
stated not merely to general terms, but to terms ofvenues of approach tolists and so on. And most broadly of all, our whole National totelbgence Surveya formal research framework, bibHograpbies.
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to highlight excellently gap areas In ourknowledge Significant as these devices are, however, we areong way from erring on the side ofthe problem of gap-detention.
Informing the collector. Once you have your gaps spotted, you must make perfectly sure that they cannot be filled by some available materials. The analyst who reaches for the requirement sheet before he has picked all the brains within reach andruly conscientious search of the openand available reporting (using Mr. Borel's massive tools as they should bean analyst Iseplorable species. Butm told, not non-existent or even perhaps on the decline. Granted that the need has been found real, however, it must then be stated precisely andto the collector, and must ask him for something within his potential capacity to provide Thus this step may In practice often follow the next one, the selection of amethod.
In the drafting of requirements we have tacreasingly stressed the Inclusion of as much background as possible to make what is wanted absolutely clear to the field collector. But the ultimate questions must, at all costs, be firm andequirement that asks the production capacityoviet plant, without more, is of no use whatever to the collector. Rather the requirement should seek feasibleanswers that bear on this desired conclusion.great things can sometimes be accomplished If thecan be pitched so as to elicit useful responses by an untrained as wellrained observer. You may noteturnee scientist, butayman, so It behooves theto think in termsayman's capacity to remember floor spaces, height of stacks, size of loading facilities, and so on. And even If you have (and can personally brief) an expert collector, yon must still stress your precise gaps and go over ways to meet them.
Choosing the collector. If our analyst is fortunate enough to have one of the self-contained collection systems at hiswe need shed no tears for him. If he is In State, he may not be able to Induce his department or the Babul Embassy to share his interestull count of the goats in Afghanistan, but his only problem will be persuasion.ar more serious
The Guiding Of Intelligent Collection
case Is that of the Bloc economic analyst who, In pursuit of bis top-priority study of rocket-fuel Inputs, finds that he lacks any real dope about the most prominent known Sovietfacility. To what collection agency shall he turn?
This, frankly,ajor problem withm told that somethingf the requirements that come through our inter-agency machinery now arriveis,prior warning to the collectors or discussion of what they can or cannot be expected to accomplish.equirement may often name multiple possible collectors, and each ot these may conscientiously accept the requirement, try to find out more about It, and then make an effort to fin It It wouldbe better If they didIn practice we do findrequirements increasinglyonsumer should care enough about his need toot of foQow-up on it. and only If such follow-up produces no indication of tbe bestmethod is he entitled to call broadcast upon many
This problem, like so many others, gets back to the end to the Individual analyst's consciousness of collection problems and capacities, assisted and advised by requirementsto whosehall return. That analysts are not sufficiently collection-conscious Is due to physical separation, security precautions often largely legitimate, and not least to personnel turnover.hade too to the academicof self-help and solo effort In any case, the fact remains that this particular link of collector selection Is probably the weakest one In our process at present It Is ofar from unique organisational problem. Perhaps Its parallel could be found to the relationship between Production and Sales in any manufacturing business. But It certainly Is one on which we can profit at this conferenceew shared
Servicing the return. Moving to the next stage, set usthat the requirement, In usable form,ollector to the field (whether to an Embassy,landestine station, or within the semi overt collection complex to the United States) and that the collector Is then able to do something about It and assemble some information. At this point, there arises the problem of servicing the return so that It can be
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most useful. This problem is Dot serious if there Is no great time pressure and if the source will be readily available forterroga lion, further visits to ther more search of bis files. In questioning returned Oerman scientists we have been able to work through several stages of refinement, so as to be fairly sure of having tapped the collection capability to the maximum.
In other cases, however, we have often had disastrousof misunderstanding and Incomplete collectionwhen the source was no longer available. In seeking to avoid such failures we have found It useful, at majortoeports officer right on hand ready to put the take Into at least semi-finished form, set the product against the requirement, and direct Immediate follow-up to catch theuggest that this device may have more uses than we have yet turned it to, perhaps Including an area of concern to all of us. the handling of legal travellers from the Bloc.Communist China.
Evaluating and appraising. From what might be called specific "bitermedlate" or "field" evaluation it Ishort step to the final major problem in the normal process, that of final evaluation andubject tohall return at the conclusion of this paper.
The need for specific evaluation may sometimes be voiced in an urgent plea from the collector who hasew source and wants to know whether it Is worth furtherThat type of evaluation raises not too much difficulty with us. Provided he is not tackled too often, the consumer does respond adequately. But In the more routine case ofcollected in response to general requirements, our collectors complain bitterly about the lack ofuspect It Is one of the parts of our process thatot of attention andevice or two.
ommunity as far-flung as ours It is perhaps too much to strive for any uniform system or form of evaluation, and this we have never attempted. Moreover, there will always be the problem of reluctance to criticise, or appear toollection service under separate command. Yet this Is just the crying need, and felt by none more strongly than thehimself.
