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T
OF. PARTMP NT
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 0
*ij Stilt
LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE] DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPABIL ITIES BY ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES
i)
the
OF CENTRAL INTEIXIUENCE
The folloaing intelligence organizations participated tnof this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
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Kthe Army, the Navy, the Atr Force, and The Joint Staff.
In by the
STATES INTEIJJCENCF HOARD
on ZD Concurring were The Director ofand Research, Department of State; theof Staff for Intelligence, Department ot the Army; the
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Assistant Chief of Naval Operations {Intelligence).of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IISIB; theto the Secretary of Defense. Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency- The AssistantFederal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
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NHDMon-i'ft
LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES BY ADDITIONAL COUNTRIES
the problem
To estimate the capabilities and intentions of additional countries to develop and produce an operational nuclearuclear weapons andver the next decade; and to estimate Use consequences ol theofapability. (NOTE: In this paper we deal primarily with the potential of individual countries and certain groupings to develop nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities at present levels of external assistance, and the likelihood of their doing so. Any significant change in the level of external aid would clearly alter the basic estimates contained herein, both as to the liming and likelihood of such programs.)
conclusions
the nextumber of countries could produce nuclear weapons and certain of them could also develop missile delivery systems provided theyajor and very costly effort und started their programs in the next year ur two.) However only France is known to have programsCommunist China almost certainly haseapons program. West Germany, Sweden, Japan, and India could initiate such programs but areto do so in the next several years unless thereramatic shift in the international situation.
France will almost certainly push its program and will probably not be deterred by any nuclear test ban involving the
1 The1 nuclear capability" aro used with ihi* im'iiiilnir throushout the paper.
present nuclear powers unlessan were combined with effective nuclearincluding control of delivery systems. Provided Francearge-scale effort,t couldodest operational nuclearusing light Jet bombers andfission bombs; by the end of the decade, it couldignificant missile capability with thermonuclear warheads. French development of an independent nuclear capability would probablyFrance's demandsarger voice in NATO and in overall Western planning.
hinese Communist progress in the nuclear field is heavily dependent onaid. We believe this aid has been fairly substantial and increasing over the years, at least until recently. On the
basis of the scanty evidence available, we now believe that the most probable date at which the Chinese Communists coulduclear device is sometimehough it might be as later as earlyepending upon the actual degree of Soviet assistance.'1 Six months or so thereafter they couldrude fission weapon deliverable by the BULL bombers which the USSR hassupplied. By the end of theCommunist China could. missile with awarhead, but probablyonger range missile. If Soviet aid has been or becomes considerably greater, all these dates could be advancedonsiderable decrease in aid would retard the program significantly. With theby Communist China of acapability, the incentives in other Asian countries for accommodation with Communist China would increase.and India, however, might feelto develop such weapons )
est Germany could probably produce independently an operationalears. We do notWest Germany would undertake an independent effort until it had found it impossible to obtain the benefits of acapability through NATO, bilateral arrangements with the US.oint
'Tbe Anltfuit Cruet of Naval OpersUoniDepartment o( lhc Navy. OUsfiira with Into See fooUiote lohich foicii Uii* point at ienith 'The Auurtant Chief of Stall. InlelllEenrr.hould read: "On theof cvldencr- uvuilnblc. nndHixm con llnua lion of the prcunt level
.:!i. '. II I- litlMiiti il lli.i'. IMn:-
munut China coulduclear device by"
Western European program.
A joint European effort, with French-West German cooperation as its core, would spread the economic burden and, even without the UK, would probablythe achievement of an initialnuclear capability with missile delivery by the participants by as much as two to three years. However, in the absence of US encouragement, or unless thereasic loss of Europeanin the US. we believe il unlikely thatoint effort, especially with UK participation, will emerge during the next several years. )
Sweden couldodestnuclear capability with missile7ears after decision. Only in the eventerious degeneration of the international situation, or if it loses hopeuclear test ban or effective disarmament, is Sweden likely torogram.
ny increase in the number of nuclear powers could raise the chances thatweapons would be used. It would also increase the dangers which could Mow from actions taken throughor desperation. It could also, however, engender greater restraint on international moves which could lead to military confrontations. It would in-
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crease the pressures throughout the worldest ban, disarmament, and nuclear free zones.
he relative position within an alliance of any country acquiring nuclearwill be enhanced. Considerable strains in an alliance could result If the newly acquired capability encouraged the possessor to pursue policies inconsistent with those of its allies.
