Created: 6/2/1960

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a speech in Moscow onay, Khrushchev carriedthe effort initiated in his East Berlin address toany adverse consequences of the summit failure on Soviet foreign policy. In elaborating on his explanation ofncident and the Paris talks, Khrushchev again sought toand justify thebetween his policy ofand his performance in Paris. He asserted that "we have operated, still operate, and will operate" ln theof relaxing international tensions, despite the collapse of the summit conference. He concluded that Soviet policy was "correct and Just" and asked, "Why should It be changed?"

Although he ridiculedEisenhower and againthe United States onncident, Khrushchevis beginning to work back toward his pre-summit position whichistinction between the President and "cold-war orces" in the US. Conjuringontrast between the"good Intentions" and US foreign policy, Khrushchev said,till believe Presidenthimself wants peace." In this manner the Soviet premier Is apparently seeking to protect himself from any charges that he was mistaken ln his judgment and bad allowed.himself to be deceived by the President.

Khrushchev took the unusual Step.of specifically denying speculation that internalor pressure from Communist China was responsible for his

behavior in Paris, as well as Western conjectures that Mlkoyan may be In trouble. Histo Mlkoyan, however, were sufficiently vague'to leave Mlkoyan's status in doubt. uture demotion remains aalthough any move against him-may be put off for some time, as was the case with Bulganln.

Although ln his speech Khrushchev again.expressed hopeew summit meeting would take place ln "six to eighte added that he wo- Id not be surprised if this did not occur. His call for theof Communist China, India, Indonesia, and other ountries ln future meetings could be designed toay out of the commitment he made ln hiaay speech ln Berlin to maintain the status quo thereew summit. He again counseled patienceew meeting and reaffirmed hiato strive in thefor negotiated aettlements of outstanding problems,the German and Berlin questions.

During private talks in East Berlin onay, East German party chief Ulbrlcht reportedly urged Khrushchev to take prompt actioneparate poaco treaty with East Germany, on the groundummitin six to eight months waa highly unlikely. Ulbrlcht reasoned that Western agreementew summit would probably be conditional onepetitionf the events in Paris, and^a^



Khrushchev agreed with this evaluation. The Soviet premier refused, however, to commit the USSRpecific timetableeparate peace treaty, and agreed only to Ulbrlcht'sthat the Berlin and German treaty questions be raised through diplomatic

ublic lecturo onaffairs ln Moscow, tho speaker emphasized that the current increase intension wasemporary nature and assured his audience that the "basic forces" leadingelaxation of tension were still operative. The lecturer claimed that, ln contrast to the "consistent failures" prior to Stalin's death, subsequent Soviet efforts to reducehad been successful; as the summit-approached,t became clear that no progress could be expected on Berlin, and the US announcementay of plans to conduct nuclear tests to Improve detection"scuttled" the solewith good prospects for agreement.

According to an American Embassyttending the lecture, the audience appeared concerned over the possibleon US-Soviet relationsrial of Francis Powers and the conclusioneparate East German peace treaty.

The Soviet press treatment of foreign reactions tospeech stressesof hopeolicy of detente will continue And that there isrospect for East-West negotiations. Pravda onay quotes The New" York Times that "KhrusHcFovTsholding to his course"

on more consumer goods and on his effort "to maintainy means of diplomaticions with the West." ispatches from Paris,nd Bonn report that Khrushchev's

speech is being Interpretedn indication that Moscow will continue its detente policy.

Marshal Malinovsky'say warning that he hadSoviet missile forces to retaliate against the base of any aircraft intruding on the air space of the USSR or Its allies was designed to maintain the momentum of the Sovietagainst American bases abroad. He was careful tohis order for retaliation to bases, and he refrained from using Khrushchev's broader threat to strike against both the base and the country which controlled the base. Thus far, Soviet propaganda has stressed Malinovsky's statement that his order to Soviet forceswarning andhreat."

Nuclear Test Talks

In the first meeting of the nuclear test talks since the summit, Soviet delegate Tsarapkln made It clear that further onesearch program for improving methods of detecting small underground explosions would be dependent on agreement on the duration of the moratorium on these tests. However, the Soviet experts discussing aspects of thoprogram allowed the talks to adjourn onay withoutisputo over the final report.

In agreeing that eachshould report back to Its own political delegation,


chief Soviet expert noted that basic differences remained oh the number of test explo*-sions, the use of experimental teste to investigate theof muffling tbe shock of underground explosions, and the use of tests in the range of one kiloton or less. He also stressed that since Moscow could not begin theesearch program until it was assured that the control system would bethe program could not be Implemented until aras isigned.

Soviet tactics inthe unresolved questions to the political conference suggest that Moscow will refuse toitselfrogramUS tests before of the main politicalof the moratorium and the annual quota for on-site inspections. eans to extract concessions-on these two issues, the Soviet delegation probably hopes to exploit Western desire tothe research as soon as

As an additional form of pressure, directed primarilythe British delegation,choed Khrushchev's warning that unilateraltesting by the United States would be interpreted as freeing the USSR from itsnot to resume testing. Tsarapkin elaborated onstatement by adding that the USSR would considerfree to resume weapons tests of any size and lnnvironment.

Peiping's Reaction

Although Khrushchev's latest speech in Moscow was prlntod on

In People's Dally, Chinese partydid not highlightabout possible Chineseat the nexthas not commented thusthe speech. Instead,emphasized the futilitynegotiations becausewill nevercomment onreport to thehas concentrated onAmerican peacethe need to "expose"has concluded that peace

.can be safeguarded "only byesolute struggle against the US."

Peiping's leadershave no illusions about their chances of participatinguture summit conference. They undoubtedlyuturethe Chinese Communist ambassador In Cairo recentlyunlikely to yield them any practicalparticularly in regard to reducing American support for the Chinese Nationalists. The ambassador stated thatcannot accept statements of American good intentions as long as the US continues its "occupation" of Taiwan.

Western Positions

French President de Gaulle'

speech castigatedfor scuttlingGaulle voiced France'sto continue allrelax tensions in orderthe "monstrous peril"war, but he alsoa return to theof diplomacy" as thethis end. His formulatensions includedFrench proposals heand has persistentlydisarmament aimed


at vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and East-West cooperation on aid tonations.

De Gaulle cited thethe West exhibited at the summit and stressed France's intention to remain an integral part of the Atlantic alliance. He nevertheless reiterated that France "must be sole mistress. ofesources and her" underlining at the same time his insistence on "ever closer coordination" of Western policy and strategy. He also stressed the growing Importance of an Increasingly integrated Western Europe in international affairs, and forecast aentente from the Atlantic to the Urals."



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