CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations participated In the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organisations ol the Departments of State, the Army, the Haw. the Air Force. The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by Ihe UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD on tzoncurring were ine Director of Intelligence and Research, Department ol Slate, Ihe Assislant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army; the Assiit-ant Chief of naval Operations lor Intelligence. Department of the Navy; Ihc Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAP; the Director lor Intelligence. The Joint Staff: the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Special Operations: the Director of the National Security Agency; and the Atomic Knergy Commission Representative to the USIB. The AstistantFederal Bureau ol Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside hu iurtidictton.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. ThisTor thc information and use ol the recipient and of persons under his jurisdictionneed to know basis. Additional essential dissem trial ion may be authorized byofficials within their respective departments.
of intelligence and Research, ior the Department oi state
Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army
Chief of Naval Operations lor Intelligence, for the DepartmentNavy
of Intelligence, USAF. for the Department of the Air Force
for Inlelligence, Jnint Staff, lor the Joinl Staff
of InteUigence, AEC. Ior the Atomic Energy Commission
Director. FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, for theDefense
irector of NSA for the National security Agency
j. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency
This copy moy be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned io the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.
When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain Iteriod not in excess of one year. At thc end of this penod, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with2
The title of this estimate when used separately irom the text, should be classified: mm niTinni rrr
contains tnformotion afr^swic the NaThsoalDpfensc oiwithinlaws, Title IB. USC., theof wTrretw44Lanv manner UnBil'ffLjiilhotlzcd person Is prsJiffinW haatow.
UTTON: White House
National Security Council Department of State Derailment of Defense Operauons Coordinating Board Alumlc Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation
TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE
To estimate trends in Soviet military capabilities in the.
pace and character of Sovietdevelopment over the period of this estimate will be affected by many things which cannot be confidently foreseen; hence we have notetailed or exact estimate. Among the variable factors are the rate of scientific andadvance, thc course of military development in the US and other major nations, the degree of stability within the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the terms of any international agreements which may be reached for thc limitation and control of armaments, and the views of Soviet leaders about thc chunging militaryand opportunities presented by the international situation.)
The expanding national product of the USSR would, overears, permit aincrease in military expendituresorresponding increase inburden. Moreover, the Soviet leaders could If they choseuch greater proportion of the nationalto military uses than they do today. It is impossible to predict thc decisions
which they will make in this connection during the next decade. In thc past few years the proportion of product allocated to the military has slightly declined, and we sec no reason at present to estimate that the Soviet leaders will allocate an appreciably greater proportion topurposes. We feel certain,tliat they will insure, so far as they can, that their military power is at least equal and perhaps superior to that of any other major)
Assistant Chief Of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. believes Uie paragraph should be changed lo read:
vle: leaders win, of course, view lhcir military requirements in the light ot theirof the military strength ol Uione slates likely to oppose their expansive alms. Tlie Soviet leaders arc endeavoringattain at the earliest pracucableilitary superiority over the US which tliey would consider to be so decisive as to enable them either to force their will on the US through threat of destruction, or to launch such devastating attacks against the US that, at the cost of acceptable levels of damage lo themselves, the USorld power would cease toeries of successes InSoviet Influence abroad might move them to accelerate the tempo of this endeavor, even at thc risk ol what they wouldestern Initialed war ol despetauon.
The equipment and weapons of thearmed forces will include the latest and best types that Soviet scientific and technological efiort can devise. Great emphasis will almost certainly be placed on research and development. While progress in this field is to some extent unpredictable, the scientists of the USSR are as able as those of any other nation to make important advances, and the ability of the Soviet state to direct the work of scientists into militarymay be superior lo that ofnations. Not all of thc improvements and innovations which are developed will be produced in quantity or introduced into operiitional unils; Soviet decisions on this point will depend on various factors, not the least of which will be the Soviet estimate of the nature and number of opposing weapons systems.
Soviet military forces will almostcontinue to be adaptedide variety ofandlong range and short range, large and small scale, however they may be designated. This does not exclude the likelihood of considerable changes, from time to time, in the structure or size of various elements of the Soviet military establishment, often dictated byin the technology of weapons and of military equipment generally.)
