Created: 8/9/1960

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

date: may


national intelligence estimate0


SubnUtted bp the director of central thtelugekce The toTtomaa inUJHgenee orcanteaUcits partlcipitedhe prtsarrMnotThe Cent-al IxtetHoense Agency and the InteUlgtKC* organization* ol the Department* of State, the Amy. thehe Air rarer, the JoM Staff, and AtC.

Concurred tu oy lhe

unrno states intelligence board

uffttst im. Cencvmnp iter* The Director ot /nteDl-oence and Reteerch. Department ot State; the Asttttant Chleltaff lor InlfUfgence. Department of Me Arme; the Aittsi-ant Chiel of Naval Operations tor IMimgtnce. Determent ol the Havg; the AuisUmt Chief ol staff. InleUtgenoe, USAP; tht Director lor inteUtoenee, The Joint staff; the Atom* Sr.erep commission Reprr.vitamr toffstb; tne AatMant to the Stfttary Ol Dt.'ense, Specialnd Vieot the National Seearttp Agency. The Assistantfederal Bureau ol Investigation, aMtdtned. the sublet bung outride, o/ hi* WMdtcttafi.



estimate waa disseminated by lhe Central Intelligence Agency. Thisfor the InformsUon end use of the recipient and of persons under his Jcxlsdietionneed to know beats. Additional essential dusembuUion may be authorised byowing official* within their respective departments.

of Intelligence and Ratearcb, for the Department of State

Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army

Chief of Naval cmeraUou tor for the DepartmentNavy

of Intelligence, UBrtF. for the Department of the AirDirector for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

of Intelligence, AEC, lor the Atomic Energy Commission

Director. FBI, for lite Federal Bureau of inveaUgation

to the Secretary of Defense. Special Operations, for lheDefense

L Director of USA for the National Security Agency

ssistant Dtrector for Central Rf, CIA, for any other Department or

Thisretained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulaUons7cr*ft*airned to the Central intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Referent

When an estimate istbe ortrsaaa reel plant* may retain Iteriod not in excess ol one year. ACTns*<neIof Ibis period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to theptTrruation should be requested ef Uil forwarding agency to retain ll2

The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, shouldOR OFFlt

material contains mtonr.iUnci^fWrUrj: the Tvatoool Defense* or UieJ*rtled stales within ufflsoeanlng oltews,TM. the traos-mts&Mn orId any manner to an anauiM5?liedby law.

DISTRIB 'JTIOH! WhlH Hoose national Security Council Depsrtm*nl of Rata Department of Defease Operations Coordinating Board A'.cmlc Energy CcwiUPan Federal Bureau of IriVcHtgatton






ol the


Leadership Within the

Leadership of Communism Outside the

World Outlook and Foreign


The Military

Communist China's Dependence on the Soviet Union

Nuclear Weapons and

Dli.ermaiv.ent, Test Bans, and Atom-Free Asia

The Economic


Analysis of the Slno-Soriet Relationship







the problem

To examine the Sino-Soviet relationship, and to estimate probable developments therein over the next five years.


growth of Communist China's power and self-confidence has brought to the Sino-Soviet relationship an increased Chinese assertivenessonsequent sharp increase in discord, particularly concerning outlook and attitude toward the non-Communist world- There is still one Communist faith, but there are now two voices of Communist authority.onsequence, the Sino-Sovietis hi process of difficult change.)

The Sino-Soviet relationship Isommunist monolith. Instead, itelements of both cohesion andand varying degrees of unity are displayed in the relations of the two powers in Ideological, foreign policy,and military affairs. Although joined in the pursuit of broadobjectives, the Soviet and Chinese partnership is subject to many of the separatist forces that haveconfronted alliances and coalitions.)

e believe that cohesive forces in the Sino-Soviet relationships will remain stronger than divisive forces at least through the period of this estimate. The strongest of the cohesive forces willutual awareness of the heavy damage to their national interests and to the Communist causeubstantialof the alliance would inflict The two partners will almost certainly continue toommon hostility to the Westelief that through their common effort in advancing international communism they can somedayin dominating the world. Theirwill also continue to findin the political, economic, and military advantages each receives. This will have particular force for the Chinese who, in view of their continuing military and economic dependence on the USSR, will probably feel that they have noacceptable alternative totheir alliance with the Soviets.)


forces continue to be present, however, and may increase. Differing national interests and characteristics, and the wide disparity in the develop' ment of the USSR and Communist China as Communist societies, will continue to exert basic stresses on the Sino-SovietCommunist China's relative weight in the Bloc is likely to grow over the next five years. This growth willthe leverage Moscow can bring to bear through Peiping's military anddependence. The Chinesewill be more inclined to pursue their own interests and to question Soviet leadership than they have during the first decade of the alliance.

We do not rule out the possibility that the two powers may during the period of this estimate either come to an open break orore fundamental integration of interests than now exists. We believe it much more likely, however, that there will be no fundamental reconciliation of differences, that discord will ebb and Sow, and that the growing duality of power in the Bloc will become increasinglywith the present Blcc structure which has been basedingle source of authority. However, differences will be unlikely to force the USSR andChina so far apart that they cease to look to each other for support in their common drive against the West.)

he threat which the Sino-Soviet allies pose to US security and US interests is of great dimensions and is more likely to increase than to diminish during the period of this estimate. Nevertheless, since the alliancehanging andrelationship, It offers possibilities for favorable as well as unfavorablefrom the US point of view. Stresses and strains In the Sino-Sovietwill tend to weaken the hostile combination, and may provide situations and opportunities which can be exploited by the West. At the same time, Chinese Communist pressure may on occasionthe Soviets toorecourse toward the West than the Soviets would otherwise choose on tactical grounds. )



he Sino-Sovlct relationship has of late been publicly displaying greater signs olstrain than at any time In ita decade of existence: most importantly, the USSR and Communist China hare been engagedontroversy over global strategy In which each claimt, to be preaching the true doctrine. Disputes of this magnitude raise the question as to whether the Slno-Soviet relationship can long maintain Its present character or its present degree ol coordination.

ha history of the Communist movement has been marked by controversies and achlsrns. These have occurred not only within theParty of the Soviet Union, but between parties and between Communist regimes as well. Where disputes have reached serious proportions they have generally been settled by an exercise of Moscow's power.however, Moscow has either not sought or has not been able to exert such power, and schisms have occurred. The most notable example is Yugoslavia.


Communist China began toa great power, the Communistnoterious controversya major potential rival to tbeCommunist experience provides nofor settlingisputeCommunist powers, the presentbetween Moscow and Peipinga difficult test for the Sino-SovietIn offsetting inherentThe outcome will in the long runinfluence the future course ofinternally and externally. Ithave profound implications for theof the US and the west. Thefollows seeks to examine the natureSine-Soviet relationship and tofuture course.


A. Evolution of the Relationship

The present Sino-Soviet relationship has been molded by anharmonious, sometimesnearlyears' standing between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party. Beginning with theof the Chinese Communist Partyhe two groupselief both incommunism, and in the goals of overthrowing existing Chinese regimes and destroying Western Influence In China, it was to the interests of the USSR to sponsor the nascent Communist movement in China. To the Chinese Communist Party, In its earlyeak and disparate assortment of intellectuals, labor leaders, and militarythe USSR was Initially the only source of guidance and support.

There have been dlfflculUes Inherent in this relationship from Ihe outset. Stalin's faulty comprehension of the Chinese scene ledegree of misguidance that at limes almost wrecked the Chinese Communist Party.1 The USSR continued historic Rus-

' Chinese Communist media continue occasionally to criticise tbe courses taken, especially in th*, by "misguided* Chinese leader* who "automatically copied foreigntan efforts to obtain special rights andin China. China lacked even thebase and adrnlnUtratl ve-technlcat skills which the Bolsheviks Inherited in the Russiaarxism, which had once beento tho Russian scene, then required even more radical adaptations to fit it to an agrarian Chinese setting.

problems were fairlylong as the Chinese Communist Partya revolutionary instrument forthe existing Chinese state, but thebegan to takeew aspect onceCommunist Party had firmlyits authority In China.arthan the Soviet Satellites, it wonby its own efforts. Tbe Pcipingdeveloped Its own sources of politicalpower, Independent of directThe terms of theccorded Rwithin the Bloc, and it aeonthat Peiping could hi some respectsown course. Mao had alreadyoctrinal innovator; thehad been laid for Pelping to becomesecond source of authority in whata monolithic Bloc.

nderlying Forces

A number of very strong ties bindChina and the USSR. The leaders of both countriesommon core ofandommon enemy. They join in perceiving the world powers as divided into two hostile camps and in placing their two countries on the same side The Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders declare that there is an overriding need to preserve the unity ol the Bloc in carrying on the struggle against the common enemy, and especially against its leading element, the US, thoby definition.

