SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Created: 9/18/1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AOBMCI

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It occurred to meumber of points were lefts^pm^^jpf^Qentr.ar on Sino-Sovietof vhlch vera impliedrecent briefing and mostfuxi)

of vhlch point toward tne Feasibility of even greater tensions in this complex relationship. Emphasis on the fact that there will notundamental split ia of course most necessary, particularly if anyone cherishes tho illusion that the over-all security danger to tho US night magically bo diminished by some convenient revolution or internal schismrand scale. But thisit like saying there vill bo no revolution ln tho USSRit ls true, but it can behould say has been) misleading by implying that nothing shortrnmatlo revolutionsplit" can have real significance for the policymaker.

. With even more than the customary apologias forthe interjection of random thought, and tho brevity of my exposure to recent material on thehould lite to

DAK DIE?BtO

outline (I) certain broad lines of probablo dovelopmont in each powor that Mere left out of yesterday's dlsoussion and theof which for the Sino-Soviet relationship were therefore(II) certain reflections on the nature of the relationship, and (III) an estimative conclusion for the next five years.

I

Soviet NSP 1ft the twenties

J. Basically, Commmist China iaeriod of rapid--probably convulsiveeconomic development and transformation. Exactly how thoy do it is not eo ia, extant for our purposes, sa is the fact that China's accumulated national grievances and exaggerated sense of prosent historical importance, together with the blunt dictates of realistic economic self-interest and the apparent resolve of her present rulersall point to the fact that China will sustain aa nucharrison atmosphere, as much Intense alnost masochistic fanaticism as the traffic will bear. If they stop for breath oncehileas they hove apparently done at the present (or ore they Indeed sustaining their noraantua by activating the borJer aituation again;we should at any rate not look for any real abatement of the pace. Since their ecoconic problcas axe even greater than were Aussie's, it does notist they will allow

(even should there be increased trade possibilities with the outside vorld). Despite what the Russians have said, they never really tried anything like the people's communeseven under the extreme press cf "Wax Communism" during the Civil Uar. Hor were thoy able to achieve basic colioctlviiation at anything like the pace of Communist China ln its earlier "leap."

lu In view of China's ambitious and grandiose efforts to pull themselves up by their ownonder if we should not allowreater range ncertainty io estimating not only the dimensions of their future acconplishraunt, but the nature of their economic andeolontlflc. emphases. Particularly ln saienae and technologywhere the Chinese have an old if dormant tradition, and where their work in Russian universities appears consistently to amaze their mare advanced mentorsIt seems possible that China may be capable of more dramatic breakthroutfis than our current eatlmatea allow. Dramatic scientific advance ln certain seleoted areas would be within the range of possibility as far aa personnel is concerned. With proper concentration of technological effort,

would

soat oonatruction might be possible which/yield greater prestige and dramatie impact results at less cost to theoconccy than broad

plans requiring furthor/hrrangoment of thd economyational

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Juat aa tbe USSR's development bas taxed our precooceptlona differently motivated systems could accomplish, it seems to me that we shouldittle more heavily in tho Implied direction

namelyew dramatic technological hud developments nay be forthcoming before long, and that an atomic capability may Indeed arise within five years. At the very least, wo should oak ourselves and cur competent scientific estimators if It might not be technically feasible for China to workattern of technological development that vould abort-cut several of the stages of development that took place in the process of technological evolution in the West or even the USSR. It seems to mo that the business of blast furnaces in theLbock yard may be only the firsteries of dramatic experiments at new patterns of florid technological experimentation; and that they may well at least try to move directly and rapidly toverd one or more of the major new modern sinews of war: rockots, atomic weapons,ore rapidly than analogies with our own or even Russian development vculd suggest.

6. Whatever tbo prospects for dramatic new economic or technological advances may be in China, tba atmosphere of fanatlclem, xenophobia, extravagant pronouncomonts and rituals,ertain lack of realism will probably be increasingly fecir features of the Chinese landscape.

uhother or nob Internald vloloncc develop ln China ln

tho iralce of this forced Indus trial! ^ntlon and centralization, over-all

domestic te.ision will alooot certainly Increase ond tho need for

on alnosphore of mythical Infallibility end st la; la tod xenophobia

seaa likely to increase.

7* Dy contrast, the atmosphere in Russia appears to be moving aliaoot as inexorably twardo the Gratification ofd increasingly realizablo concessions to consumer demandselaxation of tension." It natters relatively littlo that

tho party in general and IJirushciiev in particular are trying periodically

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to gerieratc/idcologicel enthusianua for reuote coalsroturn to lcniiioist i'.oma of party life, overtaking America, pushing on to Conrxiiiicia, etc, IStcopt for the rapidly anachronistic toughs ouch ao! Cualov (significantly ccugh choaen to load the delegation to China) no one appears willing (let aloae able) to underscore ldoolccy with blood ond tears, without which real sweat ls unlikely to be forthcoming. Ideolectcol pronouncements haveynthetic tjuallty in the woke of the increasingly coarse level of Khrushchev'n language and reasoilng and the admission of fallibility. It oeecs not ur.reaoor.Gble totbat tho vaunted "Ideological unity" which la allcccd to link them in some unshakable (but taiite unexplainable) way, may oonfiiie Itoclf to increasingly ritual statements of ultimate belief rather than coordinated cocoon programs ef action.

seena to mo that as far as tbe Chinese araideology, the papacy hoa moved to Avignon. Ibcy are laof development vhlchyth of infallibility; andnot, moreover, fool thcnselveB lnpllcated ln past Sovietocaaolonalend lnoraasingly Infrequentexercisesto specifically Soviet formulations ere probably onlyof the Sovlots continued ability to call the tu.wwish to pressure the Chinese to do so. lha fact thattrill be eblo to extort this kind of ideological obedience

for 3one yearscasuro of their superior power doea not neon that they ore recognized to possess very aich. If any, genuine moral or ideological hold over the Chinese. 'iho Chinese retrcnchcient oa corxjunco can be more convincingly explained by their am second thoughts on economic grounds than by editorials in Pravda or even secret Soviet pressure.

I feel strongly that tho alleged ccoaonbetween the two is already of ulnar importance ln theis Likely to become increasingly ao. ihe general popular front

and relocation of tensions line (including such possible developments ao freezing of atomic testa) are all vary much in the Soviet interest and relatively little ln the Chinese.

10. In General It appears probable that the frustrations and aggravations of the Chinese willcre serious Irritant in the relationship than tho apprehe.isioas of the Soviets, nonetheless. If one accepts the probability that the Increasing pragmatism ofpeeches and policies is to sane oxtcnt on irreversible trend in the USSR, Itatter of logic that they trill be Increasingly concerned with the amiiiently practical conccmo any great stato fools overapid growth ln strength and self-confidenceany contiguous power with uhlch one has no well-established trcdltlon of friendohip. While It nay be true (as said at the oenlnar) that tho .AiGsiona ore not as cor.ccrr.cd os scno 'Western observers would have then with the denographic ccrloslon and Insular arrogance of their Chioese allies, the Implication that they ore not really concerned flics ln the face of tho anticipatory appreciation of chejgos ln "the balance of fcrccs" uhlch is instinctive in seasoned Cotrainlst leaders. Soviet leaders when asked if they arc apprehensive about China consistently reply that "thisourgeois way of looking at things, there is enough room for everyone, etc." Ac answer appears to core I'm. men who would lihe to bcllevo this, but uho hevo their more trordly doubts. It has the flavor of appealingomforting ideological hope rather thanonfidant belief about the future.

"bile playing tuo sides of tho street simultaneously (ao ln, say, tho lodla-Chincoe border <ruestlon) may offer occasional incidental advantages to both thena Communist China, thio cannot be the preferred way of doiig thinesarticularly for the Chinese uhoec claims oro beingar greater measure of tacit understanding exists ln the relationship than eeefcc to bo the ease.

It is perhaps worth underscoring tho total lack of warmth that characterizes the Cine-'Soviet relationshipapparently at all levels. Ihe self-imposed (end gladly accepted) isolation of Chinese students in ftuosian point,bservation obcut the correctness and evident lack of warmth of Slno-Sovlet cultural end diplomatic contacts in Peking* It may not bo Irrelevant to recall that, historically, the .Russians ucrc perhaps the cost vigorous of all iuropcen proponents ofellow peril" ln the late nineteenth and ocrly twentieth centuries possibly because of their own extrcno diocau?iture at boingootern" by mnny 'cetera Europe-enaound many thinking .Missions unusually sensitive about last cuuer). 'hatcver Lenin nay hove sold

HMD

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about the colonial peoples (and It vas core paranthotlcal than la usuallyheir poso of fraternal benefactor to Chinaelatively recent, unfamiliar, and probably rather ai/tarard postureeople whose popular couboys-and-lndlans type folklore is built around throwingrevious Asian conquoror, and whose frequently used term for tho Chinese, kltcohkl, lo perhaps even ttoro disrespectful than the Engliah "chink."

13. Froa the Chiacoo aide, although little is known of their reel attitudes, their general coolness to "uasiens has been manIfcot, and they probably tend to lump all Duropeano together in their thinking spooking openly, for instance, and with curious lack of differentiation of the need to overtake first the IK, then the USSR, finally the US, atter what the size of Soviet aid or bow "fraternal" the Soviet external posture may be, Chinese official sensitivity and testlncss appears to be such tactew slights and say the otatuo of Cuter Mongolia would be enough to ranlilo very deeply with the Chinese. If the cntinato is correct that Soviet pressure to be effective uast involve retiindcra of Chinese dependence on3 for economic and technolcglcal aid, any such pressure will tlaoet certainly be viewed, at least in part, by the Chinese ln tho classical context of inpcriol pressures. luus the Soviets will ln effect bo continually faced with the choice between losing their leverage over China or increasing chincae resentment while exercizing it*

W. More directly relevant la the absence of any apparent present boois for friendly interparty understandings or coordination on anythinc more than broad agreement on cannon enenlc3 and the General desirabilityoxxunint acciety. Again, the hiotoricol recordell-documented record of post quarrels between tbe Chinese Cocruaists and their distent Soviet supporters, "bile all discussionorc recent internal Chinese party uattera Is conducted io theennan feels that there OBI tho ooat bitter negotiation over the initial old agreements when he was ambassador ln Itoocov earlyhink tho contention can bo mode that the only najor Chiecu elite purge since coming to power was at least partically designedarning to theor at least would be so Interpreted by the Soviet leaders), 'tho ao i'ong purge of5onductedime when Soviet policy wastate of considerable uncertainty on cottore deeply affecting the Chinese (such aa allocations to heavy Industry) ucs directed against the one man in the Chinese leadership who hod not made the "long march" and hod independent negotiations with iloocow (in the sumcr ofas the ruler of I'anchuric, then the only part of China under firm Ccarainiot control, and perhaps the only port which Stalin really cored about), 'tether or not ICao Kane'3 alleged rcgionclist views containod in fact any special favoritism to UmOCVj this wa3 a

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Chinese

good uny of telling I'osccu (end Indeed/Communist subordinates)ecognizable lannucgo that no potential channels of communication with China except those going direct to "Poking would boie opinion of OCI analysts that the recently dlsDissed military leaders were nore pro-Rovfet than their ouccassors wouldif Justifiedindicato that the Chins so ore further fortifying their monolithic front for hard boxgniniug with their Soviet allies as well co poasiblo hard policies toward tholr enomles.)

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15. Although ootimctcs cennot bo excessively labyrinth!ft in their search for evidence, it sccus to neonsideration should be given not only to probablo differencesoof interest in areas of caxan involvement, but the ways in which gestures to third parties by the two allies any bo subtle neons of ca-rajalcation. Inducement, and even xramlng to each other, recessive Chinese ccsttgatioa of Yugoslavia lest year alnost certainly contained iiiplied warnings to the UBBH itself (which could not be endo openly)soft" policy detrimental to China. Soviet moves to conciliate and aid Indiaincluding the recont unprecedented "neutrel" statement on the Sino-Inulnn border disputeprobably havo,artial (perhaps only partially conscious) motivatingesire (a) to open up other avenues of direct ccminication Into the fluid Asian picture than exclusive relianceklng would

afford, end (h) to reestablish the posoibllltlee for penetration end Influence ln this mora traditional mid clcoot equally populous area of Hussion interest,

16. In short, civen no dracatio chances in the political leodcrohip of cither power or In the General lnternatlcnnl situation, it occrao fair toontinuing acceleration of tension innc-Soviet alliance for throe fundooontel end interrelated rcaoons:

the radically divorr.ent patterns of projected econoaic and social development that booms likely to prevail for the next decade: aa increasingly automated economy subject to Greater local and consumer pressure the cne hand,ighly centralized manual economy mobilized for the frantic buildinc of sinews of industry;

the attendant popular attitudes in the tiro countries, whichnlxiost certainly give an incrccslncly different content to the prevailing policy expanses oTo countries: creeping pragwitisti vs. semi-eytholcgical idcologlccl fanaticl3_i>

the related tendency to look to different paths for future foreicn policy Gains: on the oneontinued attest

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primarily to soften and dlvido the oppoeitlcn while opening up new arcojs for more gradual and long-tons popular front gains: on theeed totill-sensitive national privc bynique role for China ln Asia through more traditional and brutal methods of subversion, intimidation, end

utilization of overseas Chinese and IncldenMst claims,

17* Although strenuous efforts will continue to be made toaacdo of ideological unity (which may even Include agreed programs to frighten theheee will be unlikely seriously to arrest this trend unless dramatic new foreign policy gains (or losses) were to open up in the Slno-Soviet caqp. On balance, the odds sects better than even that thorelation ship, uollo remaining an alliance In ocec fees for years to cooo will (a) coco to differ In degree roth or then in kind from their relations with other states, withaning cohesive force, common enemies aoe? abiding one, and (b) bo sufficiently delicate in form ond complex lo nature that the possibility of external Influence having on effect on It ln some instances can not be aa confidently excluded as in the paat.

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