Created: 2/1/1960

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


1. Intro due lion

The objective of the Partido Socialiata Popular (PSP -Cuban Communist Party) at this time is to increase its control over Fidel Castro and his government without unduly emphasizing the existence of Communist Party members in official positions. Its tactics, therefore, are to conceal the membership, recruitment, or rcaffiliation of Party members who now occupy key positions in the government. This is in accord with the training in "legal and illegal activity'" which Communist Party leaders from Latin America have been given in Chinapitomizedecret training manual prepared by the CP China which states, in part, that:

"All of the Party members who work in legaland institutions should patiently retain their legal positionong time, without revealing their Party affiliation. They should gain power in theand institutions in which they work and they should retain their legal position as long as necessary. "

Through these secret Party members, the Party is able to influence governmental policy, aod bring about the appointment of additional Communist Party members (secret or known) to governmental positions, and/or the dismissal or neutralization of individuals who cannot be easily influenced or used as fronts Thus within the Cuban government today there are some known Communists {particularly io the armedome secret Communist Party members who seek to guide and direct governmental policy and administration, and numerous non-Communists, often young and inexperienced, who are used by

the Communists to execute their plans for national andsubversion. These secret members are also used to

defend "unity ofs advocated by theand its known leaders, in order to prepare publicopinion for the acceptance of recognized Communists

in progressively higher levels of government.

These secret Communist Party members are inwith known Communist Party leaders, such asJoaquin Ordoqui, Severo Aguirre, and Carlos Rafael

Rodriguez, who establish public Communist Party policyin turn, in contact with the Communist Party of the (CPSU) and the international Communist apparatus. It

is the intention of the Communists to eventually bringCommunist Party officials into the government, but

only afterh of July Movementndpolitical parties have been infiltrated sufficiently

to insure protection for the Communists under the guisepooular democratic government of national liberation. "

Since the victory of the Castro forces. Communistof the Cuban government andhas been progressing rapidly at all levels. cannot cover, in detail, the entire scope of the Commu-

nist effort, which is totalitarian in nature. It concentrates, therefore, on evidence of Communist policy and planning prior to the rebel victory and on three areas of major Com -munist effort. These three areas, on which the Communists have concentrated successively as their strength and influence haveincreased, are control of the armed forces, control of agrarian reform and the peasantry, and control of foreign policy in support of the USSR. These are treated in the following sections.

x; Tbe Development of Communist Policy and Activity during

the Guerrilla War.

The nature of the Communist policy and tactics canback to the Cuban Communist Partynd officially approved infter

Cuban Communist leaders had consulted with Soviet leaderstime of the celebration ofh Anniversary of the

Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow. This program, which isof tbat which the Castro government is now carrying

was described by the party to be an interim program --

v el programa socialista del desarrollo futuro sino el

programa democratico,ot the socialist program forbut the democratic, agrarian, and national-

liberationist program for currentt istherefore, that the Communist Party wants toout under Fidel Castro's "bourgeois" governmentof the next stage in which the proletarian dictator-

ship will be establishedfter "democracy and national liberation" have served their purposes and when the Communist Party is officially in control. The Communists have avoided public discussion of their program for this next stage, however.

Following the approval of the Cuban Communist Party program by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the full

of the international Communist apparatus began to be

mobilized in support of the Cuban Communists and their effort

further penetrate and gain control overh of July

Movement, led by Fidel Castro. In Moscow, representatives of all the Latin American CP's were instructed in7 to pass resolutions and hold solidarity demonstrations in behalf of the "Cuban People". Inhe Cuban CPetter to "all socialist and workers' parties of the world" and established an office inare of Sr. Baldomero Albarran,.hrough


which support was coordinated. The International Students Union and the World Federation of Democratic Youth asked their affiliates to sponsor pro-Cuban demonstrations. Within Cuba the Communists intensified their efforts to gain official recognition fromh of July Movement. They would not support the8 strike called byh of Julyso that they could use the failure of the strike as an argument in favor of collaboration with the Communists. Withinh of July Movement itself, pro-Communists such asuevara and Raul Castro increased their efforts to persuade non-Communists, such as Armando Hart and Jorge Almeida (currently Che Minister of Education and the Chief of the Air Force respectively^ to acceptviews and support. Guevara, an Argentine who became one of the most important guerrilla commanders, is now Director of the Cuban National Bank and Director of the Industrial Department of the Agrarian Reform Instituteaul Castro, Fidel Cairo's younger brother, is now Minister of the Armed Forces.