Each nation derives great practicalfrem Its association with the other. The USSR and Communist China both appreciate the great increase in strategic strength that derives from their alliance. Their possessionarge land mass fronting on two oceans obliges the West to disperse ita military

strength widely In opposing the Bloc. The fact that Communist China opposes the West ln Asiaonsiderable portion of Western armed forces, diverts Westernand economic assets, and enables Masco* to concentrate its forces elsewhere. It was demonstrated in Korea that In certainChinese Communist armed forces may serve Soviet Interests without necessarily involving Soviet aimed torees in direct conaict with the West. For its port. Communist China has received economic backing and technical support which has been essential to its Industrial development. It has alsoguidance ln the establishingommunist totalitarian state, support from the Soviet Union Inforums, equipmentowerfulestablishment, and tho protection of the Soviet nuclear capability.

Bask stresses, however, underlie theNationalis, the whole spectrum of peculiarly nationaland nationalaseparatist force. Russia and China are nations with long end proud traditions, and the Russians and the Chinese are verypeoples whose relations with one another have often been marked by enmity andcontempt. The Chinese Communists, In particular, continue to manifest traditional Chinese extreme pride and sense ofAlthough both the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaderships preach thatthinking" is an evil to be overcome, their primary appeals to their publics arekeyed to national pride and"Proletarian internationalism" has not bridged the gulf that exists between the heritages, cultures, and psychological outlook of the Russians and tbe Chinese.

The wide disparity In the development of the USSR and China as Communistalso places important stresses on their relationship. The immediate needs andof the two countries differ in many respects. Communist China is in the early stages of building an Industrial base; it feels compelled to drive Its people, squecse itsfrom their output, and prolong extreme austerity. The pievatllng mood isOn the other hand, the relatively mature and aflUicnt Soviet Union lias reached the stage where It la giving greater attention to the working conditions and livingf Its people In order to achieve the (pension and qualitativeof Its iwmorny. it. addition, the Soviet people almost certainly have on increasing stake in preserving the gains in livingand freedom from terror that they have experienced since Stalin's death.

he greatly different status of the two partners in inter national affairs alaoeparatist force The foreign polley outlook of Ccmmunut China is heavily Influenced by tbe fact that it docs not Itselfentral role in councils and it lacks many of the attribute* of the great power status it covets. Because af relativeIn international affairs and Itsposition. Communist China is an Asian power with immediate Interests concentrated in that area and with little opportunity or capability for realistically assessing theIn the West. Its foreign policyare frustrated not only by Westernbut alao by Soviet icstralnts.


A. Communis* Rotations

IS. Idedogy. The leaders of both countries draw upon the same Marxist- Leninistof thought for their appreciation ofand comeaUc affairs. Tbeyommon faith In the ultimate world triumph of communism, teheeing themselves to bethe crest of inevitable historicThey are unalterably opposed to what they consider to be the decadent system of capitalism, which has tn their view reached Its final stage in imperialism. They believe that their efforts can hasten the destruction of capitalism. In addition, the Soviet and Chinese leaders nloo agree that Communists must gain and hold power In other countries, anddictatorship of the proletariat" must be established, led by the Communist Party,rsee foicsd development of the

econtrmj through stole plaarilug nnd itate ownership of ihe means a! production.

nnowerer. the lnlcrpreUtton endof ideolcajical -truths" it ativklve force in the Sino-ftDviet tela-Uonship. Although In both regimeseiea are conceived within tha Communist frame of f'tarence and some may be largely motivated by doctrinal concepts, we believe that moat major policy decisions are primarily directed try practical considerations. In any case, every Important switch and turn ofin the Communist world mutt beby doctrinal luslifiration. In the past few years bcth the Soviet and Chineseleaden have endeavored to sanctify widely difioiing policies by clling selectedfrom the vast and often contradictory mass of Communist scripture, claiming ir. the process that their leaders, Khrushchev and Mao. art "creativelylassictfocUiase. in this colloquy, Mao Tee-tung and his colleagues appearense as fundamentalist "prophets" who consider lhat the "esUbllahedas become Wo worldlyurbune, andeturnecessary lor Invigorating the common faith. Moreover, they deny statue toreat developerevel with Man. Kngek, They appear lo considerecond.generatlcn Communistackslider from Leninism.

SO. As long as Chinese policy Initiatives and doctrinal pretensions were confined tominor domestic matters, the Sovietwas favorable. However, aa early6 the Chinese began to make grandcm Bloc matters, and have since become Increasingly assertive on bothand world affairs, differing Hatly and openly with the SovieU on an Increasing range of question* of doctrinal interpretation. The Soviet leadership is affronted by the departure from Soviet pobcy and the Chlneee challenge to Soviet authority. Thus.SinoSovle* debates oo the proper mterpretaUon of Communist scriptures reflect serious disputes both on fun-damental policies and on the authority of the tnterpreieri to formulate such policies.

in the past few years Moscow and Peiping have at limes been In strong disagreementumber of questions of ideologicalAmong these have been theemphasis on "uninterruptedhe Chinese view that "contradictions" can exist between the leaden and the ledommunist state, and the Chinese claim that political awareness La as Important inproductive effort asystem cfrewards Although these matters are of considerable Ur.jcrtance among Commi-ntsts, they have been tamely overshadowed by two especially significant areas of disputation. These concern idecJoglral support far variant foreign policies and the theoreticalof the Chlneee communes

The most serious question of foreignfor Moscow and Peiping la which policy ahouM be followed toward the West and toward revolutionary movements outside the Bloc, in general, the Chinese Interpretliterature touch harder and mom aggressive line In these respecte than does Khrushchev. The differences concern interpretation of the present historical epoch, the degree to which modern weaponrynew elements into tho historical process, the proper definition of coexistence, theof ehmlnatlng war, and, mostthe proper risks to be run The USSR and Communist China publicly state their present bitter differences In Ideologicalamong Communists, Indicates that tha dispute has become acute.1

The other ratadpeJ dispute has concerned the Chinese Communist commune program, which runs completely counter toplans for organising snd raitingproduction In the USSR and Eastern Europe. Apparently without any previouswith the Soviets, the Chinese launched this radical program Incomments In the controlled Chinese pressrescendo of doctrinal claims which gave tha impression that through the devolop-

'Tbenhnj apply ipeclflcslly to tanif policy nnd to 'Jve world Communist moverc ulKUM'd OoMw In.

ment ol communes, the stage ofwas Just around the corner in China. The Chinese thereby implied not only that they haday to get there ahead of the USSR and the rest of the Bloc, but that the Chinese Communist commune might well serveodel for certain other countries,

artlyesult of Soviet displeasure, the Chinese, toward the endacked away from their more extravagant ideological claims for the communes. At tbe same time, Internal considerations also dictated aof retreats In the commune system. Tbe Chinese accepted tbe Soviet position that no society could advance to communism without following the Soviet experience of greatlyindustry and high productivity, and they temporarily abandoned their claim that the commune Idea was relevant to otherThe initial Chinese assertlveness almost certainly played an important part in moving Khrushchev, at the XXI Congress of theParty of the Soviet Unionc make new ideologicalof his own These clearly seemedto make unequivocal the primacy of the Soviet Union's position in the march toward communism, and at the same time to concede that all Bloc countries. Including China, would achieve the ultimate goal of communism at approximately the same time.

he commune dispute has not yet been resolved. Soviet criticism of the communes has continued, and the Chinese Communists have moved slowly to regain some of the ground lost in their retreat ofn addition to reasserting tbe objectionable claims that the communes represent theof China's transition to communism and are relevant toountries, the Chinese Communists haverogram of urbrt commune ligation as well. Articles in the Chinese press have revealed, moreover, that the issue of Soviet experience and Its relevance to the Chinese commune program hasubject of dispute within the Chinese Communist Party and that opponents of the program have sleaed on Soviet criticisms and the Soviet example to buttress their own positions.

taOershtp Within the Bloc. Pelpingto take an active, Independent role In Bloc affairshina's reluctance to go along fully with ofc-Stallnlsation, its initialof tbe Poles and Hungariansnd its criticism of Soviet "groat poweradded to Soviet problems, even though Peiping subsequently supported Soviet actions in Hungary and assisted the Soviet leadership In reaffirming unity m. the Bloc. Morethe Chinese Communists have morechallenged Soviet leadership byamong representatives of other Blocagainst the course of Soviet foreign policy.

