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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
ALGERIA
SECTIONUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY
JOB NO.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Washington, D. C.
TOTAU DO^HEREIH.?^
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FOR RELEASE DATE1
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The entire content of this document is Nationaland is subject to the special controls established for tho safeguarding of such intelligence. In particular.Intelligence may not be shown to or discussed with representatives of any foreign government or international body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1.
The information presented under "Comments on Principal Sources" requires special handling and is not releasable to foreign nationals under any circumstances.
NND
FEMA
NKC
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OF CONTENTS FOR SECTION 54
Subdlrectorate of Active.
Office of Criminal .
Office of Public.
(b) (C) (d)
of Territorialof General Investigationof Administrativeservices
Police
Police Units
Security Groups
Republican Security Companies
Gendarmery
b. Other forces engaged in the maintenance of public
Territorial
Urban Protection Units
Barkaa
utodefense units
pecialized Administrative Sections and UrbanSections
facilities and methods
of interrogation
of Informers
Identity and registration system
Techniques of riot control
Civil defense
Police personnel
Police schools
Attitude of the public toward the police
b. Muslims
bility of the police to maintain public order and safety
system
The Penal Code
The Code of Criminal Procedure
of crimes and prosecution of criminals .
of criminal cases
Incidence of crime
The prison system
regular prison system
and Screening Centers
Internment Centers
Internment Centers
in places of detention
and release of internees
data
on principal sources
j
FEMA
FBI
SI-
NRC
POLITICAL
I960
LIST OF FIGURES
of police services
4
of police units
5
lorces guard Government General
9
wire barrier, the Casbah
acts and
of persons tried for lesser crimes
misdemeanors
common lesser crimes and mis-
of persons tried for felonies
of juvenile delinquency cases
central and short-term prisons
institutions for juveniles
Transit and Screening Centers
Internment Centers
Military Internment Centers
This Section was prepared for the NIS by the Bureau of InteUigence and Research, Department of State.
LIST OK ABBREVIATIONS
CDR CLASH
CMI CRS CTT DCS A
DPI! DST
enp
GMPR MS OAME
paf
PJ
RO
sau
an ..
SKA
ut
Aulonomes de Reserve (Autonomous Reserve Companies) Centre* de Reiducation (ReeducaUon Oonler*)
Centre d'tnitruction et d'Appticatlon de la Stlrete Nationals (Center ofand Application of tha National Security Organization) Centres Milltairts d'Internement (Military Internment Centers) Compaantes RepubUcalncs de Sicnritd (Republican Security Companies) Centresrt et de Transit (Tnuutt and Screening Centers) Direction de la Su'ete Generale en Algtrie (Directorate o( Genera) Security In AlecrU)
Direction Generate de la Sitreti National* (General Directorate ot National Security)
Dtspasitlfs de Protection Urbaine (Urban Protection Units) Direction AciIm de la Surveillance du Terrltotre (Territorial Surveillance Directorate)
Ccoic Natkmale de la Police (KaUonal Police School) Front de Llbdratkm Nationale (National Libera lion Front) Gendarmerie Departmental* (Departmental Genaartnery) Gendarmerie Mobile (Mobile Gvndarmery>
Groapei Mobiles de Protection Surals (MobUe Rural ProtocUoo Groups) Croupes Mobiles de Securiti (Mobile Security Groups)
Inspcctevr Otntrale de I'Adminlslralton en Mission Extraordinaire (Inspector
General of Administration on Extraordinary Mission) Service Central de la Police de I'Air et dei Fronllires (Central Office of Air
and FronUer Police) Service Central de la Police Judicial'* (Central Office of Criminal Police) Sous-direction des Rensetgnements Oiniraus (SubcUrectormtc of General
IaTesUaaUon)
Sections Administrative*Specialised AdmlnUtraUve Sections) Sections Administrative* Urbatnei (Urban Administrative Sections) Sureti Nationale (Nationalopular name lor DOSN Sirett Nationale en Algeria (NaUonal Security Agency inopular name for DOHA
Service Central de la Securiti Publluue (Central Office of Public Security) UnitesTerritorial UnlU)
nm)
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238
6
ublic Order and Safety
The user can supplement the information In this Section by re/errtng totructure of the Government,iscussion of governmental practices which maythe operations of the forces of lata and order.
General
Governmental machinery for the assurance of public order and safety In Algeria is an Integral part of that of metropolitan France. ThisIncludes large and well-trained policeystem of civil and military courts, and an extensive penal and detention system. Since the outbreak in Algeria of the Muslim nationalist rebellion of the National Liberation Front {Front de Liberationtoowever, the French Government has been able to maintain its authority and tolerable conditions of public order and safety In much of the area only by the employmentilitary force of up toillion men, in addition to the regular police and security forces. Because the rebelsIn Individual acts of terrorism as well as In organized military activities, the French Army in Algeria has become increasingly Involved in police work. (The strictly military aspects of theof public order and safety in Algeria In the present circumstances of civil war arc not discussed In this Section; however, the role of the military In the administration and operations of the police and penal systems is discussed where appropriate.)
he police forces of Algeria werethat Is. theyart of theadministration. under the GovernorIn5 the Mendes-Francedecreed the Integration of the Algerian police Into the metropolitan police organization, the Surete' Natumale, In order to strengthengovernment control over the Algerian force. Until0 the administrative control of the police of Algeria was centered In the Ministry of the Interior. The municipal police In Algeria, though not immediately affected byere also gradually brought under control of the SHreti Nationalerocess of steady amalgamation of municipal police units Into the Algerian State Police.
The Integration of the Algerian police into the Sxlrtti Nationale did not bring about the desired degree of central government control but. on the contrary, reduced it. The Algerian police were freed by this Integration from responsibility to the executive authorities In Algiers; at the same time the SHrctt Nationale in Paris was too distant to exercise effective control over its nominallyunit in Algeria. The independence of the Algerian police of all effective control wasduring the period of integration by the fact that the police services remained In the hands of European Algerians or their sympathizers. Following the settlers' and army revolt ofn army colonel. Yves Godard. who had played an important part in the revolt, became director of the entire Algerian security system. In these circumstances grave doubt existedthe loyalty and reliability of the police in matters where the interests of the European settlers might come into conflict with centralpolicies- The equivocal performance of the police during the settlers' insurrection atin0 finally led the government to change both the administrative structure and the top-ranking personnel of the Algerian police. In0 tbe police were returned to the control of the Algerian administration, headed by the central government's representative inthe Delegate General, who has since then directly supervised their activities. At the same time, It was decided that the appobitment of Surete Nationale personnel to key positions in the Algerian police hierarchy would facilitate theof central government authority.Godard was replaced as director of thepolice organization, the National Security Agency in Algeria, by Jacquesember of the French prefecture! corpsormerot the Surete Nationale.
The Algerian police, like the French police, are highly centralized. Yet effective functioning of the police services throughout the Algerianoften requires considerable decentralization of police authority. One Important feature of the administration of the police system in Algeria is the fact that all units of various police services (for example. Criminal Police mobile brigades, State Police companies, and Mobile Security Groups) which are assignediven civilare usually subordinated to, or "placed at the dispositionhe responsible civilianin charge of the Jurisdiction. Thus, the
1
Ministry of the Interior places RepublicanCompanies at the disposition of theQeneral. The Delegation Qcncral places State Police companies and mobile brigades of the Criminal Police at the disposition of theprefects. The prefects in turntheir responsibilities to subprcfect* andThe Ministry of the Armed Forces similarly places gendarmery personnel at the disposition of civil authorities throughout Algeria. Thisis also followed when it is nocessary tothe police forces of an area in ansituation. When law and order break downoint at which army units must be brought in. these units too may be placed at theof the prefect or subprefect. Where large numbers of troops are required for long periods, as has been the case in much of Algeria sincet has been the practice to replace civilian authority by military authority. Many posts of prefect in Algeria have been tilled for varyingof time by army officers, although allarc now civilians.
The Algerian penal system, like that of France. Is governed by the French Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. The Penal Code derbies law violations and their punishment; the Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth procedures by which persons are brought to justice, tried, and punished. French law recognizes three general typesrimes, which include felonies such as arson, murder, and serious acts Involving theof the state;ims, which roughlyto lesser crimes and misdemeanors Inlow; andontraventions, or minor infractions.
The outbreak of the rebellion4 brought an Increase in the number and character ofacts committed in Algeria, and posed serious problems to the French and Algerian authorities In restoring and maintaining order. Thesewere aggravated by several factors,the chronic inadequacy of administration by the French in much of the territory and their reluctance, at least in the early and critical stages of the uprising, to consider the rebellion as other than an increase in Individual crimes and acts of terrorism. The judicial establishment then, as now. was similar to that of the metro pole, but the courts were soon overwhelmed by the volume of cases arising out of the rebellion, whichhad to be investigated and tried under ordinary Judicial procedures. The Law of Special Powers In Algeria (Lot sar les Pouvoirs Speciaux en Algetic) ofnacted by the Mollet government, attempted to adapt theof Fterfeh justice to the emergency in Algeria by givingnot solethe military courts andthe number of chambers In each court.decrees passed under authority of this law increased the number of military courts In Algeriand further extended their competence lo Include every type of criminal act (crimes and deltts) committed against thesecurity of the state or committed "for the purpose of giving direct or indirect aid to thehe burden of the courts would have been even heavier if the law had not permitted theInternment without trial or otherprocedure of thousands of persons suspected of complicity In the rebellion.
Three separate detention systems function In Algeria: the regular prison system, under the Ministry of Justice; the Transit and Screening Centers and Civilian Internment Centers, under the control of the Delegation General and theand the Military Internment Centers,army control. Tbe regular Algerian prisons are old, overcrowded, and inadequate In manyPlumbing Is rudimentary or lacking. In some prisons there have been chronic epidemics. Though medical and hospital facilities are fair to good, they arc overburdened. Institutions fordelinquents are under the supervisioneparate Directorate of Supervised Education within the Ministry of Justice. Conditions in them arc more satisfactory than in the prisons. Many modern techniques for caring for anddelinquent children are in use.
Reports of harsh practices and conditions at many of the Internment centers in Algeria, mainly in some of ther more civilian Transit and Screening Centers, in which persons allegedly or actually associated with the rebellion are initially confined, have occasioned concern In France and elsewhere. French military officers have been charged with, and some have admitted,torture in the interrogation of prisoners. Other charges Include illegal detention ofand unhealthful and seriously deficientat detention installations. Thousands of persons whose activities are deemed dangerous to the security of the state are detained in Civilian Internment Centers and elsewhere without trial or conviction ot any offense, under the authority of legislation granting the government emergency powers in Algeria.
The French Government haa invitedozen Investigations of internment conditions in Algeria since the outbreak of the rebellioneven of which were carried out by committees of the International Red Cross. These inspections have invariably confirmed the existence of the practices and conditions charged, Including torture and Illegal detention of prison-
ers. Thereport, datedoted some Improvement over conditions reportedrevious Inspection team that had visited internment centers in Algeria
B. Police system
The first Algerian police services, patterned after those of metropolitan Prance,4 In Algiers, Constanttne, and Oran. Their strength was insufficient to maintain order in the areas outside the principal cities, and French military units eventually had to be called upon to assume, under civil administrative guidance, responsibility for many policeSince that time, though the Algerianforces have been steadily increased and strengthened, the increments have never beento permit the army's role In theof public order to be ended. In recent years, the line between military and civil police authority has been blurred, particularly in the areas outside the major cities Various pa rambodies acting in the countryside havealternately under civilian and militaryas the public order situation has oscillated between comparative quiet and widespreadSince the beginning of the nationalistinivil and militaryfunctions have become practicallyas police and army units have acted under Joint command to oppose nationalistaction and to counter terrorist activities.
Untilhe Algerian police were autonomous, that is, they were under the sole control of the Governor General, and personnel was not interchangeable with the police of France.ecree ofowever, thepolice were integrated Into the overall French police system under the Oeneralof National Security (Dfrecfton Gtnerale de la Suretecommonly known as the Suret6 Nationalen the Ministry of the Interior. (Sec NIShapte* V.or details of police organization in metropolitanppropriate additional legislation,decrees ofunendet forth the conditions of the Integration of the several Algerian services Into the corresponding units of the SOretC. The reorganization was intended in part to assist the central government In restraining the autonomous Algerian police in their sometimes brutalmeasures against the local Algerianand to strengthen the operation andthe general efficiency of the police bypossible the orderly reinforcement of the often hard-pressed units in Algeria by trained units not immediately required in the metropolc.
An unexpected result of this reorganization was to loosen the control of the civilian authorities in Algiers over the police without actually bringing the latter under close supervision in Paris. The extensive delegation of police powers to theand the appointment of an armyYvesthe top security post In Algeria after the8 uprising, had the effect of further diluting supervision of any sort over tbe police services, which were then fully responsible lo no single organization. This serious defectfully apparent at the time of the0 Insurrection. Neither the Delegationnor the central government appears to have been sufficiently well Informed in advance of the plot, of which scores of police, army officers, and civilians were at least aware.
After the collapse of the insurrection, thegovernment announced plans for thereorganization of the Algerian police.was returned to civilian hands by theof Colonel Oodard, and thewas placed under the full, and presumably exclusive, control and authority of the Delegation General. By apparent coincidence, an order of the French Council of State (Cornellatedent support to thoaction: the order In effect held null and void the decree ofhich originally integrated the Algerian police intoeteon the groundaw, ratherecree, would have been required for such anAt the same time, the influence of the SHrete" Nationale in the Algerian police was strengthened by the transfer of many hlgh-rank-ing officials from the metro pole to key positions in the Algerian securityoveaimed at securing tighter control of the latter for tho central government.