DISCUSSION
GENERAL CAPABILITIES
he requirements forew rudimentary nuclear weajxins are relatively few: (a) access to supply or natural uranium; Ib) the ability either lo separata weapons graderom natural uranium or lo extract the plutontum produced in aand (c) the ability to design, fabricate, snd test an initial weapon. As indicated in Table I. many of these general requirements can now. or will withinears, be metubstantial number of countries Moreover, as world uranium production and commercial sales ol power reactors expand. It appears likely Lhut, in the absence of international controls,ountry without direct access to natural uranium will be able to acquire uranium and produce enough fissionableto fabricate atew crude weapons.
c do not believe that. In general, awould manufacture and stockpile nuclear weapons in quantity without first having con-
the Independence of ihe Congo. Belgium no longeromestic source of uranium.
Cummunuii Chinese probably have suniclent uranium metal available loowerlulonluir. production program.
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dueled Letting. The amount and duration of testing needed would vary depending upon the sophistication, efficiency, and yield of the required weapon. It is conceivable Uiat one or two weapons of the most elementary type could be stockpiled without testing. On the other hand, tohermonuclearsuitable for useallistic missile, numerous tests conductedpan of sev-eral years would be requited. The problem of providing adequate test sites would cause difficulty lor several of the countries tnuch countries, or those reluctant to test above ground for political reasons, might use underground testing techniques. However, such techniques would increase cost, slow down development, make iaslru mentation more difficult, and reduce the amount ofdata obtainable.
To haveOrationa) nuclearountry must not only have nuclear weapons but must also be able to deliver these weaponseasonable degree of accuracy against its potential enemies, in almost all cases, this would mean delivery by means of modern aircraft delivery systems or reliable surface-to-surface missiles.ew of theappearing inill be able, at present levels of external assistance, to develop an operational nuclear capability within the nextears, and then onlyajor national effort Table II indicates the time periods which various countries wouldrequire In order touclearproduce their first nuclear woapons, andapability lo deliver nuclearby missiles against selected targets.
The dates estimated in Tabic II arc based upon tbe assumption that outside aidat no more than present levels. Major outside assistance, for example In the form of significant help in developing flsslnnable mute-rials production facilities or guided missile production facilities, or in the form ofweapons design information, would advance these dates substantially.technological breakthroughs could also shorten the development process, but probably would not enlarge the number of countries able touclear weapons capability.
II. PROBABLE PROGRAMS
A. Genorol Consideiations
While the above review of basicindicates the countries capable ofindependent nuclear capabilities, it dors not answer the question of which ones will choose to do so. These decisions will be basedomplex of economic, political,and pay etiological considerations
The factors which would tend toa country to undertake an independent, nuclear weupons and delivery system program appear lo us to include the following:
on Lhe part of countries inUie strengtheading member olor Its willingness to use Itssufficient effectively to deter a
desire, especiaUy for thoseto big power status, to increaseprestige, their voice withinand their ability to pursuepolicies.
belief that the development ofis, on balance, the moatof the manpower and resourcesdefense.
beliefuclear weaponsiicccssaryounter to theuclear capability bycountries.
eliefountry having even anuclear capability willegree of independent power capable of restraining an opponent, or will beetter poslUon to impel its allies to support It under threat ofonflict.
elief thatimited capability may be sufficient tomaller nation from being attacked during, or being drawnajor conflict between Uie larger powers.
the other hand, therearietywhich tend to inhibituclear weapons program:
a. The substantial economic and financial costs.oderate program, limitedozen or two nuclear weapons, would rc-
NND
1
quire large outlays. Such outlays woulddirectly with the requirements lor con-TcnUonally armed lorces and probably alaoUie diversion of resources from high prioilly nonmllltury uses.
b Doubts that Uie development ol nuclear weaponsrudent form of defensein view of the political inhibitions upon their use, the possibility of International ugrce-mciils to restrict their development, and the need for conventionally armed forces to dealonnuclcar type of conflict, which in many situations mightore likely contingency than nuclear war.
c. For many countries, Uie lack of adequate testing sites, and the considerable technical and jMliUcal problems likely therefore to be encountered.
elief that they may be uble to get an operational nuclear capability by transfer from Iricndly [lowers
e. Doubtsodest independent nuclear capability would be seriously regarded by the major powers and. therefore, that It would constitute inignificant restraintajor nuclear power.