Nevertheless, Pelping continues to pay formal allegiance to Soviet leadership of the Bloc and world communism. The Chinese leaders accept the importance for Communist unityingle locus of leadership, and they re cc go tee that at least tor tbe foreseeable future it must He in Moscow. However, they have insisted that Soviet policies must reflect Chinese Communist interests and Pelplng's views on certain fundamentals of Marx Ism-Leninism: in particular, (a) unremitting struggle against the clearly denned enemy (thend (b) more militant revolutionary policies In the world Communist movement.

The existence of an independent Chinese position on key Issues encourages elements within the European Satellites to beccme more assertive.umber ot occasions, various satellites have failed to echo Sovietof Chinese statements and policies, and have sometimes given the Chinese openInitially there was some evidence of support in Eastern Europe, especially infor the communal organization of the countryside. East Germany has been publicly

'Por example, three weeks alterR had published its neutral stand on the Slno-Inalan border dispute in lhe autumnastbegan public support of the Chineseposition. Thla lasted about sixeing abruptly iwlteheeovember to match the Soviet pssiuon. Cxecfioslovaaiariefer time cave even sttoriger support to Pelping on the border issue and had earUer Joined Pelping In attacking Indian "imperialism" for causing the rerolt In Tibet, North Korea and Albania gave early support to Pelping opposition to Moscow's detente tactics

sympathetic with Pelping* praise of Mac's COTtrlbuttoni to Marxism-Lcr.inisai,certain Chin eta economic innovations, and has at time* Joined In crttsebnng theline of coexistence with the Wart The Chinese Red Flag articles of0 were almost certainly designed in part to encourage and support any party members who disagreed with Khrushchev's policies toward the West

ll three of the Asian SstelHteNorth Korea. Not th Vietnam, and Outerstrong; historical and cultural ties with Chins, and the Chinese Communists haveeen Interest In these areas. However, Moscow also has Interests in these areas, and there uppears toino-Soviet division ot authority In these satellites.Communist regimes In Outer Mongolia and North Korea were an established fact by the time the Pelping regime came Into being. Moacow continues to dominate these areas, although Pelptng's influence in North Korea bos appreciably Increased sinceChina's Intervention In the Korean War. Chinese influence is probablyIn North Vietnam, but even In this case. Moscow has retained ecnetdarabk itifluenee. Both Moscow and Pelping have substantial econocUc aid programs tn the Asian Satetetea, with Soviet aid predcerunating In Outerand North Korea, and the ChineseIn Northhis division ofIs almostelicate matter, but we have no Indication of serious Sine-Soviet frictions on this score.

'Economic Assistance Cw.mitmentsof Communist China and the USSR lo the Asians or ll July im:




Leadership of Communism Outside fhe Bloc. The Chinese Communists believe that their experience uniquely equips them toguidance to Free World Communist parties in the colonial or serai colonialwhich In Communist parlance includes roost of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.China has recently made conspicuous efforts In these areas to Increase its influence both with local Communist parties and with the non-Communist governments. In some of these countries, local Communists appear to be more receptive to Chinese than to Soviet guidance, and In some cases, at least, the USSR appears at present to favor anrole for the Chinese Communists.Soviet Influence remains dominant among the world's Communist parties. Even in non-Communist Asia, the three largest Communistln India, Japan, andlook principally to the USSR 'or guidance, although there isendency among their leaders to consult both Moscow and Peiping.

Despite the forcefully expressed differences of view ln Moscow and Peiping regarding the tenor and pace at which communism should be pushed in the colonial or semicolonialwe have seen few signslno-Soviet struggle for dominance in these areas. It la probable that as long as thererospectorkable compromise or reconciliation of views between Moscow and Pelping, neither wants toourse of overt action abroad which might severely reduce this prospect. Nevertheless, if Sino-Sovieteal settlement, instances of competitive efforts to guide Communists, front groups, and leftward-leaning neutralistore likely to become more frequent and increasingly sharp.

'roiegic Relations

Outlook and Foreign Pottcy.and the Chinese Communistsworld as now divided Into three groups(a) the Communist Bloc; (b) the"imperialist" nations; andations and underdevelopedThey agree in viewing the latteraffording the main opportunity for ad vane-

ing the Communist struggle against the West, although constant pressure and efforts to erode the West's position in other areasOn these general questions the Soviets and the Chinese Communists agree. It is on questions of method, pace, and risk that ibey differ.

The Soviet leaders, headed by Khrushchev, believe that to push as forcefully forCommunist goals as Peiping desires is to take political and military risks which could Jeopardise the achievement of those goals. The Soviets and the Chinese agree that Soviet advances in science and modern weapons have altered the world balance of power, but theare more concerned than are the Chinese over the possibility that "adventures" by the Ccmmuiusts could developeneral, th. the Soviet view, would beto all participants, because of the destructive potential of modern weapons. The Soviets feel under these conditions that war should and can be avoided, In their view, the moat effective approach for the attainment of world Communist goalslexible one,example, propaganda, and aid toregimes in newly Independent countries (even though this involves cooperating in some cases with bourgeois nationalists} with subversion and on occasion the application of military pressure.

At the same time, internal factors in the Soviet Union reinforce Moscow's interest in avoiding serious risk of hostilities with the West, The Soviets strongly believe that their present economic plans, if unobstructed, will decisively strengthen the Socialist countries in competition with the anti-Communist group of nations, and will help considerably in demonstrating to all Ihe superiority andof the Soviet system. Moreover,Soviet Internal policies place stress on incentives, rather than coercion, andattention to the lot of the worker and peasant, whose production la vital to the pro-gram.

The Chinese believe that the Bloc should push more boldly and aggressively toward Communist world goals. They hold thatachievements in advanced weaponry have so altered the world balance of power that more forceful action should now be taken, even at the risk of local wars. In the Chinese view, If local war should develop Into general war, not only would world communism triumph, but enough would remain of the world to make the victory worthwhile,relaxation of tensions meanwhile will dull Communistspirit and allow thereathing space In which to prepare for wax against the Bloc. The Chinese Communists are thus less inclined than Moscow to favor negotiationsactical method ol struggle against the West.

he Communist Chinese not only consider the US as their prime enemy on Ideological grounds, they also consider the US annational enemy which Is preventing them from gaining Taiwan and thus completing their victory in the Chinese civil war. They also consider that the US Is blocking theof Chinese Communist influence in Asia and In Internaticnal affairs generally. This causes Pelplng's enmity for the US to be more passionate and indexible than Is the case in Moscow. The "hate America" spirit which pervades Pelplng's propaganda is also useful In Justifying sacrifices by the Chinese people.

The Chinese also hold that many of the "oppressed peoples" of Latin America, Africa, and non-Communist Asia are ready forrevolution, and that wars against "Imperialist oppression" in these areas areJust, desirable, and deserving of Bloc encouragement and support. Althwghitrnay be expedient to support bourgeois national revolutions in these areas, revolutionaryshould be applied where the opportunities exist and the bourgeois national regimesBy Communist ones as soon asThey place less emphasis than do the Soviets on the possibility of attainingpower by parliamentary or other means short of armed revolution,

These differences have been building up since7 and reached considerableIn9 when Khrushchev's speeches In Peiping clearly implied disapproval of Communist China's truculent foreignThey became openly bitter in0 with the Chinese attacks on Soviet detente tactics preceding the Summit. Although the

failure of the Khrushchev-Inspired Summit brought Joy to Peiping. tbe Chinesecontinued to criticize Soviet policy and lobbied for their own cause before such bodies as tbe World Federation of Trade Unions, In the Chinese Communist view, proof of the validity of its great expectations from ahard line Is to be found in recentevents in Korea, Turkey, and Japan, which Pelping interprets as blows against US-supported reactionary regimes andthat the natives are restless-SB- At the Bloc conference in Bucharest In June,K apparently outlined its harder and more militant line toward tbe West,at least temporary abandonment of negotiationsajor tactic. This switch to harsher tactics had probably been motivated in part by the Chinese Communist attitudes on world policy, and the Soviets probablyat Bucharest to extract in return Pelpfr.g's promise to fall in line with Moscow on ideological end other questions The change in Soviet tactics may have partiallyChinese Communist discontent with Bloc foreign policy. Such accommodation as may have been reached ln recent weeks,almost certainly does not eliminate the basic factors which originally led to differ-

orderland Areas. There has beenenmity in Russian-Chinese history regarding the borderland areas of Slnkieng, Mongolia, and Manchuria, and we believe that some sensitivity may continue on this score. The USSR secured Outer Mongoliauppetnd acquired temporary hegemony in SinWang province Ins. In ousting the defeated Japanesehe Soviets reclaimed part of Tsarist Russia's special rights concerning DsJren. Port Arthur, and the ManchurianTbey also sacked the Manchuriancomplex of over three quartersillion dollars worth of plants and equipment Since the Communist takeover of China,and especially since the USSR gave up Its special status in Manchuriahese issues appear to have played little noticeable role in Sino-Soviet relations.

