Created: 6/21/1960

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


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TAe foUcntmg Intelligence organizations participated tn (ft* pre?arafton of (AtJ estimate: Th* Central Intelligencehe National Security Agency, and the Intelligence organtza-ttona of the Departments ol State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The. Joint Staff. Defense, and the Atotnsc-

Concurred In

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARDV -ononcurring were The. Directorence.and Research. Department othe "Assistant

CMe/;'o/ 5tar-/or.Jfiteatoe^.De^meTii(Ac ^uljjQJil Chiefaval Operations for. Jwrtmento/ (Actfapy; (Ac. disiitartftaff,SAPtyhe Director for InteUigehcc.The 'Join

Dtrectw.of thehc'yAsSiSt^iipiTCGtorftF

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, DSAF, for the ^Department of the Air:


intelligence. Joint V'"'

f Director of Intelligence, AEC.for the Atornic Energy

- Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of

ssistant to the Secretaryof Defense, Specml Operations, for the Department

of the NSA, for the National Security Agency

. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department Agency

his copy may be retained, of destroyed by burning in accordance regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement toe Office of Central Reference,

an estimate is cusseroinated overseas, the overseas recipients may retaina period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should

ither be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested "ijjri of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with2

title of this estimate, when used separately from the text, should beV.

top cnoftay




This estimate consists of an updating of those subjects in9 about whichnew information has become available, and whichestatement, it Includes topics under the following main headings from

The Soviet Nuclear Reactor Program

The Soviet Nuclear Materials Program

The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Program

Possible Soviet Allocations of Fissionable Materials to Weapon Stockpiles The Soviet International Atomic Aid and Exchange Program

The reader should refer to9 for Lnformatloc on the following portions of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program: Organization; General Technical Capabilities; Controlled Thermonuclear Reactions; ProducUon of Uranium Metal. Lithium. Heavy. and Tritium; Nuclear Weapon Proving Grounds and Test Program; Atomic Energy Detection System; and Economic Aspects.

This estimate was prepared and agreed upon by Uic Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee which is composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force, the Atomic Energy Commission. Thc Joint Staff, thc National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Sec appropriate footnotes, however, for dissenting views. The FBI abstained, Uie subject being outside of its JurtsdicUon.

The estimate, with footnotes, was approved by Uie United States Intelligence Board on







Power Reactors .

Nuclear Propulsion Systems for Naval and Marine Vessels .

. Reactor Systems for Aircrall, Missiles, and Space Vehicles .

Nuclear Propulsion for Land

Nuclear Electrical Propulsion Systems for Space Applications

Nuclear Auxiliary (Non-propulsion) Power


Soviet Uranium Ore

Plutonium Equivalent


Nuclear Weapon Research and

Fabrication and

Weapon Development




table of illustrations


1able 2

Table 3

able 4

Table 5

Research Reactors and Reactor Experiment* Map-Nuclear Electric Power Reactoraces

Soviet Nuclear Power Stations

Estimated Soviet Bloc Recoverable Equivalent Uranium Metal Production

Nuclear Materials Production

Estimated Soviet Fissionable Materials Production

Evaluation of Soviet Nuclear Tests


S 18



the soviet atomic energy program


To review significant recent developments in Uie USSR's atomic energy program and to estimate the probable future course of that program to


n updatinge havedelays in the estimated Sovietpower reactor program andnew information into our estimates of the Soviets' nuclear propulsionand of their nuclear weaponWe have reduced our estimate ofroductione believe that theof Soviet plutonlum production based on information on known sites rep-

'Tne Director for Intelligence, Tbe Joint stuff does not agree that Uie most Ukely value of Soviet cumulative plutonlum equivalentthroughhat based on altc data. Instead he believesjusUflcatlon exists to warrant considering the uranium ore-baaed estimate of plutonlum equivalent aa an equally likely value. Thisaaed on the following:

a. Tbe marked difference between theamounts of uranium ore procured and processed and Uie smaller amount required for the site-baaed estimate of plutonlum equivalent productionoupled with Uie notation that thl. difference woulda IV, year stockpile of ore plus pipeline resents thc most likely value for current cumulativeur estimate of Soviet plutonium producUon, at least throughs significantly lower than thatear ago. However, certain factors indicate that Sovietequivalent production could be considerably higher and any planning should give serious consideration to the alternate estimate based on orepresented herein. Table 4the probable estimate and an alter-

and tocalwhich la not considered (he most reasonable. (Paragraphs S3

possibility thai plutonlum laat nn unldenUfled site.

ludgemcnt that calculatedreactor capacities at Kyshtymare not Inconsistent with avalue about Uric* as largeas the site based estimate.and OS)

possibility that Angarsk may

unknown status of Uie facilitiespreviously estimated as aproducing and chemical

nativen addition, we have modified our estimate of future Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities in view of the continuing moratorium, revised our allocations of fissionable materials to weapon stockpiles, andiscussion of US-USSR exchanges in the atomic energy field.


Power Reactors. It is apparent that the USSR will fall far short oflectrical megawatt nuclearcapacity originally projected0 in Uie Sixth Five-Year Plan. After considering the delays the Soviets have experienced in both research and power reactor programs, we now estimate that Uie USSR will have onlyegawatts of nuclear generating capacity installed by

Naval and Marine Nuclear Propulsion Systems. The ice-breaker LENIN was commissioned in December9 and is expected to operate In the Arctic in Uie summerhere have been increasing numbers of reports that the Soviets arcumber of

'Theani. Chief of Naval OperaUons. Department of the Nat/ considers Uie alternative estimate based on ore availability lo be too tenuous and hypothetical for useful guidance He believes, therefore, mat thequanUty of uranium ore procured and mined by the USSR Isuitable parameter for estimating plutonlum production. TheChief of Naval Operatlonaepartment of Uie Navy, rccognlxos Uie fact that esUmated Soviet uranium ore acquiredf that used in producing Uie amount of plutonlum estimated from site data amountstockpile of several yean. He believestockpile to be normally consistent withSoviet stockpiling practice* with Uiequality of Uie uranium deposits in the USSR, and with delays and cutback* in their nuclear power program. lie would therefore omit from0 the uruiilum-basedequivalent estimate.

nuclear submarines, but we have no firm evidence that any are in operationalased on Uie status of Soviettechnology, we estimate that7 was Uie earliest dateuclear propulsion reactorubmarine could have been available, and that at least one Soviet nuclear submarine could have beenrial status by Uie end

Reactor Systems for Aircraft. Ourindicates that Uie Soviets are attempting to produce an aircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP) system, but we have not determined the exact systems under development. We estimate that Uicare now capable ofuclear testbed with at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrusthase of the flight.uch acould lead to an ANP systemfor cruise on nuclear heat aloneubsonic aircraft of marginalWe believeuclearunitirst subsonic aircraft with substantially improved performance could be available by sometimeupersonic applications of ANP woulda long test and developmentand we do not believe that awill be achieved during Uie period of this estimate.

Reactor Systems for Rockets andWe believe that the USSR is now conducting researchuclear rocket engine, and that the Soviets coulda first static test firingrototype system possibly as earlyhile there is evidence of Soviet researchto nuclear ramjets, we believe that Uie complexity of the problem makes it unlikely that the Soviets will flightuclear ramjet during the period


this estimate, although such flight testing; is possible.