The capability of the USSR to launch missiles from the ground, from the air, or from submarines and surface ships, will almost certainlynd can, if the Soviet leaders desire, be greatly increasedThe accuracy, reliability, and rapidity of handling of missiles will in-
crease. Decoys, electronicand other penetration aids could bc incorporated, at least in the larger )
hile the development of offensive missiles seems now to be fairly well in hand, the development of an adequate defense against Uicm appearsremendous strategic advantage would accrue to the side which achievedefense before itsthe outcome of research andefforts In this field during the period of this estimate will have great significance for the InternationalSometime36 an antiballistic missile system for use In fixed defenses could probably become operational in the USSR; its effectiveness cannot now bc estimated. It is possible that scientific' advances may makenew means of defense practicable. We believe tliat the Soviets will continue toreat deal of research effort into antimissile defense, but we are unable to predict what success they may have.)
he use of space vehicles fortarget surveillance,jamming, and early warning is well within Soviet capabilities during the period of the estimate. Such vehicles might be used for delivery of weapons, possibly for purposes different from those served by the ICBM. We do not believe that the Soviets will have in thisissile,atellite, which can destroy other satellites in orbits moreew hundred milesissile designed for use against ballistic missiles could attack satellites in lower orbits.
The future development of Sovietweapons will almost certainly be profoundly affected by the resumption or nonrcsumption of nuclear testing. To reduce the size of missile warheads, for example, while maintaining or increasing the yield, may become an urgent Soviet requirement. The basis for such ancould probably be worked outaboratory, and the improved weapons built. We cannot be sure,that the Soviets would stockpile large numbers of untested weapons, or place great dependence upon them. It is particularly doubtful that they would do so if the weapons embodied radical innovations.
hemical warfare could play anrole in Soviet weapons systems during the period. Nerve agents willimportant, but duringeriod new families of lethal agents developed from natural poisons mayavailable. An additional threat may come from nonlethal incapacitating agents which affect mental and physical efficiency, and which are expected tostandard by the end of the period. Methods of delivery and dissemination are adequate for battlefield use. They are not adequate for large scale strategic
use. but they may become so during the period of this estimate. Thc principal Soviet research efforts in biologicalwill probably continue to be in thc area of development of genetically stable bacteria, rickettsia. viruses, and selected dried bacterial toxins, and in thcof insect carriers of infectious agents. Means may be developed for spreading biological warfare agents over large areas, up to thousands of square miles. )
nide variety ofand innovations will add to the firepower, mobility, reconnaissanceand logistical endurance of the Soviet armed forces. Some of theseare projected in more detail in the body of this estimate. Two broad lines, which are likely to be manifest in diverse ways, may be mentioned here. First is thc trend, already ln evidence, toward the use of missiles to supplement many earlier types of offensive andweapons, and sometimes where practicable to replace them. Second is thc use of nuclear propulsion, already well underway for seagoing craft, which could bc adapted for air and land vehicles by the period of this estimate.)
the various factors which willSoviet military policies in lhe periodreview, some can be foreseen atconsiderable confidence, but thearc in large measurein other estimates, wc must assumewill be no general war. Wc thinkcertain lhat the USSRowerful militaryand that Soviet alms for the spreadthroughout thc world willYet the temper and style of thein pursuing these alms willtime to time. More especially it Isthe degree of emphasis whichplace upon military power as anof policy will vary, perhaps'notbut sufficiently to have anon the pace and character ofdevelopment.
other factors which must beaccount in attempting to projectcapabilities Is the fairlyof the Sovici economy to supportestablishment, and thc much lessdecisions of Soviet leaders inresources between military and otherscientific and technologicalgeneral arc sure to be great, but we canforesee what particularof miliiary significance maythe international politicalthe next decade will Importantlythe magnitude Of the Sovietand the particular lines In whichbe concentrated.1
Soviet Military Policies in General
Soviets have always regardedestablishmentital element of
Please sec the footnote ol the Assistant Chief of SUff, Intelligence, USAF, ton page I.