One of the principal coordinators of Communist Party aid to the Castro movement was Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, chief of the Cuban Communist Peace Movement, Secretary of Press and Propaganda of the PSP, and currently Director of Hoy, the PSP newspaper. nown Communist Party official, holds no government position at the present time, but6 has developed into one of the closest political advisors of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Guevara. He has even been considered, as ofossible replace -ment for the present Minister of the Treasury within the Cuban Cabinet. Such an appointment has not materialized because Raul Castro and other government leaders feel that the public is not yet prepared to accept "unity" on the governmental level. However, it is apparent that Communist and pro-Communist newsmen are constantly testing public opinion on this subject.


Inodriguez explained the policy and strategy of the Cuban CP toward the guerrilla movement of Fidel Castro, which the Communists had criticized as being bourgeois and "putschist". Rodriguez now revealed, in meetings with foreign Communist leaders, that the Castro movement hadmovement of thend that "unity of action". inclusion of Communists) had been achieved "at the base" on the basis of opposition to the dictatorship. He stated, however, that because the time was not yet ripe forruly Communist-inspired "National Liberationhewere making but limited suggestions to the Castrowhich did not involve "profound changes".

In accordance with their new strategy the Communists began, abouto organize small guerrilla units or to joinh of July Movement as individuals opposed to Batista who made no attempt to bargain for recognition, asking only that they be allowed to fight with the Castro forces. As fighters, these individuals or small groups were accepted. The Communist Party, however, continued to bargain for public recognition as part of the anti-Batista coalition. Suchwas rejected by the various non-Communist revolutionary groups which signed the Caracas "unity" agreement with7 in In August, however, reports from within the Communist Party indicateeparate agreement was worked out between the PSP Youth Organization (the Juventud Socialista) and certain leaders ofh of July Movement, though not at the highest levels. This agreement was with Raul Castro who the Communists have claimed wasember of the Juventud Socialista. It was worked out, or revealed, after he had broken out of the Sierra Maestra to form the "Second Front Frankeparate command. From this time on, evidence of Communist influence increased rapidly, particularly in the Second Front, as did provocative actions and allegations against the United States. These provocations and allegations were quickly given world-wide

publicity through the Communist frame and press, revealing an organized pattern of cooperation between Raul Castro and the Communists. Under Raul Castro's guerrilla command, the groundwork was laid for the reorganization of the peasants, though the Communists among the organizers concealed their Party affiliation. Significantly, Jose Pepe Ramirez, appointed by Raul Castro as Secretary of Peasant Organization of the Second Front in the early summerinally identified himselfommunist Partyear later. According to the Communist Party organ Fundamentos foregional Peasant Congress was held on8 in the Second Front with the aid of Raul Castro. Subsequently, in response to the "demands" of the peasants, Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra headquarters promulgated the "Agrarian Law" concerning the right of the peasants to the land. According to FundauienloB, by the time the victory was won there existed "hundreds" of peasant organizations in the various rebel commands, created with the help aod protection of the rebel authorities.

Immediately before and after the victory of the Castro movement, the main concern of the party was to develop the guerrilla forcepeople's army"hatolitically-indoctrinated force imbuedasic Marxist aod anti-United States ideology.

Carlos Rafsel Rodriguez went to the Sierra in July or August, and remained for seven months. His task was that of preparing and coordinating the work of politicalbeing carried on by Communists within the guerrilla movement, including the influencing of Fidel Castro himself. The Communists developed, and then exploited, educational programs within the armed forces. From position! within the rebel movement, some close to important commanders, they encouraged political discussion in an attempt to discredit reports and discount opinions which might reflect favorably on

United States policy, while advancing the theme of "national liberation" as the solution to all Cuban problems, economic as well as political. Among themselves, the Communists studied the works oi Mao Tse-tung, Lenin, and otherrevolutionary leaders.