Uranium Ore. Recent informationthat the Soviets have matched many mining and ore concentration methods used in the US. and thatmining and ore concentration within the Soviet Bloc continuedodest ratee estimate that by the end9etric tons of recoverableuranium metal would have been available to the Soviets and thatetric tons will have beenby the end4 (Table. As in previous years, these amounts are in excess of the recoverableuranium metal required to support our current estimate of fissionableproduction.

wo large gaseousplants have been positivelyin the USSR, one at Verkh-Ncyvinsk. the other at Tomsk. We estimaterobable third plant started operating recently at Angarsk. We also believe that no other large Soviet gaseous diffusion plant exists.

We now estimate that the Soviets will have produced the equivalent0 kg ofynd that the cumulative total will havetog byTable. These valuesa reduction ofrom those we estimated inhis reduction results primarilyirmer estimate of the electric power use at the first two gaseous diffusion plants. The actual production could range%% of the mid-

airly good confidence level can be assigned% error range for theeaningful margin of errorbe assigned.'

lutonium Equivalent' While we have identified major facilities forproduction at Kyshtym and near Tomsk, we now believe, in contrast to our previous estimates, that the atomic energy site near Krasnoyarsk probably docs not produce plutonium.of all available information on the identified sites, and of the continuing very large excess of ore being procuredite-based estimate is assumed, has led us to revise our previous plutoniumestimates.

e estimate that the most likely value of Soviet cumulative plutonium equivalent production throughs that based on the available siteHowever, in view of the largeSoviet ore supply, wc believe that any planning should also give serious con-

order to accept the fill mite ol SovietrodueUon (Tablehe Assistant Chief of Natal OperaUonse-jrartment of the Navy, finds that he would have lo accept ma|or factors of Soviet capability which are ln his opinion not sufnclenUy sap-ported by available evidence. These factors(a) inlUal operation dates of theplants, (b) power consumption, and (c) useew dirfuslon technology and newHowever, he believes that Improvements in Soviet basic technology and plant efficiency have been Incorporated in the plants Installed

The Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUonsDepartment of the Navy, believes that the lower limits of the estimated values for the cumutaUve production, although high, are the more nearly correct.

term plutoniumsed to cover all reactor products, such as plulonlum.J. polonium, etc.

' Kor the view of Ihe Director for Intelligence, The Jolnl Staff, see fooLnotcage I.



on Oil IIT

to the possibility of higher plutonium equivalent production values. Wo have, therefore, presented onestimate based on what we wouldtoore reasonable, although not complete, utilization of the estimated Soviet uranium ore than that indicated by the site data. Tablethe probable estimate and anestimate.*

is very unlikely that actualSoviet plutonium production asis moreelowvalues, or much greatergiven by the ore-basedno meaningful error rangesassigned tostimates,that the more likely futureSoviet plutonium production maythe two estimates, and maythe upper values given inlor the latter part of the


and Stockpiling.have confirmed our previousthat the installation at Sarovamain nuclear weapon researchcenter. They alsonuclear weapon fabricationsites are located in theNizhnyaya Tura and possibly atWe have also conflrmedew additional operationalweapon storage sites at airfields of

' For the view ol the Assistant Chlel ol Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy, sec footnoteage 2.

'The Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUonsDepartment of the Navy, believes that more likely future values of Sovietproduction will conUnue. as In the past, to lie near the valucsMn the site-based estimate the Long Range Aviationhile we have no firm evidence of operational nuclearstorage facilities except at LRA basesew naval airfields, wc continue to estimate that suchare available to the Soviet tactical and naval aviation, to the naval surface forces, and to the ground forces.

Weapon Development. Furtherof the data from the Soviet nuclear test series conducted in the fall8 has led to only rninor changes in our estimate of present Soviet weaponHowever, we now estimate that only marginal improvements will be made in future weapons unless and untiltesting is resumed. We do not believe that the Soviets will stockpile nuclear weapons of radically new designs without nuclear testing, and we have no evidence that any Soviet nuclear tests have been conducted sincelthough covert tests could have been conducted."

Wo estimate that the Soviets have available suitable weapon types to meet their present basic requirements. On the basis of test data alone, these range from fission devices yielding1 KT to thermonuclear devices yieldingT.


believe that the long-rangeforces have been given theof fissionable materials.that at present thestockpile can support massive

' For the likelihood of Soviet evasion ol aand the possible gains from such evasion, seeo0 and StfDJ(SECRET)



attacks against targets in North America and Eurasia by the long-range striking forces estimated in. The size and nature of the materials stockpile imposes limitations on the numbers of weapons available for other air, ground, and naval operations. However, we consider it unlikely that the availability of fissionable materials for nuclear weaponsactor which in itself significantly limits Soviet policy (sec Figureabular Summary ofWeapon Stockpiles,nd

*Pw the views of the Assistant Chief of Staff rot Intelligence. Department ot the Army and the Assistant Chief oferatIonsDepartment of Uie Navy, see

e haveonsiderable growth in the Soviet fissionable materials stockpile byhich should keep pace with the estimated growth in Soviet missile capabilities for long-range attack, and also ease the limitations noted above.


During the past year the USSR has concluded bilateral atomic aidwith North Korea, Iraq, andAs with previous agreements, the Soviets have shown no haste in fulfilling commitments, and appear to betheir policy of offering atomic aid only when tangible political return can be expected.

A number of exchanges and visits with nuclear aspects have resulted from the over-all US-USSR Agreement onand the memorandum ofregarding atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The Soviets have been relatively cooperative inspecific exchanges and apparently carryell-organized information and collection program during these exchanges. However, both sides have gained Information and first-handon each other's nuclear energy program.



In updatinge haveiscussion of US-USSR exchanges In the atomic energy field, revised our estimates of the Soviet nuclear power reactor program to reflect the delays experienced, andnew information into our estimate on Soviet nuclear propulsion applications.

New inf orrnatlon has led us to increase our estimate of the uranium ore available to the Soviets, to decrease our estimateby. and to con-clude that site data provide the most likely estimate of plutonium equivalent production to date, but has led us to Include anhigher estimate of plutonium production.

Recent reports have added sigrtihcantly to our understanding of the Soviet faculties for nuclear weapon research and development, fabrication, and storage. However, we are still unable to confirm the existence ofnuclear weapon storage facilities except at long Range Aviation bases ond certain naval airfields.

Further analysis of the data from thenuclear test series in the fall8 has not required major revisions in our estimate of present Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities. However, the continued moratorium onand tho uncertainties as to whether limited or unlimited testing will ever resume have required us to modify the estimate of


Soviet nuclear weapon capabilitiesin

believe that at present thestockpile can support massiveagainst targets In North Americaby the long-range striking forcesin, but that the sizeof the materials stockpile Imposeson the numbers of weaponsother air. ground, and naral operations


are presentlyeactorsthe USSR for research purposes, andidentified two more which are0 (Tableagethere was considerableonths) between the actualand the date of operation for eachat8 Geneva ConferencePeaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.for experimental facuities wereby engineering difficulties withof the primary system,In planning cannot bespecial Importance was the fact thatfast reactor,id notfull design powerver one year afterelay indicates thatexperienced with this sodium-cooledThe pulsed reactor to be installedJoint Institute of Nuclear Researchwill not become operationalear behind schedule.