C. Military Rekitiom

The MOUarp Alliance. Since Its inceptionbe Sino-Soviet Alliance has hod an important military component. Although Its text1 Is focussed on Japan, both Moscow and Peiping view their military alliance In broader terms. For example, the Chinese Communists have stated in effect that they would enter any hostilities involving the Warsaw Pact; and the Soviets. In making supportingduring8 Taiwan Strait crisis, specifically referred to their commitment to Communist China under0 treaty. The existence of the alliance greatly Increases the military power of the entire Bloc andthe position cf each power in world affairs.

Despite the existence of the militaryand the high degree of materielof tbe Soviet and Chinesearmed forces, there has been no evidence of faint maneuvers of Sino-Soviet forces, land, sea, or air. They do, however, coordinate their air defenses. We lack direct evidence and are unable to ascertain the scope and nature of Sino-Soviet Joint military planning. Thecontinue to stress *ho military thought of Mao, end some Chinese military leaders have occasionally been criticized foralien (Soviet) military doctrine too closely. Them also appears to beamaraderie between Soviet and Chinese military personnel.

Commanfsf China's Dependence on the Soviet Ur.ian. Communist China attaches great importance to Its military alliance with the Soviet Union. The protection provided by tbe military alliance with the USSR0 enabled the Chinese Communist regime to set out upon Its ambitious domestic programs with little fear of outside molestation. Laek-

tormal basis (or military cooperation waaby the Treaty ot Friendship. Alliance and Mutual AssUtancc. otO. This treaty, which Is validrovide* that if one of ti* parties should be "attacked by Japan or any state allied with It, and thus be involvedtate of war, the other contracting party shall immediately render assistancee mis at Its disposal.*'


Ing ft nuclear strike capability of (la own, Peiping obtain* Increased foreign policyfrom Soviet possession olnuclear weapons. China has reliedentirely on Soviet materiel tc convert ita primitive mass army of IB4flowerful semtrocoeru army, backedttabte jet air farceavy with morecore of medium and long-range luumarmrs.deUverita from the USSR appear to nave declined as Communist China has increased Ita armament producUocut Peiping is run heavily dependent on the USSR for many Item which are eeientlal to the ma&tenanc* of Its present militaryand to the further development of its modernisation program.

fticlfer Weapons and UUtUa.China lt> totally dependent upon the USSR tor military support with nuclearand mlaslles. We belle-re It unlikely that the Soviet* have stationed nuclear weapon* In China, but even If they have, such weapons would almost certainly ba held under strict Soviet custody. The USSR could glre China nuclear weapons from Ita own stockpile, but It almost certainly haa not done so. and we do not believe that the Soviets Intend to do so within the foreseeable future. Similarly, we have no evidence that th* USSR has equipped the Chinese with surface-toeurface ballistic mlsitlea.are indications,that the Chinese may have rrcdvtd sane Soviet air-to-eir mlsaUes.

beiding Communis* China in basic nuclear research, but such aM does not appear to Include direct assistance inmaterial* production or nucleardevelopment. The Chinese are currently dependent on the Soviets tor supplies of slightly-enriched uranium and heavy water for the research reactor which the USSR made available to Peiping in In the same

'Prom KM toroorh 1SSS0 millten In military deflferkit to China were financed by Soviet loans. All dtllvehec stnee have beenash basis, and the Chinese have repaid over bait the amount towwi. Most of the materiel consumed lo the Korean Ivor wu probably donated by the USSR, while China supplied the monpBwtr. See also Annex C.

manner, the development of uranium mines and processing plants under way in China for several years Isroduct of Sovietand technical assistance.

The USSR Is almost certainly reluctant to see the Chinese Communists acquireweapons under tbelr own control.the most important consideration to the Soviets Is that Chinese acquisitionuclear weapons capability would reduce SovietIn controlling Chinese Independent action, particularly action which might Involve China in hostilities with the US. At the same time, the Chinese desire touclearcapability is very strong. Attainment ofinimal capability would not only greatly augment Chinese military andprestige throughout the world,In Asia, but would abo enlarge Chinese freedom of action in pursuing their national objectives.

Wo are unable to assess with cemfldeoee the impact of these fundamentally opposing interests upon the Sino-Soviet relationship. We do not believe that either pwty wishes to push its own concernoint where this Issue will Irreparably damage their relation-ship. On tbe other hand, given the keyof the problem to both sides, this Issue Is almostource of friction. We believe that the Soviets are deliberately moving slowly in assisting the Chinese toa nuclear weapons capability, whileto hold Chinese impatience and discontentevel consistent wilh the best interests of the Sino-Soviet relationship. At the same time, the USSR has probably given thegeneralised assurances of Sovietwith Its nuclear weapons capability.

Although we cannot estimate theofevelopment, it Is possible that the Soviets may decide to assuage the Chinese desireuclear weapons capability by providing the Chineseimple nuclear device and assisting them In detonating it This would enable the Chinese to claim they haduclear capability and togreat prestige benefitidelydetonation. Although this action would probably assist the Chinese somewhat

In their nuclear weapons program. It would not, lor the Soviets, run the risH of greatly accelerating the Chinese attainment of anuclear weapons capability. Such an arrangement might permit the Soviets to delay further in prodding the more advanced assistance the Chinese would need touclear weapons capability.

hinese attainment of the capability to detonate their own nuclear device in the near term, say within two ot three years, restsentirely upon the nature and extent of Soviet aid. If Soviet aid continues at itsapparent pace and character, the Chinese might attain the capability to detonate their own nuclear device by4 However, If the Soviets have, In response to Chinese pressure,reat deal more aid than we haveuclear device of Chinese manufacture might beear or two earlier. Given direct Soviet supply ofand fissionable material, and assistance In fabrication of theuclearcould be produced in China at almost any time In the Immediate future. Even after the Chinese doevice, It would take them several additional years tomall stockpile of weapons, since they do not possess the requisite highly advanced scientific,end industrial establishment

isarmament,ans, and Atom-Fret Asia. The USSR's dramatic gestures toward unilateral reduction in armed forces have not been imitated by the Chinese, Petprng has praised the Soviet decision, but has defended Its present force levels, and has made clear Its belief that true disarmament Is impossible prior to the universal triumph of communism. Proposals for an "atom-free sone forave also received occasional Chinesepropaganda support. That they areby the Chinese to be nothing more than propaganda is Indicated by Peiping'sthat no treaty with the West can be meaningful.

