STATEMENT BY MR. ALLEN W. DULLES TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITT EE (R

Created: 5/31/1960

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

STATEMENT BY MR. ALLEN W. DULLES DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE lo the

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

The duty of the Central Intelligence Afency under statute and under National Security Council directives pursuant tostatute, is to provide the President and the National Security Council with evaluated intelligence relating to our national security.

Agency hat no policy or police functions.,

In addition, however, the Agency has the duty, within policy limitations prescribed by the President and State Oepartmeat, to do whatever is within its power to collect and produce the intelligence required by the policy makers in governmsnt, to deal with the dangers we faceha worlduclear world.

Increasingly over thaears, the main target for our intelligence collection has been the U. S.ts military, its economic, and its subversive potential.

The carrying out of this task has been rendered extremely difficult because tha Soviet Unionlosed socioty.

Great areas of the U. S. S. R. aro curtained off to tha Outside world. Their military preparations.are made In secret. Their military hardware, ballistic missiles,-bombers, nuclear weapons, and submarine forces, as far as physically possible, are concealed from us. They have resisted all efforts to reallto mutual inspection or "open skies."

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This document may be downgraded towhen separated from tha balartca of the testimony.

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The ordinary Coots of information gathering, under these circumstances are not wholly adequate. These ordinary tools include both the normal overt means of obtaining information, and the classical covert means generally referred to as espionage.

It is truo that from theso sources and from the many Soviet defectors who have come over to the Free World and from disaffected and disillusioned Soviet nationals, we obtain very valuable information.

However, these sources and other sources doveloped through the application of various scientific techniques, while very helpful, did not give us the full intelligence protection 1Mb country required

against the danger of preparation for surprise attack against us,

from bases which might remain unknown and by weapons, thend power of which we might not be able adequately to evaluate.

Almost equally serious had been our lack of knowledge of Soviet defense measures against our retaliatory striking power.

Shackled by ttaditions, wo were seeing tho power of attack grow while the ability to secure the intelligence nocessary for defense against attack was slipping, bound down in part by tradition.

For example, while Soviot spy trawlors canew milos off our shoros and observe us with impunity, tho Soviets cry "aggression"lane. Invisible to the naked eye, files over it some fifteen tnilc3 above tho

Either, theoretically, coulduclear weapon. coulduch more serious nuclear blow than a

Hut, of course, as we Well know.no one would think ofuclear war with either an isolated plane or ship.

In this age of nuclear peril we, the Central Intelligence Agency, feltew approach was called for in the whole field of intelligence collection.

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was tho situation, whanlmost aix years ago, consultation was initiated on new Intelligence collection techniques. We consultedroup of highly competent technicians in and out of government. From our discussions thero emerged the conceptigh-flying, high performance reconnaissance plane. In the then state of the art of aoronautics, it was confidently believedlane could be designed to fly unintorcoptcd over the vitally important closed areas of the Soviet Union, whore ballistic, nuclear, and other military preparations against u's wore boing made.

Wo also believed,esult of these consultations, that the art of photography could be so advanced as to make the resolution of the picturos taken, even at oxtromo altitudes, of very great significance. On both counts the accomplishments exceeded expectations.

While tho developmental work for this project, pursuant to high policy directive was in process, thore came the Summit Conference of

Hera, in order to relax tho growing tensions rosulting from the dangor of surprise attack, the President advanced tho "opon skies" proposal. Moscow summarily rejoctad anything of this nature, and Soviet security measures continued to be reinforced.

Accordingly,roject was pushed forward rapidly, andear after5 summitthe firstlight over the Soviet Union took place. For almost four years the flight program has been carried forward successfully.

Speed in getting the program underway hadop priority. Wo were thon faced, that is,ituation where the Soviets were continuing to develop their missiles, their heavy bomber and bomber bases, and their nuclear weapons production without adequate knowledge on our part.

This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable both from the viewpoint of adequato military preparation on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to'tike coiintermeasuros in the event of attack.