The Guiding Of Inltlligtnct Colbcrton
Withinave called the self-contained systems the evaluation Job appears, on my brief survey, to be extremely
well done. StateDltary services appraise the t
log performance of their overseas posts quite
State, for example, does It by despatchespot basis, by periodic evaluation ot its people from this standpoint, and by an annual critique of each overseas post's mteulgenceAnd on all of these they may and do consult with other major consumers of the take. The CIA collectionon the other hand, both overt and clandestine, find their consumers, CIA producing offices as well as others, limited In their evaluation efforts; andesult the collectors are never too sure of Just where they stand with respect toIn their Job.
In all of these five day-to-day problems, much depends on the personal competence and savvy of our requirements and liaison people. In our system, we maintain requirements staffs at both ends of tbe line, at least In tbe CIA production and collection services. In State and the military services theyelieve, more In the middle, attachedneither to the producing offices nor to the offices charged with giving instructions to tbe collectors. What Is clear, tn either set-up. Is that they must have the broadest possible knowledge of the capabilities of various collection units or of their own particular one, and must be able to Interpret the coaector to the consumer and vice-versa.
At the sameenture that the really goodofficer shoulding-sized lazy streak in him,him to avoid interposing himself where he Is not needed and to permit, Indeed urge or compel, the analyst to getdirectly with the collection agency, as far down the line as possible, so that he can make clear what his need really is and tailor It to the capacities of the coDector. .
So far as organisationave sought In vain. Intoould get my bands on, for any generaliseddoa practice that our .'
One services have always resLrte. representatives detailed directly to the actually tn on the planning of operations valla to some extent In our military services* covert activities rn support of field commands and shnfiar rnhaions within the
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sphere of what we call "agreedut It la not usedmain CIA clandestine collection service. Tbedisadvantages of the two systems may deserve someat this conference.
Problems of Clandestine Collection
AH theave Just discussed are common in some degree to all forms of collection. But thereery great difference between the guidance problems of the overt and semi-overt systems and those of clandestine collection.hould say, is the ne plus ultra of guidance and requirement problems, where all the types of problems, from basicof effort to the attempt to meet specific requirements In relation to available resources, are at their maximum. This arises from the simple fact that clandestine assets cannot be laid on the table for inspection.
In the US. community our most Important coordinating device is an Interagency Clandestine Collectionn which all the major consumer agencies are represented This committee, foundedas as Itsfunction the preparation of continuing guide lists of key specific targets in tbe USSR, Communist China, and the Satel-Utea (IPCs responsibilities are worldwide and may onlead to work on other areas, such as the UAR, especiallyoviet element ishese lists are based on, and under present practice stated in terms of, the basic First, Second, and Third Priority Objectives set forth In the PNIO's.
Tbe IPC lilts havereat deal over tbewere originally massive shopping lists, in whichdoled out more or less Indiscriminately to the mole,and the badgerort of prima facie showing ofto Soviet striking power or some other key aspectpower and Intentions. Particularly within the pasthowever, they havear more meaningfulwhich we believe really does take In virtually all ofphysical targets of which we are aware. Moreover, the
frightenlngly encyclopedic character of the lists has recently been reduced by tbe production of special lists of Installations of absolute top priority, and admission to these lists Is very carefully screened indeed. The result Is that today for the
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first time our clandestine collectorsairly reliable ftame of reference against which to Judge the incoming spot requirement of consumers. Moreover, the lists have become of Increasingly greater usefulnessunction they havefilled to some extent, that oframework for long-range planning in the development of clandestine assets.
Yet there obviously remain major defects and problems. Although tbe IPC lists are pitched to terms of clandestineeach important case has to be shaken out to be sure there are not other forms of collection that can better take on allart of the Job. We have made great progress to some fields In deciding what should be gone after by the clandestine route, but there have still been ghastly fiascos where great clandestine effort was applied to obtain results that wereall tbe Ume through careful analysis of the openandm sure there are many cases where clandestine effort is not being pushed to the maximum to the belief that other sources are of some use, when to fact they are not. In this, as to so many matters to this field, thefears of the collector (not by any means only thecollector)arge part.
Naturally, tbe consumer's dreamituation where he could go to the collectors,ull layout of their assets, and go back and frame his requirements accordingly. This can be done to some extent to areas such as East Germany, where the clandestine assets are considerable andeneralthat can be presented without much security problem. But In the key areas of the USSR Itself and Communist China, assets are so relatively few that they cannot be usefullywithout tending to pinpoint themay that does clearly present major hazards.