Is apparent that the USSR will fallof the nuclear power objectivesthe Sixth Five-Year Plan. Thisfor the installationmegawatts of nuclear generatingby the endut the Sovietsthey have reduced the nuclearfor economic reasons and this claim

1 seems reasonable.

his program will be centered around the types of reactors under construction at



Beloyarsk and Voronezh and the fourreactors at Ul'yanovsk. The Beloyarsk and Voronezh stations shouldotalW of electricity while the Ul'yanovsk reactors are expected to generate about anlectrical megawattse estimate, therefore, that the USSR will have0 megawatts of nuclearcapacity Installed byhehave repeatedly emphasized that they will not select future large power reactors until they have obtained sufficient operatingwith the reactors now underlo select the reactor system meriting further development. The locations and dates of operation of the nuclear-electric powerare Indicated innd Table 2.

estimate that tlie total reactorrequired for the above nuclearprogram5 willilograms of plutoniumof which may not be used for weaponTills production will consumekg of equivalent top


Soviet Union has exhibited aIn nuclear propulsion for severalmerchant vessels and submarines.

nuclear powered icebreaker,commissioned ln9 and isto operate in tbe Arctic0 if reported operationalare overcome. Thesystem of the LENIN was viewedtimes by US scientists who reportedis adequate but that it did notadvances. Until sufficientexperience is obtained withetailed analysis, the USSRplan to construct any of the nuclearships announced In the past.

have been an Increasing numberwhich Indicate that Uic USSR Isnuclear submarines atKomsomolsk. In addition, two highofficials have stated that the USSR has

nuclear submarines. However, wc have no evidence that any arc In operational status. We estimate, based on the status ot Soviet reactor technology, that7 was the earliest dateuclear propulsion reactorubmarine could have been available lor installation, and that the Soviets could have had at least one nuclear submarinerial status by the end

c. All Soviet nuclear-propelled3 will probably utilize pressurized water reactors with enriched fuel.3 the Soviets might use other types of propulsion reactors.


horough survey of theand current Soviet research indicates that the Soviets are engaged in an effort to produce some type of aircraft nuclearsystem. We have not determined the exact type of aircraft nuclear propulsion (ANP) system under development. Thehave been active In the development of beryllium oxide for nuclear applications7owever, recent information Indicates that beryllium oxide for fuel element uses Is gaming disfavor because of poorproperties. Work with othercould lead to other approaches to the problem. The Soviets have been activelyIn the development of nickel base alloysnd their capabilities to use Nlchromeuel element material are quite high.7 the USSR has becomeactive in the development of chrome base alloys.

a. Wc estimate that the Soviets are nowoflying tcslbed airborne with at least one nuclear power unit providing usefulhase of the flight.2rogram could be expected to lead to an ANP system suitable for cruise on nuclear heat aloneubsonic aircraft of marginal performance.

1 b. An alternate development based on anroved fuel element could lead, by sometimeuclear propulsion unit for a


first subsonic aircraft with substantiallyperformance.

c. Supersonic application of ANP woulda long test and development program and we do not expectrototype will be achieved during the period of this estimate.

Ramjets. An examination of Sovietindicates that, in addition to feasibility studies on nuclear ramjets, they havea very comprehensive mathematical analysis of Inlets, dlffusers and exhaust nozzles that could be applicable to bothand chemical systems. There is also evidence of metallurgical research which could be applieduclear ramjet program as well as to several other high temperature reactor applications. We believe that the complexity of the nuclear ramjet problem mikes itthat the Soviets willuclear ram-Jet enginelight test status during the period of this estimate, although such flight testing is possible.

Rockets. Wc estimate that the Soviet Union is at this time engaged in researchuclear rocket engine. Their research in high-temperature refractory compounds, high neutron flux reactor facilities, andcontainment vessels for reactor cores would giveevelopment capability in this field. Based on the present status of applicable research facility construction and metallurgical research, wc estimate that the Soviets couldirst static test firingrototype system possibly as early5


is no evidenceormalfor land vehicle propulsion is4 Soviet scientists andhave discussed In the popularJournals, and books thenuclear propulsion for land vehiclesalluded to the existence of aVehicles mentioned tn theseas having nuclear propulsioninclude railway locomotives,for cross-country hauling,mong the reactorstudy by the Soviets which are poten

Table 1




Fuitov Pita



RPT (rebuilt) VVR-2

rtbullt) WR-fl


Moscow, Inst, of Al

Moscow, Tbermo-teeh. Laboratory

Moscow, Thcemo-teeh. Lebore-torr

Moscow. Inst, ol AE

sl. of AE

Moscow, Inst, of AE

Moscow, Inst, of AE

Moscow, Moscow Stale University

Moscow, last, of AE









Heavy Water

ons ofU

g ofU

270 kg of U

gnriched U

Graphite and Water


Graphite Water aad Water





gn-rlehed U



gn- Water riehedU

lO" gn- Water






Similar to US CP-I, served as prototype (or 1st Sovietreactor.9 Prototype for Sovietprod action reader*

renieal channel* S3! channel*

3 Full power. Five In-plleiquid metal cooled. ertical channels.

Reconstruction accomplished during normal shut-downs. Now oopseal channels.

ank-type reactor designed for testing of ehleldlngand configurations

oworizontal channels withertical channels,neutroa multiplier" (spentneataanko reactor).

eak-type,orizontal ehannals. Supplied to Rumania,Cieehoelovakla, E. Germany, Poland and Egypt.

7 Swimming-pool prototype foe use la universities and lasts.

W Teraton,in be built laMinsk, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk and Riga.







2 S



. 1


5 2-



o I



Nuclear Poire; Station!











SO toca Ol nataul


reactor inIn

Graphite-Moderated, Wnler-CooJed.Tube Co-

torn ol UftU metal

at of4 at cod


nuperheat Eat. iehsd-ule: !tt

Water-Moderated. Water-Coolcd,Vowel


ton*% UO, andons ol



-Hoy clad fuel Clemen la.

UCetal equivalent}



Ui'y anorak

aa Voronezh 1 Or&pblio-Moder-ated, WaUr-Cooied, Pressure Tube Coo-nguraUon

I Package Power, Water-Mode rated. Water-Cooled. Prea-aure Vessel

I Boiling Water

g of 03


3 First Soviet nuclear

power station.oferi,a well na power production,

2 Will be astern Med for

testing atprobablyanother Sane type fuel element

oa large PWft'a.



adaptable to land vehicle propulsion are the pressurized water, homogeneous, and liquid-metal cooled reactors. Small, compact power reactors, an announced Sovietobjective, would be particularlylor land propulsion purposes


Electric propulsion using nuclear energy sources ofTers the possibility forow thrust, high specific Impulse systemfor outer space and Inlcr-orbitalalthough such systems would be useless for takeoff.

Although the Soviets have showninterest in electrical propulsionno positive Identification of associated personnel and institutes has been made to date. However, since much of the basic mag-neto-hydrodynamic research is common to both the controlled fusion and the electric propulsion programs, it is logical to assume that fusion research organizations could also be associated with electric propulsion research.

The Soviets arc estimated to have theto pursue an extensive researchdirected toward electric propulsionbut the extreme complexity of theproblems precludes the development of an operating prototype electric propulsionuntil well


have no evidence that the Sovietsnuclear heat sources forsupplier in their space program,their outstanding work tn theof thermoelectric materials has beenBased on their capabilitiestechnology, ln the utilization ofand in thermocoupleestimate that the Soviets can developheat sources for auxiliary powerfor use in missiles and spaceany time during the period of this estimate.

This Includes ionic, plasms, and magnetohjdro-dinamk propulsion



e now estimate that by the end9 the Soviet Union hadumulative total ofetric tons ofuranium. (Tabic) Uranium mining and ore concentration within theBloc continued to expandodest rateithin recent years the annual production of ore concentrates has beenthousand tons greater than our estimate of Soviet nuclear energy program needs.

he most significant trend ln the satellites was the continuing shift in East Oerman mining operations from the largely depleted vein-type Saxony ores to the sedimentary-type Thuringiaew concentration plant is being built at Seelingstadt which will use modern ion-exchange recovery methods and possiblyally capacity0 tons. East German uranium production isexpected to increase gradually In the next five years. Reportsewplant being built near Porubka in eastern Czechoslovakia also indicate that uranium ore production Islanned modest increase there. While Poland discontinued shipment of ore to USSRulgaria. Hungary and Rumania are estimated to have supplied the USSR with several thousand tons of recoverable equivalent uranium metal9 and to continue to do solightlyrate during the next five years.