national power. In the lasl two decudes Ihey haveigh proportion of theirand skill to military purposes. They have used military power direclly and Indirectly as an instrument of diplomacy andThey do not exclude miliiary forceeans of achieving their Interests. Yet thc USSR does not consider war as the only, or even the chief, means of achieving ItsThe Soviet attitude toward war has been shaped by their belief Uiat thestruggle against non-Communlst ecnlcrs of power must be carried on by whatever means arc advantageous to thc USSR. These attitudes arc soart of the Soviet outlook that wc believe they will
the past several years the Sovietsvery high priority to theweapons with which to attack the USond to defend thc USSR againstaitack. Yet the other elements of themilitary ettabllshmcnt have by noIgnored; there has been, foreffort in the modernization ofThe Soviet military has preparedvariousandrange and short range, large andhowever they may be designated.Interest In varied eapabililiesa belief In thc continuous nature ofstruggle which, depending on theobjectives pursued from time to time,resort to force at various levels.
from this principle inpolicies seems to us highlyis virtually out of the question that theshould abandon tbe development ofto attack the US directly andthc USSR itself, and almost asthat they would concentrate onto the neglect of others. Weexpect the USSR to maintainforces suitableide rango ofThis does not excludeIn the structure or size of various
elements of the Soviet military establishment, often dictated by developments In theof weapons and of military equipment generally.
IG. Another factor of some importance In Its effects upon Soviet military thinking will be new blood in the High Command. 0 men who were but Junior officers in World War II will begin to move into seniorin the Ministry of Defense. Military theoretical development will be largely In the hands of staff colonels who entered military service after World War II. By contrast,marshals were the senior fieldin World War II and many won their spurs in the Russian Civil War. While the implications of this change cannot all be foreseen, there is at least one respect in wnich It Is likely to be significant; the techDOlogica! acuteness of this new generation of seniorwill be high.
armed forces will probably be stillorganised along the line of missions:striking forces (long and mediumsea-launched missiles, bomberairtrategic(antimissile and airndtheater forces (mobile andforces, with large missilesome air and navalheground, naval, and air servicesless differentiated than in thewill probably continue to develop In
Soviet Economic Capabilities
recent years the cost of the Sovietestablishment, expressed in terms ofhas been aboutillion dollarsthe same as the cost of theestablishment. The Soviet figureapproximately constant overand thus haslightlyproportion of gross nationalIf the Soviets should, over theIncrease their militaryin proportion to theGNP. the military outlayigure in thc general rangeollars. This amount could be
greatlyhe Soviets chose or felt forced to do so; it might also bcarger amount for economic development programs or other uses
I is clear that Soviel economicwill makeast expansion of military effort. If tlie leadership chooses lo adoptourse. To be sure, Sovietwill be subject to many urgent claims apart from those of the militaryand the Soviet leaders will have to make difficult decisions respecting priorities InWithin the military itself, all-outIn nil lines of development andsimultaneously will be out of thesome choice will have to bc made among the manifold possibilities which appear. Moreover, in any rapid military buildup there would almost certainly be shortfalls orand difficulties and delays of various sorts. These considerations deserve mention, for Soviet economic capabilities are notWe cannot now see, however, that the limitations are likely to bc of greatin building Soviet military power.
Scienlific and Technical Capabilities in General
current programs forscientific facilities, and continuousto improve thc organization andof science and technology, reflectintensity of Soviet scientificfoundation is now being laid forin all important fields of basicscience during the nextears.Plan gives priority to certainareas in which advances mightaffect economic or militarySome of these areas are:reaction, research onsolid-state physics, semkonduclers,computer research,geophysics, biophysics, and
capability of Soviet scientists forto military developmentears will be at least equal tothe scientists of any other country,ability of thc Soviet stale to directof scientists into military applications
be superior. By definition, unexpected breakthroughs cannot be foreseen Several fields may offer remarkable developments of great military significance. For example,on high energy accelerators andpropagation might leadeans for destroying ballistic missiles and other targets on the ground or in air or space by means of waveseam of high energy particles.
future development of Sovietwill almost certainly beby the resumption or nonnuclear testing. To reduce thc size ofwarheads, for example, whileor Increasing the yield, may becomeSoviet requirement. The basisan accomplishment could probablyoutaboratory, and thebuilt Wc cannot be sure,the Soviets would stockpile largeof untested weapons, or placeupon them. It isthat they would do so if theradical innovations.
