THE OUTLOOK FOR LEBANON

Created: 5/10/1960

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

ilal NationalBatinat*^^

Mebingtoe, IMS

SHIE

THE OUTLOOK FOR LEBANON

THE rirOtUM

UrnaU th* poliliraJ ouUeok In Lefaarscax particularly tba Irssplkratttran* ol tha prtstpeellve suecAkni

AT1

ftwlUlOTbettformfi Bnea tlrtual crUl war, ij^unliic th* Ustefrtty ol Uoabcb, leu to the be tanem nquctt lor US mllltafj InUrrrattoo. Tba period since tba and of Charnoun'ebaasUatlswry traoquli Unoer

tafcan a

Chanaoun, and tha strong pro-UAH tendencies exhibited by Chanvotin'a mora ardent opponents tt the Uma of3 troubles. In |antraL tat consider thai tbs

the preUrtnc* al tt tittle desireecurrence of tha ilolent oulbreaaa. and moat !ac-uons, sine* the restoration ot order, hareind ol pflitlrsl true*abinet of rnodetales who hat* largely treaded pcvrocatlTe tallies.

i This tone has rata, Cbehsh. former commander ofrecx Cbehab has so farombination of compromise and firmness In his determination toepetition of the liSSiuue. He has shown himselfto use Irjrcc against of th*

pro-UAB Moslem faction Inu gone along with Cbehab's policies, and substantial cooperation belwsen them la likely to continii*. Karaml baa

from th*

otttovering oot* lndtcattd that thi*ubalttad by th* Olraotor of centralas prepared by CIA, aad th* latwlllgnc* Mjsa&lsatloa* of th* DwparLasaota orh* Artsy, tb* levy, tb* Airnd Th* Joint Staff. All aastxra of th* thsltedintelligence Board concurred *ltb th* *atlssato onith th* exception ol th* itpr.nni.il/ii of tb* ASC and tb* rsi who .Detained on tb* grostsd* .that th* toplo va* ootsld* tb*lr jorladlctlon.

coMplesby which th*r* apportion'1in th* gov*riua*nt.

S Tom omits UiUttjU rivalriM WW) Lebanese political tatt* twain, of course, naanllally wvchanpd. The can-li tl lMUB ol MiaJcm Uiuaa ChrlaUar. Ma-dona la iMTltably cotslni to tht lora wlUitaetltna, punned for

avrts from the UAH, haba rnaMurerinaa, will Oaatroy hli po-Utteal power. Tben lanot only unonf Chrbtlan. mm the next parill beby Moslem extra rnltU bent on tU^tft>rtai tat dsUctta balance ol tht

and

tn Syria, will

Mi

of controlling Utataonbey Uuuat that WcsWraa Die their forces to rally and to counter the trend. Many Modem and Druseon the otbar hand. Uka Wtii.ni luppoct of iha ChruUians tor tjantad and mk UAR aaaislaree to countar It

1 VThikelreadyof UAR Lmerlerence In prtveieeUan maoeumlr^ we doubt that the UAR Oowmment t* Intentassive carapalgp olor that Namr prsatnUy enter-tBim serious ambitions ot absorbingorUAH there. Nasser clearly wants irrcment sym path* lie to Use UAR and taW broad alma of Pan-Arab nallrmalrsm,Ls prepared lo contribute raooey and Influence to Una and. Ha tawaeatbelieve* tbat tba Weatern Powers will provide fupport lor pro-West(actions. II be cama to believe that outside lorces want atUuaptlng to lotteri^j'.'ii tortrnamnt which would lollow Lb* lircnaly u'i-rltuu policies Cha-

mfiun puifttOd, UAR COUnltltflOf t* WOtlld

be slapped up itrorsfly. On too whole, nowevar. we thinkly that HumCi wtU atop wall short of th* kind of

aitar BarraJ may try to LnUrtaia oo aand by mean* not *ar>cuoiwd by Naaawr. butbelirv* tbat NiLiaar can probably control Sarra]ctivity.

Wt <aa* thla estiauta on Uw belief that Nairn himself Is fullyo the unique conditions governing Labaneae

and Kauaral have been essentiallyto Naaawr Naamvr It Westernndependence and Is not desirous of add-Iruj to hU troubles with the Weaternleast with thea Uma whan he li btavliy engaged with his own problems. Hi probaCly telHTri that the Western Powers under certainwould again Inltnttw Inaaoreom. be has been Impressed with Uw difficulties of governlne Syria, and It aware thateculiar dorncsUc InsUtuUoni and lnUrnatloru) position would present tten thornieri ha tried to taka Utemon.

