NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
Submitted by Iht
pinrcTon or cfntiul inttlugenci
The jblhuhH Intelligence organliattant participated In the preparation ol thh eitlmate: The Central Intelligence Agency. Ihe national Security Agents, and Ihe Intelligence organUa-tlont ol Ihe Department* ol Slate,int. Ihe navy. Ihe Air Force. The Joint Slag. Delrmr. and Ihe Atomic Lnogv CommtsiUm.
Concurred tn by the Mm STATUS IVnXUGFSCr BOARD
ononcurring Kft The Director ol Intent-genet endDepartment ol State: Ih, AfManl Chtrt a/ Staff lor Intelligence. Department nf Iht Army, the AMtMinl Chtrt ol naval Operation! lor Intelligence.of the navy; the Auhtnnt Chief ol Staff.USAF. the Director for Intelligence. The Joint Staff; Ihe At'ltlant ta Ihe Secretory ol Delcnrc. Special Opera-Half; "ie Atamlc Energyncpretntattve ta the VSin. and Ihe D'rettor ol Ihe national Security Agency. The AiWiftnl Dlrecto: Federal Dtrem* ol Inretligatkm. attained, the mbleet being at lid*t*dietton olgency
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
the soviet atomic energy program
This estimate consists of an updating of those subjects Inbout which signlfl-cant new information has become available, and whichestatemrnt. It Includes topics under the following main headings from)
The Soviet Nuclcnr Reactor Program
The Soviet Nuclear Materials Program
The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Program
Possible Soviet Allocations of Fissionable Materials to Weapon Stockpiles The Soviet International Atomic Aid and Exchange Program
The reader should refer loor Information on Ihe following portions of the Soviet Atomic Energy Progrum: Organization; Qencral Technical Capabilities; Controlled Thermonuclear Reactions; Production of Uranium Metal. Lithium, Heavy, nnd Tritium; Nuclear Weapon Proving Grounds and Test Program; Atomic Energy Detection System: and Economic Aspects.
This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee which Is composed of representatives of the Departments of Stale.Army, Navy. Air Force. Ihc Atomic Energy Commission, The Joint Staff, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Sec appropriate footnotes, however, for dimming views. The FDI abstained, the subject being outside of Its jurisdiction.
The estimate, with footnotes, was approved by the United States intelligence Board on
table of contents
II. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTOR
Nuclear Propulsion Systems (or Natal and Marine Vessels .
Rcuetor Systems for Aircraft, Missiles, andVehicles .
NueW-ar Propulsion for Land
Nuclear Electrical Propulsion Systems for Space
Nuclear Auxiliary (Non-propulsionl Power
SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALS PRODUCTION
Soviet Uranium Ore
SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON
Nuclear Weapon Research and
V. POSSIBLE SOVIET ALLOCATIONS OF FISSIONABLETO WEAPON STOCKPILES.
VL THE SOVIET 1NTERNATIONAL ATOMIC AID AND
table of illustrations
Table 1 USSR Research Reactors and Reactor
Figure 1 Electric Power Reactor Sites. .
Table 2 3ovlet Nuclear Power Stallnns and Experimental
Table 3 Estimated Soviet Bloc Recoverable Equivalent
Uranium Metal Production5
Figure 2 Nuclear Materials Production
Table 4 Estimated Soviet Fissionable Materials
Table 5 Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear
Figure 4 Tabular Summary of Possible Nuclear Weapon
Stockpiles. nd 39
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM
To review significant recent developments in thetomic energy program and to estimate the probable future course of that program to
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
n updating. we havedelays In the estimated Sovietpower reactor program andnew information Into our estimates of the Soviets' nuclear propulsionand of their nuclear weapon We have reduced our estimate ofroductione believe that the esti-matc of Soviet plutonium production
represents the moat likely value lor cur-rent cumulative production, whereas in the past it was only considered toeliable minimum.' Consequently, our
The Director forTbe Jointnot aire* lhai ihe mort likelyeumuIaUre plulonlum equivalentihrowah
/ Inslcad he believes Mim-
leallono warrant tontUlrtlnn
rlrntTiiitinc the uranium ore-based estimate of plulonlum equivalent as on equally IlkHy value. This viewbawl on the Mlawlni:
a. The marked difference between theamounts of uranium ore procuredand the Mnalkr amountof plutonliim
r-iuIrEehl produeliari iTabk-roup f4he notation lhat ihu dliTrrroee woulda SVi year stockpile o( ore phis pipeline and mealutilizationot ronMdeied Ihe moslarnaraphn S4 and
pow>lblllty lhat thehave stored Irradiated aluas from pluWnlumeactor* berausc ol delays In consiruc-llon or operation of rhemlca) separation fa-clUUcs. (Panuraph it
e. The possibility thai plulonlumnidentified site.n&Taphhe Judgement lhai calculated maiimum possible tet lor capaelues at KyhiymTomsk are not Ineorulstentlute>itum production *ahie abort twsoe aw
The possibility thai Anaatsk may produce plulonlum. 4S>
h. The unknown statu* of the facilities al KrnsnoyaiW prevleudy estimated aa alinMlueiiiB nnd ehn.iical separation site. (Paratraph III
estimate uf Soviet plutonlum production, at least through mid-lOfiO. is significantly lower than thatear ago Hnw-ever. certain factors indicate lhat Soviet plulonium equivalent production could be considerably higher and any planning should give serious consideration to the alternate estimate based on orepresented herein. Table 4the probable estimate andn addition, wo have modified our estimate of future Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities in view of the continuing moratorium, revised our allocations of fissionable materials to weapon stockpiles, andiscussion of US-USSR exchanges in the atomic energy field.
NUCIEAR REACTOR PROGRAM
otoer Reactors. It Is apparent that the USSR will fall far short oflectrical megawatt nuclearcapacllv originally projected0 in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. After considering the dclayr the Soviets have experienced in both research and power reactor programs, wc now estimate that the TJSSIi will have onlyegawatts of nuclear generating capacity installed by
VawiJ and Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems. The ice-breaker LENIN was commissioned in December9 and is expected to operate in the Arctic In the summerhere have been increasing numbers of reports that the Soviets areumber of nuclear submarines, but we have no firm evidence that any are in operational status Based on the status of Sovieltechnology, wc estimate that7 was the cnrliest dateuclear propulsion reactorubmarine could have been available, ana that at least one Soviet nuclear submarine could have beenrial status by the end
4 Reactor Systems for Aircraft. Ourindicates that the Soviets arc attempting to produce an aircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP) system, but wc have nol determined the exact systems under development. Wc estimate that theare now capable ofuclear testbed with at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrusthase of the flight.uch acould lead to an ANP systemfor cruise on nuclear heat aloneubsonic aircraft of marginalWc believeuclearunitirst subsonic aircraft with substantially improved performance could be available by sometimeupersonic applications of ANP woulda long lest and developmentand wo do not believe that awill be achieved during the period of this estimate.
Reactor Systems lor Rockets andWc believe thai Ihe USSR is now conducting researchuclear rocket engine, and that the Soviets coulda first static test firingrototype system possibly as earlyhile there is evidence of Soviet researchto nuclear ramjets, we believe rhat the complexity of the problem makes it unlikely lhat the Soviet* will flightuclear ramjet during the period of this estimate, although such flight testing is possible.
FISSIONABLE MATERIALS PRODUCTION
ranium Ore. Recent informationthat the Soviets have matched many mining and ore concentration methods used in the US. and that ura-niim mining and ore concentration within the Soviet Bloc continuedodest ratee estimate that by the end9etric tons of recoverableuranium metal would have been available to the Soviets and lhatetric tons will have beenby the end4 (Table. As in previous years, these amounts arc in excess of the recoverableuranium metal required lo support our current estimate of fissionableproduction.
wu large gaseousplants have been positivelyIn the USSR, one al Vorkh-Ncyvinsk. the other at Tomsk. Wc estimaterobable third plant started ojicrallng recently at Angarsk. Wcalso believe that no other large Soviet gaseous diflusion plant exists.
e now estimate that the Soviets will have produced the equivalent0 kg ofynd that the cumulative total will havetog byTabic. These valuesa reduction of. from those wc estimated inhis reduction results primarilyirmer estimate of the electric power use at the first two gaseous diflusion planls. The actual production could range'. of thealue. airly good confidence level can be assignedy. error range for thealue.eaningful margin of errorbe assigned.'
lutoniumhile we have identified major facilities for plu-tonium production at Kyshlym and near Tomsk, wc now believe, in contrast to our previous estimates, thai the atomic tnergy site near Krasnoyarsk probably docs not produce plulonium. r
e estimate that the most likely value of Soviet cumulative plutonium equivalent production through
""valuers consistenTwith severalof the available site information. However, in view of the large estimated So*'let ore supply, wc believe that any planning should also give seriousto the possibility of higher plulonium equivalent production values. Wc have, therefore, presented anestimate based on what we wouldtoore reasonable, although not complete, utilization of the estimated Soviet uranium ore than that indicated
1 /fableresents ihe^prob^ able estimate and an alternatet is very unlikely that actualSoviet plutonium production as ofa more. below the lor much greater than those given oy The ore-basedWhile no meaningful error ranges can be assigned tostimates, we believe that the more likely future
For the view ot the Erector for lnlelllRenee. The
joint Staff.ire of the Awlstant Chief ot Naval
operation*epartment of Ihe
Navy, see footnoteof Soviet plutonium production may lie between the two estimates, and may approach the upper values given inor the latter part oferiod.*
abrication and Stockpiling. Recent reports have confirmed our previousthat the Installation at Sarova is the main nuclear weapon research and development center. They also Indicate that nuclear weapon fabrication and stockpile sites are located in the Urals at Nizhnyaya Tura and possibly at Yuryu-zan. We have also confirmedew additional operationalweapon storage sites at airfields of the Long Range Aviation (LRA). While we have no firm evidence of operational nuclear weapon storage facilities except at LRA basesew naval airfields, we continue to estimate that suchare available to the Soviet tactical and naval aviation, to the naval surface forces, and to the groundeapon Development. Furtherof the data from the Sonet nuclear test series conducted in the fall8 has led to only minor changes in our estimate of present Soviet weapon capo-bintles. However, we now estimate that only marginal Improvements will be made in future weapons unless and untiltesting is resumed. We do not believe that the Soviets wiU stockpile nuclear weapons of radically new designs
AMUtttil Chief ot Nsvul Operation* iln-lelUiencel. Department of the Navy, believe thut mow Hkely> Igture rallies of Sovietproduction will ronunuc. a* In the past..
to lie near the values
without nuclear testing, and we have no evidence lhat any Soviet nuclear tests have been conducted sincelthough covert tests could have been conducted.*
e estimate that the Soviets have available suitable weapon types to meet their present basic requirements. On the basis of test data alone, these range from fission devices yielding_approxi-mately 1
to thermonuclear devices yielding MT
f-OSSIBLE ALLOCATIONS OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
e believe that the long-rangeforces have been given the largest allocation of fissionable materials, and that the weapons allocated to these forces0 may consume aboutercent of thetocksr more of the plutonium equivalent supply. Wc believe that at present the USSR's weapon stockpile can support massive nuclear attacks against target* in North America and Eurasia by tbe long-range striking forces estimated in. The size and nature of the materials stockpile imposes limitations on the numbers of weapons available for other air. ground, and naval operations. However, we consider it unlikely that the availability of fissionable materials for nuclear weaponsactor which In
thr nihilhood of Soviet ovarian ofand Ihr iHWdole imliw from such rvaalon. are.o NIEl-SflndSECRBT/RDi.
itself significantly limits Soviet policy (see Figureabular Summary ofWeapon Stockpiles.nd"
have estimated aIn the Soviet fissionablebyhich shouldwith the estimated growth incapabilities for long-rangealso ease the limitations noted above.
INTERNATIONAL AID AND EXCHANGE
During the past year the USSR has concluded bilateral atomic aidwith North Korea, Iraq, andAs with previous agreements, the Soviets have shown no haste in fulfilling commitments, and appear to be contlnu* ing their policy of offering atomic aid only when tangible political return can be expected.
A number of exchanges and visits with nuclear aspects have resulted from the over-all US-USSR Agreement onnd the memorandum ofregarding atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The Soviets have been relatively cooperative inspecific exchanges and apparently carryell-organ! zed information and collection program during these exchanges However, both sides have gained information and first-handon each other's nuclear energy program.
Tor Ihe torn of IheChief of Blaff fnr IntrlltRrnrr. Depfirltnent ot Ihe Army and thehief of Naval Operation*Department ol th* Navy, ateate M
n updating. wc haveiscussion of US-USSR exchanges in the alomic energy Held, revised our estimates ot tha Soviet nuclear power reaclor program lo reflect the delays experienced, andnew Information into our estimate on Soviet nuclear propulsion applications
New information has led us to Increase our estimate of the uixnium ore available lo the Soviets, to decrease our estimateby. and lothe most likely estimate oTpTuionium equivalent production lo date, bul has led us to include an alterna-live. higher estimate of plulonlum production
Recent reports have added significantly lo our understanding of the Soviet facilities for nuc'c.ir weapon research and development, fabrication, and slorage. However, wc ore still unable to confirm the existence ofnuclei! weapon storage laeilltles except at Long Range Aviation bases and certain naval airfield*
urther analysis ot the date irom thenuclear lest series In the fall8 ha* not required major revisions In our estimate of present Soviet nuclear weapon cipabllillcs. However, the continued moratorium on test-Ing and the uncertainties as to whether limited or unlimited testing will ever resume hive required us to modify the estimate of future Soviet nuclear weapon capabilitiesIn.
e believe that at present the USSR's weapon stockpile can support massive nuclear attacks against targets In North America ond Eurasia by the long-range striking forcesIn. but that the size and nature of the materials stockpile imposeson Ihc numbers of weapons avnllnble for olher al'. ground, and naval operations ll. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR REACTOR PROGRAM PISUItCM RfACIOtS
here are presentlyeactors available to Ihc USSR for research purposes, and wc hare identified two more which are lo become available0 (Tableevertheless, there was considerable lag (up toonths) between the actual operational dates and the dale of operation for each unit announced at8 Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Use* of Atomic Energy. Such lacs for experimental facilities were probably caused by enginechiig difficulties with Ihe components of the primary system, although changes in planning cannot be discounted. Of special importance was the fact lhat ihc experimental fast reactor.id not reach Its full deMgn poweregawatts untilver one year after becoming elay Indicates that difficulties were experienced with this sodium-cooied The pulsed rcnclor lo be installed at the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research in Dubna will not become operational until,ear behind schedule.
t Is apparent thai llie USSR will fall far shirt of the nuclear power objectives laid down in the Sixth Five-Year Plan. This Plan called for the installationmegawatts of nuclear generatingby the endut the Soviets clnlm that they have reduced the nuclear power program for economic reasons and this claim seems reasonable.
his program will be centered around the ty|ics of reactors under construction at Belnyarsk and Voronezh and the 'our proto-tyjic reactors at Ul'yonovsk The Deloyarsk and Voronezh stations shouldotalW of electricity while the Ulyanovsk rear lot* are expected lo cererale nboui anlectrical megawatts rEMW).
Wc estimate, therefore. llial theUof nuclear iv ni--
jitinj: rapacll) Installed by nml i'/.'i Trie So-vlcts haw rrprolrdlyhat tlicy will nol select future large power reactors until they hove obtained sufficient operatingwith the reactors now underlo select (he reader system meriting further development. The lrx.itinns and dates of opcrntlon of the nuclear-electric powernrc Indicated Innd Tublec estimate that the total reactor thermal power required for the above nuclear electric power program5 willilograms of plutonium annually, some of which may not be used forhis production will consumeg of equivalent topach year.
NUCHA*.STSIfMS FOt NAVAL AND
MARINE VESSELShe Soviet Union hasefinite Interest in nuclear propulsion for several types of merchant vessels and submarines.
nuclear powered Icebreaker,com missioned in0 and Islo opcrale In the Arclfc0 If reported operationalare overcome. Thesystem of the LENIN was viewedtimes by US scientists, who reportedIs adequate but that It did notadvances. Until sufficientexjierlcncc is obtained withetailed analysis, the USSRplnn to construct any of the nuclenrships announced In the past.
have been nn Increasing numberwhich Indicate thai the USSR Isinc. nuclear submarinesn nddltlon. two hlchofllclals have stated thai Iheubmariner. However, wc linvethat any are In operationalestimate, based on the status oftechnology, that7 wnsdaletielenr propulsiona submarine eoutd have been available for
Installation, and that the Soviets could have had al least one nuclear submurlncrial status by the end8
c. All Soviet3 will probably utilize pressurized water reactors wiin enriched fuel.3 the Soviets mlchl use other types of propulsion reactors.
REACTOR SYSTEMS FOR AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, AND
S'ACEhorough survey of theand current Soviet research indicates that the Soviets arc engaged In on cflort to produce sonic type of alrcr-fi nuclearsystem. We have not determined tne exact type of aircraft nuclenr propulsion (ANP) system under development. Thehave been active in the development of beryllium oxide for nuclear applications7owever, recent infoi matron Indicates that beryllium oxide for fuel element uses Is calninK disfavor because of poorproperties. Work with othercould lead lo other approaches to the problem. The Soviets have been activelyIn the development of nickel base alloysnd iheir en liabilities lo use Nkrhromeuel element material are quite high7 Iho USSR has becomeactive In the development of chrome base alloys.
b. We estimate that the Soviets are nowoflying testbed cirhornc with at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrusthase of the flight.2rogram could be expected lo lead to an ANP system suitable for cruise on nuclear heal aloneubsonic aircraft of mtrglna) performance.
nllemale development based on anfuel element could lead, byIDrH,uclear propulsion unit forsubsonic aircraft wilh substantiallyiierformancc.
application of ANP woulda totiE lest and developmentwr do nol expertrototype willduring Hie period of tills estimate.
amjets- An nomination of SovietIndicates that. In addition to feasibility studies on nuclear ramjets, they havea very comprehensive mathematical analysis of Inlets, dilfusers and exhaust nozzles that could be applicable to bothand chemical systems. There is also evidence of mclallurgical research which coukl be applieduclear ramjet program as well as lo several other hlgh-tempcraturc reactor applications. Wc believe thai Ihe complexity or the nuclear ramjet problem makes itthat the Soviets willuclearenginelight test status during the period or this estimate, although such flight testing Li possible.
We estimate lhat Ihcis at this lime engaged in researchnuclear rocket engine Their researchrefractory comimunds.(lux reactor fucililles, andcontainment vessels for reactorgiveevelopment capabilityfield. Based on the present statusresearch facility constructionresearch, wc estimate lhatcouldirststu piufolypc system possibly as early
NUCHA* MOttJlSlON fOt lAND VfMCllS
Is no evidenceormallor land vehicle propulsion is4 Soviet scientists andhave discussed In the rmpulafjournals, and books thenuclear propulsion for 'and vehiclesalluded to the existence of iVehicles mentioned In theseas having nuclear p: opulslonInclude railway locomotives,for cross-cotmlry hauling,mong the rraclorstudy by llie Soviets which oreadaptable lo lond vehicle propulsionpressurized water, homogeneous,cooled reactor* Small, compact
|iower reactors, an announced Soviet dcvelop-ment objective, would be particularlyfor land propulsion purposes.
NUCHA* ELECTRICAL PROPUtSION SYSTEMS FOB SPACE APPLICATIONS "'
Electric propulsion using nuclear energy sources offers ihe possibility (orow thrust, high specific impulse systemfor outer space and inter-orbitalalthough such systems would be useless for takeoff
Although the Soviets have shown con tlnued interest In electrical propulsionno positive identification of associated personnel and institutes has been made to dale. However, since much of the basic mag-neio-hydrodynamlc research Is common to both 'he controlled fusion and the electric propulsion programs, it Is logical to assume that fusion research organizations could also be associated with electric propu'sion research.
he Soviets are estimated lo have theto pursue an extensiveeeled toward electric propulsionbut the extreme complexity of theproblems precludes the dcvelo)>meni of an operating prototype electric propulsionuntil well5
e hove no evidence thai the Soviets have utilised nuclear heat sources for auxiliary power supplies in their space program,their outstanding work in theof thermoelectric materials has been well substantiated. Based on Iheir capabilities in reactor technology. In the utilization ofand in thermocouple development, we estimate tlutl the Soviets can developheat sources for auxiliary power supplies suitable for use In missiles and space vehicles al any time during the period of this estimate.
"Thisl""ic. plasma, and mainrUitivdrc dynamlr prormbWi
III. THE SOVIET NUCLEAR MATERIALSPROGRAM
We now estimate thai by the end9 the Soviet Union hadumulative total o(etric tons ofuranium. (Table) Uranium mining and ore concentration within theBloc continued to expandodest rateithin recent years the annual production of ore concentrates has beenthousand tons greater than our estimate of Soviel nuclear energy program needs
The most significant trend in the salell'les was the continuing shift in East German mining operations from the Largely depleted vein-tyjic Saxony ores lo the sedlmcnlary-type Thurlnglaew concentration plant is being built at Sccllngstadt which will use modern Ion-exchange recovery methods and possiblyaily capacity0 tons. East Ocrman uranium production Is there-foe expected lo Increase gradually In the next five years. Reportsplant being built nearn eastern Czechoslovakia also indicate that uranium ore production Islanned modest increase ihere. While Poland discontinued shipment of ore to USSRulgaria. Hungary and Rumania are estimated lo have supDlied the USSR with several thousand tons of recoverable equivalent uranium metal9 and to continue to do solightlyrnle during the next five years
increasing amount of evidence onPeoples Republic uraniumprogram suggests that araw materials base has beenHowever, we now believe thatIn China is meant lo supply theenergy program and Is nolshipment lo ine USSR.
n the USSR, the Krlvoy Rog district In the Ukraine is now estimated to be Ihc leading uranium producer. The Fergana Valley ln
Central Asia is believed to be the second largcsl producing area followed by the Frunze-Lane lssyk-Kul' district and the Pyatigorsk district In the northern Caucasus9 visit to the Krlvoy Rog area by the McCone parlyefector's report on Ihe ore concentration facilities in Ihc area have supplied information indicating that yearly uranium production Is on the order0 metric ions of equivalent uranium metal. The Informaiion alsolhat uranium mining and orebegan as early8 and by1 exceeded that of the Fergana Valley. We believe the new information on Krlvoy Rogmakes this portion of our estimate quite firm.68 military attache photography of the Pyatigorsk plant in the northern Caucasus leadsairly firmof production from this area,received on the other uranium mining sites has been more limited, but il doesthat the Soviets' doirestic uraniumand ore concentrallonodest pace. It also demonstrates thrt the Soviets have been able to extract uraniumailcly of deposits including veins, sandstones, oil-shales, limestones and sub-bituminous coals. The last typeignificant percentage of uranium to Iheirond Its use demonstrates an ability toype of deposit largely Ignored in the western world. The Soviets have matched manyand ore concentration methods used in the US, and their recovery of uranium from coals, as well as from Krlvoy Rog iron ore slags, indicates native development* requiring considerable engineering capability.
he Soviet Bloc li estimated to haveof atons of recoverable equivalent uranium metal present in deposits similar In nature lo those now mined. Of ihc known deposits being worked only the Thurin-gia deposit In East Germany and Hie Krlvoy Rog deposit have apparent reserves matching many uranium mining districts of Ihc western world Ncvc.'hclcss. the Soviet exploitation of numerous s- nail-reserve deposit* has sup-
end can cominuc to supply, all the .ramurn required in the Soviei nuclear energy program Present mining and orecosts are high, but thus situation can be altered quickly by the discovery ot one or more large reserve deposits similar lo the Ambrosia Lake deposit in New Mexico or the Blind River deposit In Canada. Theofind seems excellent due lo the geological diversity of the USSR
he rale of future expansion of uranium production In Ihe Soviet Bloc is estimated toetric tons of recoverable equivalent uraniumear. At thisetric tons or equivalent uranium metal will have been available lo Ihe USSR5 iTablehis figure Is subject to large margins or error, however, since ritual production will depend upon Soviet poMcles and plans.
rXTIMATKI*AWVAlj;XTJWAXMIM ^tKTAI, I'llODUCTTON
Ikivi* For Kslimatingroduction
Two operating gaseouseparation plants have been positivelyin the USSR, one al Verkh-Neyvinsk In the Urals, the other north of Tomsk in centralhird plant Is estimated to have started operating recently near Angarsk In the Lake Baykal areae believe, based on our analysis of Soviet electric powerand the difficulty of hiding very large power consumers, that no other lirge gaseouslant exists.roduction by ultra-centrifuge or other methodsnlikely.
During the past year considerably more precise informition has lededuction in our estimate of the electric power used by the first two gaseous diffusion plants. At Verkh-Ncyvinsk in recent years,v transformer capacity lagged thev power lines feeding Into the site, and an additional line was delayed moreear beyond published Soviet An additional delay In providing more power for Vrrkh-Ncyvlnsk from Verkhne Tagil has also become apparent. The first of0 MW generators at Verkhne Tagil was originally scheduled, according lo Soviet press reports, to bc^in operationut In9 It ap|ieared lhal this generator would not become BpCfnUoml until of recent power use al Tomsk have also been somewhat reduced dueetterof the performance andschedule of the on-site.reactor station there. The decreases in our gaseous diffusion power estimates largely account for the reduction we have now made In our previously estimated value for5 prodiirllon iTable)
he dale when operation* xtailed atlant believed lo be In the Angarsk area is In considerable doubt, since available information leads tn dales in eithera as we estimated last year, orhe dale ol the probable slart-up of the large, on-site power plant. Wc have selected ihe earlier date to account for construction timeand an increase in unidentified power use in the area In
[W? cannot exclude the poasi-btttly that Angarsk, like Tomsk, may produce plulonium as wellf considerable significance Is the evidence suggesting that the Soviets began to supply anW to the nlant at Vcrkh-Ncyvlnsk during tlieoeriod. Reports also Indicate lhat no new buildings were to be added to the plantthis period. The Installationew barrier is consistent with this Information. Installationew barrier would permit tnerensed efficiency in electric powerand an increase in production without an increase in plant area.
e haveoderate rate ofin production capacityhls assumotion is based on the Indicatedat Vcrkh-Ncyvlnskhe assumption that Tomsk will expand5 to the stfc of Vcrkh-Ncyvinslt. and thelhat Angarsk will reach equal slseo additional increase In plantis forecast for Ihls period, thoughbarrier improvement is certainlyAlthough possible, no expansion6 lias born Included in the production we calculated
roductionur estimate ofroduction is tabulated below (Tabicn terms of cumulative production of uranium enrichedontent It includesquivalentt< rial* produced at lesser
Margins of Krror
t is very unlikely that acluilroduction lieso
f0 kg value estimated forur estimate ofn therogram is subject lo wide margins of error, especially as Soviet intentions for the period5 arenot yet formulated.airly good confidence level can be assigned to a
rror range for the estimatedumulative production. Thereafter, amargin of error cannot be assigned
nuroMuM touvAiCNi ptooucnoN
Major facilities for the production ofhave been identified near Kyshtym In the Urals and north of Tomsk in central Siberialutonium productionmay exist at other localities, bul none have been Identified to date. It Is believed unlikely that they would have rem lined jn-delccled had Ihey started producing more than five years ago
Detailed study during the past year of all available information relevant to Ihe large unexplained atomic energy site nearin central Siberia has led us lo believe now- lhat it probablyt produceNo other suspcel early plutonium production site has been identified In this general area i
order lo aorrpt the ntlmstr cf Soviet eumo-lallveproduction (Tablehe Assistant Chkf of Naval Operallons flntelUKcneci.Of the Havy. finds that he wooM have lo accept major factors of Bovlel ;npabltlly which are in his opinion nol surnelenllyby available rridenw.factor,>a> Initial operation dale. Of theih*consumption, and "r> useifla-trm tcehnofaxr* and new equlp-rirtowever. he believes that improvements IIIbasic lechnoloxi and plant efnrleney ave been incorporated In the ptanU Installed riurmc im-tflfft
TheChief of Navnl Operation*Department of Ihe Havr. believe, that the lower limits oflmateor the cumulative produellnii. allhounh hith. are the more nearly correct.
owever, the continuing majorbetween the estimated amounts ofore procured and processed, andsmaller amounts required for thequantitiesnd of
nol be exphnnctTwTiTfout rtftklng WorThore of the following assumptions: a) that thehave deliberatelyarge stockpile of uranium feed material; b) lhat
'lirTrrin pTul.ii .'nil eir- !- nw-il
al) renrtorich as plulonium.S. polonium, etc
major delays have occurred in site conslruc-lion. or irradiaicd fuel elements from this reactor were processed at Kyshtym, there could haveelay of one or two years in their processing!
The USSR normally maintains large state reserveside variety of strategic materials which areigh priority necessity. However, we lack specific informationeither the existenceranium sta'eor of the magnitude of state rcscrvt* or comparable strategic materials. The surplus Indicated by the above comparison of uranium prodjdion with lhat required by the krypton-based fissionable material production estimate Is equivalent to all ore mined during thethree end one-half years after making allowance for pipelines and local reserves. On the other hand, there is recent evidence ofoperations which, If generally adopted, would make more economical use of uranium and would create even further imbalances be-tween our estimates of ore production and
Jplulonlum equivalent produc-
Trarf At the same time, the procurement of about half the uranium, of mosl of the surplus from non-USSR sources, could be explained through overexploltatlon to pre-empt these sources
t Is aim possible that live Soviets havemajor delays In the construction and operation of reactors or chemtralplants. For example, the chemicalplant at Tomskcompleted until about threc-lo-four yen after the start of construction and two-lo-lhrec years after the startup of the first Tomsk reactor. Unless the
e estimate that the most likely value of Soviet cumulative plutonium equivalent pro-through mld-lOGOf"
of the available siteHowever, in view of the largeSoviet ore supply, we believe thatshould also give seriousto the possibility of higherproduction values. Wc havepresented an alternative estimatewhat we would consider toorealthough not complete, utilizationestimated Soviet uranium ore thanThe ollcrna-
l Ive values would require that iTic Soviets have an unknown third sitee maximumreactor capacity consistent with availnblc dala on know.**
4 presents thr p. liable estimate ana anestimate"
Future Plutonium Production
cumulative estimate 'later years by adding estimated production Irom currently known expansion ol facilities throughnd thereafter adding 3C3 kg per year in each year to account for construction ot the planned dual-purpose reactors and for power level increases.o additions are assumed, although they are well within the Soviets' capabilities The alternativecumulative plulonlum production estimate has been extrapolatedimilar basis
f there have been major delays inof chemical processingIf thereecently constructedreactor site, wc wolduchincrease in Soviet pluloniumlhan that assumed inof
Further, il Is will.inlhc SovTcTs* capabilities to make greater yearly additions duringeriod lhan we have assumed. In view of the strong incentives for the USSR to Increase fissionable material production and to increase utilization of available uranium, we believe the more likely future values may lie between the two estimates and maythe upper values In the latter part of this period."
Margins of Error^
Am!sUnt Chief of Naval OperaUoruDepartment of the Navyalternative cellmate based on orebe loo tenuous and hypoftioUenl forMe believes. therefore, that thrquantityranium ore procuredby thruitableesUmatlna plulonlum production. TheChief of Navalntein*eneeoi the Navy, reeoennes th*estimated Soviet uranium ore acquiredof lhat used tn producing tne amount
tockpile ofyears. He believestockpile lo he normally consistent with ion-era! Sovtrl stockpiling prseUecs. wllh thequality of the uranium depo'l" In the USSR, and wllh delays and cutbacks In their nuclear poaer protram. He wouldomit fromW the uranium-based plulonlum equivalent
While uranium Is available to support much larger estimates, actual production values much greater than those given by the uranium-based estimate become increasingly Improbable even when allowances are madearge undetected site. No meaningful error can be assigned lostimates. Actual future production will depend on Soviet plans and policies, particularly thosethe stockpiling of small-yield tactical and air defense weapons.
'The Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of Ihe Navy, believes that the more likely future values of Soviet Plutonium production will ronUnue. as In the past, lo lie near the values in thej climate.
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iv. the sov.et nuclear weapon
NUCHA* WEAPON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENThe Soviet nuclear weapon program ha* undoubtedly been sup|mrtcd byumber of Institutes and labora-tones in the USSR, particularly the Institute of Atomic Energy of Hie Academy of Sciences (formerly Laboratoryoscow.
he main Soviel center specificallywith nuclear weapon research, dcvejnn-menl. and design is located at Sarova
iles east of Moscow (Fig. ringeriod, thewas com|)oscdumber of secure compounds dhjtcrscdooded re-.ttrk-lcd zonequare miles in area. The various compound* included laboratory-type buildings, machine shops, aninstallation which shipped out aunder heavy security, and al lensl one luyh. explosive test facility. High-quality technical personnel worked in the restricted area, and frequent explosions were heard In the vicinity.
here are Indications that Ihc Sarovahas been active In the Soviet nuclear weapon program since nluclear lest devices were probably ossembled here and technical personnel from Hie center wereIntimately concerned with thetesting at the Semlpalatinsk proving ground.cmlya. and other test _ir.iv
FABRICATION ANDThere have been indicationsarge industrial InstallationTurathe north
central Urals is Involved In some wayie Bin*let atomic rtirvgy program RecentIndlc-alc* that this liulallallon Is con-trrueil Willi the fabrleallnn end stockpiling of nuclear weaponshe complexseveral factory areas, one of wlilrli reportedly processes explosives; several arena containing partly-buried bulldingi; and one arearansformer yard and cooling lower.
arge thermoelectric power plant near Ihe old town or NlTiinyaya Tura probably went Inlo opcrallon earlylthough most of the power generated Is exported southward, wc believe Lhat the atomic energy insiallallon at Nlzhnysya Tura commenced operations al about the same lime thai large amount* of electric power became available locally.
econd nuclear weapon fabrication and stockpile complex may_bc located In Iheof Yuryuzan We are uncertain
oiwralion of this complex, but It apparently was conMruclcdater dale lhan ihc Nlzhnyaya Turn Installation.
he general Urals regionarge number of atomic energy enterprises which1 would have been able to provide Ihe Kizhnynya Tura and Yuryuzan plants with the materials ncccwary for theof nuclearrom Vcrkh-Neyvinsk. uranium metal from Glaxov, and plulonium and tritium from Kyshtym. Heavy water plants at Derrznikl and Kins-notur'insk could have provided deuterium, (see
National Assembly and Stockpile Site*e believe that early weapons produced at Nlzhnyayn Tura were stored ln the general vicinity of the production area, andentral stockpile fnclliiy still esdMa in the Nlihnyaya Tura complex. After two or three years' production, however, the requirement probably developedispersed storage syslrm. There are Indications lhat planning for nn extensive asv-mbly and storage aystem was underwaynd the first dispersed national assembly and stockpile sites were probably under construction during24 iicrirxr/-*
Storage Siles ol Arctic Staging liases
t loaal| friuclcar weapon storagearc believed lo be located In llieof probable maior Long Range Avlallonipnn airflrldshe
fMui ktti* uii]
wmWj capability.s possible lhai oilier similar sites exist In the far north, the mosl likely location being In the central arclic.
Soviet Airfield Storage Silt*e have evidence lhat operational storage facilities for nuclear weapons are assoclaled with certain airfields in the Soviet Union
/All of ihc above airfield
'sites arc home bases for Soviet Long Range Aviation units except two which appear to serve Naval Aviation. There are indications that similar storage "lies exist at oilier Sovietnd wc estimate that all primary LRA basesuclear weapon storage capability.
Other Operational Storage Facilities
We liavc no firm evidence of the existence of operationalfacilities specifically designed for nuclear weapons other than those at LRA and naval airfield sites. However, the Soviets may welluclear storage capabilityumber of tactical ond naval airfields. Soviet tactical doctrine andand nuclear testing specifically oriented to ground and naval requirements, Indicate that nuclear weapon storage sites are probably also available lo unlli of the Soviet around forces and to certain naval surface andforces.
The Soviet guided missile program lias clear requirements for nuclear warheads,in strategic attack and certain air defense applications. Although there is lo date no confirming evidence, we mightto find special security arrangements and provisions for check-oul and storage ofwarheads associated with appropriate operational missile Installations.
Fnr the lUcllhAnd of anvliH cvnilniiorn-Inrlum and Ihel>le pubis frnmcvaiUm.
Annra A NIK n.PH'HKTt. nun SNIKI'D*.
HO fviacnce mat anytests have been conducted since that date, although covert tests could have beenucted" In view of Ihc continuing mora-
toriumclear testing, wc arc assuming (TNj weapons in the followingSoviet stockpile weapons will only under- weight cJasw*
marginal Improvementsesign* (Seec have discussed future capabilities If testing were resumed only In general terms.
o significant changes In our previous estimates have resulted from further analysis of ihe data from the last Soviet lest series. Minor revisions have been made In Tablevaluation of Soviet Nuclear Tests, and in our estimate of present capabilities.
e believe that Ihe Soviets also hove the capability to produce fission weaponsariety of types and yields, including boosted and pre-inillallon proof thermonuclearand fission weapons (So* Table.
Based on our analysis of their nuclear test program, we believe that the Soviets have suitable weapon types avollablc lo meet their present basic requirements.
We estimate that al present th* Soviets have the capability lo produce thermonuclear
*. i as a a
i i l siJ
Jun-Asiembty Weapons. Although the USSR is not known lo hare tested nuclearmploying gun-type assembly. It Is conslov.vd that, because of the simplicity of design, weapons or this type could now be available In stockpile. These weapons would, however, require large amounts of fissionable materials. Therefore, we estimate that If the Soviets stockpile pun-assembly weapons at all. they would stockpile only smallof these weapons. One possible version of this weapon, suitable for artillery shellould be eight inches in diameter. weigh about WO pooodsj
Capabililles Without Fuither Nuclear Testing "
e estimate lhat the Soviets wouldTN weapons of radically newwith major changes ha niaciear"^withoutSuch changes-would require at leasttest
Extremely Light-weight Device*]
We have detected no tests
r jj analysis indicates the|
"fcharacteristics wnicn wouia
he associated with the firing ot an extremely light-weight device.,/
o direct infonration Is available on ihe specific nuclear weapon types in the UiiSR stockpile. Our estlmat- of present Sjvlet
lear wqaponapability!been baaed ki doU ttcr Win cmnecTIon with thenown Soviet tests and has used US weapon tcchociogyuide.
8ft. We believe that there could be onlyImprovement in existing fission weapons to be stockpiled without further nuclearThese would probably be limited to changing compositing ratios In cores toin the amount of deuterium and tritium to change the yield of boosted weapons, and to Improvements in high-explosive
imited Test Ikin :'
nder Ihe assumed conditions fc* aban. Iho Soviets could continue loimprove, and prooMesl small weapons yielding less thanT Considerableould also be made by using mock-up tests for small TN wea|ions. butlower rate and wilh less confidence lhan under conditions of unlimited testing
CsijialiiliticH With Unlimited Testinghe uncertainty as lo the date on which unlimited testing might be resumed, if in fact it is pver resumed, prevents any specificate of future Soviel nuclear weaponHowever. Ihc Soviets undoubtedly will continue to carryesearch andwork yn nuclear weapons, and thus have new -nd Improved designs ready to lesl If unlimited testing Is
Ihe composition of Hie Soviet stockpile.it Is possible to arrive at some broad Judgments as lo the Soviet employment of nuclear weapons, tlte relative emphasis onapons for various missions, andSoviet nuclrnr weapons capabilities. These Judgments take Into account thefact or* -
a Our evaluation of tne Soviet nuclear lesl program and lis implications fordevelopment and stockpiling;
b Our estimates on the availability of fissionable materials;
e. Intelligence information on stockpiling practices and doct'Inc for the use of nuclear weapons for various purposes;
d. Our assessmcnLi of Soviet strategy and military policy as set forth in. "Main Trends In Soviet Capabilities and
e Our estimates of Soviet development and deployment of weapon systems as set torth In. and In. "Soviet Capabilities for Slrnteglc Attack Through
ur consideration of the Soviet nuclear wenpon stockpile denls wilh the0e have nol considered the jicriod3 because our estimates on theproduction and deployment ofweaponnd particularly the ICUM. become much more uncertain after that date. Uncertainly also pervades our estimates on the future availability of fission-oble mnlprlnls. No meaningful margin of error can be staled for the estimateroductionr for the estimate of plutonium
c cannot estimate what portion of the Soviet nuclear wenpon stockpile Is likely to beeadymall percentage of weapons would be in the pipeline, ormaintenance, retrofit, or rcfabrlcallon ol any given lime. These wen|xins would nol froti-tv nvnllnlile for use fry Hieforces.
SOVIET TEST FtOGtAM
hr Soviet test program over thereflected Ihe development ol nucleartoide variety nf militaryThooviet lest* delectedalmost evenly dividededium-yield and high-yieldsome of the low- andprobably were related lo theof thermo-nuclear weapons.of the high-yield shots may haveto the Improvement nfSince November IP-.'iS whentested their
nuclenr weapon, greater empnasw nas been placed on the high-yield category. Of theesli delectedbout one-half were high-yield shots, andf these were In the megaton range. The weapon designs tested8 could now be stockpiled in significant qunnlltlrs. On the basis ot the evidence provided by Soviet nuclear testing, we conclude that the Soviets now havea wide spectrum of fission ondweapons which It probably adequate to meet their prevent basic militaryhe evidence has lededuction in our estimates of cumulativeand tn two widely 'Jittering estimates iif pluloniuin equivalent production. (See Tablehe lower plutmiiumis COnaMcrcd to be more probable ate believe that the more likely future valuese between lac twoand may approach the higher estimate In the latter port oficriod."1
we csfTmilc lhat the amount ofmaterials available will have Increased markedly, but the same approximate ratio between plutonlum equivalentrobably will persist.
estimates of Soviet stocks ofmaterials are subject to wide marginsfsee1f this order in the actual amountsmaterial available would ofaffect Soviet allocations. Thebe fell with greater acuteness inlhan o'hers. esneeliPv if theof fissionable material approachlimits of the estimates
SOVIET MUITAST DOCTRINE AND POUCV
the Soviet* cannot be certainthe nature and durationeneralappear to assume that It wouldwith massive nuclear attacks uponof theuclearwouk"e employed in Ihewhich would be character!Jted by r
M'tltum-vlrlrl IH la inn NT'
lllnh yield .ereslrr Ihsn inn
In'hide* IB tr>I* InIraitnSi
' Tor the view of Ihe Directorlntelimoi.ee. The Joint Sinff, 'ceage in.
'For Ihr view nf the Assktnnl Ciller of Nnvnl Operation*epartment ol the Navy, MV>S. OHf IS
total commitment of icmatnlng fores nndin any future conflict short of gcnrral war wc have estimated that the So-vli'la probably would seek to exclude the useclear wcii|>ons because of their superiority In conventional forces At the outset ofonflict they would probablyon-rkiernbtc effort to avoid being the first to UN nuclear weapons, but would undoubtedly respond. In kind, to Western use of nuclear weapons, if tlicy considered it militarily
n the basis of our estimates on Soviet strategy and military doctrine, we believe that Iheir military policy will nlmost certainly eon-tlnur to rest on their concept of an appropriate balance between conventional and nuclearThey apparently continueeneral war launched withnuclear attacks would turn Into aconflict in which other forces would be neededarge scale. But morerlnnt Is their belief that Iheir military policyange of capabilities permit-ling flexibility In the choice of means and the scale of operations in accordance with the poll! leal objectives soughtarticular area. Therefore, we believe that the Soviets will almost certainly continue to maintainground, air. and navalo the maximum extent feasible, tltese forces will be dual purpose, capable ofeither nuclear or non-nuclear The principal obstacle lo theof this goal Is to be found not In Soviet nuclear technological capabilities, but In the nature of tbe Soviet fissionable materials stockpile, specifically In the limited amount ot plulonium equivalent estlmaled to be If. as we estimate. Ihe Soviets have not yettate nf "ntielear nienly- the vnrlOUfl missions would necessarily have to compete for allocations of fissionable In line with our estimates of Soviet strategy and. considering thend numbers of the available delivery vehicles, we believe that the USSR has probably given the largest allocation of fissionable material tn lis Inng-range air nnd missile weaponThe remaining material probably has been apportioned lo delivery systems employed In other air. ground, and naval operations.
ION0 RANGE STRIKINGallistice Have estimated thai within the next few years, ballistic missiles will constitute Ihc main clement of Soviet long-rangeng forces. Included in this category are ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles estimated lo be In operational Inventory and such0issiles as are estimated lo be available for an initial salvo capability against land-based retaliatory targets within theirheir most effective use would clearly jc wilh high-ylrld thermonuclearand Soviet nuclear tests indicate the development of weapons suitable for missile applications. There is little evidence as to tlie deployment of these ballistic missiles, and none on the storage of nuclear warheads for these missiles.
onsideration of all factors leads us lo estimate that the Soviets would equip all ballistic missiles in Ihe category described In paragraphith thermonuclear warheads. For purposes of this estimate, we have assumed that they would equip these missiles with war-hends of the maximum yields"
"In addition lo Iheae medium raneecommute an -on launcher"USSR probably I* also producing:Tor *ub.*rquenl uto in the Initiala general war and for employmentustalned ronnict. See NIEof Staff for InlelllBenee.
Department of the Army, and the Assonant Chief of Naval Operation* (Intelligence*.of the Navy, do not concur with the Implied Judgment 'hai Ihe Soviet* would equip all ofallistic nUvltea with warhead* of the maximum yields available In their opinion, many of the mUtlon* aulgnod lono nm rante mlMIca could he ai elTeeUvely. and more effWtrntly. performed with lower yield anrhend* Ore. also, their footnote in Figure 4
nave"fin aggregate yield oft About one-half of Inks aggregate yield could be directed against the continental U8 through the use of ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles.
he number of ballistic missiles in the category described In paragraphs expected to increase markedly over the neat few years.
attack capabilities rest primanly upon bombers, oil capable of delivering hipn-ylcld nuclear weapons.
e believe that llie Soviets will seek lo provide nuclear weapons for all long-range bombers Intended for weapons delivery in the event of general war. They may also wish toertain number of weapons for multiple bomb loads in some allockingand for restrikes by surviving aircraft. Wc believe thai virtually all of these weapons would be high-yield thermonuclear type*.that most of these probably would be In Ihe megaton range.
he numbers of weapons allocated to Long Range Aviation inould vary widely depending upon operational planning, the slxe of weapons employed, and otherHowever, we believe that Long Range Aviation could now have on the orderhousand nuclear weapons
yield of these weapons could varv widely, but we believe that It may be on the order of0 MT.
e have estimated that the Soviet long-range bomber force will decrease in sirethe period of this estimate. For this reason and because of the heavy demands of ihe growing Soviet missile forces, we do not believe that the numbers of nuclear weapons allocated to Long Range Aviation inill Increase greatly above present levels. If at all. The total mcgatonnage of the Long Range Aviation stockpile could be Increased markedlyith no increase in the
The AssUlnnl Chief nf Staff. Intelligence,of Ihe Air Force believes In view of brrer numbers or Soviei operationalestimated by Ihe UBAF for mlC-ltW.hilnnilsllT hlElier srereitalc yieldW MTi w'U be allocated lolorre.See NIEi
number ol weapons, by replacement of aof the stockpile with higher yieldof existing types
All OCfCNSE eau>iOTMENf
ew So-let nuclear tests appear to have been related u> the devek>pr.icnt of air deferue warheads. However, there Is no evidence of nuclear weapon allocations to present SAM sites. If nuclear warheads arc available at these sites we believe It likely that they would be mounted on missiles, since no nuclear weapon storage facilities have been identified We have estimated that the Soviets probably nreow-altitude surface-to-air missile systemhich could appear1 or possibly0 It is possible that they will alsoong-range, hlgh-allltude surface-to-air missile system which could become operational later in the period of this estimate. Both of these systems could employ nuclear warheads."
of the nuclear devices tested byappears suitable for use In anand we believe that such abecome available Ibis year,Is as yet no evidence of Itsproduction In the absence oftesting, progress in the verysuitable for ntr-to-alr missilesseriously hindered.
of the thermonuclear devices19S6 might lend themselves toan nnti-mlssiic missile, and wc havethatystem is probablyand could become availableIn theeriod. Because wcbelieve that ll willlkl system has not beenIn terms of Its nuclenr materials However. Ifystemdeployed, it would place new andupon Soviet slocks of fissionablewhich would be fell even before
Br* NIE HIM; -SmlH CapsMllllea In tlulded UUfcM and Si "ire Vehicles.BM
he rapid and extensive deployment of surface-to-air missile sites in the USSR isof the high priority probably accorded the air defense mission. Although Soviet surface-to-air missiles arc designed lo bewilh HE warheads against aerodynamic targets, nuclear warheads would be required toignificant probability forof the nuclear weapons themselves. Such warheads would also Increase the killagainst the delivery vehicles. Wethese consideration* so decisive lhal.
Vainer seekrro provide some portion of their surface-to-air missiles wilh nuclear warheads Given the large allocation to long-range air and missile systems that we have estimated, orubstantially smaller allocation, the Soviets would nol have sufficient nuclearto provide nuclear warheads for all of Iftelr surface-to-air missiles. However,all factors, we believe that they could now have on the orderuclear-armed surface-to-air missiles available."
- The Assistant Chief of SUIT for Inlellitenee.Of the Army, and the Assistant Chief or Navalntelligence', Department of the Navy, do not concur that the esUmatc of AOO nuclear-armed surface-to-air mlullea I* any more vitld than an estimate of acreral hundred more or 1cm which would remit from different, la operational planning,ond availability of fissionable material. Aee. also. Iheir footnote lo FigureOreS0:no-Soviet Air DefervvThmuah Mid-IMS."March IMA.
riorities of various defended areas and operational factors probably would causeIn the numbers of nuclear warheads allocated to particular surfacc-lo-air missile sites. We have estimated thatissile sites are deployed at somerban-industrial areas, and lhat by the end of the year such sites could be deployed atincludingrban-industrialore extensive programreater density ofefenses in certain locations, defense of additional targets, and allocation to field forces could be completed sometime We believe lhat nuclear
warheads probably have now been provided for the defense of Moscow and other areas which the Sovlels consider of greatbul we doubt that nuclear-armed Mir-facc-to-alr missiles are available in all of these areas. Allocation of nuclear warheads tor surface-to-air missiles will probably increaseut we consider It unlikely thai the Soviets will seek lo provide suchfor all missile sites and mobile units
EMflOVMFNI IN SUPfOBT Of CBOUNOThere is ample evidence in currentmilitary doctrine and training thatplan to use nuclear weapons cnin support of groundapparently not in very large This doctrine visualizes deliveryariety of methodsrifled artillery, free rockets,and aircraft. Evidence on theot weajions for such purposes Ltmainly to possible nuclearsites at certain tactical airfields.nuclear tests have reflected nna broad spectrum of fission weaponsfrom about oneT. Theand high-yield weapons could beby aircraft or by the types ofmissiles now believed availablesupport We have estimated thaicould now have as many as amissiles of ranges upbelieve thatmall portion ofnow be equipped with nuclear Virtually allvailable for supportforces would be equipped withof varyingAssuming allocations to long-rangeand air defense on the order ofabove, we do not believe that theSoviei stockpile permits the DM ofnumbers of low-yleld nucleartactical uses. The smaller, morestockpile estimated forprovide on the orderhousandand medium-yield weaponsfor tactical aviation. missiles) for support of field forces" Given the alternate plulonium estimate, these numbers could be increased.hc limitations imposed by the availability of fissionable materials will have eased considerably, but ground supportwill have lo compete with increasing numbers of long range missiles for allocationstockpile which will stillow plutoniumatio However, Soviet nuclear ground support ca pabiiities win be greatly improved, partieu larly by the increased numbers of nuclear armed shoit and meUium range missiles which will then be available for such use.
here is firm evidence supportingevelopment of nuclear weapons for naval Of the weapons tested by theumber of medium and low-yield weapon types would be suitable for use against naval tarCeis There have been nuclear tests in Ihe Novaya Zcmlya area which almost certainly relate to navalr lo the development of naval weapons. We have evidence ofweapon storage facilities at navaland believe lhat nuclear weapon storage sites arc probably also available to certain naval surface and submarine-launchedmissiles, which require nuclear warheads for maximum. The allocution to Soviet naval forces almost certainly is being Increased wllh the growth tn the numbers of guided missiles available to navnl units. Wc have estimated lhat all submarine-launched ballistic missiles probably will be equipped with high-yield thermonuclear warheads. Nuclear warheads
Ansl'tant Chief of Staff forof tlie Army, and thool Naval Operation* ilnlrlliEeiieei.of the Navy, believe lhat othervalid assumptions as lo opernuonatand availability of fissionableresult In far diftrrcnl numbers ofcited here. See. also. Iheir footnotere
* also been provided for someon ofir-to-surfaco missiles employedvui A' im ton. and for some of ihe cruisc-ly|ie mlssiiti no* employedew surface vessels. Limited numbers o. nuclear bombs, depth charges, torpedoes, and mines are probably available for direct support of navalAside from the nuclear warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, Soviet naval forces may now haveuclear weajionse believe that ihe allocation to naval forces will havemarkedly with the more extensive deployment of missileurtherih Indicated by the growingfor more effective antl-submurine wrap* ons to meet the threat posed by US missile submarines.
' The Assistant Chief of SUff for Intellieence.of the Armv. and theant Chief of Naval Operations ilnlrllltencoi. Department of the Navy, believe that other equally asmptionj as lo operational planning, petoe-nand availability ot fissionable material would result In far diftorrnl numbers ot weapon' than cited here. See. also, their footnote lo Flcurc 4.
SOVIET NUCLEARe believe lhat the long-range sinking forces have been riven the larscst allocation of_ fissionable
j We believe that present the USSR's weapons stockpile can support massive nuclear attacks againsiIn North America and Eurasia by the long-range striking fortes. The size and nature of the materials stockpile imposes limitations on the numbers of weapons available for-other air. ground, and naval operations However, wc consider it unlikely that the availability of fissionable materials for nuclear weaponsactor which in itself significantly limits Soviet (See Figureabular Summary of Possible. Wc haveonsiderable growth In the Soviet fissionable materials stockpile byhich should keep pace with the estimated growth In Soviet missilefor long-range attack, and also ease the limitations noted above.
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IHE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
AID ANO EXCHANGE PROGRAM international aid agreements
uring the past year the USSR hasbilateral atomic aid agreements with
North Korea. Iraq nnd Indonesia; the .first such agreements since the initial round of bilaterals negotiated with most of the bloc nations and with Yugoslavia and Egypt in the. The agreements with North Korea and Iraq wire similaroseentered Into by the Soviet Union and will provide both countriesesearch reactor, isotope laboratories and technical training. In addition. North Korea is toetatron and cobalt irradiation apparatus, while Iraq will receive assistance in pro*pcct-ing for radioactive ore. As with previous agreements, the USSR has shown no haste in fulfilling these commitments and little has been accomplished since the conclusion of the original negotiations. While Indonesia hasubcrltlcalmallreactor,0 KW researchnegotiations have not bcrii completed and the extent of Soviet assistance has not been determined.
he offers lo North Korea. Iraq andseem to fit the pattern of past Soviet international atomic aid activity. From the Soviet point ofe agreement with North Koreatep to Improve and lightenwith another Communist nation, and may have been prompted by US aid to South Korea. The offers of atomic aid lo Iraq and Indonesia were plainly inspired by the same types of political considerations which led to the earlier agreement with Egypt. Thus. Ihcsc new developments do not presage any shlfl In Soviet policy toward furnishing basic atomic know-how to underdeveloped countries. In the foreseeable future the USSR can beto continue lo follow an opportunistic policy of offering atomic aid when tangible political rclurn can be expected.
t has been reported that the Soviets are ready to offer assistance lo India in the design and constructionuclear power station.
bul llie nature nnd extent of this assistance has noi been specified. The Indian Third Five Yearalls forIW felectrical) nuclear iwwer reactor of Ihc Calder Hall typewo-reactor stationW. If ihe USSR were to assist in ihis program it wouldignificant departure from the pattern of aid thus far offered to countries outside ihe bloc. InW reactor would be significantly larger than any of the power reactors Ihus far promised to the Satellites Soviet support of the ambitious Indianwould be dictated by overriding political considerations, as lt appears that the Soviet domestic atomic energy program is lagging (see
Soviet Union has continued itsof Ihe Chinese Communists ina cadre of nuclear scientists andand has furnished the Chineseresearch reactoryclotron. Aof Soviet scientists and technicianssent to China lo assist lhat countrydevelopment of its atomic energyIn addition, wc have firm evidenceSoviet-Chinese exploration ofresources.
the international atomic energy agency
Soviets have continued to givesupport to Ihe InternationalAgency (IAEA) and haveagency projects. In particular,refused lo recognize ihe necessitystandard criteria to insurematerials supplied by IAEAnations to other countries are noi usednuclear weapons. Apparency,not required safeguards as part ofbilateral agrccmcnls and profess toor no requirement for any sort ofmeasures except perhaps when veryof materials are Involved.in view of the heavy majority offor safeguards In the IAEAthe Soviets will probably agreesome form of standard safeguards
The US-USSR Agreement on Exchanges which was established In. lias resultedumber erf exchanges oland visits with nucleur aspects. Ina memorandum on cooperation was adopted by the two countries for thecj exchanges of visits and inform itiou. and ot meetings to examine the feasibility of Joint enterprises in the utilisation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes
The Soviets have been relativelyin implementing specific exchanges under this agreement, haveonsiderable number of East-West contacts at conferences and in private exchanges, and havesought entrance into atomic energyin the US. The Soviets apparently carryell-organi2od informationprogram during these exchanges The general objectives of the Soviet team which toured with Emelyanov apjieared to be the assessment of the US atomic energy research and development program in relation toinformation available in the USSR, with particular emphasis on the engineering and metallurgical aspects of both reactor and accelerator development. The team alsoa keen interest in nuclear-chemical and radio-biological research, bul much of this information was denied to them becauseimilar denial lo the American delegation in the Soviet Union. Both sides have gained information and first-hand observations of each other's nuclear energy programs.
study was approved by The United States Intelligence Board on9 in response lo specific questions as lo the possibility of covert Soviet nuclear testing, the probability of lis detection, and thetechnical gains resulting from such
I.he Soviets have been conductingplanned underground or deep spacetetli during Ihe period ol the unpotteed test moratorium, does the intelligenceassume that ice would have been able to detect these tests?
Carefully planned underground and deep-space tests could have been conducted and not delected by existing technical detection systems However, other Intelligence sources might give indlcallons of Impending nuclear tests. (See Question 2)
There Is. at present, very little US capability for detecting oruclear test In deep space.
/ not. does the intelligence community as-tume the Soviets have or have not been testing weaponsovert basis?
Since the beginning of the unpollccdfollowing the Soviet testse have observed noof Soviet nuclear testing. Wc have no clear indications from Intelligence sources of suspicious activities al their regular test siles. nor of atomic energy interest in unusualoperations, In new geographic areas having no usual connection with atomic energyor In any of the Soviei space vehicleo balance, and in view of the considerations discussed inhe Intelligence community has no reason to believe that the Soviets have been testingweaponsovert basis.
covert testing has been proceedingwhat effect might such tests haveimproving Soviet weaponsthese effects be negligible or significant?
The table below summarizes briefly, by yield class and possible test method, the improvc-
mcnla the Soviet* could possibly have achieved if they have been conducting covert nuclear testa. The term "significant" is used toimprovement In the particular device class Indicated, not for ihe over-all nuclear capability.
the "policed moratorium continuesia) tlx. (b) twelve months, orand If the Soviets continue aprogran. through this period, whatthe effects on Soviet weaponsuch effects be negligible or significant?
fa) andovert test program during the period of the next six to twelve months probably would contribute significantly to their overall nuclear weapon capability in the area of small low-yield tactical or air detente weapons, small i
or periods extending beyond the next twelve months, extensive use of decoupling or tests of larger devices in deep space (still un-proven techniques) could lend lo significantly Improved designs.
Upew hundred pound* Laboratory of inn ii'ii yield
orn of nuclear ylrW Atmospheric or underground
kmprovements Ineight wenpott* with fall-scale yields upTJ
'taclkal mpnn*Nil vu* Slpytficant
ftn to few lorn of nuclear
4 Fromfe*on* lo ubuulT of nu.lenr yield
AlnMxpherk or undrr* round
a> Underground, tneludint decoupled
V Orenter lhan nut'ear yield
bi Deep-space aboulT o( Decp-spac*
poii effect* aoMlbf* VanlfieanlIn procnUy esumatedcapability, aa well aa increased and uKcful weapon effectsThe increased confidence the dccldlni factorf
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