Iho Iniemaiional Political Conlexl
Soviets will, of course, view theirrequirements in relation to theirthe military strength and politicalof other states. If. for example,came finally to the conclusionnon-Communist powers were ableto maintain military powerUSSR had no prospect of surpassing,be increasingly disposed to turnwith the West into olherWithin certain limits, thiseclining emphasis on theof military power.cries ofin extending Soviet Influencemove them to accelerate the tempo,same lime that it led them to preparepossibilityar of desperationthe weakeningovietdevelopments will also be stronglyby US and other WesternIt is certain, for example,Soviets will seek at least to maintainmilitary position, in order to have
reasonable assurance ol the security of lhe USSR.*
part from their paramount concern wiih lhc US the Soviets, in planning theirprograms over the next decade, will have to lake account of thc probable development of their relations with Communist China, and doubtless also with Germany und otherThereigh likelihood that the international power situation will become more rather than less complex in the course of the next decade. On thc whole, wc think lhal the Soviets will view the International environment as requiring them toery high level of military power.
particular aspect of theof armsmention in this context It lsUiat over the nextears somedegree of international armsand control will be worked out Thereway of pred.cting at present whatan arrangement might lake, orit might put to Soviel militaryWe believe that there may beof arms limitation which thobe prepared to accept, howevermay be to arrive at terms. Certaincould change the basis for anfuture Soviet military development
II. TRENDS IN MILITARY
pace and character of Sovietover the period of thebe affected by many things whichconfidently foreseen. Thc followingtherefore, are general In nature.great degree they concentrate onprobable developments In weaponsand in this respect they are basedon the evidences of past Sovietand present Sovietlargely rest upon our view of thefeasibility of certain lines of sclcn-
Picas* ice the footnote of the Assistant Chief of sub, Intelligence. USAF. ton page t.
ond technological advance.prediction many years ahead ofdevelopments and ol advances In weapons technologyazardous business.which appear remote at present may materialize with unexpected rapidity.new developments cannot be ruled out of consideration. The following estimates, therefore, must bc regarded as highly
t Is also true that while Soviet research and development will proceedide front, not all of the improvements andwhich are achieved will bc put on thcline. Tlic Soviet decision to introduce new or improved weapons into operational units will depend on various factors, not least of which will be Soviet estimates concerning thc nature of opposing weapons systems.
long Range Attack System*
iallistic Missiles. Thc Soviet ICBMwill continue to be given high priority through the period ot this estimate, and we expect the development of missiles withoperational characteristics. Improved Soviet ICBMs will probablyolidtorable liquid propellant and all-inertial guidance with resulting reduced reaction time, increased reliability, and fewer facilities and operating personnel. The USSR will probably use both mobile launching systems and hard sites In this period.
c believe that at some time during the period of thishe CBP of Soviel ICBMs, under operationalcould be reduced to. This Improved accuracy can be achieved by refinement of gyros, accelerometers andIn inertial guidance systems, byof the error ln re-entry, and by Improved geodetic targeting data. The SovieU may develop multiple warheads, maneuverablennd decoys, to improve their chances against the enemy's antimissile defenses. They may also develop active ECM inand materials or shapes to minimize radar cross-sections
resent medium range missiles willbc replaced byolidutd propellant. and probably having all-Incrlial guidance. They would possessoperaUonal characteristics particularly in respect to short reaction time, mobility, simplicity, and reliability.
uringeriod the Soviets will almost certainlyubstantial force of missile-launching submarines.. ballistic missile, which we haveestimated would be Introduced ln this force in thes. could probablya system accuracy ofn missile propulsion andand in submarine navigational systems, will probably permit the introductionuch longer range submarine-launchedby thes.
Supersonic Cruise Vehicle. Ancruise-type vehicle with ramjetcould become operational byehicle could be used fordelivery, and for high altitude long range reconnaissance by photographic, electronic or Infrared means. Regardless of its actual mission, its possible employment for weapons delivery would complicate Western defense problems.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle. Before the end of the period, an operational hypersonic glide vehicle might also be available.ehicle could be manned or unmanned, and would fly at aboutc believe It unlikely that thc Soviets will consider this vehiclefor weapons delivery, but they may find it useful for reconnaissance.
Nuclear Aircraft. The Soviets probably could at any timeestbed aircraftsome useful thrusteactora phase of flight, and probably could fly on nuclear heat alonee believeorn suitable nuclear propulsion system would permit test flight byirst operational aircraft by*
Assistant Ctilcr ol Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes thc Drat operaUonal aircraft could be available In
an aircraft would be subsonic, but it would hare long range and great duration of Might, limited by permissible crew radiation doses. Such an aircraft could be used for weupons delivery, as well as for reconnaissance and for employment In an airborne early warning system.
upersonic nuclear-powered aircraft probably cannot be attained by the USSRthe period of this estimate By the end of the period, however, the Soviets may haveupersonic nuclear ramjetcruise missile.
Jet and Chemically Fuelededium bomber with cruising speed arounday bc Introduced sometime priore believe It unlikely that the Soviets willew long range conventionally fueled bomber during the period of thisHigh performance aircraft utilizing new chemical fuels such as hydrogen might be available during tlic period.
Air-ta-SuTlaee Missiles. If the Soviets saw sufficient advantage in doing so. they could probably introduce during Uie period of this estimate an atr-to-surface missile with range of the order.
issile Launching Space Vehicles. It would be technically possible for thc USSR to develop satellites or other space vehicles for launching weapons against targets on earth during the period of this esUmate.
Reconnaissance Satellite Vehicles. During and before this period, the USSR could launch reconnaissance satellites equipped withelectronic, or infrared detectionboth for early-warning and general target surveillance.
Communications Satellite Vehicles. The Soviots could, durlntr and before this period, launch satellites with navigational, commu-nications. or Jamming equipment.
Air Defense Syilerm
Missile Systems. Wesometime3issile system, employingmissiles, could become operational
for use in fixed defenses. It would have aand early warning net ofgreater detection capabilily than ts cur-renUy available in the USSR, and wouldompletely automatic datalink for coordination of the various elements of the system. We expect lhat the Soviets will attempt to developto enemy ECM and decoys. We are not able at this time to esUmate the nature or thc effectiveness of such an anUballisUcsystem.
The USSK Is probably exploringtechniques for active defense against ballistic missiles. We cannot predict Uieor success of such studies. In any case, research and development in antimissilewill continue Uirough Uils period.
The Soviets may alsoobile, or at least transportable, antiballistic missile system especially for protection of their field forces. We believe, that, despite Uie added difficulties of achieving mobility of the system and the extraordinarily short reaction Ume required against shorter range missiles, the Soviets may be able to haveystem during Uie period of Uie esUmate.
Systems. The Sovielsthat use by the West ofsatellites will establish aattack such satellites. An anUballisUcmissile could be used for interceptionup to an orbitew hundredcompletely new missile would be requiredsatellites orbiting above thatis unlikely that Uie Soviets will havemissile in operaUon during Uie periodestimate even if they choose toAlso, we doubt Uiat they could havesatellite during this period.
ntiaircraft Defenses. Tb defend against aircraft and crulsc-type missiles In thes. we believe that Uie Soviels will retain and improve upon Uie surface-to-air missile systems developed in the* ands The overall ofTecUveness of these weapons systems will probably be significantly enhanced by continued refinement of system components and greater availability of nu-
clear warheads. Some light AAA guns and lorces. Mew types would probablyolid rockets will probably be employed to supple- propellant anu use inertui guidance, and tney
ment missiles in low altitudehave Improved reliability and probably
46 Warning. Continuing improvements
early warning detectionnd ot?
nd trajectory-prcdicling radars, are ex- n improved ree-
, , , . wtth ranges up to. wi be
peeled In this period. Hilelhles and possibly . ** c
nuclear aircraft could be used lor spaceearly warningdditionml5$lle' ,ocfsystems. land-based highadars, and large cc^venUonalrob*bh' *warning radars. The variety ofArmored Vehicles. We believe lhal.possibilities for this period precludeto Improved models of tanks, anof the particular combination ofnew main battle tank will be availablethe Soviets will succeed in developingend of the period. Theon tank couldiquidFighter Interceptors. The number of * ocket weap-
fighter InterceptorTwlll continuerobablv[
K. atiles. It might be hermetically
sharply through thc period of this.