3. Communist Infiltration of the Armed Forces since the Rebel Victory.

Shortly after the victory of the Castro forces,olitical indoctrination classes were instituted at La Cabana fortress in Havana. This indoctrination was carried on under the protection of "Che" Guevara, who had been made Commander of La Cabana, and under the direction of Captain Antonio Nunez Jimenez fa crypto-Communist) and Captain Luis Mas Martinnown Communist) as well as other Communists7 leaders who had received some indoctrination in the Sierra and were known to be sympathetic to Communist ideology. These included Captain Pablo Rivaltaommunist teacher from Santa Clara who fought under the name of Moises Perez, and Luis Alberto Lavandeyra Brama, who had been indoctrinated in Marxism by "Che" Guevara while in the Sierra de Escambray. Some of the students were members of the Communist youth (Juventud Socialista) who had been sent to the Sierra to join the guerrilla movement in the last days of the campaign or who had been enrolled in the army after its victory, such as Orestes Quintana Marquez (Secretary General of the Guanabacoa regional JS committee).

esult of such controlled assignments, La Cabana became the center for the concentration of Communist and pro-Communist personnel who were to become the agents for spreading Communist propaganda throughout the armed forces. Luis Fajardoommunist Party member, was made Chief of the^Military Police of La Cabana. While in this

strategic position he was secretly responsible to the Party for the administrative control of the Communist youth who joined the army and were assigned to indoctrination courses. These youths when ordered to join the army were sentertain recruiting office where their identification as PSP members wae noted and confirmed by an officer whoommunist. These recruits, unlike the non-Communists, were then sent to receive Party instructions from Fa jar dp. They were told that the Party does not now consider it wise to establish "cells" in the army, but that Party members should operate individually and make themselves "outstanding" through hard work and discipline. They were told that they should contribute five pesos monthly to the Party, read Hoy daily, and instigate political discussions whenever possible, following the line suggested in Hoy but never deviating from the positions taken by Fidel Castro and7 leaders. Each was informed that, after his military assignment, he would soon be approachedommunist Party member who would be his Party contact, bringing him propaganda and training literature and carrying back reports, suggestions, and complaints to the National Committee of the Party.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was again directly involved in the organization and teaching of the political indoctrination within the army. Rodriguez and Joaquin Ordoqui Mesa were given special privileges and entree to all military establishments. Other Communists were assigned, through the influence of Raul Castro, to the "cultural department" of the Armed Forces. These included Alfredo Guevara, who had been custodian of the bank account of7 in Mexico, and Oscar Ortiz, who became an instructor at Campo Libcrtad in Havana. Elsewhere in Cuba, particularly in Oriente, Communists were appointed to key positions in the Army. Although not the highest commands, they could control educational and propaganda activities, or report on officers who were actively or potentially anti-Communist. For example, Anel Escalantelose

relative of Anibal Escaiante, the editor of Hoy, was made adjutant to the Chief of Information of themy in Oriente Province. Other Communists, who had not participated in the fighting, but who had worked in the Communist fronts, such as the cultural organization Nuestro Tieropo, were called on to aid in the educational work of the army. An example is Amadoainz de la Pena.

Cuban Communist leaders have reported to foreignparties that the political indoctrination given within the army is controlled by Communists. The purpose of thi6 indoctrination has not been to emphasize or identify the role of the Communist Party or to train Communist Party members, but rather toadre of pro-Communist and crypto-Communist instructors and propagandists who accept the elementary principles of historical materialism and its associated beliefs which make up the so-called "science" of Marxian socialism. These principles include the inevitability of the decline of capitalism, the collapse of "colonialism" andnd the development of Socialism andin the image of the Chinese and Russian systems. The emphasis in the political indoctrination course has been on the development of extreme nationalism, hatred for the United States based on "evidence" (dating from the nineteenth century to the present) of outrages and injuries suffered by Cuba as the result of United States political and economic "interference" in Cuban affairs. The courses also deal with the need for agrarian reform and other generally progressive measures, again with the emphasis on the "liberation" of Cuba from foreign controls rather than on the manner in which the agrarian reform and other measures are being executed.

esult of the Communist-controlled indoctrination courses, the preferential appointment of Communists and pro-Communists to controlling positions in the army, and the elimination of anC^-Communists, non-Communists, and

suspected nonconformistBariety of devices, the new Cuban array is rapidly coming under the control of thefraction established within it.

Cuban Communist leaders have stated, in secret sessions, that their success is due to the influence over Fidel Castrois brother Raulhom they consider to be the "brains" of the revolutionnd "Che" Guevara. The Soviet political specialist on Latin America, B. Ermolaev, went even furtherpeech delivered in Moscow in Ermolaev stated that Cuba "is the "revolutionary center of Latinnd that although Fidel Castro's government contained many "unreliable elements" from the petite bourgeoisie, Raul Castro is, "speaking amongommunist. Raul Castro currently holds the key position of Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and has been designated by Fidel, who is the "maximums the latteruccessor in event of his death or incapacity.