Thus tho Directorate of General Security in(Direction de la SHrete Generate encommonly known as the National Security Agency in Algeria {Surete" Nationale enremains the top civilian security organization of Algeria and exercises theGeneral's responsibility for the maintenance of public order and respect for the law. Theof the SNA (seeiffers only slightly from that of the SN in the metropole (see NIShapter V,nder Suretet is headedirectorho Is assistedtaff director (Chef de Cabinet du Dtrecteur) and an assistant to the latter (Adjoint au Chef duheserves as the principal adviser to theGeneral on all security questions. The SNA is divided Into three main sections: the Subdirec-torate of Active Services (Sous-direction des Serv-
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teeshe Subdirectorate of General(Sous-direction des Rensctgnementsand the Subdirectorate of theServices {Sous-direction des Servicesach subdirectorate hasservices, as indicated inhe Subdirector of Administrative Services acts for the Director tn tbe absence of the latter. The SNA shares with tbe prefecture! authoritiesfor the operation and activities of the so-called external services (serviceshe uniformed state and municipal police units attached to the departments and communes. It also supervises, directly, the employment of theSecurity Companies (Compagnies Re-publtcalnes deand, indirectly, the gendarmcry, which are placed at the disposition of the Delegation General by, respectively, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Armed Forces. The uniforms of all these services arc generally the same as those of theirin the metro pole. (For photographs, see NIShaptsb V,)
Various emergency military and paramilitary forces created, trained, and controlled by the French Army supplement the work of the SNA in the countryside and to varying extentsand replace SNA authority In tbe cities. The Territorial Units were, until their dissolution inoremost among such forces. Other organizations still in existence include the Urban Protection Units, the Harkas, and the farm and village autodefensc units.
In newly pacified areas In the Algerianand in underadminlstered areas In both the countryside and the cities, SpecializedSections and Urban Administrative(sec below) respectively share responsibility with the army and the SNA for the maintenance or order. The Specialized Administrative Sections have their own security forces, the Magluens.
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rganization and jurisdiction of forces for the suppression of crime
a. Regular police forces
irectorate of General Security in(DSGA)The organization of the DSOA, commonly known as the National Security Agency in Algeria (Surete Nationale enclosely parallels that of the metropolitan SHreU Nationaleith the various echelons of the former generally ranking one step below their SNhus, the Directorate of General Security in Algeria corresponds to the General Directorate of National Security in France, and Algerian subdirectorates and services correspond respectively to metropolitan directorates and sub-directorates. Total number of SNA members Is estimatedccurate and completeis not available on the relative strengths of the component services of tbe SNA;2 presents the available data on this subject.
(a) SUBDUtECTORATK OF ACTIVE SERVICES
The Subdlrectorate of Active Services comprises the Central Office of the Criminal Police {Service Central de la Policeand theOffice of Public Safety {Service Central de la SicuritiThe Active Services are also responsible for coordinating the work of the units of the Territorial Surveillance(Direction Active de la Surveillance duwhich are placed at the disposition of the Delegation General by the Ministry of the Interior.
entral Office of Criminal Police (PJ)Thelainclothes police service, has the same responsibilities and is organized .along approximately the same lines as the PJ in the metropole. It is responsible for the detection and suppression of crime, the investigation of allnarcotic, and financial infractions of the law, acts of sabotage, and, generally, for theof the state. AvailableNA officers as PJ personnel, but full PJ strength is undoubtedly greater. Under French law, all mayors, police superintendents of whatever service, gendarmerie officers, examining magistrates, and police inspectors are ex-offlclo members of the PJ. Commissioners of the PJ in charge of mobile brigades are empowered to call upon state and municipal police and gendarmerie personnel In their areas forhe PJ is organizedeadquarters group (Service Central)ield force ofr more mobile brigades assigned throughout Algeria. At the headquarters level, information on criminal activities Is exchanged with other services; liaison with the International Commission of Criminal Police (Interpol) is maintained; the Criminal
ritKJKiT.II OK ALGERIAN POLICKAjNITS.
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REGULAR POLICK l'ORCKS National Scciimy Agency in Algeria (SN A) (in-eludes Uip following UilaU ot personnel idoilli-liablepecific component icrvinw):
Criminal Police (PJ)
On "detached service" with DOT
General Invivtliitalioa services (KG)
Central Police Administration
ecurity0 group*)
Total SNA.
Republican Security Com [units (CllS) (IS coat-
Gimdiirmcry Tenth Military Region:
I0ch Legion ot Departmental Cciidarincry
lOlh bit Legionepartmental Gcndarmery
10th I" Union or Detrimental Gcndarmery...
I0tlt Legion Mobile Gcodarmcry
Municipal Police: Northern Ahjeria
Municipal Police in Suharnn Algeria
0
OTHER FORCES ENGAGED IX THBOF ORDER Territorial Police und Urban Prelection Units...
AulorirfenM
Speciul AdmiiusUaUve Sectionsn*tal-
laiiocu)
Muslim protective forces attached to SA8 (Moyno-
no Data not available. ' ltaeod on French data,
Identity Service (Service d'ldentitA Judiciaire) maintains complete criminal files for Algeria;sections handle felonies, matters pertaining to the security of the state, and infractions of economic and fiscal regulations, includingand customs violations, Mobile brigades throughout Algeria operate under one of the three chief superintendents of mobile brigades (com-missaire, chef des brigades mobiles) withrespectively, in Algiers, Oran, and Con-stantlne, seats of the three Courts of Appeal, The organization of the mobile brigades follows the metropolitan pattern. Each brigadeolice superintendentts strength varies, with the requirements of the sector,oolice{offlciers denspectorsogents (agentshe mobile brigades are at the disposition of the Algerian prefects (see below, under External
As shown inhe PJ functionsthe judiciary service. Officers of the PJthe public prosecutors (procureurs de la Ri-publique) in the investigation of criminal acts. On their own initiative they make preliminaryof crimes brought to their attention
PAGE 5
by an injuredhird party, or byofficials, reporting their findings to the prosecutor within three days. Alternatively, an examining magistrate (juge d'mslructlon) mayeported criminal actommissioner of the PJ. who thereupon becomes responsible forull investigation of the crime. In-eluding subpoenaing and Interrogating witnesses. When the investigation Is complete, the dossier is returned to the examining magistrate fordisposition. The PJ may thus be called in or recalledriminal Investigation at any stage up to its final referral to hearing
Central Office of Public Safety (SP)The SP coordinates the employment and activities of the various State Police units assigned to commissariats throughout Algeria (sec below, under Statet also controls the four-company State Police Mobile Reserve, which is available for despatch in support of other State Police units as required. The Central Office of Public Safety has responsibility for the location, organization, and personnel strength of police(commisiariali or hotels de Police) and the delimitation of areas of Jurisdiction of police commissariats. It collaborates with PJ, the Subdirectorate of General Investigation, and other services of the SNA on matters dealing with the personnel of these services operating in SPThe equipping, maintenance, andof commissariats Is the responsibility of the Subdirectorate of Administrative Services.
Directorate of TerritorialDST brigade under acommissioner (ammissaireith headquarters at Algiers, is stationed inLittle information is available on the strength of the brigade, but it is known that somefficers of the SNA are "on detachedwith the DST, supplementing whateveris sent out from France. The DSTheoretically at the disposal of theOeneral. and its officers work within the framework of the SNA. In fact, however, tbe DST operates almost solely under the direction of the SHrete Nationale in Paris. It undertakes investigations at the request of the departmental prefects or of the Delegation General, but reports its findings directly to DST headquarters In Paris as well as to the requesting office. The general responsibilities of the DST in Algeria are similar to those it has In the metropole. (See NIShattes V.nder Directorates the principal security service of the Republic, It Is responsible for the control and suppression of foreign espionage within French territory. Its activities include tne surveillance ol mail to and from Algeria, theof foreigners, and the interrogation of French employees of foreign consular offices. The DST operates fixed and semifixed radio dirccUon-finding centers in Algeria, and has radio compass vehicles at its disposal to pinpoint clandestinebroadcasting stations within general areasby the direction-finding centers.
(b) SUBDrHECTORATI of CEN1HAL (ao)RG is responsible for keeping the Delegation General informed on political,and economic developments in Algeria. Iteadquarters echelon atentral office In each department under an officer ofsuperintendent rank, and subordinate posts in each major city. At the headquarters level are the Office of Central Files (Fichierhe Service of Regulations and Documentation ofService de la, Reglementation et deshe Central Office of Information (Service Centralnd theOffice of Air and Frontier Police (Service Central de la Police de t'Air ethe Office of Central Piles is the principal file organization of the SNA; the PJ files and the files of all other police services (for example, identity files and foreigners' registration files)subordinate sections of the RG Central Files. The Office of Central Files is responsible for coordinating all criminal and administrative investigations in Algeria and for SNA liaison with the metropolitan police and Interpol. Sections dealing with possession of firearms, associations and movements of foreigners, and the operation of casinos and stadiums are in the Service ofatlons and Documentation of Foreigners. Within the Central Office of Information there aresections concerned with surveillance ofactivities, sociological development,matters, and press, radio, and films. Sections concerned with the movement of persons into and out of Algeria, and the operation of airports and frontier posts are under the PAF. Eachcentral office controls allcratlons within Its department. Representatives ofRG units are located at policein principal cities in each department, and at all international airports and frontier posts in Algeria. The PAF and other field units of the subdirectorate are at the disposal of the Algerian prefects.
(c) SUBDIRBCTOnATF. adminihthativb
sEEvicxsThis subdirectorate operates thebudget, social, and medical services of the SNA. The headquarters of the Mobile Security Groups (see below) Is also located in thisThe Service of Personnel has fourdealing, respectively, withfficer and spe-
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cial personnel,niformednd training, andersonnel regulations, starring, and legal matters.
(d> extkrnai,external services are those services which are placed by the SNA at the disposition of the prefects of the Algerian departments, hi much the same manner as metropolitan units (for example. CRSSN personnel, and gendarmerie) are placed by their respective ministries at ihe disposition of the Delegation General. The external servicesthe mobile brigades of tho Criminal Police, the Air and Frontier Police and other field units of the subdirectorate of General Investigation, the State Police, municipal police units, and theSecurity Groups. The SNA retainsand assignment authority over these units (except municipal policeut foration all police units servingepartment are ordinarily placed at theof the prefect and act under his control. The prefect in turn may delegate to his subpre-feets his authority over units assigned torondtiseme nts (subprefecturalunicipal police units are recruited and paid by the municipal authorities but are subject to the ultimate control of the SNA, which hasresponsibility in the field of public order. Municipal police units are being graduallyinto the State Police.
Three quasi-pollce services, discussed below,in close collaboration with the externalthe gendarmerie; the Urban Protection Unitsnd theolunteer Muslim force assigned to assist and protect the officers and the work of the Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS).
Ute PoliceSUte Policed'Etat) arc responsible for the maintenance of order and the enforcement of law In the centers of population and along public roads. Roughly analogous to tho public safety police (police de securitt publujue) of the metropole. theywith, and often work under the control of the criminal police and officers of the RG. SUteunits are organized into central and police commissariats {commissariats de police) andto subprefectures throughout Algeria and lo the Saharanobile reserve unit of four companies, available for despatch In support of police commissariats as required, was established In AlgiersUte Policereceive training in police work at the police school at Hussein Dcy. on the outskirts of Algiers. The strength of the uniformed SUte Police. The number, however, iseach year as additional unite of municipal police are amalgamated into SUte Police ranks (istatises).
Municipal Police Unitslarge number of uniformed municipal police arctrained, and paid by the smallergovernments. They perform the same functions as the SUte Police. Mayors, who cxer-ci.se police powers under the general supervision of prefectural general sccrcUries In charge ofmatters (see, use the municipal police to enforce the law. investigate crimes, and apprehend violators within their jurisdictions. Units of the municipal police are constantly being amalgamated Into the SUte Police. In0 budget, provision Is made for the Incorporation ofunicipal units Into the SUte Police,NA officers and noncommissioned officers were designated to train these units.
Mobile Security GroupsTheSecurity Groups (Groupes Mobiles deare the successors of the Mobile Rural Protection Groups {Groupes Mobiles dea type of rural consUbu-lary created In Algeria in5 lo strengthen the forces of public order in rural areas. By the end5 the number of groups had grownnd the number of police. Byurther increaseenroups had occurred, and the GMPR were renamed Mobile Security Groups. The OMS arc recruited mainly from among the ranks ofveterans. They are uniformed and paid by the SNA and trained by special army personnel on detached service with the SNA. As with otherforces, units are placed at the disposition of subprefects throughout Northern Algeria, anda variety of missions ranging from actualcombat in the field In cooperation with army and gendarmerie units to guard duty at shelterypical OMS field group is composed of:
fficers
oncomoUMloned otteent
S radio opera ton
e drivenehung men
Usual equipment includes individualrucks, radios, and additionaland motorized and electronic equipment as required by the particular mission.
epublican Security Companies (CRS)The Republican Security Companies In Algeria are units of the Surete Nationale that are placed at the disposition of the Delegation Gen-oral in Algeria and assigned by It, in turn, to the supervision of the SNA. which handles all of the Delegation General's police responsibilities. The CRS constitutes an elite uniformed police service
in Algeria. It is patterned on the CRS of the metropole. which furnished the original training personnel for its organization, and it fulfills most of the same missions. The CRS forces areto reinforce the local police in emergencies, and furnish personnel to train the newly created units. CRS officers and noncommissioned officers are in charge of training at the State Police School at Hussein Dey, near Algiers. In the past, CRS units In Algeria have participated in jointwith CRS companies sent from the
The first three CRS companies reached Algeria from metropolitan Francehey wereand replaced by other companies from the metropole during the following two years, main-taming approximately the same strength, until the outbreak of the rebellion Inuring the first week of thatere dispatched to Algeria by the Ministry of the Interior, includingy airlift. In response to the urgent request of the Governor General for assistance In restoring order. To permit theof the metropolitan units to France, thegovernment and the Algerian administration in6 decided to establish organic, that Is, locally recruited, CRS units. Four Autonomous Reserve Companies (Compagnies Autonomes dcwhich had been established ininere reorganized into therganic CRS companies:. In the followingew companiesbeenentral Group Headquarters was set up at Algiers, andh,h CRS Groups were established, respectively, at Oran, Algiers, and Constantine. Though the organic companies are placed at the disposition of the Delegation General lo Algeria, these unitsconstitute an integral part of the CRSwithinete Nationale In theof the Interior. As of January8 organic CRS companiesotorcycle squads,otal strength of, were assigned to the three Algerian Groups and their Central headquarters as follows:
Central Group Headquarters. Algiers:
otorcycle squad In generalh CRS Group, headquarters at Onui:
hrd CRS companies at Oran
1 motorcycle'squad at Oran
h (Mostaganero)
h (Tlemcen)
h (sinh CRS Group, headquarters at Algiers:
dth CRS companies (Algiers)
1 motorcycle squad attachedrd (Algiers)
ISSth (Bllda)
rerffie)
h (TiaOuzou)
12th CRS Group, headquarters atndth CRS companiesotorcycle squad attachedndthththhthth (Phlllppevllle)
CRS personnel are quartered in military-type barracks. Each company is commandedommandantho is assistedfficers In charge of sections (officersnd an assistant peace officer (officier adjoint de laoncommissioned personnelergeants-major2 sergeantsompany clerkervice personnel (agents denlisted men (sons-brigadiers,otorcycle squad is underfficer; enlisted personnelergeants, andorporals and privates. Each CRS companyrucks of alleeps,radios; ail motorcycle squad personnel have motorcycles. Armament Includes pistols, machine guns, and tear grenades.
