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SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
GENERAL AIR DEFENSE
ORGANIZATION OF AIR
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
Early Warning and Ground Controlled Intercept Radar
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES .
Logistic Support and
Civil Defense in the European
Civil Defense in Communist China and thc Asian Satellites .
CAPABILITIES OF THE PRESENT SOVIET AIR DEFENSE
Against Other Delivery
SINO-SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH
To estimate the scale and nature of the Sino-Soviet Bloc air defense system, and probable trends in its capabilities through
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Air Defense Policy
he Soviet leaders recognize that an effective air defense system is anelement of the strong military posture which they wish to maintain, both toto the security of the Bloc and to support their foreign policies. The scale of effort presently being applied to the continuing improvement andof the Soviet air defense system is indicative of the high priority assigned to this mission.
he air defenses of the Sino-Soviet Bloc arc designed prirnarily to provide defense in depth for major population, industrial, and military centers,those in the USSR They alsoa barrier around much of the Bloc's periphery. In order to attain maximum effectiveness, all Soviet forces deployed for the atr defense of the USSR arc under the operaUonal controlingle major command. In addiUon to forces directly assigned, other Soviet forces which can
contribute to thc air defense mission are also operaUonally available to thisSimilarly, the air defense forces of other Bloc nations are closelywith the Soviet system.
Recent Developmentshe Soviet air defense system isa major transition which isImproving its capabilities against medium and high alUtude air attack. The principal aspects of this transition are: (a) the rapid installation of surface-to-air missile sites, and (b) thedeployment of an air defensesystem with semiautomatic features. Other significant recent developmentsthe advent of radars with better detection and hdght-nriding capabilities, the introduction of limited numbers of improved interceptors, the estimated in-troducUon of nuclear warheads intomissiles, and the probableof more advanced electronic gear and armament into interceptors.
hc USSR has been acquiringajorecond generation surface-to-air missile systemesigned for defense against aircraft at medium and high altitudes.ites, each with six launchers, have been identified at twoin East Germany, at muscow, miu at many olher locations in thc USSR, most of them in the western part of the country. Defenses of various densities are apparently programmed for major Soviet cities and other key targets, and possibly for certain border areas.the length of time the program has probably been underway, the relative ease with which sites can be installed, and the observed patterns of deployment, we estimate thatites are now in operational status or beingat nearlyoviet urban areas as well as at other targets.
The new air defense control system is now widely deployed in the western USSR and will probably becomethroughout thc country and in Eastern Europe within thc next few years. This system, which provides high-speed communicationsigh degree of reliability and semiautomatic control of interceptors, should overcome most of the deficiencies of the earlier manual system. It willarked effect in reducing reaction time and vulnerability toincreasing information handling capacity, and improving coordination within the air defense system.
loc air defense needs arc served by large quantities of other0 antiaircraft guns and0 Jet fighters. The USSR itself has0 of these fighters, of whichave air defense as
their primary mission. Some Soviet fighters arc probably now equipped with air-to-air missiles. Onlyf the Soviet fighters are all-weather or limited all-weather types, however.adar sitesirtually continuous early warning network aroundoc's periphery and overlapping coverage in many interior areas.
defense weapons andmost heavily concentrated inof the USSR westinethe Kola Peninsula to thein East Germany, Poland,and ln the southernof the Soviet Far East.are found at some specificthese areas, especially in thcin eastern China. The approacheswithighters,guns, are by far the mostarea of the Bloc.
present capabilities of thedefense system would bepenetrations by subsonicdaylight and clear weathernduch conditions, virtually allBloc air defense weapons couldto bear against attackingFighters would retain someat altitudes in excess ofbut the capabiliUes of thewould be reducedperiods of darkness or poorIn the increasinglydefended by surface-to-airdefense capabilities would beby weather conditions andto at0 feet in altitude.
the improvements in thedefense system, it still has basicin copingophisticatedAt altitudes below aboutthe capabilities of the systemprogressively reduced; belowfeet, the system would lose mosteffectiveness. Against variedtacUcs utilizing alUlude stacking,maneuvers, standoffand electronicdefense capabilities wouldn addition, thedefense problem would beby the variety of deliverymight be employed,missiles, fighter-bombers,bombers.
Soviet planners must recognize that the great destructive power of nuclear weapons requires that the defense achieve the closest possible approximationomplete denial of access to vital targets. They will expect manned bombers toa major element of Uie West'sfor nuclear attack over the next five years, but their air defense problems will be complicated by the increasing numbers of Western ballistic missiles.
To meet the manned bomber threat, the Soviet leaders contemplate heavilyreliance on missiles for airTheir comprehensive defensecombining fighters and surface-to-air missiles, is probably designed tomaximum opportunity for successive attacks on penetrating delivery vehicles from the Soviet borders to critical target areas in thc interior. Judging by recentasic program forefenses,ites deployed at
locations includingtargets in the USSR, couldbe completed by the fallore extensive programites and field force units could probably be completed some time
In order to reduce their currentui iuw ievelc Soviets probably have under development asystem designed to engage targets at very low altitudes.ystem could become operational inlthough an initial operational capability1 would be more likely. It could probably be widely deployedupplement to existing defenses2s the period advances, Uie USSR will probably strive also to increase its capabilities against advanced bombers and cruise-type missiles.
Early warning ranges and reaction times will continue to permit defense forces to be brought to bear againstdelivery vehicles. For defense of targets on the periphery of Uie Bloc against supersonic Western aircraft and cruise-type missiles, however, warning times will be marginal for Uie effective employment of fighter interceptors. Warning requirements for surface-to-air missiles will probably not be so stringent. As improved communications and control equipment becomes more widespread, the saturation point of thc air defense system will be considerably raised.
Future Soviet Air Defense Capabilities
believe that thc Soviets willto improve the overall capabilitylarge and complex air defenseDespite theseSoviets probably will still notthis timeigh degree of
in dealingarge-scale sophisticated attack by manned bombers armed with high-yield nuclear weapons. They would probably expect toignificant number of the attackers, but, given the increasing complexity of the air defense problem, we doubt they will be confident of the extent to which they could reduce the weight of any given attack.
in the early part ofthe Soviets will almostno defense against ballistica high priority effort toa defense probably iseriod the Sovietsa defense system ofagainst ICBMs and othermissiles. But, barring antechnological breakthrough, wethat the USSR's air defensedeficiencies, and uncertaintiestoward the end of the periodmissilesargerof the West's total nuclear
USSR has developedwarheads suitable for airand we believe that some ofmissiles are probablysuch warheads. In the absencenuclear testing, progress inlow-yield category, suitable formissiles, would be seriouslyThe lack of nuclear testinghandicap, but notuclear-armed
Olher Bloc Nations
air defense forces of thenations will remain inferior totlie USSR. They will bethe transfer of fighters andguns from Soviet stocks,production of such equipment,provision oi up-to-uate rajarequipment. Theprobably supply surface-to-airtn at least limited numbers tonations after priority Soviethave been met. There aretbat East German andfighter forces may nowmissiles.
defense preparations inarc supervisedentralstaff representatives at regionallevels. Some civil defenseand indoctrination has beena majority of the urbanwc believe that some selectas workers in key factories andhave probably received morotraining. Subways andwhich presenUy couldperhapsmillion persons,some protection againstbunkers and tunnel-typebeen constructed formillion key personnel. The civilprograms of the Europeanpatterned after that of theprograms of Communist ChinaAsian Satelliles arc much less
AIR DEFENSE POLICY
hc Soviet leaders consider that thecr the USSR rests primarily on the overall relation of forces in the world; moreover, they consider lhat their political, economic, and military posture in tills relationship has grown greatly In recent years, and Is destined to still greater strength in the years ahead As one key element In this,overall posture,of Improved air defense not onlyto greater general security, but alsoasis for freer politicalIncluding supporttronger Soviet stand in moments ofreducing theof enemy resort to arms.