The result Is that in this area, above an, thereremium on use of the competent middleman, or Requirements Officer, who can master the possibilities of an asset and then, by some obscure process of osmosis and double-talk, get the consumer to use his imagination and frame requirements that will elicit useful responses. The premium on well-framed questions is tremendous, sources are not easily accessibleecond round, andreat deal of collateral research is needed to think of things that the particular type of source is reallyosition to observe and report. Thus the need for con-
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sinner and collector to be close together Is nowhere more acute, and yet nowhere Is It made more difficult by theof security, physical distance, and the number of go-betweens involved
Apart from their Intrinsic difficulty, these problemsarger question In the theory of clandestinewhether in fact It makes the best sense toystem of consumer-originated spot requirements forractical matter, virtually no spot requirement can be metreat deal of fouow-up contact as direct as possible between tbe analyst and at least the headquarters of clandestine collect)on. The tall does wag the dog, more than In any other form of collection, and ituestion whether requirements work should not be done almost wholly by laying out the general nature of the asset and thenconsumers to see what needs that asset can be brought to serve. This of course should not mean that clandestine planning and major direction would not continue to be done within as strong an overall framework of priorities as possible, but only that spot requirements would not be levied except after more general statements supplemented by ail thecontact and consultation possible. This relates to the organizationalentioned earlier, whether themight not have his people right In the requirements shop of the clandestine collector.
Last, and perhaps mostome to the problem of overall appraisal of the collection system and top-level work to set In motion major new developments and changes. Of all humanuppose mtelligence may be about the least susceptible to accounting methods or to attempts, at any given moment, to figure out Just how well or badly you may be doing relative to the possible. Any businessman would despair if he tried to get the equivalentepartment byprofit-and-loss statement such as General Motors gets from Cadillac, Buick. and so on; and he would succumb to total frustration If he set out toeasure of how the whole vast holding company was really doing.
Yet though we may be rightly skeptical of quantitative or even qualitative appraisals on an overall scaleave earlier
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remarked tbe importance of appraisalore specificwe bare become tocreaslrigly conscious over the past five years of the need to draw back from the operating picture and take stock to see if we are not leaving undone really big things that we ought to be doing. For this purpose the ordinary machinery of government has severe limitations. For twoad tbe dubious experience oforking group to Inform our National Security Council,ost discreet basis, how intelligence was doing. The report has become better over tbe years, but the amount of uncandour, ellipsis, and Just plain backside protection is sUU formidable. You simply cant get people to confess their sins in front of others.
Within the structure of government the one device we have found useful Is the creationadfly postigh level.elf-starting, Inquiring, and energetic individual with power to open ail doors, this can be quite profitable. For the Large tasks of appraisal, however, we have found it most useful, to many cases probably todispensable, to bring to groups of more or less expert outsiders to advise us. They are awhile to the Inquiry stage, but they bring together people from ail comers of the community, put their work Into greater focus than it had. and on many occasions come up withimportant recommendations.
Lastly, we have embarked during the past year on aexperiment to seeking to deal with our most seriousgape. This is the creation, last March,ritical Collection Priorities Committee, chaired by CIA's Deputyfor Intelligence and with high-level representation from all the main agencies. This committee, chartered to look Into any aspect of collection on key priority objectives and toaction, has taken as Its first task the field of guided missiles. Aided by the fact that the overall requirements to this field had been built up with exceptional care andby our guided missile committee, the CCPC has achievedirst step what may be the first single-document inventory of all assets being employed on tbe guided missile problem. Its work has greatI can say the more easilyave nowith it and it may well be theto future exercises to really comprehensive collection planning,oubt If the approach fits any but the moat cleanly focused substantive problems
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A Look Ahead
Let me concludeord on the future of collection against the Sino-Sovietuspect that in terms of* method tbe future will see an increasing emphasis on the technical collection methods, and that as to targets we should be focusing more and more on Soviet scientific plans andFrom my viewpoint as an estimator it appears that our Information on the Soviet Bloc economic picture, while of course still far below what we would like it to be, has sorted Itself out tremendously In the last few years. On the political side we must go on trying, but are not likely to succeed beyond modest limits in getting advance knowledge of Inner political developments or changes in foreign policy and plans. And as to military hardware, we are not In too bad shape on theweapons and forces.
It Is In advanced weapons and scientific progress that we find at once our most critical area and the one where our present status Is least good. Though our hopes lie In theof technical collection systems, It Is also true that in this area weuch greater number of opportunities for getting at tbe fringes, and sometimes more, through contacts with Soviet scientists, the expanded Sovietost of other sources that can be tapped through the more orthodox, overt and clandestine methods. Yet the use of these methods, In turn, willegree ofand training well beyond past needs. It Is one thing to train an agent to count the fiatears going through Brest-Litovsk; quite another to train and give the right questions to an agentow-level positioncientific establishment.uidance standpoint, this seems to me to present the greatest challenge to our ingenuity, industry, and machinery. The need Is greatest, perhaps the response win be also.Original document.