/ General public apprehension of nuclear weapons and fear ol nuclear fallout,earodest nuclear capabihty,il established on sites in the homeland, would provoke rather than deter an attack in the event of general war between the great powers.
chat these arguments for and against the Initiationuclearpiogram are often contradictory andto evaluate. Furthermore, the weight of the factors may change as the scope of ais revealed or as the jxilitical andsituation alters. It Is also trueountry that hasrogram louclear weapons capability would probably be reluctant to discontinue It unless the capability were acquired through help from allies. Nevertheless, we believe It isto suggest which considerations will have most weight In particular countries, and to indicate the likely naUonal course.
13 We believe thut Italy. Belgium, theNorway, and Switzerland will notindependent nuclear weaponsCost considerations and doubts about themid political value to them ol anand very limited nuclear cnjiabilily will operate teuslUve declston. Moreorer, Ihey probably do noi exclude the jxissiliilityuclear capability may be obtained, inmore cheaply and easilyajor ally or friendly power, either by transfer or direct purchase However, this Judgment does not preclude the possibility thai one or more of them will engage in Joint efforts wilh allied nations. undamental cliange in the International climate might evenecision to go ahead
Canada and Australia areecorioinic progress and arcindependent nationalwc believe that each islikely to seek close cooperation inand some form of nuclearthe US and UK than to undertakenuclear weapons program.
believe that the Easterncountries will not Initiateprograms Regardless of theirwe believe it extremely unlikelyUSSR would either encourage orlo do so. ff the miliiary forces ofever come touclearthe weapons would almost certainlyor made available lo them,the closest Sovicl scrutiny and control.
India and Japan, strong emotionalopposition to the development ofweapons will almost certainly persistyears to come. In both countries,in India, cost and Uie reluctanceresources from present economicwill also remain strongthe acquisition by Communistan operational nuclear capability,bycastngly truculentforeign policy clearlythem, would probably weaken resist-
&
ShJ^RET
within India and Japan lo theol their own nuclear weapons. (Sec
ndividual Counlries
considerations apply in thecountriesuclear weaponspotential: France. WestCummunist China.are discussed at greater lengthparagraphs below.
Fronce 8vrP*fi , ttilZ
The French Government Is following up its initial success inuclearby thr developmentuclearand delivery capability,2 France couldumber ofvylso probably strive lo develop aweapon, and could conduct an initial leslhermonuclear device by4 and couldhermonuclear weaponfor aircraftear or two later. France has ordered the production of 5t! light jet supersonicombers (DAUSSAULT Mirage IV) capable of carryingadius ofnd with inflight refueling. These bombers will probably be introduced intounits at about the same timellsslon weapons are. Two missile projects arc also underolid prupcllant missileange. as well. surface-to-surface missile.ecision to proceed is made promptly, the longer range missile could reach operational status6 but probably could not be equipped with thermonuclear warheads. Thus, while the French program is still in an early slagc. if il is vigorously pressed, Franceouldimited operational nuclear capability; by the end of the period, it could qualifyignificant nuclear power.
How lar and how fast the French push their program will depend upon such broad considerations as developments in NATO,US policy on nuclear sharing, and in the general area of controlled disarmament.est bun agreement between the US. UK. arid the USSR would almost certainly not deter France from its present program, unlessan were combined with effectivedisarmament including control ofsystems. While the program could also be influenced by domestic political trends in Fiance, we believe that any Frenchwith the exception oi' one dominated by radical leftist forces, will probably continue to press forward in the field of nuclear
The decision Louclear weapons capability was made several years before de Gaulle came to powert was based in large parielief that France could not re-establish what it believed to be Us rightful place ln the councils of nations, particularly in the Western camp, unless il possessed the weapons regarded as symbols of national power. The French believe that such acould give it someifrestrain potential enemies. France probably also believes that If theEuropean countries decided toa joint nuclear capability, France's headstarl would enlille iteader's role. Whal France wants is either an operational nuclear capability of its own making, or,inimum,apability furnished iu part by its major allies but under French
It will not be easy for France to complete an independent program. The financial and economic costs necessary to achieve awill be high, probably higher Lhan the French have estimated. The program willFrance's ability to devote resources to other ends such as the development of lhe countries of the French community, and to NATO, which will cause strain with France's allies. The French will press for increased US support and cooperation, in order to reduce the economic burden. However, in theof effective disarmament, we believe the French will go ahead with their program.
