PART 1 OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST - EAST -WEST RELATIONS

Created: 3/3/1960

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

F IMMEDIATE INTEREST

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

ambiguouson Germany and Berlin in his Djakarta press conference onebruary did not ln fact modify his previous statements on these subjects,which have carefully avoided directlya threat toeparate treaty with the outcome of the summit meeting in May. Hisambiguity wasdesigned to elicit thepress speculation that Soviet action is dependent on theresults. Moscow's strong reaction to reports that the United States would resume flights in the Berlin air corridors0 feet suggests that the Soviet leaders view this as, an opportunity 'to test Western unity in the pre-summit period and, if possible, inject the East Germans into technicalon flight procedures.

The confusion in press accounts of Khrushchev'sarose from the fact that his reference to the USSR'sentlon toeparatereaty occurred at the end of assage which openedeference to the forthcoming summit talks. Soviet leaders frequently resort to this device of calculated ambiguity when they wish to create an impression abroad that some drastic unilateral action is imminent without actually committing the USSR to take such action. Thiswas employed effectively during the Suez6 and the Syrian crisis"6

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In contrast to suchwarfare maneuvers toense of urgency in the West regarding theofailure of the summit meeting, other statements by the Soviet premier in Indonesia reaffirmed his Interest ln maintaining personal contacts with Western leaders. His joint statement withSukarno noted that the May conference would be the firsteries of such meetings. He told his press conference that although one meeting could not deal with all the issues under dispute, the May session wouldood start."

said he was not optima's tie over the prospects of achieving any "practical results" onor the German question at the summit.meeting in Ma

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jlamed Adenauer Cor rorermg an "unaccommodating" position on the West, but he added that he had not given up his effort to reach an

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USSR's onlyevont of an Impasse on the German and Berlin problems would be toeparate peace treaty.

Soviet spokesmen have attempted to soften these public andremarks by implying that unilateral action would not necessarily mean an abrupt end

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IMMEDIATE INTEREST Date-

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to the present situation or produce an acute crisis for the West.

reflected In

an oincrar TASS statement onebruary which seized on the announcement of the. West German and Spanish military talks to allege that Bonn's policies "Involuntarily bring to mind the military alliance of Hitler and Franco."that the Soviet Government has constantly warned about the "sinister danger of Germanhe statementby declaring that this collusion with Spain, aimed at obstructing an East-West "again underlines the urgent needeacewith Germany."

nical discussions on flight procedures with East German participation. Hoscow will probably attempt to increase pressure for negotiations, as it didy hinting that possible "incidents" might result. On the flights in the springs were harassed by Soviet

The impasse over the new passes for the Allied Military Liaison Missions accredited to the Soviet forces- in East Germany continues. The Soviet Union has not yet replied to the Western protest notesto the Soviet commander in East Germany onebruary, which contended that the passes violated7 agreement setting up the missions.

prompt andto press reportsUnited States willIn the Berlineetthat the Sovietthis as an opportunityWestern unity in theperiod and, if possible,the East Germanstechnical discussion on

Privately, however, the Soviet officials have continued to minimize the problem, that the passes are normal administrative action and do not constitute recognition of East Germany. Soviet mission officials in Frankfurt took this approach with American army officers. They asserted that the passes are really not new but merelyistorical fact.

warning by oviet spokesman in East Berlin that . flights0 feet, in the absence of an agreement with both the USSR'and'East Germany, would be regardedunilateral violation of East German air sovereignty" and existing four-power agreements probably is aimed at inducing the Western powers to postpone such flights and agree to tech-

New officers assigned to the Soviet mission in Baden-Baden indicated that they planned to be in Westong time, suggesting that they do not anticipate that the missions will be withdrawn soon. This pose, however, may have been intended to suggest Soviet confidence that thereaction to the new passes is temporary.

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Original document.

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