An increasing amount of evidence on the Chinese Peoples Republic uraniumprogram suggestsair-sized uranium raw materials base has beenHowever, wo now believe that uranium mined in China is meant to supply the Chinese nuclear energy program and is not intended for shipment to the USSR.

In the USSR, the Krlroy Rog district in the Ukraine Is now estimated to be the leading uranium producer. The Fergana Valley in Central Asia is believed to be the second largest producing area followed by the Frunze-Lake Issyk-Kul' district and the Pyatigorsk district



the northern Caucasus. 9 visit to the Krlvoy Rog area by thc McCone partyefector's report on thc ore concentration facilities In the area have supplied information Indicating that yearly uranium producUon la on the order0 metric tons of equivalent uranium metal. The Information altothat uranium mining and ore concen-traUon began as early8 and by1 exceeded that of the Fergana Valley. We believe thc new Information on Krlvoy Hog makes this portion of our estimate quite firm. Excellent6 and8 military attache photography of the Pyatigorsk plant In the northern Caucasus leadsairly firmof production from this area. received on thc other uranium mining sites has been more limited, but it doesthat the Soviets' domestic uraniumand ore concentration programodest pace. It also demonstrates that the Soviets have been able to extract uraniumariety of deposits Including veins, sandstones, oil-shales, limestones and sub-bllumlnous coals. The last typeignificant percentage of uranium to theirond Us use demonstrates an ability toype of deposit largely ignored In the western world. The Soviets have matched manyand ore concentration methods used in the US; and their recovery of uranium from coals, as well as from Krivoy Hog iron ore

slags, Indicates native developments requiring considerable engineering capability.

he Soviet Bloc Is estimated to haveof atons of recoverable equivalent uranium metal present in deposits similar in nature to those now mined. Of Uie known deposits being worked only the Thurin-gla deposit in East Germany and Uic Krlvoy llog deposit have apparent reserves matching many uranium mining districts of Uie western world. Nevertheless, the Soviet exploitaUon of numerous small reserve deposits hasand can continue to supply, all tho uranium required in the Soviet nuclear energy program. Present mining and ore concen-traUon costs are high, but this situaUon can be altered quickly by Uie discovery of one or more large reserve deposits similar to the Ambrosia Lake deposit in New Mexico or Uie Wind River deposit in Canada. Thcofnd seems excellent due to the geological diversity of the USSR.

he rate of future expansion of uranium production in Uie Soviet Bloc is estimated toetric tons of recoverable equivalent uraniumear. At thisetric tons of equivalent uranium metal will have been available to the USSRTableills figure is subject to large margins of error, however, since actual production will depend upon Soviet policies and plans.


est!mated soviet bloc recoverable equivalent uranium metal production


[McUic Tout. round-))



Basis Forroduction

operating gaseous diffusionplants have lieen positivelyin the USSR, one at Verkh-Neyvinsk inthe other north of Tomsk inA thirdstimated tooperating recently near Angarsk inBaykal area (Fig 2) We believef

Jthat no other large gaseouslant exists.roduction by ultra-centrifuge or other methods is unlikely.

the past year considerablyinformation has ledeductionestimate of the electric power used bytwo gaseous diffusion plants.f

lAn additional delay in providing more power Tor Verkh-Neyvlnsk from Verkhne Tagil has also become apparent. The first ofW generators at Verkhne Tagil was originally scheduled, according to Soviet press reports, to begin operationut in9 it appeared that this generator would not become operational until late

]The installationew barrier Is consistent with this information Installationew barrier would permit increased efficiency in electric power utiltra-Uon and an Increase In production without an increase In plant area.

c liaveoderate rate ofin production capacityhis assumption is based on the indicatedat Verkh-Neyvinskhe assumption that Tomsk will expand5 to the size of Verkh-Neyvinsk. and thethat Angarsk will reach equal sizeo additional increase In plant efii-riency is forecast for this period, thoughbarrier improvement Is certainlyAlthough possible, no expansion6 has been included In the production we calculated

ur estimate oftabulated below (Tablen of cumulative production ofage ontent. It includes

45of materials produced al lesser cn-

Margins of Error

t Li very unlikely that actualroduction lies%f0 kg value estimated for

ur estimate ofn therogram is subject to wide margins of error, especially as Soviet intentions for thc period6 arenot yet formulated.airly good confidence level can be assignedrror range for the estimatedumulative producUon. Thereafter, amargin ot error cannot be assigned.


Major facilities for Lhe producUon ofhave been IdenUfled near Kyshtym in Uie Urals and north of Tomsk In central Siberia.lutonium producUonmay exist at other localities, but none have been identified to date. It Is believed unlikely that they would have remainedhad they started producing more than five years ago.

Detailed study during the past year of all available information relevant to the large unexplained atomic energy site nearin central Siberia has led us to believe now that it probably docs not produceNo oUier suspect early plutonium producUon site has been IdenUfled hi this general


" In order to accept Uie estimate of SovietroducUon (Tableie Assistant Chief oferaUoni (InteUigence),of Uie Nary, nnds that be would have lo accept major factors of soviet capability which are In his opinion not sufficientlyby available evidence. These factors in-

.olude: (al InlUal opera Uon dates of theplants lb) power consumption, and (c) useew diffusion technology and newHowever, he believe In Soviet basic technology have been Incorporated In0

The Assistant Chief at Naval OperaUonsDepartment of the Navy, believes that Uie lower limits of tho estimated values for the cumulaUvo production. although high, are Uie more nearly correct.

Estimates can bo made for Uie reactor capacities In Kyshtym and Tomsk on the basis of site data. These estimates arcwith an orderly plutonlumprogram with small annual Increments. However. Uie actual reactor capacity could be as much as twice this esUmate.

Moreover, the continuing discrepancythc estimated amounts ot uranium ore procured and processed and the much smaller amounts required for the estimated quanUUesnd plutoniumas based on Uie site data cannot be explained without making Uic assumption that the Soviets have deliberatelya large stockpile of uranium feed material.

The USSR normally maintains large state reserveside variety of strategic materials which areigh priority necessity. However, wc lack specific informaUoneither Uic existenceranium stateor of Uie magnitude of state reserves of comparable strategic materials. The surplus Indicated by the above comparison of uranium production with that required by the site-based fissionable material producUon estimate is equivalent to all ore mined during thethree and one-half years after making allowance for pipelines and local reserves. On the other hand, there Is recent evidence ofoperations which. If generally adopted, would make more economical use of uranium and would create even further imbalancesour estimates of ore producUon and site data based plutonlum equivalentAt the same time, the procurement of about half the uranium, or most of thofrom non-USSB sources, could bethrough mrcrexploiUUon to pre-empt these sources.

We estimate that the most likely value of Soviet cumulative plutonium equivalentthroughs that based


term plutonlum equivalent ts used to cover all reactor products, such as plutonlum,. polonium, etc

P fif-

siteowever, tn view of the largeSoviet ore supply, we believe that any planning should also give seriousto the possibility of higher plutonium equivalent production values. We liavcpresented an alternative estimate based on what we would consider toorealthough not complete, utilisation of the estimated Soviet uranium ore than that indicated by the site data. Thevalues would require that the Soviets have an unknown third site or the maximumreactor capacity available at known sites.resents the probable estimate and an alternative estimate."