With the creation of the local CRS companies, the units sent out from the metropole werewithdrawn. The number of metropolitan companies had been reduced frommmediately after the outbreak of the rebellion4yy October of the same year, all metropolitan units had been returned to France.
The CRS hasotable record in Algeria. Used In conjunction with thethe DST, and army units, it has assisted in rounding up terrorists and controlling rioting elements in the cities, and has efficientlytraffic on the highways. The CRS is widely known and respected for Its competence In controlling riots. It is significant that, during the rioting of8 in Algiers, plotters against the Fourth Republic, including certain army officers, first arranged for the substitution of Territorial Units for the CRS forces guarding theGeneral building (seeefore they gave the signal for the successful stoirning of the building by the mob.
endarmeryThree legions ofGendarmery (Gendarmerie10thh bisndh torone legion of Mobile Gendarmeryhre assignedh military region of France. (All legions In tho same military region have the same numerical designation. They arc distinguished
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each other by the use of bisertc.) Regional headquarters are atTotal gendarmery strength In Algeriat the endhis figure was expected to be Increased to0 The gendarmery Is recruited, trained, and administered by the Ministry of the Armed Forces, but placed at the disposition of the civilsubprcfects, andaid in law enforcement. The gendarmery may perform any of the missions of the municipal police or State Police. It may also act at military police. Its civilian functions include the maintenance of public safety and security in rural districts and along the main arteries of communication. Qen-darmery personnel often work under PJ officers in the detection and apprehension of criminals: all officers and certain noncommissioned officers of.the service are ex-offlclo PJ officers. Organized along military lines, trie gendarmery isby picked career military officers. The smallest unit Is the brigade, varyingoen according to the importance of the district. The brigade Is commandedergeantorigades makeection, under aall sectionsepartmentompany,quadron chiefompanlos makeegion, which Is commandedolonel.
b. Crura forces engaged in the maintenance or public orderIn addition to the regularforces, the situation arising from thein Algeria has led to the creation of aof other full-time and part-time forces topolice action. The bast known of thesewas the part-tune Territorial Units (Unitescomposed mainly of Europeans but including Muslims also. These units were legally dissolved as of Marchltri thoce^.'u:Itlcrs' iv-volt of. because it was found that the revolt had received much active and passive support from the UT's. Most of their members, however, have been retained In "reservisthich do periodic tours of active duty. Existing quasi-poltce organizations include: UrbanUnits (Disvositifs dehe paramilitary Muslim auxiliary forces called Harkas; autodefense units; and the forces associated with the Specialized Administrative Sections, the Maghzcns. In addition to these, an undetermined number of quasi-official and private organizations made up largely of Europeanall allegedly dedicated to the maintenance of order, have sprung up, particularly In the cities. Some of them have enjoyed brief official approval, or were incorporated into official organizations, notably the UT's; others have been officially banned, have gone underground, or have simply disappeared.
erritorial Units (UT)The Algerian administration early0 created the militia-type Territorial Units in an effort to combat rebel terrorism In the dtics. All Algerian males ofdescent up to the age ofere required toayeeks to local guard duties. In emergencies, such as riots, disasters, or other civilian disturbances, Territorials were subject to call for further service. Armed and trainedarmy supervision, Territorials served atkey installations In most cities. Two armored units (Unites Territoriales Bltndies) were created. The strength of the UT was estimated aten at its peak, providing an average daily duty strength ofo the nature of the operation, however,times that number could be mobilizedelatively short time to handle anticipatedor other emergencies. Algerians ofextraction were later accepted into UT ranks, and at the time of the dissolution of thethere were anuslimOpinions on the military value of the UT varied. Supporters of the system claimed that the units freed the equivalent of two regular
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Army divisions for duty elsewhere. But whatever the value of these forces in dealing with Muslim rebels, their dependability in the face ofdemonstrations .was obviouslyEven before the revolt ofroved the unreliability of the UT, the European demonstrations-of, and ofhowed the indifference If not the actual collaboration of the UT with theReports indicate that the dissolution of the UT may have been more formal than real and that its members have retained their arms and, more or less clandestinely, their organization. What has remained of the UT since itsotentially subversive force against the government but noolice force.
rban Protection Units (DPU)The first DPU's were organized at Algiers in7 by Captain Maurice Hilly and Lieutenant Colonel Roger Trinquier, both of whom laterprominent figures in the Algerianof Public Safety and the army revolt ofalled at first Urban Protection Groups (Groupes de Protectionthe name was quickly changed to Urban Protection Units (DPU) because of the undesirable association of the initials QPU with the Soviet secret police. An organization primarily of Algerians of European background, the DPU was set up to collecton civil disturbances and threats toorder, and to provide an armed reserve which, like the UT, could be quickly mobilized Into perform police duties. Inerge Buret, then Inspector General ofon Extraordinary Mission (Inspecteur Qeniral de VAdministration en Mission(see this Chapter,nder Regional Government) in Algiers, published an order extending the DPU to other cities in the prefecture. Under the terms of the order,and Muslims who were not yet incorporated or who were not subject to Incorporation Into the Territorial Units were subject to draft into the DPU's. The DPU's were armed with small caliber weapons and organized into sections under joint police (civil) and military control. The firstin Algiers, were placedattalion commander ofh paratroop division of the army for training andolicewas attached to each section toegal cloak for its activities and to attempt to ensure that the section did not exceed itsThe total strength of the DPU eventually reached0 in the Algiers area, rindudinglockuildingembers. The DPU's are charged ^with the protection of goods, persons, and instal-llattons within limited block defense areas throughout the city. At first authorized to use their arms only within their defense areas, DPU members eventually came to be used to control and organize demonstrations, releasing CRS units for duties elsewhere. Most of the European DPU members, and many of the Muslims, are armyMuslim units are said to number in their ranks many former rebels. Released fromand shelter camps to serve with the DPU "Muslimhe former rebelsighly effective police and informer network Into the Muslim quarters of Algiers.
A DPU women's auxiliary was createdembers serveull- or part-time basis. Full-time duties include searching female Muslim suspects for the police and army, while part-time recruits devote three periods per week to attending lectures on civil defense (that Is, antiterrorism) matters by army officers.
arkasThe paramilitary Muslim auxiliary forces known as Harkas are becomingImportant among the forces of order in Algeria. Considered the best solution to the problem of countering rebel activities in outlying areas, the number of Harkis (Individual members of Harkas) has been increased7 to0 inecruited, trained, and equipped by the army, their primary mission is combat in the field against rebel detachments, although they are often placed at the disposition of the SpecialSections (SAS) and work closely with the Maghzens (seehich also support the
Harkis are organized into Harkas, which vary in sizelatoonompany. There werearkas In existence at the endhe usual detachmenten under the command of an army lieutenant or captain. Several French noncommissionedassist the commanding officer. Harkis are well paid by Algerian standards. They may belocallyiven area, or from prisoners won over from the rebellion to the French cause. Muslim Algerians released from the army are also recruited into the Harkas. The immediateof Harkis live In army-built huts in acamp which protects them from rebel coun-termeasures, and also deters Harki defections, of which reportedly there are very few.
Harkis are sometimes employed as localcollectors and as guides and scouts in army operations. Those with local relatives oftenvaluable Information on rebel activities through this source. Harkas often pursue small rebel bands. Ex-rebels recruited as Harkis are particularly skilled In rebel tactics and In recov-
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ering arms cached by the rebels. Thoroughlywith the terrain in the area, Harkis are an asset to French array units conducting localHarkis are frequently horse- or camel-mounted; but many ride in Jeeps or operate on foot, according to the terrain
utodcfense unitsThe concept of civilian self-defense against rebel attacksearlyhen tbe problem ofIsolated European-owned farms und Muslim villages from terrorist attack became acute. Anfsolated farms in the Oran region were abandoned between theof the rebellion andndere destroyed by the rebels.comparable figures are not available for the other areas of Algeria, it is probable that they were as high or higher elsewhere, notably in the Constantinc region. In addition, entire villages frequently became centers for rebel intelligence collection and sources of supply. To check this trend, the army was authorized to organize an autodcfense system for farms and to raise and arm village home guards for the local defense of their villages.
The farm defense system is employed for the most part in valleys, where farms are closeand substantiallyavalry regiment, or other highly mobile army units, may include as manyasutodefenso units in its subscctor, all of which are plottedarge-scale operations map at unitingle autodcfense unit is builtentral farm (ferme ptiote) situated on high ground. Aobservation tower, approximatelyeet high. Is located on the central farm. It is then ascertained which of the neighboring farms can be directly observed from the lower, and this de-termlnes the perimeter of thelotting diagram Is maintained in the tower showing the distance and the direction of the neighboring farms which are occupied and also those which contain farm buildings but which are notThe central farm is generally surrounded by barbed wire, and has radio communication with the military unit assigned to Its protection. Tbe towers normally arc not manned during daylight hours but are constantly manned from sunset to sunrise. Quards are civilians, usually Muslims, and they have no other duties. Noncentral farms are also heavily armed. Rosters and logs arc kept; all unusual sounds and occurrences areNight Inspections are made by militaryat Intervals of three or four nights, and these Inspections too are entered In the log book Army units assigned to autodefensc duties can reach the most remote unitalf hour. The farmers themselves bear all the direct costs of the autodefensc system, Including all materials and payment of the civilian guards. It Isthat the program costs many fanners as much0 new francs (abouter year.
The army proceeded very cautiously with the arming of Muslim guards In villages and regroup-ment centers. While some villages were reluctant to draw rebel attention to themselves byFrench arms, the real difficulty lay In army fears that arms issued to the villages would find their way into rebel hands. Preliminarywere inconclusive. Some village and re-groupment center guards promptly defected to the rebels with their weapons. In other coses, suspiciously high rates of arms "losses" andconsumption rates were reported.low start, however, the number of villages brought under the system has increased rapidly, more than doubling each year. The number rosennnd toyhe average sizeillage autodefense uniten.illagers were under arms at the enduards are generally unpaid; they are armed with shotguns, and usually weararticles of clothing suchash or armband.
Despite the phenomenal growth of armedtbe autodefense system has not completely met the original expectations of the army. Apart from Individuals and units that have defected, many units, possibly the majority, have notsought out the rebels and destroyed them, even when the latter have operated fairly openly and in small groups In the vicinity.by Implication that this lack ofon the part of the home guards may have been Justified in the pastumber of reasons, the French Army High Command In9 called on autodefense units to pass to theagainst the rebels. In an Order of the Day ofen. Maurice Challe, then commander in chief of the armed forces Inasserted that the "forces of order" (the army) had broken up the rebel formations Into units which the autodefense could handle, and called for "active autodefense that will radiate out, and not autodefensc that Is passive and shriveled up in itso marked change has been observed, however, in the activities of the autodcfense units.
The success of tho autodefense system remains uncertain. It does not eliminate the need tor military protection, although it makes protection somewhat cheaper. The army, moreover. Isin the amount of discipline it can impose on the system. With particular reference to the farm defense system, some troop commanders
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have noted acidly that many farmer* leave their farms at night and go Into town to sleep.onsequence, the Muslim guards, with noexcept the occasional patrol checks, do little guarding.
pecialized Adrninittrattve Sections (SAS) and Urban Administrative Sections (SAU)The first Specialized Administrative Sections (Sections AdministratesSAS) were established in Algeria inReminiscent of the Arab Bureaus ofhthe SAS were staffed by officer-volunteers from the French Army trained In Muslim affairs, and were assigned the mission of reestablishing with the Muslim population in rural communes contacts which had deteriorated since theof the rebellion. Similar units, known as Urban Administrative Sections (Sections Admrnis-tratweswere later established in urban areas. (See this Chapter,nd Chapter IV,or furtherof the SAS and the SAUAS andAU Installations were in existence In Algeria, staffed by morerench officials drawn from civilian ranks and active and reserve army officer ranks.
(a) sas and kachzxnsSASparticularly those located in remote orpacified areas, are protected byof Moghaznis called Maghzens. The Mog-haznis are Muslim fighters recruited mainly from among veterans of tho French Army, and trained, uniformed, and equipped by the army. The size of the Moghaenl detachments varies with theof the installation. The followingof organization planned for SAS posts destined to be installed in someacified areas0 is typical of an SAS Installation:
SAS personnel (French, or Algerians of EuropeanAS chief
Attache, assistant to SAS chler
AtUchds
1 Noncommissioned officer Maohten personnelhief of Moghaants
3 Drivers
Moghaints, 1st and 2nd class
< -J- Equipment for each Maghzenenaultupplementaryounts (camels oradio ^sending and receiving sets^.
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aghzens are responsible for theof the SAS Installation to which they are as-i. Their duties range from acting as local and guards to tracking down rebels, though (histanccs of Maghzens engaging In Held combat [are relatively rare, since SAS posts are usually installed in areas deemed to have been cleared of important rebel forces. Where needed.are strengthened by Harka units placed at the disposition of the SAS chief by the army. Moghaznis appear well trained and turned out. suitably armed, and able to maintain order under the guidance of their superiors. They arewell paid by local standards, and morale is said to be satisfactory, with few instancesof defections to the rebels.