'This is tne popular catch phrase for tbe Idea of tannine all nuclear weapons, development, and production from Asia. II abo has been presented as for "Asia and tbe whole PacificAsia andnd other forms.


has stated that it favors theof nuclear testing and has givensupport to the Soviet position inban negotiations. If theseapproach agreement, we believewould make its adherencecertain demands on the West andon the Soviet Union. Peiping mightdemands soexample, onas UN seating, the TaiwanUS bases in the Farto makein Peiping's view, that theaccept them. On balance, however,that there would be priorand that the Chinese wouldas their major goal the sabotaging ofagainst Soviet wishes.

conomic Relations

The Economic Model. For the first few years of its existence. Communist China closely followed the Soviet course of economic development and relied upon the advice of Soviet experts for the planning and direction of its own economic plans. Byowever, the Chinese Communists hadthat the Soviet model was not adequate to meet the conditions existing In China. During the next few years, therefore, and most dramaticallyhe Chineseeconomic policies that had no counter-pert in Soviet practice and which. In some cases, dismayed the Soviets, The Chineseaccording to their ownconsist of three major policies: thethe "great leapndon two legs". accompanying the rapid development of big industry with thedevelopment of vast numbers of small local plants and the use of simple equipment, and also the simultaneous development of agriculture andhese newwere added to, but not substituted for, the Soviet capital-intensive model,

Economic Benefits. Economicbetween Ccnununist China and the USSR has been an Important aspect of their rela-


ever since (he Peiping regime was established. Both parties have benefited from this cooperation, although the economic effect on the Soviet Union has been much less than that upon China. The Soviet union hasa very small pert of Its industrialto China (never more than two percent) In exchange for foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. Soviet Importation of productshigh labor Input In exchange for goods requiring low labor input has aided Its labor-short economy.

hinese gains from this exchange have been much greater. The Chinese naveIn all fields from support provided by Soviet technology and science. Soviet know-how in economic organization, finance,engineering, and In science has beenThe machinery and technicalreceived from the USSR and theEuropean Satellites In the past decade have been vital to Communist China'sprogram. Given Iheof western materials. It would have been otherwise Impossible for China to have achieved the extremely high rate of industrialercent annually) which weit attainedhina's economic tics to the USSR and the Bloc are ob^ously strong.

he USSR has made available forbyajor Installations, valued at more thanillion. About one-half of these Installations, which form the core of China's industrial development program have been completed and are now Inoviet trade has been of particular value to China In that It has meant guaranteedof investment equipment, industrial raw materials, transport equipment, andproducts. Soviet support also has been extended in the form of modern technology, the services cf soviet experts, and loans of about. of0 million was for economic development and the remainder primarily for military purchases.



wmi coaorcNiST chins, ibso-isss

Economic Credits fMillion USX.)'



oiet* Number Bets of








of Equipment* Projects (MillionUSD'


"Converted liom rablo ibe officialubles to US Si.

'Including technical assistance related to these projects.

"Agreement Sgned to deliver equipmentotal of Ml projects.

'This sura Includes the value of equJpinent and technical assistance for all ofrojects contracted through September 1BS3.

-The Chinese announced in April its* thatiajs- Soviet assisted project*pon trtrouKh April lass were reduced In number.esult of merging or some pw|aoai during their construction.

he fflno-Soviet economic relationship has been conducted In extremely business-like terms. The USSR has at no time given China financial grants; indeed, China has committed more In economic grants and credits to other countries than It has received In economic loans irom the USSR- Since Soviet credits expiredhina has paid for all its imports from the USSR wilh current exports. In order to repay previous credits, China6 has annually shipped more goods, by value, to the USSR than It has received frome believe that the terms, and possibly even tbe level, of Soviet aid and trade are sore points for Peiping. The Chinese leaders probably find It difficult to look with equanimity on fairly sizable Soviet aid tostates while China has had to deny itself

Se* Table 1.

Secnd %


f ccdstuffs and other goods in order to pay tor such Soviet aid as it receives.'*

he Chinese Commtuusts have nool participating in any scheme lorintegration, such as CEMA, which would gear their economy to that ol the USSR and make them more dependent on Moscow. To the contrary', they arc determined toas complete and autarkic an economy as possible, and, in view ol the vast economic potential ol China, they regard theol all major industries, ratherew, as the more realistic policy. The Soviets appear to accept thisas proper tor China at this time, It Is probable, nonetheless, that specific aspects of economic cooperation and the exchange of goods and services within the Bloc havesome friction in Sino-Soviet economic relations.

E, Summary Anarysit of the Sino-Soviet Rebtiomhlp

he nature of the Sino-Sovietcannot be described ln simple terms. No single descriptive term characterizes tbeof the two Communist states toward one another or their Joint demeanor toward the rest ol the world. The two countries do not, to take sn extreme example, conduct themselves as though theyolid, unitaryommunist monolith which disregards national boundaries and interests and pursues Leninist precepts in perfectThey do not, at the oppositebehave in the manner of classical nineteenUi century great powers, viewing their problems and their relationships strictly from the viewpoint of national interests.their relationshiposition somewhere between these poles and contains elements of both. The communist ideology

"In comparison with Sorlcl economic leans lo China0 million, iSSO-ISSS, the DBSB0 has extended loans cc Brants, for economic devcloprrort,4 million to India, sellto the DAB, and till mUBon to Af*hannttn. To date, however, the utilisation of these Sovttt off era has amounted only to the following:9 million, the CAB, IBS minion, andsee million.

which pervades their relations both modifies the urgent natk-aabsm of the two countries and is In turn modified by national

he Sino-Soviet relationship also does not display uniform cohesion in all respects. Varying degrees ol intimacy and cohesion are exhibited In the relations ol the two powers in ideological, foreign policy, economic, and military aflairs. In economic matters, forthe USSR and China are pursuing long-term programs which have among their goals the industrialization ot China and the growth of Sino-Soviet economic strength, At the same time, the two countries transact the actual business of exchanging Sovietproducts for Chinese agricultural and mineral products on terms which closelytrade negotiations in the capitalist world. In military affairs, the two powers have undertaken to modernise the Chinese military establishment and presumably seek to increase their combined power In support of the military alliance. Yet, the military relationship between the USSR andChina is not as close as that between the US and Its NATO allies. Moreover, in the keen Chinese desire touclear weapons capability theretrongfor disunity.

he Sino-Soviet relationship appears most solidly unified on matters of broadobjectives. On the central core ofvieworld divided between capita! ^imperialist and socialist-proletariat camps, tbe belief in the eventual triumph of communism everywhere, and the faith ln Marxist-Leninist preceptsasis forew humanand the USSR appear in firm agreement.In the interpretation and application cf these broad beliefs end concepts the twostates diverge in many respects, and, as they have demonstrated in recent months, they can on occasion disagree sharply and quite fundamentally, paradoxically, the veiy Communist Ideology which Joins the twotogether alsoource forand potential disunity.

n lhe realm of foreign poller, relations between the two CommariiM powers display ontriking lack of cohesion and uniform direction. They find in theirenmity to theingle point ofbut in their approach to the US and in other foreign relations, notably in dealing with influential neutral powers, theytake quite different paths. The actions of Communist China toward India andduring the past year clearlythe USSR and were unmistakably out of key with tho tone of coexistence and detente the Soviet regime was then seeking toIt is Impossible to advance any analysis of such behavior as the single correct one, but It appears most likely that the Chinese on these occasions were motivated more directly by considerations of their national interest than by concern for Bloc harmony and unity.

Divergences In foreign policy derive both from differing national interests and fromdifferences between the two Communist states. The Chinese differ sharply with the Soviets as to the pace, vigor, and manner of combating the West; Peiping clearly dlsxlalne the slower, more subtle formulas ofSome lack of harmony also exists in the approach of the two Communist powers to the methods and short-term goals ofcommunism in neutral andcountries.

In sum, the Sino-Soviet partnership isonolithtructure of several kinds of relationships which vary in strength and Intimacy and contain within themselvesof both cohesion and division. Though joined by Communist thought, theis subject to many of the separatist forces that have traditionally confronted alliances and coalitions. The future of thiswill be determined by the interplay of these elements and the success of theleaders in containing conflicting forces.


believe that the cohesive forces mrelationship are stronger thanforces and are likely'to remainthe period of this estimate at

8Ei least. It is probable that for some time to come both the Soviet and Chinese leaders will value the alliance so highly that they will make strong efforts to keep discord from wrecking it. There willowerfulon each side to stop short of anyact which wouldermanent split.

The strongest of the cohesive forces throughout this period willutualof the heavy damage to their national interests anfl to th? Ccmmunist caviscubstantial Impairment of the alliance would inflict. The two partners will almostcontinue toommon hostility to the Westelief that through theireffort In advancing internationalthey can someday participate inthe world. Their relationship win also continue to And cohesion in the political, economic, and military advantages eachThis will have particular force for the Chinese who, In view of their continuing military and economic dependence on the USSR, willl that they have no genuinely acceptable alternative totheir alliance with the Soviets

Divisive forces will continue to be present, however, and may Increase- The distinctcharacteristics and the disparatestages of the two states discussed in this estimate will continue to exert aforce. Judging from ihe experience of recent years, there will continue torend,omewhat uneven one. towardthe more arbitrary and stringentof Soviet society and institutions; the Chinese Conununists, however, will still be in the throes of forcefullyastend social upheaval with all thetensions thl3 entails. Communist China's relative weight In the Bloc Is likely to grow over the next Ave years. This growth willthe leverage Moscow can bring to bear through Peiping's military and economicPeiping's foreign policy outlook will probably continue to be less flexible and more aggressive than Moscow's, and this will at times place heavy strains an the relationship. Pelping will be more inclined to pursue its own interests and to question Soviet leadership than during the first decade of Ihe alliance.