& Hot do wt tellevt tbat any substantial Lebanese taction seriously wants Uw state to ba Veined with or subservient to Uw UAR. Certainly Pisaklant Cfaabab and Prime aaahlsterar* shown OtUe of Uw cstrtnw pro-UAB sentiments wtucb some ol Karainl's leliow-dlajJdrnU dlt-playtd whan Uwy wtrt In arms against Chamoun two years ago. Tht moderate

MoaWrahich wera praiphri lo luin to UMm only avalhtbla supporthamoun7 and 1HS, now (rei rwaaooably aecuri under Cbihab inci itanmL7 maenad Chriawm and strengthenedafc-Oem praaMon. -UnnU tfld hk

of but

to do so far short of iolkrwlng ths Syrian pcJlUctana Into desmatdenea onbiy *ni flnd nmrl la this coutm from Arab leaders othtr than Nasser King Saud.eavy araancbu eon-uibutor toomntm poUUraJ lac uoua. do longer haa um funds for such purposes. Howerar, such innuence ai he and hla family retain will ba exerted against the tpnsa of The Ixirtla. Turks will

UKaaaer. On the whole these.an not likelyo affect theof tha elecUoru.

ft. Neither the uk nor Prance Is likely to be bj aeUre aa In the past. Both will probably attempt to boldinimum, throutth corert sup-port of certain ChrlaUan and moderate Moslem elements, but they will probably avoid, aa unfeasible, attempts to brine ^out the kindeatern orten-Ution which BriUafa and French Influence foattred In prtvtoua Lebanese goram-menta

B. As tbe elections approach and tensions nwun I, Interested outside likely to

tf-wuiey may now mfm prauure Iranor ftrealer support, and he will find It oUTkult to reject these demands even If

wfH encounter trowing Importunities from pro-Weet element* to lake more vlgoeoui1 n.

n any case, the election* wU) be bard fought, with considerable rlakan um whole, we beam Uui tasehab's control of tha iccurlly foroa is strong tnoufb to enable him to cope with tht kind of localized arnwd clashes whichormal feature of laftanaai election* Thla la particularly true daw the .lee bona will be held on awaar ana-eeaih* Sundaya tn diCerent pasta of the country, thus enabling tba aecurlty force* to be nwvadore sartoua danger la that disorder, might become widespread, ruxlhex IneldenU such aa um May bombings ln Mr* forrample.

dealt with by Chehab.

to drop tbei, present Internal/lose ranks against each cAhtrtvVevclopmant would dirlde govern-meat and country aha* and placa criticalon um unity aod oisclpUn* of the securityahut raaort the gor-arrunent might feel cornptiltd to postpone Uw elections, but Ifaii now appears un-llHely.

IL Tha elections are likely to raaulttjlrarntnt mora acconunodaUng tond hla policies than tba recent oc* In an effort to taring all poUtieal faction*

Into lb* now ptallamsnt and discourage

ibln mSflta ry m. nciivf ring3 now seats or* to be added to tha parliament, now composed ofoerabers- In mc&xavx* withconfessional re pcswtn tattoo Is totn about the taunt proportion. However, most of tba ntw stats will probably bt won by politiciansto ChartsotBi finally, manypro-Caasuaoun deputies will prooahly cncwnui mucbxaBUoo In thrir owndlstiWt. /

It Wt do cot, howevssr, believe that ei-tremlsl Moaktaa art llxaly to tain snffl-cient strength ba parllamant to attempt drastic chaxapH bt. larbtJOD't present middle Of tht road luieljn policy or U> upset the present conlesalonal balance Any such effort would be opposed not only by tbe CbrUtlsris, but also by many mod-trat* Sunrds, moat Ohlaa, and ths Druses. An additional measure of protection Is aOorded ths Christians by virtue ol the fact that President Cherub's term of office has four more years to run. Che-hab will probably attempt to prevent any In parliament

oof-ttrm trends In Lebanon clcarlj favor aornt Increase tn Moslem Influence and pooler kaenttrksUon with Arab nev UotsaUsra In general. OotspohSO pro-Wetvarnltin of tbe Ciianioun brand tl highly unlikely to be adopted again, and no foreseeable Ubanest government would have much chance of swrtvlrigried to restoee that .uieaUsUoo. rtooc-thelfst. It remains unlikely thatnfluence will lead, trtn In the longer run, to uruncatlon of Iasbstr*on withh or tht effective suppression of pro-West or Christian elements. For the fcrtsst abie future most Letasnaae, ChilaUan and non-Christiana alike, would hast too much to lose byevelopment.

Original document.

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