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It was recognized at the outset thatrojectts risks andimited span ol life due to Improvement ol counter measures;elatively fragile single-engine plane of the nature ofight one daylame-out or other malfunction in the rarified atmosphere In which it had to travel. If that resultederiou* and prolonged loss of altitude, there was danger of failure and discovery.

To stop any enterprise of this nature because there are risks, would he, of course, in this field, to accomplish very Utile.

While air roconnaissanco is an old and tried method of gainingeacetime operation of this particular type and on this scale was unique.

ubmit that we live In an ago whon old concepts of the limits of "permitted" techniques for acquiring information are totally outdated. They come from the horse and buggy days.

I see no reason whatevor to draw an unfavorable distinction betwoon the collection of Information by reconnaissanceifth altitude innd espionage carried on by individuals who illegally operate directly within the territory of another state.

In fact, the distinction. If one is to bo drawn, would favor the former. The illegal espionage agents generally attempt to suborn and subvert the citizens of the countries in which they operate. High level air reconnaissance in no way disturbs the life of the people. It does not harm their property. They do not oven notice it.

I believe these techniques should be universally sanctionedutual basis and become an accepted and agreed part of our international arrangements.

The USSR hasood deal about these flights for the lastrs. It has studiously refrained from giving the people of the Soviet Union the knowledge they now admit they had.

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With respect tom prepared to support and document these conclusions:**

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First, that this operation was oae of tho most valuable Intelligence) collection operations that any country has ever mounted at any time, and that it was vital to our national security.

Second, that tho chain of command and authority for tho project was clear.

Third, that every overflight was carefully planned, fully authorized, and, until Mayffectively carried

Fourth, that the technical and logistic support was prompt and efficient.

Fifth, that the security which was maintained for this projecteriod of moro than five years has been unique.

I shall deal with these points in tho invorso order inave presented them.

ecurity. Tho project was runmall, closely knit organisation at headquarters and in tho fiold. Knowlcdgo of the oparatlon was restrictedinimum. Ovor more than five years, since the inception of the project, there has never been any damaging disclosure to interfere with tho program.

The existence ofircraft was, of course, well known, though its full capabilities, particularly tho altitude and range were not disclosed. It had important weather and air sampling capabilities which were effectively used and which afforded natural cover for the project. These weather capabilities were open and publicised.

For example, as farnows the first aircraft that has ever flown over the eyeyphoon. It was used very effectively out In the Far East to learn about typhoons which cause so much damage, and waery extraordinary series of pictures ofooking right down at the eyeyphoon from several miles above the top of it. Of course,lso had very valuable characteristicseconnaissance plane for peripheral flights.

With regard to technical and logistic support:rom tha inception of the project, CIA has called on the United States Air Force for support in the form of technical advice and assistance in those fiolds

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where the Air Forcetho most expert knowledge. These included

advice on aircraft design and procurement operational training ot

'aircrews, weather,and communications. ay say the Air Force liberally gave all this support to us.

The CIA also drew on the technical knowledge and advice of those members of the United States Intelligence Board with particular competence in the field of intelligenceargeting and the like. Each mission was carefully planned with respect to the highest priority requirements of the Intelligence Community.

The project has been directedenior civilian in CIA with high competence in this area of work. Ho was responsible directly to me and, of course, to General Cabell,

Since the inception ofoing back for tenersonnel from the military services, including tho Air Force, have been detailed to CIA for tours of duty. We have had as manyundred of them at one time. These personnel take their orders from CIA, not from their parent service, during their period of detail.roject, under Its civilian director, drew upon both the military and civilian personnel in the Agency. Thsy wore assigned to dutios in headquarters and in the field staffs which were responsible for carrying out the technical functions of the program. They were* chosen in vie* of their particular qualifications for this particular project.

Third, overy overflight, from the Inception of theproject, and every phase of it, was carefully planned and staffed.