The future nature of the Slno-Sovletwill be shaped In part bywhich cannot be known at present: changes In Soviet or Chinese Communist, leadership; the compulsions or rcstvalnta which developments within the USSR and China will exert on tbe respective leaderships; the strength and policies of the West; the cmportunltles which occur for the Communist movement throughout the world; and the failures and successes of various Communist ventures.

The interplay among these contingentand the broad forces of cohesion and division in the Sino-Soviet relationship will determine its precise future form. We do not rule out the possibility that the two powers may either come to an open break orote fundamental integration of Interests than now exists. Wc believe it much more likely, however, that there will be no fundamental reconciliation of differences, that discord will ebb and How, and that substantial though not complete cooperation between Moscow and Peiping will continue. Complete unity appears Inherently Improbable between two centers of vigorous Communist authority and tuitions! pride, each backed by so much power as to make it difficult for either one to impose its will on the other and eauh having strong reasons lor continuing to hold Its own views. At the same time, such discord Isto force the USSR and Communist China so far apart that they cease to look to each other for support In their common drive against the West.

The tensions Inherent ta the Sino-Soviet relationship could eventually leadasic reformation of the structure of the Bloc. It is even possible that the Sino-Sovietwill begin to take on more of the aspectsraditional alliance between twonation-states, perhaps extending to theof tacitly acknowledged spheres of Influence. In any event, over the next five years the growing duality of power in the Bloc will become tacreaslngty Incompatible with present Bloc structure which has been basedingle source of authority.onsequence, quick and effectiveof policy against the West may become more difficult. Moscow may face difficulties in successfully denying its European allies an increased measure of authority and Initiative and in preventing satellite orhclals fromto use Sino-Soviet differences as leverage against Moscow. The cohesion of the world Communist movement may sufferesult of confusing and at tunescounsel from both Moscow and Peiping and of probable Chinese attempts to increase its Influence in the guidance of otherparties.

The interplay ol Slno-Sovlet differences may well have an important effect on Bloc policies toward the West. Elsewhere we have estimated that the Soviets are Hkely, during the next few years, to mingle elements of accommodation and of pressure in theirpolicy. The Chinese will seek to minimise the former and maximize the latter. This tendency will be particularly strong In matters directly related to Communist China'sinterests, especially those concerning the Taiwan question and Pelplng's position in the international community. We do not believe that their efforts will decide the course of Soviet policy, but they will influence it The SovieU will not be quite as free to reach agreements with the US, if they wish to do so, as they would be If they were not allied lo the Chinese. Moreover. Chinese Communist pressure may at times cause the Soviets toore militant coarse toward the west than the Soviets would otherwise choose on tactical grounds.

Since the Slno-Sovlet alliance is aand evolving relationship, it offersfor favorable as well as unfavorable developments from the US point of view. Stresses and strains weaken the hostileand possibly can be exploited to the advantage of the West. Public manifestations ot Sino-Soviet disagreement damage theof Communist unity and diminish, to some degree, the forward thrust of worldMeverthelesB, despite theseconsiderations, the threat which the Slno-Sovlet allies pose to US security and US Interests Is of great dimensions, and wethat it is more likely to increase than to diminish during the period of this estimate.




tbe pastears, actual soviet dellverios to Communist China of complete Installations and other capital equipment have amounted in value to more thanill km.eries of agreements negotiated0 the USSR has agreed to provide China with complete Installationsajorwhich form the core of China's indus-trlalisaUon program. These projects include complete sets of factory equipment for tbe large, modern,arge petroleum refinery, aircraft and truck factories, and machlne-bulkiingelectric power installations, which form the core of the Chinese industrial development program. About one-half of thesehave been placed ln full or partialBy importing complete factories from the USSR, China haselatively standardized basic plant and has gained the advantage of integrated planning by experts who are familiar with the demands of aplanned economy. These are not "aid" projects in the sense of economic grants, but they have helped China's industrial growth greatly by providing long-range guaranteed deliveries and by providing ready availability of modern Soviet technology and the services of Soviet experts who have supplied necessaryll phases of plant construction and initial operation. The Soviet role Inthese projects was especiallyduring the First Five-Year.

The Chinese now claim to be more capable of coping Independently with the building of modern industrial plants, and perform much of the planning and construction work on aid projects formerly done by Soviet experts. As the Chinese advance In technical competence, however, they are attempting more complex types ofelectronics equipment, and steel-makingSoviet assistance continues to beuch higher technical level.

Soviet "aid" has taken various forms. The USSR loaned China3. of0 million was for economic development and the remainder primarily for military purchases. The credits had been almost fully utilised5 and China now has repaid about two-thirds or the totalA vast amount of Soviet technical data appears to have been made available free of charge over Lhe past decade. The USSR hes sent technicians and equipment which were in some cases in short supply at home. It has also coordinated its shipments with China's development programs and has been willing to make economic commitments years in advance.

China has also benefited from the extensive economic relations ft has formed with the Eastern European Satellites, particularlyBast Germany, and Czechoslovakia. Agreementa have been negotiated with certain of these countries calling for technicaland equipment for the construction in China of atarge Industrialabout two-thirds of which have been finished and placed in operation- Including these projects, tbe total value of machinery and equipment paid for and received by Chinarom the European Satellites was7 billion,f China's imports of these items from all sources.

Figures for the First Flre-Year Planthat the Joint projects involving Soviet capital equipment and technicians, but also Chinese materials, equipment, and labor,forercent of all state Investment In industry during that period. In absolute figures. China investedillionn Soviet projects during the First Five-Year Plan outotal Industrial investmentofillion yuan.

The original Second Five-Year Planwhich continued the emphasis on large-scale industry and on the Soviet-assistedconstruction projects, probably were based on the assumption that the proportion of state Industrial Investment in Soviet-assisted projects would be maintained at about the level of the First Five-Year Plan. The leap forward drive, however, which greatlyinvestment ta small-scaleIndustries, has radically changed the pattern of investment. The trend established8nd ta0 planthat Industrial Investment during the Second Five-Year Plan may be twice as large as orlglnallyInsteaduan. Meanwhile, Investment In Soviet-assisted projects, even though it seems to have been expanded, probably will not exceedoillion yuan. According to these figures, the proportion of Investment ta Soviet-assisted projects to total Industrial investment will

"This fujure lo etudes tbe value ol the investment goods Imported from the USSR for ibe" projects

decline fromercent during the First Five-Year Plan to shoutoercent during the Second.

In addition to equipment foroviet-assisted projects, China Imports from theubstantial additional amount ofequipment and other items forplants not Included In the assistance agreements. Also vital to the running ofeconomy are Imports of Soviet Industrial raw materials, transport equipment, and petroleum prcducts.,-

Petroleum products from the USSR are of particular importance, for evenhinas domestic production was able lo meet only about half of Its requirements, and more thanercent of Its total Imports were obtained from the USSR. Out of total importsillion tons of crude oil and refined petroleum productsircraft fuels and other fuels and lubricants foruses may have comprisedillion tons. For these products China Is still almost wholly dependent upon foreign supplies. In spite of considerable growth In domesticof crude oil and In domestic refining capacity expected in the next five years, China's dcanand is growing so rapidly that annual petroleum Imports are expected to rise toillion tonsmports will continue to consist mainly of re finedproductsizable quantity of mflitary fuels.

"Fortoroodlty breakdown of Slnc-Solet trade, lasO-lSSS, see Table 2.


irch oat^orlas ai chcmlceJa, biiWdlng rnlcnaU. phaunivmiBoata and cultural and con-etirrur good*.