Iu planning and programming their air defense, Soviet planners must assume forof national security that. In any of the likely situations under which war mighta substantial attacking force would reach the USSR. It is on this basis, we believe, that the Soviets have been concerned toigh level of air defense.
The scale of efiort presently being applied to the continuing Improvement andof the Soviel air defense system Isof the high priority assigned to this mission. The further development of tlieto cope more effectivelyanned bomber threat suggests that they expect to be concerned with this threat at least through the period of this estimate. We do not believe that the Soviets' developmentargeatlack capability with long rangewill lead them to conclude lhat they do not require an extensive air defense system. Consequently, we believe that they willtoigh priority to Its further buildup and Improvement. As the periodthc system will bc required to take on the wholly new role of antimissile defense in addition to defense against aerodynamic vehicles.
air defense mission will probablyIncreased expenditures. However,to the rapid growth in Sovietand tn theriority whichdefense mission will continue to enjoy,that economic considerations willthe substantial programs estimatedair delense.
ORGANIZATION OF AIR DEFENSE
In order to attain maximum effectiveness of air defense capabilities, all Soviet forcesfor air defense of the USSR are under the operational controlingle majorSome of these forces are assignedto this command. Other Soviet forces capable of contributing to the air defenseare also operationally available to this command for augmentation of its own forces. Bloc air defense forces are closely coordinated with the Soviet air defense system In order to provide greater defense in depth for keyadministrative, industrial, and military centers.
Thc organization primarily responsible for active air defense of the USSR is the Airof the Country (PVOhich combines ground, air, and naval elementsa headquarters which is administratively equal to those of the ground, air. and naval forces. The Commander-in-Chief of the PVO Strany is exeputy Minister ofand thc chief adviser lo the Minister and Chief of the General Staff on air defenseThe Headquarters of the PVO Strany in Moscow prepares overall plans and coordinates training and operaUons In air defense.
The chief components assigned to thc PVO Strany are the Air Observation, Reporting, and Communication (WOS) service, the Fighter Aviation of Air Defensend the AnUaircraft Artillery of Air Defensehe latter component including both antiaircraft guns and surface-to-air
control purposes, thc USSR Is dividedumber of air defense districts withcontrol athere are at least two major regional centers, one al Moscow and the other at Khabarovsk for the Far East. At present It Is estimated that the whole of the Sino-Soviet DIoc air defense system is divided Into aboutir defense districts, of whichre In thc USSR. As speeds and otherof offensive and defensive systemsthe Soviets may find it expedient to reduce the number of air defense districts and to divide them into fewer and larger sectors.
The air defense district headquarters is responsible for the coordination andcontrol of all forces in the district able to contribute to air defense. It ls alsofor Identification and filtering of tracks and passing air situation data toor Khabarovsk, to adjacent air defense districts, to subordinate sectors, and to other agencies within the district. The air defense district is dividedumber of sectors according to the size and importance of the district and thc density of air defense forces deployed wilhin It. In most cases, thc airsector control center is colocated with fighter division headquarters. The airsector, the basic operaUonal air defense unit, performs duties similar to those of the
'The Assistant Chief ol Staff for IntelUgence. Department ot lhe Army, believes that the Soviet air defense control system operates as Indicated In. but that the organisational structure Imp Hod docs not take doe account of the role played by Soviet major field commands. He beUeves that there ts no parallel and dupUcaUVe air defense command system superimposed on other commands.the integral air defense structures of most major Soviet field commands, uUUzlng special channels of communication, carry oul al) air defense responsibilities ascribed In this paper to "air defensen his view there ara but few organisational cxcepUons to the general case, such as the confirmed air defense districts at Moscow and Baku Other than tuch special cases, what are termed "air defense districts" In this paper are considered generally coextensive In area and authority with military districts In the USSR, groups of fore.tn East Oermany. and naUonal military establishments ot the Satellites.
air defense district, but within its more limited area.
Thc major fieldFleets, and Soviet Groups of Forces in thetheir own air defenseintended primarily for protection of the military forces and installations. The deputy commanders for air defense in these com-matiu's louniinate air defense activitiesthe appropriate PVO Strany headquarters and districts. Among their subordinate elementstationary and exclusively air defense role are certain AAA brigades and regiments deployed at key fixed targets, separate fixed AAA battalions employed for protection ofairfields, and Fleet AAA units defending naval bases. Fighters of Tactical and Naval Aviation augment the interceptors in the IA-PVO, in addition to their role of support to the ground and naval forces. Finally, all other AAA units assigned to ground forces field formations In the USSR probably also have channels of coordinaUon with thc PVO Strany.
The Eastern European Satellites.China, and North Korea have naUonal air defense systems modeled after that of the USSR and coordinated with It In an overall Bloc system. This Bloc system probably does not Include unified command or InlegraUon of forces, but there are established channels for communication of operational air defense information.
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT1 Surface-to-Air Missiles
major development in Soviet airover thc past few years has beendeployment of surface-to-airdefense of key target areas. Thehave operaUonal two types ofmissile systems. The first of thesebeen operaUonal for several years andaround Moscowense complex
'for detailed characteiuucs of Soviet air de-tense missiles see. "SovietIn Oulded Missiles and SpaceTOP SECR1CT) and the forthcomingS-flO.
lips arranged In two concentric rings. There areites on the inner ring at about. radius from the center of Moscow andites on the outer ring at about.ypical site hasaunch positions Joinedoad network.system at each siterack-while-scan radar (designatedby US intelligence) havingoverage in both thc vertical and horizontal planes. The system also incorporates fire controlwhich enables each site to engage as many asargets simultaneously. Thiswith the spacing of adjacent sites for mutual support and thc Inner ring of sites for backup, enables the system to direct an extremely high rate of fire against incoming targets.
issile, as originally designed for use with this system, ls unboostcd andingle liquid sustalner motor,Ils maximum speed is on tho order of, itow initial velocity which limits somewhat its engagement capability against supersonic targets. Its maximumrange will vary depending upon the approach and type of target; for example,irectly incoming, high-flyingits range would be on the order of. This missile can carry an HE or nuclear pay-loadounds and Its CEP isto0 feet. It is believed to be capable of Interceptionseet up0 feet, with some additional capability up to0 feet, particularly If equippeduclearBecause of Its cost. Immobility, and Inflexibility, we do not believe that theystem will be deployed elsewhere in theUnion. The missile employed ln It Is probably being replaced by the more advanced GUIDELINE missile described
Evidence acquired sincehe rapid and extensive deploymentew, mobile, more flexible surface-to-airsystemnd there are indications that It could have been operational as early The new system appears suitable for
the defense of both fixed targets and fieldypical site consists of six revetted launching positions deployed around asystem and linked by service roads to facilitate loading.
ites have been identified Instatus or under construction at Glau and Juterbog in East Germany, at Moscow, andany other tocatfons In themostly In the western part of the country, including Baku. Kharkov, Odessa, Lvov, Kiev, Rostov and Sverdlovsk. Deployment patterns and levels of concentration appear to varyto the geography, sixe, and shape of the target area, and the Soviet estimate of the worth of Individual targets. The sites in the Moscow area, located within tho Inner ring ofites, are probably Intended tothe existing defenses.
Mostites appear to defend major centers of population and industry. SA-2are also believed to exist for the special protection of nuclear materials production and storage facilities. In addition, there are indications that some key Soviet field forces and long range bomber bases are included In thceployment pattern. Finally,regarding the deploymenl of Sovietsuggests thatites may beIn Soviet border areas.
