Created: 8/9/1960

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

flfffOB HtLLBSt1






TAe follow/no Intelligence organtialloni participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence oreanualrom of Ihe Depart man It ol Stale, the Army. Ihe Navy, the Air Force. The Jotnt staff. and AK

Concurred In by Ihe


ugust IW Cowing mm* The Dfeetc ofand Research. Department of Stale; the Amifanl Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army; theChief of rraval Operation* lor MmWffMmnW, Department of

the Now; theChief of Staff. WbTJIIIII, USAF.

the Director for IntelUgcnce. The Joint Staff, the Atomic tnergy Commission Kepreientallve lo the VSIB. ihe Atrutant lo the Secretary of Dtfenu, Special Operations; and theof Ihe National Security Agency. The AuUlantFederal Bureau of Inwttlgalion. abstained, the subject being oultidc of his lurhdlctlan.



his estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy la for the Information and use of the recipient and of persons under his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments.

of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State

Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

c Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for InteUigence, for the Department

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission

Director, FBI, for the Federal BureaueCretary 0ffor the Department

L Director of NSA for the National Security Agency

J' AgencT' DlreCt0ECentrtd ReIerence>ny other Departmenthis copy may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable

1th6 CcntnUAgency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

hen an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients mayoftlK1 of this period, the estimate

SVUfWagency, or permissionJuneagency to retain It In accordance with

iilT* epatately frora ta* *hould *

aterlal contains Information affecting

the Nraqpflj : of the within thr^cmuas^ttWeeRJoTiigc taws. Title IB, USGatw-TMtteBt^evKailoi! of whichianpcr authorised person Is prohibit


National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Operations Coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of



odviuaamfor release throughHISVORICAI, BZVZW PROGRAM Ot the Central Intelligence Acjancy.



table of contents





of the


Leadership Within the

Leadership of Communism Outside the

World Outlook and Foreign


The Military

Communist China's Dependence on the Soviet Union

Nuclear Weapons and

Disarmament, Test Bans, and Atom-Free Asia .

The Economic


E Summary Analysis of the Sino-Soviet Relationship










To examine the Sino-Soviet relationship, and to estimate probable developments therein over the next five years.


The growth of Communist China's power and self-confidence has brought to the Sino-Soviet relationship an Increased Chinese assertivenessonsequent sharp increase in discord, particularly concerning outlook and attitude toward the non-Communist world. There is still one Communist faith, but there are now two voices of Communist authority.onsequence, the Sino-Sovietis in process of difficult change.)

he Sino-Soviet relationship isommunist monolith. Instead, itelements of both cohesion andand varying degrees of unity arc displayed in the relations of the two powers in ideological, foreign policy,and military affairs. Although joined in the pursuit of broadobjectives, the Soviet and Chinese partnership is subject to many of the separatist forces that haveconfronted alliances and coalitions.)

e believe that cohesive forces in the Sino-Soviet relationships will remain stronger than divisive forces at least through the period of this estimate. The strongest of the cohesive forces willutual awareness of the heavy damage to their national interests and to the Communist causeubstantialof the alliance would inflict. The two partners will almost certainly continue toommon hostility to the Westelief that through their common effort In advancing International communism they can somedaytn dominating the world. Theirwill also continue to findin the political, economic, and military advantages each receives. This will have particular force for the Chinese who, in view of their continuing military and economic dependence on the USSR, will probably feel that they have noacceptable alternative totheir alliance with the Soviets.)


Divisive forces continue to be present, however, and may increase. Differing national interests and characteristics, and the wide disparity in theof the USSR and Communist China as Communist societies, will continue to exert basic stresses on the Sino-SovietCommunist China's relative weight in the Bloc is likely to grow over the next five years. This growth willthe leverage Moscow can bring to bear through Peiping's military anddependence. The Chinesewil! be more inclined to pursue their own interests and to question Soviet leadership than they have during the first decade of the alliance.

e do not rule out the possibility that the two powers may during the period of this estimate either come to an open break orore fundamental integration of interests than now exists. We believe it much more likely, however, that there will be no fundamental reconciliation of differences, that discord will ebb and flow, and that the growing duality of power in the Bloc will become increasinglywith the present Bloc structure which has been basedingle source of authority. However, differences will be unlikely to force the USSR andChina so far apart that they cease to look to each other for support in their common drive against the West.)

he threat which the Sino-Soviet allies pose to US security and US interests is of great dimensions and is more likely to increase than to diminish during the period of this estimate. Nevertheless, since the alliancehanging andrelationship, it offers possibilities for favorable as well as unfavorablefrom the US point of view. Stresses and strains in the Sino-Sovietwill tend to weaken the hostile combination, and may provide situations and opportunities which can be exploited by the West. At the same time. Chinese Communist pressure may on occasionthe Soviets toorecourse toward the West than the Soviets would otherwise choose on tactical grounds. )



ho SI no-Soviet relationship has of late been publicly displaying greater signs ofstrain than at any time In Its decade of existence: most importantly, the USSR and Communist China have been engagedontroversy over global strategy in which each claims to be preaching the true doctrine. Disputes of this magnitude raise the question as to whether the Slno-Sovlet relationship can long maintain its present character or its present degree of coordination.

he history of the Communist movement has been marked by controversies and schisms. These have occurred not only within theParly of the Soviet Union, but between parties and between Communist regimes as well Where disputes have reached serious proportions they have generally been settled by an exercise of Moscow's power.however. Moscow has either not sought or has not been able to exert such power, and schisms have occurred. The most notable example is Yugoslavia.




Communist China began loa great power, the Communistnoterious controversya major potential rival to theCommunist experience provide* no(or settlingisputeCommunist powers, the presentbetween Moscow and Peipinga difficult test for the Sino-Sovietin offsetting inherentThe outcome will in the long runinfluence the future course ofinternally and externally. Ithave profound implications for theof the US and the West. Thefollows seeks to examine the natureSino-Soviet relationship and tofuture course.


A. Evolution of ihe Relationship

present Sino-Soviet relationshipmolded by ansometimesyears' standing between tbeof the Soviet Union and theParty. Beginning with theof the Chinese Communist Party intwo groupselief both incommunism, and in the goalsexisting Chinese regimesWestern Influence in the interests of the USSR tonascent Communist movement inthe Chinese Communist Party,eak and disparateintellectuals, labor leaders, and militarythe USSR was initially tbe onlyguidance and support.

here have been difficulties inherent in this relationship from the outset. Stalin's faulty comprehension of the Chinese scene ledegree of misguidance that at times almost wrecked the Chinese Communist Party.' The USSR continued historic Rus-

1 Chinese Communist media continue occasionally to crltjclxe ihe courses taken, especially In ihe. by "misguided" Chinese lenders who "automatically copied foreignian efforts to obtain special rights andin China. China lacked even thebase and administrative-technical skills which the Bolsheviks inherited in the Russiaarxism, which had once beento the Russian scene, then required even more radical adaptations to fit it to an agrarian Chinese setting.

hese problems were fairly manageable as long as the Chinese Communist Party wasevolutionary Instrument for pulling down the existing Chinese state, but thebegan to takeew aspect once the Chinese Communist Party had firmlyIts authority in greater extent than the Soviet Satellites. It won Its victory by its own efforts. The Peiping regime had developed its own sources of political and military power, independent of direct Soviet control. The terms of theccorded it special status within the Bloc, and it soon became clear that Peiping could in some respects set its own course. Mao had alreadyeputationoctrinal Innovator; thehad been laid for Peiping tonique second source of authority In what hadonolithic Bloc.

nderlying Forces

umber ot very strong tics bindChina and the USSR. The leaders of both countriesommon core ofandommon enemy. They join In perceiving the world powers as divided into two hostile camps and in placing their two countries on the same side. The Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders declare that there is an overriding need to preserve the unity of the Bloc in carrying on the struggle against the common enemy, and especially against its leading element, the US. theby definition.

ach nation derives great practicalfrom its association with Ihe other. The USSR and Communist China both appreciate the great increase in strategic strength that derives from their alliance. Their possessionarge land mass fronting on two oceans obliges the West to disperse its military


widely in opposing the Bloc. The fact that Communist China opposes the West In Asiaonsiderable portion of Western armed forces, diverts Westernand economic assets, and enables Moscow lo concentrate Its forces elsewhere. It was demonstrated In Korea that in certainChinese Communist armed forces may serve Soviet interests without necessarily Involving Soviet armed forces in direct conflict with the West. For its part, Communist China has received economic backing and technical support which has been essential to its industrial development. It has alsoguidance In the establishingommunist totalitarian state, support from the Soviet Union inforums, equipmentowerfulestablishment, and the protection of the Soviet nuclear capability.