From time to tlma intelligence requirements wero reviewed, and programs of one or more missions were authorized by higher authority.

Within the authority thus granted, specific flights could then be carried out on the order of the Director of Central Intelligence, as availability and readiness of aircraft and of pilot and as weather conditions permitted.

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elements constituting the Soviet Union's capability tourprise attack. Inajor target during this program has been the Soviet air defense system with which our retaliatory force would have to contend. La case of an attack on us and aby us.

Today, the Soviet bomber force is still tho main offensive long range striking force of the Soviet Union, However,rogram has helped to confirm thatreatly reduced long-range bomber production program is continuing In the Soviet Union, It has established, however, that the Soviet Union has recentlyew mediumomber with supersonic capabilities.

rogram has covered many Soviet long-range bomber airfields, confirming estimates of tho location of basos and the disposition of Soviet long* range bombers. It has also acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them.

Ou^overflights have enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground facilities involved.

With respect to the Soviet missile tost program hall illustrate graphically by showing you the photograph, of these facilities, including both their ICBM and thoir IRBM test launching sites which could, of course, also become and may well be,ites.

Our photography has also provided us valuable insight into the problem of Soviet doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. It has taught us much about the use which the Soviets aro making of these site* for the training of troops in the operational use of the short and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

The program has provided valuable information on the Soviet atomic energy program. This information has been included In the estimate which we give periodically to the Joint Committee on Atorr.ic Energy, but without referring to the actual source of our data. This has covered the production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, and size of many stockpile sites.

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The project ha* shown that, despite Mr. Khrushchev's boasts that the Soviets will soon be able to curtail tho production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, tho Soviets aro continuing to expand fissionable material capacity.

The Soviet nuclear testing grounds have been photographed more than once with extremely interesting rasults. The photography has also given us our first firm information on the magnitude and location of tho USSR's domestic uranium ore and uranium processing activities, vital in estimating Soviet flssionablo material production. We have located national and regional nuclear storage sites and -forward storage facilitios.

In general, the program has continued lo give usoful data on the siso and rate of growth of Soviet industry.

The material obtained has been used for the correction of military maps and aeronautical charts.

Among the most important intelligence obtained is that affecting the tactics of the United States deterrent ale strike force. w have hard information about the nature, extent, and in many cases, tho location of tho Soviot ground-to-air mtssilo development. We havo learned much about the basic concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, deployment, and rate of development of the Soviet air . efense system, including their early warning radar development.

We have obtained photographs of many scores of fighter air fields previously inadequately identified, and have photographed various fighter-types vainly attempting to intorcopt. All of this haa proved invaluable to SAC in adjusting its plans to known elements of tho opposition it would have to face.

esult of the concrete evidence acquired byrogramarge number of targets in the Soviet Union, it has now been possible for U. S. commanders toore efficient and confident allocation of aircraft, crews and weapons.

hotography has also made it possible to provide new and accurate information to strike crews which will make it oasierfor thorn to identify their targets and plan their navigation more precisely.

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We have obtained new and valuable information with regard to submarine deployment and tho precise location Ot their submarine pons.

La the opinion of our military, of our scientists, and of the senior officials responsible for our national security, the results of the program have been invaluable.

The program has had other elements of value. It has made the Soviets less cocky about their ability to deal with what wo might bring against them.

They have gone through four years of frustration in having the knowledge6 that they could ba overflown with impunity, that their vaunted fighters were useless against.such flights, and that their ground-to-air missile capability was inadequate.

Khrushchev has never dared expose this to his own people. It is only after he had boasted, and we believo falsely, that he had been able to bring downnround-to-air missile while flying at altitude, that he has allowed his own people to have even an inkling of the capability which we possessed.

His frustrated military, many of whom know the facts, are far loss confident today than they otherwise would have been.

At the same time, In competent military circles among our allies, tho evidence of American capability demonstrated by the present disclosure oflights hasow and better perspective of our own relative strength as compared with that of the Soviet Union.