he foreign and military policy ofermany continues to rest on the principle that the country's security against the Soviet ltlgc dependstrong and cohesive NATO in which US power and leadership play the central role. At the same time, there isthat the West Oermans are sensitive to any indication* that they are considered toecond-class status in the alliance. There arc Indications of growing official and popular support lor strengthening the armed forces by acquiring modern weapons,nuclear weapons. Furthermore. Adenauer and other German leaders have expressed doubts as fci whether the deterrent effect of US nuclear capabilities will continue to be as ureal as heretofore.onsequence, the Federal Republic Is casting about formeans to inhibit Soviet aggressivein Western Europe, and to increase its voice In Western forums
e do not believe that the West Germans now have any defuute plans for developing an independent nuclear capability. Moreover, wc believeourse highly unlikely, at least for the next several years, since thearc considerable. Treaty restrictions and lack of space lor testing constitutehurdles to an independent effort.touclear weapons program, would probably Involve seriousdissension within West Germany, and actrovocation lo the USSRime when the overall Wesl German military strength is slill limited
e believe it likely, therefore, that West Germany will seek for the benefitsuclear capability by oilier means. Initially emphasis will be given lo developing arrangements within NATO whereby MKHMs would bein continental Europe, including West Germany, with control not vested solely in the US, or arrangements within NATO under which the West Germans could: (a) obtain nuclear warheads under certain stipulated conditions, and (b) also be able to produce and deploy missiles (Including MKBMs).
Either or these arrangements would probably satisfy the West Germans for some time. If no such arrangement* evolved, however, the West Germans would then probubly seekarrangements with tlie US. and if this proved unsuccessful, participation in some form of European cooperative effort lo produce an operational capability. Palling all these, the West Germans might believe thai they were facedhoice between developing Independent nuclear capabilities, and making some political accommodation with Ihe Blocituation, if it arises, is probably still some distance in lhe future and we cannot say at this juncture whul decision would be made.
Western European Groupings
Extensive cooperation between France and West Germany, especially within the frameworkarger continental European arrangement, would substantially reduce both the time and economic burden involved innuclear capabilitiesational base. Moreover, it would remove or mitigate substantially the major political and technical obstacles faring an independent West German effort, European cooperative action on many levels, especially within the Common Market grouping, tends lo improve the climate for cooperation in this field. Nevertheless, weit unlikely thai any sigiiilicanlm the nuclear weapons field betweeninental European countries will develupthe next several years, at least without US urging.
Like mosL European countries. France is fearful of the possible consequences of West Germany'suclear capability. Moreover, at least so long us de Gaulle remains In power, it Is unlikely that major shifts will be madetrictly national effort which heretofore has gained much prestige for de Gaulle and France.ore general vein, and looking beyond dc Gaulle, France will also probably continue reluctant to enter any arrangements which would reduce its freedom of action, unless under dramatic external pressure.
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n Ihe present atmosphere ol internationalprobably for the next severalGermany, and other European countries are unlikely to press for anjoint European effort in the nuclear weapons field. These countries clearlyUiat they are now dependent upon the US for their basic security. Many Europeans also feel that such an effort would have to include the UK if it was to be timely and effective.ituation where continental nationsready tooint effort, the UK would undoubtedly be under considerable pressure lo join, partly in an effort tomaximum influence over West German nuclear activities. However, it is unlikely that the UK would taketep without US encouragement or unless il lost basicIn the US.oss in confidence would probably occur much later in the UK than in France or other European countries.
he ideaestern EuropeanIn producing nuclear weapons will,probably persist. Moreover, during the extended period of this estimate it couldsignificant momentum, particularly on Ihe continent, if it appeared that the USor resolve to defend Europe hadbeen unpaired Nevertheless, It Isto be translated into actkm until thereonviction that the cooperative effort is both necessary and potentially effective.
