SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH MID-1964 (NIE 11-8-59)

Created: 2/9/1960

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90

HISTORICAL REVIEW FfiQSRW

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH

Submitted bv tht DIRECTOR OP CENTRAL INTFM.IGEXCE

Tht following Intelligence organisations vantclpattd in Ihe preparation of thu estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence, organisations ol Ihe Departmentstate, the Army, the Navy, the Airhe Joint Stag. NSA. and ASC.

Concurredy the

UNITED STATES IHTEJ-UGESCl BOARDoncurring were The Director 0Jand Research. Department Ol Stale: the Assistant Chlet of Staff tor Inteiligente. Department of the Army. Ihe Director ol Naval Intelligence. Iht Awitnnt Chief of StafJ. Intelligence. USAF; the Director lor Intelligence. The Joint Stat; Ihe Assistant to the Secretary ol Defense, Specialthe Director of the Nalionul Securily Agency, nnd the Atomic Energy Commission Heprtunlatlve to tne USIB. The Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Inuestigation. ab-

stained, the abject being outside ol hi, fwtadfeffen'

VK

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AOENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE

I.estimate was disseminated by the antral Intelligence Agencv. This cowo,ma1tIon and usehe recipient and of persons under his Jurisdiclion(Insemination may be authori.ee bv the loilowing ofhcials within their tcspectlvc departments.

of Intelligence and Rwrarch. lor the Department ol State

Chief of staff foi Inielligence. Department of the Array

e. Aaslsuiit Chier of Naval Operations for Intelligence, for the Department oi the Navy

d. Director ol Intelligence. USAF. for the Drparlment oi the Air Forceirector lor Intelligence. Joint Stall, loi the Joint Staff i. Director ofC. for lite Atomic Energyssutant Director. FBI. fo. the Federal Uureau of In test is. Asnstam to the Secretary cf Uc.ciue. Spcc-al Operations, for thr Department of Defense

L Director of SSA for the Nation t| Security

j. Assistant Direcior for CentralA. for any other Department St Agency

2 This copy may be retained, orby burning in accordance with appUcal*ISll,as>ur wMurnttl lo then Intelligence Agency by arrangement with Ihe Office of Central Reference. CIA.

hen an estimate Is dlsseinimilrdfile overseas reel men Is mav"1 JU0 cnd of this period, thc estimate

agency, or permissionJ 1 agency to retain It In accordance with

a

the text, should be classMcn:

i'isihiMi;ni)N:

NnUonal Security Countepartment ot Stale Department of Defense Operations CoorOlnatlng Board AtomicComraUMoa Prdtrt! lluiri.ii of Investigation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE

CONCLUSIONS

DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGICTO

Long Range

Naval and Tactical

Alr-to-Surface

Ground-Launched Ballistic

Nuclear

Soviet Evaluation of Current

BROAD CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE FUTURE COMPOSITION OF SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC

MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC

LONG RANGE

Medium

Heavy

Air-to-Surface

ANNEX A: CALCULATIONS OF SOVIET ICBM REQUIREMENTS

Basic

Requirements Against US Retaliatory

Requirements Against US Metropobtan

ANNEX B: SCALE OF ECONOMIC EFFORT FOR CERTAIN ICBM

Missile

Launching

Total

ANNEX C: ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PROBABLE STRATEGIC

ATTACK

Expenditures for strategic Atiack

Shifts in

The General Scope of the Major

Ground-Launched

ANNEX D: PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET

LONG RANGE

ANNEX E: DEPLOYMENT AND TARGET COVERAGE OF BOMBERS AND MISSILES (Graphics)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE CfA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM

SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK THROUGH

THE PROBLEM

To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet long-range air and missile weapons systems suitable for strategic attack, through

FOREWORD

critical feature of this estimate Is our judgment with respect to the force goals of the existing Soviet ICBMThis judgment is based in part on calculations regarding Soviet ICBM requirements for various defined strategic purposes. These calculations aresensitive to possible differencesour assumptions and those actually made by Soviet planners with respect to two important factors:

a. The probable future performance characteristics of the improving Soviet ICBM.

"Strategic attack" as used herein Is defined as nuclear attack against retaliatory (orce* and key war-making strengths in North America, as well as US and Allied retaliatory forces at sea and In overseas areas. The weapons systems primarily considered arc heavy and medium bombers assigned to Long Hange Aviation,alr-to-surtacc missiles, eround-launched missiles with maximum rangesautical miles or more, and submarine-launched missiles. It is recognized that other delivery systems are available for use against targets at sea and overseas.

b. The probable future development of the US nuclear retaliatory force.

We have assumed for the Soviet ICBM the performance characteristicsfor it at various dates in, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Spacend in the USIBto Holders of" datedoviet planners mayetter performance, in which case their estimates of the numberswould be lower than ours.we would expect them to useassumptions in making soalculation.

With respect to Soviet targeting, we have assumed that existing approved US military programs will be carried out. Explicit information on these programs is presumably not available to Soviet planners, but we believe that they have

t

*POT> CBCBBffi

general information from open sources to be able to estimate them with fair accuracy. These US programs are, of course, subject tois the Soviet ICBM program also. The present Soviet ICBM program, however, must be based on the present Soviet estimate of the probable future development of the target system.

It is beyond the scope of this estimate to consider what political or military courses of action the USSR might adopt if the development of its strategic attack capabilities were to be as estimatedSuch matters will be considered in the forthcoming, "Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and

CONCLUSIONS

Soviet rulers probably regard their present strategic attack forces as capable of devastating US and AlUed concentrations of population and industry, but incapable ofby military action, the nuclearof the

Thc ICBM presents the best prospects of being able toeavy weight ofwithin the least timeecision to attack, and thereby to prevent theor reduce the weightS strategic attack on the USSR. Hence, we believe that thc future development of Sovietatiack capabilities wilt beunction of thc development, production, and deployment of ICBMs. Soviet ICBM capabilities will be supplemented byubmarine-launched missile capability and by the maintenanceubstantial long range bomber capability.)

Our analysis leads us to believe that. If the US military posture develops as presently planned, the USSR will1 have its most favorable opportunity toecidedpolitical, and psychological advantage over the US by thc rapid deployment ofICBMs. Even at that time, however, the proportion of US retaliatory forces which the Soviets could expect to destroy in aattack would depend not only on the number of missiles employed and theircharacteristics, but also, andupon thc degree of surprise attainable

and upon the precision with which the initial salvo could be timed. Even if surprise were complete and tuning perfect the USSR would have to expect retaliation from such USas might be on airborne alert at the time of attack, from at least some of the UScarriers and missile-launchingthen at sea, and from any other US retaliatory forces that survived the Initial salvo.1 the numbers of semihard-cned and hardened US ICBM sitesto become operational woulda steep increase in the number ofICBMs to achieve comparable objectives against US retaliatory forces. )

From an economic point of view the main determinant of the Soviet ICBM program Is not so much the availability of resources, as the physical difficulty of rapidly building up production of missiles and particularly of launching facilities during the first year or two after IOC, and of training in ashort lime the personnel required to maintain andarge number ofThese difficulties set practical limits to the Soviet ICBM program. )

Every present Indication suggests that the Soviet ICBM program, wliilerashis designed toubstantial ICBM capability at an early date. The goal of the program is probably an ICBM force as large as Soviet planners deem necessary toubstantial deterrent andattack capability. In our view, this

cncnr.'i*

3

be consistent wtth the presentand orderly tempo of the Soviet ICBM test-firing program, with current Sovietdoctrine, and with the USSR's observed policy ofalance amongcapabilities designed to accomplishmissions.*

e conclude that thc probable Soviet ICBM program would provide on the orderCBMs on launcher inithin this range, the Assistant Chief for Intelli-

'The Assistant chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, docs not concur In the second sentencee does not believe that Sovietas we have observed It, warrants the Judgment that their objectives would be satis-fled by attainment or only substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack capability. Rather, he believes that thc Soviet rulers arc endeavoring to attain at the earliest practicable date asuperiority over the United Slates which they would consider to be so decisive as to enable them either to lorco their will on the United States through threat ot destruction, or to launch such devastating attacks against the United States that, at the cost of acceptable levels of damage to themselves, the United Statesorld power would cease to exist. He further believes that such an objective could be attained by the development of their overall military capabilities which would include an operational ICBM (orce ot5 on launcher) by5 on launcher) by0 on launcher) byt Isagreed that the Soviets have both the technical and Industrial capability to produceorce; the physical difficulties thereby entailed will almost certainly not be thc limiting factor,

It Is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, that, while Soviet planners will undoubtedly feel that they will havea capacity for substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack byr earlier, the real objective of thc Soviet ICDM program ls "decisive militaryie believes that the Soviets would not be content with conceptual levels of deterrence; they would realize theof error In their own calcuIaUons and acknowledge Uie possibility of Westernof their deterrent capabilities. This latter conUngency would weigh the more heavily if the Soviet leaders intended, as he believes likely, u> exploit their capabilities in political offensives. In this event, their estimate of the likelihood of Western "desperate" acts wouldthem to attempt attainment ofdecisive military superior!ly."

gence. Department of the Army, and theChief of Naval Operations forDepartment of the Navy, estimate that the Soviet program is likely to be toward thc low side. The Direclor of Intelligence and Research, Department of Stale, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, and the Director for Intelligence, Thc Joint Staff,that Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained as Justifyingeffort, estimate that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher Is likely to be towards the high side ofange.

The military capabilities which thc Soviets would acquire with this missile force would dependreat degree upon thecharacteristics of the missile. By the endowever, the estimated Soviet ICBM force willrave threat to the principal US metropolitan areas, and will thusowerful political andweapon In1 it will present andangerous threat to SAC bomber bases, unhardened ICBM sites and command Installations, although the degree ofthc Sovieis would have of being able to destroy US retaliatory forces would varydepending on the performanceof their ICBMs, and In any case would be subject to the qualifications in3.

The development of the Soviet ICBM force1 would be likely lo be affected by such considerations as the actualof the target system to be attacked, the prospectsreatly improved Soviet ICBM, and the prospects (on both sides) for an effective anti-ICBM. as well as by the general development of the world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Any figures for future years should be reviewed In the light of auchand of evidence on the actual progress of the Soviet ICBM program. Projecting our estimates of the present ICBM program (and assuming that if the USSR hasCBMs on launcher inould substantially level off in the sub-

sequent two years) the most likely number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher Inouldnd tnould be

USSR will have no serious difficultyits estimated requirementsn.m..

the basis of the foregoingnumerical estimates of Soviet mediumbombers in Long Range Aviationand medium-range ballistic missiles,submarines are as shownfollowing table: *5

Mid-

Bombers

Heavy

Missiles

m.

In Invert toiy

Launcher

njn.

Inventory

Launcher

cm.'

In Inventoryn Launcher

The Assistant Chlel of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. does not concur in this sentence. See bisto paragraphbove-

Submarines

class 4

"G" class' .. 18

11

' Not estimated beyondHot estimated beyond IMS."Z" class submarine would probably carry two missiles.

Each "O" class submarine would probably carry about five missiles.

associated mlssllo may not become avaUablen which case the missile used in the "O" class might be used In this submarine. Bachwould probably

DISSENTING.he Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, does not concur In the numbers of heavy bombers and ICBMs estimated, believing they should be:

4

Heavy bombers ..

ICBM

In 50

On

"The Assistant chief of Staff for Intelligence,of thc Army, docs not concur In the numbers of heavy bombers estimated. In his view, future Soviet heavy bomber strength wUl approximate the following:

Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid-1 2 3 4 Heavy bombers 75 79

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DISCUSSION

decisions regarding theol strategic attack capabilities arethe context of Soviet (not US) politicalconcepts. Although we lack directof Soviet intentions andthe future development of strategicthe conceptual context in whichare formed Is generally well known.

Ruling circles in the USSR regard the world situation as one of constant, unremitting struggle between Communist andforces. Their faith requires them to prosecute the struggle by every expedient means. They believe that the courses ofwhich may be appropriate at any given time can be determined with scientificby Marxist calculation of Uie cverchang-ing "rclntion ofhey recognise, of course, the possibility of error throughnalysis of the situation. "Leftors theof opposing forces (or overestimatlon of Communist forces) which leads to theof unwarranted risks. "Rightors the reverse, which results in failure to take maximum practicable advantage of enemy vulnerabilities. Either deviation is notistake,in.

Military force is only one factor in thc"relation of forces" to be calculated Marxist analysis does not admit of the sharp distinction between military and poUticalwhich has been characteristic of much Western civil and military thought. Itsconcept is power, and power Includes, in addition to the military factor, political,and economic elements, which are understood to be mutually reinforcing. Thus military forces are valued for psychological and political as well as strictly military

The calculation of their militaryin the context of the total relation of forces has led the Soviet rulers to maintain.

at considerable economic cost, large andforces. Strategic attack forces are only one element in this total militaryand, up to the present at least, have beenomparatively smallof total Soviet military expenditures.

In the present world relation of forces, the Soviet rulers almost certainly calculate that the only military contingency they have to fear wouldassive US nuclear attack on the USSR. They would regard theof such an attack as wildlyonsequently, they are deterred from pursuing courses of action which, in their estimation, involve serious risk ofthat result But they evidentlythat Uie US ls In large measure deterred from delivering such an atiack. Theythis deterrence to psychological and political as well as military factors In the total relation of forces. Moreover, from the Soviet point of view, mutual deterrence from nuclear strategic attack istalemate, but anto press more vigorouslyeconomic, and political forms ofand possibly even to engage In someforms of military action.

The Soviet rulers, however, are not content to maintain the present relaUon of Soviet to US military power. They are bound toto change this relaUonshlp to theirin their estimation, the greater their relative military strength, the greater will be their political opportunities, without actual recourse to general war. They would consider themselves guilty of "right devla-tfonism" if, with the advent ofballistic missiles, they did not attemot toilitary advantage over the US. From their point of view, tt would be desirable touperiority so decisive as to enable them either to dictate terms to the US or. if necessary, to attack the US without receiving unacceptable damage in return. At the same time, however, they must exercise care to avoidS preventive attack.

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decisive militaryprove unattainable, Sovietsecurity requirements call forthe contingency of nuclear warfrom accident, or miscalculation, orIn tho Soviet view, thethe USSR may be in pressingand psychological attack, thcthe dangeresperate USmay become. Consequently, theof the Soviet state and societycapability to destroy the US nuclearprior toat least thoto reduce thc weight of such anthe maximum feasible extent by aof offensive and defensive measures.connection, Soviet military literaturea concept of pre-emptiveis, an attack with Immediatelydesigned to seize the strategican enemy who Is himself preparingto attack*

II. THE DEVEIOPMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK CAPABILITIES TO DATE

World War II the USSR didan effective long range attackNevertheless, the USSR was quickthe strategic significance oflong range bombersissilesoward thethe war. It immediately launchedto achieve for Itself capabilitiesfields. Of necessity, its initialdirected toward the achievement ofdominance in Eurasia. As the onlymilitary counter to US strategicat that time, it also devoted aeffort to the development of airthe first, however, the USSR almosthad the objective of developing anstrategic attack capability againstUS.

"This concept Is distinguished from prcvenUveis. an attack deliberately planned, prepared, and Initiated for the purpose ofan enemy's attack capablUUes before they have heen fully developed.

long Range Aviation

6 the USSR established Long Range Aviation as an Independent operationaldirectly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The BULL piston mediumopy of theas produced for the equipment of this force. The BULL, however, can have been regarded onlyonvenient means of meeting an urgent interimEven while the buildup of BULL strength was In progress, the BADGER jet medium bomber was under urgentIt went Into large-scale productionhe transition from BULLs to BADGERs in operational units proceeded steadily thereafter, in accordancemooth and orderly program. BULL strength was substantially maintained for several years, however, while the BADGER buildup was In progress. This overlap appears toesire to retain an established capability until an improved capability designed to supersede it had also become well established. As aLong Range Aviationeak strength ofULL and BADGER medium bombers. Since thenave been phased out more rapidly: theedium bomber strength of Long Range Avialion is estimated to haveULLSADGKRs. Thoof BADGERs has now ceased. Thus, when lhe last BULL has been phased out of Long Range Aviationhc net result will be thc replacement of BULLs by BADGERs onnc-for-one basis.

hese medium bombers are best suited for operations in and near Eurasia. They areof reaching targets In the US If need be, but with few exceptions only on one-wayore satisfactory capability against the US. the USSReavy bomber. To meel this requirement, the BEAR turboprop and BISON jet heavy bombers were developed concurrently with each other and with the BADGER. There are Indications that large-scale production of heavy bombers

'raphic presentation of possible Unietby particular bomber types from forward staging bases, with and without refueling, see Annex B.

was Intended. However, BEAR production ceased after the completion of about GOCumulative BISON production reached aboul US int has been marked by numerous modifications of the aircraft and by low and fluctuating production rates. During tho fallhe rate of production appears to have been one oronth.

of the delays in BISONmanifestly due to deficienciesthe aircraft, but we believe thatovicl change of mind aboutbomber progrnm. Disappointmentperformance of lhe BEAR and BISON,of concurrent and prospectiveIn thc air defense of Northand growing confidence in theof an effective Soviet ICBM appearresultedoviet decision torapid buildupeavy bomberheavy bomber strength is now about

ISONs andEARs in operational units.

deployment of Soviet Longand the locations of forwardln the Soviet Arctic are shown InK. The estimated optimumof the BULL. BADGER,HEAR are shown In Annex D.

he USSR has notpecific tanker aircraft to meet Its inflight refueling requirement, bul has developed such athrough the conversion of BISON and BADGER bombers for use as tankers. All of tho BISON regiments and about half of the BADGER regiments probably have thisThe use of bombers as tankers would, of course, reduce thc number available for use as bombers In any single attack.

ithin the limitations of its bomberSoviet Long Range Aviation laroficient force, although Its training, basing and maintenance standards fall below those of thc US Strategic Air Command. Itsand home base structure are adequate to support large-scale operations launched directly from these bases against Eurasian and peripheral targets. Its capabilities against the US are limited by lhc difficulty of staging

through Arctic bases. In recent years,more realistic and larger scale Iraining exercises have been conducted, and the scope and magnitude of Arctic operational training has increased. Electronic equipment for navigation, bombing, and ECM has beenStorage and loading facilities forweapons are probably now available at all home bases and some Arctic staging bases; wc believe that crews have been trained In the handling, loading, and delivery of these weapons.

Naval and Tacticol Aviation

addition to those in LongADGERs have beenSoviet Naval Aviation. Theseunits are specially trainedto attack navalforces at sea. There are also someassigned to Soviet TacticalIn addition to medium bombers,and Naval Aviation are equippedlight bombers whose, rangeto attack many targets in Eurasiaperiphery.

Air-lo-Surface Missile*

only Soviet air-to surfaceubsonic type withof. This missileound warhead againstsea. We estimate that about sixtwo of them in Long Rangeand the remainder in Naval Aviation,equipped with these missiles andtheir use. Assuming that unitaverage twoissiles perthe present allocation towould beissiles.

Ground-launched Ballistic Missiles 1

a well conceived programwith high priority since shortlyWar n, the USSR has developed

ore extensive discussion of missileand of our bases for estimation,. "Soviet Capabilities In Oulded Mlullca and Spacoovember IMP,

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family of short, medium, and long range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.oviet ballistic missilefound warheadaximum range.EP. has been available for operational usen thc basis of availablewe cannot Judge the present scale of production. We have not identified any units equipped with such missiles, although there are indications that thc USSR is deploying this type of weapons to East Germany.the length of time available for theirand deployment in conjunction with Soviet requirements (see Section V.c believe that inhe USSR probably had an operational inventory ofissiles and aboutaunchers.

2fl. Wc estimate that another ballistic) capable ofound warheadaximum range.EP of. became available for operational use in8 ormall number of such missiles were probably deployed by

Thes road mobile; theay be road or rail mobile.hows tho ranges of these missiles from positions near the borders of the USSR Itself and of the Soviet Blod.

The USSR is currently test firing an ICBM which we believe is capable ofound warheadaximum range. if employedeatslnkAvailable evidence is believedto gauge the general progress but not the precise timing of the Soviet program to develop an operational ICBM system. We believe, however, that for planning purposes it should be considered that Sovietof an initial operational capability (IOC) with aproduced ICBMs will have occurred

reduction In warhead weight would permit an Increase In range; use of an ablative nosecone wouldeavier warhead or extended ranee.

We have no direct evidence of Soviet ICBM deployment concepts or of the intendedof operational launching sites. In other Soviet ballistic missile systems, mobility has been stressedasic design consideration. The Soviet ICBM could be rail mobile, with multiple prepared launching positionsof little moreoncrete slabpecial spur track.ystem would reduce vulnerability by making launching sites difficult lo find and identify, and byuncertain thc location of the launching unit at any given time. In any case, whether the Soviet ICBM force employs fixed sites, or rail-mobility,ombination of the two. it will be essentially dependent on the Soviet rail net.

In recent years there have been increasing indications of Soviet Interest inapability to launch guided missiles fromWe estimate thatirst effort, about two "W" class submarines wereto launch, while surfaced, two subsonic cruise-type missilesapableound warheadange.. CEP.aterabout four "Z" class submarines have been modified (by enlarging the sail) probably to launch two ballistic missiles each. These probably could not be launched while theis submerged but it has not yet been determined whether the submarine would have to be fully surfaced, or only partiallyWe have no specific information to permit identification of missiles for thisbut wc believe that compatible missiles may be capable ofound warheadange. (or less likelyith an operational CEP. The most recent development is the appearanceew class of conventionally-powered"G" class by USof which are probably now in operation with the Fleet. Although the evidence in this case is not so convincing as in the case of lhe modified "Z" class, we evaluate thc "G" class as probably having ballistic missile launching capabilities. Their very large sail, considerably higher and longer than that of lhe modified "Z" class, suggests

9

they could each carry about. missiles, although shorter or even longer range ballistic missiles are less likely possibilities. The warhead weight couldounds and the CEP under operational.

Nuclear Weapons 10

y an extensive series of tests begun inhe USSR has demonstrated its ability to provide high-yield nuclear weapons suited to the various delivery systemsin this estimate. On the basis ofand payload, the ballistic and submarine-launched missiles considered will require nuclear warheads for effective employment under all but limited and specialWe believe that in general the USSR will equip its ICBMs and,submarine-launched missiles with warheads of thc maximum yield attainable within the limits of its nuclear and missile technology. Warheads. ballistic missiles, however, will probably be producedange of yields in order to provide operationalo permit selection of yield in accordance with the weapon effects desired at the time of attack.

We believe that nuclear bombs of high and medium yields are now thc primaryof Soviet Long Range Aviation, and that they have been provided to BADGERs of Naval and Tactical Aviation as well. Alr-to-surface missiles employed against ships at sea could employ either HE or nuclear warheads ofor low yields.

Considering the estimated availability of fissionable materials and the level of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, we believe that at present the USSR has sufficient nuclear weaponsajor attack by long range air and missile weapons systems, including

omplete discussion of this subjectthe yields to be expected from the bombs and warheads associated with particularsystems, as well as the estimatedof fissionable malcrlab in the USSR, see, "The Soviet Atomic Energydated9 (Limited

sufficient nuclear warheads for Its operational submarine launched missiles and ground-launched ballistic missilesm. range and greater.

Soviet Evaluation of Current Capabilities

Soviet rulers probably regardstrategic attack forces as:

toevastatingUS and Allied concentrations ofindustry;

of preventing, by militarythe nuclear devastation of the USSR.

the political point of view,Soviet rulers evidently consider thatrecentlyubstantiallydeterrent against nuclear attack,this achievementeryshift in the global "relation oftheir own minds (and in generalthis shift Is attributed primarilyemerging capability with longthe effectiveness of which Ishave been demonstrated by theLunik shots. Whatever theirthc Soviets evidently regardmedium range missiles aspolitical weapons of first importance.

III. BROAD CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE FUTURE COMPOSITION OF SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES

It is evident that thc Soviet authorities do not regard increased numbers of their present bombers as the means of meeting theirattack requirements. The production of BEARi and liADGERs has stopped; theof BISONs is minimal. The problem, then. Is to estimate the relative extent to which the Soviets are seeking to meet these requirements through the development and production of Improved bombers, of missile launching submarines, and of long rangemissiles.

As Western air defense continues totime and vulnerability factors aremanned bombers progressively less adequate for most Soviet strategic attackThe Improvements in Soviet bomber

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weapons systems estimated lor thc nextyears are not likely to alter this basic trend. An attacking bomber force couldappalling damage upon USof population and industry, paying to atr defense the price of admission. However, because of US early warning capabilities and alert procedures, Soviet planners could not expect attacking bombers to reach USattack force bases in time to prevent the launchingarge-scale nuclear retaliatory attack upon the USSR.

The missile-launching submarine could provide an effective means of attack ontargets In the US. We believe that the USSR is developingapability and would use it in any strategic attack. The number of Soviet submarines that could be deployed ln launching position off US coasts without undue risk of forfeiting strategicwould depend on the established pattern of their operations. At present, the number that could be so deployed is very small It could be increased over the coming years. Soviet planning, however, does not appear to contemplate delivery of the main weight of an attack by this means.

Because the ICBM presents thc bestof being able toeavy weight of attack within the least timeecision to attack, we believo that thc futureof Soviet intercontinental attackwill beunction of the development, production, and operationalof ICBMs. The initial limitations of the Soviet ICBM. in terms of reliability, accuracy, and numbers, will diminish as the weapon system is improved and as production nnd deployment proceed. Sovietof forces for stralcgic attack will bein terms of an improving ICBM system.

Nevertheless, we expect the bomber strength of Long Range Aviation to remain fairly constant during the next year or two, although it will probably decline toward the end of the period. The USSR has ainvestment In the aircraft, skilledand base structure of its present bomber force. These assets are not likely to be dls-

o

carded. Observed Soviet military practice suggests that Long Range Aviation will be maintained as an effective force in being al least until an ICBM capability has become well established.

ormidable ICBMbeen established, the USSR will haverequirement for mannedln lesser numbers. For some timethe bomber will be capable ofheavier payloads with greatercan the ICBM. It will continue toIn certain types ofagainst targets of uncertain location.

IV. INTERCONTINENTAL BA1USTIC MISSILES

planners would consider thatSoviet ICBM capabilityimportant psychological andajor deterrent effectUS, and that these effects wouldthe size of the Soviet ICBM force.of our problem Is to estimate howand sacrifice the USSR will make,rapidly, to build up its ICBM forceto: <a)alculatedlo destroy US nuclearprior to launch, and (b) exploitcapability through political andmethods.

an approach to this problem, wethe approximate numbers ofICBMs that would be required onin the USSR to give Soviet plannersof being able to inflict severeon the bases and fixed installationswith US nuclear retaliatoryoperational air bases. ICBM sites,and command Installations beyondof.eour analysis to the periodwhich projections of Sovietand US target systemsmore uncertain.

"For a. detailed analysis see Annex A. Triocharacteristics ot the Soviel ICBM arc given Ln Table I' ot that Annex.

11

analysis leads us to believe that1 the USSR would have its most favorable opportunity,apid deployment of operational ICBMs. toecided military, political, and psychological advantage over the US. On the basis of an Initial Sovietcapabilityt Is highly unlikely that the USSR could deployufficient number of ICBMs to provide high assurance of being able totrategically significant proportion of the US nuclear retaliatory forces prior to launch. On the other hand,1 the number of scmihardencd and hardened US ICBM sites programmed to becomewould resultteep Increase Inrequirements, despite the estimatedin the performance characteristics of the Soviet ICBM. Moreover, as the period advanced thc US nuclear retaliatory force structure would presumably include airborne alert, increasing numbers of missile-launching submarines and possibly also some mobilemissiles, systems generally un-targetable tir ICBM attack. In thesea crucial question for thisis whether the Soviet rulers would consider it feasible to establish1 an operational ICBM force which, in conjunction with other Soviet forces, would give the USSRilitary advantage as would enable it to impose its will on the US.

In this connection, Soviet planners would recognize lhat lhe ICBM weapon system is Inherently limited to employment againstwhose precise locations are known In advance. In evaluating the strategic effect of nn ICBM attack on such fixedthey would have to take Into account the mobility of the forces based thereon and their reaction times. They would recognize that Soviet achievementapability lo destroy air and naval bases could beoffset by US maintenance of sizable air and naval forces, airborne and at sea.

The plannedeaction times of US nuclear retaliatory forces wouldigh initial salvo capability in any ICBM force designed to be able to attack them prior to launch. For this reason, wo assume that tho

USSR would provide launchers toapproximatelyercent of the ICBMs in its operational Inventory, that Is, theof missiles expected to be serviceable at any given time. We also assume thatICBMs rated as reliable on launcher will actually leave the launcher within minutes of the scheduled lime. The improbability of soerformance in so complexactor which would tend to Increase the number of ICBMs required on launcher, or conversely, to reduce Soviet assurance of being able to accomplish the desired effectiven number of ICBMs,

ince the accuracy, reliability, andyield of the Soviet ICBM are notknown, we have usedasis for calculation two sets of performanceone the "best" and one the "worst" that can be derived from our estimate on thisalculations made on this basis are set forth in some detail in Annex A. It is emphasized that our estimate of the characteristics for the Soviet ICBM does not correspond directly with either the "best" or the "worst" characteristics used forummary of our actualsec footnote (a) tonccordingly, the illustrative calculations that follow cannot be directly correlated wllh the

-Best" Missile

/January

CRP ;>

In Flight Reliability

"Worst- Missile

1 January

ItSO Mld-Ml

CEP (am.)

tn Flight Reliability

(See USIB Memorandum to Holders of. datedor the CEP of the best missile3 we are using IJ nm. In the Memorandum for Holders, it ls stated that -probably not later thanheCEP for an all-tnertlal system could be reduced loa, and the operaUonal CEP of the iadto-Inertial system would be somewhat better.-)

top oiionni^

of the probable Soviet ICBMwhich appears in

On the basis of the "best" missileof1 Sovietrogram toCBMs on launcher Inould give theery high assurance of being able to inflict severe damage on SAC operational air bases, unhardened command and control installations, and unhardened ICBM sites beyond the rangen thc basis of the "worst" missile characteristics of1 Soviet ICBM, atoCBMs on launcher would give thc same levels of assurance of these results.

If the USSR were to exercise this attack capability, however, it would still have toretaliation from bombers then onalert, from all or some of the few semi-hardened and hardened ICBM sites thenand from aircraft carriers and misslle-launching submarines then at sea. Moreover, even at high levels ol statisticalmall proportion of the targeted UScapabilities would remain after the original salvo.

If tho Soviets were to raise their sights higher and seek toery high degree of assurance of severe damage on hardened and scmihardened as well as on unhardened ICBM sites and air and naval bases, theintill assumingsurprise, wouldbest" ICBMs on launcherworst" ICBMs on launcher II can be seen that the needs rise steeply with the number of hardened and scmihardened sites considered for attack, and that the amount of assurance gained per additional missile falls off sharply.

Any force goal of the magnitudeCBMs on launcher byould be realized onlyrash programdiversion of resources from other programs to which the Soviet rulers have attached great importance,igh level of activity that would tend to stimulate US counter measures There is no indication thatoviet effort is now underway. The Soviet leaders would probably take Into account that the US might, by adopting such

measuresontinuous airborne alert,arked acceleration of the construction of hardened ICBM sites,arge part of the advantage they had expected from their numbers ol missiles.

Finally, thc assumption of completeand lactical surprise underlying the above calculations must be subject to some degree of discount by the Soviet rulers. They would have to expect thai any tentativeeven any suspicion, that they intended to attack the US, would lead to anof US capabiUties for deriving further warning, as well aseightened alert of SAC and other US retaliatory forces. Tor as long as the alert posture could bea substantial proportion of these forces could be placedosition which would enable them to avoid missile attack. Thus the Soviet rulers would have to consider that in any period of unusual tension between the US and USSR the vulnerability of US forces to attack would almost certainly bo diminished. With all these factors in mind, we conclude that the Soviet leaders would be unlikely to take the measures necessary toorce goal Of thc magnitudeCUMs on launcher by

Every present indication suggests that the Soviet ICBM program, whilerashis designed toubstantial ICBM capability at an early date. The goal of the program is probably an ICBM force as large as Soviet planners deem necessary toubstantial deterrent andattack capability. In our view, this would be consistent with tho presentand orderly tempo of the Soviet ICBM test-firing program, with current Sovietdoctrine, and with the USSR's observed policy ofalance amongcapabilities designed lo accomplishmissions."

egarding the scoperogram of even this more limited sort, the manyIn available knowledge. require that we allowide range of possibilities. For

-The Assistant Chief of Staff.SAF. dees not concur In this paragraph. See histof the Conclusions

IMP- SEC

calculations could allow for the existence and operation of one or more plants. On the assumption that one large finalplant is already in operation and building upeak production rate ofCBMs per month,rogram for the construction of launchers and associated equipment and facilities already begun, and building upeak completion rate of nine launchers per month, the following would result:

Mid- Mid-3

Produced 60

Io 50

On Launcher 35

This wouldigorous program, but one which, in conjunction with other major military programs, could be carried outappreciable hindrance to presently planned Soviet industrial and constructionts accomplishment wouldhighly effective planning, operations, and coordination in order to produce ICBMs and ground equipment, to construct launching facilities, and to train operating personnel in relatively short periods of time. We have made no allowance for serious breakdowns, bottlenecks, or other interruptions, although we recognize that such delays are usual In programs of this nature. If such cUfflculties occurred, thc number of missiles andwould lag behind the schedule set forth.

To expand this ICBM programin the early years would introducegreater, though not insurmountable,arger number of missiles could be provided byecond large final assembly plant into production. Deliveries from this plant to operational units would probablyonths after initial operational deliveries from the first plant. This interval would be the minimum lagwith obtaining satisfactoryfrom the second plant. Assuming arapid production buildup, use of the

"etailed treatment of the economic aspects . of this ICBM program, together with Ihe olher Soviet programs for strategic attack forcesIn this paper, see Annex C.

two plants could increase the number of ICBMs about as follows;

Mid- Mid- Mid- Mld-

2 mt

40

In Inventory 50

On 35

The production of these missiles, however, would have little significance without alauncher construction program, including production of related groundlaunching, and guidance equipment. Even if the sites were unhardened, tothe required launching facilities byphould be undersimultaneously by the last halfresumably at widely dispersed sites.the task of training operating andpersonnel would be difficult toon this scale so soon after attaining an Initial operational capability.

military capabilities representedtwo ICBM programs dependthe operational characteristics ofwhich Is produced. By way ofthe following table shows theof assurance of inflicting severeSAC operational air bases whichgiven by thc programs In

Missile

issiles on launcher

ercent

issiles on launcher

Inercent

It should be emphasized that this is merely an example; we do not attempt to estimate what the Soviet strategic concept for theof ICBMs would be. or what degree of assurance Soviet planners would consider necessary. Moreover, as noted earlier, the proportion of US retaliatory forces destroyed (as distinguished from the number of SAC bases hit) would depend on thc degree ofachieved, and the precision with which the attack was timed,

deciding on thc magnitude andIts ICBM program. Soviet plannersinto account their other weapons systems

: i

strategiclong range bombers and missile-launching submarines. They would recognize that. In addition to thc damage which could be inflicted in specific target areas, there would be millions of casual-tics and widespread denials from fallout. We believe that they would regard tho capabilities represented by either ICBM program asa substantial deterrent andattack capability.

We conclude that the probable Soviet ICBM program would provide on the orderCBMs on launcher inithin this range, the Assistant Chief of Stan* for Intelligence, Department of thc Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence. Department of the Navy,that the Soviet program is likely to be toward the low side. The Director ofand Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believing that Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained asadditional effort, estimate that theof Soviet ICBMs on launcher is likely to be towards the high side ofange.

As stated above, the military capabilities which thc Soviets would acquire with this ICBM program would depend greatly upon the performance characteristics of thc missile. However, by the endhe Soviets could with no more thanCBMs onwhether with the best or worst performanceassurance of detonating an ICBM over each ofS metropolitan areas. Thus they willolitical and psychological weapon of great consequence in everyhe estimated Soviet program will present an extremely dangerous threat to SAC air bases,

The development of the Soviet ICBM force1 would be likely to be affected by such considerations as the actual development of the target system to be attacked,reatly improved Soviet ICBM. and the prospects (on both sides) for an effective anti-iCBM, as well as by the generalof the world situation and of relations

between the US and the USSR. Any figures for future years should be reviewed in the light of such considerations and of evidence on thc actual progress ol the Soviet ICBM program. Projecting our estimates of the present ICBM program (and assuming that if the USSR hasCBMs on launcher inroduction wouldlevel off in thc subsequent two years) the most likely number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher inouldnd inoulds

V. MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES

Within the range of thc..allistic missiles, the distinction between strategic and tactical targets is slight. During the next five yean, existing Western strategic and tactical air and missile bases in areas peripheral to thc Bloc will be augmented by additionalof ground launched surface-to-surfaceew of which may bo in hardened sites by thc end of the period. Factors of timing and security, as well as theImprovement in Western airwill make it increasingly desirable that an initial Soviet attack against theseretaliatory capabilities be deliveredwith medium ranee ballistic missiles. Numerous bombers, as well as shorter range missiles, will be available throughout the period for use in initial or follow-on attacks as needed and for other related missions.

We believe the SovieU will seek to deployndissiles and launchers in sufficient quantities so that. In an Initial salvo, they wouldercent assurance of Inflicting severe damage on Westernair bases and unhardened missile sites within range. Considering the potentialcoverage of these missiles when launched from Soviet territory (seeethat for this purpose the USSR would need to have on launcher0issiles plus an equal number of SS-5

"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,oes not concur In the last sentence of thisflee his footnote tof tbe Conclusions.

CDORDT

15

all equipped with high-yieldAs both missile characteristics and thc target system changed, the requiredofissiles on launcher would increase to2 and after, while theequirement would decreaser less1 on."

in the case of the ICBM system,problems in buildingwith medium range ballisticLie ln the preparation of launchingestablishment of logistic support,and training of units, ratherthc production of the missilesestimate that with relativelyrograms, the Soviets could meetrequirement for an initialland-based retaliatory targetsn.m. of the USSR fromgainst such targets1 on. The followingmissiles on launcher are thereforeasoviet Initialover thc next five years:

initial salvo capabilityrepresents only partargerfor medium range ballistic missiles.probable that the USSR is alsomissiles for subsequent use ineneral war and forlaler phasesustained conflict.probably allocate warheads of lessyield to these purposes.)to meet these needs as well'as thoseinitial salvo the USSR producesndissiles perestimateeasonable builduprange ballistic missiles from present

"Calculations were madeanner comparable lo that employed to derive ICBM requirements, using characteristics estimated for the Soviet missile systems In, and planned and programmed Western retaliatory forces. The considerations set forth In paragraph.ould apply here also.

strengths would result Ln total operationalas shown In the table below. Should changing circumstances require somewhat greater numbers of missiles'or even launchers, their production and deployment4 would not present serious difficulties to the USSR.

Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid- 1 2 3 6 SO

VI. LONG RANGE

The history of the BULL and BADGER suggests that hitherto the Soviets havetheir standing requirement for medium bombers in Long Range Aviation atircraft. As medium and long range ballistic missile units become an increasingly effective operational force, this requirement will tend to diminish. We estimate that the medium bomber strength of Long Rangewill gradually decline ton

apid builduphe number of BADGERS in Naval and Tactical Aviation has recently tended to level off. We estimate that inhe BADGER strength of these components will be, respectively. It will probably not decline during the period, and thereossibility that it will be increased through reassignment of BADGERs from Long Range Aviation. The medium bombers of Tactical and Naval Aviation, together with their light bombers, will contribute to Soviet capabilities for attack on naval task forces and Eurasian targets, rather than on targets In the US.

Wc consider it possible that the USSR willedium bomber capable ofdash. On the basis ofomber would be unlikely to be-

" Operational Inventories include missiles on launcher given Inlus additional missiles per launcher for purposes other than Initial salvo. Total production at these missiles would be larcer to provide for training,test Orlng, etc.

-TQg

available for operational use untilr later. Its performance characteristics might be as shown In Annex D. Ii it LsInto operationalotalr so might be provided for highly specialized uses."

Heavy Bombers

e estimate that Soviet heavy bomber strength will increase tout that it will gradually decline thereafter, tonhis estimate is based on the belief that no more than two BISONs per month will be produced over the next year or so, and that their production will then cease."

-The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. believes that the SovieUomber wllh supersonic dashfor employment by Long Range Aviation, primarily In the adranco wave(s) of strategic bomber strikes. Considering recent reports and sighting of new bomber types, and historical and continuing Soviet Interest In the bombertrategic weapon delivery system, and thetechnical capability Of the USSR toandupersonic dash bomber, the Assistant Cblef of Staff. Intelligence. USAF, believes that the Introductionupersonic dash bomber Into operaUonal units Is likely

Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF, believes that the Soviets willequirementarger heavy bomber force during the period of this estimate than that estimated above. He believes that the level and type of acuvlty or the present Soviet heavy bomber force as well as thc continued production of DISON bombersurther buildup. He further believes that BISON-type bombers will be produced at the rate of two or more per month over tlic next few years.

-Tha Assistant Chief of Stall for Intelligence, Department of thc Army, cannot concur ln this estimate of an Increase In operational heavy bomber strength, which would reflect anotercent within the next yearalf over the cut rent estimated strength ofhU nonconcur-rencc Is based on the following factors:

a. Thc trend In annual WSON production has been downward since tho peak production yearhe Increaseeneral reversal ot this trend.

a

b. The totalresumably would Include the sameKAIts now estimated to be InunlU, an aircraft which will then have been out of production for over, four years. Thus, the Increase estimated has either toa still greater BISON production rate or to assume that no BEAR* are withdrawn or otherwise go out of service ln the next yearalf. The former assumption wouldan even sharper reversal of observed trends, while the latter assumption ls hardly reasonable.

The apparent conflict with production trends referred to above could presumably be overcome and the force Increased by adding bombers which hava been produced but are not now in operaUonal status. However, such action would alsoongstandingfor no apparent reason, unless, contrary to our estimates, tha SovieU associate specialwith the dale,

d. Tho apparent emphasisuildup of Long Range Aviation heavy bomber strength, implied5 percent Increase, conBlcU wllh JudgmcnU elsewhere In this NIEhat the Soviets do not regard Increased numbers of their present bombers as the means oftheir strategic attack requirements and thai tney willubstantial buildup with ICBM's during the same period.

Based on analysU ot the foregoing factors, the Assistant Chief of Start for Intelligence.of the Army, concludes that Soviet heavy bomber strength probably will remain relatively unchanged over the next yearalf, and than, wiih the probable cessation of BISON production and Increasing ago of Ihe DEAR, will decline rather rapidly. In his view, future heavy bomtxr strength willthc foUowtaf:

Mtd-ltSl Mtd-IMZ Mid-JKJ

etter than marginal improvement over present Soviet heavy bombers could be achieved by the developmentuclear powered aircraftomber could derive tactical advantages from its virtuallyrange and Its concomitant abuity to make very low altitude penetrations.there are Indications of Sovietin nuclear-powered aircraft, no specific Soviet program directed loward theof such, an aircraft has yet beenWe believe that thc Soviets haverogram underway, but believe it unlikely

17

they will have any nuclear-powered bombers In operational status within the period ol this estimate-1"

n sum. we estimate the operational strength of Soviet Long Range Aviation.BISON and BADGER tanker-bombers, will be about as shown over tho next Ave years:

Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid- 1 mt 3 4

Heavy

BISON and

ISO

O Kit lJSO SCO Total 'l500

* There mightew supersonic "dash" medium bombenerhaps Increasingr son which case we woulda corresponding decreasehe number of BADGERs.

Air-lo-Surface Missiles

here may be some further increase in the number of BADGER regiments equipped with the currently available subsonic air-to-surface missileut its limited range and utility argues against its production and deployment in large numbers. On this basis, we estimate that an operational inventory ofill be maintained during theortion of these missiles willbe equipped with nuclear warheads of

-The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, bollevea that In view of thc tactical andadvantagesuclear-powered bomber. Uie slate of Soviet aviationuclearand the evident Soviet Interest In theof such an aircraftmallof nuclear bombers may appear Instatus by tho end of the period of this estimate.

3 The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. believes that this table should read:

Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid- 1 IHt 3 4 Heavy Bombers5 ISO For the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, sea his footnote to

low and medium yields, the remainderHE.

USSR has need of an improvedsurface missile, for use againsttargets on land as well as againstsea. Wc believe thatissilenow under active development, and thatprobably become operationally availableIt will probably be capableb. warheadange of atn.m. at supersonic speed (Machmissile would presumably be designedcarried by any medium or heavyduring thehe replacement ofnd anto heavy bombers, we estimater moreissilesbeen supplied to operationalyield nuclear warheads will probablyfor those missiles intended forland targets. Medium and lowwarheads, and possibly HElikely to be allocated for antiship use.

the absence of evidence, but onof operational desirability andwe estimate that the USSRhave available air-launched decoysmedium or heavy bombers.could be carried nlong with a

VII. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES

believe that the USSR isthe development of submarinesto launch missiles and offor them to employ. In view ofconsiderations, the most desirablewoulduclear-poweredof launching, while submerged,missiles of atm range. Onof Soviet technical capabilities, wethathe USSR couldfor operational use aballistic missileb. warheadangenm.EPm.indications are that the Sovietsubmarine program Is sufficiently far

so that theissile could beas soon as the missile becomesuclear-powered submarine could probably2 such missiles.

n the absence of direct evidence, butthe potential value of thc weaponwe have assumed an active currentprogram which woulduclear submarine/ballistic missile system ready for operational useeasonable construction program, the Soviets could probablyew such submarines into operational unitswhile continuing the construction of nuclear submarines equipped withn this basis, wc estimate thatubmarines equipped. missiles will be operationalith proper operating proceduresonsiderable portion of this num-

"uller discussion of estimated Sovietand programs for nuclear-poweredsec the forthcoming, "Slain Trends In Soviet Capabilities and"

bo deployed off US coasts ot all times, should the Soviets so desire.

The foregoing weapon system isand expensive, and will probablyin number relatively slowly, in the next few years, the USSR willimited number of new,powered submarines designed to launch ballistic missiles. The capabilitythrough such an interim program would probably be retained to supplementstrength In nuclear-powered missileThe USSR would probably alsoconverted missile submarinesuildup In new submarines. Weeasonable allocation of missiles (excluding those for training and other noncombatwouldumber sufficient for about two combat patrols per submarine.

On the basis of the preceding discussion (sec alsoe project aa follows the numbers of ballistic missile-launchingand their missiles, in Sovietunits, through

Missltcs

Nuclear-powered

m."

8

m

*

ZOO 16

Mid.

missile systemay not be available until as laten which case the missile used in the "Q" class might be used In this submarine.

-Jp-1*

ANNEXES

ANNEX A

CALCULATIONS OF SOVIET ICBM REQUIREMENTS

ANNEX A

CALCULATIONS OF SOVIET ICBM REQUIREMENTS

an aid toward lhc estimation ofgoal of the present Soviet ICBMwe have made calculations ol thoof Soviet ICBMs that would bein each of the years covered byto provide high assurance ofto accomplish certain specificWe have considered threecases, as follows:

Case A: The number of ICBMs required to provide at leastercent assurance of being able to inQlct severe damage on SACair bases, unhardened US ICBM sites, and unhardened command installationsthc range. missiles. This concept would leave olher targetsaval bases and semlhardened and hardenedto attack by missile-launch ingand bombers.

Cose fl: To provide at leastercentof being able to inflict severe damage on semlhardened and hardened as well asUS nuclear retaliatory force targets, including naval bases.

Case C: To provide at leastercentof being able to inflict severe damage on hardened US retaliatory force targets0 percent assurance with respect to others, leaving naval bases to attack by other means.

the accuracy, reliability, andof the Soviet ICBM are notwe have usedasis forsets of performance characteristics,"best" and one the "worst" that canfrom the USIB "Memorandumoft is emphasized that our estimatecharacteristics for the Soviet ICBMcorrespond directly with either thethe "worst" characteristics used for these

calculations.ummary of our actual estimate, see footnote (a) ton thisccordingly, the Illustrativethat follow cannot be directlywith thc capabilities of the probable Soviet ICBM program which appears in01.

In Introducing the numbers derived from these calculations, wc must draw particular attention to the essential distinction between the effect of thc detonationingle Soviet ICBMarget and the number of ICBMs required lo give Sovietesired level of assurance of being able to achieve that effect. It is with thc latter order ofthat Soviet planners would be concerned in establishing Soviet ICBM force goals.

As noted in the Foreword, our calculations are especially sensitive to possible differences between our assumptions and those actually made by Soviet planners with respect to the future performance characteristics of theICBM and to the future development of US retaliatory forces. In any case, we must emphasize that the numbers resulting from our calculations are to be regarded only as approximations. Soviet planners, if they have made similar calculations, havearrived at somewhat differentOn the whole, however, we believe that their orders of magnitude would be the same as ours.

The target systems against which wc have calculated Soviet ICBM requirements consist exclusively of fixed Installations: SACair bases, ICBM sites, naval bases,Installations. An inherent limitation of the ICBM is that it can be employed only against targets the precise locations of which are known In advance. In evaluating the

strategic etTect of an ICBM attack on such fixed installations, Soviet planners wouldo take into account the mobility of the forces based thereon and their reaction times. For example, the primary object of anAC base would be the destruction of bombers prior to take off, but only such bombers as were present on the ground at the time of the attack could be destroyed.an attack on naval bases could have no immediate eflect on aircraft carriers and mis- -sUe-launching submarines at sea Sovietwould have to consider that Soviet achievement of an ICBM capability to destroy air and naval bases could be considerably cfl-;set by US maintenance of sizable air and naval forces airborne and at sea.

n any case, the planned fast reaction times of US nuclear retaliatory forces would requireoviet ICBM attack be delivered In an initial salvo. For this reason, we have assumed that thc USSR would providelaunchers lo accommodate all the ICBMs expected to be in commission at any given time. Our calculations have also assumed that Soviet ICBMs rated as reliable on launcher will actually leave the launcher within minutes of the schedulede are unable to quantify any allowance which should be made for the.technical or otherso precise ain so complex an operation. Itactor which would tend to Increase the number of ICBMs on launcher required, or conversely, to reduce the Soviet assurance of being able to accomplish the desired effect .with thc numbers of ICBMs indicated.

"Tills assumption prosupposcs advanceto maximize readiness.

With respect to US ICBMs, our calculations take into account only the Atlas and Titan programs. Soviet requirements are likely to be Increased, beginning iny the growing but as yet uncertain number of hardened Minuteman sites becomingTo this extent, the Soviet ICBMwhich we show forre low.

With these cautionary observations, weinhe numbers of Soviet ICBMs which we calculate would be required ln each of lhc cases specified in paragraphhrough

As indicated above.eaves naval bases, hardened and semlhardenedto attack by means other than ICBMs. The greatest portion of the Case Atherefore comprises the ICBMs needed on launcher to achieve at leastercentof inflicting severe damage on SAC operational air bases alone. The on launcher requirement against these bases would be as follows:

Mid- Mid- Mid-1 2 3

-Dest" Missile

"Worst-

is clear that as the Soviet ICBM is.thc number required to achieve aeflectelatively staticwill decline, as in Case A. At thehowever, the overall US nuclearforce base structure will beand hardening, with aincrease in overall Soviet ICBMas in Case B.

21

METHODOLOGY

Thereetailed explanaUon ol the method whereby the numbers given inndere calculated.

Boiic Data

types of data were used torequlremenU for ICBMs inthrough thc period cf thisare:

characteristics and performanceSoviet ICBM weapon system underconditions;

target systems which we believewould consider appropriate tostrategic purposes, as set forth in1;

the appropriate degree of assurance ofiven level of damage on thesesystems, as set forth in paragraph 1.

The characteristics of the weapon system which bear most heavily on the number ofICBMs needed to accomplish certainobjectives are accuracy, warhead slxe,and In-commisslon rate. Values for these characteristics used in the calculations are shown in Table B.

The Improving weapon characteristics thus described have in both cases the effect ofthc number of ICBMs required toa given level of damageiven Urget During the time period under consideration, the Increase In accuracy reduces the number of weapons required to fall in the area oftargets. The growth of the on launcher and in-flight reliabilities decreases the number of missiles on launcher required per missilein the target area. Improvement In the in-commisslon rate reduces the number of spare missiles in operational inventory per launcher.

Requirements Against US Retaliatory Bases

basic military target system wascalculating ICBM requiremenU.types of targets were omitted forof strategic attack, as indicated1. The basic military target system in-

cludes all installations, beyond the range ofm. missiles, which possess an immediate retaliatory capability against the USSR According to present US plans and programs, these targeU will increase rapidly In number and change markedly in character throughout the period of this estimate.S ICBM launching sites will begin toajor element of thc targetMoreover, since most such sitesoperaUonal1 and after will be hardened and dispersed, they will bedifficult to destroy. The followingof the basic military Urget system for ICBM attack illustrates its changing

.VUOlPfF Of

- .

1

Unhardened ICBM t I t

Semlhardened ICBM Sites B 39 36

Hardened ICBM Sites 3 33 90

Sac Operational Bases 63 63 63

Naval Bases 10 10 10

Command and Conlrol * * 4

The foregoing list does not Include improved ICBMs now In relatively early stages ofand development, which may begin to be deployed in hardened sites and possibly mobile uniU as well ineriod. Soviet planners would have to Uke intothe possibility that these wouldurther sharp increase In requlremenU.

he number of weaponsunction of the desired degree ofiven level of damage will be Inflictedpecific target. Thc degree of assurance, sayercent, ofiven level of damageingle targetthe likelihood thatarge number of such attacks, at leastercent of the time the target will receive such dnmage. In any given attack the target might be subjectedesser level of damage or might receive far more damage than intended The effect of reducing the degree of assurance Is tothe number of missiles necessary tothe objective. For example, if the degree of assurance against the UrgcU con-

6 KO-titf

starred Inere reduced fromoercent, the number of missiles required on launcher would be cut In half; if assurance were reduced fromoercent, theof missiles required on launcher would be cuthird.

hc criterion of severe damage was used In the calculations of requirements for thc target systems discussed. This criterion, as used by US military planners, calls for tho following damage on various types of targets:

Tyh or ICBM Overturning erectedsevere damage to

nearby above ground fs-

Semlhardened ICBM SIU

Hardened ICBM Site

s

Damage to parked aircraft io

as to requlie depot repair and moderate to severe damage to above ground facilities.

he following procedured tothe numbers of ICBMs and launchers required in each year0

the estimated accuracy,reliability of the Soviet ICBM,numbers of ICBMs required onattain the stipulated degree ofsevere damage will be inflicted ontarget of each type;

each of these numbers byof targets of each type in asystem;

these products to obtain theof ICBMs required on launcher fortarget system;

the estimatedcalculate the size of theneeded to meet the onat any given time;

a minimal additionalof0 percent) forand quality control, and tomajor maintenance and normalcalculate the required totalICBMs

should be emphasized that thcmissiles requirediven year, asbelow, are for an operaUonalwith the characteristics estimatedparticular year. In any given year,the missiles in operational Inventorybeen produced in earlier years. Ifmissiles were not modernizedthe characteristics estimated forunderreaterbe required to accomplish thcconsideration. Moreover, to thethe training and proficiency of thecrews had not reached thein the estimated characteristicsreater number ofbe required.

Requirements Agoinsl US Metropolitan Areas

have also considered the numberwhich would be required to givehigh assurance of being able toa devastating ICBM attack on USof population, industry,and government facilities. Weaboutercent of the total USand aboulercent of US defensefacilities are concentrated inareas. Beyond thismetropolitan areas, the concentrationand' industry falls oflTheserincipalare:

New York

Angeles

Francisco

Louis

town

the Soviets desired at leastercentof detonating one ICBM over each of these metropolitan areas, the oningle salvo would be no more than0 on.

CASE A'

On Launcher In.

CASE B*

On Launcher

In

CASE C

On

I

r

[

MISS1IJIMJS9TI.K'

Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid-

3

] J

]

' seend( this Annex.

'For definitions, seef this Annex.

' In this table, the numbers of ICBMs -in Inventory" are those which would need to bt assigned tounits tn order to have the required numbers on launcher at any given lime. The relationship between missiles in Inventory and on launcher reflecta the in-eoremission rate, estimated Ino Increase fromercent at IOC to aboutercenihe total number of ICBMs produced would Include the additional missiles required for telling, training, and quality control, and to allow for major maintenance and normal attrition. We haveinimal additional quantity for these0 percent).

CEP

Warhead

In Commission

Reliability On

In Flight (percent)

"WORST" MISSILE

70

80

55

Values for ihe 'best" and -worst- characteristics are derived fromnd the USIBto Holders ofatedhe figures for mld-lMO.ndi2 have been Interpolated. Tbe actual estimate of accuracy and inflight reliability, as contained tn the above mentioned Memorandum, may be summarized as follows:

Accuracy

n.m. CEP at IOC; somewhat betterm.

. CEP at IOC;.ll-lnertlal guidance willbe incorporated, after which the probable Soviet ICBM force Is likelycrtial andeuldance systems, with an Increasing proportion of the latter

(footnote) The Assislant Chief of Stall tor Intelligence, Department of the Amy. continues to perceive no justification In presently available Intelligence for the changes reflected in the above characteristics and believes the accuracy for the radlo-lnertlal system at IOC shouldm. CEP; for the all-Inertia! system. CSP.

Inflight Reliability

Estimated toercent atercenthe Assistant Chief of Staff for In-te.ugcnce .Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, believe thet the lower end ot the ranges In both years. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF, believes the reliabilities lie at the upper ends.

yields as estimated for this. assuming no further nuclear tesunpIn calculating ICBM

SECRET

SCALE OF ECONOMIC EFFORT FOR CERTAIN ICBM PROGRAMS

ANNEX B

SCALE OF ECONOMIC EFFORT FOR CERTAIN ICBM PROGRAMS

Annex analyzes ICBM programs which would meet the requirements identified In the main text asat leastercentagainst all retaliatory force targets) andat leastercent assurance against hardened targets and atssurance againstt considers the economic impact of production andprograms which would meet these requirements innd innd compares them with the ICBM program estimated as probable in Section IV of the main text.

An assessment of the economic Impact of thc several ICBM programs considered in this estimate requires the consideration of more than one dimension of the problem.f this Annex summarizes four economicof each program:

of missiles:

of launching facilities;

of military personnel on site;

costs.

Missile Production

Indicated in, wescries production of ICBMs andequipment is already underway InFor purposes of these calculations,in all cases assumed that the firstmissile was delivered early inquarterissile productionprograms Is based upon an ICBMfacility which had been engagedproduction of ICBM vehicles forand lest purposes. Thus, In the prob-

able program this facility is assumed to have begun its missile buildupoing rate of three per month and toeak delivery rate ofer monthonthsissiles in the first yearer year thereafter.

other programs, whereeak rate ofissileswas assumed under the sameand reached in the second year.1'the larger programs required moreof these plants, and it is assumed forofelow that all ofstarted production at the same time.

actual practice, however, thealmost certainly not begin seriesof ICBMs (or any othermore than one plant simultaneously.plant might lag the first bySince only one facility couldbeing the producer of developmenthardware, the follow-on facilitiesstart production until the problemsoutput bad been solved by theThe postulated multiplantmerely leaduplication ofproduction engineeringeven more plants would probablyto meet these larger programs.practice in multlfacility programs can be

"Theissile per month pcaK rate wasas maximumingle (acuity. This assumption waa based upon IndustrialIn the productionultlstaged vehicleass raUo at least as great as thc OS Titan.

25

Table A SCALE OF ECONOMIC EFFORT FOB CERTAIN ICDM PROGRAMS

m

o

CumuUtlve Number of ICBMs InInventory

Number of Missile Plants

Peak rataer month

Peak rat*er month

PeakProduction

Cumulative Number of Launcheri

Peak Monthly Launcher Completion

Military Personnel (thousands)

Cumulative ICBM System Cost" (billion

doUari)

Cumulative ICBM System Cost*

Annual Strategic Attack rubles)

ptobnble

Prcbable

Case 11

Case B

aseC

Scic

i

Excludes cost of nuclear warheads and cost of modernization of previously produced ICBMs.

'Expenditures for fiscal year, assuring other elements of Soviet strategic attack capabilities are as estimated In main text.

illustrated by the following source-timein the BADGER program:

to Reach

Rate Peak

BADGER

, 3

Plant ii, 4

, 5

Inroductionhange in estimated IOC date could result in substantial changes. For example, in the probable programdditionalcould be available on launcher byf the IOC date were estimated to occur three months earlier. However, when applied to the probable programhange could be offset by logistic pipeline lag as well as the assumption that no major problems occur at any point in the production programin schedule slippage.

For each of the final assembly plants in the program there would hove toarge number of subsidiary plants to supplycomponents andarge number of other plants would be required to supply the groundand ground guidance equipmentfor the operation of the weapon system. In many respects the supply of this ground equipment is more of an economic burden than the missiles themselves; missiles represent onlyercent or the initial cost of establishing an operational capability with ICBMs.

Launching Facilities

number of launching facilities Is aof the amount of activity involvedgiven ICBM program. This ts not sothe launcher as such is somore because thisimple way ofall the facilities, other than thethemselves, which are necessary toweapon system. The otherwhich are subsumed under thisthe ground guidance facilities, test, check-

out and maintenance equipment, fueling and storage facilities, housing and generalequipment.

facilities. Including launchers,the major initial costs of establishingICBM system and are thefactoreployment program.case of fixed Installations, hard or soft,activation of launching facilitiesthe efficient scheduling andof large-scale construction projectslocations. In the case of asystem the primary problems wouldthe scheduled construction of specialof the necessary equipment,activation of complete missileconstruction of fixed facilities would bepart of the effort but would still havescheduled Into the entire program.

Since we do not know the Sovietconcept, the present analysis includes two extremes which we believe are likely to encompass thc actual cost and effort involved in activating Soviet launching facilities. Launching facilities for the probable program are assumed to be fixed and hardened, costing SUillion per launcher andotal construction time ofoonths each. Facilities for the other programs are assumed to be fixed and unhardened, costingo J9 million per launcher andotal construction timeonths each. Guidance facilities are assumed to be radio-inertial, and the net costissile system using radio-inertlal guidance is somewhat more than if all-inertial were employed. Costs are based on US plans and limited USadjusting where possible forbetween Soviet and US prices,methods, pay scales, etc.

The preliminary US studies available on rail mobile systems are inadequate toasis for economic analysis. We believe thc cost and effort involved in activating such systems would fall somewhere between thatfor soft and hard fixed systems,closer to the hard than the soft.the major impact would be on theequipment industry rather than the sector of the economy. Semi-

*

fixed systems would likewise fallthc two systems wo Iiave analyzed. Thus we believe that the total cost andeffort shown ln the table may beoverstated in the case of the probable program, and may be somewhat understated in the case of the other programs.

Personnel

number of military personneloperate, service, and guard ICBM siteslarge when compared with theof the Soviet armedarge portion of the operating andpersonnel would have to beThis would require individualtrainingchedule consistentcompletion of launching facilities.with shorter range ballisticshould facilitate this training.

Total Cos!

The total cost for establishing andthe probable ICBM program throughould amount to betweenndillion rubles, exclusive of tha cast of nuclear warheads and research and development. This implies an average annual expenditure0 billion rubles: less than one percent of Soviet ONP. While this percentagenegligible, economic aggregates of this type are too broad to reflect the physical effort and difficulties involved in implementing large programsingle weapon system.

To appreciate the impact of the probable program on thc Sovietomparison with some nonmilitary programs is useful. In thc past seven years the USSK Invested someillion rubles In its ferrous metallurgical industry (iron mining and steelt plans to Increase its crude steel output byercent by investingillion rubles in this Industry in the Seven-Year Plan

9hus the average annual Investment In this major industry wasillion rubles In the past and is planned to be aboutillion rubles ln the future. Investment Ln the machine building, chemical and railroad Industries arc planned for the future at annual rates ofubles per year each. The probable ICBM program in this estimate would imply average annual expenditures of0 billion rubles on the ICBM system alone, more than half thc planned rate for investment In the entire ferrous metallurgical industry of the USSR.

Thc last line In lha table illustrates the eflect of the three ICBM programs onfor strategic attack innd, assuming that other elements of the Soviet strategic attack capability are asLn the main text.oint ofthese expenditures arc estimated to be aboutillion rubleshe probable program implies that these expenditures would beillion rubles Innd aboutillion In

In summary, the probable program is siziblc ln terms of the economic effort Implied in activating and equipping the launching units especially during the first two years after IOC. The economic strain implicit in larger programs, is not soatter of their financial cost as of the magnitude and pace of the physical activities required to produce missiles and ground equipment, to construct launching facilities, and to train operating personnelelatively short period ot time, Even thc accompHshment of the probable ICBM program1 will require highly effective planning,and coordination among selected sub-sectors of the Soviet economy. Although it is likelyultitude of unforeseen, minor bottlenecks will appear, the probable program assumes lhat no major delays will be

ANNEX C

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PROBABLE STRATEGIC ATTACK PROGRAMS

TOP-SB

ANNEX C

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF PROBABLE STRATEGIC ATTACK PROGRAMS

for Strategic Attack Programs

Annex sets forth the expendituresthe USSR has incurred in recentproviding forces for strategic attack,future expenditures implied by theestimated as probable In thisestimate thatoviet expenditures for programsrelated to strategic attack werebillion rubles. The probable programsin this paper will result infor strategic attack, with anexpenditure ofsee

Shifts in Composilion

shifts ln the composition offor strategic attack programstake place. Expenditures relatedrange aircraft were responsible forstrategic attack expenditures duringperiod, but will decline sharplyweight in the projection period.of these aircraft includingmissiles, which represented aboutof cumulative strategic attackin the historical period, isdrop to about four percent of thefor personnel, operationsand construction related towill take diminishing proportionsfor these categories.

"Programs which are estimated only as possible have not been Included in this Annex. Note also that the analysis in this Annex reflects the lower limit Of the ICBM program estimated as probable in Section IV ot the main text.

TABLE A

AVERAGE ANNUAL EXPENDITURES FOR SOvTBT STRATEGIC ATTACK5 rubles)

Total Strategic Attack

and Maintenance

issiles*

Mis-

issiles' ..

Weapons"

are rounded. Totals are derived from unrounded data and do not always agree with those based on rounded components.

cost of continued procurement of BISON and alr-lo-surface missiles and support equipment.

' Includes cost ol submarine-launched mtssltes, conversion of existing submarines andof new missile-launching submarines.

cost ofndICBM) missiles, guidance and support equipment. Costs reflect the lower limit ot the probable Soviet ICBM program. In addition,ntry for constructionillion rubles tor constructing on-site facilities for these missile systems.

for nuclear weapons for strategic purposes are derived from tho Illustrativeof nuclear materials In. The caveats appearing ont that estimate apply.

rocurement and installation of ground-launched missile systems will increasehare of strategic attack expendituresercent fn the historical period to aboutercent in the projection period. At the same

SRCRSY.

time, the share for submarine systems will increase fromercent toperating and maintaining missileare relatively costly, and ground-launched and submarine systems arefor nearly all of the absolute increase in the operations and maintenance category shown In Table A.

The General Scope of the Major Categories

expenditures for strategic attackthis Annex include only directfor the following: (a) personnel ofAviation, long rangeunits and missile launching(b) operations andfor units; (c) procurement ofand of supporting equipmentusing thc weapons;aintenance of airfields andand (e) nuclearsubordinate to Tactical andhave been Included with aircraftRange Aviation for costing

Ground-launched Mmilet

basis for scheduling the productionof Soviet ion Ms resulted fromof actual and planned USby what is known and assumedSoviet practice. In light of thethatewICBMs will probably beof lhe discussion In the main text ofa reasonable productionpostulated which would provideon launcher3 togetherreasonable additional quantityo account for maintc-

Aercent margin between operationaland production lor operational purposes was used In the requirements examined In Annex A.argin Is minimal; theercent margin applied to the probable program Is more reasonable, although still on the low side.

nance, training, production testing andattrition. The production programa buildupeak rate of aboutCBMs per month by the end

production buildup employed inand reflected in thc main text isdifferent from that employed Inin which we considered thatwould be established withand that series production wouldIOC date. The present suialysis takesthe estimate, inroduction would have begun priordate. Assuming the concurrent schedul-

- ing of launching facilities, crews, and logistic support, this change resultsore rapid buildup of operational capabilities in the months following IOC date than was indicated In previous estimates.

For purposes of costing the probable ICBM program, hardened fixed sites were assumed; if the Soviet system is rail mobile, the total cost of the program would be about the same or somewhat lass, but much of the initial cost now allocated to construction would shift to rail mobile equipment and operational costs would be higher. Construction of launching facilities was scheduled for that portion of the operational Inventory expected to be Inat any given time. It should be noted that these launching, guidance and support facilities would average SUillion per launcher nnd account for aboutercent of the Initial costs in the estimated ICBMThc Initial costs of this entireaverageillion per missile on launcher.

Production ofndissiles was scheduledasis similar to that for the ICBM, at peak rates of nine and sevenper month respectively. Thc costing of theas basedoad mobile system; that for lhen rail mobility. Aboutercent of the total estimated ruble cost of these weapon systems is incurred by the ICBM program.

TOP OUBT

ANNEX D

PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET LONG RANGE BOMBERS

n *rm n n

s

S 8!

a

n

9 3 3

5 s

5

S

I 5

S i

8 1

ill

DEPLOYMENT AND TARGET COVERAGE BOMBERS AND MISSILES

CAPABILITY9 BADGER

l" " "

Cf

frrptt

Original document.

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