1
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
(Supersedes, Memorandum to Holders of, and Advance Portion of)
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES
AND SPACE VEHICLES
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
Submitted by fie
DIRECTOR OF- -
The following InteMotnce organltatwns participated tn the preparation of this estimate: The CentrattimtelhQtmcond the intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, ASC and USA.
Concurred tn by the UNITED STATES INTFLLtOKNCK BOAKDoncurring were the Director ofand Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief Of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army; the Atslst-ent Chief of Naval Operation* lor Intelligence. Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF; the Director lor Intelligence. The Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Representalioe to the USIS. the Assistant to the Secretary of Defenii. Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, lhe sub-telng outside ol Mi lunsdlctton
390
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
SUMMARY AND
SIMPLIFIED TABULAR
I. AIR DEFENSE MISSILE
Surface-to-Air Missile
Alr-to-AIr Missile
IR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
MISSILE
V. RELIABILITY OF MISSILE
VI. REACTION AND RELOAD
VII. ORGANIZATION AND
VIII. SPACE
IX. SUMMARY
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9
OECni-lT-
FIGURES AND TABLES
Description
Guided Missile Sites In the Moscow
Area
Figure 2 Typical Surface-to-Air Guided Missile Sites in the Moscow Area
FigureMissileovember
oscowPhotograph: Launcher Emplacements Shown
Through Camouflage Netting at Glau, Soviet Zone, Germany B. Line Drawing: Launcher Locations Showing Cable Layout of Surf ace-to-Air Missile Site at Glau, Soviet Zone, Germany Figure 5 A. Photograph: Surface-tc-Air Missile Guidance System, Glau, Soviet Zone, Germany B. Perspective Drawing; Surface-to-Air Missile Guidance System, Glau, Soviet Zone, Germany Figure 6 New Type Surface-to-Air Missile Site Near Moscow (Glau-type)
ypical Guidance/Flight Profile for the Komet (AS-1)
Figure 8 Possible Aircraft/Missile Compatibility (TU-16
with Two Missiles Suspended) Figure 9 Typical Mission Komets
(AS-1)
Figureypical MissionKomets (AS-1)
Figureurface-to-Surface Missile7 Moscow Parade
Figureurface-to-Surface Missileoscow Parade
Figure 13 "Z" Class Submarine Conning Tower
Figure 14 Klldln and Kotlln Class Destroyers
lll li
4
0
Reliabilities of Soviet Missiles
TableEarth Satellites and Space Probes
TableSoviet Space Development Program
0 34
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AFf ROVED FOR RELEASE CIA HISTfiRiCAL-RCTICW PROGRAM
SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE
VEHICLES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development of guided missiles, and the major performance characteristics and dates of operational availability of such missiles. Further, to estimate thc technical capabilities of the Soviets In space including the earliest possible dates of achievement of-Important space ventures.
FOREWORD
estimate supersedes, "Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and SpaceatedMemorandum to Holders ofatednd the "Advance Portion oft ls made on the basis of our belief that the USSR does not now intend to initiate general war deliberately and Ls not now preparing for general war as of any particular date. It assumes that there will bo noagreement on the control ofor outer space.
In view of the paucity of positiveon Soviet missile and spacewc have given considerable weight to estimated Soviet militaryestimated Soviet capabilities in related fields, and US guided missile experience.
For guided missiles, except where noted otherwise, the initial operationaldates given are the years during which we estimate one or more seriesmissiles could probably have been placed in thc hands of trained personnel in one operational unit, thusimited capability for operationalFor space flight activities, the dates given are the earliest possible time periods by which we believe each specific objective could be achieved, although we believe it unlikely that all these objectives will be achieved within the specified time periods-Forthcoming estimates will consider to what extent the USSR has the resources and industrial capacity to produce the missile systems described herein, together with the ancillary equipment necessary to their deployment.
Revtitdoe estimate Soviet ICBM guidance at IOC date as aattached to back of radar track/radio command/lncrtlal system which Is calledalthough an all-inertlal system is possible. Soviet capabilities
in related components at IOC pointheoretical CEP ol. with the radlo-inertial system. Tht Soviets probably will Incorporate the all-lnertlal system in their ICBM sometime duringeriod and. should they adopt this systemhey couldheoretical CEP ofun. The data available for estimating both TOP ODQltDT the above tfuoreticai cEPs are tar from exact. The precise amount of degradation which would be Introduced by operational factors lsbut weEP under operational conditions at IOC date of. with the radlo-lnertlal system; with an all-lnertlal system the operational CEP0 would be. We further believe that the Soviets will be able to improve the accuracy of their ICBM following IOC, and that over the next few years, and probably not later thanhe operational CEP for an all-lnertlal system could be reduced tond the operational CEP of the radio-lnertlal system would be somewhat better.*
* Tha Assistant Chief of StaC for Intelligence, Department ef theelieves that this re-examlnaUon which resulted In the estimated better Soviet ICBM accuracy eitherr was suggested, by recent US ICBM tut asptrlenee which caused certain members of trie USIB to revise their Judgment as to the validity of the moat recent IntelUgenee study of thisconducted for the USIB by the Oulded Missile and AstronauUesCommitteehe Assistant Chief of Staft for Intelligence, Department of the Army, recognises that It Is prudent to estimate that the SovieU would sooner or later, if not currenUy. possess an ICBM system of an accuracy comparable to that of the CS ICBM. However, at present, ha perceives no Justification tx abandoning the esUmatea derived from so recent an analysis of all available technical intelligenceurther significant consideration ls that estimates of operctioael accuracy are based on theoretical degradation o* test range performance which further Increases the uncertainties In swh estimates. Accordingly. It is believed that there la no present intelligence basis lor changing theto operaUonal accuracy as contained In the OMAIC report and, therefore, that the more likely range of operational accuracy for Soviet ICBM at IOC. using "radlo-lnertlal" guidance. Is on the order, CEP; that by sometimeith the all-lnertlal system, the CEP could be reduced tolthough the operational CEP of the "redlo-lnertlel" system would be somewhat better.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS pft(
Soviet programs Ui the development of guided missiles and In space flight liave been carried forwardide front over thc past year. As these Soviet programs and our own intelligence collection and analysis havewc have acquired considerable new information on both specific developments and the extensive scientific and technicalunderlying them. In general, this information has confirmed progress along the lines indicated in previous estimates. Of theoviet missile sysLems estimated ax probably available for operational use now or within the next two years, wc have evidence on the existencehe others are inferred from Soviet requirements and technical capabilities. Evidence on some systems Ls extensive, but for most there are serious deficiencies, not only in thc quantity and quality of information but also in Its timeliness.
Surface-lo-Surface Ballistic Missiles
Missiles in this category which we know the USSR haa developed or has under development include those with maximum ranges of aboutautical milesnd an intercontinental ballistic missilehese missilesmeet high standards in reliability,and other performanceWo believe that In the development of longer range systems, maximum use has been made of proven components.
Mobility appears toasic designSystems with ranges. and less arc probably road mobile.. system is probably road and/or rail mobile. The available evidence suggests that the Soviet ICBM could be rail mobile, but we do not know whether Lhe ICBM systemhole will consist of rail mobile units, Axed installations,ombination of the two. In any case, the system will be heavilyon the Soviet rail network.
ICBM.9 the Soviet ICBM test firing program resumederiod of vir-
tual Inactivity in lhe second hallfiring schedules indicate thathole is proceeding in an orderly fashion rather lhan on a'"crash" basis. We do not know that series production of ICBMs has actually begun, nor do we have evidence of operational launching facilities. However, there has been ample time for the USSR to begin turning otit series produced ICBMs, as implied by Soviet claims. Evidence derived from Soviet ICBM flight tests is considered adequate to gauge the general progress of the program. We cannot state with certainty the precise liming of the initial operational(IOC) of aproduced ICBMs. In light of all the evidence, we believe that for planning purposes it should be considered that the IOC will have occurred
n the basis of correlated data from ICBM and space vehicle launchlngs. we believe the Soviet ICBM tone and one-half orstaged vehicle, employing liquid oxygen/ kerosene propulsion, capable ofound nuclear warheadange. if employedeat-sinkeduction in warhead weight would permit an increase in range; use of an ablative nosccone wouldeavier warhead or
_ e estimate Soviet ICBM gufdafrte atombination radar track/radio
mertial system, although an aU^rncrtlal system is possible. Soviet capabilities Incomponents pointheoretical(CEP)xfiT The amount of degradation whlcrfsffpaid be Introduced by operational factors ls-'uirknown, but wethat CEP urlder operational conditions would be no greaterOC date and may be^better, say. In anv-event. wo estimate that underEP.3 -nm6 will be feasible.
ther SurJace-toSurface Ballistic Missiles. By8 oresearch and dcvel-
O-RW
3
work on. missile hadto thc point where this system was probably ready for operational use. Test firings on this and shorter range ballistichave continued*
D Although no units orhave yet been Identified with theseall systems from.. are probably now In operational use. From launching sites within thc. missiles couldound nuclear warheadsarge majority of critical targets In Eurasia and periphery, with CEPs. andAll-inertlal guidance could probably be available now or by tho end
Air Defemo Miwiles
In the surface-to-air missileew system is being added to the defenses of Soviet industrial and population centers. It probably became operationalnd has been deployed extensively during at least the past year, Including some units In EastIn contrast to the massive, immobile system which has been employed at Moscow for the past several years, the new system is flexible and employs small Ore units. It can, at relatively low cost, be deployed widely for defense of large areas, smaller fixed points, and forces In the field. Both the old and new systems can effectively deliver high explosive (HE) or nuclear warheads against present Western bomber types, except at very low
In the absence of evidence, bul considering Soviet technical capabilities and probable needs, wc estimate that within the next year or two the USSR will probably have available two additional surface-to-air missile systems, one designed primarily to engage very lowtargets, the other for long-range (on the orderngagement of targets at altitudes up0 feet. These systems will have Increased kill capabilities against aircraft and cruise-type missiles. We also believe thathe Soviets will have available an antlballlstlc missile
system with undetermined capability against ICBMs, IRBMs. submarine-launched, and air-launched ballistic missiles.
continue to estimate that theseveral types of short-range (up to 6missiles with HE warheads, forwllh day and all-weatherAdditional types, with longercapable of carrying nuclearprobably become available0
Air-lo-Surface Missiles
subsonic air-launched antishipof delivering nuclear or HEa maximum range ofs nowto jet medium bomber units Incoastal areas of the USSR Thewill probably have available In aboutsupersonic missile which will provideand heavy bomberstandoffof atnd will befor use against land targets or shipsThey may now have In operation andecoy to simulate medium or
Naval-Launched Mitiilei
estimate that at least one andtypes of submarine-launched missileswarheads are operational Inof modified, long-range,submarines. One is asystemaximumow altitude cruiseCEPn addition, somemay have been modified tomissiles of similar range andthese systems would require theto surface before launching achiefly on Soviet requirements andwe estimate thatwill probablyystemdelivering ballistic missilesaximum range ofin.ubmerged submarine.