Neither Raul nor "Che" have ever admitted beingmembers, and even within the Party this is denied. Raul's "former" membership in the Communisthas been acknowledged, on occasion, withinand as long ago3 heesponsible positionthe preparatory commission for the Communist-front Con-

gress in Defense of the Rights of Youth held in Vienna.since the revolutioa he continued to work closely with the

Communist youth in Cuba. His wife, Vilma Espin, isseveral Communist fronts. It has been Raul Castro who has

most actively supported the coordination of internationalyouth activities in the Caribbean area and has called"Latin American youth congress" to be held in Cuba in mid-

nd has supported the convocationatinwhich hasommunist .objective

In view of the evidence, itis not unlikely that both

Raul and his wife are. In fact, secret members of the Commu-nist Party at the present time.

It seems less probable that "Che" Guevaraommuniat .Party member. However, his close association withgoes back many years, and it is known that heember of the Mexican-Russian Cultural Institute when in After he joined Fidel, his wife, Hilda Gadeactediaison capacity between Soviet military advisors in Mexico and various Latin American revolutionaries in exile. She also worked closely with persons identified as Soviet international intelligence agents. (Gadea, now divorced froms currently employed in the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute.) "Che" was one of Fidel Castro's small group which invaded Cuba in As an advisor to Fidel and later the commander of his own column, he encouraged the study of Marxism among the guerrilla forces and defended the Communists, though with emphasis always on "national liberation". Subsequent to the victory, he was charged by Fidel to organize Cuban aid to the foreign revolutionaries who flocked to Cuba (including those with whom his wife had worked innd used his authority in an effort to force these groups to accept Communists as equals in "unified" movements. Guevara's activities as commander of La Cabana fortress, the nature aod activities of his appointees, the character of his trip to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and his policies as Chief of Industrial Development of the Agrarian Reform Institute all attest to his desire to use the Cuban revolution to support Soviet foreign policy, which seeks to promote the "national liberation struggle" in Latin America and elsewhereeans of attacking the United States andeutralist bloc which ie susceptible to Communist penetration. Although Guevara has relied on known Communists as bodyguards, adjutants, and appointees, and has favored Communists among the foreign revolutionists asking for Cuban aid, his denials that the Cuban revolution is Communist-influenced or supported indicate strongly that he wishes to exploit Cuba as the modelustifiable, popular, nationalist movement

which will generate enthusiasm in other Latin American countries and underdeveloped countries where Communism is weak or discredited.

4. Communist Influence within the Agrarian Reform Institute.

Following the initial drive to infiltrate the revolutionary army and control the political indoctrination and loyalty of its members, the Communists shifted their attention to the next important objective the infiltration and control of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). The Institute was officially established in9 under the Agrarian Reform Law drafted by Antonio Nunez Jimenez with guidance and advice from Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara. Foreign Communists were also conaulted, such as Dionisio Encina of the Mexican Communist Party, possibly because of his experience in the organization of communal farms in Mexico during the Cardenas presidency. Nunez Jimenez, who has worked publicly for the Communists9 and is reliably reported tosecret" member of the Party, was appointed the Executive Director of the Institute.

The INRA, both in theory and practice,overnment io itself. It expropriates, manages, and disposes land and other property, it undertakes public works, creates schools, issues publications, carries on "culturalperates stores, and negotiates for economic aid and trade with foreign firms. Nunez Jimenez has told his high INRA chiefs, in private, that they are in fact subservient to no other agency of government. These INRA chiefs are, in practice, considered to be "commiaars1 in the Soviet sense, and have authority over military and civilian officials within the districts they control. The chiefs include some known and some suspected Communists, and in the lower levels of the bureaucracy are numerous known Party members. Waldo Medina, the INRA's general counsel,ommunist, asumber of others on the INRA staff. Thus planning and administration of the INRA ie Communist-influenced