1f tbe value of good* Dot JUtcd oy Sovietaivd believed to be primarily cl rrXttarj and Jtraiefk oflctn.


kxpobts fhom communist china to the ussr as repo&tfd by thend ftecentatu

ExiWJi Villi.

maWrtali at eanenl-



IU*Wrlal* of animal


Mor.feerow? mail raw i IT

MUcellanaooa' B




















materials of agricultural




Ml M






matBtlaU of animal.

errous and alloy metal*.





inw materials












All dala cor.Uiasd la ItU table are from aovrea otherwise todeataS

' BBSBlarMowa include* lodrulrtal (coda, industrial raw mattrtals. eftejeWata acd rubOK. aad ecltarai



The trend toward greater Chinese self-sufficiency Is also characterized by the growth of the Chinese machine-building industry. Although China must continue to rely entirely on imports for some types ot machines. It officially claims that It Is now able to fulfill from Internal production aboutercent of its overall recniiremenis for machinery,roduction rale during the First Five-Year Plan which met onlyercent of such requirements. This advance bas not been uniform in all lines of production,and much of the additional machinery produced in China has been of simple types, for example, irrigation pumps for agriculture, or simple equipment for small factories.

he Impact of Soviet equipment onChina's economy has been greatlyby the employmentarge number of Soviet exports, most of whom have been on Chinese Communist payrolls or Included In the cost of the Soviet assistance to major aic projects By90 Soviet economic and technical experts reportedly had worked In China at one time or another. These experts have Included not only top-notch Soviet industrial specialists but alsoadvisers who have helped formulate economic planning In all sectors in the Chinese economy, in the past two or three years the number of soviet technicians has dwindled, and the remaining technicians are mostly in the background as technical advisers and trouble shooters rather than as managers and operating engineers. Another mechanism for transmitting Soviet technology lo Communist China bas been tbe training program for Chi-nese students in the USSR.8 China reportedly had0 students to the Soviet union for study0 individuals to Soviet industrial establishments for on-the-job training. Most of those receiving practical Irainuig were assigned to plants similar to ones under construction in China, to prepare them for serving as the Initial group of skilled workmen and technicians in newly completed Chinese factories.

II. Although less tangible than technicalin the form of expert advice and training, Soviet transfers of technicalhave been of considerable importance in the industrialization program ofChina. Under the Slno-Sovlet Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreementhe USSR has provided China with blueprints for the constructioninds of factories and enterprises, designsets of machinery and equipment, andinformation on production processes. Additional agreements for further technical cooperation were negotiated8or application during the Second Five-Year. Knowledge and datain this manner from the USSR have been useful to China even on projects with which the USSR has not been mvolvcd.



and Nature ol Communiston tbe Bloc

China Is capable, withoutforeign aid, of graduallyscientific and technologicala small group ol very ablewho have access to thein their fields. To reach worldeffortignificant numberhe Chinese would requireoutside aid,ntraining. The dependence athowever, Is for the most part atlevels. Aid Is required, lororgsnising the nationalesearch program,the latest in scientific know-howproblems quickly, furnishingresearch, and training new made, personnel atscholastic and scientific levels willThis pattern has been followedcountries and Is not new. To date,have requested aid from theand other Bloc countries in aof fields and have received aid inof them. The Chinese also haveWestern technological developmentsuse of them as far ss practicable.

Scole, Nature, and TermsAssistance

he Soviets had largelyChinese need for organization,undergraduate education. Most ofwasractical level with littleIn research and development,furnished up to this time wereteachers, short-term lecturers,industrial types. Startingew hundred researchers began to work jointly with Chinese scientists In China for periods of several monthsear or two.

inceear protocol was signed under the Brno-Soviet Scientific and Technical Agreementoviet aid has stepped up. This protocol clarified Slno-Sovlet relations Ir. research and development and the training of scientists, forrograms were to be carried out jointly or with Soviet assistance to supportyear Kan for scientificWe believe some of this work alsothe Soviet research program.

Connected with8 step-up was an agreement made in7 between the academies of the two countries whichfor direct communications, jointand expeditions, and coordination of work in important problems of science and technology. Similar agreements wereIn8 between the academics of agricultural sciences of the two countries and between the minis tries concerned with higher education. Theseearwith executive plans to be made yearly. Tbe agreements were associated with thementioned above. Research andand training In all fields and allagencies of government werein these documents.

Training in the Soviet Union Is one of the most Important ways that the Soviet Union is aiding China. Training in China has not progressed well andandful ofnew scientists has been produced in China. The growth of qualified scientists In China has come almost entirely from those returning

after graduate study in the SortM Uruon (other thanr more who returned from the US and Europe after the Communistostgraduate training began to receive Increased emphasis starting in IDAS, and,olicy was adopted whereby only graduate students would be sent abroad. With this new policy, the number sent each year is believed to have dropped fromnd over56ew hundred per year. The number studying In the Soviet Union appears to be decltrung, but the level ol study is rising. There are probablyhinese currently studying in the Soviet Union, mostly In scientific and technical fields.

be expenses of Soviet experts who stay In China up to three months reportedly are paid by the Sovietcse who stay up to six months have their travel paid by China; and those who stay longer have both salaries and expenses paid by China. It Is believed that the expenses of Chinese students in the

Soviet Union are borne by China. Scientific apparatus and Instruments are also paid for;his trade item wasillion yuan.

C. Nel Worth to the USSR

enefits to the Soviet Union ore not obvious,umber of Chinese researchers and graduate students working in Soviet research institutions have contributed to tbe overall research and development output in the USSR. Some research done In Chinaew fields Is probablyevel that would be Of Interest and value to Soviet scientists. Close contact with China's research and development has given the Soviet Union an opportunity to keep informed on China's progress and prospects. Tbe Soviet access to tbe geographical area of China gives some advantage to the soviet Union In such fields as satellite tracking also derive from this

SK c:



Ground Forces

Equipment. Communist China'supon the USSR for equipment has progressively lessened over the lastears. Nevertheless, China is still dependent upon the Soviet Union tor many types offor its armed forces.

At the time of the Korean War,China was making mainly Infantryand ammunition. The USSR supplied armor, artillery, ammunition, and vehiclesarge scale, although Communist China was alsoariety of captured Japanese and US weapons. Shortly after the end of tho Korean War, Communist China decided tounitions industry with Soviet aid and geared to the production of Soviet-type weapons. Since then, China has gradually expanded its production to include Soviet-type artillery and artillery ammunition, medium trucks, the new type Soviet small arms and ammunition, and, most recently, medium tanks. It Is believed that Communist China now produces enough of these Items to supply the current peacetime replacementof Its armed farces. For all other Items of equipment, especially heavy armor, specialised artillery, some kinds of complex signal and electronic equipment, and aof trucks and special purpose vehicles, Communist China is completely dependent upon the USSR or other members of the Bloc.

The quantities of equipment which may have been sent to China are unknown.sufficient equipment has been identified In the hands of troops to indicate that these shipments have been substantial. Little la known of tbe possible stockpiles of equipment In Communist China, but it Is probable that If stockpiles exist that they consist primarily cf Soviet Items. Estimated production of military items in Communiat China indicates that output would hardly have been sufficient for the accumulation of stockpiles. Also, during the heavy Chin men ahelling, theammunition a'tuch waa recovered and analyzed was mainly of Sonet manufacture, wrdch suggests that ammunition stocks are certarruy of Soviet origin

n the last few years, the nature of Soviet assistance to Communist China has shifted. Instead of supplying mainly finished military equipment and supplies, the USSR Is now chiefly providing technical aid and Industrial facilities for munitions manufacture. By this means, China has been able toairly extensive number of up-to-date weapons. More importantly, theseplants provide the base which can be expanded to that Communist China will ultimately become self-sufficient In the output of many types of military equipment.

But for the present, and for some years to come, Communist China's ability toIts forces with Items ol Its own production will be very limited. At current estimated production rates, for eaample, ofasic item of equipment as4 tank. It win be five years before4 tanks nowto units In the armored divisions and tank regiments of infantry dlvbnoru can be repined, even al tht modest levels nowIr. the current

Chins doss not now hare and is not likely to haveumber ofomestic capabUity to meet all of its requirements at wartime consumption levels for conventional weapons and the more complex types of radar and electronic equipment now essentialodern ground force. The Chinese,eacetime, are dependent on the Soviets to

tables CM


replacements and spare parts Ior many weapons now In use, and must rely on the Soviets for much of their communications equipment, radar, snd early warning devices.