Sweden
o date. Sweden has avoided making any clcar-cul decision In regarduclearprogram. Military leaders andpolitical elements, as well as someol the governing Social-Democratic Partyave agreed that an operationalcapability would discourage Sovieion Sweden in the evenl of hostilities in Western Europe between Soviet and NATO forces. Basic nuclear research of high quality is continuing. However, the economic and financial costs, the strong opposition within the SDP, and the lact that it will probably be at least several years before enoughproduced plulonium becomes available for weapons production and testing, have all combined toecision in abeyance.
any Swedes, and particularly those in the Social-Democratic leadership, continue to hope lhat the international climate willso as to obviate the need touclear lest ban or positive steps towurd disarmament agreed upon by theeasonable hope Unit one or other would soon comeprobably be sufficient toositive decision. If such hopes prove illusory, and especially if other countries have Initiatedweapons programs, tlie government will probably decide to produce nuclearerious degeneration of Uie International aituation would probably cause the Swedes torash program and to endeavor to purchase nuclear materials or even weapons iron Western sources
Communist China
e believe the Chinese Communists haveery high priorityuclear weapons program. They almost certainly consideremonstration of their capability to produce nuclear weapons would confirm their claim to great power status. Wc believe that
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Chinese Communists will carry theirweapons program forward as rapidly as feasible.
Our evidence with respect to Communist China's nuclear program is scanty as is our information about the nature and extent of Soviet aid. In what we estimate to be the present state of Chinese Communiststhe carrying out of fissionable materials production programs requires significantassistance in the form of technicians,and equipment. As we have estimated earlier, we believe that the Soviets have been movingeliberate pace in assisting the Chinese in the nuclear field, seeking to hold Chinese impatience and discontentevel consistent with the Soviet view of the best interests of the Sino-Soviet relationship.*evidence strongly suggests that in the jiast the USSR has given the Chinesemore technical assistance toward the eventual production of nuclear weapons than wc had previously believed likely. Thisis insufficient to establish how much assistance has actually been given, although we believe the aid has been fairly substantial and increasing over the years, at least until recently.
The USSR has provided Communist Chinauclear research reactor and isnuclear scientists in the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna, USSR. The exploitation of native uranium resources has been underway, with Soviet assistance,vereposits are now being worked, and we believe that ore with ametal equivalent of several hundred tons is being mined annually and retained in China. The Chinese Communists have probablythe processing of uranium ores Into metals, and this leads us to believe they are currentlylutonium productionAlthough there is no conclusivethere arc strong indications that they may also beaseous diffusion plant.
uller discussion of Sino-Soviet attitudes aod relations in this matter, seeiO, "Sino-Soviet Relations".
On the basis of the scanty evidencewe now believe that the most probable date at which the Chinese Communists couldirst nuclear device is sometimehough it might be as later as earlyepending upon the actual degree of Soviet,iven direct Sovicl assistance in fissionable materials,and fabrications, the Chinese coulda nuclear detonation in Chlnu at almost any Umc in the immediate future. On the other hand, ifesult of Sino-Sovietthereessening of Sovietin the nuclear field, the Chineseprogress would be substantially
While the explosionuclear device would give the Chinese Communists political and propaganda rewards, Ihey would almost certainly proceed to create an operationalcapability as quickly as feasible.lt will take them several years alter the explosionuclear device toignificant stockpile of weapons. Moreover, given economic limitations and the realities
'The Assistant Chief ol Naval Operation*Department of Ihc Navy, believes that the discussion In paragraphshroughfO, approved by USIBs still valid. He considers that available new evidence ia insufficient to substantiate theChinese Communist capabilities that would permit detonationuclear device at an earlier date than what was estimated only slightly moreonth ago. Moreover, the current dissensions between Ihc Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, and thelgnincant proportion of Soviclfrom Communist china may retardCommunist progress In ihe nuclear field. In addition, he considers thai this estimate shouldiscussion of the possibility that the Soviets will provide the Chinese Communistsimple nuclear device for prestige purposes without materially enhancing their nuclear weapons capability.Assistant Chief of Siafl, Intelligence. USAK. believes this sentence should read:
"On the basis of evidence available, und con-lingen! upon continuation of the present level of Soviet assistance, it Is estimated thatChina coulduclear device"
V