(b) sauTho SAU's operate in the larger urban areas where contact between theand subprefectural authorities and the Muslim population is limited or lacking. FirstInhe SAU's areafter the SAS In the rural areas, provide many of the same services (medical, social,assistance, vocational training,andnd exercise the same controls over the Muslim population (maintenance ofimpositionurfew, operation of an identity card system, surveillance by house and blockhe SAU's have no specialforces corresponding to the Maghzens, but rely on the local civilian police, or in some cases on army units, for protection of theirand maintenance of order.
riminological facilities und methods
The Algerian police use the same methods and have essentially the same facilities for theand investigation of crimes and theof criminals as the SUreti Nationale of metropolitan France. These Include central and criminal files, and statistical, anthropometric, photographic, flngerprlnling. and scientificlaboratory faculties manned by trainedModern armament, communications equipment, and motor transport are provided to all units, though horses and camels are still in use in many remote areas.
a. FilesThe Central File Service (Ftchterithin the Subdirectorate of General Investigation, is responsible for coordinating all criminal and administrative investigations inand for communication with theand international police services. Through Centraleach year distributes within and outside Algeria several hundreddescriptions of individuals sought by theor expelled from or denied residence In tbeCriminal Police cooperates with the metropolitan service and the International Commission of Criminal Police (Interpol) in the apprehension of international crlrninals. theof counterfeiting, and the suppression of the international traffic In narcotics.
of interrogationThelike the metropolitan French, tend toscientific techniques of crimethan do police in the United Kingdom orStates. Great dependence is placed onIn the solution of crimes, anduse of third degree methods bymilitary authorities Is well documented.cases of terrorism, some policeofficials have attempted off-the-recordof the use of torture on the groundsby such methods can the authoritiesin time to prevent terroristuse of torture In Algeria has given risecontroversy in metropolitanis little discussed lit* Algeria itself. Thepress reflects the views of the Europeanmost of whom apparently have littleany effective method of combatting theOpposition to torture has beenby some French socialists andAlgeria and, notably, by the hierarchy ofCatholic Church In the area.
or nfFOBUExsThe police andconsiderable use of Informers, bothand Involuntary. The former arcamong the population and from among"rallied rebels" (that Is. rebels whoover lo theccording toreports, prisoners released fromare requiredondition of theirunder threat of severe penalties lo signto mform the military or civilany rebel activities of which they haveThe amount and value of Informationthrough these sources cannot be
dentity and registration system
The metropolitan system of registration of the civil population extends to Algeria, and mostfigure in tbe records of one of thebranches of the French Government.all Algerians of European background arewith the authorities of the place of their birth, and bear the National Identity Card (Carte Sattonaler otherdocumentation. Muslim Algerians residing in the cities, in relocated villages, or in areas under SAS tutelage are also registered. One of the first acts of the SAS or SAU authorities uponin an area Is the takingensus and the issuance of individual identity cards to eachInhabitant. This cardescription of the subject, with photographs, fingerprints and the subject's signature or mark. Individualarc thereafter maintained on eachand additional records arc made whenever the Individual comes to the attention of thefor medical care, social or employment assistance, or disciplinary reasons. Besidescards, some SAU Jurisdictionshich are compulsory for all male wage carriers In the jurisdiction between the ages ofhis permits closer control of the so-called "idle youths" (that is, thoseho are thought to provide afield for rebel recruitment.
Rigid curfew regulations, and periodic dragnet-type operations called ratissages, tn which houses, public places, vehicles, and streets are combed forinof proper documentation, complement the registration procedures and aid In suppressing terrorism in the cities. Similar roundups aroby army units outside the cities, in areas where clashes between rebel and French troops have occurred. All male Muslims found in such areas are brought to so-called Transit and Screening Centers for identity checking andprocessing.
Many officers In charge of SAS or SAUappoint block wardens, who are madefor seeing that the Inhabitants of their blocks, and only they, arc in their respective houses at night,ass has been issued. In the Casbah of Algeria the number ofin each house is indicated in painted figures at the entrance. An act of terrorism is followed by an Immediate check of every house for the proper number of occupants.
echniques of riot control
The forces of order are frequently called upon to deal with riots, strikes, and other civilin the population centers of Algeria. The outbreak of the nationalist rebellion in4 had the effect of drawing off to the rebels much of the militant nationalist leadership, which, prior to that time, had been active Indemonstrations by the Muslimin the cities. Hence, there has been relatively little mob activity by Muslim elements in the cities since that time. Muslim protest expressed Itself67 in the form of general strikes, demonstrating solidarity in support of the nationalist cause or because of fear of FLNbut7 the army had developedfor dealing with this tactic. The strike of the summerhich involved Muslimas well as trade unionists, was carried off successfully. But the week-long general strike culled In7 was broken by the army, which forcibly opened shops closed In violation of government antistrike orders, and arrestedand trade unionists.
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Almost all instances of rioting and mob violence5 have involved mainly Europeanof the population, and such instances have frequently grown out of ostensibly peacefulorganized to protest someaction or inaction. European demonstrations against central government policies have often had the tacit or active support of local European officials and police, who, according to observers, frequently stand complacently by while crowdare fanned by agitators. In suchfuneral processions, for example,from the burialuropean victim of rebel terrorism, have become rioting mobs, attacking Muslim communities and government buildings and causing great property damage.
When the civilian police are unable or unwilling to control such disturbances, CRS and army units have proven fully capable of dealing with them, when requested or permitted to do so. The army and the CRS, moreover, by reason of their great mobility, manpower reserves, strategic locations, equipment, and training, have demonstratedcompetence in riot control, and probably possess the capability to deal effectively with any civilian outburst conceivable in presentThe tactics employed vary with theA favored technique is that ofthe rioters Into less important sectors of the city where the riot in effect burns itself out.
The ability of the army and the CRS to control the civil population In urban areas, however. Is no guarantee of civilian order, since many doubt whether the army itself, the key element In the situation, can be relied upon in all circumstances to put down European rioters, particularly in the event of moves by the central government that the army might Interpret as foreshadowing the abandonment of Algeria by France. Armynotably Colonels Ducasse, Trlnquler (one of the organizers of thehomazo, andwith the acquiescence of their superiors,deeply involved in the disorders ofhich, characteristically, began as ain memory of three French soldiersby the rebels. Plotting to use the disorders to prevent the Investiture of the Pflimlinwhich they suspected of favoringwith the rebels, responsible officers not only refused to curb rioting demonstrators, but brought about the replacement of CRS units, which might have, done so. by DPU units under army control. This permitted the sacking of the Government General building by Europeanand led eventually to the collapse of the Fourth Republic. Tbe obvious reluctance of thearmy to put down the Europeann Algiers in0 raised again the ques-
; ion of the army's loyalty to the government, though in this case the army finally obeyedde Gaulle's order to end the uprising.
defense
Civil defense measures In force in the metropole extend, at least in theory, to Algeria. (See NIShapter v,nder Civil Defense,iscussion of civil defense In tberactical matter, however, the authorities inare little concerned with civil defense asto include measures to be taken againstthreats to the external security of thesince no important threat to Algeria fromthe country is foreseen, apart from theraised by the nationalist rebellion operating against Algeria from Tunisian and MoroccanThe limited resources available to the French authorities for civil defense are considered to be better employed In the metropole. On the other hand, the emergency that has existed In Algeria since the outbreak of the4 has given rise to many typical civil defense measures. These measures include, on the part of the civilian administration, theof special decrees regulating the movement and residence of persons, the bearing of arms by civilians, the right of assembly, and the control of communications including, notably, the press. The military is charged with arming andcivil defense forces and relocation andof the Muslim communities. Among groups enforcing civil defense measures such as these are all the units of the Algerian police organization. In particular the DPU's. the autodefense units, and, prior to their dissolution inhe Territorial Units. Among.civil defense-typethat have become commonplace since theof the rebellion are: periodic halting and searching of individual vehicles; patrolling ofroads; curfews; the constitution of and the granting of special competence to militaryarbitrary searches of private homes with confiscation, of material of potential value to the rebellion; and the preventive detention ofIndividuals.
personnel
5 the Algerian policeompletely autonomous body, having the sameto the Government General in Algiers as the Surete' Nationale to the centralMoreover, in addition to the State Police, therearge number of independent municipal police systems, the personnel of which are appointed by the mayors and paid by the localeries of decrees datedlaced the SNA under the SureU A'a-
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and set forth the conditions ofand reclassification of the various grades of the Algerian service into the corresponding classes of the Surete. The personnel of the two systems thus became interchangeable, though most ensuing transfers involved the movement of metropolitan personnel to Algeria rather than the reverse. Personnel of the police In Algeria were considered placed at the disposal of theGeneral by the Ministry of the Interior. However, the reorganization0 ended thisand returned the SNA to control ofin Algeria. Although many formerof the Sureti are serving with the SNA. there is now no direct relationship between the staffs of the two organizations.
Until recently, Europeans and Algerians of"Europeanthe majority of the personnel of the SNA. This preponderance, however, has been reduced as more and more municipal police services, with their high proportion of Muslims, have entered the SNA through the amalgamation program. The rapid expansion of the GMS, also predominantly Muslim in personnel thoughofficered by Europeans, has furtherto this process. Control of the police, however, has remained firmly In the hands ofand European Algerians, whof the higher positions in the police. This stems from former policies tending to limit the number of Muslims in top positions and the consequent seniority that Europeans at present generally enjoy over the relatively recentlyMuslims. Moreover, most Europeans have had the benefit of more education ormore suitable for administrative positions In the French civil service than the average Muslim likely to be Interestedolice career.
Despite these handicaps, however. Algerianpolice officers are now beginning to climb through the ranks to high positions. Theirwas nominally favoredovernmentenacted, to meet whategitimate Muslim grievance bya governmental policy of encouraging the access of Muslims Into the civil service.the police. The decree and series oforders established general qualifications. Including French citizenship and good moralto be met by Muslim candidates for civil service positions, and required that fixedof all new vacancies in certain classes be filled by Muslims. These measures haveMuslim participation in themall extent, but they have been of less effect In this sector of administration than In some others, notably education.
The Director of General Security In Algeriasubdlrectors of the subordinate servicesServices. General investigation.Services) are appointed by decree of theof the Interior, normally from amongcorps. However, the extensiveof police powers In Algeria to the militaryIn the appointment8 of an armyYves Godard. to the post of Directorthe SNA. Colonel Godard was replacedy Jacques Aubert, _
The most
jbTTor Godard's replacement wasdissatisfaction with the handling of the0 insurrection by his security forces. Subordinate police officials arc also appointed by decree of the Minister of the Interior, normally from lists of successful candidates for suchNoncommissioned officers areby the prefects. Other noncommissioned personnel are accepted as recruits on the basis of their performance on competitive examinations, for which Muslims, as well as Europeans andAlgerians, are eligible. All positions In the municipal police are filled by appointments of the mayor.unicipal police unit Is amalgamated with the State Police, all ranks are appropriately reclassified
The loyalty and reliability of the police areto assess in the present situation, in which many individuals holding the highest positions of trust in all categories of the public service appear uncertain where their loyalties lie. The police have thus far proven loyal to. and have followed the orders of, their superiors. They can beon to maintain order, within the limits of their ability, if they are ordered, or permitted to do so. There is no evidence of importantsubversion or Infiltration among the police, but there have been occasional reports of rebel penetration among Muslim personnel. Theof all services Is reported good. This applies as well to the Muslim police, despite slowness of promotions and other factors that mightbe expected to affect morale adversely. The legal prohibition against strikes by the police which is in effect in the metropole extends also to Algeria
The training. Indoctrination, and efficiency of the various units of the police vary; recentlypersonnel are on the whole neither so carefully selected hi the first instance nor so well trained as regular SNA personnel. Newlymunicipal units, however, undergoIn SNA methods and police work given byand noncommissioned officersfor this purpose.
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Police schools
Personnel ol the SNA who entered theirservices in the metropole and other highpersonnel ol the Algerian police have in many cases received training at one of the principal metropolitan training establishments; thePolice School (Ecoie Nationale de lathe Center of Instruction andof the National Security Organization (Centre d'Instruction et d'Applicatton dereteand the Nationalof Combat Sports (Centre National des Sports dehe rank and file of the Algerian police receive their training in Algeria, cither in their own units or at the Police School (Ecoie de Police) at Hussein Dey. near Algiers. Training in Algeria Is of shorter duration than In theand tends to be more specific. Emphasis is placed on certain phases of instruction designed to fit the emergency situation In the area, such as antiterrorlst tactics, riot control, and bomb disposal.
The ENP Is located at Salnt-Cyr-au-Mont-d'Ortroad cultural,and practical program for police officersfor posts of responsibility in the higherof thefuture superintendents ofwell as practical training forofficers. Trainees live at the school; the curriculum comprises three main categories of subject matter: general culture, basictraining, and practical work. The general culture program Is intended tonini-mal cultural background for future police(commissaires deandidates attend lectures In history, bterature. science,and the arts. Professional training subjects Include studies in clinical criminology, police work, and organization of the police services. Practical training Includes report writing, typing, driving, photography, physical training,and Ufcaaving. The duration of the course is one year for police superintendent candidates (elexes-commissairci) and six months for police deputies (policend police officers (offl-ciers des of the summerwere enrolled at the school, dividedections of policeections of police officers,ection of student policeObservers and auditors from present and former overseas dependencies alsohe CIASN. located at Sensigorous course of practical training forCRS personnel. The average duration of tbe course is six months- The Center hasforrainees, who livemphasis Is on physical training, acrobatics,work, weapons handling, and military type discipline. Special technical training Is given to motorcycle squad trainees.
The National Center of Combat Sports at Plom-bieres-les-Dijon (Cote d'Or) offers instruction to police officials in physical self-defense techniques. Police superintendents, police officers, andare enrolled in the school, though aobjective is the turning out of physicalspecialists who can In turn assumefor the physical programs of theirunits. The duration of the course varies. Aboutrainees arc enrolled In each cycle. The principal subjects taught are boxing (French- andiu-jitsu, wrestling, fencing,and rescue work. Emphasis is on methods of Instruction of tbe subjects and the adaptation of the various disciplines to police work, rather than on Individual performance.
The Police School at Hussein Dey. just outside Algiers, was established In4 pursuantovernment General decree oft offers training in basic police worktate Police recruits each term. The director of the school is M. Labarre. Theof the course is approximately two months, and special emphasis Is given to mine-defusing techniques and antiterrorlst tactics. CRS officers and noncommissioned officers are in charge ofand training. One hundred seventy trainees, graduating ath commencement exercises held Octoberroughthe number of police who havetraining at the school.