at the very highest levels by Communists snd sympathizers, who rely on advice from the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties in an attempt to bring the functions of INRA into closer agreement with the Communist theory of state control. For example: since its formation, INRA has concentrated, not on the distribution of land to landless peasants, but on theof peasants into collectives or cooperatives where they arc to receive "profits" rather than "wages". There is no direct tribute paid to Communist Party inspiration, nor does the PSP claim credit for INRA's activities. However, in practice, the Communists have been the only group among Castro's trusted followers in Cuba who have the experience and organization to draw up draft programs, draft regulations, or "studies" which appeal to the government. They have been careful to leave the initiative in Fidel's hands, but to guide Fidel's revolution so that it will, in time, openly rely on Communist advice. Thus, after the formation of cooperatives under INRA had been approved, the Communist theoretical organ Fundamentos, forublished an article concerning the nature and function of cooperatives, supplementedranslation of the "Reglamento Modelo para Cooperatives Avanzadas de Productores Agricalas" (Model Regulation for Advanced Agricultural Cooperatives) of the Chinese People's Republic. These comments allegedly were offered in amanner, though some had already been accepted. They present an ideal picture, but the voluntary and democratic aspects which they pretend to favor are invalidated byto the "present stage of the revolution". Fundamentos states that the success of the cooperatives will depend on the quality of administration by INRA, and suggests that "in this first stage, it would be advisable for each of the cooperatives to have an assessor general, appointed directly by the INRA, who, even though he might not possess technical knowledge, would be politically prepared to orient the workers and the cooperative itself along the paths laid out by the Revolutionary Government. " "ahis suggestion, which hasatter of

practice, is the basis for the appointment of Communists or Communist sympathizers to control the cooperatives, inasmuch as they pose as the most faithful supporters of the revolution and are "politicallyespite ignorance of agricultural practices.

The INRA is only one of the government agencies which the Communists seek to control, but it is the most important one for their purpose, as it will allow control of Cuba's economic wealthentralized bureaucratic system. Through INRA they will also be able to organize Communist control over the peasantry, thereby preventing the developmentuccessful rural counterrevolution.

The Castro government has planned other agencies, such as the National Institute of Urban Reformo extend control over other sectors of the population. The INRU is to be established innd reportedly will havepowers over all urban land, houses, buildings, and personal property attached to real property. Owners ofproperty are to be nominally reimbursed, INRU will develop or sell buildings or dwellings on the basis of popular or individual need, and tenants will be allowed to purchase their dwellings through payments equal to their farmer rent (which the government has already reduced). Through the reallocation of urban property, the INRU will beosition to control the urban bourgeoisie and to buy the loyalty of the urban proletariat. It is believed that Communist Infiltration in the INRU will follow the pattern set in the INRA, though this remains to be seen. It is already apparent, from remarks made by Fidel Castro in private, that the true pattern of "democratic" governmente plans to establishureaucracy controlled by representatives of the Army, the INRA, the INRU, and other autonomous agencies, rather than one controlled by popularly elected officials. It ls also apparent that the bureaucracy which is sow developing under Castro will be largely the Communist Party or its

sympathizers aad that elected officials and political parties may, as in the Soviet Union and China, play but inconsequential roles in government.

5. Communist Influence on Cuban Foreign Policy.

After initiating their drive to infiltrate the Army and INRA, which were their first priorities, the Communists and their sympathizers turned to control of Cuban foreign affairs. In this, they have been more concerned with concealing direct Communist participation than in other fields, but their influence has steadily grown. They have obtained the support of high officials of the Cubanidel Castro, Raul Castro, "Che" Guevara, Armando Hart, and Raul Roa (the Foreign Minister) for various International projects which are known to be Communist inspired, somo having been formulated in Moscow.

The purpose for which the Communists are using Cuban foreign policy becomes evidenteview of Soviet Communist Party objectives in Latin America, and specifically, Soviet efforts toatin American "peoples' congress".

The broad objectives of current Soviet policy toward Latin America were suggested in an article in Kommuniat (an important CPSU theoretical organ) inigned by M. rjanilevich. This article attacked the United States as controlling Latin America in the Interest of militarism and profit, and noted the applicability to Latin America of the communique, issued by the Bandung Conference, regarding the "subordination of nations to foreign enslavement,and exploitation". Further on it claimed that "the working class, headed by the Communist parties, was emerging as the roost consistent defender of national interests, political and economic independence, peace and democracy." It reported, with approval, the formation of "broad coalitions of patriotic forces" and noted that the development of relations between the

"Socialist countries" and Latin America will "facilitate the cooperation of these states in matters concerning the supporting and strengthening of peace. " The article was, in effect,irective to the Communist parties and an offer to nationalist elements of Soviet support.