geography, they would probably relyon aircraft as delivery vehicles. Theyew piston medium bombers of the HULL type, which could reach Japan. Taiwan. Okinawa, South Korea, and South Vietnam, as well as additional areas in Southeast Asm In the next few yean we believe they maysome jet medium bombers from the USSR. We believe that they will also gowith the development ol ballistic missiles, probably concentrating Jn the first placeissileangeapable ofission warhead. Such missiles would give them coverage of must of thementioned above. If deployed in Tibet, such missiles would also give coverage of the major cities of northern India. We believe that they could develop such missilesr. with considerable Soviet assistance, much earlier. Wc do not believe they could, by themselves, produce. missile necessary lo giveapability against the US until well
III. CONSEQUENCESPREADertain general consequences ofmall increase in the number of countries having nuclear weapons can be predicted. The mere fact lhat more countries had the ability to use such weapons would result ln some Increase In the elements of danger arising from world tensions. Indeed, even the stationing uf nuclear weapons on foreign soil and training indigenous forces in their use is not without risk. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by more countries could magnify the consequences of acts based on miscalculation or taken through desperation or irrationality. The danger has long existed that such acts, though local and limited in origin, couldinto situations in which thereeal risk of war between lhc US und USSR. The spread of nuclear weapons, however, wouldInto suchactor of unknown but critical significance. On the other hand, the recognition of this and of the consequences of nuclear war could induce the nuclear powers, asthers, lo exercise or try to impose greater restraint on International moves which might lead to military
ower grouping the relativeof any country acquiring nuclear weapons wouldrance in NATO, orChina in the Slno-Soviet Bloc. Strains could develop within the alliances,if the newly acquired capabilitylhe possessor to pursue policieswilh those of its allies. Some other countries would probably press their allies for nuclear weapons or alharing of nuclear technology.
Any significant addition to lhe number of nuclear powers would increase the pressure among the peoples of the world and theof uncommitted countries forsleps towards disarmament, the banning of nuclear tests and weapons, neutralized zones, and the like. This would give greater ;cope for the propaganda of those countries anxious to identity themselves with opposition to nuclear weapons.
Wilh respect lo specific countries, tlieby France of actual weapons would encourage its demandsarger voice in NATO and, indeed, in Lhe whole world strategy of the West- Tlie acquisition of annuclear capabuity by France, or by aWestern European grouping, could add to the factors deterring Soviet aggression against Wesiern Europe and thus kn some degree contribute to stability in Rasl-Wesl power relations.
prospects of West Germanyweapons would be unwelcome tocounlries. particularly the UK.and its European satellites wouldwith parUcular dismay on Westarming und would exploit thoWest Germany's allies that Germanygetting out of hand. Thesebe raised lo dangerous levels wereto undertake independentof such weapons, allhough we believethai lhc USSR would counterstep by direct military action unlessappeared to be isolated fromand mililary support.
If Sweden acquired nuclear weapons, the reaction in both the West and East would be minimal. It wouldubject for Soviet propaganda, but Western eountries might welcome the development as reinforcing Swedens neutral posture.
he acquisition of nuclear weapons byChina would have importanton its relations both within and without the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The USSR probably has serious misgivings as to the effect of suchon Sino-Soviet relations, fearing that it will prejudice the USSR's claim toleadership of the Dloc and lessen the degree of Soviet influence on Communistactions, particularly those which might risk war wilh the US. The Soviets have nevertheless felt that they had to extend some aid to the Chinese Communists. The pace of Soviet aid has been deliberate and there has been no apparent assistance in the Held of missile delivery systems.
he acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Chinese Communists would probablythe intransigence of Chinese foreign policy, particularly towards its neighbors. The prestige of Peiping would rise InAsia and the incentives forin such countries as Burma. Cambodia, Thailand, and even South Vietnam andwouldemand byChina, the Philippines, and South Korea,uclear capability of their own would probably ensue. Communist China'sol nuclear weapons capability would face Japanritical situation,olarization of forces between those advocating strict neutralism (or evenwith thend those favoring the strengthening of ties wilh US and possibly acquisition of their own nuclear capability. The outcome of such an internal disputenow be predicted. India's concern would also be great, and the government mighttouclear weapons program. This would be more likely if, at the time, Nehru has been succeededess neutralist government.
Original document.
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