The armyounterguerrllla school near Oram It alsochool offeringtraining for personnel of the DPU atoastal resort towniles west of Algiers, which Is the headquartersoreign Legion Airborneolice school for Algerian trainees offering training In antiterrorlst tactics was reportedly established near Pont Blandln5 with facilitieslgerianAvailable information does not Indicate whether this school Is still in operation.
ttitude of the public toward the police
a. EuropeansThe attitude of theAlgerian population toward the police In many localities is linked to the degree of success of the police in suppressing crime, and innationalist terrorism. The bulk of the police leadership, drawn from Europeans and European Algerians, can in general be counted upon towith non-Muslims against Muslims.are treated, except In those rare coses of Europeans suspected of collaboration with the rebellion, with the consideration normally shown
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Ability of the police to maintain public order and safety
Since the outbreak of the rebellionhe whole problem of the restoration andof order In Algeria has been far removed from its normal framework. The police arc not, nor are they expected to be. capable of coping with all. or even an important proportion, of the threats dally posed to public order by thechallenge of ordinary crime and theof criminal acts growing out of themovement. In dealing with ordinary crime, in the cities and populated areas between the ctlles. the police appear to be competent and to discharge their duties well. Moreover, the police continue toart In the suppression ofin the cities and hi the apprehension of terrorists. Ordinary crime, however, cannot easily be separated from other attacks on pubhc order. The long reluctance of the Frenchto recognize officially the existenceationalist movement has further complicated the task. In the absence of an admitted civil war or nationalist rebellion, politicnl assassins arc considered to be murderers, terrorists and bomb throwers to be arsonists and criminaland rebel soldiers to be bandits. This haa placed abnormal demands on the police and the judiciary, who have the responsibility incircumstances to deal with offenses against the common law. In view of the Inability ofO-man police force to maintain law and order everywhere inivision ofbetween the police and the military hascome into being. The police are In general responsible for the suppressions of criminal acts of all kinds in the cities and surrounding aroas, while the army and paramilitary units (Harkaa, Maglizens) assume this responsibility outside the cities. Where army units are required tothe police in the cities, their nominal subordination to civilian control may be assured by the procedure of placing the troops at theof the civilian authorities, or byof military officers to civilian posts.
C. Penal system
The French penal system, which applies tois based on the Penal Code (Codehich defines violations of the law and specifies punishments for them, and on the Code ofProcedure (Code de Procedurehich outlines the procedures for bringing criminals to Justice and names the officials and courts charged with their apprehension and trial (see NIShaiter V,. The prisonunder the Ministry of Justice, administers
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national prisons, and departmental officials axe in charge of the departmental prisons.delinquents are the responsibility of the Directorate for Supervised Education,art of the Ministry of Justice.
By US standards, the French penal system, especially as it is at present operated in Algeria, is archaic and harsh. The codes themselvesheavily weighted in favor of the government and against the individual. Most prisons Inare old: practically all are lacking in the most basic equipment, such as plumbing. All are seriously overcrowded. Many prisoners serve out their sentences, or serve periods of Indefinitewithout trial, In prison barracks,camps, and places of confinement other than regular prisons.
be Penal Code
Three types of violations are recognized by French law as embodied In the Penal Code. The least serious is the contravention, which may be translated as infraction. These minor offenses are tried by Courts of First Instance (Tribunauxnown prior to the reforms8 as Tribunaux dc Paix (Courts of the Justice of themall fineail sentence of up to two months may be Imposederson judged guiltyontravention
The second type of offense Is the debt, which corresponds roughly to the Anglo-American lesser crimes anderson accusedVt is triedourt of Superior Instancede Grandeonvictionerm of Imprisonment of up to fiveoss of civic rights, or any combination of these three punishments.
The most serious offense Is the crime, thatelony triable In the Court of Assizes orCourt (Couronviction mayin execution, long Imprisonment plus loss of civic rights, or merely loss of civic rights,to the punishment prescribed by law for the particular crime. The minimum prison sentenceerson convictedrime is five years, though time spent In detention prior tois deducted from the total time to be served.
The property of persons convicted of crimes against the security of the state may beby the state, although part of it may be left to the innocent spouse of the convictedIn addition to suffering imprisonment and loss of civicerson convictedeiit or crime may be further punishedesidence prohibition (interdiction dehichresidence In the place where the crime was committederiod of up toears. The residence prohibition may not be imposed unless the law under which the person is tried specifically so provides and unlessenalty is assigned by the court. The residence prohibition may be cancelledardon or reduced by anmeasure. Heavier penalties are provided for recidivists than for first offenders, andcriminals may be confined to specialfor life. The law also provides some attenuation of sentence in the case of minors and aged people. Special judges try juvenileunder special regulations.
Under French law two categories of persons may be punishedrime:hose who havethe crime and their accomplices, who are equally liable under the law; andhose whonown criminal to flee, who could haverime orerson in danger at no peril to themselves but refused to do so, or who failed to testify to the Innocenceerson they knew to be innocent. Persons in the latter category may be convictedelit and fined or imprisoned.
The Penal Code distinguishes between crimes against the state and crimes against individuals. The former category, denned in the Code as crimes against the security of the state, includesselling of stale secrets, and inciting toor otherwise threatening the security of the state. Treason, for which the punishment is death, is the most serious crime against theof the state. Treason can be committed onlyrench national, and Is defined asarms against France; Inciting or aiding apower to engage in hostilities against France; delivering troops, territory, or material ofinterestoreign power; inciting ortroops to desertoreign power in time of war, or recruiting troopsower at war with France; and establishing communication with the enemy In time of war. Other crimes against the security of the state includeFranceeclaration of war or to reprisals by another nation; enrolling Frenchmen on French soil into foreign armies; bringing about the loss of French territory; engaging In civil war or revolt against constituted authority;armed force Illegally; taking over orilitary command without properpillaging or destroying propertiesto the state; raising bands of persons with the intent of committing any of theacts or giving shelter or lodging to any member of such bands; andeetingeditious nature to take place on one'sThe penalities attached to offenses against the security of the state varyinimum sentence of one year in prison to death.
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While In most matters the Penal Code has evolved In the direction ol leniency, penalties for crimes against the security of the state, which are now of major importance in Algeria, have been retained unaltered and the definitions of these crimes have constantly been broadened. Thus, treason formerly was defined merely asarms against France ororeign power to engage in hostilities against France. Today, however, the definition has been extended to include the other actions enumerated above, all of which carry the death penalty.
Crimes against property are also severely dealt with. Theft committed at night, by violence, on the public thoroughfare, or on railroads Is regardedrime and exposes the offender to aterm of five years. The thief who injures his victim is liable to life Imprisonment at hard labor. Penalties for arson, which are extremely severe, alwayserm of Imprisonment at forced labor, and if the property set afire servedwelling, whether-Jnhabited or not, theIs liable to the death penalty.
he Code Of Criminal Procedure
The Code of Criminal Procedure outlines the entire procedure to be followed in the repression and pimlshment of crime, Indicates the officials responsible for the investigation and prosecution of crime, specifies the courts competent to hear various types of criminal cases, and describes how these courts must be constituted. It defines the rights of the accused during the pretrial inquiry and during trial, outlines appeal procedures,the parole system, and determines the civil status of ex-convicts.
The composition of the magistracy In Algeria Is the same as that In metropolitan France. Both Judges and prosecutors are members of the French body of magistrates and are subject to the same regulations as their metropolitanThey are appointed by the Ministry of Justice, and are not subject to control by theGeneral or by other authorities in Algeria. Judges are removable only for irregularities of conduct. Local prosecutors (procureura de la Re-pubUque) are subject to administrative discipline, and are required to follow the instructions of their hierarchic superiors. They may, however, orally express their disagreement with acase. Appointments to the lowest ranks of either branch of the magistracy are limited to French citizensears of age or older whoa law degree and haverofessional examination.
a. Investigation or crimes and prosecution or criminalsThe Code of Criminal Procedureofficials exercising criminal police powers into:hose who by virtue of their office arc primarily responsible for the repression of crime; andheir auxiliaries. In the first group arc prosecutors assigned to Courts of First Instance, examining magistrates, who conduct the pretrial inquiries, and. under certain conditions, mayors and their deputies. The second group Isof officers and noncommissioned officers of the police and of the gendarmcrlo.
Anyone observing an offense may report it to the mayor or police commissioner or to Inspectors of the gendarmerie These officials draw up an official reporttating the nature and circumstances surrounding the offense, which must be promptly transmitted to the prosecuting attorney. Ordinarily, offenses are reported to the police commissioner or gendarmerie brigadein authority in the locality; complaints may in some instances be made to the mayors or their deputies.
The prosecuting attorney is the key officer In the investigation and prosecution of crime. He. or one of bis deputies, receives all complaints and denunciations from officials or private citizens Involving possible deltts orf. after aexamination of the matter, he finds that the circumstances wurrant, he refers the case to the examiningge d'instructlon) for an official inquiry. The examining magistrate first determinesroper charge has been presented. If so, he orders the accused brought before him, and proceeds to examine the evidence. From this pointnotaccused is entitled to have his attorney present at alland interrogations in his case. Neither the accused nor his attorney, however, may examine or cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise pmrtlci-pate actively in the inquiry. The examining magistrate has broad powers to subpoena andwitnesses, collect evidence, and to heartestimony.
When he has completed his Inquiry, themagistrateummary of theand his findings. If he decides that the offense involvesontraventioneiif, he forwards this summary and the dossier to the prosecuting attorney, who prepares the formal Indictment The Indictment Is returned to the examining magistrate, who then either dismisses It or sends it to tho appropriate courtourt of First Instance or Court of Superior Instance) for trial. If the examining magistrate decides that the offenserime, he forwards his summary and the dossier to the procurator general (procureur gtneral) attached to one of the
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ol Appeal. The procurator generalthe indictment and submits It to theof Accusationsccusations) ot the Court of Appeal. This Chamber examines theand decides:o dismiss the case;o refer the case to the appropriate court for trial If the offense involvesontraventioneUt; oro accept the case and send it to the Court of Assizes for trial if itrime.
The examining magistrate may In some cases set bail, which Is forfeited if the person on bail falls to conform to the conditions of his release or if he fails to appearearing or at his trial. Documents or other evidence seized by themust be taken in the presence of theor his representatives, or if they are absent, in the presence of two witnesses.
Decisions by the examining magistrate may be appealed to the Chamber of Accusations by the prosecuting attorney and in some cases by the plan tiff. Such appeals are generally made when tbe magistrate hasase or ordered indictment of the subject for an offense judged by the prosecutor less serious than warranted by tbe facts of the case. The right of appeal of the accused is generally limited to the matter of ball orhallenge of the legal competenceurisdiction) of the examining magistrate.
In view of the heavy responsibilities attached to his office, the examining magistrate Is In theory an experienced jurist, free of any pressuresto influence his decision,an ofmaturity and experience to command the respect of the police officers under his orders and to direct the investigation firmly and Impartially. These principles are to some extent undeirnlned, however, by the fact that the office of themagistrate is at the bottom of the judicial hierarchy. Young men often begin their careers in the Judiciary as examining magistrates. Their lack of experience coupledeavy work schedule often causes them to turn for help to the experienced police officers nominally under their their direction, or actually to delegate to police officers the responsibility for the entireFrequently, therefore, the already limited rights of the accused may be entirely neglectedolice officer anxious toonfession, and such extralegal practices as the third degree are on occasion employed. This is especially true in Algeria, in' the Interrogation of Muslimsof terrorist activity. These deficiencies are often criticized In the metropolitan French press (but rarely innd have createdpublic distrust of the processes ofhe law attempts to limit the period during which an arrested person may remain subject to police power by requiring that in most cases he be produced before the examining magistrate within one or two days (these periods areInnless that official authorizes detentiononger period. However, themagistrate mayuspect, or ain preventive arrest after interrogation for an unlimited period, and some suspects have thus been held for several years. If the suspect is eventually convicted, the time he has spent in preventive arrest is deducted from the total time he must serve, but if he Is acquitted he has no redress. In Algeria suspects are often subjected to unlimited administrativetoafter acquittalompetent tribunal. otable case In point is that of Alssat Idlr, an Algerian trade union leader, who was arrested onn suspicion of aiding tho rebellion, He was first sent to the Internment center of Berrouaghla (Berrouarlua) and transferred to various other Internmentduring the following three years. Brought to trial withther suspected rebelbefore the Armed Forces Tribunal of Algiers indir was acquitted, alongthers of theccused. Instead of being freed, however, he was ordered returned toconfinement, and sentransit center to await return to an mternment center. Shortly after bis arrival at the transit center, Idir suffered serious burns, from which he died several months later on
b. Conduct or ouminal casesViolations of the law are tried in the first instance before one of three courts, according to the gravity of the offense to be tried. (See this Chapter,nder Court System,ull description of the courthe Tribunal d'Instance (Court of First Instance) corresponds to the courtustice of the peace,unicipal court in the United States. In criminal cases, it isto judge minor infractionssuch as traffic violations andIt mayine of upew francs (aboutrerson to jail for not more than two months. The court consistsingle judge, sittingury.may be made to the Tribune/ de Grande Instance (Court of Superior Instance).
There areribunaux de Grande Instance in Algeria, one for each Judicial district (arrandis-sementhese courts consist of panels of at least three Judges each, also sitting without juries. They may hear appeals from Tribunaux
The French authorities stated that the burns had been Incurred either as the result of an accident In which Idlr set fire to his bed oruicide attempt. The rebels and other partisans of Idlr maintained that the bums were tho result of torture.
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fl"'Instance, and they lake original Jurisdiction inhich can Involve Imprisonment of up to five years. The Judges decide each case byvote. Judgment Is pronouncedafter the trial, or at the next session of theefendant not present Is Judged tnand on the arguments of the prosecution only. Such cases, however, may be reopened if the defendant later appears. Cases originating in and decided In the Tribunal de Grandemay be appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Courts of Assizes have original jurisdiction In felony casesut no case may be brought to trialourt of Assizes unless the defendant has first been indicted by the Chamber of Accusations of the Court of Appeal. Courts of Assizes are the only courts In France that make use of the jury system. The court is composed of;hree judges appointed ad hoc from the membership of the Tribunaux de Grande Instance (in tbe Judicial arrondissements ot Algiers, Constanline. and Oran tho president of the court is chosen from among the judges of the Courts of) either the prosecuting attorney of the Tribunal de Grande Instance in whose district the trial is held, or the procurator general of the Court of Appeal; andury of nine laymen. Courts are established at the seat of the Tribunal de Grande Instancerime is to be tried One of tbe judges serves asof the court, and draws the names of the jurors by lot from the annual list of eligible jurors. The defense has the right to exclude four names from the list, and the prosecution three; the names so excluded are replaced by others.
The procurator general of the Court of Appeal, or his deputy, presents the state's case. While the procurator general has the right, with the president's permission, to question both theand the witnesses directly, the defense attorney may examine and cross-examine only through the president of the court. Bothand defense make their closing arguments directly to the Jury, the defense speaking last. The president Instructs the judges und the jury on the questions of fact and law they mustJudges and Jury then retire to decidef theust find the accused guilty to convict.