though most of those remaining wfll
be an-wcather Interceptors armed withcrossings and amphibious
air missiles. We believe that the Soviets ^
continue research and development inWe estimaterogram for thcinterceptor aircraft Into the periodpropulsion of land vehicles hasestimate, but whether new typesfor several years. Militaryreduced into operational units is likelyof such vehicles could be availablemainly on whether the Sennetsperiod of this estimate, to Includewill be useful against US orlogistic vehicles and possibly
General. The general trend ofof the ground forces will probablyto place emphasis upon Improvingand Increasing both nuclear and non-nuclear firepower. The chief developments will probably be In the fields of missile and rocket artillery, cross-country mobility, and air transportability. Thc field forces willto be equipped with improvingfor rapid communication, for television and other battlefield surveillance systems, for amphibious operations, for night actions, and for rapid unit movements to and on the
MissUe Artillery. In addition to some of the longer range missiles already discussed, new shorter range ballistic missiles willalso be available for support of the ground
Airlift. Improved tactical battlefield and strategic airlift will probably be provided by advanced assault air transports, helicopters, and perhaps vertical take-off aircraftupersonic transportcould probably be available during thc period of this estimate.
Air Support. Tactical aviation will decline in size as missiles continue to replace aircraft for interdiction and close suppori, and no new types of tactical combat aircrafl are likely to be provided for these purposes
Technological and scientificwill alsorofound impactSoviet Navy. As various newequipment, and propulsionavailable, their adaptation towhere appropriate, will occur.
ubmarines. Thc submarine fleet willa larger variety of employments,missile-launching and antisubmar.neax well as interdiction of Western lines of communication. The number of nuclear-powered submarines will increase, but the overall size of the submarine fleet willdecline as the large force ofpowered ships built in theecomes obsolescent. hermoelectricpropulsion system applicable tomay be developed, which would reduce the amount of machinery and thc chances of long range acoustic detection. Antisonar coatng may come into widespread use. In addition to missiles, advanced types ofwith homing characteristics, andarmed with nuclear warheads, mayavailable.
urface Ships. The surface fleet of the USSR is now undergoing conversionraditional force with conventional weapons to one which will employ the most advanced types of weapons. We believe Uiat thisof modernization will conUnue. possibly at an accelerated pace. Nuclear-poweredships may be Introduced into the fleet during the period. Construction of missile-launching destroyers, already begun, may be increased considerably. Missile-Iuunchlng cruisers may be introduced, perhapshe Soviets will probably conUnue to experiment with hydrofoil design, and its military application may be successful during the period.
ntisubmarine" Warfare. It is virtually certain that the Soviets will continue to seek means for Improving Uieir ASW capability, recognizing the Importance of the US fleet ballistic missile threat. Improved means of
detection will probably be achieved through hydroacousUc techniques, includ-ng advanced sonar, although infrared, magnetic, and other types of equipment may be developed for both long range research and identification ofFor destruction of submarines, the Soviets may develop nuclear depth charges, in addition to such possibilities as missilesire-guided torpedo.
Chemical, Biological, and Rodiofogkal Systems
Chemical Warfare. Nerve agents willimportant, but duringeriod new families of lethal agents developed from natural poisons may become available. An additional threat may come from non-lethal incapacitating agents which affect mental and physical efficiency, and which are expected to become standard by Uie end of the period. Methods of delivery andare adequate at present for large scale battlefield use; they are not adequate for large scale strategic use. but they may become so during Uie period of this estimate,
BicJogical Warfare. The principal Soviet research efforts will probably continue to bc in the area of development of genetically stable bacteria, ricketlsia, viruses, and selected dried bacterial toxins, and In the development of insect carriers of Infectious agents Means may be developed for spreading biologicalagents over large areas, up to thousands of square miles.
GO. Radiological Warfare (Apart from Falloutlthough thc Soviets have shown some interest in the idea of radiologicaland Uie possibility of Soviet development in this field cannot be excluded, we think It unlikely that they will develop weapons for ihr, purpose.Original document.