Coinciding with the publication of the Kommunlstpecial secret conference of Latin American Communist delegates to the XX CPSU Congress was held in Moscow under Soviet auspices. This conference emphasized coordination of Communist activities in Latin America, and proposed the holdingpeoples' congress" which would be "anti-imperialist" in nature and inspired by the Communists, though attended mainly by democratic personages not linked with international Communism. It is apparent that this "peoples' congress" was designed to circumvent the generally favorable attitude of Latin American governments toward the United States by gaining the support of prominent persons for "anti-imperialist" resolutions or demagogic proposals compromising to United States policies.

The Communists were unable to organize or findthis "peoples' congress"6nd inwere reprimanded in Moscow by Soviet Communistcharged with Latin American liaison. Thethat the "peoples' congress" hadatterpriority, and requested further action.

various Latin American Communist party representatives met privately at the Argentine Peace Congress in8 to discuss the organization of the congress, which was mentioned publicly (for the first and only time) in the Bulletin of the World Peace Council later in the year. entative date for the7as 6et, but again the Communists had difficulty in finding non-Communist sponsors and, .as the Argentine government became increasingly anti-Communist, the Congress was postponed. Subsequently, it was decided to hold it in some other country, where conditions would be more favorable.

Inhe CPSU againecret conference of Latin American Communist party delegates in Moscow, at the time of the XXI CPSU Congress. The subject of the "peoples' congress" was again discussed, and it was decided that the main theme should be the "defense of nationals before, the Soviets indicated that "anti-imperialist" language should be avoided in gaining support for the congress, although the final resolutions should be exploitable for the anti-imperialist campaign. The Communist initiative in calling the congress should be concealed, and

leaders such as Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, and Jose Figueres of

Costa Rica were suggested as persons who might be "used" to

convoke the meeting, thereby assuring it of popular support.

Finally, it was decided that "fraternal delegates" from Africa

and Aaia were to be invited.

As Communist influence in the Cuban government increased, responsibility for the organization of the "peoples' congress" was transferred to the Communist Party of Cuba. The anti-Communist statements and actions on the part of Figueres and Betancourt, otherwise relatively favorably disposed toward the Castro government, probably have eliminated them from consideration as possible sponsors of the Congress. ew spokesman has been found in Armando Hart, the youthful Cuban Minister of Education who had already revealed his pro-Communist tendencies by appointing Antonio Nunez Jimenezommission charged with rewriting the history of Cuba for use in the public schools. Hart was acting as interim Foreign Minister inrior to the appointment of Raul Roa, and used this position to greet foreign delegates to the "Agrarian Reform Forum". He told these delegatee that, as Minister of Education:

ave the intention of convoking inongress of political leaders and Latin American personalities.

among whom will be intellectuals, not specifically government delegates, representatives of institutions, universities, and the workers. In that congress it will be possible to trace the lines of the political future of Latin America. t is necessary to establish the fact that it is not only the governments and their armies which determine the policies of countries. "

In advancing this project (which foreign Communistidentified as the "peoples' congress" planned inrevealed himself as the instrument of thethrough "unity from below" are seeking to circumventlegitimate governments in the conduct of theirforeign affairs.

Subsequently, when Foreign Minister Roa went to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Santiago de Chile inducation Minister Hart went also as headpecial mission to meet with leaders of opposition groups from various countries. These included representatives of various Communist and Socialist parties, members of labor organizations, youth movements, and political opposition fronts. Hart wasby Carlos Rafael Rodriguez of the Cuban Communist Party, and waa joined later by Raul Castro. These leaders met unofficially, independent of the Foreign Ministers, in order to examine (according to Radio Peiping) the problem of strengthening the "national and democratic movement" in Latin America. Subsequently, the National Action Front (FRAP) of Chile, which played host to the meeting, announced ita adherence to Hart's proposal forcongress of democratic personages, repreaentatlvea of political parties and social and culturalaul Caatro, who went to Santiago to meet with youth representatives, announced bis support of Hart's proposal in September, at which time he also proposed publicly that the Latin American youth congress be held in Havana.