Acquittal' or sentencing Is pronounced by the president of the court. If the defendant is found not guilty, he must be freed at once, except that, as in the case of Aissal Idir, an accused inmay be returned to administrativeunder6 Law of Special Powers. In case of conviction, the verdict Is unappealable and sentence must be executed withinoursetition Is made to the Court of
A court record (easier Judtciaire) is maintained cm all persons who have undergone trial in any court. This record is centralized and maintained at the seal of the Tribunal d'Instance havingIn the commune of the person's birth. It lists all matters forerson has been tried, convictions, pardons, and commutations. Under French law aU persons convicted of felonies or misdemeanors have the right tohat is, the convictionerased from the record and any legalannulled. This procedure should not be confused with any program oformer convict. Legal rehabilitation is automatically grantederiod of goodfixed by law, and may be requested even before it automatically takes effect. The Code of Criminal Procedure establishes limitations on the time withinerson may be arrested and tried for an offense as well as on the time withinentence must be executed. Thus,erson escapes from jail and evadesertain period of time, the sentence may no longer be carried out.
A petition to the Court of Cassation (pourcoi en cassation, or pourvol en revision) may be made from the nonappealable verdict of any court to the Court of Cassation (Cour de Cassation) in Paris. This court is divided into five chambers, of which one is concerned with criminal matters. The criminal chamber hears cases from the Courts of Assizes in crimes, from the Courts of Appeal in delits, and from the Courts of Superior Instance in contraventions. The Court of Cassation does not rehear the case, but only rules on points of law. It may annul the sentence or Judgment, or the entire proceedingsower court. Action of thetype does not automatically exonerate thehowever, for the case is remandedourt ofof anotherfor retrial orecond petition may be made In cases remanded for retrial. The court must ruleonth undays of theetition is made; rejectionourvoi en cassationourvoi en revision by the Court of Cassation Is final.
Cases Involving the security of the slate are tried by permanent military tribunals (tribunaux permanents des forcesather than by civil jurisdictions. One of these courts Isin each of theilitary zones ofincluding the Saharan departments; each court may comprise one or several chambers and may sit anywhere within theilitary tribunal Is presided overivil Judge chosen, If possible, from among the judges of the Court
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of Appeal of the region in which the tribunal is located, and is composed of two other civil judges from the courts of the region and she military judges. Procedure follows the Code of Military Justice, and decisionsivilianmust be by at least six votes to three.may be contestederies ofappeal courts to the Court of Cassation.
Military courts have become Increasinglyin Algeria. In0 theof these courts was extended to include "solo and full jurisdiction over all felonies and misdemeanors against the external security of the State and all felonies and misdemeanors against the common law committed for the purpose of giving direct or indirect aid to the rebels."courts were also empowered to try minors between the ages of
ncidence of crime
Prior to the outbreak of the nationalistInhe French authorities considered the status of security In Algeria to be good. The total number of major crimes reported by official French sourcesittle lessf population per year.5 shows the number of criminal acts andIn Algeria for the, the most recent year for which data are available.
Crime reporting In Algeria Is far lessthan in the United States or in Western Europe. Because of the time lag in publication of crime statistics and the fact that the same type of information Is not regularly provided foryears, firm statistical inferences cannot be drawn from data provided by the FrenchIn addition, the published crime rate4 probably does not include all acts of violence connected with the uprising, because many Muslim victims of terrorist acts committed by the insurgents do not report these acts to the authorities. This circumstance, and the general blurring of the distinction between civil andpolice functions, have ledecline In the adequacy of crime reporting
he Government General published data on the number ofis.attributed to the insurgents.nd included;
ets ol deliberate homicide Against women unci children;
cts of "savagery" <auasslr.aUons. muUlaUoru,
severeeu or vandalism arainst public or national UiiUluUoos.rime* against schoolrimes against agricultural exploitation
These figures were published at leastrt to support the government's demand fromfor increased police support to suppressbut they can probably be accepted asaccurate. Figures published by the French Government9 placedhe monthly average number of terrorist or terrorist-Inspired acts committed in Algeria. This figureecline from the monthly average (Figures include deaths and injuries to persons and property as well as rebel extortions and demands for money.) During the first three weeks ofhe following rebelactivities were among thoseebel bandilitary post near Selkf,oldiers and woundingebels in French Infiltrated the barbed wire defenses of Setlf, fired on pedestrians,uropeans,thers, anduslim taxi driver to death; nearrenades were thrownuslim cafe,erson andt Hussein Deyuburb of Algiers where the Stale Police School Isaxi driver was injuredomb left in his vehicleassenger; also nearruckrivers killed; nearersons were killedounded inivilian vehicles, and atebel grouparm building, killing a
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man and his wife. Although some of theacts appear to beilitary nature, the French authorities consider them offenses against the common law. The army announced that it would cease to publish weekly figures on French and rebel casualties from military operations afternd that thenceforth only the results of important individual operations would be announced.
The ratio between the number of persons of European background and those of Muslimbrought to trial for lesser crimes and(dibits) berore the courts was1or the3s shown hi the following tabulation:
IBS! 4 lass
Muslims 2 4
During the first full year following the outbreak of the rebellion, however, the ratio was1 toeflecting the rise of crime among the Muslims by reason ofthe rebellion. The rebellion was also reflected in the sharp rise in the number of those sentenced5 to Imprisonment for over one year, as compared lo the preceding years (see. and the marked Increase of the number of persons accused of illegal possession of arms (see. The only statistics available on felonies, indicating those triedthe Assises Courts of Algeria5 (see. provide no breakdown by ethnic background.
The handling of the cases of children regarded as Juvenile offenders In Algeria Is In general the same as in France. (See NISnder Treatment of Juvenile Offenders, and this Chapter.nder Juvenile Courts.) There is no Information on the ratio
of Juveniles of European and Muslim ancestry processed by the courts and committed toIt is probable, however,elatively high proportion of Juveniles accorded specialdelinquent treatment arc of Europeansince there Is some evidence that civil and military authorities tend to treat Muslimoffenders as adults. The presence ofofears of age in detainment centers, especially the Transit and Screening Centers, has been mentioned in many reports on conditions In Algerian prisons and Internment camps. Youths ofears and younger are said to be much sought by the FLN for use as couriers. Figvrb
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hows Ihe disposition of cases ofhe latest year for which such data are available.
he prison system
Three distinct prison systems exist In Algeria:he regular prison system. Includingcontrolled by the Ministry of Justice, establishmcnla for Juvenile delinquentsby tbe Directorate of Supervisedwithin the Ministry of Justice, and local Jails and houses of detention underhe Transit and Screening Centers and the Civilian Internment Centers, under thecontrol of the Algerian Delegation General and the departmental prefects; andheinternment Centers, operated by the army.
The regular prison administration In France has been under the Ministry of Justicexcepteriod during the Vichyhen it was placed under the Ministry of the Interior, together with the police. French prison administration is quite advanced In theory, and Includes education and rehabilitationIn actuality, however, conditions in the prisons, especially In Algeria, lag behind those In most Western European countries, and haveworse there since the outbreak of thelargely as the result of almostdemands on prison facilities.
The regular prison system in Algeria, however, Is dwarfed by the extensive network of Transit and Screening Centers and Civilian and Military Internment Centers, under civil and militarywhich was created tn Algeriaesignedemporary emergencyto aid in the suppression of the rebellion, the internment camps and transit centers quickly outstripped their original conception and purpose, anduasi-permanent instrument, in many respects more nearly indispensable than the regular prison system for the maintenance of order. At the same time, the fundamentalof this system with traditional French principles has caused concern and controversy in the metropole.
Partly in order to Inform Itself on conditions in Algerian detention establishments, and partly in response to chronic and widespread criticism of conditions In prisons and Internment centers in Algeria, the French Government hasthe International Red Cross to conductinspections of prisons, prison hospitals, and military and civilian internment centers In .the territory. The most recent (seventh) inspection was carried out from Octoberoage confidential reportconditions in each ofstablishments visited by the Red Cross committee was submitted to the Debre government onthe full report has not been madesummaries of it have appeared in the press of France and other countries. Red Crosswhile denying responsibility for the leak, nave nevertheless confirmed the accuracy of the summaries. The material on prisons andcenters which appears below was drawn from the published summaries, which are the most Important source of Information on the Algerian penal system.
The total number of individuals detained in thenstallations visited and reported on by the Red Crosshis is obviously afigure, inasmuch as the committee had been furnished the names of moreFurthermore, the committee indicated in its report that it was convinced of the existence ofr more "clandestine" Transit andCenters, the names of which had not been listed by the authorities.
a. The regular pbison systemAlgerian prisons are organized and administered in the same manner as those of metropolitan France. (See NIShapter V,nder Prison
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Algeria ish penal region (err-conscriptUm penitentialre) of France. Allprisons are seriously overcrowded.conditions are generally rudimentary, though perhaps tolerable by Algerian standards. The prison death rate Is considerably lower than that of the general population. Prisondoes not appear In general to be harsh, although cases of brutality, sadism, and otheragainst prisoners by guards and by other prisoners have been reported. Most penitentiary officials are former military personnel, selected by competitive examination. Personnel of the prison system are transferable between Algeria and the metropole.
The regular prison system Includes:entral prisons (maisons centrales or prisonshich are used for convicts subject to sentences of longer than one year and for so-calledA" prisoners (persons convicted of political) short-term prisons {maisonshich are occupied by prisoners serving sentences of up to one>year; S) local jails andhouses, usually under municipal control, which arc used for the detention of personsinvestigation or awaiting trial;or juvenile delinquents.
There aremportant central and short-term prisons In Algeria. Inrisons for which the press reported the findings of the most recent Red Cross inspection committee (seehererison population of0 persons convicted of common crimes and political offenses. Moref thesewere Muslims; betweenndere women.pproximatelyt suchwere underears ol age, but It isthat this percentage has increased since the outbreak of the rebellion. In which many young Muslims are active.
The principal criticisms made by the Red Cross committee concerningrisons were of overcrowded conditions and various healthnotably of recurrent typhoid epidemics In certain prisons. On the whole, however,in the prisons were characterised asPrisoners ore allowed to send and tomall, to receive visitors, and toibrary, canteen, andare attached to each institution. Medical and hospital facilities were found to be very good In some prisons and satisfactory in the others, although In all cases the general overcrowding of the prisons has led to overburdening of facilities. At almost all penal centers In Algeria some sort of vocational training program exists, similar, thoughodest scale, to such programs in the metropolitan penal centers. Prisoners who participate in the vocational training program are paidld francs (approximatelyoer day, one-third of which they may spend at the prison canteen. Rehabilitationalso follow tho metropolitan pattern. The practice of permitting prisoners who are close to completing their sentences to leave the prison each day to work, returning to the prison only to cat and sleep, was introduced in
No information Is available on the many local jails and houses of detention. The most recent data available on places of detention for Juvenile offenders daten that year thereublic institutions,nternees,rivate institutionsnternees, fordelinquents, all under the supervision of the Directorate of Supervised Education.hows the distribution of children In the public and private Institutions for juveniles as of Decemberf that year. It Is probable that
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both delinquency and confinement of juveniles have increased over the past several years.
b. Transit and Screening CentersTransit and Screening Centers {Centres de Tri et deare nominally the responsibility of the Delegation General and of the prefects of the departments In which they are located.however, they operate underilitary operationistrict in which local villagers are suspected of having aided the rebels, the troops usually round up every Muslim male In the area between certain ages and bring themTT for thorough individualUnder regulations currently tnthese men may be legally detained In such centers for up to three months. In practice,they are held for whatever period isto dispose of their cases.
At some time during the period ofTT. usually at the beginning,suspected of withholding Information onactivities may be questioned at specialcenters located either In the CTT or at some nearby installation. At suchaccording to reports, the most severeincluding various forms of torture, may be employed to obtain the desired information. Some of tho reports of the use of torture appear substantiated by the International Red Crossof conditions and treatment ofat certain CTT's (sec below). Armyparticularly members of paratroop units, are most frequently mentioned in connection with employment of torture. The forms ofmost often alleged to be employed during interrogations are: torture by water (involving either forcing waterose Into the victim's stomach until disablementome cases, death ensues; or alternately submerging anda trussed up victimub oforture by electricity (administering shocks through electrodes or metal bands applied to the |f- victim's wetnd suspensionictim by his wrists, which are tied behind histher forms of torture include beating, 'burning, and semlstrangulation. .Following interrogation, the detainees may, the enderiod of from several weeks tomonths, be:iberated;entvilian Internment Center (see below) for lnves-^tlgatlon and eventual trialivil courtpolitical or other offenee not triableilitary "iurt; orentilitary Internmentee below) for processing In connection with military offense and eventual trialill-tribunal. If found guilty of any offense, the may bo sentenced and sent to serve out
his time in one of the central prisons. If.the evidence Is considered Insufficient toa case against tbe accused, or If the accused is eventually acquitted, ho may be freed. In some cases, the authorities may decide that in spite of tbe acquittalourt, the continued detention of an individual Is in the public interest. In such cases, the detainee is simply placednd may be and usuallyivilian Internment Centerunder6 Law of Special Powers.
The International Red Cross committee9 visited and reported onransit and Screening Centers operated by the army In the three Army Corps areas of Northern Algeria and one in the Sahtrail Department of Saoura (see This number appears to be only about half of the total number of such centers listed with tbe committee by the French authorities The committee, moreover, reported its certainty of the existence of an undetermined number of additional "clandestine" centers. The existence of these clandestine centers came to light as the result of statements of prisoners regarding thelr intemment histories and. In one instance at least,hance encounter betweenroup of prisoners being takenamp the name of which did not appear on thelists.
Of theTTs visited by the committee.re In the Algiers Corpsn the Constantinen the Oran area,n the Sahara. The greatest number and the most seriousof abuses of the rights of prisoners were reported in connection with the Transit and Screening Centers. The Committee stated that It found conditions satisfactory In Tewer than one-third of the centers In the Algiers area;to poor in about one-third; and franklyin the remainder. Among thecenters, the committee cited the camps of Ben: Messous, Bou Kandoura, and the small camp of Moudjebeur. Camp Palestro near Thd Ouzou was also cited as satisfactory,inor ofears of age was found imprisoned there. Conditions were described as fair also at Camp des Chcnes. one of the clandestine camps In the Algiers Corps area, which the Committee came across as the resulthance encounter. Since no CTT was listed In the particular area, the Committee decided to Investigate. Its report stated conditions in the camp to be as follows:
ll prisoners were the menountain Tillage.