Basic stresses, however, underlie theNationalis. the whole spectrum of peculiarly nationaland nationalaseparatist force. Russia and China are nations with long and proud traditions, and the Russians and the Chinese arc verypeoples whose relations with one another have often been marked by enmity andcontempt. The Chinese Communists, in particular, continue to manifest traditional Chinese extreme pride and sense ofAlthough both the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaderships preach thatthinking" is an evil to be overcome, their primary appeals to their publics arekeyed to national pride and"Proletarian internationalism" hat not bridged the gulf that exists between the heritages, cultures, and psychological outlook of the Russians and the Chinese.

The wide disparity in the development of the USSR and China as Communistalso places Important stresses on their relationship. The immediate needs andof the two countries diner in many respects. Communist China is in the early stages of building an industrial base; it feels compelled-to drive its people, squeeze itsfrom their output, and prolong extreme austerity. The prevailing mood IsOn the other hand, the relatively mature and affluent Soviet Union has reached the stage where It Is giving greater attention to the working conditions and livingof its people In order to achieve the planned expansion and qualitativeof Its economy. In addition, the Soviet people almosi certainly have an Increasing stake in preserving the gains In livingand freedom from terror that they have experienced since Stalin's death.

greatly different status of theIn International affairs alsoseparatist force. The foreign policyCommunist China is heavily Influencedfact that It does not Itself play aIn International councils and itof the attributes of the greatit covets. Because of relativein international affairs and Itsposition, Communist China Is anwith Immediate intereststhat area and with little opportunityfor realistically assessing thein the West. Its foreign policyare frustrated not only by Westernbut also by Soviet restraints.


A. Communist Relations

The leaders of bothupon the same Marxist-Ienlnlstof thought for their appreciation ofand domestic affairs. Theycommon faith in the ultimate worldcommunism, believing themselves Lo bethe crest of inevitable historicThey are unalterably opposed toconsider to be the decadent systemwhich has in their viewfinal stage in Imperialism. Theytheir efforts can hasten thecapitalism. In addition, the Sovietleaders also agree thatgain and hold power indictatorship of thobe established, led by theto oversee forced development of the


through state planning and state ownership of the means of production.

n practice, however, the Interpretation and application of ideological "truths" is ativisive force in the Sino-SovietAlthough In both regimes allare conceived within the Communist frame of reference and some may be largely motivated by doctrinal concepts, we believe that most major policy decisions are primarily directed by practical considerations, in any case, every important switch and turn ofin the Communist world must beby doctrinal justification. In the past few years both the Soviet and Chineseleaders have endeavored lo sanctify widely differing policies by citing selectedfrom the vast and often contradictory mass of Communist scripture, claiming In the process that their leaders. Khrushchev and Mao. are "creatively developing" classicdoctrines. In this colloquy. Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues appearense as fundamentalist "prophets" who consider that the "established church" has become too worldly and urbane, andeturn tomilitancy Is necessary for Invigorating the common faith. Moreover, they deny status to Khrushchevreat developerevel with Marx, Engels. Lenin. Stalin, and Mao. They appear to considerecond-generation Communistackslider from Leninism.

s long as Chinese policy Initiatives and doctrinal pretensions were confined tominor domestic matters, the Sovietwas favorable. However, as early$ the Chinese began to make grandon Bloc matters, and have since become increasingly assertive on bothand world affairs, differing flatly and openly with the Soviets on an increasing range of questions of doctrinal interpretation. The Soviet leadership is affronted by the departure from Soviet policy and the Chinese challenge to Soviet authority. Thus, Slno-Sovict debates on the proper interpretation of Communist scriptures reflect serious disputes both onpolicies and on the authority of the interpreters to formulate such policies


the past few years Moscow andat times been in stronga number of questions of ideologicalAmong these have been theemphasis on "uninterruptedChinese view that "contradictions"between the leaders and the led Instate, and the Chinese claimawareness Is as important Inproductive effort asystem ofrewards. Although these mattersconsiderable importance amongthey have been largely overshadowedespecially significant areas ofconcern ideological support forpolicies and the theoreticalof the Chinese communes.

The most serious question of foreignfor Moscow and Peiping Is which policy should be followed toward the Westoward revolutionary movements outside the Bloc. In general, the Chinese interpretliterature touch harder and more aggressive line In these respects than does Khrushchev. The differences concern interpretation of the present historical epoch, the degree to which modern weaponrynew elements into the historical process, the proper definition of coexistence, theof eliminating war. and, mostthe proper risks to be run. The USSR and Communist China publicly state their present bitter differences in Ideologicalamong Communists, indicates that the dispute has become acute.1

The other principal dispute has concerned the Chinese Cornmunlst commune program, which runs completely counter toplans for organising and raisingproduction in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Apparently without any previouswith the Soviets, the Chinese launched this radical program incomments in the controlled Chinese pressrescendo of doctrinal claims which gave the impression that through the dcvelop-

' These differences, as ihey apply specifically to foreign policy and lo the world Communist movement are discussed below In.



of communes, the stage ofwas just around the comer In China The Chinese thereby Implied not only that they haday to get there ahead of the USSR and the rest of the Bloc, but that the Chinese Communist commune might well serveodel for certain other countries.

Partlyesult of Soviet displeasure, the Chinese, toward the endS, backed away from their more extravagant Ideological claims for the communes At the same time, internal considerations also dictated aof retreats in the commune system. The Chinese accepted tho Soviet position that no society could advance to communism without following the Soviet experience of greatlyindustry and high productivity, and they temporarily abandoned their claim that the commune idea was relevant to otherThe initial Chinese assertiveness almost certainly played an important part in moving Khrushchev, at the XXI Congress of theParty of the Soviet Uniono make new ideologicalof his own. These clearly seemedto make unequivocal the primacy of the Soviet Union's position in the march toward communism, and at the same time to concede that all Bloc countries, including China, would achieve the uUimate goal of communism at approximately the same time.

The commune dispute has not yet been resolved. Soviet criticism of the communes has continued, and the Chinese Communists have moved slowly to regain some of the ground lost in their retreat of8 In addition to reasserting the objectionable claims that the communes represent the begin-nlngs of China's transition to communism and are relevant to other countries, the Chinese Communists haverogram of urban communalisatlon as well. Articles in the Chinese press have revealed, moreover, that ihe Issue of Soviet experience and Its relevance to the Chinese commune program hasubject of dispute within the Chinese Communist Party and that opponents of the program have sirred on Soviet criticisms and the Soviet example to buttress their own positions.

eadership Within the Bloc. Peipingto take an active, Independent role In Bloc affairshina's reluctance to goalong fully with dc-Stalinlzallon. its initialof the Poles und Hungariansnd its criticism of Soviet "great poweradded to Soviet problems, even though Peiping subsequently supported Soviet actions In Hungary and assisted the Soviet leadership in reaffirming unity In the Bloc. Morethe Chinese Communists have morechallenged Soviet leadership byamong representatives of other Blocagainst the course of Soviet foreign policy.

Nevertheless, Pclplug continues to pay formal allegiance to Soviet leadership of the Bloc and world communism. The Chinese leaders accept the Importance for Communist unityingle locus of leadership, and they recognize that at least for the foreseeable future it must lie Ln Moscow. However, they have Insisted that Soviet policies must reflect Chinese Communist Interests and Peiping's views on certain fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism: in particular, (a) unremitting struggle against the clearly defined enemy (thend (b) more militant revolutionary policies in the world Communist movement.

The existence of an Independent Chinese position on key Issues encourages elements within the European Satellites to become more assertive.umber of occasions, various satellites have failed to echo Sovietof Chinese statements and policies, and have sometimes given the Chinese openInitially there was some evidence of support in Eastern Europe, especially infor the communal organi7.ation of the countryside. East Germany has been publicly

'For example, three weeks after the USSR had published lis neutral stand on the Sno-lndlan border dispute In Ihe autumnart Oer-munv began pubUc support of the Chineseposition. This lasted about six weeks, being abruptly switchedovember to match the Soviet position. Cwchoslovakioriefer time gave even stronger lupport to Peiping on the border Issue and had earlier Joined Peiping In attacking Indian "imperialism" for causing the revolt in Tibet. North Korea and Albania gave early support lo Peiping's opposition to Moscow's detenu- lactlcs

sympathetic with Peiping's praise of Mao's contributions to Maixism-Loninism. hascertain Chinese economic innovations, and has at times joined In criticizing theline of coexistence with the West, The Chinese Red Flag articles of0 were almost certainly designed in part to encourage and support any party members who disagreed with Khrushchev's policies toward the West.

ll three of the Asian Satellite areas-North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outerstrong historical and cultural tics with China, and the Chinese Communists haveeen interest in these areas However. Moscow also has Interests In these areas, and there appears toino-Soviet division of authority In these satellites.Communist regimes In Outer Mongolia and North Korea were an established fact by the time the Peiping regime came Into being. Moscow continues to dominate these areas, although Peiping's influence In North Korea hus appreciably increased sinceChina's Intervention In tlm Korean War. Chinese influence is probablyIn North Vietnam, buthis cose, Moscow has retained considerable influence. Both Moscow and Peiping have substantial economic aid programs in the Asian Satellites, with Soviet aid predominating in Outerand North Korea, and the Chinesein Northhis division ofis almostelicate matter, but wc have no indication of serious Sino-Sovict frictions on this score.

*et Commitments of Communist China und the USSR to tho Asian Satellites, as of II




' Including debt cancellations amounting2 million.

'Including debt cancellations amounting0 million, but excluding assistance committed In February ISGO for which no value has been

eadership of Communism Outside the Bloc. The Chinese Communists believe that their experience uniquely equips them toguidance to Free World Communist parties in the colonial or semicolonlalwhich in Communist parlance includes most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.China has recently made conspicuoushese areas to Increase its Influence bolt) with local Communist parties and with the non-Communist governments. In some of these countries, local Communists appear to be more receptive to Chinese than to Soviet guidance, and in some cases, at least, the USSR appears at present to favor anrole for the Chinese Communists. Soviet influence remains dominant among the world's Communist parties. Even >ii non-Communist Asia, the three largest CommunistIn India, Japan, and Indonesiastill look principally to the USSR for guidance, although there Isendency among their leaders to consult both Moscow and Peiping.

the forcefully expressedview in Moscow and Peiping regardingand pace at which communismpushed in the colonial or semicolonlalwe have seen few signs of afor dominance In these areas. Itthat as long as thererospectworkable compromise or reconciliationbetween Moscow and Peiping.toourse of overt actionmight severely reduce thisif Sino-Sovieteal settlement. Instancesefforts to guide Communists,and leftward-leaning neutralistarc likely to become moreincreasingly sharp.

B. Strategic Relations

Outlook and Foreign Policy.and the Chinese Communistsworld as now divided into three groups(a) the Communist Bloc; (b) the"imperialist'* nations; andations and underdevelopedThey agree in viewing .the latteraffording the main opportunity for advanc-


SGitib T

the Communljt struggle against the West, although constant pressure and efforts to erode the West's position In other areasOn these general questions the Soviets and the Chinese Communists agree. It is on questions of method, pace, and risk that they differ.

The Soviet leaders, headed by Khrushchev, believe that to push as forcefully forCommunist goals as Peiping desires is to take political and military risks which could jeopardize the achievement of those goals. The Soviets and tho Chinese agree that Soviet advances in science and modern weapons have altered the world balance of power, but thearc more concerned than are the Chinese over the possibility that "adventures" by the Communists could developeneral In the Soviet view, would beto all participants, because of the destructive potential of modern weapons. The Soviets feci under these conditions that war should and can be avoided. In their view, the most effective approach for the attainment of world Communist goalslexible one,example, propaganda, and aid toregimes in newly independent countries (even though this Involves cooperating in some cases with bourgeois nationalists) with subversion and on occasion the application of military pressure.

At the same time, internal factors in the Soviet Union reinforce Moscow's interest in avoiding serious risk of hostilities with the West The Soviets strongly believe that their present economic plans, If unobstructed, will decisively strengthen the Socialist countries in competition with the antl -Communist group of nations, and will help considerably in demonstrating to all the superiority andof the Soviet system. Moreover,Soviet internal policies place stress an incentives, rather than coercion, andattention to the lot of the worker and peasant, whose production is vital to the

The Chinese believe that the Bloc should push more boldly and aggressively toward Communist world goals They hold thatachievements In advanced weaponry have so altered the world balance of power that

SBaV more forceful action should now be taken, even at the risk of local wars. In the Chinese view, if local war should develop into general war. not only would world communism triumph, but enough would remain of the world to make the victory worthwhile. Any relaxation of tensions meanwhile will dull Communistspirit and allow thereathing space In which to prepare for war against the Bloc. The Chinese Communists arc thus less inclined than Moscow to favor negotiationsactical method of struggle against the West.

The Communist Chinese not only consider the US as their prime enemy on Ideological grounds, they also consider the US annational enemy which is preventing them from gaining Taiwan and thus completing their victory in the Chinese civil war. They also consider that the US is blocking theof Chinese Communist Influence in Asia and in international affairs generally. This causes Peiping's enmity for the US to be more passionate and inflexible than Is the case in Moscow. The "hate America" spirit which pervades Peiping's propaganda Is also useful in justifying sacrifices by the Chinese people,

The Chinese also hold thut mnny of the "oppressed peoples" of Latin America, Africa, and non-Communist Asia are ready forrevolution, and that wars againstoppression" in these areas areJust, desirable, and deserving of Bloc encouragement and support. Although it may be expedient to support bourgeois national revolutions In these areas, revolutionaryshould bo applied where the opportunities exist and the bourgeois national regimesby Communist ones as soon asThey place less emphasis than do the Soviets on the possibility of attainingpower by parliamentary or other means short of armed revolution.

These differences have been building up since7 and reached considerableIn9 when Khrushchev's speeches In Peiping clearly implied disapproval of Communist China's truculent foreignThey became openly bitter in0 with the Chinese attacks on Soviet detente tactics preceding the Summit. Although the


failure of the Khrushchev-inspired Summit brought ]oy to Peiping, the Chinesecontinued to criticize Soviet policy and lobbied for their own cause before such bodies as the World Federation of Trade Unions. In the Chinese Communist view, proof of the validity of its great expectations from ahard line is to be found in recentevents in Korea. Turkey, and Japan, which Peiping Interprets as blows against US-supported reactionary regimes andthat the natives arc restless.

the Bloc conference in Bucharestthe USSK apparently outlined itsmore militant line toward the West,at least temporaryajor tactic. This switchtactics had probably beenpart by the Chinese Communistworld policy, and the Soviets probablyat Bucharest to extract inpromise to fall in line withIdeological and other Soviet tactics may have partiallyChinese Communist discontentforeign policy. Such accommodationhave been reached in recent weeks,almost certainly does no', eliminatefactors which originally led to

Areas. There has beensiderable enmity in Russian-Chineseregarding the borderland areas of Sinkiang,

Mongolia, and Manchuria, and we believe that some sensitivity may continue on this score. The USSR secured Outer Mongoliauppetnd acquired temporary hegemony In Sinkiang province inss. In ousting the defeated Japanesehe Soviets reclaimed part of Tsarist Russia's special rights concerning Dairen. Port Arthur, and the Manchurian rail-.roads. They also sacked the Manchuriancomplex of over three quartersillion dollars worth of plants and equipment. :Since the Communist takeover of China, how-,ever, and especially since the USSR gave up jits special status in Manchuriahese tissues appear to have played little noticeable role in Sino-Soviet relations.


C. Military Relations

he Military Alliance. Since its inceptionhe Slno-Sovlct Alliance has had an important military component. Although its texts is focussed on Japan, both Moscow and Peiping view their military alliance in broader terms. For example, the Chinese Communists have stated In effect that they would enter any hostilities involving the Warsaw Pact; and the Soviets, in making supportingduring6 Taiwan Strait crisis, specifically referred to their commitment to Communist China under0 treaty. The existence of the alliance greatly increases the military power of the entire Bloc andthe position of each power in world affairs.

Despite the existence of the militaryand the high degree of materielof the Soviet and Chinesearmed forces, there has been no evidence of joint maneuvers of Sino-Soviet forces, land, sea. or air. They do. however, coordinate their air defenses. We lack direct evidence and are unable to ascertain the scope and nature of Sino-Soviet joint military plnnning. Thecontinue to stress the military thought of Mao, and some Chinese military leaders have occasionally been criticized foralien (Soviet) military doctrine too closely. There also appears to beamaraderie between Soviet and Chinese military personnel.

Communist China's Dependence on the Soviet Onion. Communist China attaches greatts military alliance with the Soviet Union. The protection provided by the military alliance with the USSR0 enabled the Chinese Communist regime to set out upon its ambitious domestic programs with little fear of outside molestation. Lack-

'The formal basis lor military cooperation wasby the Treaty or Friendship, alliance and Mutual Assistance, ofhis treaty, which Is validrovides that if one of the parties should be "attacked by Japan or any state aUied with It. and thus be Involvedtate of war. the other contracting party shall Immediately render 'assistance with all means at Its disposal."


a nuclear strike capability of its own, Peiping obtains Increased foreign policyfrom Soviet possession ofnuclear weapons. China has reliedentirely on Soviet materiel to convert its primitive mass army9owerful semi modern army, backedizable jet air forceavy with morecore of medium and long-range submarines.deliveries from the USSR appear to have declined as Communist China has Increased its armament productionut Peiping Is still heavily dependent on the USSR for many items which are essential to the maintenance of its present militaryand to the further development of Its modernization program.

Nuclear Weapons and Missiles.China Is totally dependent upon the USSR for military support with nuclearand missiles. We believe it unlikely that the Soviets have stationed nuclear weapons in China, but even if they have, such weapons would almost certainly be held under strict Soviet custody. The USSR could give China nuclear weapons from its own stockpile, but it almost certainly has not done so. and we do not believe that the Soviets intend to do so within the foreseeable future. Similarly, we have no evidence that the USSR has equipped the Chinese with surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. There are indications,that the Chinese may have received some Soviet air-to-air missiles.

The USSR is aiding Communist China in basic nuclear research, but such aid does not appear U> include direct assistance Inmaterials production or nucleardevelopment. The Chinese aro currently dependent on the Soviets for supplies of slightly-enriched uranium and heavy water for the research reactor which the USSR made available to Peiping In the same

throughboutmillion in military dUlvtrlw to Chinannanctd by Sorirt toam Allnce hawaahand ihe Chinese hav* repaid over hall the amount loaned. Mom ol Uir materiel consumed In the Korean War was probably donated by ihe USSR, while China supplied the manpower. Seu also Annex C.

manner, the development of uranium mines and processing plants under way in China for several years isroduct of Sovietand technical assistance.

The USSR is almost certainly reluctant to see the Chinese Communists acquireweapons under their own control.the most important consideration to the Soviets Is that Chinese acquisitionuclear weapons capability would reduce SovietIn controlling Chinese independent action, particularly action which might Involve China in hostilities with the US. At the same time, the Chinese desire touclearcapability is very strong. Attainment ofinimal capability would not only greatly augment Chinese military andprestige throughout tho world,In Asia, but would also enlarge Chinese freedom of action In pursuing their national objectives.

We are unable to assess with confidence the impact of these fundamentally opposing interests upon the Sino-Soviet relationship. We do not believe that either party wishes to push Its own concernoint where this issue will irreparably damage theirOn the other hand, given the keyol the problem to both sides, this issue is almostource of friction. We believe that the Soviets aro deliberately moving slowly In assisting the Chinese toa nuclear weapons capability, while seek-lng to hold Chinese impatience and discontentevel consistent with the best interests of the Sino-Soviet relationship. At the same time, the USSR has probably given thegeneralized assurances of Sovietwith lis nuclear weapons capability.

Although we cannot estimate theofevelopment, it Is possible that the Soviets may decide to assuage the Chinese desireuclear weapons capability by providing the Chineseimple nuclear device and assisting them in detonating it. This would enable the Chinese to claim they haduclear capability anil togreat prestige benefitidelydetonation. Although this action would probably assist the Chinese somewhat




their nuclear weapons program, it would not, for the Soviets, run the risk of greatly accelerating the Chinese attainmentep-arate nuclear weapons capability. Such an arrangement might permit the Soviets to delay further in providing the more advanced assistance the Chinese would need touclear weapons capability.

Chinese attainment of the capability to detonate their own nuclear device In the near term, say within two or three years, restsentirety upon the nature ond extent of Sovietoviet aid continues at Itsapparent pace and character, the Chinese might attain the capability to detonate their own nuclear device byowever, if the Soviets have, in response to Chinese pressure,reat deal more aid than we haveuclear device of Chinese manufacture might beear or two earlier. Given direct Soviet supply ofand fissionable material, and assistance in fabrication of theuclearcould be produced In China at almost any time ui the immediate future. Even after the Chinese doevice, it would take them several additional years tomall stockpile of weapons, since they do not possess the requisite highly advanced scientific,and Industrial establishment

Disarmament. Test Bans, and Atom-Free Asia. The USSR's dramatic gestures toward unilateral reduction in armed forces have not been imitated by the Chinese. Peiping has praised the Soviet decision, but has defended its present force levels, and has made clear its belief that true disarmament Is Impossible prior to the universal triumph of communism. Proposals for an "atom-free zone forave also received occasional Chinesepropaganda support. That they areby the Chinese to be nothing more than propaKiinda is indicated by Peiping'sthat no treaty with the West can be meaningful.

'This Is the popular catch phrase for the Idea of ban nine all nuclear weapons, development, and producUon from Asia. It also has been presented as for "Asia and the whole PacificAsia andnd olhcr forms.

has stated that it favors theof nuclear testing and has givensupport to the Soviet position inban negotiations. If theseapproach agreement, we believewould make its adherencecertain demands on the West andon the Soviet Union. Peiping mightdemands soexample, onas UN seating, the TaiwanUS bases in the Farto makein Peiping's view, that theaccept them. On balance, however,that there would be priorand that the Chinese wouldas their major goal the sabotaging ofagainst Soviet wishes.

D. Economic Relations

The Economic Model. For the first few years of Its existence. Communist China closely followed the Soviet course of economic development and relied upon the advice of Soviet experts for the planning and direction of its own economic plans. Byowever, the Chinese Communists hadthat the Soviet model was not adequate to meet the conditions existing in China. During the next few years, therefore, and most dramaticallyhe Chineseeconomic policies that had noin Soviet practice and which, in some cases, dismayed the Soviets, Tho Chineseaccording to their ownconsist of three major policies: thethe "great leapndon two legs"ccompanying the rapid development of big industry with thedevelopment of vast numbers of small local plants and the use of simple equipment, and also the simultaneous development of agriculture andhese newwere added to, but not substituted for. the Soviet capital-intensive model.

Economy Benefits. Economicbetween Communist China and the USSR has been an important aspect of their rela-

tionshlp ever since the Peiping regime was Established. Both parties have benefited from Rhls cooperation, although the economic effect ran the Soviet Union has been much less than [that upon China. The Soviet Union hasa very small part of its industrialto China (never more than two percent) [in exchange for foodstuffs and industrial raw materials. Soviet importation of productshigh labor input In exchange for goods 'requiring low labor input has aided itshort economy.

Chinese gains from this exchange have been much greater. The Chinese havein all fields from support provided by Soviet technology and science. Soviet know-how in economic organization, finance,engineering, and in science has beenThe machinery and technicalreceived from the USSR and theEuropean Satellites in the past decade have been vital to Communist China'sprogram. Given theof Western materials, it would have been otherwise impossible for China to have achieved the extremely high rate of industrialercent annually) which weit attained. China's economic ties to the USSR and the Bloc are obviously strong.

The USSR has made available forbyajor Installations, valued at more than S3 billion. About one-half of these installations, which form the core of China's industrial development program have been completed and are now inoviet trade has been of particular value to China in that It has meant guaranteedof investment equipment, industrial raw materials, transport equipment, andproducts. Soviet support also has been extended in the form of modern technology, the services ot Soviet experts, and loans of3, of0 million was for economic development and the remainder primarily for military purchases.




ovlet economic relationship led in extremely business-like has at no time givenndeed. China has committed grants and credits to other it has received In economic USSR. Since Soviethina has paid for all its USSR with current exports, previous credits. China nnually shipped more goods,

by value, to the USSR than It has received

believe that the terms, and

possibly even (he level, of Soviet aid and trade

ts for Peiping. The Chinese

leaders probably find it difficult to look with

fairly sizable Soviet aid to neu-

tral states while China has had to deny itself

Table 1.




needed foodstuffs and other goods in order to pay for such Soviet aid as it receives.1*

he Chinese Communists have noof participating In any scheme forintegration, such as CEMA. which would gear their economy to that of the USSR and make Ultra more dependent on Moscow. To the contrary, they arc determined toas complete and autarkic an economy as possible, and. In view of the vast economic potential of China, they regard theof all major industries, ratherew. ns the more realistic policy. The Soviets appear to accept thisas proper for China at this time. It is probable, nonetheless, that specific aspects of economic cooperation and the exchange of goods and services within the Bloc havesome friction In Sino-Soviet economic relations.

E. Summary Analysis of llio Sino-Soviol Relationship

he nature of the Sino-Sovietcannot be described in simple terms. No single descriptive term characterizes theof the two Communist states toward one another or their Joint demeanor toward the rest of the world. The two countries do not, lo take an extreme example, conduct themselves as though theyolid, unitaryommunist monolith which disregards national boundaries and interests and pursues Leninist precepts in perfect They do not, at the oppositebehave in the manner of classical nineteenth century great powers, viewing their problems and their relationships strictly from the viewpoint of national interests.their relationshiposition somewhere between these poles and contains elements ot bolh The Communist Ideology

"In comparison with Soviet economic loan* lo Clilim0I0M, the USSItO has extended loans or grants, for economic development, it Stat million lo India. SU1to the UAH. and fill million lo Afghanistan. To dale, however, the uUllxeUon ol these Soviet offers has amounted only lo the following: India. million, theillion, andillion.

which pervades their relation* boththe urgent nationalism of the two countries and is in turn modified by national

he Sino-Soviet relationship also does not display uniform cohesion In all respects. Varying degrees of intimacy and cohesion are exhibited in the relations of the two powers in Ideological, foreign policy, economic, and military affairs. In economic matters, formple, the USSlt and China are pursuingerm programs which have among their goals the Industrialisation of China and the growth of Sino-Soviet economic strength. At the same time, the two countries transact the actual business of exchanging Sovietproducts for Chinese agricultural and mineral products on terms which closelytrade negotiations in the capitalist world In military affairs, the two powers have undertaken to modernize the Chinese military establishment and presumably seek to increase their combined power in support of the military alliance. Yet. the military relationship between the USSR andChina is nut as close as that between the US and its NATO allies. Moreover, in the keen Chinese desire touclear weapons capability theretrongfor disunity.

he Sino-Soviet relationship appears most solidly unified on matters of broadobjectives On the central core ofvieworld divided between capitalist-imperialist and soclalist-pioletarlat camps, the belief in the eventual triumph of communism everywhere, and the faith in Marx 1st-Lenin 1st preceptsasis forew humanand the USSR appear in firm agreement In the interpretation and application of these broad beliefs and concepts the twostales diverge in many respects, and. as they have demonstrated in recent months, they can on occasion disagree sharply and quite fundamentally. Paradoxically, the very Communist ideology which Joins the twotogether alsoource forand potential disunity.


the realm of foreign policy, relations between the two Communist powers display oninking lack of cohesion and uniform direction. They find in theirenmity to theingle point ofbut In their approach to the US and In other foreign relations, notably in dealing with influential neutral powers, theytake quite different paths. The actions of Communist China toward India andduring the past year clearlythe USSR and were unmistakably out of key with the tone of coexistence and detente the Soviet regime was then seeking toIt Is Impossible to advance any analysis of such behavior as the single correct one, but it appears most likely that the Chinese on these occasions were motivated more directly by considerations of their national interest than by concern for Bloc harmony and unity.

Divergences in foreign policy derive both from differing national Interests and fromdifferences between the two Communist states. The Chinese differ sharply with the Soviets as to the pace, vigor, and manner of combating the West; Peiping clearly disdains the slower, more subtle formulas ofSome lack of harmony also exists In the approach of the two Communist powers to the methods and short-term goals ofcommunism In neutral andcountries.

In sum, the Sino-Soviet partnership isonolithtructure of several kinds of relationships which vary in strength and intimacy and contain within themselvesof both cohesion and division. Though joined by Communist thought, theIs subject to many of the separatist forces that have traditionally confronted alliances and coalitions. The future of thiswill be determined by the interplay of these elements and the success of theleaders In containing conflicting forces

IV. PROSPECTS ve believe that the cohesive forces inino-Soviet relationship ore stronger thanivisive forces and aro likely to remain so

throughout the portod of this estimate at least, it is probable that for some time to come both the Soviet and Chinese leaders will value the alliance so highly that they will make strong efforts to keep discord from wrecking it. There willowerfulon each side to stop short of anyact which wouldermanent split.

The strongest of the cohesive forces! throughout this period willutualof the heavy damage to their national' interests and to the Communist causeubstantial impairment of the alliance would) inflict. The two partners will almostainly continue toommon hostility to the Westelief that through theireffort in advancing internationalthey can someday participate inthe world. Their relationship will also continue to find cohesion in the political, economic, and military advantages eachThis will have particular force for the Chinese who. in view of their continuing military and economic dependence on the USSR, will probably feel that they have no genuinely acceptable alternative totheir alliance with the Soviets.

Divisive forces will continue to be present, however, and may increase. The distinctcharacteristics and the disparatestages of the two states discussed in this estimate will continue to exert aforce. Judging from the experience of recent years, there will continue torend,omewhat uneven one, towardthe more arbitrary and stringentof Soviet society and institutions; the Chinese Communists, however, will still be in the throes of forcefullyastand social upheaval with all thetensions this entails. Communist China's relative weight in the Bloc is likely to grow over the next five years. This growth willthe leverage Moscow can bring to bear through Peiping's military and economicPeiping's foreign policy outlook will probably continue to be less flexible and more aggressive than Moscow's, and this will at times place heavy strains on the relationship. Peiping will be more inclined to pursue Its own interests and to question Soviet leadership than during the first decade of the alliance.


The future nature of the Sino-Sovietwill be shaped In part bywhich cannot be known at present: changes in Soviet or Chinese Communist leadership; the compulsions or restraints which developments within the USSR and China will exert on the respective leaderships; the strength and policies of the West; the opportunities which occur for the Communist movement throughout the world; and the failures and successes of various Communist ventures.

The interplay among these contingentand the broad forces of cohesion and division in the Sino-Soviet relationship will determine its precise future form. We do not rule out the possibility that the two powers may either coma to an open break orore fundamental integration of interests than now exists. We believe it much more likely, however, that there will be no fundamental reconciliation of differences, that discord will ebb and (low, and that substantial though not complete cooperation between Moscow and Peiping will continue. Complete unity appears inherently improbable between two centers of vigorous Communist authority and national pride, each backed by so much power as to make It difficult for either one to impose its will on the other and each having strong reasons for continuing to hold its own views. At the same time, such discord isto force the USSR and Communist China so far apart that they cease to look to each other for support in their common drive against the West

The tensions Inherent In the Sino-Soviet relationship could eventually leadasic reformation of the structure of the Bloc. It

I is even possible that the Sino-Soviet relationhip will begin to take on more of theraditional alliance between twonation-states, perhaps extending to theelopment of tacitly acknowledged spheresnfluence. In any event, over the next five years the growing duality of power in the Bloc will become Increasingly Incompatible with present Bloc structure which has been basedingle source of authority. onsequence, quick nnd fffectiveof policy against the West may become

more difficult. Moscow may face difficulties in successfully denying its European allies an increased measure of authority and initiative and in preventing satellite officials fromto use Sino-Soviet differences as leverage against Moscow. The cohesion of the world Communist movement may sufferesult of confusing and at timescounsel from both Moscow and Peiping and of probable Chinese attempts to Increase its influence In the guidance of otherparlies

he interplay of Sino-Soviet differences may well have an important effect on Bloc policies toward the West. Elsewhere we have estimated that the Soviets are likely, during the next few years, to mingle elements of accommodation and of pressure In theirpolicy. The Chinese will seek to mmirnlxc the former and maximize the latter. This tendency will be particularly strong in matters directly related to Communist China'sinterests, especially those concerning the Taiwan question and Peiping's position in the international community. We do not believe that their efforts will decide the course of Soviet policy, but they will influence it. The Soviets will not be quite as free to reach agreements With the US, if Ihey wish to do so, as they would be if they wore not allied to the Chinese Moreover, Chinese Communist pressure may at times cause the Soviets toore militant course toward the West than the Soviets would otherwise choose on tactical grounds.

ince the Sino-Soviet alliance Is aand evolving relationship. It oilersfor favorable as well as unfavorable developments from the US point of view. Stresses and strains weaken the hostileand possibly can be exploited to the advantage of the West. Public manifestations of Sino-Soviet disagreement damage theof Communist unity and diminish, to some degree, the forward thrust of worldNevertheless, despite theseconsiderations, the threat which the Sino-Soviet allies pose to US security and US interests is of great dimensions, and wethat it is more likely to increase than to diminish during the period of Ihls estimate



annex a

the impact of soviet trade and technical assistance on communist china's economy

During the pastears, actual Soviet deliveries to Communist China of complete installations and other capital equipment have amounted in value to more thanillion.eries of agreements negotiated0 the USSR has agreed to provide China with complete installationsajorwhich form the core of China'sprogram These projects include complete sets of factory equipment for the large, modem.arge petroleum refinery, aircraft and truck factories, and machine-buildingelectric power installations, which form the core of the Chinese Industrial development program. About one-half of thesehave been placed in full or partialBy importing complete factories from the USSR, China haselatively standardized basic plant and has gained the advantage of integrated planning by experts who arc familiar with the demands of aplanned economy. These are not "aid" projects in the sense of economic grants, but they have helped China's industrial growth greatly by providing long-range guaranteed deliveries and by providing ready availability of modern Soviet technology and the services of Soviet experts who have supplied necessary guidance in all phases of plant construction and Initial operation. The Soviet role Inthese projects was especiallyduring the First Five-Year.

2 The Chinese now claim to be more capable of coping independently with the building of modem industrial plants, and perform much of the planning and construction work on aid projects formerly done by Soviet experts. As the Chinese advance In technical competence, however, they are attempting more complex types ofelectronics equipment, and steel-makingSoviet assistance continues to beuch higher technical level.

Soviet "aid" has taken various forms. The USSR loaned China3. of0 million was for economic development and the remainder primarily for military purchases. The credits had been almost fully utilized5 and China now has repaid about two-thirds of the totalA vast amount of Soviet technical data appears to have been made available free of charge over the past decade. The USSR has sent technicians and equipment which were in some cases in short supply at home. It has also coordinated its shipments with China's development programs and has been willing to make economic commitments years In advance.

China has also benefited from the extensive economic relations it has formed with the Eastern European Satellites, particularlyEast Germany, and Czechoslovakia. Agreements have been negotiated with certain of these countries calling for technicaland equipment for the construction In China of atrge industrialabout two-thirds of which have been finished and placed In operation. Including these projects, the total value of machinery and equipment paid for and received by Chinarom the European Satellites was7 billion,f China's imports of these Items from all sources.



lor the First Five-Year Planthat the joint projects involvingequipment and technicians, butmaterials, equipment, and labor,lorercent of all stateindustry during that period. InChina investedillion yuan"projects during the Firstoutotal industrial investmentofillion yuan.

original Second Five-Year Planwhich continued the emphasis onindustry and on the Soviet-assistedconstruction projects, probablyon the assumption that thestate industrial investment inprojects would be maintained atlevel of the First Five-Year Plan.forward drive, however, which greatlyinvestment in small-scaleindustries, has radically changedof investment. Thend in0 planthat industrial investment duringFive-Year Plan may be twice asoriginallyinsteaduan. Meanwhile, investment inprojects, even though it seems toexpanded, probably will notillion yuan. According to theseproportion of investment into total Industrial investment will

"This figure includes tho value of the Investment goods Imported from the ussr for these projects.

decline fromercent during the First Five-Year Plan lo aboutoercent durine Ihe Second.

Vor theoviet, assisted projects, China imports from theubstantial additional amount ofequipment and other items forplanus not included in the assistance agreements. Also vital to the running ofeconomy are imports of Soviet industrial raw materials, transport equipment, and petroleum products."

etroleum products from the USSR areimportance, for evenhina's domestic production wasmeel only about half of itsmore thanercent of its totalobtained from the USSR. Outillion tons of crude oilpetroleum productsand other fuels and lubricants foruses may have comprised about 1For these products China is stilldependent upon foreign supplies.of considerable growth in domesticof crude oil and in domesticeajiVluf in years'

China's demand is growing so rapidly that annual petroleum imjiorts are expected to rise loillion tonsmports will continue to consist mainly or refinedproductsizable quantity of military fuels.

ommodity breakdown of Sino-SovietCM95B. see Table 2.





including such categories as chemicals, building materials, pharmaceuticals, and cultural andgoods.

'Representing the value of goods not listed by Soviet sources and believed to be primarily of military and strategic origin.



Haw materials ol agricultural origin


Raw materials of animal origin

Nonleirous and alloy metals

Textile raw


Miscellaneous' ..

data contained In this table are fromxcept where otherwise Indicated.

Includes industrial goods. Industrial raw materials, chemicals and rubber, and cultural ana consumer goods.



trend toward greater Chinese self-sufficiency is also characterized by the growth of the Chinese machine-building industry. Although China must continue to rely entirely on imports for some types of machines, it officially claims that It is now able to fulfill from internal production aboutercent of its overall requirements for machinery, as corn-paredroduction rate during the First Five-Ycar Plan which met onlyercent of such requirements. This advance has not been uniform in all lines of production,and much of the additional machinery produced In China has been of simple types, for example, irrigation pumps for agriculture, or simple equipment for small factories.

The impact of Soviet equipment onChina's economy has been greatlyby the employmentarge number of Soviet experts, most of wliom have been on Chinese Communist payrolls or included in the cost of the Soviet assistance to major aid projects. By90 Soviet economic and technical exports reportedly had worked in China at one time or another. These experts have included not only top-notch Soviet Industrial specialists but alsoadvisers who have helped formulate economic planning in all sectors in the Chinese economy. In the past two or three years the number of Soviet technicians has dwindled, and the remaining technicians are mostly in the background as technical advisers and trouble shooters rather than as managers and operating engineers. Another mechanism for transmitting Soviet technology to Communist China has been the training program forstudents in the USSR8 China reportedly had0 students to the Soviet Union for study0 Individuals to Soviet Industrial establishments for on-the-job training. Most of those receiving practical training were assigned to plants similar to ones under construction In China, to prepare them for serving as the Initial group of skilled workmen and technicians in newly completed Chinese factories,

lthough less tangible than technicalIn the form of expert advice and training, Soviet transfers of tcchnlcolhave been of considerable importance in the Industrialisation program ofChina. Under the Slno-Soviet Scientific and Technical Cooperation Agreementhe USSR has provided China with blueprints for the constructioninds of factories and enterprises, designsets of machinery and equipment, andinformation on production processes. Additional agreements for further technical cooperation were negotiated8or application during the Second Five-Ycar. Knowledge and datain this manner from the USSR have been useful to China even on projects with which the USSR has not been involved.


annex b

sino-soviet scientific and technological relations

and Nature of Communis!on the Bloc

China is capable, withoutforeign aid, of graduallyscientific and technologicala small group of very ablewho have access to thein their fields. To reach worldeffortignificant numberhe Chinese would requireoutside aid, particularly intraining. The dependence athowever, is for the most part allevels. Aid is required, fororganizing the nationalesearch program,the latest in scientific know-howproblems quickly, furnishingresearch, and training new made, personnel atscholastic and scientific levels willThis pattern has been followedcountries and is not new. To date,have requested aid from theand other Bloc countries in aof fields and have received aid inof them. The Chinese also haveWestern technological developmentsuse of them as far as practicable.

Scole, Nature, and TermsAssistance

he Soviets had largelyChinese need for organization,undergraduate education. Most ofwasractical level with littlein research and development.furnished up to this time wereteachers, short-term lecturers, advisors.

and industrial types Startingew hundred researchers began to work jointly with Chinese scientists in China for periods of several monthsear or two.

Sinceear protocol was signed under the Sino-Soviet Scientific and Technical Agreementoviet aid has stepped up. This protocol clarified Sino-Soviet relations in research and development and the training of scientists, forrograms were to be carried out jointly or with Soviet assistance to supportyear Plan for ScientificWe believe some of this work alsothe Soviet research program.

Connected with8 step-up was an agreement made in7 between the academies of the two countries whichfor direct communications, jointand expeditions, and coordination of work in important problems of science and technology. Similar agreements werein8 between the academies of agricultural sciences o! the two countries and between Ihe ministries concerned with higher education. Thesecarwith executive plans to be made yearly. The agreements were associated with thementioned above. Hesenrch andand training In all fields and allagencies of government werein these documents.

Training In the Soviet Union is one of the most important ways that the Soviet Union is aiding China. Training in China has not progressed well andandful ofnew scientists has been produced in China. The growth of qualified scientists in China has come almost entirely from those returning


graduate study in the Soviet Union (other thanr more who returned from the US and Europe after the Communistostgraduate training began to receive increased emphasis startingnd,olicy was adopted whereby only graduate students would be sent abroad. With this new policy, the number sent each year is believed to have dropped fromnd over58ew hundred per year. The number studying In the Soviet Union appears to be declining, but the level of study is rising. There are probablyhinese currently studying In the Soviet Union, mostly in scientific and technical fields.

he expenses of Soviet exports who stay In China up to three months reportedly are paid by the Soviet Union; those who stay up to six months have their travel paid by China; and those who stay longer have both salaries and expenses paid by China. It is believed that the expenses of Chinese students in the

Soviet Union are borne by China. Scientific apparatus and instruments are also paid for;his trade item wasillion yuan.

c Net Worth lo tho USSR

enefits to the Soviet Union are not obvious,umber of Chinese researchers and graduate students working In Soviet research institutions have contributed to the overall research and development output in the USSR. Some research done In Chinaew fields Is probablyevel that would be of Interest and value to Soviet scientists. Close contact with China's research and development has given the Soviet Union an opportunity to keep Informed on China's progress and prospects. The Soviet access to the geographical area of China gives some advantage to the Soviet Union In such fields as satellite tracking also derive from this access.



annex c

communist china's military dependence on the ussr

Ground Forces

Equipment. Communist China'supon the USSR for equipment has progressively lessened over the lastears. Nevertheless, China is still dependent upon the Soviet Union for many types offor its armed forces.

At the time of the Korean War,China was making mainly infantryand ammunition. The USSR supplied armor, artillery, ammunition, and vehiclesarge scale, although Communist China was alsoariety of captured Japanese and US weapons. Shortly after the end of the Korean War, Communist China decided tounitions industry with Soviet aid and geared to the production of Soviet-type weapons Since then, China has gradually expanded its production to include Soviet-type artillery and artillery ammunition, medium trucks, the new type Soviet small arms and ammunition, and. most recently, medium tanks. It is believed that Communist China now produces enough of these Items to supply the current peacetime replacementof its armed forces. For all other items of equipment, especially heavy armor. speciali7ed artillery, some kinds of complex signal and electronic equipment, and aof trucks and special purpose vehicles. Communist China Is completely dependent upon the USSR or other members of the bloc.

The quantities of equipment which may have been sent to China arc unknown.sufficient equipment has been identified in the hands of troops to indicate that these shipments have been substantial. Little Is known of the possible stockpiles of equipment in Communist China, but it is probable that if stockpiles exist thai they consist primarily of Soviet items. Estimated production of military items In Communist China Indicates that output would hardly have been sufficient for the accumulation of stockpiles Also, during the heavy Chinmen shelling, theammunition which was recovered and analyzed was mainly of Soviet manufacture, which suggests that ammunition stocks are certainly of Soviet origin.

In the last few years, the nature of Soviet assistance to Communist China has shifted. Instead of supplying mainly finished military equipment and supplies, the USSR Is now clilefly providing technical aid and Industrial facilities for munitionshis means. China has been able toairly extensive number of up-to-date weapons. More importantly, theseplants provide the base which can be expanded so that Communist China will ultimately become self-sufficient in tho output of many types of military equipment,

But for the present, and for some years to come, Communist China's ability toits forces with items of its own production will be very limited. At current estimated production rates, for example, ofasic item of equipment as4 tank. It will be five years before4 tanks nowto units in the armored divisions and tank regiments of infantry divisions can be replaced, even at the modest levels nowIn the current TE."

China docs not now have and Is not likely to haveumber ofomestic capability to meet all of its requirements at wartime consumption levels for conventional weapons and the more complex types of radar and electronic equipment now essentialodern ground force. The Chinese, even in peacetime, are dependent on the Soviets to


replacements and spare parts lor many weapons now in use. and must rely on the Soviets for much of their communications equipment, radar, and early warning devices.


Chinese Communist ground forces dwarf all non-Communist Asian military forces, but the level of equipment of the Chinese forces is still far short of advanced modernFor example, in the Soviet tankthere are more than eight times the number of tanks in the Chinese armoredin the tank regiments of infantrythe Soviets are over twice as strong as the numbers of tanks. Thehaveimes more tanks than theand most of them are larger and newer models.

Thus, evenonnuclear war, the time is not in sight when the Chinese Communists will be able to sustain majorodern armed force without substantial quantities of additional Soviet weapons and equipment. The Chinese will also need help in meeting their increasing POL requirements.

The lackajor military research and development program will further extend the time before Communist China will achieve "militaryhe Chinese haveapability to makeon blueprints and plans of the relatively simple military equipment they arc nowbut seem not yet to haveany serious program of research and developmentruly "Chinese" weapons system, or of native Chinese support equip-


raining. The Soviets have made acontribution to the Chinesearmed force strength by permitting them lo attend Soviet training schools and through the Soviet advisory program in China. Here again, limited data indicate that the Soviets are withdrawing some of their personnel from lower units, probably because the Chinese can run their own training programs for their current organizations and weapons.the Chinese undoubtedly realize theof continuing to send as manyas possible to advanced Soviet schools to prepare for further modernization of their


The Chinese Communiststo support their effort In Koreaa large-scale Soviet logistics effort,considerable work and progress,of the Chinese Communistremains basically found In the transportationlimited capacity and itsinterdiction, In the logisticalwhich provides this service toforces, and In the lack ofspare parts. POL, and otherto permit the Chineseto engage in modern dependent on the Soviet Unionsupport in any militaryan enemy which included amilitary force

B. Air Forces

Communist China Is today heavilyupon the Soviet Union for aircraft, air weapons, air logistic Items, electronic equipment, and training; and It is likely to remain soong time to come. As China lacks the two essential ingredientsong-range strike power (nuclear weapons and long-range deliveryt mustrely upon Soviet capabilities. Into this dependence, China must also rely upon its Soviet ally for the maintenance and further development of the defensive and offensive air capability it now has In being.

Today, Communist China's aircrafttotals mureircraft inunits includingetandet light bombers. The great bulk of these aircraft has been supplied to China by the Soviet Union. This aidconstitutes the major directcontribution to Communist China'smilitary power. In addition to thisthe Soviets have also helped theChinese to establish facilities for the local production of Soviet-designed aircraft. The Chinese Communists began seriesof Soviet-designed fighters (FHESCO-


nd utility aircraft7 and have been producing helicoptersn series since the falleries production or FARMERSas probably recently begun. Sovietof this production has been extensive, but has decreased from initial levels as the Chinese have been able to supply more and more ol the raw materials, components, and qualified personnel required in production. While this trend is likely to continue, it Is probable that the Chinese Communists will have to depend on the USSR to supplycomponents for these aircraft for some time to come.

ommunist China remains heavilyon the Soviet Union for air logistic items. While Peiping's overall dependence on tbe USSR for air logistic materials hasmoderatelyhe volume of its imports has Increased substantiallyesult of increases in Communist China'sInventory. At present, it is estimated that China must depend upon the USSR for approximatelyercent of Its total airrcquirempnlA. China is particularlyon the USSR for the higher grade petroleum products required for its air forces. It Is believed that all such products,all aviation fuels, are now imported from the USSR and European Bloc countries. Even with the expected improvements in China's petroleum industry, Peiping will probably continue to rely on the USSR for the major portion of these petroleum products for some time. Thus China's military air capability will continue to be directly dependent upon the Soviet supply line.

oviet training assistance has Included both extensive supervisory and materieland has resulted in the development of an air training establishment In China closely patterned after that of the Soviet air forces. At the time of the Koreanarge number of Soviet advisors and instructors werethroughout the Chinese Communist Air Force. Since that time, the number of Soviet personnel assigned in China hasdecreasedew still remain In an advisory capacity Today the Chinesearc capuble of meeting most of their annual training requirements through their own resources and probably rely upon the Soviets only for advanced technical equipment

and for the training of highly skilled

C. Naval Forces

ateriel Assistance. Only through the extrnsive assistance of the Soviet Navy has the rapid development of the ChineseNavy (CCN) been possible, and chips transferred from the USSR" and thosein China from largely Soviet-supplied components" today provide the principal combat potential of the navy. Most CCN naval materiel, especially ordnance,and propulsion machinery, and petroleum products, has also originated In the USSR. Much recent Soviet technical assistance has been directed toward the establishment of programs for local Chinese production of naval equipment

oviet Naval Advisory Mission. Equally important assistance In the development of the CCN has been furnished by the Soviet Naval Advisory Mission. This mission was Instituted to Impart Soviet naval experience, methods, and technical skills to the Chinese. It consists of the Soviet Advisory Section at NavalPeiping. andetwork ofattached to every major subordinate command or installation. Initially set up in

this network became so extensive as to include every ship and tactical organization in the navy. It is estimated that by about

upwardsoviets were assigned to various naval missions with the CCN. witherving with the Soviet Advisory Section in Peiping. Gradually, ns the CCN developed and gained practical operatingthe number of Soviet advisors was reduced. At Ihe present time, the number probably does not; the advisory section In Peiping has been reduced to aboutersons with then duty with the fleet and district commands, the naval academy at Dairen, and specialized training commands.



or psychological reasons the Soviet Naval Advisory Mission is integrated Into the CCN organization so as to cloak even the slightest outward appearance of Soviet control orMost of the personnel wear civilian clothing or CCN uniforms without badges or rank insignia. Relations between the Chinese and their Soviet advisors are generallyas "polite" with little evidence ofethnic friction on any level. Customarily the local Soviet advisors give specific advice only when It is requested. They do. however, make periodic reports to the head of theAdvisory Section, Peiping, who in turn can recomtrfend general remedial measures to the national CCN high command. TheNaval Advisory Mission not only provides beneficial guidance to the CCN but alsothe Soviet Navy to evaluate adequately the professional competence of its Far Eastern ally.

umerous other Soviet personnel have been provided to the Chinese to give technical guidance in the establishment of shipbuilding prog rami. Additional technicians have been sent to Instruct the Chinese in the proper operation and maintenance of modern naval equipment.

During the earliernof the CCN large numbersofficers were sent to the USSRand specialized naval schoolingof senior naval officers are stillannually to the Order of Leninat Leningrad for command andA limited number of juniorenlisted personnel arc enrolled eachspecialized technical training atSoviet naval schools in theand in the Vladivostok-Nakhodka

addition to technical and materielIn developing the CCN, the USSRseveral measures which haveprestige of Chinaewhe USSR ceded Kuan-tungPeninsula) to China,Its important naval and industrialof Port Arlhur-Diilren. Port Arthurbecome one of the two largest basesCCN. In the summer6 theFleet made an official visit tofirst visit of foreign warships tosince Ihe defeat of the ChineseTo date the Chinesenot paid the customary return visit





Small Arm.i

m Pistol, lypeCopy of So* 0

m CarMnr. typeCopy of

m 8MO.Copy of Sot

m Ugni MO. lypeCopy of SOv

m Heavy MO. typeopy of Sot LM0

lz.7mm Heavy MO, lypeCopy of


82mm (Copy of Ssv

12Cmm (Copy ofmm

m (Copy of flov

Reroillrss Rifles

*7mro. typeCopy of US MlBi Production ceased al end7

75mm. typeCopy of US MM)

Roc lee: Launchers

OGinm. typflCopy of) Production ceased a: end oftype lOO


37mm AA gun. lypeCopy of So*

57mm AT eun. typeCopy of So*


im How (CopyI93B)

m How (Copy Ol Sov


OOl Medium (Cnpy of So*

Trucks 0



Artillery and on rounds








Fld/AT Gun










AA Gun


AA Gun

AA Gun

AA Gun


Rkl Lnclir .

Rkl Lnchr



China .

Tk. JS-2



Gun. JSU-1S2










N on operational

Non operational






.. 17



dditional units underor fitting out.

rogram terminated withof 4th unit

terminated with launch-

ing of ISth unit

under Still under construction.

construction program started in Communist China




of Imports, Exports, and Trade Balances of Communist China with the USSR

as reported by the


(Fiom Chjno)

fcaianfl i


iw sovst

IOtai ivaoi








: ii


(To Chino)


m i

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: