central intelligence agency
OFflCe" Of THE DIRECTOR
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Subject: Agreed Guidance for Implementing the Presidential Directive on Disclosures of Classified Intelligence
In his directive of0 on "Disclosures of Classified Intelligence" the President indicated that he would look to the Director of Central Intelligence to assure the Issuance of appropriate guidance to departments and agencies, as required In the Implementation of this directive.
The attached documont on "Agreed Guidance for theof the Presidential Directive on Disclosures of Classifiedeveloped pursuant to this directive, was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on Accordingly, it Is forwarded for guidance and appropriate action.
C. P. CABELL General, USAF Acting Director
Copies to: The President
Members of the United States Intelligence Board
. MAY -nru-
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Agreed Guidance for the Implementation of the Presidential Directive on Disclosures of Classified Intelligence
For the purpose of providing guidance in the implementation of the Presidential Directive, the following is agreed upon by theoard- To the extent applicable, this agreed guidance should be incorporated in any regulations or instructions issued in theof the Presidential Directive.
L. The President, in his Directive to the addressee departments and agencies concerned, expresses his concern over the serious damage caused to national security and the harm that has been done to the intelligence effort through the appearance in public information media of classified intelligence tending to reveal intelligence sources and methods. The President directs that immediate action be taken to prevent the disclosure of classified intelligence except to properly authorized recipients. Further, in summarization the President directs certain other actions that:
shall be made solely ln consonancestatutes and regulations.
procedures for controlling classifiedbe reviewed and corrective action taken wherefound.
continuing review shall be made of the dissemination
of classified intelligence to ensure that it is confined to authorized recipientstrict need-to-know basis.
appropriate Intelligence Chief shall assess thethe national security and to the intelligence sources andrelease outside of authorized channels is considered.
of classified intelligence shall be made awaredamage to intelligence sources and methods throughactions.
The President also requires the assurance of the issuance of proper guidance in the implementation of his Directive and that he be informed of developments under this Directive together with appropriate
he intent of the Presidential Directive is toreater degree of protection to all classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods and prevent unauthorized disclosures of classifiedinformation. The results desired by the President can be obtained by strict compliance with applicable controls, statutes and regulations together with careful and continuing review to ensure their adequacy. Further, the proposed disclosure of classified Intelligence outside of authorized channels shall be carefully assessed. Of special concern)ackground to this Directive, is the fact that the most damaging disclosures of classified intelligence in the past several
years have involved vital intelligence sources and methodsirect bearing on the national security. This classified intelligence has been disseminated officially in channels protected by authorized code words or project designators to those officials having anneed-to-know and properly authorized to receive such It is In this area of intelligence dissemination that greater emphasis Is needed in indoctrinating all recipients of the detrimental effects of unauthorized disclosures and the requirements for strict compliance with controls governing such Information.
This guidance is in addition to and does not supersede existing special controls governing the handling of such sensitive Intelligence as communications intelligence, code word and certain project designated intelligence. atter of policy, only under the most exceptional circumstances should classified intelligence involving sensitive sources and methods be considered for release to the public.
The guidance contained in this paper is applicable to all classified intelligence. Certain classified Intelligence, due to its sensitive nature, requires special controls. The term "sensitive intelligence" as used in this paper is defined as that classifiedwhich contains information, or which tends to reveal sources or methods, requiring special controls upon its dissemination because its disclosure could lead toeopardizing the continued productivity of Intelligence sources or methods which provide intelligence
vital to the national securityffsetting the value of intelligence vital to the national security. Sensitive intelligence within the meaning of the foregoing should be identifiedode words authorized for suchrojecthe marking "WARNING NOTICE -SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODSnythereof.
5. Departmental and agency regulations should include control and review procedures establishing the responsibility of the Intelligence Chief for the assessment of the risks to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved when dissemination of classified intelligence is contemplated outside of authorized channels, including releases to the public. Such control and review procedures should include:
a. Disclosure and Release Control:
(1)eview by intelligence authorities of any classified
intelligence proposed for declassification or for use or dip-
speeches, writings for publication, presentations, courses of instruction, press releases, formal and informal interviews with press representatives, and other aspects of publicactivities whereby intelligence sources and methods may be revealed. ecord should be maintained of any classified intelligence declassified or authorized for disclosure and
should contain the name of the individual who authorized such action.
intelligence inadvertently discussed with
or disclosed to any person or persons not authorized for access to such intelligence should beatter of record by the responsible official and reported to the appropriate Intelligence Chief.
person having knowledge of any disclosureintelligence made not in accordance with theof the regulations and controls of the departmentconcerned should promptly report it to theChief for action. Such action may includesteps as are feasible to repair or limit the extent of
the damage,equest for investigation by appropriate authorities, (c) an assessment of the possible harm tosources and methods and notification to intelligence authorities concerned and (d) prompt notification to all official recipients that an unauthorized disclosure has occurred together with advice of remedial action to be taken and guidance for responses to inquiries from public media representatives that may result from the compromise.
procedures for the control and releaseintelligence should be reviewed and revised in light
of the foregoing and should be supplemented by appropriate enforcement provisions. In particular, such procedures should include provisionsecipients of sensitive intelligence may determine whether or not individuals with whom they are in contact are authorized to receive such intelligence.
b. Disclosure and Release Techniques:
Each Intelligence Chief should establish procedures for the assessment of risks to the national security and to the intelligence sources and methods involved in any proposed dissemination of classified intelligence outside of authorized channels.
Release procedures should Include in the assessment of the risks those ways and means by which an attempt may be made to sanitize intelligence sources and methods. before classified intelligence can be sanitized effectively and sensitive sourceslausible source or sources should be available to which attribution may be made if necessary. When .this condition exists, then such devices as obscuring or qualifying source attribution by approximating figures,place names and geographical locations, approximating
the time and circumstances and altering other factors which
may be revealing of the source and method involved shoulde used.
Sensitive intelligence disclosed in official briefings and budgetary reports should be clearly identified from other information utilized in such briefings, and the recipients cautioned when appropriate, of the harmful effects to national security by disclosure of the information to unauthorized recipients. Similar measures should be employed, when appropriate in disclosing sensitive intelligence to thoseofficials who deal with public media and who cannot readily be expected to know the origin of all information with which they are dealing.
The proposed release of classified intelligence derivedoint or combined project of the intelligence community should consider the Interests of other intelligence community members participating in the intelligence project.
epartment or agency authorizes the disclosure of sensitive intelligence for any of the purposes set forth in paragraph., that department or agency is responsible to inform the other members of the USIB of that actionwith any sanitized version thereof prepared in accordance with paragraph.
6. Each department and agency shouldontinuingprogram for all recipients of classified intelligencehe damage that can accrue to intelligence sources and methods through
the Improper disclosure of such intelligence. rogram may-include wherepecific instances of known unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence involving sensitive sources andn assessment of the possible harm resulting from such disclosuresxamples of the countermeasuras that might be taken by foreign intelligence services to negate the information or the sources and methods involved.
practices for the dissemination of classified particularly sensitive intelligence, should be reviewedwhere necessary in order to ensure protection toand methods. Such should include but not be limited to:
ontinuing basis the disseminationintelligenceiew to ensuring that suchis confined to authorized recipientstrict
of intelligence. When disseminated inand similar documents, sensitive intelligence shouldto distinguish it cleanly from other Informationin such documents.
shall consider the need for additionalwell as other means to ensure the proper protection offfort.Original document.