Created: 1/28/1960

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apparentlytoeductiontroops in Easternhis next move to setfor his forthcomingAsia and France and for h

German ambassacloronTsjanuaryrecent Soviet decision toctrx conventional forces by one third would be followed by "proportionate" reductions in Soviet troops stationed lnHungary, and East Germany. He added that the USSR wasto withdraw all of its forces from these areas if the West accepted the Sovietplan.

Khrushchev probably believes these moves will give further momentum to his disarmament plan and strengthen his hand at the summit, particularly in pressing for reciprocalof Western forces lnand Berlin. Last Decemberpeech in Budapestdwelt at length on the "utmost absurdity" which could develop If the West agreed to his disarmament plan and at the same time insisted on retaining forces ln West Berlin. He as-serted that "continuation of the' occupation regime completely contradicts the idea of."

East German party chief Ulbrlcht ls already bringing pressure on Bonn to follow the Soviet lead andisarmament Initiative" ln In hisanuary letter to Chancellor Adenauer, Ulbrlcht

warned that If Bonn did not cease its atomic arming andban on armamentshortast Germany would beto request its allies to place rocket weapons at its Ulbrlchteferendum ln Germany to determine the popular attitude on complete disarmament and the conclusioneace treaty and alsothat the two German states agree on ceilings for their forces and on the "stationing offorces" ln Germany.

Moscowimilar pattern ln exploiting previous reductions6hose moves were given heavy publicity and were accompanied by appeals to Western governments and parliaments to follow the Soviet example. The Supreme Soviet's resolutionppealing to theof all nations to take "practical steps" on disarmament to "create an atmosphere ofand facilitate theof forthcomings almost Identical toesolution whichthe announcement8an reduction, Including withdrawals0 troops from0 from Hungary.

Khrushchev can also beto follow up hisof troop reductions ln the satellitesenewed effort to press previous proposalsuolear-free zone In Central Europe and reductions of foreign forces In Germany and other European countries.

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China officially endorsed tbe Soviet decision but strongly implied that It.will make no comparable gesture. Foreign Minister Chen Yl sought to justify this positionpeech onanuary by charging that the "peace" posture of the United States Iscover for Its policy of aggression and war." Be claimed, however, that Peiping's sincerity inpeace and disarmament" has been repeatedly shown by its past armament reductions.

Chen Yl also warned that Peiping would not regard asany disarmament agreement "arrived at without the formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic and theof its delegate."

Germany and Berlin

Khrushchev reaffirmed theroposals on Berlinerman peace treaty and underlined his recent public warnings that the USSR wouldeparate peaceithflrioas^consideTat^^ were tlven to the Soviet proposals.

would Insist on discussingGerman peace treaty and Berlin at the summit but that he would be "content"emporaryon Berlin, provided thewas ended. Berojected linking the Berlin question with German unification.

Moscow's apparent Intention to stand firm on Its established positions on Berlin and Germany at the summit meeting was echoed

ln East German party leader'a recent Interview with an Italian paper. Be olalmed that "the positive results of the Geneva foreign ministers* conference will undoubtedly serveasis of discussion" at the summit conference. In his letter to Adenauer, Ulbrlcht emphasized that the creationfree city" ln West Berlin would be achieved sooner or later and renewed bis proposals to establish an all-German committee, based on equal representation, to "deliberate" tho preparationeace treaty and the reunification of Germany.

Soviet expectations ofperiod ofGermany and Berlin were/ j


and Ulbrlcht-hiveong-range strategy for gaining Western concessions. The Communistfeel that they can afford to be patient, believing that the West will eventually grow tired of the Berlin problem.

In the interim, however, physical and propaganda pressure reportedly will be maintained against West Berlin to keep the cityrP.SL "uncertain susponse.1'

negotiations, Khrushchevstated, ln referring to the Berlin problem, that "not one but several meetings of heads of government will be needed? in order to solve "those questions which now are ripe forand which need to be settled step by step."





aim in passingemorandum to theand Berlin Mayor Brandt is probably to bring pressure on the party to take more decisive action ln challenging Adenauer's recent assertions that the Western proposal at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference for an Interim Berlin solution should not bo the West'spoint at the summit. Moscow may also be seeking to create difficulties between party leaders and Mayor Brandt, who hasosition similar to Adenauer's in contrast to the more flexible official party attitude toward the negotiations at Geneva.

people the right of

In the courseisit to Romeanuary, Adenauer may have been less successful than he had hoped in obtaining from theirmtojuo^^

The Soviet premier has boon angling for an invitation to visit West Germany since hisctober letter to Adenauer, but Bonn has not responded.isit, probably coupled with attopover la East Germany, would serve to accentuate the Sovietthat two German statesolitical reality which should be accepted by the Wost.

Western Attitudes

Chancellor Adenauer's re- ly ofanuary to Khrushchev's! letter ofctober was bluntly worded, in the hope of ending the exchange. Adenauer believes further correspondence affords Khrushchev an effective means of exerting pressure on Boon in the pre-summit period. The chancellor raised no new issues and referred to previous letters in refuting certain charges. He noted that tho Berlin question would be settled as soon as Khrushchev permlttod tho German




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