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At thisropose to show you some photographs to support my presentation regarding the Intelligence value of the project.

hall present the facts with regard to the dispatch of thelight and the onsuing developments insofar as the Intelligence aspects are concerned and insofar as they are known to us.

As to the timing of the flight, there is, of course, no good timeailure.

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I have already presented Iho circumstances underssumed direct responsibility for dispatching this flight.

If this Qight haduccess, we would have covered certain targets of particular rigniflcance and we would. In the normal course, have wished to analyse its results beforeurther mission. When it failed, it was obvious even before we received instructions that we would not try again before studying the cause and effects of failure. In either event, success or failure, after this flight wc were not preparing to fly again for several wneks and until further policy guidance was received.

With respect to tho timing of tho flights, the President, in his speech ofad this to say: "As to tha timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailableater date. The decision was that the programt be halted. "

"Tho plain truth is this? ation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be usedoncealurprise attack."

I would point out, also, that if you turn off all flights for months before international meetings and then for some time after such meetings and beforo trips to tho Soviet Union of high American officials or trips here of Soviet officials; if you also estimate that in times of tension flights should be stopped because they'might .increase the tension, and In times of sweetness and light they should not be run because it would disturb any "honeymoon" in our relations with the Soviet Union; If, on top of this, you take into account that in much of the Soviet Union most days of the year are automatically eliminated because of weather and cloud cover and low Arctichen you can understand the problem of timing of flights.

If you asked me whether orlight would have been made after this particularannot give you the answero not know. At the time, we had no authority for any mission other than the one that was then undertaken.

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With respect to the flight itself, whon the aircraft did not reach its destination within the flight time and fuel capacity given it. It was presumed to be down. But at first wo did not know where. "It could havo beon within friendly territory, in hostile desert, or in uninhabited territory, or within hostile territory where if alive the pilot would have been quickly apprehended as was the case. We did not know whether the plane was Intact or destroyed, the pilot alive or dead.

I shall dealoment with the statements which were Issued du.-iag this period of uncertainty.

The quastlon of course arises as to what actually happened to cause this aircraft to come down deep in the heart of Russia.

Let me remind you first that tho returns are not yet all In, and so our picture ia not complete. However, wo doonsiderable body of evidence thateasonable judgmentigh degree

of confide o.

Our bsst judgment is that it did not happen as claimed by the Soviets, ThM is, we believe that it was not shot down at Its operating altitude ofeet by the Russians. We believe that it was initially forced downuch lower altitude by some as yet undetermined mechanical malfunction. At that lower altitude, Ititting duck for Soviet defenses, whether fighter aircraft or ground-to-air fire or missiles.

As to what happened at the lower altitude, wo are not sure. The pilot may havo bailed out at any time or he may have crash landed. The aircraft was equippedestruction device to be activated by the pilot as he leaves the aircraft. in wo do not know whether or not he attempted to do so. It shouldd, however, that no massive destruction device capable of ensuring complete destruction could be carried in this aircraft as weight limitations were critical, and every pound counted.

Thus, whether or not the destruct device was used, ono might oxpect si/.ablo and identifiable parts of tho aircraft and its equipment to remain.

Aa lo tho nature and cause of the suspected malfunction, we aro not prepared to pass judgment. But let me remind you that this aircraft and this pilot had proven their high degree of reliability in many technically similar flights, inside and outside friendly territory. When operating as in this case,0 miles within unfriendly, heavily-defended territory, there can be no cushion against malfunction.

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There has been much comment and questioning with regard to the pilot and his behavior after appro hens ion. Of course, we only have ihc Soviets' roport on all of this, and we should accept it with caution.

All of the pilots engaged in this enterprise were most carefully selected. They were highly trained, highly motivated, and, as seamed right, well compensated financially. But no one in his right mind would have accepted these risks for money alone.