-I
Soviet Navy's modernisationthe arming of surface ships with Some destroyers are being modified
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others constructed to launch .subsonic cruise-type missiles, probably. range, in lieu of main battery guns andIt is logical to suppose that such missiles will be Installed on any modlllcd or newly-constructed Sovietound-launched surfacc-to-alr missiles will probably be adapted for use by surface ships. The USSR will probably also develop missilefor antisubmarine warfare: surface ship-launched and submarine-launched versions could probably enter service2
Space Program
he probable main objectives of the Soviet space program are: to conduct scientificto develop military applications, tomanned space travel, and to supportpropaganda and policy. The actual launching program has, like the ICBM test firing program, proceededairly deliberate pace. Its recent emphasis has been onand propaganda objectives. In addition to high altitude research vehicles, the program
sinceas Included three spacewhich reached thc vicinity of the moon. All three lunar probes were major feats ol theory and technology.
upported by high thrustealth of scientific and technical know-how, thc Soviet space effort will achieve large and Increasingly refined satellites and space vehicles with scientific and perhapsutility. Judging by the USSR's known and estimated capabilities, and in light of tbe obvious Soviet desire to achieve worldwide propaganda and psychological Impact, wcthat during the nextonths or so tbe Soviet space program will Include one or more of the following:
or downrangc flight anda manned capsule;
lunar satellite or softthe moon;
to the vicinity of Mars or Venus;
and recovery of capsulesinstruments, anan.
UI.AU SUMMARY PROBABLE SOVIET CUfDED MISSILE DEVELOPMENT I'llOGRAM
l>ES10KATIOH
MAXIMUM
VAMBAO oeioin
ACCUftACT
(ear)
Surface-lo-Surfaee Ballistic Hlsal.es
CUD
SS-4
CBM
SS-antitank
Ground-Launched
MissilesoscowUIDELINE .
SA-3
SA-4
SA-4
Air-to-AIr Missiles
AA-1
AA-3
AA-3
AA-4
AA-S.
Home*
AM
Submarine-Launched Missile*
SS-7
allistic
Othercruise lype
SW.
NM
LateIBM.
73
Prior8
B
7
MS
ra
.
3 nm
a
t m
a
m
m
ds.
lMri
0
O fi
t
9 II
t.l IOt.
Undetermined capability against ballistic missilca
.
0
ISO ft acalnst
n lead,
t. HfAlf.il
Swpare. 94
ships.
Deployment Concept Road mobile Road mobile Road mobile Rood rooblla Road and/or rail
mobile. Rail mobile and/
or fixed
Effective Altitude
t.
m-oo.ooo
t. Up0 ft
Condition, for Use All weather Limited All weather All weather All weather
Speed
Subsonic
Supei sonic
Conditions for Use Surfaced Submerged
Deployment Concepta,
civi&m. Surface skip
launched Submarine
launched.
a detailed summary of each mbsile catuftory, covering all motion including possible developments, see Seetlon IX. For in space flight, see Section VIII.
estimated cliaracloristica and Other pertinentetailed summary of estimated Soviel capabilities
I. AIR DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEMS
MISSILE SYSTEMS
At the end ot World War II the Soviets, realizing the future Importance and role of surface-to-air guided missilesook steps toapability In this field. They appropriated German missile hardware and designs and deported to the USSRpersonnel who had worked on German SAM projects during the war. These efforts advanced their state of the art more rapidly than if the Soviets had initiated research and development In this field without assistance. Thus when the Soviets decided to proceed with the developmentissile system to counter the threat posed by growing Western air capabilities, theyonsiderableof research and development on which tohoice.
In9 orhc SAM systemuidance scheme known asas selected and Its development was placedriority basis. The Sovietsthis system for the defense of Moscowast complex to the exclusion, al that time, of protection of other potential targets in the USSR. This was the firstamily of surface-to-air missile systems the Soviets have developed or arc believed to have under development. Each of these systems istopecific threat, fill agap, or take advantage of scientific and technical advances to assist In solving airproblems.
ysiem
Is the arbitrary USof the Soviet SAM systemis limited to the Moscowsystem employsguidance system andmissile. Because Germanand technical personnel assisted inof this system, and becausebeen under observation for aboutand fully deployed for about three years.
more information Is available on this than on any other Soviet SAM system.
The priority assigned to theystem in9 or0 resulted in aof development time. Components and subassemblies ofystem wereto be in production at Plant, Kuntsevo, and in plants in Leningrad as earlyhe herringbone or chevron-type ground Installations typical of theystem were under construction at least as early aseployment of thewas begun4 and thc entirewas probably operationalhe sites required approximately three "to four years to construct and necessitated aexpenditure of manpower and materials. To date.issile sites have been located with accuracy sufficient to indicate that the over-all deployment pattern consists of two concentric rings with radii approximatelynd. from thc center of Moscow. (See Figurehere are probablyites in the defense complex, of whichre on the inner ring andn theypical site hasaunch positions joinedoad network. (Sec Figureissile erection equipment for these sites was probably produced at "Mashin-ostroitel" Moscow.
Each of these large, fixed sitesrack-while-scan radar (designated "Yo-Yo" by USaving aboutcoverage in both the vertical and horizontal planes,aximum radar range capability of about. The system uses missile and target track data obtained from the Yo-Yo for computing missile corrections, which are then transmitted to thc missileadio link. It is believed that thc system, as originallyutilized four tracking consoles, each capable of handling five missile-target pairs, thus giving each site the capability ofas many asargets simultaneously. This Individual site capability, together with the spacing of adjacent sites for mutualand thc deployment of an inner ring of
sitcs for backup, enables the system to direct an extremely high rate of tlie againsttargets
issile originally designed for use with this system is unboosted andiquid propellant sustaincr motor. While Its maximum speed Is on the order of. itow initial velocity which limitsits engagement capability against supersonic targets. Its maximum intercept range will vary. depending upon the approach and thc type target; for exampleirectly incomingype target its range Is on the order of. Data indicate It was designed to carry an HE payloadounds. Wc estimate its CEP to0 feet. Although probably designed for an altitude capability of up0 feet, the missile should have some effectiveness up to0 feet,if carrying the nuclear warhead which it could now employ. Ita minimum effective altitude iseet.
he Soviets will probably continue totheystem at Moscow as long as It has any real effectiveness against tbe aircraft threat. Nevertheless, we believe that thewas selected primarily to counter the massed raid concept of thend. By the time the Moscowwas completed, tt ls probable thatof the threat to be expected had changed and that other defense techniques weremore appropriate. Moreover, theazimuth coverage of each site makes the system rather inflexible, and in its present configuration it Is completely immobile. The magnitude of effort involved In Its deployment probably also argued against lis use In less critical areas.
erman returnees reported that inissile wasrototype production at riantn Khimki and by the end2 production engineered missiles were being produced at Plantushlno. and probably at Plant, Dolgoprudnaya. Stabilization and control componentsgyro assemblies) and other subassemblies and components were produced at Moscow Aircraft Instruments Plant, Moscow
Clock Plant Nond an electronic plant, Nolso In Moscow. We estimate that current production of this missile is foronly and that the bulk of thecapacity is being utilized for theof theissile.
ystem
have recently-observedew, more flexibleThe first Identification of athis system was at Glau,(see Figurencomponents of thcthc Guideline missile (see FigureeItbe traced back toidentification of radar signalsfrom the Glau site has permittedof similar signals from otherinased on thesighting of thc Guideline missileintercepts probably associated withsystems, we believe the systemoperational
ites have definitelyin various stages of constructionand Jueterbog, East Germany, andRostov, Kiev and Sverdlovsk,addition, we believe sites exist atlocations, possibly includingUSSRhe Far Eastseveral cities in the Black, CaspianSea areas, and other locations In The equipment at these sitesbe identical and quite mobile,sites identified within the USSRrelatively more permanentsite equipmententralsystem and associated van-typetrailers which probably house radarequipment and powerlaunchers are normally but notoughly circular pattern offeet in diameter, with the fire controlIn the center. urveillance typedisplaced several hundred yards fromol the equipment. (See Figure 5)
he fire control radar (nicknamedonsists of at least four separatelocatedingle, mobile mount. (See
SECRET-
LAUNCHER LOCATIONS
SHOWING CABLE LAYOUT OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITE AT GLAU, SOVIET ZONE, GERMANY
Figurehc entire mount and antennas appear capable of rotationertical axis. At least one ol thc dishes Is capable of rotationorizontal axis as well. The surveillance radar (nicknamedperates In thc VHF range. The launchers can probably rotate in azimuthach launcher can accommodate one missileaunching arm which can be elevated to various angles. A' road network ls carefully laid out at each site to facilitate reloading thc launchers by missile-carrying truck-trailers.
lthough the evidence is not conclusive, the missile employed with theystem is believed to be theolid propellant booster anda liquid propellant sustain ex motor. (See Figure 3) This missile was displayed at7 Moscow paradepecial trailerype recently Identified at the Olau site. Guideline appears compatible with thc equipment and other features of theystem; when used with it. maximum range Is estimated to. Maximum missile velocity Is probably about Machheis estimated toounds and could be either HE or nuclear. Maximum effective altitude capability is0 feet, with some effectiveness up to0 feet, especiallyuclear
recise estimates of miss distance cannot be made at this time because the guidance mode has not yet been determined, but we believe the CEP would approximate0 feet estimated foradio/radaror beam rider arc likely guidance schemes. ariation of the radar command
'The Quldcllne missile, allhouebted for use In theystem, could possibly also be utilized In theystemeplacement for Uie singleissile. If so. the Ould*-llne version In thcystem would probably not be IdenUcal lo IU counterpart In theystem. For example, although the basic air frames would be similar, th* internal missile guidance equipment could be quite different. Tlie use ofoosted missile In tbeystem would Increase the system capability,against faster or smaller radar ctoss-secUon targets. Maximum Intercept range would.
couldrack-whllc-scan system.cheme, similar in concept lo the SA-1wouldultiple, simultaneous intercept capability. However, the limited number of launchers and lhe relatively slow reload method at theites seemwithapability. At present there Is insufficient data and analysis tofirm estimates of radar range capabilities or low altitude limits. We do not believe that the system is capable of attacking targets at very low altitudes low asut lt is probably effective at altitudes belowoot lower limit estimated for SA-1.
hree sites have been observed underin the Moscow area (seeiles from the center of the city. Two of these are about three miles apart; the third is in another quadrant. Theseites are Inside the inner ring ofites. Theites at Moscow are unique with respect to those observed in other areas. In that the six individual launcher revetments are arrangedemicircle (sec) apparentlytheir primary sector of fire is away from lhe city, with little consideration for mutual support of sites on opposite sides of thcarea. It is believed that theseitesackup for existingefenses and are intended to supplement them.
onsidering theystemhole In relation to thets improvements lie partly In range capabilities and In thc shorter time of flight of Its boosted missile. The chief advantage of thc newer system is its flexibility. It can, at relatively low cost, be deployed widely for defense of large cities, for small but important fixed facilities, and for defense of forces in the field. This flexibility Isat the expense of target handlingper site relative to the SA-1.
yifem
either theorystems would be effective against very low altitude targets (as low ase therefore estimate that in order to meel an urgentery low altitude systemrobably Is being developed. This system may be capable of engaging both single and closely
BEST COPY AVAILABLE
'i'. O
multiple targets at extremely low altitudesEP ofoeet.intercept range would be on the order ofiles against low altitude targets and up toiles against medium altitude targets. Altitude coverage could reach fromeet0 feet, with limited effectiveness up0 feet. Maximum missile velocity could beohe warhead weight may be ISOounds. HE warheads could be effectively used with this system; however,warheads, which the Soviets could have, would increase thc kill probability and may be required for effective engagement under some conditions. The system could probably be deployed at static sites and have mobility compatible with lhat required for use with field forces. The Soviets will probably haveystem available for operational use fn
System
the basisilitarythe Soviet state of thc art, wea surface-to-air missile systemincreased range, altitude, and killwill probably become availableemployment. Itthat this system wouldguidance equipment within azimuth. The system couldeffectively at altitudesange on the orderr nuclear warheadestimate command guidance withhoming would be employed with
System
have practically no evidenceeither to thc priority or thewhich the Soviets are applyingproblem of an antiballistic missileConsidering the ballistic missilethe technical problems involvedan adequate defense system,that the Sovietsighprogram underway. Wea first operationalould be achieved Inperiod. The capabilities of thc sys-
tem would depend upon tactics anddetection and acquisition methods, and the effectiveness of Western counter-measures, among other factors. Tlte netof such factors is largely conjectural at this time. We can therefore conclude only that theystem would have ancapability against ICBMs, IRBMs, submarine-launched and air-launchedmissiles. In any case, rewarch andin antimissile defenses willbe continuous.
Olher Possible Surfoce-lo-AIr Systems
e estimate that the above missile systems will probably be developed. Nevertheless, these do not meet all of the Soviet surface-to-air missile requirements. Depending upon the Soviet judgment of their-futureIn viewynamic threat, theof development in terms of valueand the degree of difficulty Involved, we believe thc following three missile systems fall within Soviet capabilities but will onlybe developed:
ground-based missile systemystem withcapabilitiesnterception ofwhose orbits had been establishedaltitudes did not exceedmight be availableowever, that theouldinitial limited capability torowth potential forcapability and intercept withof preorbital data.
mobile antiaircraft system capablefield forces against lowmancuverable aircrafttypes and helicopters) as wellspeed drones and tactical aircraftranging from very low tofeet;ystem might bein
mobile antimissile system capablefield forces with at leastdefense against ballistic missilesofuch abe uvallablo
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AIR-TO-AIR MISSIIE SYSTEMS
lr-to-alr missile systems will have utility as long as interceptor aircraft are important components of Soviet air defense. Newis becoming available which indicates that alr-to-alr missiles may now bo deployed, but their specific characteristics have not been determined. There is little evidence ondevelopment of such missiles, however, with the exception of that reported by German returnees who described early Sovietwork on theSoviet designation
SnM)he following is anSoviet development program based on
estimated requirements and on scientific and
technical capabilities.
e estimate that the USSR now has three air-to-air missile systems available foruse:
a. beam rider limited to use with some all-weather fighters with suitably modified radar.
b.short-range infrared homing missile limited to tail attack and clear air mass1 conditions. It is usable with most interceptors including day fighters. Its range varies with the radar capability and altitude of the launch aircraft, from. with day fighters to about. at altitude with an all-weather fighter.
'Clear Air Mass: Absence of clouds andbetween missile and tareeL The lerm Is equally applicable to day or night operations, in addition, an Infrared system Is also degraded hy bright background such as white clouds and attack angles close to the sun.
10
e.-An all-weather semi active radar homing missile of about three to. range.
ill probably be phased out alter the next few years because ofonger range missileapable ofuclear warhead will probably become available. The necessity for safeguarding the launching pilot fromeffects willissile range of aboutn.m.ead-on attack or five njn.all attack. To provide tacticalsomeissiles will probably be equipped with Infrared homing and some with scmlactive radar homing. The Infraredwill have greater accuracy but (as inill require clear air mass conditions. The scmlactive radar system will have all-weather capability Willi less accuracy;will be limited to certain, all-weather fighters.
3 the Soviets will probably haveombination infrared/semlactivc radar homing guidance package for the basicombinationould provide Increased resistance to Jamming and Unproved operational flexibility for all-weather fighters.
Inncreases In fighter and target speeds and resulting increases In the launching ranges required for safe delivery of nuclear warheads would require an air-to-air missile of. range employing an appropriate guidance system. Wethe acquisition ofystem to be within Soviel capabilities for this time period, but its development is contingent upon trends in Soviet fighter and Western bomber forces and In Soviet surface-to-air missile defenses.
SK-CRRT-
II. AIR-TO-SURFAC
he USSR had recognisedof providing bomber aircraftstand-off capability against surfaceSoviet efforts resulted In an airmissile of about. range.of Improved Western air defensewe believe the USSR will providewith an extended stand-offan air launched missile of at leastConsidering probable Sovietplans for other types of missiles asbombers, we believe these two missilessatisfy thc USSR's need formissile systems in the
ystem
The USSR has hadubsonicaximum range of about. Itpeed of Mach OA and canuclear or possibly HE warhead ofounds,EP ofeet against well-defined radar targets. Ituidance system known as Kometeam rider withhe characteristics of which limit Its employment almost exclusively to ships at sea.
Although originally designed to be carriedULLhes compatible with the BADGERSee Figureecause it Is carried externally and Its launch altitude is only0 feet. It limits the BADOKR's radius capability to. when carrying one missile or. when carrying two. (See Figures
3 On the basis of this and the early development date, we estimate that it has already been assigned to several BADGER units of Long Range Aviation and Navalin the Western USSR and In tho Far East.
: MISSILE SYSTEMSyilcm
improved Western aircapabilities and comparing theseobvious limitations in thentype of target, we believe thealready commenced development ofuir-to-surface missile system.would be primarilyextension of range, speed andand Improvement oflo permit employmentwider variety of targets.
We estimate that in1 thc USSR will have operationally available anjmproved, supersonic cruise type systemf at. range, capable ofound nuclear warhead. Wea cruise altitudeeet,ignificant improvement overissile speed ofould be achieved withurbojet or solid rocket boosted ramjet propulsion system; we believe the former to be probable.
We are not confident as to whether this system will be used against land targets, ships at sea. or both. Different types of guidance would be required for these purposes.all-incrtial guidance, the CEP against land targets would probably be aboul. If fitted with terminal homing suitable for use against ships at sea, the CEP would probably beeet. For use against ships, the launching range would have to be reduced or other aircraft or ships would be required toetection, acquisition, and Identification of the target. We estimate lhatill be adaptable for use against land tnrgets or ships at sea with accuracies as indicated above.
Effective delivery of this missile could be accomplished by the BADGER. BEAR, and BISON, and presumably by future medium or heavy bombers. We estimate thatould probably weigh0 pounds. BEAR and BISON could carry two,
Bi-
TYPICAL MISSIONADGER/ONE KOMET (AS-1
Cftitu aut.
'S. IXC n.
4IMCSCIW
O
Ptrtwa UTi WmtC.BX L
'it lud (eiervt cvifut
Aariol Rafuallngi
Bft-Orie mdI iifrtlWi .tl! inonu iialMi oMWlirjjsi. Ttaoe, mnsm
0 Ol.tanc (lOaO
Ji am* TYPICAL MISSIONADGER/TWO KOMETS (AS-1)
(MOW)
:
flitlintfWh (tltiu
33
200
100
MO
TOOO
10
800 )
) Cliir*miMWtiltiirtd tomeli
u
ft-fcta IfViMI* M
PrrfwoWkfM im 1?
S Bf'.rtwOilW
0 CoKIim eaM inaa* lun in!miuMoiiO tl ceniUnl illiludt) min. futl riiarvi oid heme Uu
lOiC
(itilnkf Mfljl rctalnf nil McifiuMBitttytMl Mt.b;j< rmsn
DGEK one or possibly two onmissions. Weangeof0 percent for these aircraft when carrying one such missile,ercent when carrying two.
Special Applications and Decoys
he Soviets are capable of developingsystems forresigned to home on air defense or other radarThere is no evidence of presentInterest in such modification, and we do not consider them probable development
lthough wc have no evidence, weon the basis of operational desirability and technical feasibility, that the OSSK is probably developing and may now havean air launched decoy to simulateor heavy bombers. We estimate that four can be carriedISON or BEAR and twoADGER in additionomb lead. The decoy would probably be poweredurbojet engine which would permit the decoy to simulate aircraft performance. to this system would be required to maintain its compatibility with advanced bomber developments.
III. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
SO. The USSR hasamily ofballistic missiles through an Intensive ond well conceived programat high priority since shortly after World War II. Missiles known to have been developed or to be under development atInclude those with maximum ranges ol aboutnd Intercontinentale have more extensiveon the ballistic missile program than on any other Soviet missile program. We therefore estimate this program withassurance, although our confidence in the details varies.
German scientists, technicians, missiles, and missile facilities gave the Soviets major assistance in ballistic missiles during the early postwar years. At Soviet direction, German design studies were made on missiles of ranges as greatnd there is goodlhat Soviet research paralleled some of thc German projects. German assistance was no longer an Important factor In surface-to-surface ballistic missiles by
A substantial body of evidence supports our belief that the Soviet ballistic missileprogram hasumber of years been well coordinated, extensivelyand conducted by qualified personnel with access to excellent facilities. It hasin thc development of operationalwhose reliability, accuracy and othercharacteristics meet high standards.
We believe that in the development of longer range systems, maximum use has been made of proven components. On the basis of Indirect evidence and the logic of adevelopment program, we consider It
ule otallistic missile can be fired to about one-third of maximum operational ranee without serious degradation in accuracy, and toshorter ranees with degradedThe CKps estimated herein are for maximum missile range.
BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
reasonable lo conclude that the two active Soviot ballistic missile lest ranges (Kapustin Yar for missiles up. range, Tyura Tam for ICBMs and space vehicles) have been mutually supporting with respect totesting and shared experience.
lic type of warhead employed with Soviet ballistic missiles will vary with the specific mission of thc missile. Tn general, however, we believe that for missiles with maximum ranges. or less, HE, nuclear, or chemical warfare (CW) warheads will bein accordance with Soviet military doctrine, depending, upon nuclear stockpiles, missile accuracy, character of the target, and results desired. Wc estimate that for missiles with ranges. and over, only nuclear warheads will be employed, although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use. missiles for certain limited purposes. We believe lhat the USSR Is capable oftechniques for missile dissemination of biological warfare (BW) agents, although we have no specific evidence relating BW and missile research and development. In view of operational considerations we consider BW use In ballistic missiles unlikely, althoughfor certain special purposes.
obility appears toasicin Soviet ballistic missile design and we have good evidence of road mobility on some systems with ranges. and less. The size and weight of. missile may be such as lo limit its road mobility to selected first class road nets; In view of this limitation, we believe it may be road and/or rail mobile. In the case of road mobile systems, it islhat missile carriers and support vehicles are readily adaptable for rail transport.as It applies to an ICBM system isin paragraphs
SS-lt. Ballistic Missile System
l7 Moscow parade a
missileeet longeet In diameter.
aow
nicknamed SCUD, was displayed mountedelf-propelled, tracked vehicle. (Seeholo analysis of thc launchingcoupled with the mobility Inherent in the tracked carrier, indicates this missile is transportableueled condition. The type of propellant cannot be ascertained withsome details suggest solid propellant while others indicate the usetorable liquid propellant. Analysis of thcalsoange capability of up to.ound warhead. Wc estimate theecame,adlo-lncrtfalsystem. An all-inertial system probably became available, with either systemEP ofeet.
. Ballistic Missilefter World War II, thc Soviets seized large numbers ofissiles which became the basis for their ballistic missileTest firings of this missile areto have occurred ot Kapustin Yar as earlyhere is evidence thatand prototype productionhort-range,ype missile took place at Plant. Khimki, In the. and that serial production of this missile may have begun as early1 at theetrovsk Automobile Plant (DAM). We believe It unlikely that production of this missile continued (or moreew years and we do not consider it to be an operational system today.
ue to the operational limitationsinystem, we believe the USSR paralleled the above programecond generation missile of the same range and payload characteristics. Wc estimate thatissileecame operationalaximum range of.EPjn. Guidance could be radio/inertia! or) all-Incrtial. but there is no evidence on this point. In light of the probability that the second generation missile was developed primarily to obtain better operational and handlingwe estimate continued useound warhead as in.
. Ballistic Missilee believe this missile is an outgrowth of, Improved in range and accuracy by Soviet and German efforts in the yearsWorld War II.s probably based on the GermanO andKorolov missiles, both of0 pound thrust engine. This would giveaximum range capability of at.ound warhead. The first two Korolov9 were reported to be unsuccessful.
Theissile system Is estimated to have become operational4 with radlo/iner Hal guidance and to be now equipped with an all-inertial guidance system, giving an accuracy ofm.
. Bolfitfie Missilehere Is considerable evidence C
3issile which would meet the Soviet requirement. range weapon has been under test at Kapusiln Yar for many years. We believe that test firings began innof about two per month have occurred sincee estimate that this system has been available for operational use sincelthough no operational sites or units have been identified.
ntil recently we were unable towhether the largest missile In7 Moscow parade (nicknamed SHYSTER form. missile or. missile.
3 together withand photographs released by the USSR, has provided sufficient data to permit thelhal SHYSTER Is probably. missile. Analysis of this evidence has caused us to change our previousof maximum warhead weightounds toounds.
BtSTCOPY -SECRET- AWWfl"
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE7 MOSCOW PARADE
Figure 11
arsrccpv
-COP-T-
continue to estimate that prior tomissile utilized radlo/incrtlalthat commencingnsystem would becomeare some indications Q
3 that Inertial components were being tested inissiles already produced and equipped with the radlo/lnertlal system will not necessarily undergo retrofit to the alMncrtial system.
We do notecond generation missile ol this range Is yet being developed. There arc indications that. missiie has contributed to theof other missiles, but the exact nature of this contribution cannot be determined.
US Designation
IOC Date"
Maximum Range
Leneth
Diameter
Propulsion
e estimate that this missile system isand in production tn Uie USSR, and that it probably has Uie following'
UN
.eel
Outdance .
eet Single thrust chamber. Jet vane controlled (noI.0 pounds thrust, liquid oxygen /kerosene, two step thrust cutoff
Single stage ballistic.tankage
ll-inertial (retrofit optional)
Accuracy
Maximum Warhead
Weight Ground Environment
. CEPjn. under average operational conditions
ounds,eparaung nosccone
mobile
'For estimates of reliability and reaction times under various conditions for this and olherdiscussed herein, secnd VI.
'Date al which one or more missiles could have been placed In the hands of Ualned personnel In one operational unit.
. Bolliilic Missile Syilggsj
have good evidence L
issile of. maximum range has been under test nl Kapustin Yar for over two years; sinceboutuch missiles have been test fired. There have been periods of high firing rate as well as periods of inactivity, the latter Including one as long as nine months.
C
D. missile could have become operational in8 orlthough no operaUonal sites or units have been identified.
3 There areof inertial components, of engine burning time, and of four combustionIn the engine. Likend. missile, this engine shuts down in two steps. Jet vanes are probably used forstabilization and control. We no longer believe that. missile isun. missile, although it would be In keeping with Soviet practice for this system to make maximum usage of proven components and designs from other programs.
the basis of all available evidence,thatm. system Isand in production in the USSR,It probably has the following
US Designationsn-i
IOC8 or early 1QS9
Maximum Range .
Propulsion combustion chambers.
liquid oxygen/kerosene, two step thrust cutoff, Jet vane stabilisation and control
Configuration Single stage ballistic
GuidanceRadlo/lnertlal or ill Inertial
Accuracy 3 . CEP at njn.
under average operational condlUons
Maximum Warhead ounds.
a separating nosecone
Oround (environment Road and/or rail mobile
P-
[nlernWicitc Mivtilc Sysloim of Longer Range
deployment within.issiles areofarge majority ol criticalIn Eurasia nnd its periphery. It isthat the USSR intendsallistic missile system withrange ofxisting target coverage anddeployment in more secure areas.fairly early in the USSR's ballisticprogram, the Sovicls instructedspecialists to make design studieswith ranges as greatknow ol no further developmental workmissiles, and we do not believebeen any lest firings or preparationsto intermediate ranges ofc conclude that anof longer range hasairlyIn any case, the initiation ofwould probably precede firstcapability byonths to two years.
nicrconfimmlal Ballittic Miwila System
in our most recent estimate on Soviet development of ICBMsc considered It probable that the USSH would achieve an initial operational capability withrototype ICBMs at some time during the. We also held il lo be possible,imited capability withunproven ICBMs might have8 These conclusions restedariety of factors, including the estimated very high priority the USSR placed onan [CBM capability for both political and miliary purposes, the estimated willingness of Soviel planners to accept considerable risks In initiating ICBM producllon and deployment, and the available evidence on Soviet lestand capabilities in ballistic missile
We now have considerable additional knowledge of the ICBM test firing program,
his evidence shows that9 the Test program has proceeded in an orderly manner which we believe is effec-
tivelyomplete ICBM system. There is good evidence that from theof the lest firing program7 until the present there have been aboutCBM lestigh percentage of which have been successful in traveling from the Tyura Tam rangeheadistance of. to the terminal end of the range in the Kamchatka Peninsula area, in the lest program, since its inception in7 we have observed periods of launching activity and Inactivity, but thc evidence Is not sufficient to determine whether this was dueetback in the program. Reanalysis of tesl firing patterns for both ICBM and shorter range missile systems leads us to believe Ihat this periodicity of test firing activity Is the Soviet method of conducting an orderlyIn any event, both the rate andof ICBM test firings are lower, than we had expected by this time.
Opetati-mal Capabilityall lhc evidence, we believe it is now well established that the USSR is not engagedcrash" program for ICBM development. We thrrrforc believe it extremely unlikely that an initial operaUonal capability (IOC) wasearly In lhe program with prototype missiles or with missiles of very doubtfulcharacterisUcs.
On the olher hand, wc still considerogical course of action for the USSR toa substantial ICBM capability at the earliest reasonable date. {The IOC for lhe ICBM marks the beginning of the planned buildup in operational capabilities andthe date when the weapon system could be counted on to accomplish limited tasks in the event ofho hard evidence at hand docs not establish whether or not seriesof ICBMs haa actually begun, nor docs it confirm thc existence of operational launching facilities. However, Khrushchev'st the winterlhc establishment of ICBM serieshave been considered in relation lo all other evidence and In light of variations in thc meaning of "serialtherSovietnd cold war tactics. These statements arc not inconsLttent with a
-SBK T-
Bevlted paragrapho be attached to bach of
top cuonnT
We estimate ICBM guidance at IOC dateombination ol radar track/radio eommand/lncrlial which is calledlthough an all Inertial system is possible. Soviet state ol thc art in precision radars, gyroscopes and accelerometers leads us toheoretical CEP at IOC.. range for the radlo-lnertlal system. Wc believe the Soviets probably will incorporate the all-lnertlal guidance system Into their ICBM sometime duringeriod (seend could0 achieve with thisheoretical CEP ofm. The data available for estimating both the above theoretical CEPs are far from precise. Further, under operational conditions the theoretical CEPs will be degraded by several factors, such as (a) re-entry errors induced by undeterminable winds and air density over the impact area; (b) geophysicalnd (e) human and experience factors. The amount of degradation which would be mtrnduced by such nnnguidance system errors cannot be firmly Axed, but we estimate that the operational CEP at IOC date for the radlo-inertial system would beun. Should the all-lnertlal system be Introducedt could have ar, operational CEP of
errors include gravitational anomalies. gccJde] uneerlainUes. and uncertainties of target location relative to launch point and local verueals.
'See the Assistant Chief of Staff (or Intelligence, Department of the Army, footnote lo para graph 0.
iCRMT"
decision lo tool-up for series production and to begin preparation ol operational units and facilities bclorc all technical aspects of the system had been fully demonstrated Considering that production lead times are probably on the orderonths, wethe USSR has had sufficient time to begin turning out series produced missiles.
tea
Evidence derived from Soviet ICBM flight tests is considered adequate to gauge theprogress of the program. We cannot state with certainty the precise timing of the IOC of aproduced ICBMs. In light of all the evidence we believe lhat for planning purposes It should be considered thai the IOC will have occurred
The rate of operational buildupto IOC date would depend not only on thc priority assigned, but nlsoreaton the planned force level. This will be discussed in the forthcoming9 "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through
ICBM PerformanceThere is no direct information on theof the Soviet ICBM and no conclusiveregarding ICBM compoi although Soviet statements Indica relationship between the ICBM sp nnd proven military hardware
hides uindica
Sputnikhut the ICBMne and one-half or parallel stagebut is probably not tandem. At this time we do not believe there ls sufficient evidence to permit selectioningle most probable ICBM configuration.
3 Variations in the performance of Soviet ICBMs and space vehicles could be accounted for byof one basic lype of vehlclo tospecific purposes. It Is also possible that some or all of the space vehicles do not specifically represent thc basic ICBM, but were special purpose vehicles. While we can-
not firmly relate any of these vehicles lo the ICBM, the energy they required can beto alternative ICBM warhead weights. An ICBMize sufficient to orbitnd II would have gross takeoff weight ofounds and could carryoundseat-sink nose-cone. An ICIIMize sufficient to propel Sputnik III or Lunik wouldrossweight ofounds and couldarheadounds f
hile thc evidence is not conclusive nnd wc cannot eliminate the possibilityighter warhead, wo believe the current Soviet ICBM is prohabiy capable ofarhead ofoundsange of.eat-sink noseconeeduction in warhead weight from lhat usedm. would permit an increase Inorange of. could bo achievedarhead ofounds with the same nosecone configuration Since there is no firm evi-dence on whether the Soviet ICBMeat-sink or ablative type nosecone. It must be noted that the ablative type would permit an even henvler warhead or extended range. Although wc believe them to be within Soviet capabilities, neither radar camouflage of nose-rone nor decoys have been detected in ICBM
test firings to date.l
We estimate ICBM guidanceoheacombination of radar track/radio mand>inerUal. although an aU-lnertiaJ^stem is posslble^Jsee. Sdvicl slate of the artecisJon radai^gyros, and ac-celeromcterstoheoretical CEP of aboutaa IOC. range. However, thtv^te available fortheoreticalCEP Isnso far fromthat tht* figure mlghXbe somewhat lower or higher. Under operationalileal CEP will be degraded by nuprfrous factors, such as geodetic erro>vjn-jfflclently known weather and wind com
in the target area, lhe inability ofent>tp remain at peaked efleclivcm-asforvariations in thc-*fjVraiices of, >ucnTst.jnexperienced personnelat IOC ancr-alinewand theof combat condftjrjfis on the personnel. The amount of de^rS^aUoo which would be Introduced by sucn factors fir^jnknown, but we estimate hat CEP under operational con-dilionswrfuld be no greater than (Weivjn. at IOOdalc ond may be better, say.
TO^Jn any event, we estimate that underpfEP of three^JTTiv3 and6 win^etfsible. We have no knowledge^sJo-jSOviet intentions to retrofit inertial sys^&rrfiinteSCJJMs fabricated prior to opeijitidnal adoption of wTTtUJnerHaL system^tfnlch could probably occur.
vailable evidence does not support the testing of more than one basic type of ICBM at Tyurapossible variations in range and warhead weight discussedould be accomplished with one basic missile.' Likewise, there is no evidence to
Auuunl Chief of Staff.AP believes lhal the ICBM currently undergoing lests at Tyura Tamollow-onossibln correlationm. missile tcsLs at tho Kapustin Yar missile lest centerehicle firings al Tyura Tam can beChronologicallym. missile firings, the early Soviet spacendnd the successful ICDM firings from7 toould be related to the objective of developing an ICBMross welghl of approximately JSO.OOO pounds,ound warheadangeimilar chronological correlation emerges from analysis of the test firings of. missile, lhe later Soviet space ventures (Sputnik III and Lunlkl and the most recent run of successful ICDM test firings0 lof the IniUal success of the ICBM were derived fromm subsystem testing and experience gained fromnd ll. the similar pattern ofwtthto Kapustin Yar test firings of. missile. Sputnik in. Lunik, and the most recent successful run of ICBM firings woulda follow-onrogramissile designed for greater warhead weight and
indicate developmentecond generation ICBM to replace that now being tested. If developed and tested in the future,ilwile would probably be designed tocertain operational difficulties and to permit simplified logistics. It mightbe considerably smaller than lhcsystem, taking advantage ofin the technology of construction,design, warhead efficiency, fuels, and guidance.
ICBM Groundls no firm evidence to indicate thc Soviet concept of ICBM deployment or the nature of operational launching sites. Prom other bnllistic missile systems It appears that mobilityasic Soviet design consideration. The size, weight, complexity, and mission of the ICBM,bring new factors to bear on launching system and site parameters.
As opposed to the advantages of hard or soft fixed siteobile system can reduce vulnerability by making site location and identification more difficult Eliminating load mobile systems as being Infeasible for the Soviel ICBM, weail mobileusing special railroad rolling slock and presurveyed and preconstructed sites, to have certain advantages and disadvantages. So longultiplicity of sitesail inob-.Ie system would increase flexibility,vulnerability and reduce thefor enemy knowledge of occupied sites. On ihe other hand, missile system reliability might be reduced and sizable special trains would be required. Thc number and type of cars would depend on the size ondof the missile and the amount of fixed equipment Installed at each of the prepared sites. The permanent installation at the launching site Inail system could be no moreoncrete slabpecial spur, but might Include other facilities suchmall liquid oxygen facility, missile checkout building, missile erecting equipment, etc.
The available evidence suggests that the Soviet ICBM could be rail mobile. It islo establish whether the systemhole will consist of rail mobile units, fixed
ombination of tho two. Whatever ground environment la selected, however, thc Soviet rail network willentral role in the operational deployment and logistic support ot the ICBM system.
CBM Systemsummary, thc probable characteristics of the Soviet ICBM system are estimated as follows:
US DesignationSS-6
IOC DateSee paragraph 73
Maximumm.ound
warhead
PropulsionLiquid oxygen/kerosene,final stagelarge verniers
ne and one-half or parallel staging
Ouldance Probably radar track/radio
command/lnertlal. All-lnertlal cod Id probably bo available
Accuracy .. See paragraphsnd 79
NoseconeSeparating; hcat-slnk or ab-
laUve (see paragraphWarhead ounds atrange
Ground Environment Kali mobile and/or fixed
Close Support Missiles
onsidering general Soviet progress in the missile field, we believe that for several years thc USSK has had the capability of making close support missiles available to ground force units. Such missiles could include:ingle stage missileange ofards, capable ofound shaped HE charge against tanks or other hard targetsEP of about two feet, possibly employing wire link command guidance;issile capable ofound payload to ranges on the order00 yards which could, with aobserver/controller, obtain accuracyeet employing radio commandDespite the lack of evidence, wethat thc first of these missiles probably has been developed and is now operational. Sovicl development of the second missileisossibility,robability.
IV. NAVAL MISSILE SYSTEMS
Evidence Indicates that first steps were
here is an increasing amount of evidence subsequent5 that indicates an intent io equip ships with guided missiles.
here is little evidence of research andassociated with specific missilefor Soviet naval application, although there have been sporadic reports of possible launchings of missiles or rockets in theSoviet fleet areas, i*
3
. Submarine Missile5 there have been sightings of "W" ci.iss and smaller submarines withand/or launcher-like structures on their decks. These included an excellent sighting
iW,-.
capsule and launching ramp. It is ptObaWeew "W" class submarines have been converted to carry subsonic cruise typeSome smaller submarines havebeen converted as well. It is estimated that two such missiles can be carriedeck capsule and launchedam;j. Characteristics of the system areas follows:
US
IOC
Typecrulsu
Maximum Donge Of .
M talk's Member psr Rub- 2
marine
Programmed wllh dumpier
assist, peimllli.ig lowflight profile
Accuracy . CEP underconditions
Maximum Warhead ounds Weight
SS. Submorine Missile System
6 there haveew sightings and photographs of "Z" class submarines withiSince ll'sii, Ibrte such submarines with two dome-shaped covers in the after portion of the enlarged sail have been observed in the North; we believe at least one such submarine is in the Far East. (See 'I'kese submarines may have been modified lor carrying and launching ballistic rfil-^ileso. an initial operational capa-lwith aihseei-x-istcd since
uchould carry two missiles each, but could probably launch them only while fully surfaced. The missile mightange ofarheadounds,EP underoperational conditions. atrange. Although wc estimate these submarines may have been modified to carry and launch ballistic missiles, we are notconfident to include themprob-
here ts inconclusive evidence that thef.re developing an advanced submarine/ ballistic missile system. None of the small amount of evidence available concernso< an associated missile itself. Based mainly on estimated Soviet requirements and technical capabilities wc believe the USSR will probablyubmarine/ballistic missile system having the following characteristics:
US
Maximum Range ofm. Ml Miles
Launch!:ig Condition Submerged or .or statable liquid
l.QP ET
All-inertial
CEP under Opera-
tional conditions Maximum Warhead ounds
Weight Number per Sub-
marine
. Shipborne Swrfoce-lo-Sor-facc Miisilc System
Kothn class destroyers havewith armament and electronicssignificantly different fromKotlln (see. Thesedesignated Klldln class, have neithermain battery armament nortubes. Theyarge .in place of the after mainmountlsslle-handllng deckforward of the launcher. Althoughnot seenhere Is somethat they were being worked onn both the Black Sea and FarMore recently we have seen amissile destroyer, tentativelyKrupnyy class, which has twosimilar to the Kildin, oneone aft.onstructionstopped on four to six uncompletedclass cruisers and several wereIt Is still not knownships will be scrapped or completed.logical to suppose that guided missilesincluded in the armament of these andcruisers modified or constructed InThc surface-to-surface missileof destroyers and cruisers isto have thc following characteristics:
US
Type of Missile ubsonic cruise
Maximum Range .
or radar track/
radio command withhoming
Maximum Warhead ounds Weight
Shipborne Surface-to-Air Missile Systems
armament couldnd/ordapted forInstallation of these systems wouldextensive alterations to existing ships.
The Krupnyy and Kildin, previously nolcd as having surface-to-surface missiles, do noturface-to-air missile capability. Wethat adaptations of thendould be put on destroyer and cruiser types, whereas the size of theould limitto cruiser types.
ntisubmarine Missile Systems
antisubmarine missile system coulddevelopment In tbe USSR withoutThe USSR has the basicand technical capabilities to developsystems as well as the requiredand tracking equipment. We believeUSSR.will probably develop'ah" ASW"for operational use. The alternatedevelopment availableompleteevidence on Soviet development of suchsysLemirm estimatemissile characteristics. Based onand the state of the art wethe following system. Thc specificof the actual weapon may varyfrom listed characteristics:
US Designation
IOC Date .ship-launched
4 Su bmaS-1M5
Maximumun.
CEPyards at water re-entry
ConflgutaUons(a) BalUsUc launched depth
charge with HOO pound nuclear warhead (b) Ballistic launchedtorpedo with ISO pound HB warhead
Guidanceaddition, theto employacoustic homing
Remarks May possibly be used against
surface ship targets
Coait Defense Missile Systems
carrying out Its responsibility forthe sea approaches to the USSR,Navy maintains and operatescoast defense weapons in addition toand forces afloat. It is possiblemissiles or rockets have been orIncorporated into this coast
011
information onimilar review of the evidence relating to ICBMhas led to Ehe conclusion thatf theshould also be revised. We have concluded that the
inflight reliability, that is, the missile's reliability after leaving the pad, lies in the range betweenercent andercent at IOC as opposed to theercent now appearing in the Table. We further conclude that inflight reliability at IOC plus three years lies in the range betweenercent andercent as TOP SSOnBT opposed toercent now in the Table. Within these ranges the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations forDepartment of the Navy believe the reliabilities inlie at the lower ends; the Assistant Chief of StafT,USAF estimates that the reliabilities lie at the upper ends and herewith withdraws his footnote on pagef the subject estimate. Note that figures in the Table regarding "in commission rate" and "on launcher reliability" are unchanged.
V.BILITIES OP SOVIET MISSILES
TABLE 1
We have little Information on which lo base an estimate of the Operational reliability of Soviet missiles. The following areas possible reliabilities. For several ycara after an IOC.issile syiUm will probably improve, and then level off. Except where noted the following rellabllltlra arc for the period aub-sequent to IMS.
On Launcher h In Flight
ESJONATIQ!*
Alr-to-Surface fiyitem*'-
SO
65
unched) Sjiw-in
90
7b
t
IOC plat 1
ICBM) at
IOC plus 3
V CO '5 75
ubeequcnt improvement)
n
O TS
Surfaoa-IAyaUfOi
SS-0
IOC plus 3
ASW) al
NA NA NA NA NA
0 20
S5
SO
ubsequeut improvement)
Surface-to-Air Systems
SA-I
SA-2
SA-3
SA-4
t IOC
Ubeequcnt Improvement)
Surface-to-Air (Naval) Systems*
Naral)
NA
(Naval)
NA
85
NA
Systems *
NA
NA
NA
BO
NA
NA
fimmotoi on not puc.
Percentage of national opernUoiisl inventory considered "good enough lo try" lo launch at any giren time (considered meaningful inew casta). Willi pint preparation in-eommission rnlc would be higher.
Percentage of those missiles In operaUonal uniu considered "good enough to try" lo launch that will actually get ofT Ihe launcher when fired.
Percentage ot those missiles that get oiT the launcher that will actually reach ih* vicinity ot theerform within tht designedof tho missile system.
Tn these categories, only those missiles considered "good enough to try" to launch will be loaded on ships and aircraft.
The assumptions made for air-to-surf ace and air-to-air missiles do not Include losses due to aircraft aborts which are caused by nonmi&dlc related Items,
' The Assisuust Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, estimates that the Inflight reliability ot Soviet ICBM's will beercent at IOCndercent three years latee. This estimate is based upon the very high and well recognised reliability of Soviet short and medium rang* missiles, the vast Soviet experience In surface-to-surface missile launch operations, the high proportion of recent ICBM launches which have travelled the full ICBM teal range distance, and comparable USAF ICBM programs.
NOTE: It is pointed outarger number or missiles than in naUonal operational Inventory will httve been produced, the extras going to training, test, etc. Tlie number of "extras" will vary with the type missile.
VI. REACTION TIMES FOR
he reaction times of Soviet missile units would vary according to the type of missile, thc location (on or oil site) and degree of alert. In the absence of Information wethe following are reasonable estimates:
This. missile,ueled state by avehicle, could be fired about fiveafterresurveyed position.
throughach of theseis estimated to have varyingmobility. For units in transit at thealert, tlie following times arethe launching of the first missileunit has arrived at the site, whichat least presurvey and In somefixed facilities:
hroughours after arrival at site
2 hours after arrival at site
he following reaction times are estimated for thehroughhen the missile unit is in placeaunching site and under the alert condition Indicated:
a. Caseon routine standby,equipment cold, missiles not fueled but could have been checked out recently. Reactionours.
24
VII. ORGANIZATION ANO CONTROL'
As in the case of other priority programs of great magnitude, basic policy decisions of the Council of Ministers guide and controldevelopment, and production of Soviet missile systems and the construction offacilities. The military, economic, scientific, and industrial organizationsin the program receive instructions from and submit recommendations to thc Council of Ministers. Within the Councilthere is evidence to Indicateeputy Chairman. DmilrlJ Ustinov,eading role In thc missile production program. It is likely that Ustinov and his colleaguescientific Technical Councilol scientists. Industrialists and military officers who arc experts in this field.
he Ministry of Defense controls allaspects of the guided missilehe conception of military requirements; the military participation In design, testing, procurement, and production; the inspection, acceptance, storage, and maintenance ofsystems and operational facilities; the training of military personnel to operate the systems, and the formulation of strategic and tactical doctrine for their use. Within the Ministry the organisation designated lo carry out these responsibilities, as they apply to the equipment itself, is the Chief Artillerywhichimilar function for many other weapons systems. The activities of thc Chief Artillery Directorate and thc other ministerial organizations participating in the missile program are believed to be directed and coordinated by Chief Marshal of Artillery M. I. Nedelin, who has had wide experience in thc weapons field andormer head of the Chief Artillery Directorate, Unlike other Deputy Ministers, the nature of Kedelin'shas been kept secret since his ap-
'This discussion of the basic organization and control of the Soviet guided missile program Is based In part upon direct evidence and In part on analogy with the way the Soviets arc known to handle other high priority programs ofsignificance.
pointmenteputy Minister of Defensen light of his background there is little doubt that he plays an exceedinglyrole in the missile program.
nce the decision is made by the Council of Ministers toissile system to meet the requirements of the Ministry ofumber of scientific-industrial organizations become major participants in carrying out the program. Thc research and development phase is centered In various researchdesign bureaus, and experimentalsubordinate either to the Ministry of Defense itself or to facilities belonging to the state committees which handle various facets of defense production. These facilities have the capability for experimental production of major missile system components and handle the bulk of thc developmental missile uccessful development programecision to proceed with pilot-line production and testing preparatory to quantity production, the USSR Oosplan and the USSR Ministry of Finance have thefor integrating the production and construction plans with the over-alleconomic program.
he slate committees established for such critical industries as defense, electronics,and chemicals have primefor thc participation of these Industries and their plants In the over-all missile program. However, Individual plants engaged in serial production appear to be subordinate to the regional Councils of the National Economy, which exercise executive authority over their day-to-day operations.
he completed missiles and theirequipment are transferred directly from the plants to organizations of the Ministry of Defense. The Chief Artillery Directorate, in ils role as principal weapons procurement agency for the Ministry, maintains plant representatives who carry out technical checks and Inspections to Insure that specifications
ate being met and accept Items on behalfIn numerous Gelds of technology.
thc Ministry ofthe known members of thispersonnel of thc Academy of Sciences
Soviet spaceirected by The Ministry of Defense is rap-
Inleragency Commission foron the commission (but docs not
Communications (ICIC) ofnd the facilities of the Ministry
Council, Academy of Sciences, USSR,Defense are utilized for launchings of space
membership of which includes leadingand other space research rockets.
VIII. THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
Objeclivei
USSR has announced that theof its space program Is the attainmentInterplanetary travel. Atprogram appears to he directedacquisition of scientific andwhich would be applicable to Soviettheir ICBM program, and basicresearch. While the spaceundoubtedly Initiated to serveone of the primary underlyingwhich continues lo give it Impetuspromise of substantial worldwidepsychological gains for the USSR.considerations may have little bearingdecision to develop certain types ofalthough thc successfulthese vehicles could result In militaryThus we conclude that theprogram has four majorwill have varying priorities as theitself progresses and as newmiliiary requirements develop:
space travel;
research;
applications.
Of the above. It appears now that the flight test priority has been on the scientific and propaganda objectives rather than on man-in-space or military applications.
importance the Soviets attach toprogram Is Illustrated by theof leading scientists to lisy the broad range ofspecialists engaged In Itsby thc wealth of theoretical andbeing conducted In Itsby the number and type oflaunched over the past twothe Soviets have not devoted asto the flight test phase of thewe had previously expected. Theprogram has (like the ICBM test proceededairly deliberate
pace. Thc acquisition of data and experience leading to future accomplishments has been limited by the absence of Soviet attempts to orbit additional satellites for such Important purposes as recovery of capsules orthe extent and nature of radiation belts around the earth.
have no direct evidence on thethe over-all Soviet space program relativeof the military missile program. Weevidence that it has interfered withprogram and we do not believe Itpermitted lo Interfere in the future.
Recenf launching Activities
lunar probes, or Luniks, launchedwere major feats of theory andTheir general nature and complexity,with their announced payloadan advance over the Sputniks,had exhibited progressivelypayload capability andThe launching vehicles forLuniks were probably essentiallyThey used one stage more thanor ICBM vehicles. Sincend II were probably to hittheir instrumentation wasthe tame. The first failed tothe mission and the second wasThe mission of the third wasacquire pictures of the previouslyportion ol the moon's surface.released data indicates that this wasallhough the actual quality ofcannot now be assessed. Duringof the Lunik beneath and beyondaround thewasIn the modulationc/sindicate the transmission ofdata to the Soviets. Lunik IIIan earth satellite with anorbit. The Soviets have triggereddata link only when thebesl be received in the USSR,lhe West from intercepting an ap-
prcclnblc amount of data or locating the vehicle.
In addition to satellite and space vehicle launchings, thc USSR has conducted anscries of high altitude research firings. Inhe Soviets displayed nose sections recovered from rockets fired vertically to altitudes of. Live dogs have been carried in some such rockets and successfully recovered from even the highest of these altitudes, according to Soviet announcements.
The Sputniks and Luniks have probably all been launched from thc Tyura Tam range-head. Many but not all of the vertical rockets have been launched from Kapustin Yar. Some characteristics of the Sputniks and Luniks are given In Table 2.
The launching of such significantpayloads Is largely attributable to the availability of high thrust propulsion systems, which have more than compensated for higher structural weights and nonuse orof miniaturized components. To date, conventional liquid rocket propellants have probably been used exclusively. Within the next few years the Soviets will probably be able to employ high energy propellants In the upper stages of their space vehicles. Wethe Soviets are interested In and are probably working on nuclear rocket engines for this purpose. However, nuclearwill probably not be used for the first stage. Nuclear rocket engines may beby ion and photon type engines, If these can be proved practical.
he estimated mobility and Inherent transportability of Soviet missiles which we believe comprise major elements of their space vehicles supports the feasibility of launching an earth satellite from areas other than the established Soviet test ranges. There may be some technical reasons why this would beFurther, political or propaganda benefits might dictate such an attempt. For example, based on the prestige andbenefits and thc existing Sovieland logistical capability, we believe that the USSR could launch an ostensible "Chinese
satellite" from the territory of Communist China. We would not expect this toative Chinese launching vehicle although they may design and build the Instrument package.
Ma [or Supporting Capabilities
or tracking space vehicles, the Soviets can employ their extensive system of optical observatories, radio telescopes,radars, and radio direction finders. The accuracy and response time of their opticalare adequate for determining relatively stable earth satellite orbits; thc speeds ofof the Interferometer, radar and thc radio direction finding stations are adequate for observing their nonrepetttlre trajeelories. Soviet observation facilities and data handling capabilities will be adequate to carry out most of the individual space missions'considered herein. However, some will have to beby self-containedo effect rendezvouspace station, or toan on the moon. Such missions will be handicapped to some extent by the USSR's present lack of access to land-based locations for worldwide tracking stations. Shipborne installations could alleviate but not eliminate this problem.
he accomplishment of more advanced space projects requires contributions from many fields of science and engineering. In the basic sciences, the Soviets havehigh capabilities In related fields such as physics, mathematics, and the geophysical sciences, stemming from an extensivebackground, large and effectiveand research programs, andefforts to keep informed about Western scientific advances. The Soviets arcIn celestial mechanics and astrobiotogy. they arc making rapid strides to overcome limitations in astronomical Instruments, and their capability In computers Is adequate for space research purposes.
Capabilities to Accomplish Specific Objectives
he dates given for Soviet spaceestimated In this section represent the earliest possible time periods In which we
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each specific event could beWe recognize that the various facets of thc space flight program are in competition not only among themselves but with many other priority programs, and that the USSR probably cannot undertake all of the space flight activities described below at the priority required to meet the time periods specified. In addition, some of these missions depend upon successful prior accomplishments of other ventures.
nmanned EarthUSSR will continue to place Into orbit satellites growing progressively In size and weight. On thc basis of information from previous space flight operations, we believe that the USSR could now orbit scientific payloads weighing on the order0 pounds inrbit As additionalInformation is obtained, the USSR will refine and develop new scientificto be placed lillo satellites, and will explore fully those critical regionsthe earth to assess accurately theeffects of radiation and. other hazards which may be present. Objectives willinclude continued measurements of the gaseous compositions of the upper atmosphere and space, micromcteorites. primary and secondary radiations of all types, aurora and Ionospheric characteristics and electric,and gravitational fields. Within the next several years the Soviets can be expected to undertake relativity checks and theof astronomical data.
pecific military support functions which may be served by unmanned satellitessurveillance, communications relays, navigational aid to shipping and aircraft, geodesy and mapping, and early warning. Techniques to accomplish the above Include photography, infrared, radio, and Within the general classification of surveillance satellites, there are several types which have potentlnl usefulness to the USSR. Theseeather satellite, afor warning against ballistic missile attack, an electronic surveillanceatellite for mapping, a force deployment satellite, an electronic countcrmeasures satet
lite,atellite for the detection of high altitude nuclear tests. Any of these missions could be undertaken to demonstratebeginning ineriod.they could probably not contributeto Soviet military capabilities for several years after first feasibility
There arc three nonsurvelllance types of military satellites which wc believe will be included as Soviet military requirements. These are navigation satellites used byand surface craft to aid in positioncommunications satellites of the simple and delayed repeater types, and non-radiating satellites so positioned as toomplete and accurate description of the geoldal shape of the
Currently, the USSR could place Into orbit and probably recover biologicalfrom satellites for the purpose ofessential knowledge of recoveryand thc effects of the spaceof such specimens. Soveral such tests would be highly desirable, If not necessary, prior to manned capsule recovery from orbit.
Unmanned LunarSoviets have announced the total inflight weight ofnd II toounds, respectively, which includes the final stage empty rocket weightounds, respectively, ol scientific Instruments,and batteries. Given such payload capacities and the demonstrated ability to Impact on the moon, we believe the USSR could orbit the moon with an instrumented satellite at anyoft impact on the moon requires the useetro rocket, more accurate guidanceethod of attitude orientation An Instrumented lunar soft landing could probably be accomplished bye also believe that the capability demonstrated by the Luniksurrent capability to carryiomedicalto the vicinity of the moon. Asanned lunar landing, we believe that an unmanned experimental landing on the moon and return to earth could occurthe.
P-fi-BGR-B*
Planetaryprobecould utilize existing propulsion units and presently available guidance components. We believe the USSR could launch probes toward Mars and Venusood chance for success, with the communications link probably presenting the most formidableThe first launchings toward Mars could occur abouthen Mars will be in the most favorable position relative to the earth. More sophisticated probes could be launched abouthen Mars will again beavorable position. On the same basis, the first launchings toward Venus could occur aboutnd more sophisticated probes could be launched abouthe months given are those in which energy requirements areinimum and the guidance accuracy requirements are the least stringent. An approximate three month period on either side of those specified is practical but as one departs from these minima, penalties In payload weight and guidance accuracy are imposed.
Manned Earthbelieve that the Soviets will achieve their first man-in-space successapsule-type recoveryinimum of refinements. The present Soviet payload capacity Isto meet initial requirements. However, prior to attempting even the most elementary man-in-space ventures, the Soviets must solve various problems, many of whichrogression of space experiments. Wethat many of these experiments would precedeigh risk attempt.
Most important among problems stillsolution are. (a) thc development and testinguitableeliable rocket vehicle, and (b) development and testing oftechniques which will necessarilyprovision for safe re-entry Into the earth's atmosphere as well as the ability to control ejection and re entry in relationreselected geographic area.
Certain biomedical experimentation is an absolute requirement for passengertabilization, temperature control, and other physiological and psychologicalcontrols must be provided. It is
possible that harmful radiations associated with large solar eruptions will inhibit manned space flight, but until additional knowledge of thc degree and effect Is acquired, noassessment can be made. Based on the limited data presently available on the Van Allen belts. It Is possible that unshielded manned sustained orbital Might will be limited to altitudesiles or0 miles.
Intensive testing within tho next six to eight months could provide sufficientbackground toigh risk man-in-space attempt or more normal testing for the nextonths wouldess risky attempt. An early efiort resulting in failure would notrisk adverse publicity because of thc USSR's strict security measures. Weestimate that, in consideration ofadvantages that would accrue, the USSR could attempt toannedfrom orbit at any time by the acceptance of very great risks of failure. However, we estimate that byohe USSR could acquire sufficient experience and scientific data toan from orbital flightair chance of success. Glide type re-entry vehicles could make theirone or two years later.
We believe that the USSR now has the capability for manned vertical launchings and that downrange manned recovery tests could begin at any time.
Manned Maneuverabte SpaceAchievementaneuverable manned earth satellite could follow closely uponinimum man-ln-space capability. It is believed that3 the Soviets couldinimum ability to change the pathanned space vehicle. Longer lived and more maneuverable space vehicles allowing repeated path changes could be developed using conventional propellants. When acapability for maneuveranned space vehicle had been achieved, it would be possible to effect rendezvous with an orbiting vehicle. Once contact had been made and items of equipment constructed or modified In space, the Soviets could claim they had
SKCRE-T-
33
a manned space station.on the successful prior development of the maneuverable vehicle. It Is believed they could establishtation
Once the long-lived maneuverable manned vehicle using conventional propel -lants and large boosters becomes practicable. It would permit tho construction, operation, and maintenance of Initial space stations. These stations wouldapability for position keeping and for making minor adjustments In position as desired. Advanced space stations suitable for sustaining life and for performing scientific or military functions for extended periods of time (several months or more) would probably use unconventional propulsion systems and closed cycle ecological systems and could be established. Manned Lunar upon successes with manned earth satellites, the developmentew, largo boosterand concurrent advances In scientific experimentation with lunar rockets,staging techniques and attitude orienting devices, the Soviets are believed capable of
manned circumlunar flight with reasonable chance of success in the; of recoverable manned lunar satellites Ineriod; and of lunar landings and return to earthone of the above estimated missions would, Initially,unconventional propulsion systems.
Probable* Next Step*
udging by thc USSR's known andtechnical capabilities, and considering the Soviet desire to achieve major worldwide propaganda and psychological impact, wethat during thc nextonths or so thc Soviet space program will Include one or more of the following:
or downrange flightanned capsule;
lunar satellite or softon the moon;
probe to thc vicinity of Mars
and recovery of capsulesinstruments, anan.
HH-FP-
34
TABLE 3
POSSIBLE SOVIET SPACE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM'
FIRST POSSIBLE
SPACE PROGRAMDATE
These dates represent the earliest possible time period ln which each specific event could be successfully accomplished. However, competition between the space program and the military missile program as well as within the space program itself makes itthat all of these objectives will be achieved within thetime periods. Unmanned EarthSatellites
ounds, low orbit
Recoverable (Including biological)
Militarydates shown are the earliest indemonstrations could begin. After feasibility
stration, militarily useful systems could generally become
able in two to threeweather, mapping, and force deployment 0
Navigation. Geodesy, and
Early Warning
ECM and
Unmanncdockcts
Biological Probe 9
Satellite of the
Lunarurn. and Earth Recovery
Planetary Probes
About0
Venus About1
Manned Vertical or Down range Flight
Manned Earthspecified time periods for manned accompUsfniients are" predicated on the Soviets having previously successfullyumber of similar unmanned
Capsule-typeto
Glideears after above
Maneuverable (minimum; conventional
Maneuverable
Space Platform (minimum,easibility
Space Platform (long-lived) 0
Manned Lunar Flights
Circumlunar
Satellites (temporary)
0
'Secor accompli ihm en Is to dale.
would piobably be ai tempted alter the (list Ow orbiLi but lift could probably be sustained forerk.
IX. SUMMARY T,
DEVELOPMENT PRO
SUMMARY TABLE
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROORAM FOn SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILEAND NAVAL LAUNCHED)1
I MM
SA-I.
SA-3
Navel).
Naval)*
. -Omm,
a-
1BS4
0
: .'
an) ;
w.ooo
{mini mumIBB)
minimum
(sainimun
maximum hciiiovti'.
true (mac*!
e order Of IM
3.5
aft.
M
an)
Trsck-while-scen radar; radio command.
O.
Outdance system, al yetBelieve CEP would0 It. estimated for SA-1.
IOC
Command with active terminal homing.
Semiaetive racer homing all lhe way.
- II ARB
HE or Nucttar
E or Nuclear
Bor Nuclear
HE or Nuclear
B-2O0 guidance system with lhe multisiile deployed only around Moscow al Hied aiiea. Boosted Guideline pouibly atao utilised Idystsmeplecement.
System being widely deployed In Soviet Bloe, lypiSed bynd estlmaud toGuideline miaatlea. May be used fee italic oe meSile defines.
DesignatedNavaO tf adapted aa surface
Ship armament
Static er motCe system primarily for low
evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages cf development which ara not necessarily reflected ia this Uble. We estimate that co miserable energy will be cipenrJed in second generation longer range missile*.
Adaptations otilould be suitable for cruisers andoy era. The sise of theould limit It to cruisers. Date at which one or more missiles could have been plated In the hands of trained personnel In one operational unit. Maximum attitude Is not necessarily achieved at maximum range. imited capability will eilst above the Indicated altitude. Accuracy varies with target sire, speed, altitude and range.
wirhead includes the explosive devicels associated fusingiring mechanise.
SUMMARY TABLE
OVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR AlIl-TO-AlR MISSILE SYSTEMS'
4 Mi-
-
rxrr)
uncjurr
I
tail*
IWCa
or-
IMTtDKU
capability
wajmSas
rvra) *
oaou
"SIOMT
Capability
(Hu)*
beam rider..
HE
and modified Rail light
6 IHead-on)
Soviet datljnstlou
"ShM."
D, E
(Taa only)
3 (Tall only) Limited byranee to Approximately
1 nm
B
homlnc...
HE
ace plate Fitter
to cleari' ead tail cone attack.
all-
Sea Level
B FluhtlrM
Flaab-
active radar
Fiahpol
Freaeo D
(Head-on)Tall)
B Flaihlljht and modified Flaah-
H|hL
iaeoeua ea Mil
O 41 B
: a
1
b St
* ii
7 cf
in ii
- a
a 3
in*
?
111
]1I
ACCURACY
maximum ramus (nm;
maximum wabhiadnd tim)
IHTTULIONAl. CaPA-
E Of Nuclear..
1
.
E or Nuclear..
lain BATE*
gainstm against land targets,
eel against ihlpa
SSR it probably developing and mty now have operational an air launched ds
Beam riding with aeml- Antiship mlMftt. "Kernel.'
active radar homing. Adaptable for uae against land target! with sll-lnertla! guidance, or ships ot ica with, terminal homing. use would require reduction Id range or aitlttance of other aircraft oro simulate ratjlum cr heavy bomfar.
TOP SECRET.
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Original document.
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