CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Korea: Demonstrationsay at Taegu and Pus an by0 students calling for electionew national assembly suggest that the students have no intention of giving up their hard-won initiative. Constitutionalare complicating the evolutionew regime and preparation for elections.
Acting Chief of State Huh Chungfe Intention to ceasediplomacy, relax enforcement of the Rhee line, and admit Japanese newsmen to South Korea will largely meet the require-ments for progressettlement between Seoul and Tokyo. (Page 1)
Indonesia-Netherlands: The Indonesian Governmentay took its first retaliatory step against the planned cruise of Dutch naval units to Netherlands New Guinea by ordering all foreign oil companies in Indonesia to replace their Dutchwith Indonesian citizens. Their departure is likely to reduce the companies' efficiency and cause furthpr riamaw tc th*nesian ei
Morocco-France: fThe Moroccan premier hasYost that unless France shortly agrees toits Moroccan bases, Morocco may "be obliged" to takemeasures. Moroccan harassment of French facilitiescalled Portis operatedthe United States, would provide new difficulties inrelationsT}2)
UAR-Africa: The UAR is accelerating its program of assistance to various African nationalist movements, f
Pakistan: [Pakistani President Ayub apparently intends to relieve ambitious Lieutenant General Sheikh of his duties as minister of interior and to appoint him permanently to the less powerful Ministry of Food and Agriculture, which he took over on an apparently temporary basis onpril. While this move and the appointment onpril of ex-Food Minister Lieutenant General Azam to the governorship of East Pakistan reflectigh priority being given to increasing food production and progress in East Pakistan, the two assignments, which are resented by the appointees, also suggest that Ayub may bereducing the Influence of the two strongest members
of his cabinet.
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
New Demonstrations in South Korea
New peaceful demonstrationsay at Taegu and Pusan by0 South Korean students calling for the speedy electionew national assembly suggest that the students have nointention of giving up their hard-won initiative. This continuing student ferment accompanies the efforts of the Huh Chung cabinet and the incumbent National Assembly to solve the constitutional problems complicating the evolutionew regime and preparation for new elections. Although gradually relaxing martial-law restrictions, LieutenantSong Yo-chan has warned that his men would take "strict action against future demonstrations."
Some American observers have speculated that newfor the legislature will be held sometime in July, when the assembly probably will have finished amending orthe most repressive legislation of the Rhee regime. It is not yet clear whether electionsew legislature willor follow the establishmentorm of governmenta prime minister and cabinet responsible to parliament.ystem might also eliminate the popular election of the president. Undue legislative conflict and delay over theamendment of the constitution might provoke publicagainst the legislators and further aggravate political instability.
Meanwhile, Huh Chung has indicated to the Americanthat he intends to revise Rhee's hostage diplomacyJapan, relax enforcement of the "Rhee fishingnd permit Japanese newsmen to enter South Korea. Such action should largely meet Tokyo's requirement for progressettlement of outstanding issues between Seoul and Tokyo. Huh, however, must move cautiously to avoid any impression that he is making excessive concessions to Japan.
Moroccan Premier indicates intent to Press lor French Evacuation
r ocean Premier Abdullah Ibrahim has informed Ambassador Yost that unless France shortly agrees to evacuate its Moroccan bases, Morocco may "be obliged" to take "very severe" measures. Ibrahim recently protested the procedure followed when American units withdrew from two radar sites operated jointly with French forces. He demanded that the United States relinquish allthose operated Jointly withtoforces, adding that incidents are "just what wef these are necessary to get the Frenchenewed protests are likely when American forces installedrench base in Rabat are with-drawnj
(Ambassador Yost comments that Ibrahim appears to be aware that he is about to be replaced and may plan, when out of power, to lead Moroccan leftistsfrontal assault" on all Moroccan ties with the West. The King, however, still hesitates to replace the present government?]
harassment of French operations at the naval airat Kenitra--formerly Port Lyautey--which are operated in conjunction with the US, would pose new problems in US-Moroccan relations. The French Air Force is considering transferring its command functions and personnel from Rabat to Kenitra.ove might provoke Moroccan leftists to attempt to blockade the base."^
UAR Increases Aid to African Nationalists
The UAR is intensifying its efforts to influenceleaders in the emerging states of Africa.^
The UAR is using the current Afro-Asian Economicin Cairo as another vehicle for influencing African nationalists and, in particular, for warning against Israeli efforts to bolster economic and political contacts in the area. Nasir's opening address to the conference went to some length to picture Israel as an "imperialist spearhead" whose expenses are paid by "countries which want Israel to establish new zones of Influence for them in the newly, independent states."
3 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Pakistani Cabinet Shifts May Hurt Governments
Prestige and Authority
(Pakistani President Ayub apparently intends to relieveLieutenant General Sheikh of his duties as minister of interiorew weeks and appoint him permanently to the lessMinistry of Food and Agriculture, which he took over on antemporary basis onpril. Sheikh says that he hasthe intended shift but that Ayub insists on the grounds that heoan of Sheikh's strength in this key economic ministry. Lieutenant General Azam Khan, generally regarded as AyubB right-hand man, vacated the top post in the Ministry of Food when Ayub appointed him governor of East Pakistan on II AprilT)
(Both men are unhappy with their new assignments. Azam was apparently eager to push ahead with his crash program" to increase food production and reportedly tried to decline the governorship. In addition, he probably viewed his departure from Rawalpindi as asince it removed him from both the military and political center of power. Sheikh has been frequently mentioned in rumors circulated by opponents of the regime as eager to increase his own power even at the expense of President Ayub, and he may feel keenly his loss of control over Pakistan's police forces, which are under the Ministry of Interior;)
(While the changes demonstrate the importance Ayub attaches to the problems of food production and the administration of Eastthe simultaneous reduction of the influence of the twomen in the Ayub cabinet suggests that Ayub may be at least partly interested in consolidating his paramount position in the government. The re assignments could weaken the appearance of governmentand internal harmony, which Ayub has hitherto managed toto the Pakistani public. In addition, the change in the Food andistrv. the third in four months, may slow down the food program'
THE PRESIDENT The Vice President
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