Since the oporallonal phase of tho program started, tho reliability record of the piano,raft of this character, was little short of phenomenal. Itribute to the high skill of the designor, the maintenance crews, and the pilots. Until the May first flight, overour-year period of operations, no piano had been lost over unfriendly territory in the course of many, many missions. Several wero lost during tho training period at home and in friendly territory abroad.

Francis Gary Powers, the pilot on tholight,ourth generation American citizen, born in Jenkins, Kentucky, about SI years ago. HeA degree from Milligan College, Tennessee, in Scholasttcally he was high average. Ho joined the Air Forco in the fallrivate and served in an enlisted status untilhen he was dischargedorporal in order to enter the Aviation Cadet School to trainilot. He attended the Air Force Basic and Advance Pilot Training School at Greeaville, Mississippi. Upon completion of this training Ine was commissionedecond Lieutenant.

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Hi* first duty assignment.was,.as1 Commando Jetithlh Strategic Fighter Squadron at Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. He resigned his Air Force Rescrvo Commission under honorable conditions in The reason for such resignation was to join the project we are discussing.

His record with the Air Force had been uniformly good. He waspecial security screening by tho Air Force and also

a supplemental check by the security office of tho

During his Air Force career, he received training with respect to his behavior and conduct in ovent of capture, and after entering the employ of the Agency, he took the Agency's oscape and evasion course at our training station here In the United States in June He had subsequent training in escape and evasion after his assignment to his overseas post in

An Air Force Major Flight Surgeon assigned to CIA who worked withilots during their training in tho United States and continuously during their stay overseas, had this to say In regard to Francis Powers,uring tho period of my assignment as Flight Surgeon atot infrequentlyoom with Mr, Powerii and participated in social, flying, and mission duties with him. In my opinion Mr. Powers was outstanding among the pilots for his calmness under pressure, his precision, and his methodical approach to problems. avo flown considerably in jets with Mr. Power*. ould consider him temperate, dovoted, perhaps more than usually patriotic,an given to thinking before speaking or acting."

It should be remembered that Powersilot,ell-rounded aviator trained to handle himself under all conditions, in the air or if grounded in hostile territory. He was not trained as an "agent" as there were no foreseeable circumstances, even the present ones, where he would act as such. Furthermore, such training would have been incompatible both temperamentally and with tho strenuous technical demands of his flight missions.

The pilots of these aircrafts on operational missions, andas true in the case of Powers, received the following instructions foe use if downedostile area:

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Flr3t,heir duty to ensure the destruction of the Aircraft ami its equipment to the greatest extent possible.

Second, on reaching the ground it was the pilot's first duty to attempt escape and evasion so as to avoid capture, or delay it as long as possible. To aid him in these purposes and for survival he was given the various items of equipment which the Soviets have publicized and which are normal and standard procedure, selected on the basis of wide experience) gained in World War II and in Korea.

Third, pilots were equippedevice for self destruction but were not given positive Instructions to make use of it. In tho last analysis, this ultimata decision has to bo left to the individual himself.

Fourth, in tho contingency of capture, pilots wero instructed to delay as long as possible the revelation of damaging information.

Fifth, pilots were instructed to tell the truth if facedituation, as apparently faced Powers, with rospect to those matters which were obviously within tho knowledge of his captorsesult of what fell into their hands. In addition, ifosition where somo attribution had to bo given his mission, ho would acknowledge that he was working for the Central Intelligence Agency. This was to mako it clear that he was not working for any branch of the armed services, and that his mission was solely an intelligence mission.

These instructions were basedareful study of our experience in tho Korean war of the consoquonces of brain-washing and of the oxtont of information which could be obtained by these and other means available to the Soviets.

Whether or not In this Instance the pilot complied with all of these Instructions, It is hard to s'ato today with the knowledge we have.areful review of what he hae laid does not Indicate that hogiven to the Soviets any valuable information which they could not have discovered from the equipment they found upon the pilot's person or retrieved from the downed aircraft.