Paralleling the unofficial meetings attended by Hart and Haul Castro, the representatives of the various Communiit parties met secretly at the headquarters of the Communist Party of Chile. Each leader reported on conditions in his own 'country, the problems which faced the Communists, and thediscontent which might be exploited by them. The Cuban representative, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, wae appointed to 'visit various Latin American countries and totudy on the social and economic situation which would be used in preparation for the "peoples' congress". Subsequently, Rodriguez visited Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries where he conferred with various Communist leaders, asking them to prepare material and to visit Cuba to further discuss the matter. In October, therefore, representatives of the Communist Parties of these countries met in Havana, during the plenary session of the Central Committee of CP Cuba. Theyentative date for the Congress in0 and planned an agenda which would stress the economic development of underdeveloped nations, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and the struggle against "dictatorships". It was also decided that the congress should be formally convokedanifesto signed by well-known non-Communists, probably including Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, Salvador Allende of Chile, Oswaido Aranha of Brazil, Wolfgang Larrazabal of Venezuela, and others described by "Che" Guevara as forming the "possible nucleusnified position" which might lead Latin American countries to develop the "enviable cohesion maintained by the Afro-Asian countries since the Bandung Conference." Although the sponsors of the conference have not as yet issued their manifesto, and some have not even been approached on the 'matter, the various Communist parties involved in planning the congress already have special representatives in Havanaermanent organizing committee.

The Latin American "peoplesa planned by the Soviet and Latin Ante rican Communists, is clearly the type of

non-governmental Communist-controlled "popular" meeting which the International Communist Movement desires prior to (orubstitute for) action on the official level. It will, if held, be similar in purpose to the "Asian Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions" which was held in just prior to the Bandung Conference, and which gave rise to the Asian Solidarity Committee. It will be similar to the second "Arab Peoples'which, when united with the Asian campaign, gave rise to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo, at which was established the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

The campaign in Latin America to unify anti-imperialist and nationalist elements, to the detriment of the United States and the advantage of the Sino-Soviet bloc, thus follows the pattern set in Asia. The organizers havemall group of professional Communist party members aided by reliable sympathizers already active in front activities. As in Asia, the Communists want to follow up the "popular" congress with action at an official level; thus Danilevich, writing in Kommunistet the Bandung Conferenceodel for Latin American anti-colonial action. At that time, Danilevich noted that "political development" in Latin America was not as "advanced" as in Asia, obviously referring to the anti-Communist orientation of the governments, and not to their long history of political independence. The Communistof the Castro government in Cuba has changed this picture, however, and has now given the Communists an opportunity to operate at the official diplomatic level. This has been done, apparently, largely through the influence ofuevara and the medium of Raul Roa, the Foreign Minister, who recently calledcongress of underdeveloped nations" to be held in Havana.

The tour ofuevara to the Afro-Asian countriesnitiated the Cuban policy of

attempting to draw Latin America closer to theee countries in defenseneutralist" policy. Official formulation of the policy, however, and the accompanying reorganization of the Cuban Foreign Ministry apparently awaited the return of Guevara from his trip. The nature of the new policy was first outlined, informally, by Guevara on his arrival at the airporteptember. It was next described by Raul Castro oneptember, at which time he approved the Communist-inspired plans for youth and peoples' congresses in Cuba. Guevara further defined the policy oneptember, and finally. Foreign Minister Raul Roa officially delineated the new policy at the United Nations General Assembly oneptember.

The new Cuban policy emphasizes sovereignty and neutrality with respect to the capitalist and Communist blocs; and solidarity with the "underdeveloped nations" of Asia and Africa. Cuban officials have particularly emphasized the "third position". Guevara firmly states that he is not aand that he believes Cuba does notommunist system "at this moment". Roa has called capitalism and Communism "twin evils". Yet in practice. Cuban "neutralism" is usedeans of attacking the United States to the benefit of international Communism. Moreover, it is apparent that foreign policy, as carried on by the Foreign Ministry, is supplemented at all levels by government-approved activities designed to circumvent foreign governments by appealing directly to certain groups who are opposed, or potentially opposed, to their governments. Thus the Cuban government, largely through "Che" Guevara, ia known to have provided training, supplies, advice, and propaganda support togroups seeking to overthrow the governments of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and certain other Latin American countries. Communist or pro-Communist groups have been particularly favored. of youth and student organizations, labor organizations, and other groups in foreign countries are given subsidized trips


to Cuba where they are subjected to propaganda and indoctrination. Cuban diplomatic officials, as well as non-governmentalare used to facilitate organizational activities abroad. For example, Cuban Ambassador Rene Rayncri Parla in El Salvador has been actively involved in Salvadoran labor and student affairs, and reportedly supplied Cuban funds to help the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Salvadoran Laborongress to which other Central American leaders would be invited. In another instance, the Guatemalanspecifically accused the Cuban Ambassador, in conjunction with other high Cuban officials, of complicity in an oppositionist plot against the government. Inhe Venezuelan government rejected Cuban Ambassador Pividals' efforts to have Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara visit Venezuela.