In retrospect, we believe that SA-2has been underwayide scale sincend lhat the USSR ls rapidlya major operational capability with this system. In estimating the current status of the program, we have considered the length of tune It has been underway, the relative ease with which sites can be emplaced and units activated, and the observed patterns ofThe construction of sites and the training and activation of firing units has been seasonal, with activityinimum during the winter months. Considering the various factors involved, wc estimate that at present nearlyoviet urban areas haveites deployed in their defense, and that, into thc Ii6ites around Moscow,ndividualites may already be operational or being emplaced.
missile employed in theystemarge, two-stage missile (nicknamed guideline) whicholid propellantnd,iquid sustainer motor. GUIDELINE'S present performance characteristics are better in some respects than those of theaximum intercept range will vary depending upon the approach and type of target; for example, against aincoming, high-flyingIts range would be on the order of. Maximum velocity is probably about Macharhead weight is estimated atounds and the CEP at maximum range is probablyeet. Maximum effective altitude is0 feet, with some capability up to0 feet, especially If employeduclear warhead. Use of the boosted guideline missile in theystem will improve that system's capabilities against high altitude and high speed targets and against targets with small radar cross-sections.
Theuidance systemire control radar (nicknamed FRUIT SET)urveillance radar (nicknamed SPOONhe system is probably similar to theuidance system in the employment of track-while-scan radar and radio link for transmission of missile commands. Each site appears capableegrees coverage. The system possibly can handle two targetsime, with more than one missile In the air against each target. However, these targets must be within the approximateradar look angle of the FRUIT SET radar.
The low altitude capability of theystem depends upon siting, distance fromand the receipt of warning in time to alert the system and to train the fire control radar. Under ideal conditions, it could be as low aseet against heavy and medium bombers. Under usual conditions, theow altitude capability would be considerably higher, and under unfavorable conditions It might be as higheet. Thc SA-2docs not appear to be specifically designed to cope with low-level attacks, but rather for defense against small numbers of penetrators at medium and high altitudes. Thc principal advantages of this system over thc Moscow
system lie In Its lower unit cost,and flexibility, although this flexibility is obtained at the expense of target handling capacity.
Soviets are probably equippingof their surface-to-air missileswarheads. In order tocapabilities against Westernchea direct "kill" of enemy nuclearbelieve that the USSR has developedfission warheads suitable for use inmissile systems. Three of thenuclear tests conductedonnected with thisIncluded devicesariety ofeconomical enough for air defensehave no evidence that nuclearavailable at existing surface-to-airbut this does not preclude theatimited capability.
There has been little change ln theof Bloc fighter forces over the past two years. The Soviet fighter force still consists primarily of day fighters: the obsolescent FAGOT, five versions of the subsonic FRESCO, and three versions of the transonic FARMER. Introduction of the FLASHLIGHT all-weather interceptor and of modified day fighters with limited all-weather"D" and "E" and FARMERproceededelatively alow pace.f the force still consists of gun-armed interceptors equipped with optical fire control systems, which are restricted to pursuitunder conditions of good visibility.all-weather fighters arc likewise limited lo pursuit attacks. There is good evidence that two new supersonic fighters are now being introduced into Soviet units.
Soviet jet fighters appear to have beenprimarily for the Interceptor role and therefore have good climb and altitudeThe older Bloc )et fighters, FAGOT and FRESCO, have combat ceilings on the order0 feet. Combat ceilings Of the newer types, including FARMER and FITTER, are on the order0 feel. At maximum
the PARMER is believed to be capable of climbing0 feetinutes, and the FITTERinutes. The speed,and climb capabilities ol the heavier FLASHLIGHT are believed to be somewhat lower than those of the currently operational day fighters.1
Soviet production of jet fighter aircraft hasharply over the past three years.0nnual production ranged fromo/ It is estimated to have declined toroduction difficulties with the newer models probably have played some part in this decline, but other, factors Include the high cost and complexity of modern fighter aircraft, the growing destructive power ofInterceptors, and especially theavailability and effectiveness ofmissile systems.
Airborne Intercept Radar. Theairborne Intercept radar, which has an estimated search range of.rack range ofs believed to be the most effective Soviet AI radar now in use. The FRESCO "D" and "E"earch capability ofjn.rack capability of. The FARMER "B" radarearch range of.rack range of. These estimated ranges are calculated forsize targets.
The gun armament of Soviet fighters has not kept pace with improvements in aircraft performance characteristics. Most Soviet fighters are still equipped witharge caliber guns having relatively low muzzle velocity and rate of fire. Only the FARMER "B" and "C" and the FITTER are believed to have revolver type guns. Older models are equipped with gun sights with manual range input, but more recent models employ sights with radar ranging. If the newer Sovietsuch as FARMER and FITTER are toatisfactory intercept and killthey will require air-to-air missile Most Soviet interceptors are believed
1 For detailed estimates of the performance characteristics of Soviet fighter aircraft, see Tablennex A.
capable of employing unguided rockets, guided missiles, or comoinaUon armiments.
Missiles. We have onlyregarding Soviet air-to-airbased largely on considerationsrequirements and capabiliUes andevidence is available, we estimateUSSR now has three short rangeir-to-air missile systemsemployment with day andeam rider missile,homing missile, and anradar homing missile. Thesearc believed to employ HEare some indications that one orthe foregoing types of missiles are nowwith Soviet Interceptors, and it isUiat they have been supplied to Uieand Chinese Communist Air Forces.
Early Warning and Ground Controlled Intercept Radar'
The Soviet early warning (EW) and ground controlled Intercept (GCI) systema very large number of radars deployed toery high duplication of coverage In many areas. Properly exploited, Uiehigh signal density would increase thc USSR's capability,amming environment, to maintain track of attacking Western
Early Warning Radars- Many types of radar are utilized for long range earlyin Uie Soviet Bloc. The most widely used are the TOKEN and KNIFE REST. However, sevenand radars have been developed from the basic TOKEN and are being widely deployed. Several of these sets have frequency diversity. The most effective of these ls BAR LOCK, which probably Is Intended to be Uie prime EW radar in Bloc air defensesnder average conditions, primary earlyradars now ln use can probably detect jet medium bombers penetrating at altitudes up to their combat ceilings at distances. from radar sites. Maximum altitude
* For detailed characteristics of Soviet BW and GCI radars see. Tablennex A.
capability for thc TOKEN, used in an EW role, is0 feet, and for other EW radars,o welleet.
GCI Radars. Because of its moderatelyheight-finding capability, TOKEN is also widely usedCI role. Much more accurate height-finding radars are employed at GCI sites In combination with theand radars. Theoretically, maximumcoverage of Soviet GCI radars couldup to0 feet with the TOKEN, and up to aneet with the BAB LOCK/STONE CAKE or CROSS OUT/ STONE CAKE combinations. Underconditions these theoretical maximums would not be attained. However, the height coverage capabilities of Soviet radars will probably not be the limiting factor in Soviet GCI capabilities during the period of this
In general, the low altitude effectiveness of Soviet early warning and GCI radars is limited, although some operational radars are nowto have moving target indicators. The development of high frequency ionospheric back-scatter radars which could be used for detection of ICBM launchings has been within Soviet capabilities for at least five years, and some such radars may now be in position.
he Soviets continue to employ largeof anti ilr craft guns for defense of field forces and fixed targets including airfields. Thc standard light, medium, and heavy AA guns are thendm. The obsoletem. andm. guns are rapidly being replaced In Soviet units, but are still found In considerable numbers in other Bloc AA units. Soviet field forces also have large numbers of automatic antiaircraft machine guns. For mobile defenses and low altitude coverage, them. gun offers athreat to low-level aircraft and to aircraft up0 feet. Under certain conditions,m. gun can deliver continuous pointed fife well0 feet. However,m. gun. the principal type nowin static defenses, declines rapidly in effectiveness against targets at altitudes above
eet or al speeds in excessarge percentage of these guns employ fire control radars. The use of proximity fuses, which are believed to be available, would further increase their capabilily.
Firt Control Radar. Thc WHIFFboth Soviet versions of the USremain the primary antiaircraft firer=dars. They both operate in thehave ranges considerably in excess ofwith wMch they are employed. Aset. FIRE WHEEL, isin increasing numbers.which was widely used as anradar, has now been replaced on mostKNIFE REST, and, In some cases, by aFLAT FACE. SPOON REST,issile system, may also beAA gun units as acquisition radar.
Olher Electronic Equipment
ano* Control.communications have beenthe last few years by the large-scaleof landllnes and microwaveIt Is believed that landllnes andmicrowave are the primary meansair defensehigh frequency radio still widelythe far north and other remote areas,(LF) and high frequencyto countermeasures andtheof passing air defense data.
Is as yet no Indication of the employment of ultrahigh frequency (UHF) systems for alr-to-alr and air-to-ground communications.
he most important advance in Soviet air defense communications over thc last few years has been the development and deploy-
ew air defense control system with some semiautomatic features, including data-handling equipment for rapid processing of air defense information and data-linkfor vectoring interceptors. This system, which is similar in concept to the US SAGE system, but less complex, is now believed to be widely deployed in the western USSR and will probably become operational throughout the USSR and Eastern Europe within the next few years. It is expected that data-handling equipment will increase the traffic capacity of each Soviet radar reporting site to at leastimultaneous tracks, and that, when the system is fully implemented, this couldracks. Fighter control centers in the system probably are designed to handlentercepts simultaneously, but we believe the present capability is lessy the end of the period of this estimate, tho full design capability of the system may be' realized. This system, which providescommunicationsigh degree of reliability and accurate semiautomaticof interceptors, should overcome most of the deficiencies of the present manual system. It willarked effect in reducingtime and vulnerability to saturation, Increasing Information handling capacity, and improving coordination within the Soviet air defense system.
lectronic Countermeasures. At present, the USSRapability for jammingbombing and navigational radars atup0 megacycles and possibly higher, and especially for jamming the lower frequencies normally used in Western long range radio communications. Shipboard and ground jamming equipment for useand blind bombing radar ls known to exist. In addition, some FRESCO "D" interceptors with large belly protrusions are believed to carryand spot noise jammer, but this equipment docs not seem to be widely used. The Soviets are known to have employeddeception, including simulation ofnavigational aids, against WesternThey are now producing magnetrons and travelling wave tubes suitable forIn the microwave frequencies, and re-
search in this field is continuing. They are also currently employing passive detection equipment believed capable of detectingfrom the very 'ow frequencies up into the microwave spectrum. Toward the end of the period of this estimate, the USSR willhave in operational use equipmentof jamming at frequencies from0 mc/s. Including all frequencies likely to bc employed by Westernradar, and navigation equipment.
Electronic Counter-Countermeasureshe USSR is aware of theof countermeasures against radar and hasumber of years conducted bothand mechanical jamming exercisesto make its air defenses proficient in the face of enemy countermeasures. In the last fewrend toward greaterdiversification has appeared in Soviet radar and radio equipment. Increased power and other antijamming techniques alsoto be receiving attention and arcIncorporated In the latest Soviet radars.
Navigational Aids. Within the last few years, the USSR has extensively improved its interceptor aircraft recovery system bythe elementary two-beacon approach system with installation ofequipment, air surveillance radar,landing systems, and GCA equipment. Although differing In some details, thisis comparable to that used by NATO nations.
IFF Equipment. For the past few years, thc Soviets have been converting to anIFF system toystem which was relatively insecure and easily countered. We estimate tbat the new system probably will have completely replaced the older system
STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT
large quantities of air defenseavailable to the Bloc are deployedin defense of key Soviet staticmilitary forces. Total Bloc jetass estimated
f which0 are in Soviet fighter units. Of these,re In Fighter Aviation ol Air Defenseith air defense as their exclusiveOperational Bloc AA guns are estimated to totalncluding0 light guns,0 medium guns,eavy guns. More thanercent of this lets! are in Soviet unite Regardingof surface-to-air missiles, we believe that the USSR may now have operational or being em placedites, mostly around main industrial centers, in addition to theites in the complex around Moscow. There is no evidence that anymissiles have been given to any other Bloc nation, and this is not expected to occur until Soviet needs are more fully satisfied.
Generally, the most advanced weapons arc deployed first within the USSR, and in ato make maximum use of theirNew supersonic interceptors, now entering service, have appeared first in units near peripheral urban areas, apparently to provide cover to routes of approach totargets. This deployment is consistent with its best capability as an area defense weapon. The bulk of Soviet all-weather fighters are based in peripheral areas of the USSR andlightly lesser degree around the larger urban centers. Soviet surface-to-air missiles deployed to date are apparently intended primarily for point defense, although the sites seem to be deployed variously, inwith the particular features of each area, in order toaximumto area defense as well. Antiaircraft guns are usually located closer to the defended area than fighters or missiles, and arebi depth, with heavy and medium guns farthest out from the center, and the light AA guns closer in.
The areas of greatest concentration of Bloc air defense weapons and associatedinclude that portion of European USSR from the Kola Peninsula to the Caspian, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Maritime and Sakhalin areas of thc Soviet
Far East. Heavy defense concentrations arc also found at some specific locations outside these areas, especially In the Urals and inChina. The approaches to Moscow are by far the most heavily defended area of the Bloc. Moscow's defenses include abouturface-to-air missile sites,ay and all-weather fighters, andntiaircraft guns. Although we have no direct evidence, some portion of the surface-to-air missiles probably are armed with nuclear warheads. Moscow's defenses are estimated toigh capability to engage large-scale attacks under all-weather conditions, but probablyvulnerable to very low altitude attack.
eavy prime radars,of tbe TOKEN and BAR LOCK types, andight auxiliary radars areinadar sites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc* These sites are so disposed as to produce virtually continuous overlapping coverage of the periphery.enetrating target by three or more radars can probably be achieved through most of European USSR, the Satellites, and thc Pacific coastal areas. Gaps in peripheral early warning radar coverage now appear only in southwestern China. Radar equipped ships are available to supplement and extend radar cover in maritime border areas of the USSR
The extent of this radar cover isbut its quality varies with thc area to be defended. In well defended areas, the roost solid warning cover exists from0 feet downeet. Height-findingparticularly for altitudes0 feet, depends upon the availability of the newer height-finding equipment, which Is not yet deployed in sufficient numbers to provide dense coverage in all areas. Widerof the new types of radars already in service, together with developments incontrol systems, probably will leadecrease in total radar numbers within the next five years.
* See Tablennex A. lor esUmatcd operaUonal characteristics of these various radars.
FACTORS AFFECTING AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
Moreirfields in the Slnc-Soviet Bloc are currently being used for air defense operations. There are, in addition, many other airfields which could be used to support air defense operations and which arelocated in areas consideredfor air defense.
In the USSR, most of the airfields suitable for Jet fighters were developed priorince that date, construction or improvement has continuedore limited scale and has occurred chiefly in the Arctic and otherareas. Despite the considerablein the Arcticacilities are still inadequate for deployment of fighters in the centralxceptew widelybases.
Airfield construction in the Satellites wasigh level during thend has since tapered off. However, aactive program of improvement and construction has been underway in this area during the last two years. Many ofoot runways at military airfields are being lengthenedeet, probably because of the longer runwayof later model and higheraircraft. At both Soviet and Satellite airfields, navigational aids and night lighting equipment appear adequate to support present requirements.
In Communist China, at least seven major airfields have been constructed in the coastal and interior regions during the last two years. In addition, the runways of about eightairfields have been extended and landing aids have been modernized. Atommunist airfields are believed to be equipped with GCA.
Logistic Support ond Mainlenancc
estimate that the Soviet supplytransportation network, and localare adequate to meet immediateneeds in most areas. Antiaircraft
gun and missile installations, airfields, and radar stations are usually located adjacent to populated areas and/or mainand communication lines. Maintenance procedures appear to be exacting andsupervised, and maintenance ofis considered to be good to excellent. Evidence on Soviet electronic equipmentthat it Is generally reliable and well maintained.
Jet Fuel. Although information ison the exact location ol Jet fuel storage points in many areas and the amount of fuel actually stored, operational Bloc fighter bases are believed generally to have sufficient stocks of jet fuelays sustained combat operations. POL storage facilities on many Bloc airfields have been expanded andnow have adequate capacity for Iraining, normal flight operations, and the requiredfor emergency use. There arc nothat training activity has been widely curtailed because of the lack of Jet fuel, although in some instances training appears to have been reduced because of short supplies of jet fuel locally, probably due to transport difficulties.
Jet Serviceability. We estimate that, for present jet fighters, an immediaterate on the order ofercent of unit strength could be achieved without special preparations.0 day stand-down, this rate could bc temporarily Increased to aboutercent for about one week, and then could bc maintained at aboutercent for about another week. Thereafter,rates could bc maintained at aboutercent for approximately six monthscombat conditions, and would then declineercent. Under extreme weather conditions and in areas not served by adequate transportation, such as in the Arctic, the above serviceability rates would be reduced.
Personnel ond Training
believe that technical skills andof air defense personnel are generallyalthough we have insufficientpermit an assessment of the training ofcategories of personnel, notably those ln
air warning services. Training standards in the Satellites and Asian Communist nations are lower than those in the USSR.the Bloc, however, personnel requirements are probably fulfilledriority basis in accordance with the emphasis placed on air defense.
The USSR has maintainedighter pilot training schoois wnn an taamaUaiutput ofraduates. Thesewill presumably decline over the next several years with the reduction ln the size of the fighter force. The course of instruction lasts slightly less than three years, during which time each pilot accumulatesours ]et. Very little time Is devoted to night and instrument training during thephase.
oviet fighter pilot has beento an operational unit, he probably averages only aboutours flying time perraining goals were tofully the technique of Interception and destruction of large hostile air formations, but these goals probably now Include interception and destruction of single aircraft and small formations. Instrument training isin operational units. Night flying has increased considerably and the standards have probably been raised, but we believe they are probably below US standards.
CIVIL DEFENSE Tho Soviet Program
Civil defense in the USSR is supervised by the headquarters of Local Antlair Defense of the Country (MPVOubordinate to the headquarters tn Moscow are MPVO staffs at republic, oblast, city, and rayon levels. These staffs are responsible for planning,supervision, and training, and their members are schooled at an MPVO institute located in Leningrad.
At the local level, the MPVO stairs rely primarily on already-existing governmentalfire departments, medical ln-
'US fighter pilots averageours per month.
stallatlons, plant guards,civil defense functions. These agencies, supplemented by auxiliary personnel to bring tnem up to strength, are organized as civil defense units for such functions as Are defense, shelter and cover, blackout, and decontamination.by the MPVO staff, line officials of the government hierarchy, such as the oblast MVD chief or thc chairrnan of the city executive committee, function as Ihe responsible civil defense commanders.
Training the Soviet population in civil defense is thc responsibilityaramilitary organization known as DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army,andbout one-fifth of the Soviet adult population Is formally enrolled in this organization. The DOSAAF trainingin some areas has been plagued by an Ui different teaching staff, and apparently by padding of progress reports. DOSAAF aims at training the entire civilian population, with virtually all Soviet citizens between the ages ofndiable for compulsory service with civil defense. The majority of the urban population has been given atortion of the scheduled training, but the general public's participation in alerts and drills has been limited to clearing the streets andwith blackout regulations. Somegroups, such as workers in key factories and students, probably have received more intensive training.
Basement shelters may be available for as many asillion people, whileillion could And refuge in the subways of Moscow and Leningrad. Partially completed subways now exist in Kiev, Tbilisi, and Baku. Basement shelters could provide someagainst fallout, but they are of little use against heavy blast If provided with special doors, subway shelters could provide better protection against fallout as well as against blast and thermal effects. However, there is little evidence to indicate that stocks of food and water have been provided for subway or basement shelters. Heavy bunkers and tunnel-type shelters have been constructed for approximately two million selected persons
al communications installations, governmeni headquarters, civil defense and military command posts, and major Industrial plants. Virtually nothing has been done to provide shelter for the rural population.
is probable that the USSR hasthe evacuation of key party andpersonnel from Moscow in the eventemergency. City civil defenseas those for fire fighting, medicalreconnaissance, are to bc evacuatedshelter on the periphery of urbansome consideration has beenevacuating nonessential elements ofpopulation- upon official declarationspecifically charged with theof school children and disabledadded to the operating units of thesystempecial units ofwith disaster relief functions, alsoto have come into existence.
thc Soviet civil defensean effort of longstanding andindications of increased emphasis onaspects of civilumber ofThe most important deficiencylack of adequate shelter for the bulkthe population. This deficiency willduring the period of thisthe amount of basement shelter increased considerably, and as the result of new apartmentconstruction. Civil defensebeen hampered by public apathy andbut the civil defense programcontinuity alone, is Impartingto an ever-widening circleprobablyorps of relativelystaff specialists. Thc supercivil defense programs on alreadypolice, and local governmentprobably sound and realistic Againstof the general regimentationin the USSR, these factors would tendcasualties and facilitate thoof administrative control in areassuffered peripheral damage
CMI Defame in lhe European Saiolliiei
n thc European Satellites, civil defense programs resemble that of the Soviet Union. Central agencies, usually attached to theof the Interior, exist to administer the programs. Some East German andcivil defense officials have been trained at thc MPVO school in Leningrad. uf the population is,ule, carried onaramilitary organization similar to the Soviet DOSAAF. Public training is most actively carried on In Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. Basement shelters in new apartment house construction appear to be standard Ln the four northern Satellites. All the Satellite regimes are believed to have constructed bunker-type shelters for key There have been scattered references to the evacuation of some elements from cities. Public apathy toward civil defense isin thc Satellites. Only in Poland has thc regime made any serious effort to acquaint the public with the latest developments in civil defense through radio broadcasts and the public press.
Civil Defense In Communist China ond tha Asian Satellites
China, North Korea,Vietnam possess rudimentary civilorganizations; their programs forthe public are limited and sporadic.leaders may fearajoreffort would Involve unacceptableand might Impair the nationalMoreover, these leaders appear tothat their country's vast size andmakes it less vulnerable toHowever, some sheltersin Communist China andlor key government personnel.
CAPABILITIES OF THE PRESENT SOVIET AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
the basis of the foregoingconclude that the Soviet air defenseisajor transitionsignificantly Improving Itsmedium and high altitude airprincipal aspects of this transition are:
in weapon systems, thc rapid Installation of surface-to-air missile defenses, andin communications and control, the widespread deployment of an air defense control system with semiautomatic features. Otherdevelopments include the advent of radars with better detection andcapabilities, the introduction of limited numbers of improved interceptors, theIntroduction of nuclear warheads into surface-to-air missiles, and the probableof more advanced electronic gear and armament into interceptors.
Against Subionk Bom ben
The present capabilities of the Soviet air defense system against subsonic bombers would be greatest when penetrations wereln daylight and clear weather atbetweennd0 feet. Under such condiUons, virtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could bc brought to bear against attacking aircraft. Antiaircraft gun and fighter Interceptwould dimiriish0 feet, although present Soviet fighters could operate with some effectiveness at altitudes ln excess0 feet. At alUtudes beloweet, the capabiliUes of thc system would be progressively reduced; beloweet, thc system would lose most of Its effectiveness.
Because of Uie limited availability of all-weather fighters, Uie capabiliUes of Uie fighter force would be reduced considerably during periods of darkness or poor visibility.In Uie Increasingly widespread areasby surface-to-air missiles, air defense capabiliUes would be unimpaired by visibility or weather conditions and would extend to at0 feet in alUtude. Radar-controlled antiaircraft guns could also engage lnpointed fire under any visibility or weather conditions, within their altitude
Thc principal current weaknesses in Uie Soviet air defense system arc: ils limited all-weather fighter capability; Uie tjafnc-handling capabiliUes of communications and control components, Uie inadequate low altitude tracking capability; deficiencies in fighter
armament; the limited early warning Ume available In Bloc border areas; and the lack of an operational surface-to-air missiledesigned for use against very low altitude attacks.
varied penetration tacticsaltitude stacking, diversionaryweapons, decoys, andcapabilities of thesystem would bc significantlyIneet alUtude wouldthe EW/OCI system's capabilitycontinuous track andunder close control. Suchwould also render Uie medium AAAand be relaUvely Invulnerablendurface-to-air
Againtf Other Delivery Syslomt
Soviet defense capabiliUes against current Western fighter bombers, supersonic bombers, and cruise-type missiles are more difficult to assess, but probably are generally inferior to their capabilities against subsonic bombers. The smaller radar cross-sections of thesevehicles would reduce the Soviet ability to detect them and to give warning toweapons. Assuming successful detecUon and tracking. Interception by fighters could probably be accomplished only by thc limited numbers of transonic and supersonic types now in Soviet units. Surface-to-air missile systems, however, wouldonsiderably greater capability against such vehicles, except at low altitudes.
We believe Uiat Uie Soviets do not now have an active defense capability against ballistic missiles of any type.
PROB ABIE FUTURE TRENDS
estimating the future developmentair defenses, we haveumberInto account, including:general estimates of Soviet strategicand air defense policy; (b) UieIn Uie air defense system over theyears; (c) present air defenseSoviet planners presumably wish to
(d) the likely Soviet estimate of future trends in Western delivery systems; (e) known and estimated Soviet scientific and technical programs and capabilities to develop more advanced air defense weapons andand (f) the economic resourcesand the considerations we believe the Soviets would take into account In allocating resource: to air defense programs.
Our conviction that active air defense will continue to receive very high priority in the USSR is supported by the history of the Soviet military establishment from the end of World War II until the present. This has been markedonsistently strong emphasis on air defense. The scale of effort currently being applied to modernizing the systemthat this attitude persists. Moreover, the general tenor of the Soviet announcements of0 regarding future military policy pointontinuing high priority for air defense. They also indicate thatcontemplates heavily increasedon missiles to enhance Sovietfor air defense as well as for strategic attack. Finally, it seems certain that the Soviet planners would estimate that the manned bomber threat will continue to be present for at least the period of thisand that in theystem will have to be developed to cope with ballistic missiles.
The deployment patterns of air defense weapons and equipment wilhin the Bloc show that the system Is designed primarily todefense in depth for the majorIndustrial, and military centers of the USSR. Soviet planners will recognize that, while successful defense against sustained high explosive attack could be achieved byigh rate of attrition onforces, defense against high-yield nuclear weapons would require achievementery high assurance of denying access to vital targets. Consequently, they will seek toair defense capabilities to meet each type of Western offensive delivery system, tomajor population and industrial centers by both active and passive means, and totheir own strategic striking forces by
active defense, by concealment, dispersal, or mobility as appropriate, and by hardening in some instances.
Probable Soviel Requirements
On the basis of information wc believe they can acquire, largely through overt means, Soviet planners can probably estimate fairly accurately the numbers, types, and worldwide dispositions of the weapons and deliverythe US and its allies could employ against the Bloc They can probably anticipate,years in advance of operational dates, the weapon systems the West is likely to add to its inventory in future years. However, the Soviets are probably uncertain as to the planned tactics and employment of Western delivery vehicles in the event of general war.
Soviet planners will be aware that, during the next five years, the greatest weight of attack (In megatonnage) that can be launched against the USSR will be In manned bombers, most of them subsonic medium and heavy types. They will expect no increase ln the numbers of subsonic bombers, but they willontinuing improvement inand tactics, especially for low altitude penetration and weapon delivery. The Soviet problem of defense against aircraft will be complicated by the variety'of relatively small bombers and fighter bombers with supersonic capabilities now entering or soon to enter Western inventories.
Present Western capabilities invehicles, comprising aircraft andcruise-type missiles, will begin to change within the next year or two, with the advent of supersonic air-to-surface missiles designed to provide bombers with standoff capabilities up tohe Soviets probably foresee US possession of considerable numbers of such missiles, and must also consider the possible subsequent appearance of air-launched ballistic missiles of. range.
From the Soviet point of view, the surface-to-surface ballistic missile threat will become' progressively greater throughoutime period. Missiles with great diversity
ranges, times of flight, and otherwill be deployed in widely dispersed locations In the US and Eurasia, USballistic missiles areto become availablehe Soviets may also view Western space vehicles.reconnaissance satellites, as potentiallysome counteraction.
considering the forms and scales olwhich might be directed at criticalby the Western forces outlinedplanners would in most casesombination of weaponand penetration aids would beThey would also assume thatnuclear weapons commensuratecapacity would beinto virtually all delivery vehiclesagainst the USSR. These factors,with uncertainty as to Westerntactics, will require the USSR tomixed force of air defense weaponthe period.
Soviet planners will take intothe effect of warning time on theof air defenses In various areas ofLand-based early warning radargive Moscow and many other targetsinterior of the USSR more than oneof attacks made with subsonicThe more limited early warningin Bloc border areas would reduceof even heavy defenses inAs the speeds of Westernincrease, and as Westernreater part of the threat,of warning time will become
Major Near-Term Devclopmenls
believe that the current programdeployment is intended to provide,high priority basis, missile defenses fortargets which the Sovietsgreatest value to the USSR. Based onof the deployment patternthe evidence at hand, it appears thatof various degrees of density are
programmed for all Soviel cities withof, as well asumber of other locations of key Importance to the Soviet economy, the military establishment, and the government control apparatus. If this generalattern were completed along the lines presently Indicated, it wouldotal ofites'beltra around Moscow),atocations includingrban-Industrial areas. Into activating the necessary firing units with trained personnel, equipment, andsupport,rogram would involveotal operational Inventory of00 missiles, assuming threeperon site and one inreserve. This inventory would include the number required for substitution of theissile for theissile in thearound Moscow. Considering the rate at which we believe deployment has proceeded in the recent past, we estimateasic program ot this magnitude could be completed by thc fall
It Is possibleomewhat greaterofefenses is planned for certain locations and that additional targets will be so defended. Moreover, lt Is likely that mobileystems will be allocated to Soviet forces in theore extensive program,these additional factors into account, might callout ofites and Held force units. If this were tbe case and deployment proceeded at the apparent recent rate, the program could probably be completed some timefissUes were allotted to otherof the Bloc, this program would have to be expanded and might extendfter the current program is completed, we believe that the Soviets will have acquired relatively effective missilefor their major target areas against medium and high altitude air atiack.
Previously, the USSR rolled uponas the prime air defense weapon,in thc single instance of Moscow. We
that tho trend Is now toward aof fighter and missile defenses. These will probably be employed In fairly well-defined zones, in order to effect properbetween fighters and missiles and to provide the defense In depth which the Bloc air defense system alms to achieve. Moscow will remain heavily defended by surface-to-air missiles with coverage out to aboutm. from the center of the city,one beyond primarily for fighter engagement. Elsewhere, surface-to-air missiles will cover key targets, with fighters probably employed in existingn the Urals, Uie Ukraine, and possibly thc southern Maritime region of Uie Soviet Par East, Uie number and conccntraUon of defended locations will create area-typedespite thc limited range of individual missile sites. Likely sea and borderto the USSR will be protected by barriers of advanced day and all-weather fighters, and possibly by surface-to-air missiles as well.
The proportion of fighters in thefighter-missile defense system willIn terms of absolute numbers, wethat05 the total number of Soviet fighters will be reduced sig-nificantly from thc present strength oferhaps by as much asercent. The transfer7 of certain fighter units to PVO control probably indicates Uiat the IA PVO will not decline in strength as rapidly as Uie fighter units of Tactical and Naval Aviation.
As suitable surface-to-air missiles become available inarge proportion of Uie medium and heavy antiaircraft guns willbe phased out of Uie defenses of static targets in Uie USSR Thereery limited amount of evidence Uiatrend hasbegun. Transfer of some of thisto Soviet field rorces and to other Bloc countries is probable Light AAA. especially automatic weapons, will be retained for low alUtude defense until low altitude surface-to-air missile strength Is well established.
Advanced Surface-to-Aii Minilei'
USSR has an urgent requirementsurface-to-air missile defensedeliverydefense against very low altitudefor interception at longer rangesalUtudes than present Sovietsystems. Thc USSR has Uieto produce sucn systems.Is no evidence, we esUmate Uiatarc now in process of development.
Low Altitude System. Aspecifically designed for alUtudesabouteet could become availableoperational use latelthoughcapability1 would be moreIntercept range would be onof. against low altitudeabout. against mediumup to at0 feet. Otherare tentatively esUmated asmaximum missile velocity,ounds; CEP.
have no evidence regardingow alUtude system inmajor Soviet target areas. However, ifaccorded high priority, weefenses of static targets couldsupplemented with lowunits by thc end2 orsystem could also be deployed Into augment Uie defenses of Sovietagainst low-level air attack.
Surface-to-air systems could also beon surface ships of the Soviet Navy,their use would require extensiveto existing ships or the construction of classes specifically designed as missile ships. Adaptations ofndould beas surface-to-air armament for destroyers and cruisers.
Long Range High Altitude System. Longer range, higher altitude surface-to-air
'For estimate* of future Sortct air defensedevetopmenu, aee. "SovietIn Guided Mlutlea andovember IBM, (Top Secret) and the forthcoming.
would increase the eflectlveness ofair defense, particularly against advanced aircraft and alr-to-surface missiles. However, in view of the widespread deployment andgrowth potential of theystem, wc now consider it very unlikely that thewill attempt to meet this requirement with an entirely new system ast least in the near term. Rather, technical Improvements will probably be made in the altitude and range capabilities of thcystem. SignificantIn this system could appear ln
Antiballistic Missile System
We do not know what technical approach thc Soviets are employing in what we believe toery high priority program to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. Solution of the problems of an antimissile missile would involve the development of complex and costly components and their integrationeapon system with high capabilities fordetection, identification, discrimination, and interception. The net result would be heavily dependent on tactics, deployment, and the effectiveness of Western countermeasures. Taking these factors Into account, we canonly thatystemould become operational ineriod, and that it would have an undeterminedagainst Western ballistic missiles.
The USSR ls probably also exploringtechniques for active defense against ballistic missiles. We cannot predict the nature or success of such studies. In any case, continuous research and development in antimissile defenses will be underway during the next five years and beyond.
Future Fighter Aircraft
introduction of new fightertypes Into the combinedsystem will continue throughs. In addition, thc Soviets,the period of this estimate, will probably
continue their research and developmenton supersonic fighter aircraft.
To alleviate their all-weather fighterthe Soviets probably will introduceevelopment of FISHPOT with all-weather capabilities. We estimate that2 the Soviets mayew orall-weather interceptoretter performance and fire control system. Thisis based solely on estimated Soviet requirements and technical capability. Such an aircraft could probably achieve speeds up tondombat celling of0 feet. Its airborne intercept radar could probably have search and track ranges ofnd. respectively, aimprovement over the Soviet's best current Al capabilities.
The rate of fighter production andinto units In thes will probably increase somewhat over that of the last year or two, but it will remain low by comparison with earlier years. Older fighters will be gradually phased out of Soviet forces and not replacedne-for-one basis. The primary Soviet effort ln the fighter field will be to improve tbc armament and electronic capabilities of individual interceptors and to perfect techniques for their control and
Air-to-Air Missiles. The Soviet fighter force may be generally equipped with air-to-air missiles. It would be logical for theto make air-to-air missiles the primary armament of all new fighter types appearing this year or later.he USSR could, have an improved air-to-air missileead-on attack range. However, introduction Into service ofissile probably would depend uponuitable nuclear warhead. In the absence of further nuclear testing, the Soviets would probably design any nuclear air-to-air missile to be compatiblereviously tested nuclearore sophisticated versionould become available
Warning and Control1
efforts to improve the Bloc'selectronic capabilities willdirected primarily toward moreof the high performancewhich has already appeared andmore effective Integration of thedefense system. Important objectiveseffort will bc to Increase the earlytime available and to reduce the timeto solve successfully all phases ofproblem, from detection toand kill.
The newest Soviet early warning radar, BAR^LOCK, Is estimated toighof detection out to ranges ofs compared with TOKEN'Sdetection range ofjn. with somewhat lower probability. BAR LOCK and other radars with similar performance will probably become the major Bloc earlyequipment.ew type may appear late In the period BAR LOCK'S detection range should provideof the head-on approach of subsonic medium and heavy bombers at high altitudes when they are someoinutes from the radar site; TOKEN'S capabiliUes In thisare probably al leastinutes. These detection ranges are sufficient so Uiat. evenortion of the Intercept problem must be solved by manual communications and data-handling methods, enough tune will be available for fighters on two-minute alert to reach alUtude and engage. (This assumes straight-line courses and the colocatlon of radar and fighters.)
Against smaller delivery vehiclesat speedsnots or more, the problem will be much more difficult BAR LOCK and comparable radars would provide warning when the target wasrom thc radar site, TOKEN about nine minutes or less. The rapid Introduction of data-link communication and controltogether with the use of computers in air defense sector headquarters, will eliminate
a graphic presentaUon or estimated Bloc early warningee Map, Annex B.
much delay In processing information. GCI equipment with better tracking ranges and height-finding capabiliUes are being installed. The more advanced all-weather fighters may be equipped for completely automatic control of interception. But even for newer fighters on two-minute alert, the total Ume required from detection to engagement wouldbe0 minutes. We thereforethat in areas where radars cannot bc sited well forward of targets and fighter baseslong Blocarning Ume for fighters will be marginal against the highest performance Western aerodynamic vehicles.
The problem of warning Ume for surface-to-air missiles probably will not be soIn Uie usual case, where targethas been made by Uie SPOON RESTin Uie immediate vicinity of Uie SAM site, adequate warning lime is available.of target data could be accomplishederiod of time which would enable the SAM site to prepare to engage the target. We do not have evidence as to Uie method the USSR will use to Ue in Us naUonal early warning network with Its expanding missile defenses. It appears possible Uiat semiautomatic control will be employed for such use as well as the control of fighters.