I would ware, of course, against putting too much belief in what Powers may say, particularly if he ia later put on trial. By that time they will havaore thorough opportunityompleteoperation which might wellixture of truth and fiction.

I will now deal with tho "covor story" statements which wore issued following May I.

lane is overdue and the fact of its takeoff and failure to return is known, some statement must be made, and quickly. Failure to do so, and, under normal conditions, toearch for the lost plane, would in itsolfuspicious event.

Thus, whenisappeared on May first and did not return to its base within the requisite lime period after its takeoff, action was required.

For many years, in fact since the inception of tlie operation, consideration has been given lo the covor story which would be used in the case of the disappearancelane which might possibly be over unfriendly torritory.

Because of its special characteristics,lane was of great interest to the U. S. weather services and to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the predecessor of NASA, NASA was very much concorncd with the scientific advances which operations ofs could make towards groator knowlodgo of tho upper atmosphoro and for other.scientific purposes. As already s have now undertaken many weather and related missions and thoir functions In this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has been distributed freely to the world.

It was therefore natural that NASA's operations be used to explain the presencos at various base3 throughout the world, although NASA did not participate in the development of intelligence devices, nor did they participate in the planning and conduct of any Intelligence missions.

Accordingly, when the May first flight was lost, an initial statement was issued on May 2nd by tho Base Commandant at Adanaircraft, engaged in upper air studies and operating from the base was down, and oxygen difficulties had been reported. This was identified in the pressASA plane. earch for the plane was initiated in the remote aroas of eastern Turkey.

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On Mayarly in the day by our time, Khrushchev made his claim that "an American aircraft crossed our frontier and continued its flight into the Interior of ouras shott that time, Khrushchev gave no further details of significance.

Apparently a* an attempt at deception, Khrushchev followed up his speech the next day by distributing photographsile of junkccording to experts, pieces of an old Soviet fighter planepossibly for the purpose of making us think thatlane had been effectively destroyed. Sincefake wreckage was quickly identified for what it was, this particular ruse had no effect.

The NASA statement which followed the Khrushchev speech ofeveloped somevhat further the original cover story. Also on Mayhe Department of Stateelease which generally followed the covor story. Mr. Dillon has covered this in his testimony before this Committee on

At thise still did not know whether tha plane or any recognizablo parts of it or the pilot were in Soviet hands, or whether the pilot was dead or alive. Furthermore, then we did not know whether Khrushchev desired to blow up the incident as he later did, or put it under the rug and spare his people the knowledge that wo had been overflying them.

Honco, in this situation, there seemed no reason at that time to depart from the original cover story.

These two press releases attributed to NASA were worked outbetween CIA and NASA and after conferring withof

Those statements did not come out of any lack of forethought or attention to their preparation or lack of coordination, The basic cover story had been developed some years ago for the exigencyailure, and this original cover story was onodified to meet'our then estimate of what was best to say in the light of what little we knew about the details of thelight failute.

Subsequently, on Mayhrushchev adduced evidence that he had the pilot alive, and quoted his purported statements. He also

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produced certain of the content* of the plane And later varioul '

of the plane itself. This clearly disclosed tho true nature of the mission, on which the plane was engaged.

"The cover story was outflanked.

The issue then was whether to admit the incident but deny high level responsibility, or to take the course that was decided upon ant! clearly expressed inSecretary Herter's statement ofnd in the President's statement ofnd his address of

In Mr. Horter's appearance before this Committee, ho has dealt with tho statements which were issued during the period after Mayxcept for the two statements involving NASAave covered.

I would only add tlvti In my opinion, in the, light of all the factors involved, the decision taken to assume responsibility In this particular case was the correct one. Denial, in my opinion, over the long run would have been tortuous and self dofcating.

Those who took this decision knowas ready to assume the full measure of responsibility and to covor tho projectechnical intelligence operation carried out on my own responsibility as Director of CIA. This alternative, too, was rejected because of the many elements making It hardly credible over the longer run.

This concludes my statement respecting the Intelligence aspects ofroject.

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