Future Plutonium Production

SS. The site-based cumulative estimate has been extrapolated to later years by adding estimated production from currently known expansion of facilities throughnd thereafterg. per year In each year to account for construction of the planned dual-purpose reactors and for power

" For the view of the Director for Intelllcenee The

Joint staff, tee footnote I, pageThe Annum Cruef of Naval OperaUonsepartment of tbe Navy, considers the allernaUve estimate baaed on ore availability to be loo tenuous and hypothetical for useful guidance, lie bebevea, therefore. Uiat IheQuanUty of uranium ore procured and mined by theuitable parameter for eaUmatlng plutonium produeUon. TheChief of Naval OperaUonsepartment of the Navy, rreognixes the fact that estimated Soviet uranium ore acquired in excess or Uial used In producing the amount of plutonium estimated from site data amountstockpileeveral years He believestockpile to be normally consistent withSonet stockpiling practices, with thequality of Uic uranium deposits In the USSR, and with delays and cutbacks In their- nuclear power program. He wouldomit fromhe uranium.based plutonium equivalent estimate.

level Increases.5 no additions arc assumed, although they are well within the Soviets' capabilities. The alternativecumulative plutonium production estimate has been extrapolatedimilar basis.

f thereecently constructedreactor site, wc woulduch more rapid increase In Soviet plutonium equivalent production than that assumed In our extrapolation ol the site-based estimate Further, it Is within the Soviets' capabilities to make greater yearly additions duringeriod than wc have assumed. In view of the strong incentives for the USSR to Increase fissionable material production and to increase utilisation of available uranium, we believe the more likely future values may lie between the two estimates and maythe upper values In the latter part of this period."

Margins of Error

J While uranium is available to support much larger estimates, actual production values much greater than those given by the uranium-based estimate become Increasingly improbable even when allowances are madearge undetected site. No meaningful error can be assigned tostimates Actual future production will depend on Soviet plans and policies, particularly thosethe stockpiling of small-yield tactical and air defense weapons.

-The Assistant Chief ot Naval OperationsDepartment of Uic Navy, believes that iho more likely future values of Soviet Plutonium produeUon will continue, as In the past, to lie near the values in the site-based estimate.

ESTIMATLD KOVIttT I' i TEUIAI'KOIIUCTlONj (Cumulative Production':

PlutoniumTheara naniHrrcd tomo- likelyTW moreutureIk tdira tho tro values, andIhe uranium-based values dm in*part of tho period.)

A villi Mr foJ

Mil Year


oe tbe uiicouiiittns and range* of error InaUmeUa.

Production of leaa-highly enriched uranium la included aa equivalent quantitie*

Non-weapon use* of plutonium are cipeeted to be negligible daring the period or thia estimate.

For Ihe view of the AsnsUbI Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy on cumulative

roduction and plutonium equivalent production see footnote II.ndTbe Director for Intelligence, The Joint Sul does not agree thai the moot likely valae of Soviet eomulaUve ploto-niam oquivelnit production througha that baaed oo nite data. Instead he betkevea auhV csonti evils U> narrant eorxidertug Uie uranium ore-based cellmaLe of plutonium equivalent ai an equally likely value. This view is based oa tbe following:

a_ The marked difference between tho estimated amounts of uranium ore. procured and processed and the smaller amount required for the site-baaed cellmate of plutonlum equivalent productionoupled wilh the notation that this diflerenee wouldM rear stockpile of ore plus pipeUne and localall on wbHb la not considered the moat reaooualile. (Paragraphs S3.

b. Tbo poanbility that plutonlum Is produced at an unidentified aite. .

a. The judgment thai calculated naiimum possible reactor eapadtien a* Kythtym aad Torosa are not IIssteatlutoniumue about twice asg). (Paragraphs. d Tho peaaibdity that Angaria mav peodur* plutonium- .

e. The unknown status of tho laefliUee at Kraanoyarsh previously eat!matedlutoDiun producing and cnemloal separatum si to. .



The Soviet nuclear weapon program has undoubtedly been supported by research con-ductedumber of institutes andIn tlie USSR, particularly the Institute of Atomic Energy of the Academy of Sciences (formerly Laboratoryoscow.

The main Soviet center specificallywith nuclear weapon research,and design is located at Sarovaf

iles east of Moscowuringeriod, thewas composedumber of secure compounds dispersedoodedzonequare miles ln area. The various compounds Included laboratory-type buildings, machine shops, aninstallation which shipped out aunder heavy security, and at least one high explosive test facility. High-quality technical personnel worked In the restricted area, and frequent explosions were heard in the vicinity.

are Indications that the Sarovahas been active in the Sovietprogram since atdevices were probably assembled herepersonnel from the center wereintimately concerned with thetesting at the SemlpalatinskNovaya Zemlya, and other test areas.


have been Indicationsarge industrial installationtheUrals is in vol red in some way inatomic energy program Recentindicates that this installation Iswith the fabrication and stockpilingweapons (Fig.he complexseveral factory areas, one ofprocesses explosives; several areas

containing partly-buried buildings; and one arearansformer yard and cooling lower.

A large thermoelectric power plant near the old town of NIzhnyaya Tura probably went into operation earlylthough most of the power generated is exported southward, we believe that the atomic energy Installation at NIzhnyaya Tura commenced operations at about the same time that large amounts of electric power became available locally.

A second nuclear weapon fabrication and stockpile complex may be located Ine are uncertain as to the date of initial operation of this complex, but It apparently was constructedater date than the NIzhnyaya Tura Installation.

he general Urals regionarge number of atomic energy enterprises which1 would have been able to provide tlie NIzhnyaya Tura and Yuryusan plants with the materials necessary for theof nuclearrom Verkh-Neyvinsk, uranium metal from Glazov, and plutonium and tritium from Kyshtym. Heavy water plants at Bcreznlki and Kras-notur'lnsk could have provided deuterium (sec

National Assembly and Stockpile Sites

c believe that early weapons produced at NIzhnyaya Tura were stored in the general vicinity of the production area, andentral stockpile facility still exists In the NIzhnyaya Tura complex. After two or three years' production, however, the requirement probably developedispersed storage system. There arc indications that planning for an extensive assembly and storage system was underwaynd the first dispersed national assembly and stockpile sites were probably under construction during24 periodf


Storage Sites at Arctic Stagingweapon storage fa-

cilities arc believed to be located in theot probable major Long Range Aviation staging airfields in tbe arcticf

Soviet Airfield Storage Sites

e have evidence that operational storage facilities for nuclear weapons are associated with certain airfields in the Soviet Union


1AU of the above airfield sites are home bases for Soviet Long Range Aviation units except two which appear to serve Naval Aviation. There are indications that similar storage sites exist at other Soviet airfields, and we estimate that all primary LRA basesuclear weapon storage capability.

Other Operational Storage Facilities

We have no firm evidence of the existence of operational storage facilities specifically designed for nuclear weapons other than those at LRA and naval airfield sites. However, thc Soviets may welluclear storage capabilityumber of tactical and naval airfields. Soviet tacUcal doctrine andand nuclear testing specifically oriented to ground and naval requirements, indicate that nuclear weapon storage sites are probably also available to units of the Soviet ground forces and to certain naval surface andforces.

The Soviet guided missile program has clear requirements for nuclear warheads,in strategic attack and certain air defense applications. Although there is to date no confirming evidence, wc mightto find special security arrangements and provisions for check-out and storage ofwarheads associated with appropriate operaUonal missile installaUons.


tn view of the continuing mora-

'For the likelihood o( Soviet evasion of aand Uie possible gains from such evasion, seeo NIEndSECRET).

torlum on nuclear testing, we ore assuming that Soviet stockpile weapons will onlymarginal Improvements9 designs (Seec have discussed future capabilities If testing were resumed only in general terms.

o significant changes in our previous estimates have resulted from further analysis of the data from the last Soviet test series.

Minor revisions have been made In Tablevaluation of Soviet Nuclear Tests, and ln our estimate of present capabilities.

Present Capabilities

ased on our analysis of their nuclear test program, wc believe that the Soviets have suitable weapon types available to meet their present basic requirements.



Table 5



Sep 51


Od (1

A,ic M






0rl 64



Oct 54


Jul 44 Semi

** 6eM

IT ep SS St


o*emi 2i; eb 60 ea




ion <

Apt 57

Apt 57


AitR 57

Sep 57

Sep 57

Sop 57





Oct 57


Dee 57


Jmi 58


Feb 58


Feb SS

Feb 58


M ne S3

Mar 58



Mat 68

Mni 58


Mar 68

Sep 58


Sep 68

0 K

Oct 58



Oct 58

Del 68

Oct 58


Oct 68

SUSS rootnc-tci ator law?




emlyo. ^Values ol bunt height sod yield are best values.

'ange of values have been reported, they are written as nunimum/maximum. Greater lhaii:ess than:pproximately:

top ononDT

Weapons. Although the USSR Is not known to have tested nuclear weapons employing gun-type assembly, It Is considered that, because of the simplicity of design, weapons of this type could now be available in stockpile. These weapons would, however, require large amounts of fissionable materials. Therefore, wc estimate that If the Soviets stockpile gun-assembly weapons at all, they would stockpile only smallof these weapons. One possible version of this weapon, suitable for artillery shell applications, could be eight inches in diameter and weighounds.

Extremely Light-weight Devices. We huve detected no tests in which analysisthe characteristics which would bewith the firing of an extremelydevice. [


direct mfonnaUon is available onnuclear weapon types in the

Capabilities Without Further Nuclear Testing1'

estimate that the Soviets wouldTN weapons of radically newwith major changes in nuclearwithout testing. Suchrequire atock-up test.that there could be only limitedIn existing fission weapons towithout further nuclear testing.

Capabilitiesimited Test Bant J

the assumed conditions for aban, the Soviets could continue loImprove, and proof-test smallless tlianT. Considerablecould alsomade by usingfor small TN weapons, butlower

ee footnote IB. pace 20

rale and with less confidence than under conditions of unlimited testing.

Capabilities With Unliniited Testing

uncertainty as to the dale ontesting might be resumed, if inIs ever resumed, prevents any specificof future Soviet nuclear weaponHowever, the Sovietscontinue lo carry out research andwork on nuclear weapons, andnew and improved designs ready tounlimited testing is resumed.



Is still insufficient evidence toa firm estimate of the Sovietstockpile by number, type, orparticular, reanalysis of tlie evidenceto plutonium equivalent productionrise to considerable uncertainty asquantities available to the USSR. Inwe believe that it wouldto present any detailed estimatescomposition ol the Soviet Is possible lo arrive at someas to the Soviet employmentweapons, the relative emphasisweapons for various missions, andSoviet nuclear weaponsJudijroenls take Into account thefactors:

a Our evaluation of the Soviet nuclear test program and its implications fordevelopment and stockpiling;

estimates on the availabilitymaterials;

information onand doctrine for the use offor various purposes;

assessments of Soviet strategypolicy as set forth In NTBTrends in Soviet



Our estimates of Soviet development and deployment of weapon systems as set forth in. and In. "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Through

Our consideration of the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile deals with the0e have not considered the period3 because our estimates on theproduction and deployment ofweapon systems, and particularly the ICBM, become much more uncertain after that date. Uncertainty also pervades our estimates on the .future availability ofmaterials. No meaningful margin of error can be stated for the estimateroductionr for the estimate of plutonium

We cannot estimate what portion of the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile is likely to beeadymall percentage of weapons would be in thc pipeline, ormaintenance, retrofit, or refabrication at any given time. These weapons would not be immediately available for use by theforces.


Soviet test program over thereflected the development of nucleartoide variety of militaryTheoviet tests detectedalmost evenly divided among themedium-yield and high-yieldsome of thc low- andprobably were related to theof thermo-nuclear weapons.reater emphasis hason the high-yield category. Of the 31

. tests detectedbout one-half were high-yield shots, andf these were In the megaton range. Thc weapon designs tested8 could now be stockpiled in significant quantities. On thc basis of the evidence provided by Soviet nuclear testing, we conclude that thc Soviets now havea wide spectrum of fission andweapons which is probably adequate to meet their present basic military

The USSR Is not known to have tested gun-type weapons, but it is considered, because of the simplicity of design, that weapons of this type could have been developed.


Basic to any consideration of the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile is the estimated amount of fissionable material available for weaponse-examination of the evidence has lededuction in our estimates of cumulativeand to two widely differing estimates of plutonlum equivalent production. (See Table. The lower plutoniumIs considered to be more probable at present" We believe that the more likely future values may lie between the twoand may approach the higher estimate in the latter part oferiod."

Our estimates of Soviet stocks ofmaterials are subject to wide margins of error (see7f this order in the actual amounts of fissionable material available would of course sharply affect Soviet allocations. The effect would be felt with greater acuteness in some categories than others, especially If theof fissionable material approach the lower limits of the estimates.

(lens thanT)

31 T)

26 High-yield (greater

Includesests In the megaton



the Soviets cannot be certainthe nature and durationeneralappear to assume that It wouldwith massive nuclear attacks uponof the opponents. Nuclearwould also be employed In thewhich would be characterised bycommitment of remaining forcesln any future conflict sliortwar we have estimated that theprobably would seek to exclude thenuclear weapons because of theirconventional forces. At the outset ofconflict they would probably make aeffort to avoid being the firstnuclear weapons, but wouldIn kind, to Western use ofif thoy considered it militarily

the basis of our estimates onand military doctrine, we believemilitary policy will almost certainlyto rest on their concept ol anbetween conventional and nuclear They apparently continueeneral war launched withnuclear attacks would turn Into aconflict In which other forcesneededarge scale. But morets their belief thatange of capabilitiesflexibility ln the choice of means andof operations in accordance withobjectives soughtarticularwe believe that the Sovietscertainly continue to maintainground, air, and naval forces.

the maximum extent feasible,will be dual purpose, capable ofeither nuclear or non-nuclearThe principal obstacle to theof this goal Is to be found not lntechnological capabilities, but inof the Soviet fissionablespecifically in the limited amountequivalent estimated to beIf, as wc estimate, the Soviets have not yettate of "nuclear plenty" the various missions would necessarily have to compete for allocations of fissionableIn line with our estimates of Soviet strategy and, corisidering the characteristics and numbers of the available delivery vehicles, we believe that the USSR has probably given the largest allocation of fissionable material to its long-range .air and missile weaponThe remaining matcrlnl probably has been apportioned to delivery systems employed in other air. ground, and naval operations.


"In addition to these medium range missilesoiuUlutc an "on launcher" capability, the USSK probably Is also producing such missiles for subsequent use In the InlUal phaseeneral war and for employment In later phasesustained conflict. See.S7.

flaliufic Missiles. We have estimated that within the next few years, ballistic missiles will constitute the main clement of Soviet long-range striking forces. Included in this category are ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles estimated to be In operational inventory and such0issiles as are estimated to be available for an Initial salvo capability against land-based retaliatory targets within theirheir most effective use would clearly be with high-yield thermonuclearand Soviet nuclear tests Indicate the development of weapons suitable for missile applications. There is little evidence as to the deployment of these ballistic missiles, and none on the storage of nuclear warheads for these missiles.

Consideration of all factors leads us to estimate that the Soviets would equip all ballistic missiles in the category described in paragraphith thermonuclear warheads. For purposes of this estimate, we have assumed


they would equip these missiles withof the maximum yieldshese weapons would have an aggregate yield ofT. About one-half of this aggregate yield could be directed against the continental US through the use of ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles.

he number of ballistic missiles in the category described in paragraphs expected to increase markedly over the next fewhese weapons would liave anyield ofOO MT. atf which could be directed against thc continental US."

ong Range Aviation. There Is ample evidence that the Soviets, early In theirweapons program, decided upon the extensive deployment of nuclear weapons to Ixmg Range Aviation,he Sovlots probably began construction of the nuclear storage sites which have been Identified at numerous Long Range Aviation bases, and we estimate that all primary LRA basesuclear weapon storage capability. In their test programs, the Soviets clearly stressed .the rapid development of thermonuclear weapons. All of these weapons would be suitable for bomber delivery. At present. Soviet long-range attack capabilities rest primarily upon bombers, all capable of delivering high-yield nuclear weapons.

We believe that the Soviets wiU seek to provide nuclear weapons for all long-range bombers intended for weapons delivery In the event of general war. They may also wish toertain number of weapons for multiple bomb loads in some attackingand for reslrikes by surviving aircraft. We believe that virtually all of these weapons would be high-yield thermonuclear types, and that most of these probably would be In the megaton range.

The numbers of weapons allocated to Long Range Aviation inould vary widely depending upon operational planning, thc size of weapons employed, and otherHowever, we believe that Long Range Aviation could now have on the orderhousand nuclearhe aggregate yield of these weapons could vary widely, but we believe that It may be on the orderT.

We have estimated that the Soviet long-range bomber force will decrease in sizethe period of this estimate. For this reason and because of the heavy demands of the growing Soviet missile forces, we do not believe that the numbers of nuclear weapons allocated to Ixmg Range Aviation inill Increase greatly above present levels. If at all. The total mega tonnage of the Long Range Aviation stockpile could be Increased markedlyith no increase In the number of weapons, by replacement of aof the stockpile with higher yieldof existing types.


few Soviet nuclear tests appear torelated to the development of airHowever, thcro is no evidenceweapon allocations to present If nuclear warheads are available at

"The Assistant Chief of filafl for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and Ihe Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUons (InteUigence).of the Nary. beLeve that Int is equally as valid to estimate that Long Range Aviation could now have no moreuclear weapons and sUll be consideredarmed for general war tasks. See, also, their footnote to Figure 4.

TOP CliORfiy

sites we believe it likely that they would be mounted on missiles, since no nuclear weapon storage facilities have been identified. We have estimated that the Soviets probably areow-altitude surface-to-air missile systemhich could appear1 or possiblyt is possible that they will alsoong-range, high-altitude surfacc-to-air missile system which could become operational later In the period of this estimate. Both of these systems could employ nuclear warheads."1

One of the nuclear devices tested by the Soviets appears suitable for use in an air-to-air missile, and we believe thatystem could become available this year, although there is as yet no evidence of its development or production. In the absence of further nuclear testing, progress in the very low-yield devices suitable for air-to-air missiles would be seriously hindered.

Two of Uie nuclear devices tested8 might lend themselves to application in an anti-missile missile, and we havethatystem is probably being developed and could become availableineriod. Because we do not believe that it will become operationalhis system has not beenin terms of its nuclear materialsHowever, ifystem were widely deployed, it would place new and heavy demands upon Soviet stocks of fissionablewhich would be felt even before actual deployment.

The rapid and extensive deployment of surface-to-air missile sites In thc USSR isof the high priority probably accorded thc air defense mission. Although Soviet surface-to-air missiles are designed lo be eftec-tise with HE warheads against aerodynamic targets, nuclear warheads would be required toignificant probability forof the nuclear weapons themselves. Such

f warheads would also increase the kill prob-

' -See NIKSoviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space

ability against the delivery vehicles. Wethese considerations so decisive that the Soviets would seek to provide someof their surface-to-air missiles withwarheads. Given the large allocation to long-range air and missile systems that wc have estimated, orubstantially smaller allocation, the Soviets would not have sufficient nuclear material to provide nuclear warheads for all of their surface-to-air missiles. However, considering all lac-tors, we believe that they could now have on the orderuclear-armed surface-to-air missiles available."

"The Assistant Chief of Staff for intelligence,of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUonsepartment of the Navy, do not concur that the estimateuclear-armed surface-to-air missiles is any more valid than an estimate of several hundred more or less which would result from different assumpUons as to opcraUonal planning,and availability of fissionable material. See. also, their footnote lo Figure a.

" See: "Sino-Soviet Air DefenseThrough9

riorities of various defended areas and operational factors probably would causein thc numbers of nuclear warheads allocated to particular surface-to-air missile sites. We have estimated thatissile sites are deployed at somerban-industrial areas, and that by thc end of thc year such sites could be deployed atincludingrban-industrialore extensive programreater density ofefenses In certain locations, defense of additional targets, and allocation to field forces could be completed sometimee believe that nuclear warheads probably have now been provided for the defense of Moscow and other areas which the Soviets consider of greatbut we doubt that nuclear-armedmissiles are available In ail of these areas. Allocation of nuclear warheads for surfacc-to-air missiles will probably increaseut we consider it unlikely that the Soviets will seek to provide suchfor all missile sites and mobile units.


There Is ample evidence in currentmilitary doctrine and training that the Soviets plan to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield in support of ground operations, although apparently not in very largeThis doctrine visualizes delivery ofweaponsariety of methodsrifled artillery, free rockets, guided missiles, and aircraft Evidence on theof weapons for such purposes is slight, relating mainly to possible nuclear weapon storage sites at certain tactical airfields.nuclear tests have reflected an in terestroad spectrum of fission weapons with yields from about oneT. The larger medium and high-yield weapons could beby aircraft or by the types of surface-to-surface missiles now believed available for ground support. We have estimated that the Soviets could now have as manyew thousand missiles of ranges upm, but we believe thatmall portion of these would now be equipped with nuclearVirtually all medium-range0vailable for support of field forces would be equipped with nuclear warheads of varying yields.

Assuming allocations to long-rangeand air defense on the order of those noted above, we do not believe that theSoviet stockpile permits the use of very large numbers of low-yield nuclear weapons for tactical uses. The smaller, more probable plutonium stockpile estimated forould provide on the orderhousand low-yield and medium-yield weapons (Including those for tactical aviation. missiles) for support of field forces."

Given the alternate plutonium estimate, these numbers could be Increased markedly.

he limitations imposed byof fissionable materials willconsiderably, but ground supportwill have to compete withof long range missiles fora stockpile which will stillow plutoniumSoviet nuclear ground supportwill be greatly Improved,by the Increased numbers ofshort and medium range missilesthen be available for such use.


There Is firm evidence supporting the development ol nuclear weapons for navalOf the weapons tested by theumber of medium and low-yield weapon types would be suitable for use against naval targets. There have been nuclear tests In the Novaya Zemlya area which almost certainly relate to naval effects or to the development of naval weapons. We have evidence olweapon storage facilities at navaland believe that nuclear weapon storage sites are probably also available to certain naval surface and submarine-launchedmissiles, which require nuclear warheads for maximum effectiveness.

The allocation to Soviet naval forces almost certainly is being Increased with the growth in the numbers of guided missiles available to naval units. We have estimated that all submarine-launched ballistic missiles probably will be equipped with high-yield nuclear warheads. Nuclear warheadshave also been provided for someof the alr-to-surface missiles employed by Naval Aviation, and for some of the cruise-type missiles now employedew surface vessels. Limited numbers of nuclear bombs, depth charges, torpedoes, and mines are probably available for direct support of navalAside from the nuclear warheads for submarine-Launched ballistic missiles. Soviet naval forces may now haveuclear


e believe that the allocation to naval farces will havemarkedly with the more extensive deployment of missileurtherIs Indicated by the growingfor more effective anti-submarinelo meet the threat posed by US missile submarines.


e believe that the long-range striking forces have been given the largest allocation of

EThe Assistant Chic! of Staff for Intelligence,of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval OperaUonsepartment of the Navy, believe that other equally as valid assumpUons as to operational planning, prior* lUes, and availability of fissionable material would result In far different numbers of weapons than cited here. See. also, their footnote to Figure 4.

fissionable materials. We believe that at present the USSR's weapons stockpile can support massive nuclear attacks againstin North America and Eurasia by the long-range striking forces estimated In. Thc site and nature of the materials stockpile imposes limitations on the numbers of weapons available for other air. ground, and naval operations. However, we consider it unlikely that the availability of fissionable materials for nuclear weaponsactor which In itself significantly limits Soviet(See Figureabular Summary of Possible Weapon

e haveonsiderable growth in the Soviet fissionable materials stockpile byhich should keep pace with the estimated growth In Soviet missilefor long-range attack, and also ease the limitations noted above.

t- -



uring the past year the USSR hasbilateral atomic aid agreements with North Korea, Iraq and Indonesia; the first such agreements since the initial round of bllaterals negotiated with most of the bloc nations and with Yugoslavia and Egypt in the. Thc agreements with North Korea and Iraq were similar to thoseentered into by the Soviet Union and will provide both countriesesearch reactor, isotope laboratories and technical training. In addition. North Korea is toetatron and cobalt irradiation apparatus, while Iraq will receive assistance in prosjiect-lng for radioactive ore. As with previous agreements, the USSR has shown no haste in fuimiing these commitments and little has been accomplished since the conclusion of the original negotiations While Indonesia hasubcrlUcalmallreactor,0 KW researchnegotiations have not been completed and the extent of Soviet assistance has not been deteiTnined.

he oilers to North Korea. Iraq andseem to fit the pattern of past Soviet international atomic aid activity. From the Soviet point of view the agreement with North Koreatep to improve and tightenwith another Communist nation, and may have been prompted by US aid to South Korea. The offers of atomic aid lo Iraq and Indonesia were plainly Inspired by the same types of political considerations which led to the earlier agreementpt. Thus, these new developments do not presage any shift In Soviet policy toward lurnUhlng basic atomic know-how to underdeveloped countries. In the foreseeable future the USSR can beto continue to follow an opportunistic policy of offering atomic aid when tangible political return can be expected.

. It has been reported that the Sovietseady to offer assistance lo India in thc design and constructionuclear power station,

but the nature and extent of this assistance has not been specified. The Indian Third Five Yearalls forW (electrical) nuclear power reactor of the Calder Hall typewo reactor stationW. If the USSR were to assist In this program it wouldignificant departure from the pattern of asd thus far offered to countries outside the bloc. InW reactor woutd be significantly larger than any of the power reactors thus far promised to the Satellites. Soviet support of the ambitious Indianwould be dictated by overriding political considerations, as it appears that the Soviet domestic atomic energy program Is lagging. (See

Soviet Union has continued Itsof the Chinese Communists Ina cadre of nuclear scientists andand has furnished the Chineseresearch reactoryclotron. Aof Soviet scientists and technicianssent to China to assist that countrydevelopment of Its atomic energyIn addition, we have firm evidenceSoviet-Chinese exploration ofresources.


Soviets have continued to givesupport lo the InternationalAgency (IAEA) and haveagency projects. In particular,refused to recognize the necessitystandard criteria to Insurematerials supplied by IAEAnations to other countries arc not usednuclear weapons. Apparently,not required safeguards as part ofbilateral agreements and profess toor no requirement for any sort ofmeasures except perhaps when veryof materials are involved.In view of the heavy majority offor safeguards In the IAEAthe Soviets will probably agreesome form of standard safeguards


The US USSR Agreement on Exchanges which wu established inas resultedumber of exchanges ofand visits with nuclear aspects. Ina memorandum on cooperation was adopted by the two countries for theof exchanges of visits and Information, and of meetings to examine the feasibility of joint enterprises ln the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The Soviets have been relativelyin implementing specific exchanges under this agreement, haveonsiderable number of East-West contacts at conferences and In private exchanges, and havesought entrance into atomic energyIn the US. The Soviets apparently carryell-organized informationprogram during these exchanges. The general objectives of the Soviet team which toured with Emelyanov appeared to be the assessment of the US atomic energy research and development program in relation toinformation available in the USSR, with particular emphasis on the engineering and metallurgical aspects of both reactor and accelerator development. The team alsoa keen Interest in nuclear-chemical and radio-biological research, but much of this information was denied to them becauseimilar denial to the American delegation In the Soviet Union. Both sides have gained information and first-hand observations of each other's nuclear energy programs.

-TOP fiBOH-fe^

annex a

study was approved by The United States Intelligence Board on9 in response to specific questions as to the possibility of covert Soviet nuclear testing, the probability of its detection, and thetechnical gains resulting from such

f the Soviets have been conductingplanned underground or deep spacetests during the period of the unpoliced test moratorium, docs the intelligenceassume that we would have been able to detect these tesU?



intelligence sources impending nuclear

tests. (See Question 2)



There is, at present, very little US capability for detecting oruclear test in deep space.

f not, does the intelligence communitythe Soviets have or have not been testing weaponsovert basis?

Since the beginning of the unpolicedfollowing the Soviet testse have observed noof Soviet nuclear testing. We have no clear indications from mtelligence sources of suspicious activities at their regular test sites, nor of atomic energy interest in unusualoperations, In new geographic areas having no usual connection with atomic energyor in any of the Soviet space vehicle launchlngs- On balance, and In view of the considerations discussed In, the intelligence community has no reason to believe that the Soviets have been testingweaponsovert basis.

covert testing has been proceedingwhat effect might such rests haveimproving Soviet weaponsthese effects be negligible or significant?

The table below summarizes briefly, by yield class and possible test method, thethe Soviets could possibly have achieved If they have been conducting covert nuclear tests. The term "significant" Is used toImprovement in the particular device class indicated, not for the over-all nuclear capability.

the unpoliced moratorium continues(a) six, (o) twelve months, orand if the Soviets continue aprogram through this period, whatthe effects on Soviet weaponsuch effects be negligible or significant?

(a) andovert test program during the period of the next six to twelve months probably would contribute significantly to their overall nuclear weapon capability in the area of small low-yield tactical or air defense weapons and small TN weapons.

or periods extending beyond the next twelve months, extensive use of decoupling or tests of larger devices In deep space (still un-proven techniques) could lead to significantly improved designs.




tons of Atmospheric or underground

b) Deep-space

ew hundred tons to aboutT of nuclear yield

of Deep-space

Greater than about SO KT nuclear yield

Improvements In light-weight weapons with full-scale yields upT. Significant.

and diagnostic tests ofweapons developed undermock-up tests ofdevices. itgnlficant

teats and weaponand diagnostic tests and weapon

effects. Pouibli tlgni/lcaniIn presently estimatedcapability, as well as increased and useful weapon effectsIncreased confidence might be the deciding factorecision toeapon of advanced design.

Original document.

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