As part of its unofficial foreign policy, and to promote "unity from below" the Cuban government has encouraged and subsidized Cuban participation in Communist-front congresses, such as the World Youth Festival in Vienna (attendedubans) and the Communist-organized Latin American Women's Congress in Santiago de Chile. It has encouraged the holding in Cuba of international meetings, oftenommunist-front character, and the participation of foreign "observers" (including Soviet representatives) at Cuban meetings, such as the congress of the Cuban Confederation of Labor. On occasion. Cuban officials use such meetings as platforms for the exposition of Communist-lino views on foreign affairs. Thus Antonio Nunez Jimenez, Communist Director of the Agrarian Reform Institute, used the "Inter-American Radio Announcers' Congress" in Havanaorum for attacking the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.

The decision of the Cuban government to organize aof underdeveloped nations" in Havana in0 is one facet of the new foreign policy. It is apparent that theparties in the various Latin American countries, through

the research undertaker, and the non-Communist support acquired in preparation for the "peoples'ill be prepared to offer arguments in favor of various "anti-imperialist" or "anti-colonial" views or to levy demands on the "imperialist" or "colonialist" powers. It is probable that the Communist parties in Asia and Africa, through their fronts, will also seek to encourage official participation in the congress and to influence thender the conditions existing in Cuba, the congress, if held, will certainly be usedorum for the presentation of demagogic appeals and denunciations based, in all probability, on the preparatory work done by the Communist parties. It is even more certain that the activities of the congress, regardless of the truewill be propagandizedictory for the unity of "hungry nations" against imperialist and colonialist oppressors. This will be possible through the controlled Cuban press, now almost completely at the service of the Castro government, and the Communist-dominated Prensa Latina, which now has working agreemonts with TASS, the New China News Agency, and various 5ateUite or Communist-infiltrated agencies in other parts of the world.

As with the "peoples't is probable that the Communists wish to avoid direct participation of known party members in the "underdeveloped nations conference". Raul Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister, bas been closely associated with Communists and Soviet agents, but is not believed toommunist Party member orympathizer. Eugenio Soler Alonso, new Cuban Ambassador to India who ia visiting the Middle and Far East to seek Asian support for tha congress, was well knownuban Communist Party member3 Heolumn in Hoy, the CP newspaper,nd has been Cuban correspondent of the Daily Worker, the organ of the CP of the United States. Asowever, he was referred to in Hoy as an "expelled"Party meniber who had joined the Autentico Party of

President Prio. As is the esse with many "expelled" or "former" Communists, it is not known whether he has, in fact, broken with the Party, or whether hsrypto-Comrounist who has been assigned, in the words of Liu Shao-

to "gain power in the organizations and institutions in which he works for as long as necessary, without revealing his party affiliation. "

6. Conclusion

In review, it is evident that after the increasingand popular support enjoyed by Fidel Castroinhe Communists decided to takethe movement's democratic nature and the youth and political

inexperience of Its leaders. With the aid of Raul CastroGuevara, they infiltrated the guerrills forces andcontrol over the political indoctrination andin the armed forces. They then put theirexperience to work in the Agrarian Reformconcepts supplied by the Chineseeans ofCastroolicy of aid to individual peasantthe organization of large-scale "cooperatives" controlledofficials. Next, in the field of foreign relations,sought to inspire or control government policy. Covertly,

Cuban Communist Party leaders have conferred with foreign Communist leaders, including those of the USSR and China, and have drawn up plans and undertaken studies for execution by the CaBtro government. Overtly, Communist sympathizers in the government have encouraged participation in Communist-front congresses and have aided foreign groups in opposition to the established governments in Latin America. Finally, on the official diplomatic level, Communists have apparently provided the inspiration for an attempt to develop unity among thenations, uaing "anti-imperialism" and "anti-colonialism"asis for common sction, while claiming that such unity will promote neutralism and independence.


such neutralism and independence is regarded by Communists onlytep toward international Communist domination is evidenced in the words of the Cuban Communist Party program, which are paralleled in Communist party programs throughout the world. The ultimate goal is that of leading Cuba to "Socialism" under the guidance of theParty, which signifies the incorporation of Cuba into the "Socialist Bloc" headed by the USSR and China and controlled by the international Communist party apparatus.

Original document.

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