Chinese Communist ground forces dwarf all non-Communist Asian military forces, but the level of equipment of the Chinese forces Is still far short of advanced modernFor example, in the Soviet tankthere are more than eight times the number of tanks in the Chinese armoredin the tank regiments of iniantrythe Soviets are over twice as strong as the Chinese in numbers of tanks. Thehaveimes more tanks than theand most of them are larger and newer models.

Thus, evenonnuclear war, the time is not in sight when the Chinese Communists will be able to sustain majorodern armed force without substantial quantities of additional Soviet weapons and equipment The Chinese will also need help In meeting their increasing POL requirements.

The lackajor military research and development program will further extend the time before Communist China will achieve "militaryhe Chinese haveapability to makeon blueprints and plans of the relatively simple military equipment they are nowbut seem not yet to haveany serious program of research and developmentruly "Chinese" weapons system, or of native Chinese supportj.

The Soviets have made acontribution to the Chinesearmed force strength by permittingattend Soviet training schools andSoviet advisory program in Chinalimited dabs indicate that thewithdrawing some of their personnelunits, probably because the Chinesetheir own training programs fororganisations and weapons.the Chinese undoubtedly realise tbeof continuing to send as manyas possible lo advanced Sovietprepare for lurther modernization of their forces.

The Chinese Communiststo support their effort in Koreaa large-scale Soviet logistics effort,considerable work and progress,of the Chinese Communistremains basically weak,Is found in the transportationlimited capacity and itsInterdiction, in tbe logisticalwhich provides this service toforces, and in the lack ofspare parts, POL, and otherto permit the Chineseto engage in modern dependent on the Soviet Unionsupport in any militaryan enemy which included amilitary force.

B. Air Forces

Communist China Is today heavilyupon the Soviet Union for aircraft, air weapons, air logistic Items, electronic equipment, and framing; and It Is likely to remain soong time to come. As China lacks the two essential ingredientsong-range strike power (nuclear weapons and long-range deliveryt mustrely upon Soviet capabilities. Into this dependence, China must also rely upon Its Soviet ally for the maintenance and farther, development of the defensive and offensive air capability it now has in being.

Today, Communist China's aircrafttotals moreircraft tnunits including0 Jetandet light bombers. The great bulk of these aircraft has been supplied to China by the Soviet Union. This aidconstitutes the major directcontribution to Communist China'smilitary power. In addition to thisthe Soviets have also helped theChinese to establish facilities for the local production of Soviet-designed aircraft. The Chinese Communists began seriesof Soviet-designed fighters JFRESCO-


and utility aircraft7 and have been producing helicoptersIn series since the falleries production of FARMER*as probably recently begun. Sovietof this production has been extensive, but has decreased from initial levels as the Chinese have been able lo supply more and more of tbe raw materials, components, and qualified personnel required in production. While this trend is likely to continue, it is probable that the Chinese Communists will have to depend on the USSR to supplycomponents for these aircraft lor some time to come.

Communist China remains heavilyon the Soviet Union for air logistic items. While Pelplng's overall dependence on tbe USSR for air logistic materials hasmoderatelyhe volume of iu imports has increased substantiallyesult of increases in Communist China'sinventory. At present, it is estimated that China must depend upon the USSR for approximatelyercent of its total airrequirements. China is particularlyon the USSR for the higher grade petroleum products required for its air forces. It Is believed that all such products,all aviation fuels, are now Imported from the USSR and European Bloc countries. Even with the expected improvements in China's petroleum Industry, Peiping will probably continue to rely on the USSR for the major portion of these petroleum products for some time. Thus China's military air capability will continue to be directly dependent upon the Soviet supply line.

Soviet training assistance has included both extensive supervisory and materieland has resulted In the development of an air training establishment in China closely patterned after that of the Soviet air forces. At the time of the Koreanarge number of Soviet advisors and instructors werethroughout the Chinese Communist Air Force. Since that time, the number of Soviet personnel assigned In China hasdecreasedew still remain in an advisory capacity. Today the Chineseare capable of meeting most of their annual training requirements through their own resources aod probably rely upon the Soviets only for advanced technical equipment and for the training of highly skilled technl-

C. Naval Forces

lfl. Materiel Assistance. Only through the extensive assistance of the Soviet Navy has the rapid development of the ChineseNavy (CCN) been possible, and ships transferred from the USSR" and thoseIn China from largely Soviet-supplied componentstoday provide the principal combat potential of the navy. Most CCN naval materiel, especially ordnance,and propulsion machinery, and petroleum products, has also originated In the USSR. Much recent Soviet technical assistance bas been directed toward the establishment of programs for local Chinese production of naval equipment.

oviet Natal Advisory Mission. Equally important assistance in the development cf the CCN has been furnished by the Soviet Naval Advisory Mission. This mission was instituted to impart Soviet naval experience, methods, and technical skills to the Chinese. ItconeJste of the Soviet Advisory Section at NavalPeiping, andetwork ofattached to every major subordinate command or installation. Initially set uphis network became so extensive as to include every ship and tactical organisation In the navy, it is estimated that bypwardsoviets were assigned to various naval missions with the CCN, witherving with the Soviet Advisory Section in Peiping. Gradually, as the CCN developed and gained practical operatingthe number of Soviet advisors was reduced. At the present time, the number probably does not; the advisory section in Peiping has been reduced to aboutersons with then duty with the Beet and district commands, the naval academy at Dairen, and specialized training commands.

'See. 'See


For psycho'.ogical reasons the Soviet Naval

Advisory Mission is integrated into the CCN organization so as to clot* even the slight est outward appearance or Soviet control or Most ot the personnel wear civilian

or CCN uniforms without badges or

ran* insignia. Relatione between the Chinese and their Soviet advisors are generallyas "polite" with little evidence ofethnic friction on any level. Customarily the local Soviet advisors give specific advice only when it is requested They do, however, make periodic reports to the head of theAdvisory Section, Pefping, who In turn can recommend general remedial measures to the national CCN high command. TheNaval Advisory Mission not only provides beneficial guidance to the CCN but alsothe Soviet Navy to evaluate adequately the professional competence of Its Far Eastern ally.

umerous other Soviet personnel have been provided to the Chinese to give technical guidance In the establishment of shipbuilding programs. Additional technicians have been sent to instruct the Chinese in the proper operation and maintenance of modern naval equipment.

TramrWo. During the earlier stages In the development of the ccn large numbers of Chinese, officers wetn omit to the USSR for senior and specialised naval schooling. Small numbers of senior naval officers are still being sent annually to the Order of Lenin Naval Academy at Leningrad for command and staffimited number of Junior officers and enlisted peisonnel are emclled each year for sprained technical training at several other Scvtel naval schools In the Leningrad area and in Ihe Vladivostok-Nakhodka naval complex

In addiuon to technical and materielin developing the CCN. the USSR has taken several Bssaouna vrnicb have enhanced the pm'.lge of Chinaew naval power.he USSR ceded Kuan-tung Pan-too (Kwantung Peninsula) to China, together with its Important naval and Industrialof Port Arthur Dalren. Port Arthur has since become one of llie two largest bases of the CCN. In the summer* Ihe Soviet Pacificade an official lo Shanghai, the first visit of foreign warships lo mainland China since the defeat of the ChineseTo dale the Chinese Communists have not paid the customary return visit.




Small Arms

mPistol. lypeOcwof SovTT-SJ)

m CsrbJrve, type tt {Copy ol Sot

m 8MO. typeCopy o* SOV

rUinm Light MO. typeCOP? Of Sov RPD)

m Keov>typeCopy ot Sov Goryunov)"

m Heavy MO, typeCopy ol gov MM BQtiK)


81mm iCoyy otra Mittl)

m (Copy olmm

leOrom (Copy oi Sov

Ricoiltod* Rlftea

57mm, typeCopy ol) Productiont tnd of 1OT

T&mra. typoCopy of)

Rocket Launchers

90mm, typeCopy of) ProdaeUon ceased at end or iffi

loamm, type


l^nim AA em typeOorry ol)

&7mm AT &un. typeCopy of Sov UHH3)

71mm Div gun*Copy of)

IHmra How (Cbpy oi Sot MU38)

m How (Copy ol Sot


TW um Medium (Copy of Sot Model)


J r: -p-


ArtOtery andL4

Small Amu ISOmillionrcunds









Kuinbtr Dfctt Rcmattt*





Value of Imports, Exports, and Trade Balances of Communist China with the USSR as reported by the

[IO Chi"-}

Estimated Utiliiation and Repiynisits of Swiet bins In; Cimitunist

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: