MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1959-1964 (NIE 11-4-59)

Created: 2/9/1960

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE9

MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

Submitted(Ac DIRECTOR OF CENTRALICENCE

rite foltovtng intelligence orpanuaficufir p'tparolKm of (hii titimatr Tht Central Intelligence Agenep end Iheepartments ot State, lhe Armp. tke Hat. the Air toeee. The Joint Staff. USA. and ah

Concur rr4 ia oy lhe UNITED STATKS INTIXUGENCE BOARDebruary tttO Concurring uert The Dtteetae ofand Research. Department ol State: the Asitilant Chle/ OJ Staff lor Intelligence, Depailmrnt nl the Army; the Assistant Chlel of Naval Operations lor Intelligence.of Ihe Novg; the AtMtlani Chle) af Staff. Inlelttgenee. VSAF. the Director lot Intelligence, The Joint Staff. Ihc Assistant to the Secretary of lieltnte. Special Operations, lhe Director of the NationalAgmc. and the Atomic Snerg9 Commis&um Representative to the VSIB TheDireclor, federal Bureau af tnteitigallon. abstained lhe smojtxt being outside of hu lurtsdictton.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE

SUMMARY OF THE

ESTIMATE

POLITICAL

Khrushchev's Position as

Cliange In Soviet Society under

Problems for the

IN THE SOVIET

Main Emphases of Soviet Economic

Prospects and Problems of the Seven-Year

The Labor Supply

Investment and Labor

Management

Planning

Problems in

Consumer

The Level of Military

) Foreign

Prospects for.

SCIENCE AND

Role of Science in Soviet

Resources and

Level of

PoliUcal

IN SOVIET MILITARY

Basic Soviet Ideas Concerning the Role of Military

Evolution In the Structure of Soviet

Soviet Views on the Current Balance of Military Power

and on

Probable Developments in the Structure of Soviet Forces

Military Policy Toward Other Bloc

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V. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST STATES . 32

Soviet-Salellit*

Sino-Soviet

VL SOVIET FOREIGN

Current Soviet View of the World

Main Emphasis of Soviet Policy in the

Attitude Toward General

Some Alternatives for Soviet Policy Short of General War

Probable Line of Soviet

Policy Toward NATO ond thc

Policy Toward Underdeveloped

ANNEX A: SOVIET MILITARY

Forces lor Strategic

Long Range

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Medium Range Ballistic

Submarine-Launched

Capabilities for Long Range

Air Defense

Weapon

Radar and Control

Air Defense

Soviet Ground Forces and Tactical

Strength and Disposition of Ground

Ground Forces

Air

Capabilities for Land

Naval

Strength and

Submarine

Capabilities for Naval

Special Weapon

Nuclear

Chemical and Biological

Electromagnetic

ANNEX B: TABLES OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY5

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MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

THE PROBLEM

To review significant developments affecting Lhe USSR's Internal politicaleconomic, scientific, and military programs, relations with other Bloc states, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet policies and actions over about the next five years.1

SUMMARY OF THE ESTIMATE

TRENDS IN SOVIET EXTERNAL POLICY

ver the last year Soviet policy toward the West has veered from extremein connection with the Berlin issuearmly expressed willingness to seek new avenues of accommodation through negotiation. Wc believe that,this change of tone is derived from tactical considerations and that theobjectives of Soviet policyis the West remain unchanged. The Soviet leaders currently show great confidence that the trend of events, in what theyto think of as an inevitable struggle

'Th* referenceeriod isThe esUmalei oo the So Tie: economy carry thro conform to the SonetPlan. JuOsmentt on many other matters pertain to periods ol lew than five years, and. particularly on political questions, arefor the most pari to apply for the next year or two.

with the non-Communist world, is in their favor. Their rate of economic progress, their scientific and space successes, their advances in missile development, their estimate of the political tendencies in the underdeveloped countries (despitein some areas) all suggest torowing shift in world power relations favorable to the Communist cause. These considerations as seen by the Soviet leaders permit Iheir policy to be less rigid than formerly. From the position of strength which they believe they now have they see themselves as able not only to engage thc West vigorously on disputed issues when they wish to do so. but also to relax tensions when expedient without any imputation of weakness. Theythemselves able at the same time to pursue their programs of internalincluding the betterment of living standards and the furtherance of rapid economic growth.

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believe that, over theolicyat eliminatingolicy of pressure withbelligerent tone is likely toby the USSR. We expect toof both pressure andand varied as tacticalmay suggest. For the nearerpresent emphasis on negotiationseems likely tothe motif of pressure andprobably reappear. Whateverof emphasis may occur,swings are likely to fall within aexcludes, on the one hand, theassumption of serious andrisks of general war, and, onabandonment of the conceptstruggle between twoworlds.

Khrushchev's unchallengedascendancy, his views are likelythe primary determinant infor the present. His attitudeson the one handtrongthe growth of Soviet military andpower andrude andin asserting the claims of thatthe world's attention andhas been free in his vigorous usethreats. On the other hand,thinks it possible to winfor Soviet views throughrather than by force alone.understands thc horrors ofand his proclaimed dedication toadvance appears to be sincere.genuinely believes that thesystem can prove its superioritycompetition, although hethat Soviet power plays ain this competition. Thus, the con-

tradictory tendencies toward belligerence and accommodation in Soviet policy are probably in someeflection of thc attitudes and personality ofand may persist so long as he is the commanding figure on the Soviet scene.

The immediate outlook is that thewil! continue their present tactics of detente at least through the initial phase of the series of high-level negotiations now ineriod of partial detente presumablyumber of useful purposes from Moscow's point of view. First. It enables the USSR to ascertain through negotiations what positions the West is now willing to take in view ofSoviet strength, anduitable and superficially alluringfor possible Western concessions. Secondly, even barring specificwith the West. Moscow probably views high-level East-West talks as an acknowledgment by the West of thelegitimacy, and equal status of the Communist Bloc. Finally, duringeriod of detente the Soviets would hope to improve their relative powerstill further, since they would expect Western military programs to be carried on with less urgency.

Beyond this phase thc outlook is less certain. The main influence shaping Soviet policy is likely to be the Soviet leaders' sense of their improved power position relative to that of the West. In another year or two they may feel that their capabilities in long-range missiles have brought themeriod when the relations of military power are the most favorable from their point of view. At some stage, they will almost certainly wish to test the chances ot drawing ad-

from this situation if it emerges as they expect. They will still try to win Western concessions basically through negotiation. But the element ofand threat will probably become more pronounced, perhaps much more so, than at present. The Soviet leaders may think it possible to undertake more provocative behavior in areas where they are in contention with Western power and influence. In their view, thestand-off of intercontinental striking forcestalemate only of general war capabilities. They consider that this situation of mutual deterrence would open up new opportunities for advancing Communist power by political, economic, and perhaps even limited military means. We believe, however, that even then they would not wittingly assume serious risks of general war. We believe that they would draw back if the Western response were of such vigor that in their view more extensive Soviet involvement wouldeither serious risk of general war or net political loss. At the same time, we believe that the chance of theirrisks may increase if they remain convinced that their relative power is growing.

6 Although the SovieU have allowed thc Berlin crisis to diminish in intensity, the issues involved in it will remain of high concern to their policy. They willto seek an arrangement aboutunder which both sides wouldat least tacitly the indefinite division of the country. To this end. they will continue to press for some form orrecognition for East Germany. They secevelopment not only as ato the stability of Communist

power in Eastern Europehole, but alsolow against West Germany's relations with NATO which it is theirpurpose to undermine. On thc Berlin issue itself, wc believe that, as long as the Soviets are confident that they can make progress towards their aims inby negotiation and propaganda, they will probably abstain from any major interference with Western access toand fromeparate peace treaty with East Germany. If theythat further progress is impossible by comparatively mild methods, they will probably make the separate peace treaty, though they would not necessarily try at the same time to obstruct Western access to Berlin.

n the coming phase of negotiation, the Soviets are likely to continue to giveto disarmament. By taking thein this field they will expect to earn broad political dividends since hopes for peace throughout the world are associatedesire for disarmament measures. The Soviets may actually wish torutback in somein order to improve theirfor long-run political andcompetit'.on, but we do not believe that they are obliged for economic reasons toar-reaching arms reduction agreement. They would probably not even regard such an agreement assince they consider that their great military strength is an essentialin the challenge they pose to thc non-Communist world. Moreover the Soviet aversion to extensive foreign controls and inspection in the USSR persists, and will almost certainly exclude anything more lhan limited agreements.

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if Soviet policy seeksEuropeeduction of tensionswith the Western Powers, itbe increasingly active incountries of Asia,Latin America. The Soviets seepolitical ferment in these areasopportunities for eliminatingand ultimately the likelihoodrevolutionary turn which willcontrolled forces topolicy of appealing tosuch areas through trade and aidconventional forms ofwill probably continue tothe general framework forFrom time to time, however,will probably have tothe prospective gains of aattempt to seize power inanother country would Justifythis policy andrisks and difficulties ofaction. During thethis estimate there are likely to bewhich thc Soviets will be morethey have recently been tomilitant action by loculalthough they would probablyabout involving the Bloc insupport to such action

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE SOVIET POWER

challenge which the USSRfor the West over the next fiverestontinuing growth inof Soviet power--military,and scientific Advances inof national power can bea great state which has reached adevelopment in which il can for the

first time realize its full potentialities. But this process is accelerated in the USSR by thc presenceoliticalwhich is single-mindcdlyto the aim of aggrandizing the power of thc Communist system. It Is always possible that the upward trend in the growth of Soviet power internally could be arrested by the appearance of political instabilities, either within the USSR or In its relations with otherstates, but at present we see no basis for estimating that this is likely to be the case.

Military Developments

he single most importantaffecting the structure of Soviet military power during the period of this estimate will be the buildup of an ICBM force. Long-range missiles will enable the USSR to overcome its inferiority to the US in nuclear strategic attackas il was unable to do with bomber aircraft. Because of the uncertainties, risks, and high economic cost involved in acquiring ICBM capabilities which would permit them to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forces with thc degree and certainty of success required to insure that the USSR couldeneral war without itself incurring unacceptable damage, wc do not believe that the SovieU will attempt to build an ICBM forcefor this purpose. Nevertheless, they will probablyubstantial long-range missile force. They will almost certainly wish toigh degree of deterrence, and beyond this,orce offering as much promise of successre-emptiveor indeedetaliatory attack.

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as can be bought within acceptableof economic cost. Also, and again consistent with acceptable cost, thewill probably build up their planned force rapidly in order to capitalize through poliUcal exploitation on their lead over the West in missile development. On thc basis of these criteria, wc estimate that the probable ICBM program willinumber of missiles on launcher on the orderore tentatively, because of technical and political factors which may affect Soviet plans in the interim, we estimate thatICBMs on launcher are likely to number in the rangenn

espite the effort which we estimate that the USSR will make to build long-rang attack forces, it will almost certainly not do so at the cost of sacrificing its other military capabilities. The Sovietsthat their military policyange of nuclear and nonnuclearpermitting flexibility in the choice of means and the scale of operations in accordance with the political objectives soughtarticular area. Tiie Soviet leaders probably believe that such varied capabilities become even more important under mutual deterrence from general war when, in their view, pressure and threat, maneuvers and coups, evenlocal wars may be undertaken with greater freedom and pushed further lhan

:The views ol lhe members of Ihc USIB vary as to tht most probable number within this ranee. See the statement of their separate views Inollowing this summary.

'The Assistant Chief of Start, intelligence,issents from this paragraph. See his statement Inollowing this summary.

in the past' Thus we believe that the Soviets will continue to maintainground, air. and naval forces, and that to the maximum possible extent these forces will be dual purpose, capable of employing nuclear or nonnuclear weapons, as circumstances dictate.

n addition to the buildup of long-range missile capabilities there willumber of other major developments in the Soviet forces over the period of this estimate. Thc effectiveness of the airsystem against bomber aircraft will be increased by the new surface-to-air missiles now being installed on ascale for the defense of vital areas, and by additional control and warning systems to improve reaction times. The most significant developments in thc ground forces will be the widespreadof missiles for tactical use and the achievement of greater mobilityfrom new motorized equipment, transport aircraft, and helicopters. The Soviet Navy will probably continue to give priority attention to the development of

'The Director lor intelligence. The Joint Stall, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, do not concur In the estimate that the USSR probaOly believes that ll can undertake the actions described with frealer freedom and can push then; further than in the past-oviet judgment would. In the view of the above memtsei* of the USID,involve an estimate by the Kremlin thatthe Unitedto their pressures and probing* would lack the vigor necessary to dissuade them. They do not believe that the Soviets will make such an estimate.

The Assistant Chief of Staff.would revise the sentence In questionThe Soviet leaders probably believemutualwar eventu-

ates, such capabilities could become even more important, when pressure and threat, maneuvers and coups, even undeclared local wars may be undertaken with greater freedom and pushed further than In the past.

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and the buildupuclear-powered and missile-launchingforce will be the most importantto Soviet naval capabilities.

Economic Developments

Although the continuing rapidof the Soviet economy aimed at in the Seven-Yearilla number of serious problems, we believe that the goal ofercentincrease in industrial output will in the main be achieved. As in the past the plan In agriculture will not be achieved, and net output is likely to rise by about one-fifth in the seven-year period asroclaimed goal ofercent. The position of the Sovietwill continue to improve, thoughomewhat slower rate; consumption goods and services per capita will probably increase aboutercent during the plan period as compared0 percent gam over thc preceding seven years.

Even though some goals oi the Seven-Year Plan may not be achieved in full. Soviet gross national product (GNP) will probably continue to grow atercent per annum.ate of growth is impressive by any absolute standards and will bring the Soviet economy measurably closer in size and strength lo that of the US Assuming that the US maintains an average annual rate of growth in-GNP ofercent, Soviet GNP measured in dollars will increase from aboutercent that of the US at present to about half that of the USowever, morethan this rough comparison of the gross size of the two economiesomparison of the uses to which national

resources are put. The smaller Soviet economy has in recent years supported military expenditures which, measured in dollars, were about equal to those of the US. Likewise Soviet investment in the economyhole is currently almost equal to that in the US, and Soviet investment in industry may be somewhat greater.esult of this steadyof large resources to growth,5 the absolute annual increment to GNP in the USSR will approach that In the Ua

Soviet leaders are aware thatand rapid economic growth isasset in the worldIt will enable them to carryof competitive armamentsThe USSR will be able toaid programs, and perhapsin world markets In anThis will mean political leveragecountries. If, in addition, thecan finally raise livingto demonstrate that theirfor the growth of welfare asthe expansion of national power,expect the influence ofspread even more rapidly. Thecan be counted on to pressof their economy in all waysthem, including substantialwhen necessary, in orderthe political goals which theyas the real aim of economic policy

Scientific Developments

achievements of its scientistsone of the principalthe USSR's prestige and influence,Soviet political leadership has been

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in exploiting this fact as aof the superiority of thesystem in competition with the West. The Soviet successes ariseenerous commitment of resources over the years to training personnel andresearch facilities, from the fact that the motivations and incentives of scientists in the Soviet environment are high, and especially from theof efiort in fields related to national power. The rate of advance of Soviet science appears to be increasing, and the current Seven-Year Plan, which relies heavily on scientific and technological achievements, will provide additionalThus, significant Soviet advances in science and technology are likely to occur with greater frequency than in the past, and over the next several years, thc USSR may achieve world leadership in some additional scientific areas. It will probablyumber of "firsts" infields. In the immediate future, these are most likely to occur in the Soviet space program, but thc quality andof research on such problems as controlled thermonuclear reactions and direct conversion of heat to electricity may produce spectacular results in other scientific fields.

Internal Political Developments

he outlook on the Soviet internal political scene points to continuingKhrushchev's position as leader has become virtually unassailable, and if he lives, will probably remain so during the period of this estimate. While there may be elements within higher Party circles which mistrust his leadership, it Ls unlikely that, in the absenceajor failure of his policies, any effective opposi-

tion could form. Given Khrushchev's age, however, the prospectewproblem probably already figures in inner Party maneuvering.demise is most likely to be followed by another period of "collective leadership"hase of contention for the top position. We continue to believe that the Soviet system has an inherent tendency to revert to one-manThe inevitable struggles for power which this produces are not likely to menace the stability of the regime, much less alter the nature of its most basic policies. However, the fact of personal government is likely always to affectthe manner and tone of Soviet policy.hrushchev's successor might bring to the conduct of Soviet policy features quite different from thoseof the present dictator.

he years of Khrushchev's rise to power have been markederies of reforming changes intended to cope with problems raised by past policies and with new conditions resulting from rapidand modernization. The relaxation of police terrorreater concern for living standards, some greater degree of ideological flexibility, wider foreignore pragmatic and innovating spirit applied to institutionalthese are changesore than transitory character which, even if there should be some reversion, willasting influence on the future evolution of thc Soviet system. Their main effect for the present has been to give the Sovietopeful sense of forward movement, and thereforemore satisfaction with the regime and its goals than has existed at any time in the Soviet period. But it docs not

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that the changes which have taken place so farore basicaway from totalitarianodern industrial society is notincompatibleotalitariansystem, especiallyation like Russiaong authoritarianIn any case, for the period of this estimate we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to diminish the motivation, will, orof the regime to project its rapidly growing power externally.

Soviet Relations with Other Communist States

he challenge which the USSRto the non-Communist world will be much affected by the extent to which Soviet authoritynified bloc of the Communist states is maintained. In Eastern Europe Soviet authority appears more firmly established than at any time since the eventsoland'sinstability continues to be anfactor in Eastern Europe,the disruptive influence of itsin internal policy seems to beas thc Gomulka regime movesighter discipline. However, there are signs that Communist China is becoming less disposed to accept Soviet guidance in domestic and foreign policy, even though it has outwardly compliedumber of disputed issues in recent months We believe that the problem of intrabloc harmony is far from beingDisharmony is likely to arisewith the appearance of new issues, and in the long run will probably be one of the more critical problems with which the Soviet leaders will have to cope.

he main challenge to Sovietand unity within the Communist Bloc in the future is likely to come from China. The Sino-Soviet relationship will probably become increasinglyand difficult as Chinese power and prestige increase, and as Soviet levers of authority over China become lessFrictions have already arisen over extremist tendencies in Chinese internal policy, over Chinese ideologicalover foreign policy tactics, and probably over whether the USSR should supply nuclear weapons to China. These or other frictions may be magnified in the future. Thc Chinese have always reserved their right to exercisejudgment on doctrinal and tactical issues. We believe that they willexercise this right, not only inaffairs, where direct Soviethas always been minimal, but in external affairs as well. Thus each party to the Sino-Soviet alliance may come to act more in terms of its view of its own national needs and interests. This does not mean, however, that an open rupture is in sight; both parties recognize that their alliance is vital to them inthe hostile lorces of theworld.

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Views on the Soviet ICHM Prooiam We Jiuve concluded that the probable Soviet ICBM program would provide on tho order ofCBMs on launcher in mid-iwi. Within this ranse, th* Assistant Chief lor Intelligence. Departmeru ot the Army.he Assistant Chief of Navalfor lntellieer.ee. Department of the Navy. eiU-mate that the Soviet program is likely to be loward the low side. Tne Director of Intelligence andDepartment or Slate, lhe Assistant Chief or Suff. Intelligence. USAP. and the Director torThe Joint staff, believing that Soviet planners would regard the advantages lo be gained aa justifying sddlUonal effort, estimate that the number ol Soviet ICBMs onikely to be towards the high side olange

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OUsenl on the Estimate of the Soviet ICBM frooraot

The AuUUDl Chief of SUIT. Intelligence. USAF. does not believe that soviet behavior, a* we have observed it. warrants the Judgment that theirwould be satisfied by attainment of only substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attackRather, he believes that the Soviet rulers are endeavoring to attain at the earliest practicableilitary superiority over the United Stales which they would consider lo be so decisive as to enable them either to force their will on the United States through threat of destruction, or to launch such devastating attacks against Ihe United States that, at the cost of acceptable levels of damage to thcmnclves, the United Statesorld power would cease to exist. He further believes that such an objective could be attained by the development of their overall military capabilities whleh would include an operaUonal ICBM force of about ISO Utt on launcher) byl,S on launcheri bynd0 on launcheri byl

It Is generally agreed that the Soviets have both "he technical and industrial capability to produceorce; Uie physical difficulties therebywill almost certainly not be the limiting factor.

Il is the view of the Assistant Chief of Staff.USAF, that, while Soviet planners will undoubtedly feel that they will have attained ator substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack by2 or earlier, the real objective of the Soviet ICBM program is "decisive militaryHc believes that the Soviets would not be content with conceptual levels of deterrence; they would realize th* possibility of error In their own calculations and acknowledge the possibility of Western pre-emption of Ihcir deterrent capabilities. This latter contingency would weigh the more heavily if the Soviet leaders intended, as he believes Ukely. to eaploit their capabilities in politicalIn this event, their estimate of (heof Wrslemcts would induce them to attempt attainment of totalilitary superiority."

O

ESTIMATE

I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Position As Loader

hrushchev's position as the leader olRussia has become virtually unassailable, and it he lives, will probably remain so during tlie period of this estimate. While there may be elrments within higher party circles which mistrust his leadership, it Is unlikely that, in the absenceajor failure of his policies, any effective opposition could form. Apersonality cult has begun to envelop the new leader, who nowerious interest in establishing his own place ln world history. As is the founder of thc Soviet state, and Stalin the builder of Socialism in one country, so Khrushchev evidently hopes to go down in history as the leader who brought Russia to the threshhold of communism and gave the Communistecisive weight andin the world.

here is no indication lhat Khrushchev will resort to the terroristic methods employed by ui a. the peak of his power.appears genuinely concerned to develop another image ofthe leader who exercises power humanely and ln closeto the will of Party and people. There probably is. Inreer and frankerwithin the inner circle of the top leadership than there ever was in Stalin's time. The regime has even allowed someof influence by interested groups on some measures of lesser political consequence, as for example in the cases of the educationaland the reorfjanization of scientificHowever, there has been no evidence that decision-ma king willore con-stituUonal character, and In fact Khrushchev himsell could react to possible policy failures by adopling more arbitrary methods. In any

case, the role ol the people continues toassive one.

iven Khrushchev's age, the prospectew succession problem probably alreadyin inner Party maneuvering.himself hashat Kozlov would be the successor, but probably meant this only in the senseczlov's positionirst Deputy Prime Minister made him the logical next Chairman of the Council ofThere would almost certainly be other contenders for the real power, which willto reside ln whoever has control of the central Tarty apparatus. Khrushchev'sis most likely to be followed by another period of "collective leadership"hase of contention for the top position. Weto believe that the Soviet system has an inherent tendency to revert to one-manThe Inevitable struggles for power which this produces are not likely to menace the stability of the regime, much less alter the nature of its most basic policies. However, the fact of personal government is likelyto affect profoundly the manner and lone of Soviet policy. Thus. Khrushchev'smight bring to the conduct of Soviet policy features quite different from those characteristic of the present dictator.

Change in Soviet Society under Khrushchev

s Khrushchev's policies have unfolded it has become more and more clear that his rule was to be marked by significant changes in the USSR. Some of these changes wereto mitigate the evils ol Stalin'sits police terror, Us isolation and xenophobia, its Dtglect of livingof which

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had come to be teal obstacles to thc country's internal development and to the spread o! Communist influence outside thc Bloc. But Khrushchev is evidently attempting to do more lhan correct evils and remove negative features. He is concerned toragmatic and innovating spirit which will free the development of Soviet society from the constraints of stale doctrines,ontinuing growth ol Soviet power, and at the same lime improve the material lot of thepeople.

Regime and People. Perhaps the mostchange that Khrushchev hashas been in the relationship between the Soviet regime and the people. Whereas Stalin seemed lo assume that there was an implacable hostility between regime and people, Khrushchev has acted on the belief that by-and-targe the loyalty of the Soviet people could be trusted. It was on this basis that he altered Stalin's control system,mainly upon material incentives and promises to stimulate active cooperationo( using unpredictable police terror to cow the Soviet people into submission. This did not mean, of course, that the regime was prepared to allow anything like real freedom or to deprive itself of its controls through the Party and police apparatus to maintainas needed. At most it meant that, instead of being regarded, as enemies, thepeople came to be treated as good though potentially wayward children. Against the experience of almost three decades of Stalin's terror this comparatively benevolent but watchful paternalism has evidently seemed to the great majority of Soviet people toonsiderable gain. The effect of this and such other equally important factors as the gradual Improvement in living standards, scientific successes, and gains in international prestige has been to bring about what isider sense of satisfaction with thc regime and ils goals than has existed at any time in thc Soviet period.

Renovation of the Party. Khrushchev has also sought to revitalize the Communist Party, and to make ofore responsive andinstrument of rule. Its ascendancy over other organs ofpolice, army, and

stateseemed to be threatened at various times in the unsettled years lollowing Stalin's death, has been firmly re-established. The corps of full-limein the Party apparatus has been reducedercent,umber of replacements have occurred in the middle ranks with tbo announced aim of advancing able younger men and of retiring incompetents. Moreover, an attempt Ls being made to improve the tech-nicial and professional training of Partyparticipating in the operation of the economy. In consequence, the regime has probably improved its ability to obtainadministration of ils programs.

conomic Reorganization. It is in theof thc economy that Khrushchev's innovating temperament has found greatest play. The changes of economicwith thc setting up-of regional economic councils7 have apparently helpedto reduce the snarl of overcentralixa-lion tn the Moscow ministries and to give room for Initiative at the operating level in industry. The attack on agricultural stagnation with new land expansion and measures to improve the efficiency of collective farms has resulted in significant gains in output. But beyond particular measures, the willingness toold institutions and procedures in the light primarily of the criterion oi productivity has apparently given fresh stimulus to the Soviet economyhole.

deological Flexibilityocietyas much by ideology as is that of the USSR, there Is alwtys thc danger that doctrine willarrier to adaptive change as the society's evolution presents new problems. Khrushchev Is determined to narrow and ll possible eliminate in Lhe shortest possible time the disparity which exists between Soviet theory of how things ought to be and theol Uie existing system; in brief, he wants to make Soviet socialism work.He haslo enhance ideology as anforce by presenting his reorganizations and relormsrogrammatic transition into communism. At the same time, he often promulgates necessary measures andseeks such ideological justifications aa

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be indicated. He has emphasized that Marxism-Leninismoctrine which should be open to new insights. It was thistoward what his supporters calledMarxism" and what his opponents labeled as "praclicism" which was apparently one of the issues between Khrushchev and his opposition. With his victory in the inner Party struggle. Soviet policyar more flexible and practical approach to its problems.

Foreign Contacts. Finally,more significant changes of theregime hasew manner Inof relations with the outsideaside the consequences of this inpolicy proper (see Chapterthad important repercussions on thescene. The willingness to permitdegree of contact with theto lift the garrison atmospherehad imposed, has tended tomistrust of the regime. For theclass, especially in technicalwider contacts have apparently beenvalue. At the same time, thehasolid advantage into knowledge ofrime motivation in opening

Problems for tho Fufuro

changes discussed above have beento cope with certain problems raisedpolicies and by rapidmodernization. This they seem toat least for the present. Especiallyfrom within the framework ol ItsSoviet society is probably inand healthier slate today thanat the time of Stalin's death. Attime, however, the new measures andprocesses of change are togethera new set of conditions in the USSK.likely that current policies willrise lo serious problems. Il is eventhat thc new measures of recentthe beginnings of basic change inof Soviet Institutions.

t is clear that the Soviet leadershave been disturbed at some of the "negative" manifestations which havetheir loosening of tho reins.officials have had to be warned against diversion of resources to local purposes. The reappearance of national minority sentiment has evoked purges of local party organizations. Anlireligious propaganda has again been somewhat intensified Pressure on writers and intellectuals for conformity has beeneased and tightened. Thereform introducing work requirements Into student programs has provided into its othereans of discipline against excessive interest in "alien bourgeois" influences. Beyond such measures ofand warning, however, the regime apoar-ently counts mainly on stimulating greater popular support and even some revivedfervor through Its promisenewhe building of communism isa stage in which there will be greater material benefits for all.

he effects on the Soviet people of the repime's current policies, ln particular the lessening of fears and tensions and theof contacts with lhe West, are extremely difficult to forecasthort period, such as lhat covered by Ihis estimate, the regime probably runs no very serious risks It will probably continue to be cautious and selective with respect to the outside contacts it permits, and it will retain ample means of acting against dissidence if necessary. It Is probably also correct in lis calculation that increasing material benefits and pride in the USSR's scienlific achievements and statusorld power will tend tu olfnet the discontents which may be stimulated by increased education,ider diffusion of administrativeby freer communication within theand by broader knowledge of thewoild. Moreover, despotic government is soart of the Russian historicalthat it tends to be accepted by the people as normal In addition, tlie Soviet regime is likely to be sufficiently responsive to popular desires and presures to avert theof discontent ln any really serious form.

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Some observers have suggested that basic change could occur in the Soviet systemrocess of institutional evolution away from totalitarian dictatorship. In ourodern industrial society is nototalitarian political system, especiallyation like Russiaong authoritarian tradition. However, it is pos sible to imagine circumstances inollective organ of authority like thc Central Committee of the Party could come tothe system, and giveorecharacter. This might happen,ominating Individual leader failed to appear at some juncture, and if at the same lime thereecline in the Party'sauthority accompanied by popular

pressures for more liberal and moderateAny such combination ofseems remote at this lime.the Communist Partyard political school which seems likely to go on producing forceful leaders. Hence, insofar as it isto formulate judgments on matters of this kind atrediction that the Soviet system is likely to endureong Lime in essentially its present form seems the only sate one to make. In any case, for the period of this estimate we see no prospect of change on the Soviet domestic scene so fundamental as to dimmish the motivation, will, or capacity of the regime to project lis rapidly growing power externally.

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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY

EMPHASES OF SOVIET ECONOMIC POLICY

Soviet policy continues lo emphasize rapid economic growth and maximum expansion o( the bases of national power. The Seven-Years presentedecisive step toward matching American achievements in economic output, and toward bringingsociety into thc era o( communism. The mood of the leadership, which evidently feels itself to be on the highroad of majorIn Soviet competition with the West, is one of solid optimism Indeed, the Soviet leaders, though aware of serious problemsthem, claim that they will fulfill the Seven-Year Plan, or al least certain aspects of It. ahead of schedule.

This optimismolid basis in theof the economy over the last two years and in thc success of various reforms that have been adopted. Thc industrialwas carried out without serious disruption and is now operating tolerably well. Measures to expand agricultural production and increase efficiency have achieved adegree ofajor reailoca-Uon of investment funds78 to raw material Industries appears to havethe raw material shortages that appearedndustrial growth over the three58 has0 percentDue in large partumpergrowth of GNP8 was probably in excessercent as comparedr 7in the preceding years.n the other hand, there hasevere drought and on this account the growth in fiNP wilt be curtailed.

The major theme of thc Seven-Year Plan, as in the case of its predecessors, is the growth of heavy Industry. Output of producers goods is again scheduled to growore rapid annual3 perceni) than output3otal industrial production Is lo grow at an average annual rateercent. Although outputs of basic industrial materials are generally to grow more slowly than In thc past, their rates of growth still involve tasks of considerableand represent progressively largeradditions to production in absolute terms. Production of steel, for example, is planned to growate ofercent annually, in contrastlanned rate ofercent in the abandoned Sixth Five-Year Plan, and7 percent achieved in the Fifth Five-Year Plan. But the quantity of crude steel produced In the next seven years Is scheduled lo jump from aboutillion metric tons per year. IntartlingIs planned. Output in this field Ls slated to triple and will include for the first time significant quantities of plastics,and petrochemicals.

The task of the regime is made moreby the inclusion in the Plan of important secondary themes in addition to theof heavy industry. The regime has made such emphatic promises to improve the material standards of the population that It may find it difficult to sacrifice consumption and welfare goals, as it has often done in the past, when their achievement threatened other production targets. The greatest single effort in favor of the consumer will come in alleviating thc extreme shortage of housing. The regime claims that new construction under the plan will increase the total urban

housing spncc by aboutercento( this goal would raise urban living space per capita by about one-third. Even with this Increase, however, per capita living space for city dwellers will still be only about three-fourths of the official sanitary norm of nine square meters.

Another secondary theme of current Soviet planning Is the continuing effort lo find more effective forms of organization tn agriculture, the condition of which must appear to the leaders toainful contrast to their progress in industry. The grandiose plan0 percent increase in gross agriculturalappears to be based, not on any significant extension of the area under cultivation, but rather on increases in yields, obtained by greater use of machinery and fertilizers, proper crop rotation, and improved seeds. Both livestock, numbers and output per animal arc to increase In addition, emphasis will be placed on Improved management practices.

Achievement of these Soviet objectives in industry, agriculture, and consumption rest primarilyery substantial Increase in the planned investment program. Overall, the sums invested are to beercent greater than in the preceding seven years; Inalone they are to be doubled. Measured ln rubles, the proportion of the nationalploughed back into thcuarter at the beginning of the Plan period, is to be one-third by Ils end.

PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS OF THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN

he road to the broad horizons5 is noi, however, without obstacles. Postwar recovery, and the period of relatively easy gains through Improvements in technology and management, are over. Another new factorharp decline in the rate of Increase of the population of working age These facts call for new approaches to the problems of economic development. The "Soviet response is along three lines: (a) efforts toarger proportion of the population into the labor force, (b) efforts to modernize industrial equipment and hence achieve rapid growth In productivity of labor; and (c) efforts to im-

prove economic management includingof incentives at all levels.

of these efforts is attended byIt is correspondingly difficult tothe degree of success the Soviethave or the further expedients tomay resort. On the whole, we do notthat thc problems which arethe following paragraphs will preventsectors of the economythe Plan goals. However.has loudly proclaimed histhe goals will be fulfilled ahead ofThe problems are serious enoughsuch an achievement verythey are fundamental enough,the field of management, so thai thewhich the regime copes with them willbearing on the further evolution ofeconomic system.

Tho Labor Supply Problem

One of the main problems which confronts the Soviet planners In thes that of labor supply According to the Scven-Year Plan, state employeesll except the armed forces and collectiveare to increase byillion persons, whereas the natural increment to the labor force, because of low birth rates during Worldill amount only to about eightalf million. Soap belwcen labor required and the available supply couldfulfillment of the Plan, especially ln view of the pledge to reduce hours of work and the high gains In labor productivity which are already assumed in the Plan. The Soviet leaders have already begun lo attack this problemroad front.

The measures the regime is undertaking will, wc believe, permit it to achieve Its labor force goals. Khrushchev has recentlyhis intention to cut theut of this orderill materially ease thc labor supply problem during the period when the natural increase in lhe labor force will be smallest. Further Increments of workers also may come fromge groupof thc probable continuation2

the current downward trend in theof this age group enrolled in fulltimc school. The opening or. more restaurants and public nurseries will release women for the labor force The shorter work week and the higher minimum wages for unslcilled workers may also serve to increase femaleWhatever portion of the gap in the planned increase in the state labor force Is not covered by transfers from the armed forces and greater labor force participation by the populationhole can. we believe, beby transfers from the collective farms

Investment ond Labor Productivity

n the past. Industrial labor force goals have been overfulfilled by wide margins and have compensated for failure to meet labor productivity plans. Since labor will be harder to obtain. productivityey factor in meeting industrial output goals This fact has ledhanged pattern ofItattern intended to insure the high gains in industrialercent annually per man-on which Plan fulfillment depends. Except In the raw material sectors of Industry,of output are to come In relatively greater degree than before from increasing productivity of existing plants than from the construction of newetermined and centrally directed program for modernita-Hon of existing plant and equipment is under way throughout the economy, with emphasis on automation and mechanization.machine tools arc to be made available at nearly double the previous rate. Railroads arc being diesclized and electrified. There Is loajor expansion of civilian airusing several new aircraft types nowinto service,ixfold increase in pas scnger and freight traffic5 is planned. Thc shift away from coal to more easilyfuels, such as oil and natural gas. win conUnue and become more pronounced, coal is to supply onlyercent of5 as againstercent

hile modernization will Increase laboi productivity it will also bring problems of its own. Frequent and widespread retooling is a

new problem for Soviet managers; it Is only recently that tho regime has officiallyobsolescence as an acceptablein depreciation accounting. Illustrative of the difficulty is the significant drop in production experienced at one time or anothery the machine tool,equipment, and automotive industriesesult of change-over to new types and models. The evidence suggests that Soviet managers may be somewhat slow Inthe complex problems Involved In plant modernization, especially since this is now to be attempted throughout the economy. Thus achievement of the planned rate ofIs doubtful, and to the extent that it is not achieved, overall Plan goals will be more difficult to fulfill.

task of achieving continuingof Increase In labor productivity Isattackedrowing emphasis onmaterial and psychological.entire consumer programpart an effort to persuade the Sovietto work harder and to produce moreof enlightened self-interest. Hispropagandizing of the themes ofand prosperous fulure and of apower in thc world are also intendedextra effort. More concreteare being offered in promiseshours of work and to raise wages.endhour work week Isfor all state employees, and by thcthe Plan period the transition to ats to have begun Meantime theol the state-employed worker is tobyercent, and the wages ofpaid categories of workers by

Monogement Problems

the period of the Seven-Yeargains will depend increasingly onmanagement, particularly withthe introduction of new technology. Asystem, recently introduced, ismaking managers at all levels moreUp to now. ihe Sovietbonuses were tied to overfulfilment

of output goalsigid time schedule, were reluctant to experiment or to risk Interrupting production to introduce new machinery and procedures. Under the new bonus rules, managers' bonuses are tied to the plant's success in cutting production costs while still meeting output goals. These new rules shouldore receptive attitude toward new technology. Moreover, anpropaganda campaign currently is being carried out against the reluctance to innovate, and additional special incentives toward this end probably will be introduced shortly. At the same time, scientific research Is beingto emphasize "applied" research and to connect research institutes more closely with industrial plants.

hc industrial reorganization7 was an attempt to overcome the inefficiency of huge central bureaucracies byimited rote to newly created regionalIt has evidently been beneficial in some respects, notably because it has speeded up decision-making, and has given more room for initiative at the operating level.it haside effect, denounced by the regime ashich iscausing concern. The two mostmanifestations of localism so far are fadure to fulfill interregional deliveryand diversion of resources to noivpro-duclng projects, such as recreational facilities, which arc not approved by central authorities. In some instances (Latvia, for example) local-Ism has also taken on the complexion of minority nationalism. The problem has been kept under control, however, by speciallegislation, by firing offending officials, and by the creation of party control units at the factory level.

Planning Problems

rowing problem of the Soviet economy is the lack of reliable efficiency criteriaasis for economic planning. The system of setting prlcrs and production targets without relation to real costs has resulted inwaste and inefficiency. This becomes more troublesome as the economy becomes more complex, for continued rapid growth

then depends more upon closely calculatedchoices. These are difficult In the absenceelation of prices to each other which accurately reflects thc real casts af producing various goods.

he Soviet leaders have responded to these problems by encouraging economists tothe criteria for investment choice and proper price setting. They have alsoenlarged contacts between Soviet and Western economists tn order to obtain the benefit of the more cost-conscious Western planning techniques. They are setting up. as part of the new scientific academy ina center to apply Western input-output analysis, and are equipping Itigh speed electronic computor. They areensus of capital plant andwhich could provide the kind of datafor such analysis. In addition, they haveew State Scientific-Economic Council with ministerial status for directing and coordinating economic research related to planning problems and have placed it in charge of a leading planner hrough such improved planning methods thc Soviet leaders aim to maximize efficiency and growth without endangering the centraldirection of the economic system. they do not plan any drastic reforms for thc present. They may be led eventually, however, to consider further Institutional changes which, asould produce sharp conflict between those who remain politically doctrinaire and those who approach economic problemsore pragmatic spirit.

Problems in Agriculture

griculture has longroblem for the Soviet economic planners, and will remain so In the years ahead Not only have they set extremely high requirements for gains inbut they evidently Intend ta reduce the amount of labor available to achieve the gains, since the labor supply scheduled for industry will necessarily require some withdrawals from the farms. They have planned togreatly the amount of machineryto the farms, but If there are difficulties

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In fulfilling plans for Industrialthis ambitious goal may not be met It is true that Soviet agriculture Is notoriously inefficient and that there is room for great productivity gains, especially If the planned larger scale of investment is carried out. However, it is probably also true that in order to achieve these gains, the Soviet leaders wil) attempt to make some important changes in the collective farm Institution.

he general tendency of these changes has been apparent from certain reformingof recent years and from others now projected. Tbe system of multiple prices set by the state for agricultural commodities has been replacedingle price system which diminishes the great income disparities among farms by increasing the earnings of poorer collectives and reducing the Incentives ofand their members to sell on the free market. Some collectives are already going over to monthly cash wages instead of year-end payments based on labor days and it is likely that lhi3 development will be greatly extended Better management practices, tn particular cost accounting, are beingThere is toapid development of rural industry. In part under the auspices of new collective farm associations which will pool their indivisible funds (capita) savings) for this purpose. Such Industry, mainly in construction and food processing, will utilize labor released by the better organization of work on thc farms, and will also provideemployment At the same time, the share of stale farms in total output andIn marketing will Increase further.

ltogether these and other such measures are intended to Increase thc efficiency offarm production and raise peasantso that farmers will have an incentive to work harder on the collective farms and in associated industries instead of on their private plots. Ultimately the regime hopes to be able to induce the suspicious peasantry to give up Its private holdings of land and livestock and become exclusively dependent upon thc communal economy. Khrushchev

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clearly intends to be cautious in moving in this direction. However, the regime is in earnest, both on practical and ideological grounds, and local authorities might be tempted to proceed with an excess of zeal and pressure which would provoke peasant resentment, perhapscale sufficient toonsiderable political-social problem.

Consumer Expectations

urther problem confronting the Soviet leadership Is that created by their political commitment in the field of consumption and public welfare. If Plan fulfillment fallsschedule, the temptation will be strong to maintain the rate of growth of producers goods by sacrificing promised improvements in material welfare, as In the past But in this event the leadership would have to face the possibility thatailure mightthe cobperativencss of thc labor force, and thus Jeopardize the growth rates of heavy industry Once having embarkedolicy of seeking the active cooperation of thc masses through promises of higherthe regime may And that these promises impose some lestraints on its freedom of action. In the final analysis, however, the regime would probably prefer to cut back on the fulfillment of promises to consumers rather than to curtail any of its high priority programs.

The Level of Military Expenditures

59 annual Sovietexpenditures probably have declined Implementation ol thc military reductions announced onill reducefor military manpower, and for certain programs marked for curtailment However, tolal military costs will still probably increase since the savings will be more lhan offset by the rising costs of new weapons Military expenditures should cause no unusual strain to the economy; during the period of this estimate they will probably aver-approxlmatelyercent of GNP.

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TRADE

The achievement of output goals Inis to some extent dependent upon imports of production equipment. This is true in the fields of petrochemicals,communications electronics, andin ferrous metals. The growth of Soviet exports will beate sufficient to improve their prospects of obtaining such imports, although some difficulties will be encountered in Western markets. Soviet foreign trade will probably grow more rapidly than Soviet GNP, while the proportion of it Involving free world countries will probably rise from one-fourth to about one-third. In the machinery and equipment field the USSR will try to increase Its Imports of more complex items from the industrial nations, both within and outside thc Bloc. At the same time, its exports of complete industrial plants, transportation equipment, and farm machinery will continue to Increase in absolute and perhaps also in relative terms.

Imports of machinery and equipment from the Europenn Satellites, morefrom East Germany and Czechoslovakia, aie scheduled to double in value during the next seven years, and will satisfy most ofimport requirements in these fields. These imports will be paid for largely with increased quantities of Soviet iron ore,coke and other industrial rawBut Soviet-Satellite trade generally, which currently comprises about one-half the Soviet total, will be proportionately somewhat less importanthe excess of Soviet exports over imports ln trade with thewhich reflects Soviet shipments under credits6 will soon disappear, after which Satellite repayment should resultoviet Import surplus.

boutercent of Communist China's foreign trade is with the USSR and machinery and equipment presently account for about half of Soviet exports to China Theseare of great importance in the Chinese industrialization program, they represent one-quarter of the construction costs of those plants designated as the hard core of China's

industrialization program The Chinesefor them Is Increasingly useful to the USSR- It ls composed primarily of consumer goods, such as textiles, and raw materials which are scarce in thein. The food deficit areas of the Soviet Far East are drawing an increasing share of their supplies from China. The Chinese share of Soviet trade (now approximately one-fifth) willremain about thc same during the Plan period. Chinese determination toelf-sufficient industrialization program will probably have no perceptible effect on Sino-Soviet trade5 or after.

The USSR will continue to expand itsof trade and aid to the non-Communist underdeveloped countries. As the USSRmore affluent its leaders may be more willing to exchange industrial equipment for such commodities as cocoa, coffee, fibres, and other consumer raw materials which are the staples of underdeveloped countries. The principal determinants of the volume of this trade will be the political gains foreseen by the USSR and the receptivity ofnations to Soviet overturesas Iheir affluence increases, the Soviets might bo more inclined to enlarge theof grant aid, which has been minimal in their programs so far, especially where theyeal political advantage.

The USSR will tiy to increase sharply imports from the Industrial nations of the West, particularly of critical machinery and equipment, over tbe period of the Plan. In the early part of thc period, the USSR may encounter considerable difficulty in finding and marketing additional exports necessary to pay for these imports. Thus, the Soviet Government will probably, if politicalare favorable, continue to press forcredits. In view of the uncertainty of getting such credits, however, the Soviet leaders will be prepared lo lake the stepsto acquire the requisite foreignThey can, for example, increase Soviet exports of gold, though the Increasing cost of producing this metal will reinforce their efiort to seek other solutions. Also by selling at prices below those prevailing in

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markets, they can increase such exports as petroleum, lumber, and selected metals. They can to some extent obtain hard exchange by developing trade in third markets, bytourism, and by further reducing their dependence on foreign shipping.

PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH

c believe that the Soviet leadership will find adequate solutions to most of thedescribed above and that In Industry the goals ot the Plan will in the main be achieved. The one significant exception may be the ambitious program in chemicals, whose goals in plastics, synthetic rubber, and fertilizers will be very difficult to fulfill. The general problems arising from modernitatton ofcan be solved, If need be, by above-Plan allocation of investment and labor to industry, but at the cost of slower growth In otherof the economy. Moreover, the scheduled growth rateercent per annumhole is relatively modest, and the question is really whether the Plan Incan be completed ahead of schedule, perhaps even in Ave years, as the Soviet leaders evidently hope. It is at this higher level of accomplishment that their problems in labor productivity and management assume serious proportions.

62 As .ii the past, the plan in agriculture will not be fulfilled and th* shortfall is likely to be large. Thc goal0 percent Increase in gross outputet increaseercent. Under normal weather conditions and given the inputs which we estimate will be made available, net output is expected to rise about one-fifth, or anofercent per year. Labor productivity will rise faster, but the planned increase will also not.be realized. As small an actual increase in annual output as we presently foresee may not be acceptable to thc Soviet leadership. It is possible that further new programs and additionalof resources may be undertaken. This could result in faster growth, but even in this event we do not believe that the Plan can be Fulfilled.

ercentage gains in total consumption will be somewhat less than in the preceding seven years We believe that the availability ofgoods and services per capita will probably increase aboutercent during the Plan period, as compared0 percent gain over the preceding seven years. striking gains will probably be made in certain commodities having particularappeal, such as clothing, consumerthe urbanproducts Most striking Is the projectedIn housing both urban ander capita increase almost four times as great as that of the past seven years. Although the state is apparently determined to fulfill the program, if difficulties develop elsewhere in the economy, the housingmay not be fully achieved. the position of the Soviet consumer will continue to improve, even though at aslower rate than in recent years. This latter fact, if noted at all by the Soviet people, will be offset by gains In the quality of goods and especially by the long-desiredin housing, so that popular attitudes are likely to be little affected.

ven though some goals of the Seven-Year Plan may not be achieved in full, or ahead of schedule, the Soviet national product will probably continue to grow atper annum. Industrial output willachieve an annual growth rateas planned.

hese rates of growth are impressive by any absolute standard, and will bring thc Soviet economy measurably closer in size and strength to that of the US. Comparisons between the two economies depend, however, not only upon the validity of estimatesthe USSR but also on the accuracy of assumptions about US economic growth, and on thc realism of various ruble-dollar ratios used In compulation We calculate that at present Soviet GNP measured in dollars is aboutercent that of the US, and Soviet industrial output aboutercent. Sovietin the economyhole is almost equal to that In the US. and Soviet investment In industry may be somewhat greater. Soviet

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expenditures In recent yearsIn dollars) were approximately equal to those of the US. Assuming for the US an annual onp growth rate in years to comeercent, and an industrial growth rateercent,5 both Soviet ONP and Soviet Industrial output will be about half that of the US.5 the absolute annual increment to Soviel GNP willbut still not quite equal, that in the US.

ore striking and significantis that between the allocation of resources and effort in the two economies.NP less than half that of thc US, the USSR already devotes almost the same amount (measured In dollars) to investment In the economyhole as does the US; Soviet investment in industry alone may be somewhat greater than US industrial investment. Likewise, the USSK already spends about the same amount (measured in dollars) on its militaryas docs the US.se ofassures rapid economic growthaximization of national power.

Implications of Soviet Economic Growth

he Soviet leaders are aware thatand rapid economics anasset in the world power struggle. It will enable them to carry the burden ofarmaments more easily. The USSR will be able to enlarge its aid programs, and perhaps ultimately compete in world markets in an important way. This will meanleverage in many countries If, Inthe Soviets can finally raise livingenough to demonstrate that their system

provides for the growth of welfare as welt as thc expansion of national power, they will expect the Influence ot communism to spread even more rapidly. The Soviet leaders can be counted on to press the growth of their economy in all ways open to them, including substantial structural reforms whenin order to achieve the political goals which they regard as the real aim of economic policy.

hc Soviet Union is the first nationalwhich has made planned growth the central objective of its economic system. Thus far this has meant forcing growthin the means of further growth and simultaneously In the economic facilities necessary for great military power. These will remain the decisive goalseriod as brief as thc next five years and probably much longer. But the'tlmc may come when growth for its own sake and for expanding thc means of national power will no longer seem rational or sufficient ends of national policy If this happens, the Soviet system might, in order to make use of lis greatpower, turn at last to the aim ofthe long suppressed desires of its peopleigher material standard, becoming in soniconsumer-oriented society. On the other hand, Soviet politics are soand exclusively oriented toward power lhat to alter course significantly In this respect wouldery great ideological and political transformation. No such change in basic Soviet goals can be forecast at this lime. Whether or not It ever occurs will depend greatly upon how the world politicaldevelops and upon lhe policywhich it poses for the Soviet leaders

t B

SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

of Science in Soviet Society

he USSR has for many years placed great .emphasis on scientific and technologicalas basic to the growth of its military,and political power. It hasubstantial and increasing part of thcproductcientific and technological effort focused primnrily on the buildingtrong industrial base and the development of modern weapons.onsequence, Soviet achievements In certain areas of criticalan Industrial significance areto andew cases exceed those of the US. Scientific work which Is less directlyto industrial development and military power has also received strong support, albeit of lower priority, and Soviet scientists have made outstanding contributions in many areas of fundamental research.

he high place assigned science andin Soviet society has been an important factor in scientific achievement. In terms of social position and financial status. Soviet scientists have longrivileged group. They also enjoy great popular esteem, derived in part from traditional Europeantoward learning, and in part from thc influence of an ideology which exalts science. These conditions, together with the fact that many scientific fields permit an escape from immediate political Involvement impossible in most professional activity, have madecareers attractive to the Soviet In those areas of learning having no immediate ideological import the current Soviet environment is for the most partconsiderably more freedom being granted the Individual scholar than under Stalin. For their part, Soviet scientistsroup appear

uller account Of thU subject, see6 H. "Soviel Science andateduly ISSfl SECRKT.

to be dedicated to their work, politically loyal or at least apolitical, and animated frequentlypirit of intense competition with the US. Although Party control of science now seems to be tightening, it is directed in the main toward better administrationore effective scientific contribution toadvance, and there will probably noteturn to the extreme interference which characterized the late Stalin period.

Resources ond Administration

he number of scientific and technical graduates in the USSR has increasedthreefold in the postwar period and is now significantly larger than that In the US. Soviet numerical superiority results primarily from the larger number of persons graduating as engineers and agricultural specialists; the US leads in numbers of physical and biological scientists. These relationships probably will persistumber of years. The work of the best Soviet scientists isar with that of leading Western scientists, and, sinceprograms have steadily improved, the quality of the who> scientific corps is rising However, we believe that thc capability ofscientific and technicalhole Is still inferior to that of the US. On the basis of current trends,4 Soviet scientific-technical manpower will be about one-third larger than that of the US. and probably roughly comparable in quality. The lessening of differences In quality and the Increasing Soviet advantage in numbers willrowing challenge to the West.

he Soviet educational system, probably more than any other in the world,on training scientists, technicians and skilled labor. This emphasis will beby thc educational reorganization now underway. On the secondary level,ew emphasis on pre-

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paring Soviet youth* for jobs in industry and agriculture as opposed to the previouson college-preparatory training.all children o( secondary school age are to have some work experience either In the form of shop training In the schools or on-the-job training in farming or Industry. The full-time secondary school curriculum has been expanded to Include additional vocational training as well as some additional hours in academic subjects. These changesonsiderable improvement in the quality of Soviet workers. On the college level, students In practical disciplines such as agriculture, medicine, and some engineering fields must acquire work experience relevant to the subject matter of their studies.rue also with respect to students in theo retical scientific and technical fields although thc requirement for work experience seems to be applied somewhat less rigidly. The greater emphasis on work experience probably will improve the quality of graduates in practical engineering and applied science.

Soviet expenditures fordevelopment are estimated to be atbillionthe estimatedThese expenditures, when measuredare considerably more than halfthe US, even though Soviet GNP isat only aboutercent ofFurthermore, the Soviet effortfar more highly concentrated onto national power; aboutbelieved to be for military or relatedWhile this emphasis will probablythe rate at which scientific andresources are Increasing will permitattention in the future tofields, and larger technical aid

the last lew years, Sovietresearch and development havea slightly greater rate than GNP Thegrowth over the nexl five yearsbe somewhat lower, but stillany event, past trends and announced So-

viet plans give reason to believe that strong financial support will continue to be provided for the scientific and technical effort in thc USSR and that Soviet expenditures probably will permit full utilization of new personnel and facilities.

he economic reotganizationany of the industrial ministries and reassigned research insUtutlons formerlytheir control. Generally, it appears that administrative control over institutionshigh-priority research remainswhile administration of lower priority research has beenewDepartment of the Academy of Sciences has been formed which will have within its jurisdiction two new scientific centers now under construction at Novosibirsk and Irkutsk. To date, the major changes inorganization involve: (a) considerable administrative and geographic(bj closer ties between science anddirected toward greater emphasis on practical results of research; (c) improved planning and coordination of researchhole. There is evidence that additional changes are impending which appear to have similar objectives.

Level of Achievement

The more spectacular Soviet achievements to date have resulted primarily from theof resourcesew high-priority programs, while capabilities in otherareas have advanced more slowlythe USSR now has the capability and ap parently the intention to advanceuch broader front. During the past three decades, the USSR hasolid foundation foradvance Research facilities have been greatly expanded, the quality of Soviettraining has been improved, and the number of graduates in scientific andsubjects has sharply increased. The rate of advance of Soviet science appears to be increasing, and the current Seven-Yeai Plan, which relies heavily on scientific and technological achievements, will provideimpetus Thus, significant Sovietin science and technology are likely

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occur with greater frequency than in the past, and over the next several years, the USSR may achieve world leadership In some additional scientific areaa.

n the basic sciences, Soviet capabilities are generally good, particularly in the theoretical aspects. Soviet science shows particular strength in physics, mathematics, and the geophysical sciences, and it ls in these fields that major Soviet advances are most likely to occur. The USSR generally lags behind the West In chemistry, biology, agriculturaland some aspects of medical research However, during thc next several years there will probablyajor expansion of allresearch with particular emphasis in fields where the West now leads, such as plastics, petrochemicals, and synthetic fibers. Soviet medical research and clinical medicine will probably be raisedevel approaching Western standards, and research in theand agricultural sciences is alsoto improve appreciably.

hc USSR is continuing its strongon military research and development. The high priority given to missile and space programs has assured the availability to these programs of capable personnel, high quality facilities, and strong support from associated fields. Rapid advances, including thcof manned space flight within thc next few years, are likely. Development of ground, air, and naval weapons continues, although lack of sufficient experimental facilities has hampered aeronautical development to some extent and may continue to do so in the future. In general, Soviet electronics research andhas been outstanding, and notable advances in military- electronics can be The USSR Is believed to havechemical and biological warfareprograms, and future researchwill emphasize new and improved agents, means tor dissemination, and equipment for defense

oviet Industry is characterized by marked qualitative unevenness in technologicalbetween industrial sectors and even within certain sectors generally well developed. In heavy industry, such as steel making,and equipment often comparewith those used in the West. However, industrial practices generally are inferior and sometimes even crude by Western standards. Industrial applications of automationappear to have been limited to selected pilot and experimental installations, but the Seven-Year Plan calls for such techniques to be introduceduch wider basis. advances in the average level of Soviet industrial technology will continue. in spite ot the effort and resources being devoted to this task, the magnitude of the problem is so great that Soviet industrialwill remain generally behind that of the West well 'beyond the period of this estimate.

Political Implications

chievements in science and technology have greatly enhanced Soviet prestige. The earth satellites and the moon rockets inhave provided impressive evidence of the present high level of Soviet scientificand have bolstered Soviet claims of successes in other fields, particularly In weapons development. By concentratingand resources, thc USSR probably will achieve during the next fewumber of additional "firsts" In prestige fields. In the Immediate future, these are most likely to occur in the Soviel space program, but the quality and Intensity of Soviet research on such problems as controlled thermonuclear reactions and direct conversion of heat to electricity may produce spectacular results In other scientific fields. In addition to their economic and militaiy implications, suchwould have considerable psychological and political effect throughout the world.

IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY'

SOVIET IDEAS CONCERNING THE ROLE Of MILITARY POWER

ideas aboul military policy arenot only by the (acts of worldbut also, like every other aspectby the Marxist-LeninistSoviet ideas about the role ofpower as an instrument of Sovietbeen little affected by thein the military position andof the USSR over the last twoproblem of understanding Sovietand of estimating the militarylt is likely to produce, begins withIdeas, which differ in manyfrom those held in the West

thc Communists, it is anot faith that there Is anbetween their social system andthe non-Communist world While theythis as fundamentally anon class lines rather than abetween states, they have alwaysthereontinuing danger thatstates would deliberately attackIn order to destroy the Communistor that they would do soastface of the disintegration of their ownConsequently, the building ofto deter or deal with Westernwell as to insure ultimate victory instruggle, has always been aof Soviet military policy. Similarly,Incentive ol the sustained andeffort to expand Soviet economicbeen to provide the basis for

foi delailcd estimates Of the present andstrengths and capabilities of Soviet lorces. seend the tables in Annex D

Moreover, the Soviets see other uses for military forces than that of military defense. For them great military powerymbol and instrument of their total power position. In their central concepttruggle between social systems, the power wielded by each side takes various forms. It is political, economic, psychological as well as military, and these aspects of the total power position are seen as mutually reinforcing. The Soviets willthe world lo see in the growth of their military power proof of the success andof their social system. They will expect that their political influence, theof their adherents in the world, and the effectiveness of their psychologicalshort their ability to advance the cause of CommunLsmbewith the increase of their military power They are also aware that military power can be used not only in combat but also as an instrument of political pressure. Thus so long as the Soviet ideological outlookessentially unchanged, theof military power is likely torimary preoccupation of the Soviet regime

It has always been the Soviet claim that Communist armed forces are not and cannot be used for military conquest. War foris said to be characteristic of pre-Com-muntst social orders, one of the evils which their revolutionary movement aimed toMoreover, the Communists argue that they have no Interest In military conquest because they believe that the process of social change in history does not result fromeans but only from revolutionary class struggle. Whether or not these propositions would have any effect in determining the magnitude of the military power the USSR might seek lo acquire or the way in which it would use superior military power is aof considerable interest at present when

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resources to support great military power are continuing to expand rapidly.

The alleged Ideological renunciation ofconquest cannot be counted upon tothe Soviet leaders from use of superior armed forces to expand Communist control in particular areas where this seems feasible to them. Thereophistry in Communist ideological contention which permits anyuse of Soviet armed forces, as against Finland and Polandnd later in Eastern Europe, to be described as "just" or "liberating" war. However, there is aninhibition attached to sudden military assaults aimed at outright conquest andby appropriate political conditions.

The fact that the central meaning ofis seen by the Communistsong-term struggle for social revolution rather thanontest of military power between states has certain further Implications for the Soviet approach to military policy. Military power in the Soviet view should not be usedto the hazard of thc main powerof Communism but should be kept Intact and enlargedey element of the total power position of the Communist world. As that total power position grows it will be an encouragement and guarantee of the success of revolutionary forces in the non-Communist states In particular, the "Imperialists" will be deterred from resorting to force to check the forward movement of the "masses"Communism. To be sure. Communist armed forces might in certain circumstances be used directly toommunist party to accomplish its revolutionary mission and seize power. But this should not be doneanner to jeopardize the security of the main centers of Communist power For these reasons. Soviet policy prefers, if military force is to be used, to employ non-Soviet Communist forces In limited actions, in politicallycircumstances.

Communists think of the revolutionary struggle for power not only as long-term, but also as continuous It Is not interrupted by formal pesice between states or by periods when "peaceful coexistence" is emphasized.

But the Communists recognize that political warfare always carries with it the possibility of resort to force by the enemy or,opportunities for the successful use of force by themselves. Communist armed forces must thereforeigh level of readiness and must be prepared to operate on any scale, local, limited, or general. The Soviet leaders, guided by politicaland revolutionary aims, wish to have maximum flexibility to employ whatever level ofactical situation might dictate.

sum, the building of military powerand will continue to have veryin the USSR. The Soviet armedintended in the first instance to deteron the USSR and olher Communistto insure survival of Communistsuch an attack occur. Beyondare regardedey element Inworld'power position,political, economic, andand facilitating the struggle ofrevolutionary forces for power incountries. They may beopportunity offers to assistof power, though they areintended for any consistent andpolicy of outright military conquest*

EVOLUTION IN THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET FORCES

structure of Soviet forces hasa striking changeorces were designed primarily lolarge-scale land battles in Eurasia, thethreat to Soviet security then being con-

' Tba A'.si.unl Chief of Start. Intelligence. USAF. doei not agree with the Judgmentir. thlt lentence. specifically that military power is "probably not Intended for any comtstent and far-reaching poIky of outright military eon-He IccU that ine Soviets' effort to achieve and maintain kubslantial military forces, especially their ICBM program as estimated by thc Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. In NIESoviet Long-Range Attack Capabilities throughndicates that Soviet forcei are as likely to be intended for aand far-reaching policy ol outrightconquest" as tor any other purpose.

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lo arise (rum the aggressive intentions and military power of Germany and Japan. With the defeat of these two enemies Soviet policy assumed, as on ideological grounds It had to, that the USSR's World War II allies, thc surviving capitalist powers, wouldbe the enemies of the postwar period. However, thc military threal posed by lhe Western allies, in particular the US, wasifferent kind and imposed new militaryon lhe Soviet armed forces. The Soviet leaders undertook immediately In the postwar period, despite the formidable tasks ot recovery and reconstruction, to acquire new weapons and lo adapt their forces to meet the new requirements.

BO. In the immediate postwar years the Soviets relied upon their massive land forces stationed in the center of Europe not only to support Soviel political objectives, but also to deter the West from resort to military action. In rlew of the demobilization of Western armies, the Soviets counted on the capability of these forces to seize Western Europe and hold It hostage as an offset to US strategic airpower. As the postwar period advanced, the Soviets pushed ahead to acquire in addition weapons and forces capable nf directly countering thc US threat. Theyajor effort to get nuclear weaponsomber force capable of striking at the power centers of theenemies. Concurrently, great effort went into the buildup of an air defense system to counter the principal threat posed by the enemy, his strategic air capabilities.reat effort was made to build naval forces to cope with an enemy who would be dependent on control of the seas in order to bring his lull forces to bear against the USSR in Eurasia.

he Soviets also began early in theperiod the development of an entirely new weapons system, that of long-range missiles This was done in part because Sovietwas prepared, especially with theof German work and Germanto move ahead successfully In this field In addition. Soviet development of heavy bomber aircraft was not strikinglyBut more important, the relative geographical dispositions, that Is, USof close-in bases around tho periphery of

the USSR and Soviet lack of equivalentbases, together with the probableof effective US air defense, probably made competition in bomber forces seemto the Soviets They saw In long-rangeeapon which would enable them to overcome their inferiority to the US instriking power.

SOVIET VIEWS ON THE CURRENT BALANCE Of MILITARY POWER AND ON STRATEGY

he acquisition of intercontinental missile capabilities isrofound impact on the Soviet estimate of the balance of military power. The Soviet leaders regard thisas symbolizing the achievementew relationship of power in which thcwill be deterred from attempting to destroy their regime by force. This marks In theirreat historic divide and is the reason for their solemn declaration thatencirclement" has ended. Nevertheless, they also recognize that at present theirarc insufficient to insure that If they were to attack the US they couldevastating retaliatory blow. Therefore, the Soviets almost certainly consider that both sides are now deterred from deliberatelyan all-out nuclear war or fromto any crisisanner which would gravely riskar unless vital naUonal interests were considered toeopardy. However, mutual deterrence against strategic nuclear attack Is not seentalemate, but rather as an opportunity to press psychological and poliUcal forms of attack more vigorously, and possibly even to engage In some limited forms of military action*

"The Assistant Chief of SUIT. Intelligence. USAF. would revise Uie last two sentences of theas

Therefore, the Soviets almost certaintythat both ildes eventually could be deterred from deliberately initiating an all-out nuclear war or Irom reacting to any emisanner whtich would gravely riskar unless vital national interreU were considered to be InXcco'tfl'iyJy il mutual deterrence againit strategic nuclear attack eventuates, 'he Soviets vtU probably tee it as an opportunity to push psychological snd political forms of attack more vigorously, and pouihly even loome limited forms of military action.

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this situation. Soviet strategic thinking now assumes lhat while general war Isit cannot be entirely excluded as Die outcomeocal crisis in which both sides became progressively committed or Iniscalculation by either side occurred. In view of this contingency and because of the great advantage gained by the side whichstrategic nuclear attack, Sovieta few years agooncept of pre-emptive attack, that is, that an attempt should be made to anticipateirstan enemy who Is himself preparingto atuck.

We believe that Soviet forces are nowto act ononcept, and that thc Soviet leaders would In fact order aattack if they were convinced that the US was irrevocably committed to initiation of all-out nuclear war. Such an attack would employ available long-range aircraft andwith lhe objective of destroying as much as possible of Western nuclear retaliatory forces prior to launch. The results achieved by auch an attack would depend greatly on the degree of surprise attained, and the increased emphasis given by Soviet strategists to thefactor In recent years shows that they are fully aware of this They do not appear to believe, however, thai surprise alone would be the decisive factor in determining the outcomear between the two great nuclear powers Its significance in their view is that while It gives an important advantage to the side achieving U, other factors such as capacity for recovery, ability to occupy territory, and residual political and economic strength would contribute vitally to the final outcome.

strategic thinking alsoSoviet forces might be used inlocal actions. The structu re of theseby the retention of largewould permit their use on eitheror large scale for nonnuclear actionsGiven thc existence of theseSoviets probably believe that asnuclear capabilities grow thebe increasingly restrained fromto prevent Communist gains.may therefore arise in which thefeel more willing than hitherto lo en-

gage in local warfare, although it wouldprefer on political and military grounds to limit itself to logistic and other support of non-Soviet forces. Any such use of Soviet forces would probably be limitedcale sufficient only to achieve local politicalwith minimal risk of expanding theThey would be particularly cautious about situationsossibility ofclashes wllh US forces. The Soviet leaders* willingness lo engage in limited war will depend upon their Judgment in particular cases on the extent to which the enemy is able and willing to bring his forces to bear locally, and on the chances of the situation developing into general war.

Soviet leaders. Including Khrushchevhave publicly contended that conflicts could not be kept limited if nuclear weapons were used in them. The Soviets probablythat in limited conflicts Iheir forces will ordinarilyonnuclear basis. Hence, Ihey will probably continue to use maximum political measures to inhibit In advance the use of nuclear weapons in such conflicts. Moruover, at the outset of anyconflict, the Soviets would probablyonsiderable efiort to avoid being the first to use nuclear weapons. However, they would respond to Western use of nuclear weapons. If they considered it militarily necessary, by themselves using nuclear weapons on any scale Indicated by thc Importance to them of the political and other factors involved in thc particular situation.

PROBABIE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET FORCES

Capabilities for Strategic Attack '

he most important question concerning lhe future development of Soviet military

etailed treatment ot the considerations underlying the Judgments made in paragraphsecoviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through0 In accordance with hi* dissent* to relevant port ion of lhat paper, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF amenta from theie two paragraphsi statement printedootnote tonnex A.

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R-fc-?

Is what policy thc USSR will follow in developing its long-range ballistic missile The key issue here is: Will the Soviets believe that they can acquirewhich would permit them to plan attacks on Western retaliatory forcesegree and certainty of success which would Insure that the USSH couldeneral waritself incurring damage il would beto accept? There ls no evidence at present that the USSR has set on footto achieve such decisive capabilities. Neither do we believe, in thc light of ourot the large sizeissile forceto effectlan, that the Soviet leaders will in fact attempt it. Apart from the Soviel view thai political-revolutionary forces are predominant In determining the outcome of thc world struggle, the mainarguingoviet attempt tosuch decisive missile capabilities are: (a) inability to insure that programs laid down several years in advance to build such forces would actually achieve their object in view of the inevitable uncertainty concerning the development of enemy countercapabllities in lhe interim; (b) thc possibility ihat the enemy would detect an effort oncale and either take effective countermeasures or resort to preventive attack; (c) thc formidable economic costs ofrogram, which would cause disruption of key economic plans.

e believe, nevertheless, that the Soviets winubstantial long-range missile force. They will almost certainly wish toigh degree of deterrence, and beyond this, should deterrenceorce offering as much promise of successre-emptive attack, or indeedetaliatory attack, as can be bought within-acceptable margins of economic cost Also, and again consistent with acceptable cost, the Soviets will probably build up their planned force rapidly In order to capitalize through political exploitation on their lead over the West In missileOn the basis of these criteria, wethat thc present ICBM program will provide inumber of missiles on

launcher on the order' More tentatively, because of technical and political factors which may affect Soviet plans in the interim, wc estimate that Soviet ICBMs on launcher are likely to number in the rangennn addition. Soviet strategic attack capabilities during the period of this estimate willorce of medium-range missiles, the bombers In Long Range Aviation (many equipped with air-to-surfacerowing number of missile-launching sub-marlnes-

Composilion and Size of Olhor Forces

espite the effort which we estimate that the USSR will make to build long-range attack forces, It will almost certainly not do so at the cost of sacrificing its other military capabil-lUes The Sdvlets will not wish to come to depend too heavily on nuclear forces. Their military policy will almost certainly continue to rest on their concept of an appropriate balance between conventional and nuclear capabilities. They apparently continueeneral war launched withnuclear attacks would turn into aconflict in which other forces would be neededarge scale. But more important is their belief that their military policya range of capabilities permittingIn the choice of means and the scale of operalions in accordance with lhe politicalsoughtarticular area. Soviet military policy thus aims to have maximum freedom of action so that the USSR can itself determine the scale of military involvement appropriate to any situation. The Soviet leaders probably believe that such capabilities become even more important under mutual detertence from general war when pressuie and threat, maneuvers and coups, evenlocal wars may be undertaken with

"The views of Ihe members of the USIB vary as to the inost probable number within this range. See the statement of their separate views printed asn page B.

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freedom and pushed further than in the past."

e believe that the substantialIn manpower strength of the armed forces which Khrushchev announcedill prohabiy be carried out. The reductions would release badly neededto assist In meeting economic programs. Due to the low wartime birth rates, theof men reaching military age annually over the next few years will decline and the manpower needs of Industry would have been acutely felt if9 force levels had been maintained. (See Chapter II,oreover, savings arising fromin force strength will largely offsetin other military expenditures. The Soviets have sought to extract propagandafrom their announcement of future force reductions and disclosure of actualstrength, in support of the current foreign policy theme of relaxation of tensions. Nevertheless, wc believe that the Soviets will almost certainly continue lo maintainground, air. and naval forces,various missile units. To the maximum extent possible, these forces will be dualcapable of employing nuclear or non-nuclear weapons, as circumstances dictate.

"The Director for Intelligence. The Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Special Operations, do not concur In the estimate that the USSR probably believes that It can undertake the actions described with greater freedom and can push them further than In the past.oviet judgment would. In the view of the above members of the USIB, neeea-sarUy Involve an estimate by the Kremlin that Weslem-.parUeularly the Unitedto their pressures and probings would lack tile vigor necessary to dissuade them. They do not behove tint tne Soviet* will make such an estimate.

The Assistant Chief of Staff. Indulgence. USAF. would revise the sentence in Question as follows: The Soviet leaders probably bellevo that If mutual deferretiee from general utarlueh capabilities could become even more Important, when pressure and threat, maneuvers and coups, even undeclared local wars may be undertaken with gicater rreedom and pushed further than in thc past.

Air Defense FcrctH

espite the prospect that the ballistic missile will ultimately become the principal Western strategic attack weapon. Sovietevidently assumes that bomber aircraft willubstantial threat at least through the period of this estimate Newmissile systems are being installedonsiderable scale for the defense of vital areas, and fighter forces will probably be modernized and reduced. These weapons systems alreadyevere threat to present types of Western bombers, but their fullwill not be realized until the USSR acquires additional control and warningto Improve reaction times. Over the next several years, the main Soviet efforts to improve air defense will probably be In the fields of air defense missiles and control Also, looking further ahead, the Soviets will almost certainly beajoreffort In antimissile defense over the next five years Some antimissilewill probably appear by thc end of the period or soon thereafter.

Ground Forces

rograms of modernization will continue to go forward ir. the Soviet ground forces, along with reductions in manpower. The steps being taken are aimed primarily at achieving greater mobility and at developing special capabilities and tactics for ground combat under conditions of nuclear warfare. Thc most important equipment changes to achieve these purposes involve the widespread introduction into the forces of missiles, and the wider use of armored and amphibiousand weapons carriers. In addition, there will probablyajor Improvement In airlift capability with the Introduction of new transports and helicopters now entering production. The major expansion of the civil air transport fleet planned over the nextyears will provide additional aircraft which could be used for military airlift If

Naval Forces

10J. The Soviets apparently consider that the principal missions of their naval and naval air forces are to assist in countering thestrategic air threat (especially thatato Interdict Western sea lines of supply, and to undertake defense of sea approaches. In addition, as more missile-launching submarines become available thc navy will participate increasingly in theattack mission. The Soviets continue to believearge submarine force should be the principal elementavy designed. In the USSR's particular geographicalto rr.eet these requirements. They will probably therefore continue to giveto submarine development. Reductions In thc surface force seem likely, although some units will be modernized. In particular by their adaptation to missile use. Theof missile-launching ships willcontinue. Another major aspect ofnaval development during thc period will be emphasis on antisubmarine warfare,to counter the strategic threat posed by US missile-launching submarines.

MILITARY POLICY TOWARD OTHER BLOC STATES

he Soviets will almost certainlyto regard their military relations with thc East European Satellites under thePact as an important clement of their toul strategic position. In general theythat the existence of these forces helps to maintain their hegemony in EasternIn some circumstances the Satellite forces would probably contribute lo Bloccapabilities in war. at least initially, buteneral rule we believe that thc Sovicls would not countajor SatelliteLikewise, we bdlieve the Satellite armed forces would maintain internal order andagainst small-scale or sporadic populai uprisings) against widespread popular revolt, they could probably not be relied upon. The size of Satellite forces will probably remain stabilized at about their present levels, and the Soviets will conUnue to supply substantial

military aid for these forces in the form of weapons and equipment and trainingThe Soviets would almost certainly be unwilling to provide them wiih nuclear weapons.

he Soviets evidently regard thcof Soviet forces in the Satellites as valuable to the defense of their own territory. At the same time, the presence of large forcesosition to assault Western Europo directly and with little warning Is probably conceived as an Important ingredient In deterrence of the West, especially against possible Western actions to alter the political situation Inand Eastern Europe. Two majorof the last year have been thein East Germany of surface-to-air missile sites and evidence of deploymentile surface-to-surface missiles, also In East Germany. Soviet- combat forces have now been withdrawn from Rumania.further reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are likely, substantial forces will almost certainly remain In East Germany during thc next few years.

ilitary point of view the USSR's alliance with Communist China has Important advantages. The very large Chinese forces add to the overall military strength of the

Bloc andhreat, especially Inareas. At the same time, they Impose constraints on Western policy In Asia.territory is also useful for extension of Soviet air defense The character of Soviet military aid to China has been changing as the Chinese, with Soviet economic help, have become capable ofider range of basic military equipment. The Chinese will continue for some time, however, to depend heavily on the USSR for complex andtypes of military equipmont. Thc USSR will probably begin to supply jet medium bombers, advanced fighters and guidedfor air defense, and possibly short-range surface-to-surface missiles. We believe,that the USSR will not wish to provide nuclear weapons and this mayource of serious tension in the alliance.

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V. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST STATES

with other Communistcontinue to be one of theconcerns of the Soviet rulers. Thedown on the USSR's "leading role" lnat the Moscow conference ofhi7 remains officiallyin most respects Soviet authorityand ideological questionsfirmly established than at anythe disruptive eventsnEurope the USSR has felt sufficientlyof the control of theto urge them once again to pressin imitation of the Soviet model ofand economic development.are signs that Communist China isless disposed to accept Sovietdomestic and foreign policy, evenhas outwardly compliedumberissues ln recent months Wethc problem of intra-Bloc harmony isbeing resolved. Disharmony is likelyrepeatedly with the appearance ofand In the long run will probablyof the more critical problems withSoviet leaders will have to cope.

disruptive factor, the hereticalinfluence of Yugoslavia withinhas continued to decline in"anti revision 1st" campaignYugoslavia from the spring ofhad the effect of isolatingfrom the Communistdenying Influence to those in thewho may have been attracted bydcvlnttonist brand ofMoscow has felt sure enough of itsin this lo entertain normalization ofwith Yugoslavia on aA new reconciliation on anis unlikely to be attempted for theor to succeed if attempted.Soviets must regard thisesirable ob-

jective though they would be unwilling to make many concessions to obtain it. One of the strengths of their doctrine is its claim tocientific creed of universallaim which the existence of YugoslaviaYugoslavia's efforts to spread Incountries its views opposing Soviet hegemony must alreadyatter ofto the Soviets.

Soviet-Satellilc Relations

the eventsoscowconsiderable success inthe Communist control structure InEurope. In lhe past year, thefelt that the time had come toneweturn to more intensivethe "building ot socialism" on thcThese accelerated programs arein conjunction withtParty Congress' proclamation ofentryeriod of theof communism."

new phasc is being pursued onInternally, thc Satellite programssocialization in the next fewlong-range plans aimed atantipathy of the Satellite populationsindoctrination, new educationaland limited efforts to improve theof the consumer. Simultaneously,of agricultural collectivizationbe sought in all the Satellites exceptand party controls are to bein the USSR. Moscow's plansthe strengthening of certainforms, such as the Council ofAidhich are Intendedlong run to make the Satellites moreand at the sameroup on the Soviet Union. ur-

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ther guarantee of lhe stability of lhe rcgiir.es. Moscow continues its efforts lo obtain Western acceptance of lhe present political ai range-ments in Eastern Europe as final and

Despite some success in narrowing the limits of divergence within the European Satellites, Moscow continues lo bethere by ideological difficulties in its relations with Communist China, as well as by continued anomalies of thc domesticin Poland. However. Khrushchevunwilling to return to discreditedpractices or methods ofhe Satellites, and thus continues lo allowleeway in internal policy. In lhe past year this could be seen in thedisparity in the Satellilcs between"great leap forward" and Poland'sand deliberate "road tohrushchev probably believes that an attempt to insist upon tooniformity would again invoke more sericus dangers than those arising from the present degree of divergence. He thus seems to have consciouslyifferentiated policy toward the Individual Satellite states. They will be encouraged toourse desired by the Soviets, tnat is. to ape the Soviet model, but the views of the Satellite leaders as to the appropriate pace, as to what is politically feasible or not feasible, will be given considerable weight. There are probably two conditions, however, which Khrushchev considers it mandatory for the Satellites to meet: whatever they do inthey must not openly challenge Soviet leadership of the Bloc and ideologicalAnd, on all international questionsthe Bloc's relations with the non-Com-munist world, Ihey must closely follow the Soviet lead.

These latter criteria are met even Inwhich continues to offer the giealestto the Soviet attempt to imposeand control in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev seems convinced that Gomulka's slower road to socialism is the best course available, given tho strength of anti-Commu-

nist and anti-Sovlct forces in the country. Gomulka has beenlear and public endorsement by the Soviet leader, who also sided firmly against the Polish Stalinists, whom he warned to get behind Gomulka and to stop advocating too close emulation of the Soviet example. Nevertheless, Khrushchev may find in the years to come that Poland's slower progress toward socialism and greater degree of Internal freedom will becomedisturbing to the other Satellites. Particularly if the other regimes encounter serious difficulties in building socialism, or if Poland's example exercises too great anon moderate elements in the other Bloc countries, lhe differences betweenpace and that of the other Blocwill probably cause strains in the Polish-Soviet alliance.

On the other hand. It is also possible that Polish internal policy wUI on its own motion developay to diminish the difTercnces between Poland and the other Communist states. There are recent indications thatfailures are leading Gomulka toa tightening of discipline. Thistogether with declines in some items ot consumer supply, especially meat, may give riseopular morale problem and might even lead to disorders among urban workers. In order to prevent serious turmoil fromthe Soviets may decide to supplyaid to alleviate the worst shortages. Over lhe longer run. thc primary Sovietwill probably be to maintain theof the Communist regime in Poland, while at the same time applying mild pressures to reduce the gap between Polish practice and that of the other Satellilcs.

East Germany continues to be of critical Importance to the Soviet strategic position In Eastern Europe.trengthening of its internal political and economic position in the past year, the regime remains theof popular hostility, as shown byovert manifestations of opposition, as well as by the diminished but unbrokenespecially of intellectuals and skilled

ti-rHr-

Although thc Soviets hove made every effort to reinforce Ulbrlcht's authority as Party leader and factional opposition has collapsed, the regime nevertheless continues to depend for its existence on the presence of Soviet forces Its internal Instability, in fact, was almost certainly one of the mainbehind last year's Soviet Initiative on Berlin. The Soviets probably believe that elimination of thc political threat posed by West Berlin, together with some form of West-em recognition of East Germany, would greatly strengthen the latter's stability. This would also give the USSR greater freedom to reduce ils forces in East Germany if Soviet leaders thought it desirable. However, should the Soviet attempt to alter thc status of West Berlin seem to have been clearly rebuffed, the present problems of the regime may be

he current tendency in Eastern Europe generally istabilisation andof Communist rule. Majorlike the Hungarian revolt or the near defection of Poland6 are unlikely in the near future, in view of the present relative stability of the regimes as well as theirmore cautious approach to internal policy. Events of recent months indicate that, when the accelerated internal programs cause difficulties, the regimes will modify their policies at least temporarily so as to ease thc pressure on the populace. However, the basic factors which led to the unrest orresentment of Soviet domination,toward Communism, and depressed livingtoecurrence of an attempted national defection or revolt could take place, sometime during the coming five years, given the proper circumstances. If vacillation or uncertainty appeared in Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe os afor example, of leadership instability In the USSR or serious Sino-Sovietit is possible that confusion within one or another Satellite parly would combine with newly emboldened popular opposition loanother challenge to Communist power. Nevertheless, the general outlook is for con-

tinued maintenance of Soviet hegemony In Eastern Europehole for the period of this estimate.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Thc Soviet Union and Communist China remain firmly allied against the West, and this will almost certainly continue for the period of this estimate. Probably thc most important factor which cements thc alliance Is mutual advantage: China obtains essential political, mihtary and economic support; the USSR has the benefit of China's military and economic potential, which magnifies the world power poaicion of the Communist Bloc, and also the political valuetrong Communist state In Asia. Unity Ls also promoted by their acknowledgmentommon enemy, the capitalist world, andommon body ofalleged to be authoritative for bothMoreover, the Soviet Union and China are aware of the disastrous consequences which wouldplit in the alliance, both to Ihcir international position and to thestability of their regimes.

On the other hand, there are severalwhich are likelyeriod of time to make the relationship an Increasinglyand difficult one. China's Immense sueation and the fact that the Chinese Communist regime came to power largely without Soviet help obliged Moscow from lhe outset to concedenique degree of Independence within the Bloc. Moreover, the Chinese are applying Communist doctrine, which the parties agreeniversal formula for social revolution, in an environment wholly unlike that in which the Soviet system was developed. Having begun their revolution by attempting to adapt the Soviet model to their uwn conditions, the Chinese Communists have tended Increasingly to wrench it out of shape, thus Inevitably presenting an ideologicalto the USSR. Further, given China's potential, it must loom as an eventualto Soviet power, first within the Bloc and the Communist movement, and perhaps ultimately eveneopolitical sense. Added to these considerations is theChinese pride and sensitivity which only

35

thc cultural gulf already existingthe two societies. This psychological element probably inhibits any real intimacy between the two ruling groups despite the formal front of harmony which isgainst this background, the effects of Die sharp ditlcrence in the phase andof economic and social development in the two countries have emerged more clearly, in the already highly industrialized USSR, able to ease internal pressures and to takewelfare increasingly Intoess doctrinaire moodore pragmaticto policy have developed. In agrarian China, however, thereeverish drive for economic development and socialwhich promotes doctrinal extremismense internal atmosphere. The Chinese aUo tend toore actively hostile toward me non-Communist world. They imply that the Soviets underestimate the rate OI decline of the "Imperialistn the past year, moreover, the Chinese have been strivingreater voice and role in the revolutionary struggle in thcareas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In general they appear toorerevolutionary approach by localthan do their Soviet counterparts, and thereby to Imply that their own revolutionary experience is more relevant to such areas.

ore immediate, however, have been the frictions emergingesult of China'spolicies, which have Includedclearly departing from the SovietThe Soviets seem to have regarded the Chinese "commune" as an ill-conceived policy from the outset. But it was the attempt to represent the communehinese-devised short-cut to communismossible model for other Communist countries to follow whichebuff from thc Soviets. Theyregarded the Chinese attitudeerious challenge to Moscow's ideologicalover the Communist movement.over the commune Issue still plagues Slno-Sovict relations, and is bound to have some lasting effect on the harmony of the relationship. Beyond the purelyissue, it is possible also that the Soviets

consider Chinese internal economic policy to be erratic and unsoundly planned From the Soviet point of view it Is desirable thateconomic development go forwardbut also that it remainoctrinal framework which poses no challenge to the USSR.

e also continue lo believe that problems arising from China's presumed desire tomodern arms,particular nuclear weapons and missiles, will be, if they are noterious complicating factor in Sino-Soviet relations. Thc Chinese will surelyitecessary badge of their equality and great power status to acquire such Thc Soviets, on the other hand, will almost certainly be reluctant to see thein possession of these weapons, partlythis would make China too "equal" wiihln the Bloc, and partly because they would fear thai China might court unnecessary risks in Its policy toward the US. The Soviets are likely, therefore, to delay as long as possible in assisting the Chinese touclear weapons capability. They probably have promised the Chinese nuclear support In case of need, however, and it is possible that they will assist the Chinese in the acquisition of short-range missiles which could be adapted to nuclear use.

e believe that frictions over Issues like those described above will have an lncreasUig impact on the Sino-Soviet alliance during lhe period of this estimate. As the power arid prestige of Communist China increase. Soviet levers of authority over China will gradually become less effective. Communist China still gives strong public endorsement to Soviet leadership of the Communist movement, but the Chinese have always reserved their right to exercise Independent judgment onand lactical issues. We believe that China win increasingly exercise this right, not only in domestic affairs, where directinfluence has always been minimal, but in external affairs as well.

hus each party to the Sino-Sovietmay come to act more In terms of Its view of its own national need and interest.

SEGfi-ET-

two regimes are virtually certain to (lifter from tune to time on questions oftactics or policy, and on the mode of controlling or influencing Communist parties in non-Communist states. They willcontinue to differ on major questions respecting the correct road to socialism and communism, and insofar as such differenceshinese challenge to SovietIhey could be the most critical of all.

This does not mean, however, that an open Sino Soviet ruptuic is in sight Both parties have too much at stake to permit this; neither party Is likely to sec any feasible alternative to maintaining the connection. They willhave to make accommodations to each olher In many matters, but theyrm alliance Is vital to both of them in confronUng the hostile forces of the non-Communist world.

-TOP Ki

VI. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

SOVIET VIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION

The world, lo the Soviet leaders, is an arena of conflict. In this arena thc chiefare themselves, seeking to advance communism throughout the world, and the ruling circles of the "imperialist" powers who seek to maintain the capitalist system and to push back communism. The struggle isand incessant, and, In the Communists' view, the victory o( their cause is foreordained by thc inevitable movement of historical forces. They also believe, of course, that it Is iheir own persistent activity which makes thisinevitable.

The Soviet leadersdraw their appreciation of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each side, and consequently theirof the most appropriate lines of policy and of tactics, by calculation of the "relation ofmilitary,the world arena In their view, the relation of forces in the present historical period Is characterized by an accelerating shift toward enhancement of the world power position of thc Communist Bloc,elative decline ln the stature and power of the US and other capitalist states. Whilerowth In the power position of world Communist forces has always been considered by Marxist-Leninists as inevitable and irrevocable, it is significant that the Soviet leaders now assert that the process has reached'the point where major consequences will be manifest on the world scene within thc foreseeable future.

The development which has had most to do with stimulating this optimistic appraisal of the world situation has been the USSR's successful pioneer achievements with ICBMs and space vehicles. For the Soviet leaders this hasajor turning point, In the

first place because of its military Implications. They consider that they are now overcoming the advantage, enjoyed by the US previously during the period of cold war struggle, ofuperior intercontinental striking capability. They see the time approaching when, whatever the circumstancesthe initiation of war, they will be able toevastating attack on the US. The consequence, as they see it, is thtt the US will be increasingly unwilling to rur. serious risks of general war, except in responseirect and vital challenge of the first magnitude. This means not only that the security ot the USSR and the Bloc is greatly enhanced, but also lhat US freedom of action is beingand Soviet freedom of action enlarged.

t lhe same time, however, the Soviet leaders probably recognize that the freedom of action that they thus expect to acquire will be limited by several factors. In the first place they are evidently fully conscious of the dangers and horrors of nuclear war and mean to avoid any provocation that could bring it about. Despite the increased relative power which they hope to achieve in the next year or so, they are also aware of lhe danger of presenting lhe Western Powers with an abrupt challengeagnitude which could provoke them into the desperate remedy of general war. hallenge might alsoilitary reaction ofature as could lead to an uncontrollable chain of events, the end product of which might be general war Nevertheless, the Soviets apparently expect to be able to draw political profit from their missile advances, even before these areinto significant military capabilities, byidespread belief lhat they have in fact alreadyignificant lend in military power.

B--

ne USSR's weapons advances and apace achievements are alM> icgardcd by the Soviet

i. riders tut major turning point because ihey see these nx symptomatic of olher emerging changes favorableem They expect their military and scientific achicvi-mcnls to result in broad gams in prestige and popular regard tliioughoui the world They arc furtherto insure that [leoplc both In the USSR and abroad will believe that these successes are owing lo theo)ity of the SovielThey expect their superiority to be further demonstrated by thc Bloc's gains in economic output Success In achieving the ScvpnYcar Plan gnals will, they thing, not only provide convincing proof to the world of their system's superiority, but also In factfurther support for their view that thcof power arc shifting In an irrevocable way They will expect their economic gains of the coming years to enable them still belter to cany thc burdens of competitive struggle with the West.

he Soviet leaders' confidence is further sustained by their belief that the movement of political forces in the world generally is favorable lo them. This is especiallyhe underdeveloped countries They see emerging there movements for "nationalor lor social and economic reform which will be more amenable lo their own tutelage and influence than to that of the Western Powers, fdeologically, Ihey consider that such societies can skip the stage of capitalist development under "bourgeois"domination and move directlyprogressive" phase in which lhe Communist model of social change will be their dominant inspiration. Their confidence inrend reslsung-run calculation, and islittle affected by the setbacks the Com-munut cause has encountered In various areas in theear or so. Even in lhe devrlopedountries of Die West they see, nut signs ol imminent collapse, but evidence of loss of dynamism whkh will make theseincreasingly vulnerable lo thechallenge as the power of thc latter grows. Finally, they feel, in spite of continuingthat political solidarity among Bloc

stale* and among Communist partieshas improvedhey seem to believe also thai the divisive tendencies which appeared in tne wake of tlicde-StaUnizaUon in Iho USSR have been brought under conliol

n sum. the Soviet uutlook at present seems lo be one of unprecedented confidence in thc trend of events. This docs not mean that thc Soviets think that their buttles are all won, or Ihnt Ihey can afford lo relax or to be Incautious They recognize continuing pioblems. including those concerning thestability of their h'astcrn Europeantheir relations with Communist China, and thc future of their own Internal political and economic development. However, they see present licnds on the whole as favorable, even though they expect that these trends will be interrupted by temporary setbacks, and that their full fruition mayong time in coming. Taking inlo account boih theand international aspects of theirsituation, and especially its present and prospective gains in power, theyerhaps for the first time in Soviet history, relatively free of any serious threat. They also believe that possibilities of political gains areup which have been closed to them in lhe past

MAIN FMPHASIS OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE

lie Com munis Is' political philosophy does not permit them to behave merely asobservers of the historical process. They consider that they are active agents of history and must exploit tlie course of events so us to hasten the success of their cause. On the basis of their present achievements intheir power ond the apparontof further such Ruins on their part. Ihey are currently striving for Western recognition of their new position and of the permanence of Communist rule within the Bloc. They want both lo reap immediate gains from such recognition, and to promote the broadest and most stable base for further advance. It Is im]>ossible to predict exactly how the Soviet leaders may seek to rxploil the increments

their power which they expect to achieve. Scviet action could be significantly influenced by events in fields having nothing to do with the balance of military power. At the same time, however, it Is apparenthift in the relation of forces of the magnitude that thc Soviel leaders apparently envisage as probable would be likely loignificant influence on Soviet policyumber of fields. In any case, it seems likely that thc Soviet leaders have considered severallines of policy.

Attitude Toward General War

Tbe alternative of deliberate initiation of general war is one which we continue tothe Soviet leaders will not entertain during the period of this estimate. They show full appreciation of the incalculablethat would be visited upon both sides Inar. Their programs to build greater military power are being pushed vigorously. But they probably do not count uponby any particular date, an advantage so decisive as to permit them to launch general war with assurance of success and underwhich would not gravely menace their regime and society."

Moreover, even if the Soviets came tothat they couldeneraligh but acceptable cost, it would probably not be their preferred coursear. Instead, in view of their philosophy about war and politics, theirwould probably be to press home their advantage by political and psychological means, expecting the enemy to recognize his position as hopeless, to shrink from an all-out encounter, and to concede positions which made his eventual submission without warOf course, there could never be assurance that, if the Soviets once gained such

"The Assistant Chief of Stall, InteUigence, USAF would revise the last sentence as fellows: White they probably do not count upon acquiring if by any particular date. they are vigorouslyto Qcoulro an advantage so decisive as to permit ihem lo launch general war with assurance of success and under conditions whleh would not gravely menace their regime. -

a margin of advantage, they would nottheir hand and take actions which would In fact precipitate general war.

ust as we exclude the deliberateof general war from the policythe SovieU would adopt, we also exclude the witting assumption of serious risks ofwar. The Soviet leaders seem well aware of thc danger that situations of high riskmighL lead lo general war without either partyit. and are likely to make every effort to maintain such control of these situations that the degree of risk does not exceed what they arc willing to accept. Nevertheless, with their new sense of increasing relative power, they may be disposed to see less risk arising from particular initiatives of theirs than they would formerly have done. They will be inclined to expect the enemy to realistically draw thefrom the altered relations of power, and to make appropriate concessions There was evidently something of this motivation at work In their instigation of tlie Berlin crisis inhus, even though wethat the Soviets will not intentionally provoke serious risks of general war. and will probably draw back if they estimate that such risks have developed, we also believe that the chance of their miscalculating risks mayif they remain convinced that their relative power is growing.

Some Aliernotives (or Soviet Policy Short of General War

If we eliminate general war or serious risks of such war from the options on which Soviet policy Lt likely to act, thereonsiderable range within which the main emphasis of that policy might fall, it might involve greater or lesser degrees of pressure, or alternatively of effort to relaxhere mightendency repeatedly to provoke crisis situations, or there might be seriousto eliminate points of friction through negotiation. Variations of emphasis have ample precedent in the history of Soviet policy.

The present periodarticularlyone In which to forecast the mainof Soviet policy because recent indications have been extremely contradictory. ear

ffOP Q-RET -

thc preceding estimate In this series) referred to the "generally hardening tone" ot Soviet foreign policy. Tniswas based on many authoritativeof Soviet leaders, public and private, which indicated their intention to act more assertively on the basistronger power position. Soviet behavior had in factthis character in various. Then Khrushchev'sultimatum seemed to manifest SovietIntentions in particularly sharp form. Even though the element of threat wasmuted, the Soviets continued to the end to surround the Geneva negotiations on Berlinertain atmosphere of tension. However, with the President's invitation to Khrushchev to visit thctrikingly new tone, one intended to relax tensions, was adopted, and has since for the most part been sustained. Thus, in the recent past, theelements of pressure andof belligerence and detent, have both appealed in Soviet policy.

easons can be alleged which might lead the Soviets to want to continue for aperiod their present posture of seeking detente* They might believeeriod of peaceful coexistenceelaxed international atmosphere would be likely to weaken Western resolution to resist the spread of Communist Influence and diminish Western determination lo maintain an adequate military posture. They might, for example, think the West would be less likely to resist forcibly possible "peaceful" shifts ot individual countries from colonial or Western-oriented lo neutral status, from neutralism to pro-Soviet alignment, or even to satellite status. Moreover, the Soviet leaders have setarge budget of internal tasks to accomplish In their Seven-Year Plan. Success may depend in someon keeping open the channels of trade and technical exchange, together with the possibility of obtaining foreign credits.peace would be popular internally, and while we do not think the regime Is under any real pressure to conform to popularthe habit of courting popularity, which Khrushchev has sponsored, may become increasingly difficult to glvo up.

However, there arc a'.so reasons why the Soviet leaders would picbably conclude thatourse of prolonged detente would not serve their interests. They are deeplyto the idea of struggle against the non-Communist world and do not really believeasting accommodation is possible. They will not expect their objectives to be realized unless some ingredient of pressure Is included in their dealings with the West. Moreover, they would fear that too muchof tensions could be dangerous to the structure of their power, both within lhe USSR itself and In thc other Bloc stales.

Alternatively, it is possible that Soviet policy will go overonsistent line ofand belligerence. The Soviet leaders would be Inclined fully to exploit what they regardavorable shift in the relations of power,olicy of consistent pressure would at least noi be inconsistent with the Communist-world outlook.ourse might also appeal on the ground that it could resultajor breakthrough in the struggle with the West. For example, winning avictoryey issue like Berlin mightudden collapse of the Western front, bringtampede of waverers andto the Communist side, and greatly accelerate lhe eventual triumph of Communist power.

ttractive as such prospects might be to the Soviel leaders, there are reasons forthat they will not followourse For one thing, they are bound to think that, since history is on their side, their relative strength over the long run will improve. One of the cardinal sins in thc Leninist lexicon Isor. an underestimate of theso far Ihe Soviet leadersrclain great respect for Western power. Moreover. Ihey seem to realize that pressure directedey Westernlo the point of showdown could bring an unmanageable crisis, and possibly end In general war. Even if it did not.olicy might draw the Western Powers closerand stimulate them to undertakemilitary efforts.olicy of unremitting pressure would tend to isolate further the Communist movement in the free

or onoriDT

and cause the USSR to Iosb considerable support in neutralist and uncommittedon which the Soviet leaders count strongly in their general political strategy.

here is another somewhat extreme course of Soviet policy which cannot beexcluded, even tnough we think it The Soviet leaders might think that if over the next two years or so the danger of conflict seemed to be declining, the West would push Its missile programs less rapidly than il otherwise might, while the Soviet buildup could go forward in secrecy as rapidly as was desired or feasible. Such an interim period of dctonte would be likely also to see atoral disarming of the West, and an increasing reluctance to maintain military forces capable of preventing Communist If then, in some context of provoked crisisajor issue like Berlin, anSoviet array of power were suddenly unveiled, the Soviets might expect to bringajor Western reversal. The objective would not be warecisive blow delivered against Western confidence and unity. The preceding period of emphasis on "peacefulwould be part of the psychological preparation for the showdown.

here are several reasons why such aof cunning, intended toingle grand deception of the enemy, seems to us unlikely. It would culminate in the kind of crisis in which the Soviels could not be sure that the risks would remain controllable by them. They evidently prefer regulatedof crisis in which the pressure applied is sufficient to win concessions but not soas to lead an enemy to acts of desperation. Of course. If the Soviets held an advantage so decisive that they did not need to fear the hazards of war and could with equanimity view war as the outcomerisis,ourse of action would be more However, as we have indicated earlier, they are unlikely to think that they canar within acceptable limits of risk and damage to themselves Moreover, they would feel that they could profiteriod of

temporary military advantage without having to incur grave risks.

Probable Line of Soviet Policy

e believe that, over the next five years,olicy single-mlndedly directed at eliminating East-West tensionsolicy of pressureteadily belligerent tone is likely to be followed by the USSR. We expect to see elements of both pressure and detente combined and varied as tactical advantage may suggest. For the nearer future thcemphasis on negotiation andseems likely to continue: later the motif of pressure and struggle will probably Whatever alternation of emphasis may occur, however, the swings are likely to fallange which excludes, on the one hand, the deliberate assumption of serious and uncontrollable risks of general war, and, on the other, abandonment of the concept of continuing struggle between two irreconcilable worlds.

he reasons for anticipatingariegated and seemingly inconstant Soviet policy seem to us compelling. ay, it has been characteristic of the whole history of Communist policy. The Communists arepreoccupied with lhe tactics ofand consciously aim at keeping the enemy confused and off balance This has been particularly true of Khrushchev's regime, which hasigh degree of tactical flexibility. It is also true thatof tactics are constantly reappraised in inner party circles and may be the subject of much pulling and hauling. It would not be surprising if the Soviet leadership at present, finding itself in new relations ot power for which there are no reliable precedents in Parly history, should hesitate or alter its course periodically. Factional politics may have something lo do with theseknow that there were sharp differences over foreign policy tactics during the posl-Stalin leadership struggles. At present, thc Chinese appear to favor harsher tactics than the Soviets. Such tactics may have sympathizers in the CPSU and other Communist parlies.

OEOniiT-

iven Khrushchev's unchallengedascendancy, however, his views arc likely io be thc primary determinant. The strong impress of his personality on Soviet foreign policy tactics has been especially maniiest In ine last year or two. His aUitudes are marked on the one handtrong sense of thc growth of Soviet power andrude and truculent pride in asserting the claims of that power to the world's attention and deference. He has been free In his vigorous use of missile threats. On the other hand, he apparently thinks it possible to winfor Soviet views largely throughrather than by force alone. He clearly understands the horrors of nuclear war, and his proclaimed dedication to economicappears to be sincere. He probablybelieves that the Soviet system can prove its superiority In "peaceful"although he recognizes that Soviet powerital role in this competition. Thus, the contradictory tendencies towardand accommodation in Soviet policy are probably in someeflection of the attitudes and personality of Khrushchev, and may persist so long as he Is the commanding figure on the Soviet scene.

he immediate outlook is that the Soviels will continue their present tactics of detente at least through the initial phase of thc series of high-level negotiations now ineriod of partial detente presumablyumber of useful purposes from Moscow's point of view. First, ituitable framework for an effort to ascertain through negotiation what positions the West is now willing to take in view of increasing Soviet strength and the threatening Soviet behavior over the last year or two. An avowedto reach agreement with the Westumber of issues, including especially dis armament,uitable andalluring framework for possibleconcessions. Secondly, even barringagreements with lhc West, Moscowviews high-level East-West talks as an acknowledgment by the West of thelegitimacy, and equal status of the

Communist Bloc. Finally, during such aof detente the Soviets would hope to improve their relative power position still further, since they would expect Westernprograms to be carried on with less urgency.

eyond this phase the outlook is lessWc have emphasized that in the coming period the main influence shaping Sovietis likely to be the Soviet leaders' sense of their improved power position relative to that of the West. In another year or two they may feel that their capabilities in long-range missiles have brought themeriod when thc relations of military power are the most favorable from their point of view. At some stage, they will almost certainly wish to test the chances of drawing, advantage from this situation if II emerges as they expect. We believe that even then they would noiassume serious risks of general war. They will still try to win Western concessions basically through negotiation. But theof pressure and threat will probablymore pronounced, perhaps much more so. than It Ls at present Thc Soviet leaders may think It possible to undertake morebehavior in areas where they are in contention with Western power andIn their view, the emerging standoff of intercontinental striking forcestalemate only of general war capabilities. They consider that this situation of mutual deterrence would secure their base and open up new opportunities for advancingpower by political, economic, andeven limited military means

POLICY TOWARD NATO AND THE US

he main confrontation between the USSR and the Western Powers remains the one in the center of Europe. The Soviets seek on the one hand to frustrate the attempts of the Atlantic Powers to organize and increase their strength In Western Europe, and on the olher to consolidate their own hold onEurope. To facilitate the latter they

43

by evciy means lo wring from thePowers recognition of the status quo which would concede the legitimacy of the Communist regimes. Beyond shoring up the East European base, however. Germanythe central focus of Soviet interest because ol the crucial increment of power it represents to both sides. The Soviets prob ably accept that they have no early prospects for extending their Influence in Westbut Ihey are determined to limit its contribution to Western military power so far as feasible. They will remain even more determined to deny East Germany to lhe West and to maximise its contribution to lhe Bloc. The Soviet sponsorshipeace treaty for lhe two German statestep toward reunification ls likely to continue to be the official Soviet position. We believe, however, that the Soviets will not undertake any serious negotiations on reunification, but that their policy will rest on acceptance by both sides of the indefinite division of the country.

By initiating the Berlin crisishe Soviets undertook,robing of the "relation ofhey probably believed there was some chance lhat the Western slates,the recent increases in Soviet power, would withdraw from Berlin.inimum, the Soviets expected to set In motionwhich would enhance the stability and international slalus of the East German regime.

As of the present, the Soviets have allowed the Berlin crisis to diminish in intensity, and have disavowed any Intention of hastening events by undue pressures. Nevertheless, they have not given up their objectives, nor the threat of eventual unilateral action. They clearly seek atimited agreement on Berlin which would undercut the Western position in the city andasis for eventually bringingesternThe value ofarginal victory on the Berlin Issue would still be so great to thein consolidating theregime in East Germany and inthe Western alliance, above all in Westit seems likely they will

renew their pressure on West Berlin at some moment they deem propitious. We believe that, as long as the Soviels are confident that they can make progress towards theirermany by negotiation and propaganda, they will probably abstain from any major interference with Western access to Berlin and fromeparate peace treaty with East Germany. If they deckle that further progress is impossible by comparatively mild methods, they will probably make thepeace treaty, though they would not necessarily try at the same time to obstruct Western access to Berlin.

Apart from pressure on the Berlin issue, Soviet strategy against NATO will probably rely on more generalized lines of attack.hase of more aggressive tactics thewin probably again have recourse tothreats directed against particularof the alliance who may be willing to have missiles or nuclear weapons stationed oo their territory. The Soviels will also hope to find other issues, in Asia, the Middle East, or Africa, where the NATO allies might be divided over the risks to assume In resisting Communist advances.hase of milder tactics, they would hope lhat the resolve of the NATO members lotrongposture would diminish. They would also hope to exploit differences over the extent to which the alliance can afford toconcessions or risk reducing its military strength or altering disposition of forces. Inhase, the Soviets would Iry to develop bilateral contacts with individual members of NATO in the hope of engendering suspicion and disagreement. The current approach to the US and the planned visit to France may be parlly motivated by this hope, in any case, whatever the tactics employed in any particular phase, the weakening andot NATO willonsistent Soviet aim.

Under Khrushchev's direction of Soviel policy the impulse to seek contacts at lhe highest level seems likely toegularin part because Khrushchev fanciesa very persuasive statesman and enjoys confronting his capitalist peers. Bilateral and multilateral summit meetings will prob-

ably be sought in order to preserve and build thc atmosphere or detente. If assertivestands were to create crises, suchwould be directed more at preserving an authoritative channel for compromise.held in an atmosphere of crisis will be intended primarily to compel the Western Towers under pressure of world opinion to accede to compromise solutions favored by thc Soviets. They will attempt to pose theeither of "peaceful coexistence" onterms or of tensionsising danger of nuclear war. hoping by occasional measured reminders of the latter toacceptance of thc former.

Disarmament

In the main. Soviet policy statements on disarmament to date have been aimed at encouraging military retrenchment ordisorientation in the West withsoviet sacrifice. At the same time, the USSR has been prepared to offer minorincluding even some limited inspection, in order to achieve agreements from which it expected to gain compensatory advantages. At present, thc Soviets probably are prepared to agreeuclear test ban provided that the West is willing to reduce still further Itsfor Inspection. The Soviets will continue to be extremely cautious aboutprecedents on Inspection, and probably feel that they do not need to be appreciably more forthcoming in thc nuclear test field. If an agreement on tests comes into force, the Soviets will probably next press for nuclear-free zones in various areas, especially InEurope.

The disarmament theme Is likely to be given increased Importance In Sovietand propaganda in the period ahead The Soviets have evidently concluded that it is desirable, aa the chief manifestation of their current posture, to champion disarmament In broad, simple and sweeping terms which will capture the imagination of many. Theythat the world wide fear of nuclear war is so intense that great political strength is added to that side in the power struggle which can capture lhe force of this sentiment, and thus align bodies of opinion with Its own cause.

At the least, the USSR will be pictured asto play its part En relaxing tensions, while the West will be placed in the position ofto seek excuses and to procrastinate when it raises questions of limitations, grad-ualness, and inspection and verificationBeyond Ihis, the Soviets will hope that some Western political groups may identify themselves with such broad disarmament plans, and that some differences concerning them may arise within the Western alliance.

Such propaganda alms were almostthe main motive for Khrushchev's sweeping proposal for total disarmamentat the UN. We do not believe that the Soviets consider totalealistic possibility or even desirable; they regard their great military strength as an essentialin the challenge they pose to the non-Communist world and the struggle remains for them one of power and not merely of Ideas. This does not mean, however, that the USSR will not press other less far-reaching disarmament plans. Regional armsproposals, particularly for Europe, are likely to figure prominently among the "partial" disarmament plans which the Soviet Government will advance atation disarmament conference. These proposals, which exploit the USSR's geographic situation, arc aimed at bringingetraction of the US overseas base system, checking the deployment of nuclear and rocket weapons in areas peripheral to the USSR, and Inhibiting West German

We believe that the Soviets might like toreeze orutback in some armaments if this could be done in some way so as to improve their potentialities for long-run economic and political competitionaffecting adversely their relative powerThey may also think that somearrangements can contribute to reducing the risks of war by miscalculation. But thc countervailing Soviet aversion toforeign controls and inspection in the USSR wUI almost certainly exclude anything more than limited agreements. Moreover, while the Soviet economy undoubtedly feels

the pinch of heavy arms expenditures, wc do not believe that the Soviet Government will feel obliged for economic reasons lo makeconcessions on disarmament.

POLICY TOWARD UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

In the Soviet view. Asia. Africa, and LatinWestern Europe and Northundergoing profoundchanges, though at different speeds and under widely varying conditions. This situation Is seen as offering growingfor replacing Western with Sovietand ultimately for the establishment of communism. Tho Soviets seek to pose as the disinterested champions of anand toree ride on the crest of the nationalist wave. Moscow hu long viewed Asia and the Middle East In this light. More recently, the "national liberationin Africa and the lef List trend in Latin America have been considered to beeriod of rising ferment, and to offernew opportunities for Communistin the years ahead. Il will almostcontinue through the period of thisto be one of thc main objectives ofpolicy loominant position in underdeveloped areas of the world.

At present, thc Soviets apparently believe Ihat the political orientation of most newly independent countries of Asia and Africa is still characterized internally by thcof "bourgeois nationalists" and externally by neutralist tendencies. However, it is clear from recent Soviet pronouncements that they see emerging in some countries of Asia and the Middleew stage of internal politicalrevolutionary turn which will eventually bring Communist-influenced forces to power. The Soviet leaders haveconsidered their support for themovements as falling into two phases, the first In which they would support all non-Communist elements in seeking the removal of Western Influence, the second in which they would try lo bring these movements under Communist control.

policy toward thecountries of Asia. Africa, andover the period of this estimatekeep an uneven balance betweentactics of cooperation withfor non-Communist neutraland its long range goal ofareas under Communist rule.of actively supporting neutral andgovernments will probublyprovide the general framework fortoward these countries. Thisto be particularly true In AfricaAmerica where the Soviets as ayet to establish close ties on alevel and where theyisingnationalism. From time to time,Soviets wUl probably have tothe prospective gainsocalattempt to seize power In one orcountry will justify the risks andinvolved. During the period of thisthere are likely to be cases In whichwill be more disposed than theybeen to support such militantlocal Communist parties.

Soviet trade and aid programs are the economic adjunct to the strategy ofIn underdeveloped areas. They willbe continued on at least thc scale ofyears, and are likely to be enlarged as Soviet resources grow or as attractivefor poUtical exploitation of trade and aid may appear,

It does not seem likely that the Soviets will concentrate their attention on anyundeveloped region of the world, say lhe Middle East or Southeast Asia Instead, they will have an opportunistic policybased on the USSR's growing economic and military strength and the Soviet leaders' apparent view that their chances ofchallenging the West in many areas are improving. At present. Africa and Latin America probably seem accessible only toaid. cultural exchange,to win support for Communist views on International issues. Localand discontents may provide anfavorable climate for such Soviet efforts.

Th- Middle East and Southeast Asia probably seem more attractive for early subversiveIn cases where there is an internal movement to the Right (as recently in Burma. Thailand, and Indonesia) the Soviets may come to adopt increasingly sharp political and economic pressure to prevent or to limit anti-Communist moves. In general, however, the

16

Soviets are likely to be cautious aboutdirect action by local Communists, especially it this is likely to involve the Uloc in military support to such attempts. Thcleaders believe that the long-term outlook augurs well for communism in thecountries; they will not wish to take undue risks or to incur unnecessary setbacks,

f FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

ANNEX A

SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

The Soviets will continue their intensive efforts in weapons research and development with the object of acquiring new systems which, through political and military impact, will shift the world relation of forces to their advantage. In making their decisions, Soviet planners will have to consider such problems aa rapid technological change, long lead times, rapid obsolescence, and Increasing costs. There will be increasing competition among military requirements of different types, and between military requirements and theof highly important nonmilitaryIn deciding whether to producenew weapon systems in quantity, the USSR will probably apply Increasingly severe tests as to whether these would add greatly to current capabilities, and as to whether costs were justified by likely periods of use before obsolescence. The history of previous Soviet re-euipment programs Indicates that existing assets arc not likely to be quickly discarded, but rather maintained untilnew capabilities have become well Nevertheless, we believe that the rate of change In Soviet weapons systems Isand that the next five years will probably see the appearanceumber of Important new developments. Significant new missile capabilities for strategic, air defense, tactical and naval use is the majorwhich can be foreseen at present.

"Onanuary Ml Khrushchev announced the personnel strength of Soviet armed forces: we believe this figure ihould beas substantially correct. He alsoplans for further reductions In EUengthen during the next two years, and for alterations In force structure. In view of these snd other indleaUona. we have undertaken to produce,ayevised estimate of present and future Soviet force strengths.

FORCES FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK H

esult ot the policies of recent years. Soviet long-range attack capabilities are nowajor transition. Currentrest primarily on bombers, allof delivering high-yield nuclear bombs and some equipped with alr-to-surfaceThc bomber force is now supplemented by missile-launching submarines and by ground-launched ballistic missiles. Wc believe that within the next few years ballisticwill constitute the main element of the Soviet long-range striking forces.

Long Range Aviation

ong Range Aviation still consists primarily of medium bombers, best suited for operations against targets In Eurasia and capable of attacking continental US targets only through extensive use of one-way missions. Within the limitations of its bomber aircraft, it isroficient force, although its training, basing, and maintenance fall below US Its strength, asas estimated at moreADGER mediumandISON and BEAR heavy bombers At that time, thc force still included morebsolete BULL piston medium bombers, but these probably are nowphased out. Inflight refueling has now been extended to all BISON regiments and about one-half of the BADGER regiments. The USSR has notanker aircraft; instead BISONs and BADGERs are converted for use as tankers.

uller discussion of this subjectlet CBPabll|tlcs fortUary lW0-

-T

lew BADGER units of Long Rangeand several naval BADGER unitsequipped with subsonic anUshipmissiles capable of deliveringHE warheadsange ofoviets arc also developing and willhave availableupersonicmissileange cf at leastwhich can be used (with differentsystems) against land targets orsea They may also now have inair launched decoy to simulate mediumbombers.

production of bomber aircraftvirtually ceased, most majorbeen assigned tot the height of thcre-equipment program, fiverepresenting aboutercent ofof the Soviet aircraft Industry,on long-range bomberonly one plant, representingpercent of this capacity, is solast of three plants which wereproducing BADGERswere produced inISONat Moscow/Fill Plant Noasby numerous modifications ofand by low and unevenCumulative BISONnnd during thethe year production appears to haveor two per month. BEARin6 after completion ofaircraft.

Soviets apparently decided againstbuildup of heavy bombers asof one or more of the followingconfidence In the development ofICBM. dissatisfaction with theof BISON and BEAR, andof Improvements in Northdefense. Evenormidablehas been established, however,USSR Is likely tomiller one. For some timethe bomber will be capable ofpayloads with greater accuracyICBM. Moreover, manned bombers would

provide the Sovieu with flexibility andof attack capabilities, and wouldparticularly useful for attacks on small hardened targets, damage assessment, and reconnaissance.

There is little evidence of Sovietresearch and development programs in the long-range bomber category. Inew bomber prototype was observed on thc factory airfield at the BISON plant in Moscow. Designated BOUNDER, theis in the heavy bomber weight class andodified delia-wing configuration apparently designed for supersonic flight However, using conventional fuels. Its range potential appears to fall In the medium bomber rather than the heavy bomber class.appears to be in an early stage ofand evidence Is still insufficient to establish Its probable development or intended mission. No other large bomber prototype has been positively Identified during the past two years, although we do not exclude the possibility that one or more may exist.

A significant improvement over present Soviet heavy bombers could be achieved by the developmentuclear-poweredwhich would combine virtually unlimited rangeapability for very low altitude penetration Although there are indications of Soviel interest in nuclear-powered aircraft, no specific Soviet program directed toward the development of such an aircraft has yet been identified. We believe that the Sovieis haverogram underway, but believe it unlikely that they will have any nuclear-powered bombers in operational status within the period of this

8 The BADGER will almost certainlythe primary medium bomber threatthe period of this eslimate. It is possible

"Tbe Assistant Chief of SlarT. inlelllcence, USAF believes. In view of the tactical andadvantagesiiclear-powered bomber, the state of Soviet aviation and nuclearloey, and the evident Soviet Interest in the development of such an aircraft,mall number of nuclear bombers may appear Instatus by the end o! the period of this fit: mat*.

DDOfllT

that the USSR will develop for operational useew medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capabilitiesange approximating that ot the BADGER.there is no evidence that development of such an aircraft is uctually in progress.

e estimate that Soviet heavy bomber strength will Increase tout that it will gradually decline thereafter tonhis estimate is based on the belief that no more than two BISONs per month will be produced over tho next year or so, and that their production will thenimilarly, BADGER strength probably will remain constant atircraft for two or three years, and then decline tof the Soviets decide toew supersonic "dash" medium bomber Into operationalew of these might enter serviceuilding up to" In summary, wc consider it possible that new aircraft types may be added to thc force in small numbers, but we believe that BISONs, BEARS, and BADGERs will continue to constitute the bulk of Long Range Aviation over the next five years.

"The Assistant chief ofntelligence. USAF. believes thai Uie Sonets willequirementarger heavy comber force during thc period ol inu estimate than that esUmated above. He believes that the level and type of activity of the present Soviet heavy bomber force as well as the continued production of HISON bombersurther buildup, lie rurther believes that BlSON-type bombers Will be produced at the rate of two or more per month over thc next lew years In his view, future heavy bomber strength will approximate the following:

iho mi mt jssj im

The Assistant Chief of Stan for Intelligence.of thc Army, cannot concur in thisol an Increase in operational heavy bomber

strength, which would reflect an increase ofercent within the next yearalf over the

current estimated strength ofpaia-

This nonconcurrenee Is based on Uie

following factors:

trend in annual UISON producUondownwardthe peakhe Increase to ISO Implies aof this trend.

totalresumably wouldsameBAlts now estimated to be Inuniu. an alrciaft which wilt thenout o; producuon lor over four yearsincrease esUmaled has either to assumegreater BISON production rate or tono BEARs are withdrawn or otherwiseul service In the nexl yearalf.assumption would suggest anreversal of observed trends, whileassumption Is hardly reasonable.

apparent conflict wiih producUonto above could presumably bethe force Increased by addinghave been pioduced but are not nowstatus. However, suchongstanding practice for noreason. unless, contrary to ourSoviets associate special significance

apparent emphasisuildupRange Avi'auon heavy5 percent Increase, eonfllcUJudgmcnU (Inhat thenot regard increased numbers of theiras the means of meeting Uieirrequirements and that they wina substantial buildup with ICBMssame period.

nased on ana:ysu of tne foregoing factorsChiel of SUI for InteUigence.of the Army, concludes that Sovietstrength probably will remainover the nexlalf,with the probable reisaUon of BISONand increasing age of Ihe BEAR, wil,rather rapidly In his view, futurestrength will approximate theMid- Mid- Mid-

-The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAr believes thai tne SovieUosiuve requ.re-meniomber with supersonic dashfor employment by Long Range Aviation, primarily in Uie advance wavttsi of tUategic bomber strikes. Considering recent reporu and sightings of new bomber typM. and historical and continuing Soviel Inteieal In the bombertrategic weapon delivery system, and the oc-cepled technical capability of the USSR toandupersonic dash bomber, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF,that the introductionupersonic dash bomber into operational uniu l% lUiely

b t

LONG

in Operational Units)

Hut-

fleecy Bombers

BISON and BEAR IUBomber**

BADOKR

TOTALS

'Might alsoew supersonic "dash" medium bomber*uilding lon which case wo would expect adecrease In the- number of BADGERs.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles"

he Soviet ICBM testwhich we believe is effectivelyomplete ICBM system, has proceeded in an orderly manner. Development of the ICBM does not appearerash basis. Since inception of testing Inhere have been periods of launching activity and inactivity, but the evidence is insufficient to determine whether the Inactive intervals were due to setbacks in Lhe program. In any event, both the rale and number of ICBM test firings up to this time are lower than had been expected.

It has not been possible to confirm lhat series production of ICBMs has actually begun as the Soviets claim, nor that operational launching facilities exist. Considering that production lead times are probably on the orderonths, the USSR has hadtime to begin turning outmissiles. In the light of all thewe believeoviet initialcapability (IOC)ew,eries-produced ICBMs Is Imminent, if in fact it has not already occurred. Although the evidence is insufficient torecise estimate of IOC date, we believe that forpurposes it should be considered that

uller discussion of this subject and thc evidence upon which these judgments are based, see, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and SpaceOP SECRET.

this had occurrede have no direct evidence as to Sovietconcepts, but believe that the Soviet ICBM force could employ fixed sites, rail mobile units,ombination of the two. In any case, it will be heavily dependent on the Soviet rail net.

We estimate that the initial Soviet ICBM will be capable ofaximum range.eat-sink nosecone configuration. Ain warhead weight would permit anin range. Forange of. could be achievedarhead ofbs. and the sameconfiguration. Use of an ablativewould permit an even heavier warhead or extended range. In general, the USSR Is likely to equip its ICBMs with warheads of the maximum yield attainable within the limits of its nuclear and missile lechnology.

We estimate Soviel ICBM guidance at IOC dateombination radar track/radio com-mand/inertial system which is calledlthough an all-incrtial system is possible. Soviet capabilities in relatedat IOC pointheoretical CEP of. with the radio-inertial system. The Soviets probably will incorporate the all-inertial system in their ICBM someeriod and, should they adopt this systemhey couldfteoreficol CEP of. Thc data available for estimating both the aboveCEP's are far from exact. The precise amount of degradation which would beby operational factors ts unknown, bul weEP under operationalat IOC date of. with the radio-inertial system; with an all-inertialthe operational CEP0 would be. We further believe that thewill be able to improve the accuracy of their ICBM following IOC, and that over the next few years, and probably not later thanhe operational CEP for an all-inertial system could be reduced to about

c F, rji ..

nd thc operational CEP of the radic-Incr'-ial system would be somewhat belter.'"

he reliability of the Soviet ICBMwill also be greatly improved. It isthat during the period from IOC tohe in-corn mission rate will probably increase from aboutercent to aboutercent, and reliability on launcher from aboutercent to aboutercent. Wethat the missile's inflightthat is. its reliability after leaving thcIOC lies ln the range betweenercent andercent, and al IOC plus three years lies In the range betweenercent andithin these ranges the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, and thc Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believe the reliabilities in question lie at the lower ends; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates that thelie at the upper ends.

" The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,of the Army, believes that theof Soviet ICBM accuracy stated ineither reflect, or were suggestedUS ICBM test experience whichmembers of thc USIB lo reviseas to the validity of the moststudy of this problem conductedUSIB by thc Oulded Missile andCommittee (OMAICI. TheChief of Staff for Intelligence.the Army, recognizes that it ls prudent tothat the Sovicis would sooner oi lalor,currenUy, possess an ICBM system ofcomparable to that of the USat present, he perceives nofor abandoning the esUmatcs derivedrecent an analysis of all availableInformation.urtherconsideration Is that estimates of operationalare based on (Aeoreffcfll degradationrange performance which furtheruncertainties In such estimates. Itthere Is no presentbasis for changing Lhe conclusionsoperational accuracy as contained inreport and. therefore, that therange of operetionaJ accuracy forat IOC, using "radlo-lnertlal"on the order. CEP: thatith the all-lnertlal system,could be reducedm, althoughCEP of lhe "radio-InertiaI"be somewhat better.

net eflect of improvements inespecially In accuracy andwould be to reduce sharply theof ICBMs required iniven target system.

is practically no evidenceplans for the production anddeployment of ICBMs. We havepossible alternative Sovietrequirements in the light of ourthe USSR's national strategy, militaryeconomic capabilities, and the We have concluded that theICBM program, whilerashis probably designed to provide aICBM capability at an earlydisrupting other programs toSoviet leaders have attached greatThe goal of the program lsan ICBM .force as large as Sovietnecessary toubstantialand pre-emptive attackSoviets would expectorceto meet these military criteriahave great value in terms of

IB. In estimating the numbers of ICBMsto achieve these goals, wc haveboth the estimated characteristics of the Soviet ICBM and the probable size and nature of US nuclear retaliatory forces against which II would be employed. Wc havethat the probable Soviet ICBMwould provld* on the orderCBMs on launcher in Within this range, the Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartment of the Army, and theChief of Naval Operations forDepartment of the Navy, estimate lhat the Soviet program is likely to be toward the low side. The Director of Intelligence and Re search, Department of Slate, the Assistant Chief of Siaff, Intelligence. USAF, and thc Director tor Intelligence. The Joint Stall, be-

" The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, does not concur tn the Judgments expressed In this paragraph. For his position see hts foolnoto to paragraph IB below.

that Soviet planners would regard the advantages to be gained as Justifyingeffort, estimate that the number ofICBMs on launcher Is likely to be towards the high side ofhc development of the Soviet ICBM force1 would be likely to be affected by such consideration as thc actual development of thc target system to be attached,reatly improved Soviet ICBM, and thc prospects (on both sides) for an effective antl-ICBM, as well as by the generalof thc world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Any figures for future years should be reviewed In the light of such considerations and of evidence on the actual progress of the Soviet ICBMProjecting our estimates of the present ICBM program (and assuming that if the USSR has approximately ICBMs on launcher inroduction wouldlevel off in the subsequent two years) thc most likely number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher inouldnd inould

Medium Range Ballistice believe that the Soviets now haveballistic missUes. ranges, which add significantly to their attack capabilities. m. missile

AssiiUnt Chief of Staff, InUUlgence. USAF. does not believe that Soviet behavior, as we have observed it. warrant* the Judgment that their objectives would be satisfied by attainment of only substantial deterrence and pre-emptive attack capability. Rather, he believes that the Soviet rulers are endeavoring to attain at the earliest practicableilitary superiority over the United States which ihey wouldlo be so decisive as to enable them either lo force Iheir will on the United Slates through threat of destruction; or to launch suchattacks against the United suteaat the coat of acceptable leveU of damage to themselves, the United Statesorld power would cease to exist He further believes that tuch an objective could be attained by theof their overall military capabilities which would include an operational ICBM force of5 on launcher) by5 on launcher) bynd SCO icto on launcher) by It Is generally agreed that the Sovieu have both the technical and

hich is believed toEP. and lob. warhead,has been operationally available. missileoEP. and the'same size warhead, probably became operational In8 orll-inertial guidance could probably be available for boih of these systems now or within the next year. Thes believed to be road mobile, and theay be road and/or rail mobile.

Factors of timing and security, as well as the programmed improvement In Western air defenses, will make it increasingly desirable that an Initial Soviet attack against Western retaliatory bases be delivered primarily with ballistic missiles launched from within the USSR. Even from within the USSR, medium-range ballistic missiles could deliver nuclear warheadsarge majority of critical targets in Eurasia, and its periphery.bombers, as well as shorter rangewill be available throughout the period for foUow-on attack and other related

We estimate that with relatively modestndrograms, the Soviets could meet the calculated requirement for an initial attack against land-based retaliatory targetsf the USSR from0 on, and against such targeu

industrial capability to produceorce thc physical dlfflculUes thereby er.uiled will almost ccruinly not be the limiting factor,

It Is Uie view of the Assistant Chief of staff, Intelligence USAF. that, while Soviel planners will undoubtedly feel that they will havea capacity for substanUal deterrence and pre-empUvt attack byr earlier. Uie real objecUve of the Soviet ICBM program Isiliury superiority- He believe, that the sovieu would cot be content withlereh of deterrence: they would realise the possibility of error In their own calculations and acknowledge the possibihty of WesU.nof their deterrent capabCiUei This Jailer contingency would weigh the more heavily if the Soviet leaders intended, as he believes likely, lo exploit their capabilities In political offemlves. In this event, their estlmau or lhe likelihood of Western "desperaU" acU would induce them lo attempt attainment of loUldecisive military superiority."

rom1 on. The table belownumbers of launchers, estimatedoviet Initial salvo capability, together with the quantity of missilesfor the initial salvo as well as foruse in the initial phaseeneral war and for employment in later phasesustained conflict Should changingrequire somewhat greater numbers of missiles or even launchers, their production and deployment4 would not present serious difficulties to the USSR.

0 njn.)

Missiles

Launchers

aSasata .

Submormo-launched Missiles

n recent years there have beenindications of Soviet interest inapabilily lo launch guided missiles from submarines. We estimate thatirstabout two "W" class submarines were modified to launch, while surfaced, twocruise-type missileapable ofb. warheadange.. CEP.aler efiort, about four "Z" class submarines have been modified (by enlarging the sail) probably to launch two ballistic missiles each. These probably could not be launched white theis submerged, but it has not yet been determined whether the submarine would have lo be fully surfaced or only partiallyWc have no specific information lo permit identification of missiles for thisbut wc believe that compatible missiles may be capable ofb. war headange. (or less likelyllh an operational CEP. The most recent development Isew class of conventionally powered"O" class by USof which arc probably now In operation with the Fleet. Allhough the evidence in this case is not so convincing as in the case of the modified "Z" class, we evaluate

the "O" class as probably having ballisticlaunching capabilities. Their very large sail, considerably higher and longer than that of the modified "Z" class, suggests lhat they could each carry about five ballistic missiles capable ofb. warheadange. wich an operational CEP. Shorter or even longer rangemissiles are considered less likelyWe estimate that the USSR will build up loan operational strength of about ia "G" class submarines Inhe USSR probably will retain these and convertedsubnuurincs during the period of this

view of operational considerations,desirable new system would be asubmarine capable ofsubmerged, ballistic missiles of atn.m. range. On the basis of Sovietcapabilities, we estimate that

USSR could have availableubmarine-launchedapable ofange.. Present indications areSoviet nuclear-powered submarineis sufficiently far advanced so lhatmissile could be incorporated as soonmissile becomes available.

the absence of direct evidence, bulthe potential value of thewe have assumed an activeprogram which would makesubmarine/ballistic missilefor operational use1easonable constructionSoviets could probably Introduce asubmarines Into operational unitswhile continuing the constructionsubmarines equipped withthis basis, we estimate that aboutsubmarines equippedn.m. missiles will be operational in

proper operating procedures and

"Themissile system may not be available until as laten which case the missile used In the "O" class might be used In the nrat Soviet nuclear-powered missile launchlnc

TOP I Ii

onsiderable portion of thisbeoft US coasts at all times, should the Soviets so desire.

Capabilities for Long Range Attack

At present, by employing their entire heavy bomber force, many of their medium bombers, their small submarine-launchedcapability, andew ICBMs. the Soviet could mount large-scale initial nuclear attacks against North American targets. The actual wtlgnt of attack launched against the US would depend upon the Soviet Judgment as to the optimum combination of surprise and weight of attack against all areas wnere US and Allied nuclear retaliatory capabilities and other essential targets were located. Against those Western capabilities deployed on the periphery of the Bloc, the Soviets could. ballistic missiles and light and medium bombers-Bombs and air-to surface missiles could be employed against Western naval forcesnuclear strike capabilities. Theleaders probably regard their current long-range attack forces as adequate toevastating attack on concentrations ofand industry, but incapable ofby military action, the nuclearof the USSR.

Because the ICBM offers the best prospect of being able to achieve the destructionubstantial portion of the US nuclearcapability prior to launch, the future development of Soviet intercontinental attack capabilities will beunction of thc production and deployment of ICBMs, Through the period of this estimate, however, the long-range striking capabilities of the USSR will include both manned bombers and ballistic missUes The Soviets probably will consider that ballistic missiles can best be employed to neutralize Western retaliatory and other capabilities In an Initial blow,upon bombers tor followup attacks.submarines will add to Soviet capabilities, but the scale of their use would depend upon Soviet judgment of the risk of premature disclosure Soviet employment of long-range striking capabilities would con-

tinue to face great difficulties of timing and distribution of attack against widely deployed, mobile and ready Western strengths.

AIR DEFENSEeapons Systems

t present, the principal weapon system for defense of Sino-Soviet Bloc targets against high-altitude atuck is the jet fighter. Ashere werehroughout the Bloc, witn more0 In Soviet units. The Soviet fighter force consists primarily of day fighters. Includingransonicubsonic PRESCOs, andC0 obsolescent FAOOTs. The FAGOTs should be completely phased out over tho next five years. There is good evidenceach 2developed from thenow beinginto units, and that another advanced fighter probably is In production. Also in service are the FLASHLIGHT all-weather fighter and the FRESCO "D" and FARMER "B" wllh limited all-weather capabilities, but their introduction has proceeded at aslow paceLASHLIGHTSRESCO "D" types are operational, and some FARMER "B" types are also in op-peralional units.

ost Bloc jet fighters now operational have combat ceilings of0 feet-however. FARMER and FITTER have combat ceilings of0 reet. There is some evidence that alr-to-alr missiles have been supplied to operational units, and most of the current gun-armed interceptors areto be capable of employing unguided rockets, guided missiles, or combinationDuring the period of this estimate, the USSR wiU probably introduce new fighter types designed lo emphasize speed2 the USSR could havefighter aircraftpeed capabilityombat celUng of0 feet.

aUonal Intelligence EeUmate on Slno-Sovlet Bloc air defense is scheduled foe production In

production of Jet fighterdropped sharply over the pastnnualfromo. estimated to have declined toroduction difficulties with theprobably have played some partdecline but other factors Includecost and complexity of modernthe growing destructive powerinterceptors, and especially theavailability and effectiveness ofmissile systems. The Sovietswill continue to design and developbut the number operational willdecrease over the next five years.

Soviets now have operational attypes of surface-to-air missilefirst of thesehich has beenfor several years, is deployed inand costly complex ofiteseach havingaunchingsystem is capable of interception atbetweennd 0 feet,has limited effectiveness up to The single stage missile firstthis system is believed to.. and is capable of carryingHEuclear warhead. Thecan probablyery highfire against multiple targets underconditions, but the system lsagainst very low-altitudedo not believe that this type ofwill be deployed elsewhere In theUnion.

ecent evidence indicates that during at least the past year, the USSR has beenin lhe rapid and extensive deploymenlew. more flexible surface-to-air missile systemhich appears suitable for rapid transport and installation for defense of both fixed targets and Soviet fieldypical site consists of six revettedpositions deployeduidance sys-

"uller discussion of Soviet air defensesystems, see NIE, "SovietUes in Guided Missiles and SpaceOP SECRET.

tern and linked by service reads to facilitate reloading. Such sites have been observed in East Germany and at numerous locations in the USSR, including thc Moscow area We believe that the missile employed inoosted two-stage missile wiih arange.aximum velocity of about Mach 3. Its maximumcapability is estimated to be at0 feet, with some effectiveness up to0 feet. Each site employing lhe new system appears capableegree coverage, and of engaging more thanime. It is believed capable oftargets at altitudes belowool lower limit estimated for theut is probably ineffective against very low-level atuck.

n the absence of evidence, butSoviet technical capabilities and probable needs, we estimate tha: within the next year or two the USSR will probably have available two additional surface-to-air missile systems, one designed primarily lo engage very lowtargets, the other for long-range (on thc orderngagement of targets at altitudes up0 feet. These systems will have increased kill capabilities against airciaft and cruise-type missiles. We believe that high-priority has been given to theof an anUbalhsUe missile system, and that the USSR couldirstcapabilityith aof undertermined effectiveness against ICBMs, IRBMs, submarine-launched, and air-launched ballistic missiles. round-based missile systemimited capability against reconnaissance satellites could be first available In the.

he Soviets continue to employguns for defense of field forces and fixed targets, including airfields. The USSR now has more0 operational antiaircraft guns ranging in slxe fromm.arge percentage of these employ fireradars. Proximity fuzes probably are used in some AAA ammunition. European Satellite forces haventiaircraft guns and there aren Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

RET

field forces also have large numbers ol automatic antiaircraft machine guns. UjuJlt certain conditions Soviet antiaircraft guns can continuously pointed fire well above

W

eet. However,m. gun. the principal type now employed in staticdeclines rapidly in effectiveness against targets at altitudes0 feet or at speeds in excessts. As suitablemissiles become available Ina large portion of thc medium and heavy guns will probably be phased out of the air defenses of static targets in the USSR

Radar and Control Equipment

adar coverage now extends over theUSSR and East European Satellite area except for certain inland portions of central and eastern Siberia; coverage also extends along thc entire coastal region of Communist China. eavy primeprimarily of the TOKEN and BARIXXTK types, andight auxiliary radars are employed in various combinations atadar sites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Under average conditions, primary early warning radars now in use can probably detect jet medium bombers penetrating at altitudes up to their combat ceilings. from radar sites. Thc major GCI radars are most effective in combination with the newer height-finder radars which are being rapidly deployed throughout the Bloc- Wider deployment of the new types of radars already in service will significantly improve Soviet capabilities against targets flying at medium and high altitudes, and. together with developments in automated control systems, probably will leadecrease in total radar numbers, perhaps Although some operational radars are now believed to have moving targetthe low altitude capabilities of Soviet early warning and GCI radars are limited and will remain poorer than high and medium altitude capabilities. The development of high frequency ionospheric backscatter radars for detection of ICBMs has been within Soviet capabilities for al least five years, and some such radars may now be in position.

everal types of airborne intercept (AI) radars now extensively used in all-weather fighters have maximum ranges againstbombers of aboutn. for search. for tracking. In addition, day fighters equipped with range only radar and infrared alr-to-alr missiles wouldimitedat night in clear weather. Of the known Soviet fighter types, theircraft equipped with Infrared missiles would provide the only combination capable ofthc requirement for accurate ground control of the Intercept mission. Some newer aircraft may have AI radar with search ranges. and track ranges. During thc next five years, as the speed of Interceptors Is increased and air-to-airarc Improved, the maximum ranges of AI radars probably will increase accordingly. By the end of the period, some Soviet fighters will probably be equipped with AI radar and related electronics gear capable of completely automatic interception. The Soviets are nowew IFF system which will probably be fully operational early In the period.

uring the past few years the USSR has beenew air defense conlrolwith some semiautomatic features,data-handling equipment for rapid processing of air defense Information and data-link equipment for vectoringThis system, which is similar In concept to the US SAGE system but less complex, has been designed to provideigh degree of reliability, and accurate semiautomatic control ofThe system is now believed to be widely deployed in the Western USSR and willbecome operational throughout the USSR and Eastern Europe within the next few years. Its widespread use willarked effect in reducing reaction time andto saturation, increasing information handling capacity, and improvingwithin thc Soviet air defense system.

Air Defense Capabilities

he areas of highest concentration of Bloc air defense weapons and associated equipment Include Ihat portion of the European USSR

P-

thc Kcla Peninsula to the Caspian Sea. Bast Germany. Poland. Czechoslovakia, and the Maritime and Sakhalin areas of theFar East Heavy defense concentrations arc also found at some specific locationsthese areas, such as Sverdlovsk,Novosibirsk, and Khabarovsk Theto Moscow are by far the mostdefended of Ihese areas, includingightersntiaircraft guns inlo thc surface-to-air missile sites noted above.

Passive Defense. Large passive defense organizations contribute to the air defense readiness of both military personnel and the civilian population. Civil defense Instruction under DOSAAF. the Soviet paramilitary mass organization, has been stepped up markedly in recent years.hree-stageprogram was initiated which wasours of training lo all citizensefense against atomic, biological, ond chemical weapons was to be included-to DOSAAF5 percent of the adult population had completed thehour program bynd the secondhour program wasfor completion by the end of the year. More recent announcements indicate thatcivil defense training has now entered the third, most advanced stage which is scheduled for completionOSAAF claims are believed to be inflated, the announcedis lagging, and the quality of training has been poor in some areas. Nevertheless, it is evident that thc Soviets are placing increasing emphasis on civil defense instruction which has by now been extended to most of lhe adult population.

The incorporation of air raid shelters into newly constructed buildingsrogram of long standing in the USSH. and there Isthat deep shelters have been provided In some cities for key government andpersonnel. However, it Is estimated that shelter against direct effects of high-yield nuclear weapons has been provided forery small percentage of the urbanThis proportion will probably not rise significantly during lhe next five years.

Warning Time. The amount of warning time available significantly affects the capa-bilities of air defenses In various areas of the Bloc. Early warning radar could now give Moscow and many other targets in the interior more than one hour's warning of attacks made with present Western bomber types. The more limited early warning time available in Bloc border areas would reduce- theof the defenses of even heavily defended targets in such areas. As the speeds ofdelivery vehicles Increase, the problem of warning time will become more critical, despite probable Soviet employment of picket ships, airborne radar and other extensions of warning capabilities.

Present Soviet air defense capabilities are greatest against penetrations conducteddaylight and clear weather at altitudes0 feet. Because of the limited availability of all-weather fighters, capabilities of the fighter defense forces would be reduced during periods of darkness or poor visibility. However, capabilities of surface-to-air missiles would be unimpaired to at0 feet under all-weather conditions. At altitudes beloweet,would decrease progressively and would be seriously reduced at very low altitudes. Agulnst varied penetration tactics utilizing altitude stacking, diversionary maneuvers, decoys, and electronic countermeasurei, the capabilities of the system would be diminished through disruption and saturation. Overall Bloc capabilities against aircraft and cruise-type missiles will increase throughin the characteristics of most Soviet air defense weapons and equipment. But thc Sovicls will continue to have difficulty invery low altitude attack, and airelectronic systems will remain subject to disruption and saturation. The USSR probably willefense system of undetermined effectiveness against ICBMs and other ballistic missiles during the, and will undoubtedly continueresearch and development in antimissile defenses.

TOP GCOllET

SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND TACTICAL AVIATION

Strength ond Disposition of Cround Forces

Thc Soviet ground forces, which represent the largest part of the Soviet militaryarc well-balanced, ably led, and equipped with excellent materlol of recent design and manufacture. Air support for these forces Is provided by Tactical Aviation, the largest single component of the Soviet air forces, and by Aviation of Airborne Troops. Under certain circumstances, Long Range Aviation and Naval Aviation could alsosignificant support to land operations; however, such use probably would not beto interfere with their primary Combat troops, along withamounts of tactical aviation, areamong theilitary districts in the USSR and three groups of forces in theSatellites. The strongest deployments are in East Germany, thc western andborder regions of the USSR, and thearea or thc Soviet Far East. StockpUes of numerous categories of supply and major items of equipment are believed sufficient to support large-scale combat operations for as much as one year without replenishment from current production. POL stocks,are almost certainly not adequate for soeriod.

Line divisions In the Soviet ground forces are still estimated (astncludingank divisions,otorized rifle and mechanized divisions,ifle divisions, andirborne divisions. Under peacetime manning levels, theseaverage considerably below authorized troop strength, especially in interior districts All these units could probably be brought to full strengthew days by mobilizing trained reserves. Forces in the border areas and the Satellites, where the highest manning levels and best equipment are maintained, could effectively initiate combat operations without prior reinforcement. Conversionar footing could be executed rapidly, andonthdditional linecould be mobilized.

n areas of densest concenlration, Soviet ground forces are organized into field armies with full complements of combat and service support for line divisions. Supporting units include large numbers of artillery andartillery brigades and divisions which are either assigned to field armies or pooled under higher command headquarters. Most of the field armies are organized around the motorized rifle division,ew armies are composed exclusively of tank divisions for speedy exploitation tasks deep in enemy rear areas. It now appears that nearly alland rifle divisions are being converted to the motorized rifle type. The mechanized division is converted by removing heavy tank and assault gun units, and the rifle division, mainly by adding armored combat vehicles! Howevor, some mechanized divisions are being converted to tank divisions,ew rifle divisions of the old type may be retained to cope with special terrain. Many mobilization divisions would probably be organized on the old rifle division pattern.

USSR has antroops most of which are organizedairborne divisionsOlher types of line divisionsair transportability trainingsmall detachments of paratroops,anew types ofweapons have been produced fortroops, but for the most partare armed with standard Infantryand supported by mortars andThe development of speciallyair transportable weapons andprobably will receive greaterthe next few years.

Ground Forces Weapons

program oi modernization andof Soviet ground forces hasthc introduction over lhe lastof more advanced designs oftypes of equipment Including:personnel carriers,ungulded rockets with rangesrtillery pieces and antiaircraftantitankew family of

a ca

arms,ide variety of transport vehicles. In some Instances, there have been two successive generations of postwarThe increasing number of tracked and wheeled amphibians and amphibious tanks has greatly improved Soviet river-crossing capabilities. Thc Soviet ground weaponsprogram will continue to reflect the demands of tactical nuclear operations.trends point to continuing emphasis on firepower and mobility.

development of guided missilesImproved the fire support availableforces. Road mobilemissiles with maximum rangesaveavailable for operational use. ballistic missile6 and. ballisticin8 orperational considerations and theof nuclear materials, HE, nuclear,warheads could be employed in allweapons. In view of operationalBW use in ballistic missiles isalthough possible for certain Nuclear warheads wouldused in virtually.

The shortest range ballistic missile system (SSould be used at ranges betweenndhich are usual for typical initial objectives of divisions and corps.. maximum range of theswllh army objectives. Thcndith maximum rangesespectively, as well as the longer range missiles, can attack both initial andobjectives of fronts, lhe largest wartime field commands. However, the employment of missiles. range and greater would initially be very largely limited to strikes against Western nuclear attack forces.

There ts virtually no evidence as to thc numbers of SS-I.rallisticavailable for operational use, nor as to

"The character!!Ilea of these twoith esU mated Soviet requirements and probable programs are discussed inf this Annex.

the numbers and types of missile units in being. On the other hand, the Soviets have had experience over thc past five years inthese short-range ballistic missiles, probably have an extensive productionand have had ample time to form and train units Ln their use We believe,that lhe present Soviel capability tosuch missiles is substantial, and may comprise as manyew thousandt should be noted that most of these missiles

would probably be equipped with nonnuclear warheads.

Air Support

actical Aviation is equipped (as ith jet aircraft estimated to includeight bombers,edium bombers. The fighters are trained in ground attack(in addition to their air defensend the light and medium bombers arc trained in ground support bombing. Tactical bomber units are still equipped with the obsolescent BEAGLE,ew units have received BADGER jet medium bombers. Afor the BEAGLE has long beena Soviet requirement, and it is possibleew supersonic tacticala development of the BACKFINdisplayed Inenter service next year, and that limited numbers might be Introduced lor special purposes. However,

"in view of the lack, of evidence, no more precise estimate as to the numbers of short-rangeand missile units can be made. As anfor planning purposes, we presentwhat we believe might be reasonable force goals to be achieved by the Soviets at some time within the next few years

60 per 6

Missile Stocks'

Probably organised into brigades of two or

or three battalions each. 'Some of these missiles In units; majority In

supply channels, and ln rear area storage.

-

Tw now

regard iu Introduction into service as unlikely. Wo believe that Tactical Aviation willdecline In numbers over the next several year as Increasing reliance is placed on guided missiles.

viation of Airborne Troopsight transports of thc CAB, COACH, and CRATE types,ULL piston medium bombers converted to transport use, and several hundredand gilders. Organic airlift(less helicopters and gliders) arcto about two airborne divisionsingle lift, although this capability could be increased by the use of other military andack of heavy drop capabilityhortage of assault aircraft limit the types of troop units that can be employed. Soviet airlift capabilities probably will increase considerably over the next few years as new helicopters and transports are added to the force. Helicopters have already greatly increased the Soviet capability for short-range operations. There is also evidence that at least two new transport types speciallyfor airborne operations are now In service: thewin-turboprop assault transport, and the four-turbopropilitary version of the civil transport CAT. It is possible that some CATs have also been assigned to Aviation of Airborne Troops for use as troop carriers. Soviet airlift capabilities will also be improved by the introduction of new aircraft into civil aviation including the CAT and COOT turboprop medium transports,urboprop heavy transport, thewin-jet short-range transport with aspeed of abouteavy Jet transport may also -be introduced for civil use within the next few years

Capobilifics for Landn accordance with established Sovietthe Soviet armed forces have continuously developed and maintained capabilities for the conduct of large-scale invasions concurrently or separately of areas peripheral to theBloc, such as: Western Europe, the

exits of the Baltic and the Black Seas, Turkey, Greece, northern Norway, Iran, and areas in the Pacific. The estimated considerable improvement In Soviet airlift, including the introduction of new helicopters andsignificantly increases Soviet invasion capabilities against peripheral areas. Such campaigns could be supported by the large available air forces, but the high priority assigned to air defense would limit theof fighter aircraft for such support operations In the Initial phaseeneral war. Naval support would be available for operations In Bloc coastal areas In support of ground campaigns, or airborne assaults such as against Alaska. Amphibiousare quite limited; the Soviets would have to rely almost entirely on merchant ships to meet the lift requirements of divisional-size units. eneral war, Soviet capabilities to undertake, such campaigns would dependreat extent* upon the effects of an initial nuclear exchange, direct Western opposition to advancing Soviet forces, and Westernof essential logistic lines.

NAVAL FORCES Strength and Equipment

uring the. Soviet naval forces were greatly strengthened by anbuilding program concentrated on light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The Soviet submarine force is the largest ever assembled by any single power in peacetime; about two-thirds of its present strengthof craft of postwar design andWc estimate Soviet naval strength as0 atestroyers.scort vessels,ubmarines. These totals include vessels of postwarightleet destroyers.

scortong-range submarines1W" class),

andedium" class) submarines.

They are grouped in four major forces: the

Northern Fleet, located In the Barents Sea

area; the Baltic Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet;

and the Pacific Fleet, concentrated largely

at Vladivostok.

Present strengthslightsince last year dueecline in naval construction, thc retirement of overage vessels, and the assignment of some to the reserve fleet It now appears that the USSR will maintain approximately the present force levels, and concentrate on qualitativeof combat units. New types which have appeared during the lasl year include guided missileew classchaser,ew long-range(designated "O" class) which probably has ballistic missiles as its main armament.

The surface forces are supported by Soviet Naval Aviation, which comprises aboutercent of total Soviet air strength and is now the second largest naval air force ln the world.ircraft arcto the Soviet fleets. Includinget lightet medium bombers,iscellaneous types. The combat aircraft are the same types as those assigned to Tactical Aviation:FARMER, FLASHLIGHT, BEAGLE and BADGER. Selected naval bomber units have probably beenuclear delivery role, and several naval BADGER units probably now have an alr-lo-surface missile capability. (Seef this Annex for estimates of Soviet air-to surface missiles.)

equipment and operating efficiencynaval forces, while still belowin some fields, are quite highcontinue to improve. Sovietduring the last year Indicatedemphasis on training forwhich may have Includedsubmarines. Betweenf the Soviet submarine force isbe available for duty at any givenpeacetime conditions, theheld in reserve or maintenancestrong defensive capability In the fleelareas can be inferred fromof lhe last several years, whichdefense of the sea approaches toSoviet naval weapons nowand torpedoes of lhe most advanced

lypes The USSR is technically capable of adapting nuclear warheads to these weapons as well as deplh charges, and there isthat nuclear tests al Novaya Zcmlya have included the testing of naval weapons

aval Launched Missiles. It isevident that the Soviet Navy'sprogram includes the addition ofto sunace ship armament. (For aof guided missile submarinesf this Annex.) Two types of Soviet guided missile destroyers have beenduring the last year. In lieu of main mattery guns and torpedoes, these ships are believed lo carry subsonic cruise-type missiles. range. Some destroyers aremodified and others newly constructed to carry and launch such missiles. Any cruisers completed orn the future will probably be armed with adaptations of ground-launched surface-to-air- andsurface-to-surface systems.

ntlsubmartne Warfare. The Soviet Navy appears to have become increasingly aware of its failure to keep pace with the rapid postwar technological advances inwarfare (ASW). In recent years there hasteady improvement in ASW tuc-tlcs and equipment,ajor effort has been made in the construction of escort ships. Inew class submarine chaser appeared. Antisubmarine rockets andsonar equipment are now in use, and evidence Indicates greater interest in theol air ASW capabilities. There is also evidence of air-launched sonobuoys, of ASW helicopters (equipped with dipping sonar) operating from surface ships, and ofASW exercises on an Increasing scale. To meet the threat from US missile-launch ing submarines, the USSR will almost certainly continue to improve its ASW capability. This would probably include construction of new and better antisubmarine vessels and aircraft as well as development of Improved detection systems (both sonar andkiller"and more sophisticatedweapons.

Programs

onventional. The USSR will probably continue to place primary emphasis onin its naval construction program.he Soviets have builtubmarines of the medium and long-range types. Soviet submarine strength hassomewhat since last year because of transition to new types and retirement of overage boats. This decline is likelyear or two.

New evidence tends tobelief that the USSR has an activein the field of nuclear-poweredalthough the present status ofremains uncertain.submarines of several differentbeen under development in the USSRyears, and it is possible thatmay include boats with nuclearplants. Evidence suggests furtherof one or more of thesewere fitting out or

on Soviet development ofreactors suitable for propulsionthe high technical capability norprogram that would be necessaryearly and substantial deployment olsubmarines. It Is unlikelyreactor suitable for submarinehave become available earlier thanpartr that sea trialspower could have begun However, in the light ofevidence, wc estimate that the USSRa few nuclear-powered submarines,there Is no evidence to establishare assigned to operational servicefleet On the basis of our belief thatUnion will undertake aprogram of nuclear boats,account of construction factors,that the number of nuclearin the fleet will probably reachbyrom which time anrate of about eight is wellcapabilities.

these submarines, the first few areto be torpedo attack types, andlikely toontinuing requirementsubmarinesactive program, whlcn would bringmissile submarines into operation( seef thisestimate that the USSR'sin nuclear-powered submarinesaboutf the torpedo attackaboutf the missile-launchingof conventional submarinesbut because of the greaterof nuclear-powered and missileannual submarine productionwill not reach thc highof recent years.

Capabilities for Naval Warfare

A grave threat to Allied naval forces and merchant shipping is posed by the Sovietforce, which Is about eight times the size of the force with which Germany entered World War II. In the event of war. Soviet submarines could conduct intensive torpedo attacks and mining operations against Allied sea communications In most of the vital ocean areas of the world. Soviet Naval Aviation could attack Allied naval forces, shipping, and port facilities within range.ng Range Aviation units could also conducton naval targets, but their missions at the outsetar presumably would be limited to attacks against targets of highest priority. Although the primary threat to Allied naval forces would come from Soviet submarines and aircraft, the surface navy wouldole in preventing attacking forces trom operating with impunity close to Soviet shores.

The principal naval weaknesses of the USSR will continue to derive from the wide separation of Its sea frontiers and its inability to control thc sea routes between these areas, although Improvements in inland waterways will Increase ils ability to Interchange smaller vessels including submarines. The lack of adequate supply lines to Northern and Par

Eastern Fleet areas and tbe land-lockedof fleets In tlie Baltic and Black Seas are additional handicaps.

SPECIAL WEAPON DEVELOPMENTS Nuclear Weapons 11

he USSR is known to have conducted more thanuclear tests since9 in Its program toariety of nuclear weapons. Nuclear tests8 includedhermonuclear devices ranging in yieldTT and at leastmaller devices ranging in yield fromoT. The8 test series Indicates that the Soviets have made further advances in theor high-yield weapons suitable for use In bombs and missile warheads, and also have apparently sought to improve low-yieldfrom the standpoint of size and economy of fissionable materials. The Soviets now haveide spectrum of fission and thermonuclear weapons which is probably adequate to meet their basic military

c estimate that at present the Soviet stockpile could include nuclearange of yields fromT to aboutT. We have insufficient evidence loirm estimate of the numbers and types of nuclear weapons in the Soviet stockpile. There Is. however, considerable evidence from the Soviet nuclear test program providing indications as to the types of weapons which the USSK may be stockpiling. Considering the estimated availability of fissionableand the level of Soviet nuclear weapons technology, we believe that at present the USSR has sufficient nuclear weapons loa major attack by its long-rangeforces. We do not believe that the present Soviet fissionable material stockpile permits the use of very large numbers for tactical and air defense uses along with substantialof high-yield weapons. However,estimated rates of production will permit

"For further detail* see, "Tho Soviet Atomic Energyated ISOP SECRET, Limited Distribution.

the Soviets to allocate large numbers (in the thousands) of low-yield weapons to such uses within the next year or so.

Chemicol and Biologicalurrenl Soviet tactical doctrine recognizes the potentialities of CW and BW as useful complements to other weapons. Sovietforces receive training in the offensive use of CW as well as in defense against it. The Soviet stockpile of CW agents isestimatedons. It probably consists largely of the nerve agents, principally Tabunmaller quantity of Sarinnd some agents ofype, which arc far more persistent and toxic thangents. The older standard agents such as mustard probably are included but in lesser quantities. The Soviets are also aware ol the capabilities of new nonethalagents, such as lysergic acid derivatives, and could have at least one incapacitating agent ready for field use

existence of an active Soviet BWand development program hasthrough identification of acenter and field test site as wellextensive Soviet literaturethis subject. The Soviet programresearch on antipersonnel,and possibly antScrop agents. Thereevidence of the existence of afacility for BW agents, but existingthe production of biologicals, togetherlaboratories, could easily producein quantities sufficient forand probably for larger scale use.

Eloctromagnetic Warfare

present thc USSR has anfor jamming Western radars atup0ndand especially for Jamming atnormally used in Westernradio communications. Thenow producing magnetrons andtubes suitable for jamming In thefrequencies, and research in this fieldThey are also currentlypassive detection equipment believed capa-

g-

of detecting signals from thc very lowup into the microwave spectrum.he USSR will have in operational use equipment capable of jamming atfrom0 mc/s, including all frequencies likely to be employed by Western communications, radar, andequipment. There is no evidence that the Soviets have conducted high altitudeexplosions to test communicationseffect, but they are certainly aware of the potential value ofhe Soviets probably are continuingon radar camouflage techniques.antiradar coating and the reduction of radar cross-sections of both aircraft and missiles. They are unlikely to develop suc-

cessful operational camouflage for aircraft Ineriod, but they mayignificant reduction In thc radarof missiles by the end of the period. They are also known to have employeddeception against Western aircraft. This has included simulation of Westernaids In border regions which has led Western aircraft off course and, on occasion, over Blocrend toward greater frequency diversification In Soviet radar and radio equipment has appeared and they are probably developing Improved antijamming techniques. However,4 Soviet electronic systems will probably still beto disruption by properly employed

ANNEX B

TABLES OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC MILITARY FORCES

ANNEX B

USSR -i totsli)

EE Satellite*latsaal

Albania

Bulgaria

Ciechoslovakla

hit Germany

Hungary

Poland

H nr..

Commuriul AM (rounded

North Korea

North

Dlix lofU (rounded)

' Figures in Ihis table are

tHur

roacE*

Avia-

CCO

OCX)

|

j

|

!

UIHlll COVTROl, AVO "AHM1V0

J

UIUTARIIED

secuarrr

FORCBS

0

_

totals

0

ud,ull

fori

aval0 naval air.

for Strategic Attack Throughebruarytables on missile characteristics appear InI S Missiles and SpaceatedsNovemberin

IfOV OEClITi 'f-

V-OP OSC HUT'

81

. <<

*

g .

n

I

i 1

;

ri '

.:

a

-

:

o -

s

8 -

ri

i

2

--

m

i

i

3

i s

:

w

-J

S

M

*

n

|

-

|

o -

< 1

: -

S

- s

V. S*

et

=

j

: 2

g -

;

:

= 3

.2

"1

1

:

i

M

-

-

-

=

=1

all

iJliial^iiipwiiiiiiiiniii

m- < a m u = = L, t-

TOP SB6BBT'

I

I

I

TABLE 4

WCffT CG.STKA1.

CACTBm Elinors

Gist

USSR *

ESTIMATED OLOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OP SOVIET AIK STRENGTH BY9

USSB

TOTAL

own'

KORTM>

is

05

w>:sriB">

735

0 40

205

430

3

735

FIGHTER

40

200

ATTACK

0

(Fir)

J.ICHT BOMBER

270

MEDIUM BOMBER/TANKER

IS

Jot

O

Prop

215

HEAVY BOMBEn/TANKER. TRANSPORT

l'top(U)

0

Prop (Med)

-

Jul (Fit)

Jet

HELICOPTER

20

125

n

Prop (Scapln)

UTILITY/LIAISON

Jetttir)

P<op (Mite)

TRAINER

Jet (Ft*)

Rounded to tali

20

50

:5

iISSANCE

45

Germany, Poland andorthern .md Leningrad MOi

Baltic, Btlorusiiiin, Carpathian, Kiyuv and Odessa MD's.Moscow, South Ural, Volga.nnd Urn! MO'i

North Caucasus and Tr.inscaucasusurkestan ind Siberian MD's.

' Kar East nnd Trantbailjal MD's.

TABLE 5

TACTICAL

AVIATION

KAVAL AVIATION'

AVIATION

or a! a

DtrCKSE

ESTIMATED USSR AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COM

LOKQ

I

A VI ,TIOS

FIGHTER

Jet

ATTACK

Jel (Ftt)

LIGHT BOMBER

M

MEDIUM BOMBER/TANKER

Prop

210

140

Hi

HEAVYRANSPORT

Plop (Lt)

Prop

135

HELICOPTER

Light

Med 'j".

HECONNaISSaXCE

U)

(Ll Bear)

Prop

48

OS

o"

Jet (Lt Bmr)

Prop) .

290

TRAINER

vs

Mln

(Fie)

ROhMlci] lOtAlt.,,

TABLE i:

estimated performance of soviet ught bomber aircraft (optimum mission profile)

UODtIA

-ross,

DVvtJjOtMevn

Madge Turboprop

Supersonic Tne deal

Radius/Range (nm)

400

8.SCO

J J

(lbs)

ni

0

bat Ceiling If I)

1') <IVl

HA .

ilh after-burning).

Aaswantoir.iUona (or liHelhgence. Deparim.nl o( thc Navv, believe* thai

ius/raHPe00 fl. ,nd aspeedlV1 soTfl

Invv lh< re is insufficient evidence lo justify the higher figures in lhe Uble.

Although the introduction or such anegardnlikely (seem supersonic dash radius.

PHT-

*> g

* n

Jim ii

si

S S2

!

I

aI 13

ii I*

Si

"i

iiii a

^

ni

o o* o

8 5 fl

III*

-

|

ill

3> Z

S

1

- ;

nr..

1 i

TA3LE 8

RIM

I

0

1

Piston

NOIIE

0

A

Ptttou

AI-UV

4

750

0

ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS

5

1

Piston

Al-IJR

1

200

i-1

I

0

2

0

i-4

1

Piston

16

HOU.VU

Operationalovietower plants

Number

Typa

'.. (nm)

Payload

Cargo (lb.)

. Speed'A Hi lode

(kUfll)

Norrnil

ftwro

mg (fl) .

ak-2*

2

Piston

0

Piston

0

TOT

TOP t

TABLE 10

CHARACTERISTICS OK RADARS

SOVIET EARLY WARNING AND CCI

sum**

w-noi

7 (Note-on)

OD

i

Altitude(H)

(Nose-on)

j (Nose-on)

Co ver-ogo

REST

K.VIKE REST

263

1

7 . LIII

Wl

mm.

mm

MESH

IrmT m 1 * * 1

J.IWJ

TOO-J.

2'JU

2C4

u>

in

j

too 1

'MO i

1

m mm

<Jrf

OUT

STRIKE UUT.HOCKOUT

. ..

OUT/STONEAK LOCK

if* i

11

SOU

340 '

IIKI

I.OCK/STONE CAKE. j

(Mt.)

.

1

0IH)

hi ifcHt nit nils theseip-ac;in nlio was

RMpg ilncfviuct, blip-scu, rtitk> incioMi.

wontl titomi. no, blip-scan ratio would Inirviucid at two-third* trie stAtcd range, bhp-.can ratioboulercent. Tinat ivhicliwrtvnlocltiivcd ItIu reuinM-iil probable inatiiuutn dvlvctign rJimc. Ar;iUo<i( .ithi.il iJ percentiieiv-iarv fai cluni (oiitfol CCI operations

Altitude covcrace -ould nUo bvill higherralio*.

ROCK CAKESTONE CtKliunw.Jar, foriiBt. cUmlfrequency (I'RF) u, Miiaj.

ith, Soviet.hM leefsn-ruc. furril' funi. im ranee data andtrwMlat. no- in vPMft-

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: .ft* :3

c *^

r> .

1 aa i

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&

I i

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^

Mi

x.

QBOltBf^

76

i s

3S S

=0 IS -

t -

3 i;

ii

II

-

8 1

o g

i=

5 3

3 i_ Q

5 e =

J :IJ IJIJ f;

-5

- i?

s C

i -

- t

3

lit III

I I

a ii sis

I ill Sill!

i a

3

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TOP 6KHLJ

Original document.

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