The telephone wires puilnc by their village had been eat on twond since the men ofie had been unable, or unwilling, toetro any Information oa tbe condition* of IhlicuUlng.
nnd 1
RG "
238
"SVC
0
military authority had decided to inflict one week's captivityenally. The exact number or the prisonershey had been detained at the postays already, and were asslencd varloui fatigue duties during the daytime, Including laying barbedhere were noheymall shed located beside the railwayome straw had been provided for them land) Uicy had been permitted to bring covers from their ownonskicrlns the brevity of the detainment period, we do not think they were badly situated. They doubtless were receiving better food than In their own homes
One might, however, ask certain questionstheir administrative status aa detainees. It Is difficult lo Judge whether Uielr status conforms with regulaUons In force, Inasmuch as It appears touestion of an InltlaUve takenill-tary unit in the field.
The most common criticism of the CTT'sas "less good, though not wholly bad" was that the camp authorities were unable to produce certain Internees before the committee, although their names appeared on the lists of persons held. The authorities In such cases claimed that the absent prisoners were temporarily with the army for labor details or for "operationalractically all prisoners Interviewed in private complained of having been tortured at the time of their original interrogation, and In somethough not many, in the same camp where they were then confined. The medical member of the committee was able to examine prisoners claiming to have been tortured andto have been satisfied In most cases as to the truth of their claims. The committee noted the disturbing frequency of deaths amongin alleged escape attempts and recommendedery close study" of all such casos.
The CTT at Bord) Mcnalcl, In the Kabylie, was singled out as the worst center In the Algiers Army Corps area. Here the prisoners slept on tbe ground, and otherwise lived in conditions termedlthough the camphe Inmates had neither mess-kits nor cutlery, and were forced to cat out of used food cans. Discipline was harsh; allcells were In use. The inmates wereas "completelynd many begged the committee not to note theirfor fear that they would be beaten or killed in reprisal. The prisoners gave evidence ofbeen tortured during interrogations atnear the camp. Aboutrisonersho were sick or In poor physicalhad been removed from the camp before the committee visit. In one isolation cell, the committeerisoner who exhibitedwounds on his forehead, several bloodin the thoracic region, rib fractures,superficial scratches on both legs, andwounds on his wrists. The prisoner, who lay on the ground with his wounds unbandaged, stated that the injuries had been received during the course of an Interrogation. He had been left unattended forours.
The committee's official report on this camp states in part as follows:
Visits by previous Committees, Interviews which this Committee had with the responsible officials, and the negative atUtudc of the latter all confirm the Impression that, as farv- officials are concerned. Lhla [poUcy)etand that demands (or improvement arehe Committee cannot escape the conclusion that the miserable condlUOns of this camp arebrought about and form partystem. While In the short run this atUtudc may obtain resultsort (the Intelligence Service is said to have obtained valuable results In thishis altitude nevertheless Is Inhuman und Incontradiction to elementary humanitarian principle*
The committee considered the conditions it found at Camp BordJ Menaiel sufficientlytoequest for an Immediatewith the then Commander of the Armed Forces In Algeria, General Challe, which was granted. Challe ordered an investigation, and the committee relates thatecond visit to the installation it found some improvement. It notes,rastic reduction In the numberoobserves that camp officials consider the normal capacity of the camp to. whereas the committeethe normal capacity.
Many other camps in the Algiers Corps Area were criticized for the same reasons as Bordj Me-naiel, though less severely. These Included: Bou Gobrinc, where (In tbe committee's words) six deaths "had been produced" In escape attempts during the immediately preceding month; Bouira; La Bouzarea; Cinq Palmiers; Damlette; Ferme Chenu. with Its two subsidiary camps; and Paul Cazelles. In Cinq Palmiers, the committeea small cell inrisoners had been confined. Three bore marks of injuries oforigin, and one had been dead for more thanours. An examination of the medical reportsrisoners who had died during the week of Octoberisclosed thatad reportedly died of the aftereffects of exposure to tear gas. The committee professed astonishment that none of the victims, who had been gassed several days prior toad received either hospitalization or medical care of any kind, and tliat death had occurred in one case over one month after the gassing. Noting the absence
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47
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an Infirmary, or oven of bedding for thethe committee suggested that individual sleeping areas on the ground be covered with wood or. straw pallets. In reply, it was informed that wood was expensive and that there were no funds for the purpose. The committee protested against the general absence of medical care of the most elementary sort. It also noted that, despite the limitation of three months during which suspects may legally be confined to CTTs under present regulations, numerous prisoners had been In such centers for more than three months, and in some instances for moreear.
The commanding officer at onede laadmitted to the committee his belief in the necessity of using torture. The committee report stated:
Regarding Injuries Inflicted daring Interrogations, the Gendarmerie Colonel in charge explained to the Committee that the struggle against terrorism makes Indispensable certain methods ofwhich nlonc make possible the sparing of human lives, and the warding oft of newacts. He assured tho Committee, however, that in his sector Uiese methods are reserved solely for certain special cases, and that they are In no respect generally applied. On the contrary, they are used only on the responsibility of an officer.
ransit and Screening Centers reported on by the committee In the Constantine Army Corps area evoked substantially the sameas the Algiers group, thoughesserThe committee found satisfactory to very satisfactory conditionsf the centers,conditionseventh, and bad conditions in the remaininghe fl satisfactory centers were: Ferme Lucas. El Ksob. Calle Morris. Hamma, Ksar Thlr, and Souk Ahras. The center termed "bearable but capable ofas Fermeclandestine" CIT the existence of which came to the attention of the committee through- statements of internees who claimed to have been Interrogated there. The authorities explained that thistemporary" interrogation center, but the committee learned that some of the detainees had been there forweeks, In one case ax long as SS days. Of the two unsatisfactory centers, the camp of Oulcd *'Attalah was singled out for its "deplorable"conditions resulting from the completeof'running water Inside the camp. Thestates:
It is evident that the Idea ofTT of sach importancenmates)airly on-healthful region not equipped with runningIs unfortunate it would seem, moreover, that.after the nearly two years that this campeen laolution should have been
8 nnd 1
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Through statements made by internees at this center, the committee learned of the existence of several additional clandestine CTTs. eight In the Bone region alone, and mentioned these camps by name in its official report but did not visit them
Tho worst camp in the Constantine area was Camp Colbert, where conditions were described as "veryarticularly "since the camp has been In existence for threehe committeecomplained that It had been permitted lo interview onlynternees out of the. Moreover, the committeethe normal capacity of the center.
In the Oran area, the Committee found6 of theTTs which it visited; these were: Benl Bahdel. Rleil Zoula. Le Krelder, Ne-dromah. Saida, and Sebdou. The committee cited two camp commanders in thiswho was himself an ex-Inmate of the Dachaucamp in Oermany, and the other onof Muslimtheir intelligence and for tho humanity of their administration. At Sebdou,rison complement at the timerisoners had been liberatedhich suggests that this center at least had been operating in accordance with the original concept of such aplace In which rounded-up suspects are briefly confined, questioned, and either liberated or sent to aor civilian Installation to await appropriate disposition of their cases. Conditions were termed slightly less favorable but still satisfactory ot tbe camps of Safsaf. Ferme Derasse, and Tiaret.
Frankly unsatisfactory conditions werein connection with only one camp In the Oran area, that of Telagh. near Sldl Bel Abbes. Here the committee foundenell in cells constructed toerson. Anotheren were found huddledommon room. The prisoners complained of being chained and hobbled by night and of having been tortured during their interrogations by intelligenceat the camp. The committee demanded the immediate abandonment of the practice ofprisoners In stocks ot night and reports that the requested assurances were given.
The committee visited one CTT at Kenadsa In the Saharan department of Saoura and reportedery good Impression" there.
c. Civilian Internment CentersCivilian Internment Centers (Centresliterally, shelter centers) came Into existence in Algeria following passage of the Law on the State of Emergency (Loi sur Vttathich was enacted on Aprilnder the Faure government.f the law empowered the
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to restrict to residence personsby the authorities dangerous to security and public order in Algeria. At the time ofthere was no question of internment or shelter camps; on the contrary, the lawprovides; "In no case may restriction to residence result in tho creation of camps whereefined in the preceding section [those considered dangerous to the national security and public order] would beespite this piohibltion, however, the Algerianunder the then Governor General Jacques Soustelle, established five "shelter camps" (camps d'hebergement) in Algeriaew weeks of tbe law's enactment. In lip service to what It interpreted as the le-ter of the law, theproceeded to doignate these camps as the "residences" of the lnilviduals whom it desired to imprison, and then confined them to theirPersons so imprisoned soon totaledthousand. They enjoyed at first somewhat better prison conditions than ordinary criminals: there was freedom of correspondence; visits by family members were permitted; internedemployees continued to receive theirsubject howcvei.eduction paid to the camp director for th ;lr maintenance; and there was no forced labor.
The dissolutione French NationalIn5 automatically abrogated the State of Emergency law. Faced with theof finding someeans to continue to hold the Internees, the government had recourseaw^ofhich authorized thein timer of persons and goods for purposes in the national interest. Although tbe internees challenged :he applicability of this law in the absenceate of war, the govenm^nt was able to conduct ci series of delaying legaluntil tho continued detention of ihewas given legal sanction by the 3pe;ial Powers law enactedy tbe Mollet government.
The Law ofowers in Algeria,scheduled to expire with the Mollethas been reenocUd by successive(and in the summer7 similar powers, with certain limitations, were given to thefor use In theives the government "the most extensive powers, in Algeria, to take any exceptional measure required by the circumstancesiew toward the re-establishment of order, the protection of persms and property, and the safeguarding of theIt provides thit measures taken pursuant to the article, which would result In modifying existing laws, must br authorized by decree of the Council of Ministers. Under the authority of this article, the government promptly enacted aof implementing decrees, among them theecree off tills decrei em-powcrod the Governor General in Algeria to order into restricted residence all persons whose ictiv-Ity Is considered dangerous to public safety or order. Moreover, without actually authorising the creation or continued existencetem-ment camps, the decrees by implication apptoort of recognition of their existence, and presumably their legality, by dropping theprohibition of them contained in the Stile of Emergency Law5 and by providing further in ArticleThe authorityr the maintenance of order will take all disposition to assure the subsistence and shelter of pcrsoisto residence, and where bidlcated. theirhe last phrase appears tooncern for the welfare of the presumablyfamilies of Individuals indefinitely deprived of their liberty by administrative order. Inpractice, the government ceased payment of salaries to Interned officials, and ordered th*-social agencies to cease payment of allot nents to families of interned persons, on the grounds that such persons were not performing their duties.
Civilian Internment Centers, all ol which are in Northern Algeria, are under the control -if the Delegation General. Funds for their ope atlon came from the budget of the Secretariat General for Algerian Affairs.9 the International Red Cross committee visited and reported3 of these centers, inotal of0 persons were Internedummarizes conditions In theamps that were distusscd in the available press summary of the comm'ttee'sore than half the camps were cinsid-ercd satisfactory as to physical conditions The committee, however, pointed to the coniinued presence of seriously ill persons in many cimps, despite urgent requests by the campment for their evacuation. At tho camp atnsaneufferingisabled prisoners were found. The committee also reported many other mei tally sick and tubercular sufferers In other camps One of these, Benl Messous, was set up as anato-rtum, and had more thanubercular cases alone. The medical equipment at thisas described as "very satisfactory."
The committee reporteduard ot the camp at Arcole had been discharged for having Inflicted Injuries on three Inmates during inInt Sidlhe committee's attention was drawn lo the Idling of an Inmate by members of the Territorial Unit guarding the camp. Despite thosethe
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<:orntnittee found conditions at mostot meeting minimum satisfactory standards, at least notably improved since the previous inspectioned Cross mission. Thet Tefcichoun was criticized for its general ai mos-phere of "psychological pressures on theto lead them to change theirhough material conditions were conceded io be "correct." The center at Bossuct was singled out for special censure. It received detainees t Iromther centers. Inmates are divided into , groups, according to whether the camp aul hori-ties consider themdangerous" (that is,rheIs harsh, with cases of prolonged andconfinement in isolation cells. Many of the prisoners, moreover, complained of pressures and cruelties. Serious incidents occurred at Bossuct innvolving repeated interventionsRS unit. According to the prisoners, these incidents grew out of the refusal ofrisoners tootion picture session arranged by the camp's mdoctrination group; the camphoiities maintained that the causetrike tlgatedroup of prisoners received from ;thc camp at Arcole. According to the authorl-jties, someingleaders who had been involved In isolationarticularly poor was created on the members of the Ittee, who complained that during the en-[tire period of their visit they were followed by an (information officer attached to the camp, whoreat show of noting the internees whom [tjje committee interviewed.
ilitary Internment CentersMili-
!
HU7{tot*rrrment Centers (Centres MllitairesMI) are Installations under army Mntrolfand operation in which an accusedieldipending his trialilitary tribunal,
t
or, ftpon' convictioniUtary offense, mayhis sentence. In the latter respect they 'iniutary equivalent to the regularhe International Red Cross comriitteerincipal CMI's inopulationsee Fioure coinmittee's report onters favorable;f them, lLvin; con-ire-described as good and proper,ut humane discipline. The comi littee icnted favorably on thealifl-ns^of many of the camp commanders, andto' their tasks. Nevertheless, It "Btailed criticism of three camps: Burdeau, aimpjjstill under construction, which had been :eneunger strike inhere prison conditions were described as rect";and"Sldi Zaher, where the commit-ijreceived' Information that various
(bed linen, beds, and clqthmg) hadays prior to its visit.
e. Conditions in places of detentionThe report of the International Red Cross committeeide variation in the physical,psychological, disciplinary, and healthIn the Algerian detention centers. The type (regular prison, CTT, Chilianurpose, and location of the particular Installation, and often the background andof the camp commander andpersonnel, are Important factors in these conditions. Overall conditions in the CivilianCenters and in the MilitaryCenters are on the whole considerablythan those prevailing in the Transit and Screenuig Centers. The general criticism ofhowever, applies to all Installations in Algeria.
The physical plants of the various centers vary greatly. The simplest form, likely to bein the caseclandestine" CTT, Is oftenleared area fenced off by barbed wire, and patrolled by Barkis, Moghaznis, QMS. oror by regular troops. The prisoners sleep on the ground or In tents or othershelters, eat out of messkits or used food containers. In semipermanentall approximatelyeet high encircles the camp, with guard-towerseet high and equipped with spotlights and automatic weapons located atorners. Barbed wire is placed inside and outside the camp wall, with the outer strands generallyroad white line traced on the ground indicates to the prisoners the limits beyond which they may not go on pain of being shot down. At night searchlights sweep theand exterior of the camp and dogs may be released in the camp streets. Barracks of wood and corrugated Iron construction are laid out in rows. Each barrackr more prisoners, who sleep in double- or triple-decker
Relations between the camp administration and the prisoners are very good in some instances. In many other camps the choice of personnel at all levels has been less fortunate. Manyarc lodged against the guard personnel, many of whom are recruited from among the lower strata of European Algerians. Some of these guards have extreme racist views, and many "incidents" involving the Injuring and killing of prisoners have been reported in cases when the day-to-day operation of the camp has been left in the hands of the guards. Such incidents have ranged from daily haranguing and threatening of prisoners and attempts to force unwillingto take part in saluting the French nag to in-
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specttons and searches at which aU occupantsarrack are required to stand naked alat the foot of their bunks, saluting officers and noncommissioned officers. An atmosphere of tension prevails tn many camps, particularly In those located In remote areas. Guards andare equally insecure, the former fearing an uprising by the prisoners,ossible attack upon the camp by the rebels while the prisoners are convinced that in the eve it of an attack they would be automatically pu; to death by the guards. Prisoners may or may not be required to perform labor. In smaller, more remote camps, they may be assigned as laborers to localCTT prisoners are frequently assigned to labor details with troops.
Another factor contributing to serious tension in many mternment centers, both civil andis heavy psychological pressure exerted upon prisoners by "psychologicalrgroups Reeducation centers (Centres dearereated asand distinct camps, sometimes as partrogram in operation at most, if not all.camps. Aimed at the so-called "recoverable" cases, the reeducation program at the military centers attempts to win over former rebel army members to tbe French side. r won over, rebels serve as Harkis and army scouts. At dvillan centers the aim Is to convert or at least neutralize recoverable or borderline internees, some of whom may be employed as informers upon their return to civilian life. Chateau Holden,at Douera. near Algiers,en-er reserved forith an internee population, according to the Red Cross comm ttce report.
Successes have reportedly been achi ?ved as the result of the psychological action piat military centers. o are not won over, howover, complain of physical and psychological pressures. One such account by an Algerian Muslim who claimed to haveeeducation center appeared Inaris weekly inccording to ills report, hevingk! francs (approximatelyebel fund collector. He slates that he andther male Muslims in his neighborhood were rounded up in tbe middle of the night and takenamp at Ben Aknoun. After repeated interrogations, at which he readily confessed his contribution to the FLN. he wasthat the evidence against him was nottorial. He was sent Insteadeeducation center at an unstated place. At tbe reeducation center he was required to attend reeducation sessions hold five times dally. At
these sessions, the internees first listened toexpositions of the purpose of France in Algeria and the beneflw of being on the French side. At later session* ;hey were required to repeat what bad been said, using different words, pointing out where the- had erred, and calling atlcntion to the errorsers. Then they became members of study grcups. supportmg, correcting, and watching each other. At each session monitors and officers watched the prisoners for reactions and facial expressions According to theprisoners were led to believe that theirreleaseupon their behavior at the center and ujon how quickly and sincerely thej absorbed thciie states that he wa released after .six weeks.
A number of vivid subjective descriptions,to the forgoing, by former Inmates of pena and detention installations, have appeared fion Ume to time In the French and foreign press Some are prO-ably FLN propaganda against the French. The importance of these reportsheir general itgreement with one another, and hi the fact that the responsible authorities often fail to deny specific allegations repeatedly made. The French Government statement followingof siimmaries of tbe Red Cross report onat internment centers stressed only that the FLN had not to dateimilarof its prison camps, and noted that the reportvery real improvement" In theregime. The government thus admitted the existence of conditions capable ofat the same time its invitation to the Red Cross to conduct so far seven Investigations of conditions apjK-ars toontlnulni;in stamping out objectionable practices, such as torture.
f. Turnover- and release orerearge turnover of Internee* of Tran-dt and Screening Centers and Civilian Internment Iten estimated that00 Algerian Muslims are detained on suspicion each month, and held in Transit andCenters for up toays. Here theirare checked and recorded and their past and possible future usefulness to the French They are then cither released, sera tocam])s. or sent to prison to await formal trial. One estimate states that the last lategory representsrthe detainees. Many more are sent tocamps as persons considered dangerous but against whom there is insufficient evidence to refer the cases to court.
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one level, the detention program is obviously Intended to sift out and apprehend persons guilty of rebel activity. On another level, it IsIntended to serveeansarge proportion or the male Muslim population can be inventoried and, In the process, be made aware of the scrutiny of the authorities.izable proportion of potential rebels, it is hoped, can be reeducated or at least neutralized
An important point bearing on the statisticsinternees Is the fact that tbe number tends to remain stable. The continual Inflow of new Internees is matched by an outflow ofreleased because no evidence has beenagainst them, or released as "reasonable risks" after reeducation or neutralization. The authorities attempt to extract maximumvalue from such releases, often lumping together mdiscrimlnalely internees against whom some derogatory information Is thought to exist but who arc being released as reasonable risks with those whose arrests were primarily on the grounds of suspicious activity or as the result ofreceived but against whom no evidence could be found to prove any Illegal act. These releases, however, occasionally tend lo create amongAlgerians the suspicion that theIs being excessively lenient toward rebel
The Inlemccs to be liberated are not selected haphazardly. They are picked on tbe basis of ] their records tn the various centers at which they may have been held, information furnished by the prefect of the place of their residence,lso according to the dossier regarding theiractivity, which is reviewedpecial Candidates for release are usuallyto sign,ondition of their release, an | undertaking such as the following.
PLEDGE
I, the unuttslcr.cil.of the village of
ho haveourse of civicat the Centerf my own
free will pledge to:ork with tho French Army against the fellagha (the rebels1 and all those who support the
2 Inform the military or civil authorities of aU acts committed by the rebels;
ive no aid to the leOagha Thisspontaneous and solemn. Any failure to meet the obligation* assumed puts at stake the life of the signer, without prejudice to thewhich may bv applied to his immediate family. Head and understood.
Signature
ypical release ceremony all availablewere assembledentral courtyard or assembly area to be addressed by numerousIncluding the camp commander and members of local settlers' organizations. Those to bewere exhorted not to forget their pastThose not being released were encouraged to believe that their dossiers were being reviewed, and that they might be the next to be released. Candidates for release took an oath of eternal fidelity to France, several of them deUvered "spontaneous" speeches of thanks.imilar ceremony in Oran. released internees marched off to the local war memorial,reath, andthe traditional minute of silence.
Upon release each internee isass (lais-*ez-passcr) authorizing free circulation. Upon their return home, former Internees areby local SAS or SAU officers in charge of their sectors.eriod of three months or more they may be required to remain at home, and to report regularly to the authorities.
D. Reference data
The tables included in this Subsection present detailed statistical data In the general order of reference in the text.
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l- CUllBECTlVE INoTITVlKOlt JUVK.NII IX ALGERIA.V4S
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LOCATION
HIM
lie t. (RMtOIx) (Illlkn-
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dOtaerv.Uoa Algvrou} (AlgfcnWrm-Uou Center).
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pproprif. d'Kl-IUiir (gur-coratdeiaouadr IJ-n) (Special Boardingaroy..
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t'untie d'AuciicIl do Tii.nivciipuratod bfHuivmU (TkrorvuI.opdor, Cm-
Centre d'Acoueil d'Hi'liopolUoperand by Equiprd* rig-
laiif. ixioral (HoDlai Group for Uic lbmine. of YouUi iu Moul :i. .Boys' Reception Center).
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dlLkNMno hhnall mxUUou odh (nil.iaKa by Ita Committee.rwutcd, report im! tortured in outlying loca-lUnwi. N'umtiar of lotnutea reduced lol by linnui CommitteeIran am-
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AlaVrt
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CuihIiIMhi* id)hom old ladavor uwb ooviied in wol'iliimar iv"pointm-ing. No bid cluLliing, no< lull uucooper. aalve. Alaoenter, with IU5 iiilcniec*.
CuodiliouaUBBaltafaclury.
Coodilieii-. Alio Ibnlucalie* CfKUi. Condition, very '| A Civilian Inlernm-nt CenterOO inlcracee nl'o located here.
n. Army Corp*
Lucaa.. .
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auod. but coninuilee notedaled pramat-ml:rwooeni bad UrnwoII.iftodattemptm* lo escape."
(Condition* good.
Condition* good. Located nelir Femiedee-AiiHliii* Miliary
Interump. Condition* tomt
Conation* (uoil ilary Imeen-i^enter.good.
niptuieNH-nl." "Clai.-
d-stliw" lamp. "Depli>rnble" tunilary euiidilions; no running whUi. Very
pooror cump. Couditioon erry bad; woTbI in area. Coumutlm eempiaimd
of beingUtt.ly 44 - f total
oMuplrtimil. Coavftrred tamp lapaiity to be
.
Conditions kixhI. Do Da. On.
Cundilioiii suod. Abo Ueedncatiou Cenk-rSS lomnto Conditiona good. Conditiout fuir.
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CoadlUom very poor;rwotireagronpa ofaan oelbv rrMomen KoUilrd or placed in atea-ka alTorturediiitnrnioilioiu Comimilx iilioluiou ofid rueominemlcd folio*up by.
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ludrr Remnrka are drawn frowmptjf. January'joo.
el Lhe On) Cram report a*n tbeapei U
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CIVILIAN* INTERNMENT CENTERS, ALGKltl
UT CUT'*
(uepahtmsmt)
nttzbh-
xca
IV-ni Meocis
..
Ami*
Hold
Udl
(near IXwiVa)
IIMta
130
Camp du Marccbol
Tiii
154
Caiclles
TrfcMbooe.
ouf
-
MM.
Presence of many nicknoted. AullwrilMw are atU'inpl-Iiik to reorganlie thin center on an improvedenlra] prison ia also located beet.
pabaa over SO lohereula/ prwoner*.notedt-Mitim.
Cui -Uiij.linn lax iihjukiImh
ood. j furonditiona good or gri-aily Improved.
Dr.
Clfcnltiucu previousCtioi<.
Oruut progrca* wocr prcvk>u* InapecUon. ruoiil and 8w_ log Centerlso located here.
Very poo* tmpre_on CmwIIIM reportedpsy-cSukglealonmake them change tbeir
poor.
Vwy unfavorable ewidilloiw. UoMuetoli'ina centerlbtrery harsh discipline, frequentomplaints of torture. Prisoner mutiny lit0 iicceMituted hit ST vnition of CRS uolL Coinnilter complained IL was followed by aafficer sttached to tbefHilervwwed.
238
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Comments on principal sources
The sources used in the preparation of thisare generally accurate and adequate,there ts lack of current information on incidence of crime In Algeria.
A basic document on the organization, training, and operation of the police and gendarmeryin metropolitan France and in Algcrlo Is Sourceccurate and detailed Information on these topics Is also contained in Sourceshe material on the organization and activities of quasi-police and paramilitary services, such as the Territorial Units, the UrbanUnits, the Maghzens. the Harkas, autode-fense units, and SAS installations, is from ofllcial French sources, from the French and Algerian press, and. Foreign Service reports and despatches.
, and IS, and the texts of French and Algerian laws and decrees as published In tbe Journal Offlciel de la RcpuUique FrancaiscJournal of the Frenchontainon the French Penal Code andProcedure. Sources,ndrovideinformation on the incidence of crime, the activities of the courts, and the number ofof central prisons and Juvenile correctional institutions.
The main sources of information on conditions In Algerian prisons and detention centers of all kinds are the published summaries and extracts, believed authentic, from the seventh report of the Committee of the International Red Cross onCenters of Algeria, datedther sources on this subject are extracts Irom previous investigation. Foreign Service reports and despatches, andf the International Commission against Concentration Camp Practices.
of sources
i.ent, sxo de Vans, Hijibv P. The French legal System. New York: Oceana Publications, lflftfl
rance. Code d'tnstniction CrtmtneUe (Codearis: Ubraine Dalloz.
3 riutca. Code Penal (Penal Code). Parts: Ubralrtc Hallos
oa Baam ox Vwawts et
m*'non (Embassy of France. Press and In-iormaUonoiuirweilpe Action a/ the French Government in Algeria. French Affair* No. New York.
DMSCATIOli OIMSjUS dc OOUTDNSMOn in
Awaaii (Delegation Oeneral ot the Government in Algeria| RapportlActtvite de tAdministration en Algirie an Court de9 iBcport on tho AcUvlly ol the Administration In Algeria. Algiers Imprlmerte Baconnlor.
OouvtawtsiiNr Oenlral or l'Algirib iOov-
ertiment General ofxpose- de laGene rale de rAlgtrie4 'Report on the General SiluaUon of Algeria inlgiers, lass.
Ezpott de la Situation Generate de fAlgirie
en IMS IReport on the General SltuaUon of Algeria. Algiers. .
Auotrnt '
dbs ArrsiRis econoniqves it de ^industrialisation. Servicetatist!qui GImesalc (Ministry ofGeneral Directorate of Economic and Indus-InnluaUonOeneral Statistical Serviced Amikflirc Statisttguc de7 (SUUsUcal Aimuai oflgiers..
Ministbis di l'lNTfcmsva et MnusTtsx w. la
MraNgg National* (Ministry of the Interior and Ministry ol Nationalncyttoptdlede la Police (NaUonal Encyclopedia of thearis: Compacnle Nationale de Diffusion du Livre.
Mihuteri as LTHTtainrs SOsrri Nstiomu
f Ministry ot the Interior. National Securityevue de la Suretef the National Security Agencyaris.9
behvigc ar L'lsiroasunoM do Cabinet du Mi-
RAsidevt sn Alccrix (InformaUOn Service ol the Cabinet of the Minuter Resident Inrogramme Gouvernemental. Meiures de Pacf/leo-tion et Relormes en Algtne laovernment Program. PacineaUon Measures and Reforms in_
Relations Abba Film Algeria. New Haven,
Connecticut: Human Relations Area Piles,
CoKsmsioM Aoatsst Cokcxjctratioi.
Cmr Practices Saturn MonUHy. Parts.
ClBri, Mabcxl La Police UetropoMalue et
d'Outre-mer (The Metropolllan and Overseas. Paris: Charlesie..
Mabguebite. Petit Manuel de Droit (Utile Law
arts: Lea Editions Soclalcs rranealscs. 1MB.
RELF.ASABLK TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
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