CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY0
F IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Khrushchev andGaulle and the routine communique which followed then indicate that the Soviet premier failed to gain any commitments or concessions which would strengthen hisat the summit. Into his extravagantof his recent Asian tour, Khrushchev, on his return to Moscow summed up the French visit as "fairlydmitting that on major Issues French and Soviet views did not "fully coincide."
Khrushchev appears to have accepted the concept ofnegotiations on Germany and Berlin in agreeingrench proposaleference ,in the communique tosettlement" of these ques-ionsasis "agreed on hrough negotiations." Hehis up in his final 'Conferencepril by ng that the conclusion ace treatyerlin bnVuomand some time."
In his speech in Moscowpril, however, Khrushchev implied that De Gaulle had made concessions to theeace treaty. He claimed they had "established that thereasis forout an agreed position"umber of most important questions, and he quoted the communique on Germany andas implicit support for this contention.
Khrushchev also claimed that hia views on dlsarraamej coincided with De Gaullo's.|
irushohev endorsed De GauTle's view that disarmament should begin withessation of nuclear tests and an agreement to convert stocks of nuclear weapons to peaceful uaes. The Soviet delegate in Geneva used the communique's referenceoint desire for thetalks to achieve "definite agreed points of view" onand general disarmament in pressing the West to take up specific measures ln tho Soviet plan.
Khrushchev expressedof De Gaulle's policy on Algeria, but he denied the French President's assertion that the Communists wereto interfere in the African continent. De Gaulle apparently did not presstatement on Algeria ln the communique. De Gaulle also raised his proposal for Joint East-West aid to underdeveloped countries and the subject of noninterference in Internal
affairs of other countries, but Khrushchev, as he had doneavoided any direct stand. Apparently in response to De Gaulle's previous statements on Slno-Soviet differences, Khrushchevconsiderable point" of Moscow's continuing good relations with Peiping, but did not urge recognition of China by France.
The communique's referenceutual Interest inEuropean security may provide Khrushchev with anto raise this issue at the summit. In his televisionln Paris, KhrushchevIncludedist of the most Important Internationalalong witherman, treaty and Berlin, and nuclear testing.
ishchev insinuated ln his speech that agreement had in fact been reached along this line by noting an "identity of views on certain matterswith the consolidation of security in Europe."
Discussions on trade,and scientific exchanges, and peaceful uses of atomic energy were included atInsistence ln order to demonstrate that the talkside range of The USSR pressed for negotiationsive-year trade agreement but settled for new talksrms for
Although the atomic energy agroement is similarS-Soviet agreement,protrayed it as the first such accordnonsocial-ist" country.
Khrushchev's publicduring the final phase of his visit and his speech inprovided further evidence that the immediate objective for his trip was toavorable pre-summit atmosphere and to project an image ofreasonableness andIn meeting Western views on key International problems.
As to the summit meeting, he saidoviet Embassy"Naturally, it isto settle allproblems in onen his TV address he held out the possibility of achieving progress "if statesmen takeof mutual interests" and meet each other half way. His treatment of the possibilityeparate peace treaty with East Germany was intended to convey an impression of extreme reluctance to take such action.
From the outset of his visit, however, it was obvious that Khrushchev hoped topopular pressure in France for some accommodation to the Soviet position on Germany by arousing old antagonisms and sowing the seeds of suspicion of De Gaulle's ally in Bonn. He sought to create doubts about Germany's reliability bythe Hitler-Stalin pact and explaining that diplomacytricky game" in which themust understand that others can play the "same tricks on them."
He warned Frenchmembers that "West Germany
2 of 8
play the same kind of trick Hitler Germany played before World War II." Ilo found itoint to ponder" that, although Adenauer attacked the USSR in his speeches, Soviet trade with Bonnould ask our French friends to put that under their hat.H
degroe ofSuccess in generating popular fears over Germany is not yet clear, but that such fears are obviously latent among certain elements andpresent amongextremists such as Daladler, who thanked Khrushchev forthe French people of Uio Gorman menace.
Jbolleved Khrunhchev had badly misjudged French feelings about Germany and that hia remarks had had little if any effect on French public opinion
Khrushchev's general clrcumspecTlon andand his stress on peace and Soviet-French friendship might overcome any hesitancy ln the average citizen againstagreements with the USSR because ofideologlcalVBHHHfltho French Communist party's role inmass receptions for Khrushchev might hurt the party, but estimated thatcooperation with theon domestic Issues would vary with the extent of theest detente.
The French Government took the unusual step of Justifying the Khrushchev visit toationwidedialogue between Premier Debre and Information Minister Terronolre. Debre said that Khrushchev's televisionwas required "by the laws ofenied that the conmunlqud was "of meagerand took special pains to explain that the Khrushchev visitecessary prelude to tbe summit. Debre also used the opportunity to state that France had few illusions about the practical results of amooting, that France wants "absolute priority" onand that an East-Westcould not be based on abandonment of the Westernon Germany and Berlin.
3 ofOriginal document.