To the degree that geography will permit, the USSR is extending Its early warningby siting equipment beyond its land borders. The European Satellite area willa valuable forward base for Soviet early warning lines. In the ArcUc. radars have been installed on Islands north of the Soviet coast. In addition, passive detecUon systems inand East European border areas will probably be Integrated Into (he air defense system to counter Jamming and augment thc early warning network. There Is as yet no evidence Uiat the Soviets plan to employearly warning patrols, but this would be within their capabiliUes.
For ground communications in support of air defense operaUons Uie Soviets willto use and to improve high frequency radio and microwave links, and coaxial cable will also continue in limited use. The systems installed during the next five years, especially
the microwave network, will be capable of relaying signals over long distances without serious degradation and will have lowto Jamming and interception. Wethatore thanercent of the short-distance operational air defense traffic will be carried on microwave links and landllnes. Tropospherlc scatter communica-Uons may alec bc employed In certain areas, such as the Arctic.
Major advances In yield-to-mass ratio and In fissionable material economy would be Soviet goals for Improvement in air defense warheads, but could be achieved only with the resumption of nuclear tests. In theof such tests, progress In the very low yield category, such as required for air-to-air missile warheads, would be seriously hindered.
At present, nuclear warheads appear to offer the best promise for destruction ofoutside the atmosphere. We estimate that the Soviets would utilize such warheads In air defense systems designed to intercept ballistic missiles and satellites. Two of the thermonuclear devices tested by the USSR8 might lend themselves to antimissileapplications. However, we have noof Soviet nuclear tests at very0 feet or In space) and believe that they lack basic effects data on high altitude and space detonations. In the absence of further nuclear testing, the lack of such data would not prevent developmentuclear-armed antimissile system, but would handicap development ofystem.
Other Bloc Nalionv
he air defense forces of the other Bloc nations will remain inferior to those of the USSR. They will be augmented by theof fighters and antiaircraft guns from Soviet stocks, continued local production of such equipment (largely from Sovietnd the provision of up-todate radar andequipment to serve their own and Soviet needs.
It is unlikely that the USSR hassurface-to-air missiles to the forces of any other Bloc nation, or lhat it will do so until priority Soviet requirements are met. Thenstallations in East Germany are almost certainly Soviet-controlled andfor the defense of Soviet militaryHowever, as the SA-2program is completed in the USSR, the Soviets will probably make this systemin at least limited numbers for theof key static targets. The most likely locations for initial deployment would bc the East European Satellite capitals and major Chinese urban-industrial areas. Judging by estimated trends In thc USSH, limitedofissiles and associatedcould be provided to other Bloc nations beginning1
There are indications that some type of air-to-air missiles may now be in the hands of East German and Chinese Communist fighter elements. In any event, considering that the Chinese Nationalists have used air-to-air missiles with telling effect, we believe that the Chinese Communists either now have or will soon receive Soviet air-to-air missiles. Other Satellite fighter forces may follow suit.
The USSR will probably not providewarheads for Satellite or Chinese use or custody during the period of this estimate. This judgment is based In part on our belief that the USSR's own requirement for airwarheads is very targe, and in part on the reluctance of the USSR to provide nuclear weapons of any kind to the Satellites orIt is possible that the Soviets mightnuclear support to the Chinese in case of need (see,
Future Soviet Air Defense Capabilities
believe that the Soviets willimprove the overall capability of theircomplex air defense establishment.these improvements, the Sovietswill still not achieve within thisa high degree of assurance ina large-scale sophisticated attackbombers armed with high-yieldweapons. Tliey would probably expect
ignificant number o( thebut. given the increasing complexity of the air defense problem, we doubt they will be confident of the extent to which they could reduce the weight of any given attack.
he Soviets are undoubtedly making vigorous efforts to counter more advanced
Western weapon systems, particularly ballistic missiles. But, barring an unforeseenbreakthrough, we believe that the USSR's air defense problems, deficiencies, and uncertainties will Increase toward the end of the period as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.
TABLES OF AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT8 Characterislics, Strength, and Deployment
NOTE: For tables on Soviet air defense missile characteristics see: "Soviet Capabilities In Oulded Missiles and Spaceop Secret) and the forthcoming. Tables on personnel strengths and future force strengths have not been Included. These subjects are now bclne examined ln detail, and will be dealt with In forthcoming estimates.
E E2 o
O IO IO
t S. :
Footnotes lor Table I.
Units*oted. performancewe eaic-aUtad with Interna) fuel only.
Combalifatt altitude; maximum speed Ii al optimum altitude.
Highest nltltudo with internal fuel only at whleh an aircraft wiiri standard armamem can climbataeel per minute with maximum power.
Standard minion Ii calculated lo accordance with USpec. Optimum mlMlon is th* lama except that fuel rmnti ar* reduced to permit cxtaadedslculalioni for aa optimum mission with external fuel SMume two wing tasks except la tha csm of Iba FLASHLIGHTone telly tank.
Them? art considered to be maximum loads, with internal fuel only, and do not exclude th* possibility of other combination* o' rocket and mlutl* arms-ment Tbe number* shown form rocket olio apply tom rocket, not Included In thi* table.
' FRESCO "E" haaaraeteriitle* similar to (note of the FRESCO "A"" but Ii equipped with nlrborne latere rpt radar of the FRESCO "D" type.
Soma ofircrafl are equipped with rang* only radar whichang*.
Two other vmlen*n Idenliced. FARMERhich hu performance rhareeierinle* ilmllar to thou of FARMERa* airborne Intercepl radararch rang*.rack rang*. FARMER "C" I* bellaved lo hav* Improved performance over lhe "A" and "B" models, and has range only radar of th* FARMER "A" type. Both FARMER "B" and "C" and soma FARMER "A'a" havi revolver type guns.
1 Eatimated performance characteristics are baand prlraadly on analysl* of prototype* which appearednd may dffler in lit pr eductioneUeved loIG-iypt, probably developed from the FACE PLATE/FISH BEDwhich appearedftDevelopment of lhaimated on th* bull of Sovietevolver typ* gun*m caliber.
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE ANO CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET EARLY WARNING
AND GCI RADARS
CobTBOL If. TIT.
V|V * * 1 T I W I
5 percent blip-toon ratio wu assumed. Range5 percent blip^canIsto represent probable raaiiraum deteeUon range. Tracking, however, would require blip-scan ratio on tbe order otoercent which would be achieved at about four-firths to lwc-4hirds of the Mated range.
figures represent our best estimate ol radar performance as limited by pulse repetition frequencyt Ihese0 percent blip-ecao ratio would be achieved. Range* could be considerablybe Soviets have evolved techniques for detecting ambiguities in range data and determining true ranges.
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS OK SOVIET ANTlAiRCKAPT QUI
m AA DShK HUG.
m AA IIMC WU-
winm AA Gun,
.m AA7 mm AA. .
m AA. BSmmAACun,
m AA Gun.m AA Cun, MI9AA-
rpm perpm per barrel...
pra per bcrrsl ..
Standard4 UnkC Quad mount of Creeb ori-ft*
Single, dual, and quad
mount. Power layinE- OfCieeh
Twin, aell-propelledalao io use, knows as
Radar fire conlrol.
Radar (Ira eoatrol. Cierb version has
Power Urinr. aad radar
fire eoatroL lUder fire control.
Por oo-earriega sighting. With radar fire conlrol. efleetlve ceiling is cHlmaled al0 II oes not haveire control.
- Proximity lairs are believed lo be available.
Previously reportedm AA.
t fi T*
West Central USSR
Caucasus USSR *
Baal OnMl USSR'
Par East USSR
Total in USSR
Soviet Forces, Eastern Europe ..
Tolal Eastern ICurope
en,it IX Orvn.TiONaL Dim
BLOC AIR DEFENSE
COMPOSITION OF BLOC FIGHTER FORCES BY AIRCRAFT TYPE
A, B, C
FARMER A, B. C