CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK THROUGH
Submitted by tbe DIRECTOR OK CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following inWltgenee organUatton* participated in the preparation of this estimate The Central Intelligence Agency and the tnteOigence wjanWfMwepartments ol State the Army, tha Navy, the An forte. The Joint Staff, and HSA
i.' and Hesea
y the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD' he Director ol tntelll-
the Assistant Chttl
ol Slaff lor Intelligence, Department of the Army; theChief of Naval Operations for Intelligence. Depart-mental the Naoy; the Assistant Chiel of Staff, Inielligence. USAT; thc Director lor Intelligence, The Joint Staff, thato the Secretary of Defense. Special Opt rations- the Director of the Motional Securily Agency; ant the Atomic energy Connlukn Represmtatue lo the USIB TheDirector, Federal Bureau ol Investigation, abstained, the subject being ouUide of hu Jurisdiction.
This esUmst* was approved by the USIB on0 iubjeet to certain lurther action3 representatives (consulting ej necessary with their renpretlve. Humince this latter action wan completedhould be considered Anallyby USIB aa ol thattem li
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I. Thb estimate was disseminated by lhe Central Intelligence AE*?ncv. Thisor thend use o* the recipient and oi person* untkr hiteed to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorisedollowing officials within their respective departments.
n-tor of Intelligence and Research, for Ihe Denarlment ol 8'aio
Chief cf Staff for imeHigence. Department of the Army
Chief of Naval Operations foi Indulgence, for th* IX-part mi .tNavy
of Intelligence. USAF. for the Depjrtment of the AirDirector for Intelligence. Joint Staff, for thi* Joint SUIT
f. Director of Intelligence, AEC. for thc Atomic Energyssistant Director, FBI. for the Federal Bureau of Investigation h. Assistant to the Secretary ol Defense, Special Operations, for the Department of Defense
I. Director of NSA for the National Security Ajy-ncy
J. Assistant Director for Central Kefeiencc. CIA, for any other Department or Agency
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he title of tills estimate when used separately Irom th* text, should br classified CONFIUI.MIAL
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SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK THROUGH
To estimate probable trends in the strength and deployment of Soviet air and missile weapon systems suitable for long range attack, throughhe weapon systems considered are heavy and medium bombers, related air-to-surfacc missiles, ground-launched missiles with rangesautical miles or more, and submarine-launched missiles.
Since the adoption of, "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack Throughe have made an extensiveof all available evidence bearing on Soviet production and deployment of ICBMs. The conclusions resulting from this re-examination are, in brief
a Soviet scries production of ICBMs probably began inut we have no direct evidence of the present or planned future rate of production.13
1 Series production means production of missiles OT Ilk* type In accordancelanned buildup rate. The date of commencement ot seriesIs deflned as lhe dale of completion of the first missile In the serlu.
Assistant Chief or Staff for Inielligence,of the Army, believes that there is no evidence lo Indicate that ICDMs have beenIn the Soviet Union In numbers larger than are required by theeUvl-tws. He therefore believes that this conclusion Is misleading In that It may be Interpreted to ImplyRMs for operaUonal deployment or Inventory started to become available In Wt. See his footnote to paragraph.
yet, we can identify notroop training activities, norpositively identify anysite, as distinguished fromtest range facilities.
stillovietoperational capabilityseries produced missiles as of
there is insufficient directto establish thc scale and pace of
'The Assislant Chief of staff for Intelligence.ot the Army, believes that as Ofhe Soviets had only an emergencytoew ICBMs against North America These ICBMs probably xould have had to have been launched from RAD faclUUes However, he believes that, for planning purposes, it is prudent to assume that thc IOC had oceurredanuary IBM.
Assislant Chief of Naval Operations forDepartment of the Navy, believes that there Is Insufficient information to judge lhat. asO. the conditions fee IOC (that ts. the date al which aICDMs could have been placed In the hands of one or more trained units at existing launching fndtilies) had been met
present Soviet ICBM production and deploymente have based our estimate in part on various indirect forms of evidence and on argument and analysis deduced from more generalThese latter Include such things as thc strategic ideas which appear to govern Soviet military policy, ourof the strategic capabilities which Soviet military planners might expect to derive from given numbers of ICBMs, our general knowledge of Soviet militarypractices, and our sense of the tempo at which the present program is being conducted.
he Soviets have strong incentives toubstantial ICBM force. The ICBM provides them for the first time with an efficient means ofeavy weight of attack on the US. What we know of Soviet strategic ideasthat the ICBM is thought ofin terms of deterrence, and ofor retaliatory attack shouldfail, rather than primarily in terms of the deliberate initiation ofwar. These terms, however, provide
"The Assistant enter ot Starr tot intelligence.of the Army, believes that the direct evidence upon which to base an estimate of prro-ent Soviet ICBM strength Is of major significance He believes that much of this evidencenegative IndlcaUons and, therefore, that Its rejection as insufficient leads to unrealistic over-estimation. See his footnote to paragraph is.
'The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAT, doe* not concur Inndielhat Soviet military doctrine, history, and behavior warrant the Judgment that the USSRstrive toapability foe decision which has as lis basis the exploitation orof military force, and he doe* not believe that the Soviets would be content with conceptual leveli of pre ernptivc attack and deterrence Thus, he believes that the Soviet rulers would
no quantitative definition of Soviet ICBM force goals.'
s an approach to an appreciation of Soviet ICBM requirements, we havethe numbers of Soviet ICBMs on launchers theoretically required for an initial salvo designed to inflict severe damage on SAC bomber bases and other installations directly related toUS nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Uncertainty regarding the inputs, and the sensitivity of the computations toin the assumptions made withto them, render the numericaltoo various toeliable basis for estimating Soviet ICBM force goals. Moreover, regardless of the results of any corresponding Soviet calculations, there arc operational factors (such as Soviet problems in achieving simultaneity of salvo, and the mobility of US retaliatory forces) which would tend to reduce their confidence in their ability, with any given number of ICBMs, to destroy orUS retaliatory forces through attack on fixed installations such as bomber, includingnotes to, and Annex A)
endeavor toilitary superiority over tlie US and would direct Soviet planners to assess those military requirements whkh would enable them cither to force their will on the U8 through Ihieat of destruction or to launch such aallacK that the USorld power would NM to exist.
'The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, believes that operational considerations which extend beyond theof the number of ICBMs required tosevere damage on certain staUe targets would prohibit Soviet military planners fromwith confidence any calculationertain number of ICBMs would be sufficient. In conjunction with the operation* of olher Soviet forces, to reduce the weightS retaliatory attack lo an acceptable Mai See his footnote to
e have also examined the tasks and problems involved in the production and deployment of ICBMs through theof three illustrative SovietThey represent the range of judgments, based on the direct andevidence available to us, regarding
the scale and tempo of Soviet effort These illustrative programs arein the chart below, in terms of the numbers of operational ICBM launchers1 which each would provide., and Annex B)
With reference to the illustrativepresented above, the members of the United States Intelligence Board have concluded as follows: *
a. The Director of Central Intelligence considers that program "A" should be re-
The number ot launchersood measure or the amount of activity involvediven ICDM program, since It Includes all of thc facilities, in addition to the missiles themselves, which arc necessary to thc operational weapon system.are ground guidance facilities; test,and maintenance equipment; fueling and Storage facilities; and housing and generalequipment.
garded as the nearest approximation of the actual Soviet program.
Assistant Chief of Staff,USAF, believes that programthe most likely Soviet
Director of Intelligence andDepartment of State, theto the Secretary of Defense,and the Director forThe Joint Staff,he Soviet program is likely
ore extended expression ot some of these views, see footnotes to paragraph O.
fall towards the high side of the range defined by illustrative programs "A" andnd, in the light of factors discussed in paragraphhey consider that ineriod it will continue to grow within the" range.
d. The Assistant Chief of Staff forDepartment of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believe that illustrative program "C" most nearly approximates the actual Soviet program.
It is notable that the potential threat posed by programs "A" and "B" isthe samethe end of the year, either woulda capability to inflict massiveon the principal USareas. At the beginningither would provide sufficient ICBMs and launchers to threaten the SACair base system. Thereafter, the threat posed by program "B" wouldmore rapidly than that of programy aboutrogram "B" would provide Soviet plannersigh assurance of being able to severelymost of the SAC air base system in an initial salvo, whereas program "A" would reach this point late in the year. The considerably smaller program "C" wouldapability to inflict massiveon the principal USareas sometime
The present Soviet ICBM program is, of course, subject to change as the period progresses. Soviet planning for1 will be substantiallyby the actual development of US retaliatory forces, the prospectsreatly improved Soviet ICBM, and the
prospects, on each side, for an effective defense against ICBMs, as well as thcdevelopment of the world situation and of relations between the US and the USSR. Our estimates for future years must be reviewed In tbe light of suchand of such additionalas we may obtain regarding the actual progress of Uie Soviet program. They must therefore be regarded as highly tentative. For these reasons, wc have not projectedentative
continue to estimate that withmodest programsndballistic missiles the Soviets0orce ofmissiles capable of seriouslythc major Western landbasedtargets within
estimate that the USSR now hascapability to launch ballisticfromozen long range,submarines.will probably increase thisover the next year oreapon systemdelivering ballistic missilesubmergedsubmarine. While woSoviets would employmissiles against selectedtheir planning does notcontemplate delivery of thcof an attack by
-The Aulstant Chief ot Staff, Intelligence, USAF. believes that, despite the difficulties engendered by consideration o( the factors enumerated, an cstimaU beyondan be made, lie believes that, lacking contradictory information, the lalen of Increase shown In program "ll" should be conUnued through IMS.
he announced Soviet forcewill probably bring some reduction in Long Range Avialion strength, but5 the USSR will probably stillubstantial bomber force. Evenormidable ICBM capability has beenthe USSR will require long range bombersariety of purposes, including attacks on difficult land targets, reconnaissance, and operations against carrier task forces at sea. Air-to-surface missiles will be available in increasing quantity. Tlic Soviets will probably in-
ew medium bomber capable of supersonicnd we estimate that they areong range,cruise-type vehicle, but BISONs and BADGERs will remain the most numerous of Soviet long range aerodynamic delivery vehicles. )
ur numerical estimates of Soviet heavy and medium bombers in Long Range Aviation, medium range ballistic missiles, and missile-launchingarc set forth in the following table:
and Tankers "
ew new supersonic -dash- bombersuilding up loyH.
" class submarine would probably carry iwo missiles. Each "O" class submarine would probably carry about six missiles. Each nuclear-powered submarine would probably3 missiles.
1 The Assistant Chief Of Staff,believes that the numbersandhould read:
Bombers and Tankers
" Probablyew new supersonic "daih" bombersuilding up ton mid-IMS.
"Tho Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, believes that each operaUonal mlMlle would be providedauncher
INTERCONTINENTAL BALUSTIC MISSILES
n the five months since the adoption ofc have gained some newand have made an extensiveof all available evidence bearing on the Soviet production and deployment of ICBMs. The conclusions resulting from thisare. in brief:
scries production of ICBMsbegan earlyhe Increasedof ICBMs has been reflected in anrate of firings at the ICBMM
have no direct evidence of theplanned future rule of Soviet ICBM
c As yet. we have not identified any ICBM-rclated troop training activities.
d. As yet, we have not positively identified any operational ICBM unit or. launchingin the USSU, as distinguished from the known test range facilities.
"Series reduction means production of missiles of like type In accordancelanned buildup rate. The dale of commencement of seriesIs defined aa the date of completion of the first missile In the series.
The Assistant Chief or Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, believes that thisIs misleading In that It Is used in this esU-mateasis for the construction ofICBM deployment programs largely based on assumed rates of missile producUon. There Is no evidence to Indicate that ICBMs have been produced in the Soviet Union In numbers larger than are required by the continuing research and development acUvlUea. Hc docs not believe that the moderate Increase In test firings Justifies the implication that ICBMs foe operationalot Inventory started to become available
In any case, he agrees with the Judgmentsimplicitly In paragraphhat thcof missiles Is not the critical factor In the establishment of an operational capability, and hc believes (hat estimates of operational ICBM capabilities which are based primarily on such noncritlcal factor! aa an estimated date of Initiation of series production and the IOC dato arrived at for planning purposes arc unrealistic and dangerously misleading.
f. as we estimate. Soviet series production ol ICBMs began earlyelivery' of series produced missiles to operational units could have been underway during the latter part of that year. In thc establishment of ancapability, however, the critical factors are the training of troops and the provision of operational launching facilities. Some troop training could have been accomplished at the ICBM test range. It is unlikely, however,ajor training program could or would be conducted on the research and development facilities thcre.P
^Our inability, as yet, to identity any operational ICBM launching facilities in thc USSR does not prove that none exists. Thc evidence neither confirms nor denies our estimate in, but it docs put in question whether launching facilities are now being establishedate commensurate with that estimate. We continue to estimate ainitial ICBM operational capabilityeries produced missiles as" "
ince there is insufficient direct evidence to establish thc scale and pace of the present Soviet ICBM production and deployment pro-
"The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations forDepartment of Uie Navy, believes that there Is Insufficient InformaUon to Judge that as0 the conditions for IOC (that Is, thc date al which aproduced ICBMs could have been placed In the hands of one or more trained units at existing launching facilities) had been met.
-Thc Assistant Chief ot Staff forof the Army, wishes to restate hiswith respect to the Soviet ICBM IOC date. He believes Uiat as0 the Soviets had an emergency capability loew ICBMS aealnst North America, but that these ICBMs probably would have had to have been launchedacilities. However, hc believes Ihat for planning purposes, it Is prudent to assume that the IOC had occurred.
e have based our estimatert on various Indirect forms or evidence and onand analysis proceeding by deduction from more general considerations. These latter Include such things as the strategic Ideas which appear to govern Soviet military policy, our appreciation of the strategicwhich Soviet military planners might expect to derive from given numbers of ICBMs. our general knowledge of Soviet militarypractices, and our sense of the tempo at which the ICBM program is being
Soviol Strategic Idcat ond the ICBM "
oviet strategic thinking and thc Soviet leaders' sense of the relative balance ofpower in thc world have undergonechanges over the last decade or so. The development of revolutionary new weapons systems Ln the period after World War II hastrongly stimulating factor in this process. It probably hastened the rethinking of the Soviet strategic position and strategic doctrine, once Statin's death made It possible
" The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.of the Army, bellcvea that the direct evidence upon which to base an eiUmate ol present Soviet ICBM strength Is of majorHe believes lhat the voluminous amounts ot InformaUon from all sourcea on thephase of the Soviet ICDM program ls Of such breadth and depth that comparablewould be given great weight, If notnearly conclusive. In making Intelligence estimates on other subjects. He also believes that the reJecUon of this significant amount of intelligence as "IruuDlcienl" appears decepUvely valid, alnee much of the evidence comUtutcs es-senUally negative Indications.ejection removes from the problem of estimating Soviet ICBM capabilities the restrtctloru Imposed by this evidence and permits theoreticalleading to unrealistic overesllmatlon. -The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF. believes thatf NIK, which was concurred In less than six months ago. provides more cogent, comprehensive, and useful reflec-Uon ot Soviet thinking regarding theof strategic attack capabilities and broad considerations aflecUng the future composition of Soviet strategic attack forces than doe* Soviel Strategic Ideas and the ICBM In HIBor ins views see his footnote tond i.
to set aside thc authoritative poisonal views of the dictator, views which wereationalization of his conduct of the war againsi Oermany and which were Increasingly irrelevant The new ideas whlrh then came into play clearly form the backgiound ofthinking against which Soviet decisions about an ICBM program have been considered in the last several years.
Fundamental to the new thinkingull recognition, long since prevalent in the military policies ot oilier nations, of the great importance of capabilities for long rangeSoviet pronouncements and actual military programs, although continuing toa balanced force concept, now give the greatest emphasis to Soviet long range attack capabilities and defenses against such Western capabilities. Weapon systems for thesehave evidently had first claim onand development efforts for some years.
Soviet doctrine has also recognised the great importance, under modern conditions, of striking lhe first strategic blow. Inof thc problems of surprise nndoviet theorists havetheir recognition that the side which achieves the first blow acquires immenseAlthough they have dentedurprise attack couldar between major powers at one blow, they have said that it could create conditionsuccessful prosecution of the war by the side achieving it. They acknowledge that, even withattack, the aggressor will himself receive very severe damage While much in Soviet doctrinal discussion on this point necessarily remains obscure, there Is no suggestion in what we know of Soviet thinking that thehave concluded that possession of long range missiles would permit them to attack the US with assurance of victory at ancost.
On thc other hand, the Soviets apparently doery considerable confidence that their ICBM program canigh de-
-That Is, an attack wllh Immediately available forces, designed lo seise the strategic Initiative from an enemy who Is himself preparingto attack.
grec of deterrence on US resort lo attack on the USSR. Their conduct increasinglytheir belief that, except for the most crucial stakes, the US will not seriouslyan attack on the USSR or even run very high riskocal Issue could eventuate in genera) war.*
his idea has evidentlyeryone for the Soviet leaders. It givesonse of equality in powerreater confidence in their eventual worldthan they had ever before felt in allodd years during which they havetheir regime to be engaged Instruggle against the hostile outside world. But achieving what they consider to be equality In military power has apparently not led them to conclude that their cause must triumph by the use of miliury power. On thc contrary, it has strengthened their belief that communism can win by other means. They reason that the naturalof political lorces will increase theof communism's adherents in thc world and that this process, together with their ability to deter resort to war by the greatest
-The Director for InteUigence. The Joint SUfJ, does not concur In paragraphs IBa believes that although Soviet publicappear to Indicate increasing satisfaction with their military power, lt does not follow that thesetn light of Soviet propagandasignify that Kremlin leaden truly possess "very considerable confidence that thrir ICBM program canigh degree of deterrence on" the US. or that they have achieved "what they consider to be equality In militaryn his opinion the Soviet rulers arc aware that "deterrence" or the us from InlUatlng an attack on the USSR has, for fourteen years, been the result of tho self-imposed moral restraint underlying US national policy. He believes that In the Soviet view the more aggressive the USSR ls In applying poliUcal or psychological pressures (Including the threat of limitedhe greater will be the riskS military reacUon. ConsequenUr. hethat in Soviet eyes the security of thestate requires attainment of maximumcapability to destroy US nuclear attack forces prior to the USSR embarkingoreVenturisUc course than heretofore or prior to their InvrsUiuEstill higher premium upon other form* of slruggle."
Imperialist power, will hasten the triumph of their cause.
Practiced as they are in the systematic exploitation of political and military assets through the whole range of political warfare tactics, the Soviets have recognized the unique possibilities for them in Ihcir claim to have an advantage in soeapon as the ICBM. Since their first ICBM firing7 they have sought lo maximize use of the ICBM as an instrument of politicalThey have magnified their missilein propaganda and have beendisposed to intervene In criticalwith pressures and threats.
At the same time, however, the Soviethave given every indication of realizing that the actual wagingreat war with nuclear weapons and modern deliverywould constitute an immeasurablefor them. They apparently recognize thatar could nullify the wholeeffort they have made loodern industrial society in Russia. The availability of nuclear weapons has Introduced into war Incalculable factors lo which they are particularly sensitive because they believeational conduct of policy directed to chosen political ends. They regard war Itself as an Instrument of policy which must always be subordinated to such political objectives. They give strong signs of believing that, while the possessionubstantial ICBMis of the highest importance for poliUcal warfare and for redressing the balance olpower, it isapability which wouldar deliberately planned to achieve rational ends of policy. This consideration would not preclude Soviet resort to general war In circumstances In which theythat to be the only means whereby they couldital national interest.
In sum, what we know of Soviet ideas suggests that the ICBM capability is thought of primarily in terms of deterrence, and of pre-emptive or retaliatory attack shouldfail, rather than primarily In terms of the deliberate Initiation of general war. The Implication which is clearest ls that the Soviets have concluded that the possession
ICBM capabilities by both sidestill higher premium upon other forms of struggle and lhal their advantages In this respect are so great as to insure their eventual triumph without resort to general nuclear war. These considerations do not, in themselves, define any particular ICBM force levels which the Soviets think appropriate lo their needs. They doseful frame of reference in which other approaches to the problem may he examined.
Theoretical Soviet ICBMhe Soviet authorities would consider that any substantial Soviet ICBM capability would have Important psychological and political effects,ajor deterrent effect on the US, and that these effects would tend to increase with the size of the Soviet ICBM force. In terms of military capabilities,they would regard the ICBM primarilyotential means of destroying orUS long range attack forces. Intheir capabilities against such US forces. Soviet military planners would of course take into account not only ICBMs. but also their other long range attack forces. They would also take into account their capabilities to attack aircraft carriers and missile-launching submarines at sen and their air defense The ICBM, however, would be their most effective weapon for initial attack on targets of known location in the US. Insuch targets, they would take Into account the likelihood that, for at least the next few years, the great preponderance of thc US megatonnage intended for delivery upon the USSR would be bomber-borne. As long as their ICBM capabilities remain limited, this consideration would tend to concentrate their attack on long range bomber bases. However, they might also be influenced by the fact that they now have some defense against bombers, none against ICBMs In flight.
s an approach lo an appreciation of the military capabilities which various numbers of Soviet ICBMs might represent, we have computed the numbers of ICBMs on launchers theoretically required for an Initial salvoto inflict severe damage on SAC bomber bases and other fixed Installations directly
related to immediate US nuclear retaliatoryhc factors employed tn these computations, and the results, are set forth in Annex A.
Thaw computations provide some sense of proportion with respect to Sovietagainst various target systems as these systems develop over time. They alsohowever, the sensitivity of the results to varying assumptions regarding theof the Urget system, the degree ofthe Soviets would desire against it. and especially the accuracy and reliability of the Soviet ICBM. Uncertainty regarding the inputs, and the very sensitivity of the compu-ULions to the various assumptions madethem, render the numerical results too various toeliable basis forSoviet ICBM force goals.
Soviet miliury planners, being lessthan wc regarding the present and future accuracy and reliability of their ICBM. are capable of making more valid computations of their ICBM requirements. They would also know their own targeting concepts, damage criteria, and desired levels of assurance. The numbers which they might derive from their computations could be substantially greater or less than those we have computed,to the values actually used by them for these factors.
hatever the numerical results of such Soviet computations. Soviet planners, intheir ICBM force goals, would have to take into account several additional factors tending to reduce their confidence in their ability, with any given number of ICBMs.estroy or neutralize US long range attack
'The ICKM weapon system is Inherentlytuck on targets the precis* locations ot which are known In advance. Consequently,the primary object ot this atiack would be to deitroy or neutralize bombers and other delivery vehicles. Soviet ICBM eapa bill ties can be anal vied only In terras ot attack on bomber bases and other Died installsUoru. inthe military significance ot such capabU-Hlcs. Soviet planners would have to take Into account thc mobility and reacUon times of the forces Unit were the true Object of the atiack. See
through attack on fixed Installations such as bomher bases. These include:
mobility of US bomber andA Soviet capability to destroybases could be considerably offsetdispersal of aircraft to alternateby the maintenance of aircraft onA Soviet capability to destroycould be similarly offset. Sovietwould almost certainly expect suchcoun la rmeasures to be taken insituation.
improbability of achieving, inICBM salvo in human experience,required to preventignificant portion of the USforces, considering their fastw
-SAC's ability to disperse could be countered by targeting all of the airfields capable ofSAC aircraft, but this would entail aIncrease in Uie Soviet ICBM requirement.
3 The Assistant Chief of Start. Intelligence. USAF. believes that thc simultaneity required for the ICBM attack ls not Improbable. If the tactics for employment nf the ICBM demandil follows that the Soviets will train their operational units and develop their equipment towards the attainment of that end. Given thc equipment postulated by any of lhc producUon programs described In Ihis Estimate,In these weapons systems does not appear as difficult to obtain as In systems the USSR already possesses.
-The Assistant cruel of Staff for Intelligence.Of Uie Aimy, believes Ihat it should be emphasised that simultaneity of launchinutes Is only an assumption and not an estimate ot capability. He believes that no estimate of such capability has been madethe problems Involved are so highlyand valid information on these problems Is so scanty. He believes that the mlnute-to-mlnutc variations In the state at readiness of an Individual ICBM on launcher, coupled with the technical exactness required in thetiring of large numbers of ICBMs would require simplifications in tlie weapons system not likely to be attained during the period of this estimate.
Accordingly, he believes that the concept of anrecisely calculated ballistic missile attack, managed by computers with the human clement and other uncertainties removed, would be realised by thc Soviets lo be impractical in lhc next few years.
increasing proportion ofelements likely to be in theforce structure as the periodthe increasing number of Polarisat sea and the introduction of aMlnuteman system.
requirement to coordinate anICBM salvo against US retaliatorybeyond the range ofmissiles with the Initialother forces involved in the initiationgeneral war. Precise coordinationrequired in these operations, Inorfeiture of strategicwould frustrate thc purpose of the
espite these operational considerations, thc ICBM provides the USSR, for the first time, with an efficient means ofeavy weight of attack on the US. and thc Soviets have strong incentives to buildubstantial force.uildup would be consistent with current Soviet strategicand would support the Soviet claim that thc longstanding imbalance between US and Soviet long range attack capabilities had been redressed."
BThe Director for Intelligence, Thc Joint stall, does not concur In paragraph. He believes the factors lt discusses would cause Soviet planners to increase their ICBM force goals, rather than to conclude that no ICBM (orce. no matter how large, couldesired degree of assurance. He believes, for example, Soviet planners would compute simulLmcity in the same manner other reliability factors areand make allowances for this factor In determining ICBM requirements.
-The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.ot the Army, believes that thoconsiderations Cited Inhich exlend beyond the computations of the number ot ICBMS required to Inflict severe damage on certain staUc targets, would prohibit Soviet military planners from accepting wiUi confidence any calculationertainof ICBMs would be sufficient. In conjunction with the operalions ot Other Soviet forces, to reduce Die weightS retaliatory attack to an acceptable level. Further, he believes that the overwhelming magnitude Of thete theoretical requirements, coupled wiih lha uncertainUes Inherent in their calculations, would combine to
PtKKiiM* oxiUbiisi oni.
. TO I' WP
Production and Deployment Program!
In building substantial operationalwith ICUMs. the Soviets mustigh order of planning and accomplishment in the production of missiles, establishment of launching facilities, provision of logisticand training and activation ofunits. The last three of these types of activity, particularly the establishment of launching facilities, arc likely to be the pace-setting factors in any coordinated program. Thc extent to which all these facets of the buildup were integratedlose timewould determine the rate at which effective operational capabilities were acquired.
Fur Illustrative purposes, wc havethree Soviet ICBM production and deployment programs, thc implications of which are summarized in the succeedingThese programs Lake into account: (a) the possibility that one or two Soviet plants arc engaged in the final assembly ol ICBMs; (b) reasonable production ratesissile of the more likely size, configuration, and weight of the Soviel ICBM, whenIn an efficiently operated facility; (c) the coordinated and efficiently scheduled activation of launching facilities at rateswith the achievementigh initial salvo capability. Details of theseand the factors considered are given in Annex B.
In our view, these programs would bewllh the present deliberate and orderly tempo of Soviet ICBM test range activity, which indicates that the USSR is not now engagedcrash" ICBM program, and wllh our estimate for planning purposes0 marked the establishment of an IOC and the beginning of the planned buildup in operational capabil>tles.,1 In gen-make Soviet planners appreciate that theofdecisive military superiority with long range attack forces was impossible and
rTho Assislant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Dcpnitment of the Army, and The Auutuuil Chief of Naval Operations far Intelligence,of the Navy, call attenUon to their footnotes to thc estimate of IOC date for the So-
eral, it should be noted that our information with respect lo the probable date of theof scries production of ICBMs In the USSR, our estimate of the approximate IOC date, and our consideration of the learning period likely to be Involved In building up to peak rates of missile production and launcher activation, all combine to give somewhat greater confidence in the limits within which economically managed programs are likely to fall at present than in subsequent years.
"A" assumes the finalICBMs at one large plant, with seriescommencing in9 andupeak rate ofissiles peraboutnd with afor the activation of launchersa peak rate of abouter monthsame lime It would provideand launching facilities as follows:
Operational IC1IM Inventory
OperaUonal ICBM Launchers
wouldigorous program,which. In conjunction with othermilitary programs, could be carriedappreciable hindrance toSoviet industrialrogram would still bean early stage that its deploymentfacilities could have escaped
vlct ICilM. at paragraphbove. The Assistant Chief of Stan for inielligence. Department of the Army, also calls attention to his footnoteICBM series production, at paragraphbove.
Assistant Chiefor Intelligence.of the Army, believes that thc scale of activity required for the initial ICBM launcher deployment envisioned in program "A" would be ofagnitude that It could not reasonably go undetected by present Intelligence collection mean* He would point out that the SovieU would have to have In aome phase ofat presentaunching facilities, consideringne-year lead Urn- foras assumed innnex U. He believes, however, that the construction time
the foregoing schedule wereUSSR would progressively acquire the
a/tereasonableof being able to detonate at leastover each of therincipal USareas. In addition to thecould be inflicted in the specifiedareas, there would he millions ofand widespread denials from fallout.
heoreticalbeing able, under "beat"evere damage onercent ofoperational air base system beyondof. missiles.
heoreticalbeing able, under "worst"evere damage onercent ofair bases, unhardened ICBMunhardened command Installations.
"B" assumes the finalICBMs at two large plants, the firstas in program "A" and thein capacity. In accordance withpractice In other military programs,of aeries production at thelags the lead plant byearfrom the solution of technical andproblems by the lead plant. Aproduction rate ofCBMsIs attained byndlauncher activation reaches moreper month.rogram wouldICBMs and launching facilities
Mid- Mid- Mid-1 2 35 Scries Produced perational ICBM Inventory 60 perational ICBM Launchers 35
for soft ICBM launching tacihtles la fromoonths, and. therefore, that ataunching facilities should hare been underinee his footnote loIf. Annex 8.
mUsilea with radlO-merUal guidance and the system peaked for attack. See Annex A.
* Assuming missiles with all-inertial guidance and no time available to peak lhe system. See Annex A.
his expanded program would introduce considerable, though not Insurmountable,These difficulties would lie primarily in the requirement to attain and properly coordinate high rates of missile production, launcher activation, and troop training early in the program. We believe that up until the present time, the difference in tempo between this program and program "A" would notbe great enough to insure itsby US intelligence. On the basis olindications, werogramlarger than this, in the near term, to be extremely unlikely. The ICBM program could be larger1ecision togreater resources to it were made this year.
* The Assistant Chief of Naval OperationsDepartment of the Navy, has expressed In another NaUonal Intelligence EtUmate his minority view of thc amount of fissionablethat wUl probably be available to the USSRe consequently believes thatIn combination with the other ballistic missile programs presented In this paper as well as with all other Soviet nuclear weaponswould not be feasible or reasonable and would not be pursued by the Soviets.
"Tlie Assistant Chief of Start for Intelligence.of the Army, believes that thc rate of ICBM launcher deployment envisioned In"B" Is highly Improbable. Specifically, he would point out that In order to achieveapid buildup, the Soviets would have to have presently under construction or completedaunching facilities, consideringne-year lead time as assumed innnex B. However, he believes that thelime for soft ICBM launching facilities Is from IB toonths and, therefoie. thataunching facilities should be in some phase of development now, and that atould have been startedSee his footnote tot Is not reasonable to assume that this scale of activity would go undetected by present intelligencemeans.
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes thatrogram wouldrodigiousteat, even by US standards, and that It wouldrash effort very likely lo be dlsrup-
K<"jtirat*ituuci oo next past-
the foregoing schedule wereUSSR would progressively acquire the
abouttheoreticalof being able, under "best"inflict severe damage onercent oloperational air base system beyondof. missiles.
heoretical expectationable, under "worst" conditions, todamage onercent of SACair bases, unhardened ICBM sites,command installations.
aboutlose approachtheoretical expectation of being able,conditions, to Inflict severe damagepercent of semihardened andsites and command installations.toercent of SACbases, unhardened ICBM sites, andcommand' installations. Thiswould be short-lived,of the sharply increasingUS hardened ICBM sites.
already indicated, the foregoingprograms are hypotheticalwhich we believe to be feasible andbut which cannot bedirectur inability totraining or launcher constructionin the USSR commensurate withmay reflect thc limitations ofcoverage. On the other hand,be that no substantial ICBMyet occurred in the USSR. If the lalter
live of lhe Sovicl economy, particularly wllh respect lo the requirement for specializedand highly trained labor and technicians.
Thc Assistant Chief of Staff tor Intelligence. Department of the Army, further observes that activity at the Soviet ICBM test range Is notcale commensurate with any large-scaleprogram.
"The Assislant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of tlie Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Inielligence, Department of the Navy, call attention lo their footnotes to paragraphbove.
is in fact tbc case, the explanation may lie In technical peculiarities of the Soviet ICBM program which are unknown to us. Themay have encountered delays in their intended ICBM production, or. more likely, in the development and construction ofhandling and launching facilities. It may also be thai they have elected touch smaller ratio of launching facilities to missiles than wc have assumed. Or it may be that they elected to establish only ainitial operaUonal capability on the basis of their early test results, and to defer aoperaUonal, buildup until their ICBM had been test-fired to. early
"C" takes Into account thethat the actual Soviet ICBMbe intentionally slower and smallerhave hitherto supposed. It assumesassembly of ICBMs at one plant,production commencing in earlybuilding upeak rate of onlyper month by aboulof thc missiles scriesre allocated to test-firingsnonurposes. Althoughis establishedprogram for launcher activationuntil lhat time and it builds uppeak of about six per month byrogram would provideICBMs and launching facilities as
Mid- Mid- Mid- 1M1 2 3
ICBMs Series Produced
Operational ICBM Inventory ICBM
the Sovicl mind, therogram might be:
general war wouldeans of advancing SovietIs extremely unlikely that even aforce could confidently be expectedmilitary victory.
a strong deterrent, thewhich would require pre-emptiveon thc US would be extremely unlikely
arise. If they did threaten to arise, they could be controlled by Soviet policy.
what Is required is astrong enough to deter thc US fromgeneral war in aU situations shortdirect threat to its national existence.small force of ICBMs wouldthis purpose. Soviet secrecy wouldthe effectiveness oforceand for supporting strongpsychological pressures on the US.
would be more profitable to directtowards winning the world bythe superiority of the Sovieteconomic and social development andSoviet influence by
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, does not concur In paragraphse considers Illustrative program "C" to be out ot consonance with the available evidence, with Soviet military doctrine, and with past Soviet weapon system practices. He therefore considers Illustrative program "C" Invalid and unwar-
ranted for Inclusion In this document. Hethc discussion Ino beIn Its treatment of the Soviet view ofe points out lhat. In his opinion:
ackdrop, presumably, for anSoviet foreign policy. Vet, In context,deterrent" Is In reality aaof ICBMs.
mputes to the Sovietsthat this "small force ofupposedly new anddea of theosture strong enoughthe US from initiating general war Inshortirect threat to ItsThc Director for Intelligence.Staff, considers that the "deterrence"US from Initiating general war In allshortirect threat lo Its nationalhas prevailed for the pastears: thatare as aware as we that suchwas the result of moral factors, notpower factors: and that the Soviets aretosmall force ol ICBMs"the power balance In their favor orthc US any more acquiescent thanto their "strong political and
i} EC HUH
If the foregoing program were maintained, the USSR would progressively acquire the
abouteasonablebeing able to detonate at least oneeach of therincipal USIn addition to the damage whichinflicted in the specified target areas,be millions of casualties andfrom fallout.
heoretical"best" conditions, of being able to inflict
severe damage onercent of the SACair base system beyond the range of. missiles.
c. By aboutheoreticalunder "worst" conditions, of being able lo inflict severe damage onercent of the SAC operational air base system beyond thc range of. missiles. Thiswould be achieved, however, onlyime when the US possessed largeof hardened ICBM sites.
Soviet ICBM Strength,3
ith reference to the illustrativepresented above, thc members of thc United States Intelligence Board haveas follows:
Director of Central Intelligencethat program "A'* should bethc nearest approximation of the actualprogram.
Assistant Chief of Staff,believes that programhe mast likely Soviet program.
c. The Director of Intelligence andDepartment of State, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Specialand the Director for Intelligence. The Joint Staff, believe that the Soviet planners would regard thc advantages to be gained fromarge ICBM force in the near term as justifying the effort requiredrogram which would be toward the high side of the range defined by illustrative programs "A" andurther, these membersthat, in light of the factors discussed inhe Soviet program will con-
to grow, within thc"eriod."
The Director of Intelligence and Research.of State, wishes to amplify his view as expressed in this paragraph. He believes that the slxe of thc Soviel ICBM force will depend largely on which of two general objectives the Soviets aim to achieve with this force. One possibility ls that the Soviet leaden do not see sufficient advantage in building an ICBM force larger Ihan what they would consider adequate to deter the US from Initiating eencral war In all situations shortirect threat to Its national existence. They might considerelatively small and well-protected ICBM force, approximating that which would result from programould suffice for this purpose, since It woulderious threat to major metropoUtan areas bynd an increasing threat to unhardened US bases as well In later years. If. however, the Soviet leaders believed that, during tltewhen the US will have few seaborneor ICDMs In hardened sites, thc ability to threaten SAC bases and unhardened ICBM sites would give them significant additionalIn the confrontation with thc US. they would probablyore vigorous program. The resulting ICBM force would then probably approach the levels calculated for program "B" and would give theubstantialcapability before thc end
The Director of Intelligence and Research. Department of State, believes that Sovietwould regard thc advantages to be gained fromarge ICBM force ineriod as Justifying the additional effort required by programe does not exclude the possibility that thc actual Soviet program Is planned to provide no more ICBMs on launcher than the strength levels calculated for programnd he recognizesarger program might fall considerably short of Its goals, but he believes the Soviet program ls more likely to approximate illustrative"B" Inar term. Specifically, he(a) that the number of Soviet ICBMs on launcher ins Ukely to be close to the high side ofange, and (bl lhal the Soviet program will probably continue at the rate projected for programat leastince there Is no particular ICBM force goal which would be achievedy continuing the Soviet program at the rates calculated lor programsore believes thc Soviet program1 will cither taper otl or be accelerated. Of these twohe considers the latter (le,of the program! somewhat more likely.
d. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence,of the Navy, believe that illustrative program "C" most nearly approximates the actual Soviet program.
"The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, believes that the actual Soviet ICBM program la no larger, and perhaps even less, than illustrative programe believes the following points to be relevant:
the establishment of anthe critical factors are thetroops and the provision, offacilities. A* yet, thehas not Identified any troopactivities, nor any operational ICBMfacilities.
deliberate and orderly tempo ofICBM test range acUvity fj
5 Indicates that the USSR Is not now engagedcrash" ICBM program.
c Soviet doctrine suggests that the ICBM capability Is thought of primarily in terms of deterrence and. In case deterrence should fall, pre-emptive or retaliatory attack, rather than the deliberate Initiation of general war.
of Soviet ICBMs onrequired for an initial salvoto Inflict severe damage on nxedrelated to immediate US nuclearcapabilities render resultseliable basis for estimatingforce coals.
the Sovietelatively smallICBMs would be strong enough to deterfrom InlUaling general war Inirect threat to its nationaland Soviet secrecy would enhanceoforce for deterrencesupporting strong political andon the US.
Soviets would consider nuclearto be self-defeatingeans oftheir Interests. To them. It would beto direct resources towardworld by demonstrating superiority otsystem for economic and social
Based on an analysis of the foregoing factors, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, beUeves thewhich Is clearest Is that thc Soviets have concluded that the possession of ICBM capablll-UC3 by both sidestill higher premium upon other forms of struggle, and that they believe their advantages ln this respect are so
&cc (obiDKri on Beat
ls notable that the potentialby programs "A"" lsthe sameefore thethe year, cither would provide ainflict massive destruction on themetropolitan areas. At the beginningeither would provide sufficientlaunchers to threaten the SACbase system, Thereafter, the threatprogram "B" would increase morethat of programy aboutprogram "B" would provideigh assurance of being abledamage most of the SAC airin an initial salvo, whereaswould reach this point late In theconsiderably smaller programapability to inflict massiveon the principal US
present Soviet ICBM program is,course, subject to change as the periodSoviet planning for theill be substantially affectedactual development of USthe prospectsreatlyICBM, and the prospects, on eachan effective defense against ICBMs, asby the general development of thcand of relations between thc USUSSR. Our estimates for futurebe reviewed in the light of such develop-
grcal as lo Insure their eventual triumphretort lo general nuclear war. lie would point outong aa the Soviets arc able to maintain secrecy concerning their actual ICDM strength, their deterrence will be as ef-feeUve aa their propaganda. In any case, he believes that an estimated Soviet capability lo detonate one ICBM over each ofrincipal us metropolitan areas1remendous deterrent.
-he view uf the Assistant Chief of Naval Opeiattons lor Intelligence, Department of the Navy, that In the light of the evidence at hand (both positive andoviet program of ICBM production and deployment on launch-era as set forth In illustrative programost nearly approximates thc actual SovietHe believes alsorogram as large as Illustrated In program "A" is feasible and within Soviet capabilities. Further, he believes It most unlikely that the SovieU wouldrogram larger than "A" at this time.
ments and of such additional evidence as we may obtain regarding thc actual progress of the Soviet program. They must therefore be regarded as highly tentative. For thesewe have not projectedentative estimate"
II. MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES
The Soviets now have available foruse ballistic missiles. ranges, which add significantly to their attack capabilities. These missiles areto be capable ofb. nuclear payloads with accuracies. andespectively.. missiles believed to be road mobile, although the missiles and their carriers and support vehicles are readily adaptable to rail transport.. missiles considered suiLablc for road or rail mobile
Factors of timing and security, as well as the programmed improvement in Western air defenses, will make it increasingly desirable that an initial Soviet attack against Western retaliatory bases be delivered primarily with ballistic missiles. Even from within thc. missiles haverange Loarge majority of such bases in Eurasia and its periphery. Numerous missiles with maximum ranges of. will also be available duringlthough they are not considered in detail in this estimate, it should be notedortion of these shorter range missiles may be equipped with nuclear warheads and (assuming forwardcould contribute to an initialon critical Western targets. Abut decreasing force of manned bombers will be available throughout the period for follow-on attack and other related missions.
We believere in series production, bui our evidence
Assistant Chief o( Slaff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that an estimate3 can be made. He believes that, lacking contradictory information, lhe rates of Increase shown In program "B" should be continued
"See, Annex A,.
Insufficient to establish production rates.
. missiles C.
3 brings have beenharply reduced rate in recent months. Thereto be numerous firings. missiles, C
3evidence on the movement's ofequipment, C.
3 suggestm. missiles have been deployed to East Germany and to key points near the Soviet borders in Europe, the Far East, and the Transcaucasus. There ls also fragmentary evidence to suggest. missiles have been deployed to the Soviet Far East.
In view of our estimate that. missile was ready for operational use as long as four years ago, and that. missile has been operational for aboutonths, it ls possible that the USSR now has large operational inventories of these weapons. We believe it more likely, however, thatand deployment to date have beenoderate scale. This judgment takes inlo account the paucity of evidence onthe restrictions which may have been imposed on warhead production by the USSR's supply of nuclear materials, and the availability of other Soviet delivery systems. Most important, il recognizes that evenmodest programs. missiles would provide lhc Soviets,0orce capable of seriously threatening the major Western landbased retaliatory targets within range.
The table below includes numbers of launchers estimated as requiredoviet Initial salvo capability, together withoperational Inventories of missiles foralvo as well as for subsequent use in the initial phasceneral war and for employment In later phasesustained conflict. The entire table, including thefors based on the general considerations set forth in thc preceding paragraphs, ralhor than on direct evidence.
It represents no change from our previous
the foregoing missiles, at leastfor an initial salvo wouldequipped with high-yield nuclearthe remainder would probably haveyields In order to provide Sovietoperational flexibility. Shouldrequire larger numbers of missilestheir production andthe next few years would notdlfllcullies to the USSR.
III. LONG RANGE BOMBERS AND AERODYNAMIC MISSILES
It Is clear that the USSR will placeheavy reliance on ballistic missiles as long range nuclear delivery systems.observed Soviet military practicethat Long Range Aviation will beas an effective force in being at leastormidable ICBM capability has been established. Even thereafter, the USSR willequirement for manned bombers, though In lesser numbers. Soviet planners will continue to view bombers as usefulariety of purposes, including attacks on small or hardened targets, damagereconnaissance, and attacks on targets of uncertain location. The recall capability of the bomber would add to its operational value. Bombers and other aerodynamicoperating tn conjunction with aballistic missile force, will provide thewith diversification and flexibility In their offensive capabilities.
Receni evidence supports the view that the USSR is maintaining interest ln long range bombers and other aerodynamic vehicles despite lis Increasing strength in ballistic mls-
-The Assistant Chief ot Starr. Intelligence. USAF, believes that each operational mlSAllo would be providedauncher.
Heavy bomber production continueslow but fairly steady pace. Research and development work Is under way on morebombers and on alr-to-surface missiles suitable for launching by medium and heavy bombers. These trends contradictrepeated allegations that bombers are obsolete and his implication that militarywill be virtually replaced, not simply reduced, in the near future. The evidence is more consistent with Defense Minister Mall-novsky's statement (inhat, while rocket troops have become thc main type of armed forces, other types are to be retained at appropriate levels. We conclude that the announced Soviet force reductions will bring some reduction In long range bomber strength, but that five years hence the USSR will probably still retain aforce.
long Range Aviation
here has been little change in the strength, status, and deployment of Long Range Aviation in recent months. This force continues to be the principal component of Soviet military strength capable of long range nuclear weapons delivery. Wethat, as oft compriseseavy bombers and tankers of the BISON jet and BEAR turboprop types, about two-thirds of them BISONs, as well asADGER jet medium bombers and
The piston-engine 1IULL is no longer considered part of the operaUonal force,some such aircraft probably remain in I'H'i; Range Aviation units for utility
f the foregoing aircraft, only the BISON is still In production.ad been produced throughn recent months thc production rate appears to have been more stable than in the earlier years of thc program The current rateISONs per month, arid there is nothing to indicate any tapering oft. We therefore continue to estimate that BISON
"FOr csUmaled performance characterIsUca of Soviet long rang* bombers, see Annex O.
will be produced at about the present rate for the next year or so
c have no firm evidence that any more advanced Soviet heavy bomber Is now under development or In production. The USSR may still be experimenting with theargo prototype observed inut there Is no indication thatikely to be Introduced into operationaletter than marginal Improvement over present Soviet heavy bomber models could be achieved by developmentuclear powered aircraft. Such an aircraft would have long range and duration of flight, limited by permissible crew radiation doses,onsequent ability to penetrate US air defenses al low altitudes. It could bofor weapon delivery or reconnaissance, as well as for other purposes such as airborne early warning. Test flightsubsonicaircraft could be undertaken during the period of this estimate; firstavailability could probably be in"
he USSR Is nowewbomber capable of supersonicnd we believe it could become available for operational useOn thc basis ofavailable at the time, such anwas estimated ins afor first operational use2 orhe new bomber will probablyange slightly greater than that of thc BADGER. Its primary applicability islikely to be against Eurasian andtargets, although It could operate over lhe US on one-way missions, or on two-way missions with multiple inflight refueling. It ls probably Intended to replaco somefor highly specialized uses. Including air-to-surface missile delivery.
onsidering the utility of long range bombers and the investment the USSR had made In them, wc estimated Inhat Long Range Aviation strength wouldfairly constant over the next year or
-The Assistant Chief ot Slafl. In tell'fence. USAF. believes this date should be ISO*.
TO tJ CHfi-T-
and then decline,ormal phase-down in BADGER strength, assuming no large-scale productionollow-on lype, would reduce the force byombers over the next four or five years. We now believe it more likelyeliberate cut of about this magnitude will be taken during the period of force reductions in the nextonths. The estimated builduporce ofupersonic "dash" bombers in the period1ould tend to offset normal attrition of BADGERsthat period. The heavy bomber force will probably increase toircraftnd then decline gradually as BISONceases and BEARs are retired. In sum, we estimate as follows the probable strength of Long Range Aviation during lhe next five years:
Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid-1 2 2 4 S
Bombers and Tankers "
ISONs and BADGERs will thus remain the most numerous of the bombersng Range Aviation during thc period of thisSome improvement in theof these aircraft, notably in Iheir range, will probably be achieved in the near future through propulsion system modification. Other Improvements in operationalwill probably include lhc equipment of
"The Assistant Chief of SiafT. Intelligence. USAF. believes that thc numbers of bombers andshould read:
Bombers and Tankers
* Probablyew new"dash" medium bombersuilding up tonf these, the majority will be HAlXiitlKs. The total will probablyew supersonic "dash" medium bombersuilding up to.
all long range bombers with active Jamming equipment. Navigation and communications equipment will be satisfactory for all bomber missions, with the possible exception of night and bad weather operations at very lowRegardless of reductions In thesize of the force, proficiency will be retained and improved ln such critical areas asweapons handling, inflight refueling and Arctic staging, and probably In the use of decoys, air-to-surface missiles, and otheration aids.
GO. Based on the trends outlined above, and considering our revised estimate (ln) of fissionable material availability in the USSR as well as lhe Increasing demands of ballistic missile warheads, we expect little if any increase in the total number of nuclear weapons allocatedng Range Aviation. It is equally unlikely, however, that there will be any drastic near-term reduction, since to thc extent of their ability the Soviets will probably wish to provide multiple weaponand restrike capabilities for theirWe believe that as Soviet strength in ICBMs, submarine-launched, and medium range ballistic missiles grows and as the role of aircraft becomes more specialized, the megatonnage allotted lo warheads for these missiles will come to surpass that allotted to thc bombersng Range Aviation. In our view, this Is likely to occur by
edium Bombers of Other Components. The number of BADGERs in components other than Long Range Aviation Isof whichre assigned to Naval Aviation andre in TacticalThese medium bomber strengths will probably be increased somewhat through re-assignments from Long Range Aviation; we believe this trend Is already under way. at least In the case of Naval Aviation. It Is also possible that supersonic "dash" medium bombers will be introduced Into Tactical and Naval components. Naval BADGER units are specially trained and equipped lo attack such targets as carrier task forces at sea, while Tactical units are Intended primarily lo support ground force operations. Thebombers of Tactical and Naval Aviation
presumably be employed (or attack on
Eurasian and peripheral targets, rather than on targets In thc US.
boul eight BADGER regiments arenow equipped with the subsonic,. ASissile and trained In Its use.that unit holdings now average twoissiles per aircraft, wc estimate the present Soviet operational inventoryTliis missile was designed primarily for use against ships, although it can also beagainst well-defined radar targets such as prominent coastal Installations. During the period of this estimate theillbe supplemented and finally replaced. missile, which will probably be ready for operational use inhis new systemhouldthe severe limitations in launchingimposed on BADGERs by thehe combined Soviet inventory of these two onliship weapons will probably remain fairly stable atissiles over the next few years. Some portion of the inventory will probably be equipped with nuclear warheads of low and medium yields, the remainderHE.
upersonic air-to-surface missileange of atrimarily for use against land targets, will probably alsooperationally available inhis systemill probably be employed to Increase the chances of penetration to heavily-defended targets byheavy bombers, thus extending their useful service life, and will presumably be compatible with supersonic "dash" medium bombers. On this basis, an operaUonalofissiles Is likely to be built up during thc. Thc CEP of these missiles, estimated atnd their mission against land targets, would probably require that they be equipped with high-yield nuclear warheads.
ore detailed estimate of these missiles and their performance characteristics, ice.
Ground Launched Cruise-Type Vehicles
estimate that thc Soviets arcand could have availableround-launched,vehiclepeed of aboutan altitudeeet, andIn excess. Such abe employed for weapon delivery orand would furtherair defense problems. UnUlbecomes available on thislt is Impossible lo predict thewliich it will contribute to Sovietfor long range attack or tho degreeUie USSR will place upon it
IV. SUBMARINE-LAUNCH ED MISSILES *
We believe that the Soviets areissile-launching submarine capability to deliver high-yield nuclear warheads. The number of submarines they could deploy in launching positions off US coasts withoutrisk of forfeiting strategic surprise would depend on the pattern of operations that had been established in advance. At present, the number that could be so deployed Is very small, but It could be increased over theyears by more extensive out-of-areaof the long range submarines of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Soviet planning, however, does not appear to contemplateof the main weight of an attack by means of submarine-launched missiles.
We estimate that the USSR nowimited capability to launch ballistic missiles fromozen long range, convenUonally-powered submarines. Four of these are "Z" class submarines, which were modifiedy enlarging the sail andhatches and vertical tubes, probably to accommodate ballistic missiles. They may have served as prototypesomparable new class of submarine, designated "O" class, which has been in producllon8 and about nine of which are now consideredAlthough only fragmentaryis avntlable on this class, wc believe
ore detailed estimate on these missiles and their perfcfmance. see NIK.
"O" Class about6 each
it is probably also designed to accommodate ballistic missiles. For missile launching, both the "Z" and "G" class submarines would need to be surfaced, or more likely in sail awash condition. Wc have no specificon the ballistic missiles they employ. Considering the size and configuration of the submarines, however, wc have estimated their capabilities ir. f- K'jw.
Missiles carried Missile designation Missile range "
Over the next few years, the USSR will probablyimited number ot "G" class submarines in an Interim program continuing at leastore advanced ballisticsubmarine system ls available. Both "Z" and "G" class missile-launchingwill probably be retained throughout thc period of this estimate. There has,been no additional Information of thc few submarines believed to have beensome years ago to topside stowage of cruise-type missiles, and we no longer consider them operational.
We estimate that the USSR willystem capable of delivering ballistic missiles against land targetsubmergedsubmarine. In viewystem of this type
The Assistant Chiel of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint SLafl. believe it probable. missile is used with both thc "Z" and "G" class submarines.
issile range of at. would maximize the Soviet naval contribution to the USSR's capacity to deliver coordinated strikes on short notice against USonsiderable portion of thr total number of operational Soviet nuclear-poweredbe deployed oft US coasts at all times, provided that the Soviets developed proper operating procedures and trained alternate crews.
Assuming that an uctlve developmentis well under way, we have estimated, in, thathc USSR could first have available for operationalallistic missile systemorlaunching and capable ofb. payloadange.EP. We continue tothis represents the Soviet technicaldespite our lack of evidence of actual development work. There is no firm evidence that any Soviet nuclear-powered submarines are yet assigned to operational units, although we believe that the USSR bag an activeandew such submarinesnow exist. Tli us the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine program ts probablyfar advanced so lhat theystem could be Incorporated as soon as the missile becomesoviet nuclear-powered submarine might2 such missiles. Thc USSR could probablyew nuclear-powered missile submarines intounits annually, while continuing the construction of nuclear submarines equipped with torpedoes.
On the basts of the preceding discussion, we project as follows the probable numbers of ballistic missile submarines, and their missiles, in Soviet operational unils through
THEORETICAL SOVIET ICBM REQUIREMENTS
an approach to an appreciation of the military capabilities which various numbers of Soviet ICBMs would represent, we havethe numbers of ICBMs on launchersto give Sovietheoreticalof being able to inflict. In an initial salvo, severe damage on SAC bomber bases and other fixed installations directly related toUS nuclear retaliatory capabilities. The factors employed In these computations, and the results, are set forth below.
The ICBM weapon system is inherentlylo attack on targets the precise locations of which are known In advance.although lhe primary object ofwould be bombers and other deliverySoviet ICBM capabilities can beonly in terms of attack on bomber bases and other fixed installations. In evaluating lite military significance of such capabilities. Soviet planners would have to take Intothe mobility and reaction times of the forces that were thc true object of the attack, as well us lhc problems of achievingand surprise In coordinated attacks against Western forces deployed in widespread areas. Any theoretical numericalwould be subject lo the considerations discussed in paragraphf the main text.
It is emphasized that thb target study and the calculations derived from it are presented only as an example of considerations themight take Into account ln analyzing their theoretical requirements for ICBMs lo be employed against tnrgetable US retaliatory force bases. Thry reflect only one of aof possible Soviet concepts for theof ICBMs. Moreover, numericalthemselves ore amonginal Soviet determination of lhe ap-
propriate scale and puceroduction and deployment program.
Soviet ICBM Characteristics
In computing the numbers of Soviet ICBMs on launchers theoretically required to givemilitary planners high assurance of being able, in an Initial salvo, to inflict severeon various target systems, we have used operational characteristics derived from. "Soviet Capabilities in Guidedand Spacestimates progressivein the operational performance ofICBMs over the. We have interpolated as necessary between the values estimated0 and
In our computations we have distinguishedbest condition"worstThe "best condition" assumeswith radio-inertial guidance and thepeaked for attackesignated time known well in advance. The "worstassumes missiles with all-lnertlaland no time available to peak therobable case would lie between theseFor relevant discussion, see.
The values used for these variables are set forth in lhe tables below:
all cases wc havewarhead, attributing to lt thein. "Theatede have ulso assumed,hat allas reliable on launcher wouldtheir launchers at scheduled timeslaterinutes thereafter.
information on the futureof the US nuclear retaliatory forceis presumably not available toplanners, but we believe thatenough general information fromto be able to estimate with fairIn our computations we havethe development of the targetin the table below, asresent Soviet estimate.
Mid- Mid- Mid- 1M1 2 OperaUonal Air Base* 78 IS ICDM 9 9 9
Unhardened Control Centers 3 3 3 emihard?ned Conlrol
Scmihardened ICDMCBM 1 41
criterion of severe damage wasthe calculations of requirements for thcsystems discussed. This criterion, asUS military planners, calls for thedamage on various types of targets:
Typo of Taicct Unhardened ICDM Site Overturning erected causing severe damage to nearby above ground facilities.
Semlhardenod ICDM site
Hardened ICBM silc
Type ofDamage to parkedso as torepair andto severeabove ground
Remits of Computations
xample A: the numbers of Soviet ICBMs on launchers required to give Sovietheoretical expectation of being able toIn an initial salvo, severe damage onercent of the SAC operational air basebeyond the range of. missiles.
Mid- Mid- Mid-1 2 3
-Best Condition" "Worst CondlUon"
In this case, the number of missilesrequired declines over time because the target system remains relatively constant while the accuracy and reliability of theare progressively Improved.
xample B: the same as Example A, with the addition of unhardened ICBM sites and command installations to the target system.
Mid- Mid- Mid-1 2 3
"Best Condition" "Worst Condition-
It will be seen that these theoreticalarc not significantly greater than those computed for Example A.
xample C: the same as Example B, with the addition of scmihardened and hardened ICBM sites and command installations to the target system.
Mid- Mid- Mid- Mld-
1 2 3
"Best Condition" "Worst Condition'
In this example, the steep increase InICBM requirementsespite estimated improvements in the Soviel ICBM, results from the anticipated increase in the numbers of semihardened and hardened ICBM sites in the target system.
D: the same aso give Sovietheoreticalof Inflicting severe damage onpercent (rather lhanercent) ofand hardened targets in
Mid- Mid- Mid- 1 3
This example alsoharp increase In theoretical ICBM requirementsut without going lo the exorbitant extremes of Example C.
Other Possible Variations
li possible that the Soviets viewrequirements for ICBMs nsor smaller than the numbersThe foregoing examples are limitedbases from which the mostcould be mounted, butmight be includedovielICBM requirements against USOn thc other hand, insofarmission of destroying US retaliatoryassigned to other weapon systemsand missile-launchingtheoretical ICBM requirementsreduced. Finally, calculations ofrequirements arc highly sensitive toin the detailed inputs, especiallyICBM characteristics and damage criteria.
for example, expectationongSoviet planners to consider it essentialan ICBM attack specificallyUS centers of population and industry,to retaliatory force bases, theirrequirement might include highof being able to detonate one ICBMof therincipal US metropolitanthese areas containf the total US populationS defense manufacturing facilities.) ofequirement In finwould increase by0 thenumbers of Soviet ICBMsCBMs onbe added to the theoreticalthe Soviets desired high assurance of being
able lo detonate one missile over each ofS naval bases serving aircraft carriers und missile-launching submarines. Considerably greater increases in total theoreticalwould result if the Soviets considered it necessary. In an initial ICBM salvo, toUS air defense capabilities andwhich Indirectly support or could be used to support the retaliatory force; nuclear weapons storage sites, airfields to which SAC bombers might disperse, etc.
he Soviets' view of their own numerical requirements for ICBMs against bases with immediate retaliatory capabilities might be reducedariety of circumstances.the use of techniques designed to minimise the degradation of system effectiveness caused by reliability factors. One such technique ls the "reprogrammtng" of Soviet ICBMs: rather than salvoing the total number of missilesrequired, slandby missiles might be launched in only those casesissile assigned to the first salvo were known to have failed on launcher or prior lotudies suggest that "reprogram-mlng" might reduce by as muchercent the theoretical "best condition"for ICBMs on launcher against the unhardened target systems considered innd B. It would have relatively little effect on requirements against the hard targets Included innd D, where the critical factor is accuracy, not reliability. US exploration of "reprogramming" has not yet established Its operational feasibility, and there is no evidence that the USSR is develop-
Employment of the "reprogramming" technique Involves: (n) ascertaining, by radar tracking or telemetry, whether orissile In thc nrrt salvo failed during Its powered flight phase: (b> prompt insertion of alternate trajectory data into standby missiles which have been counted down along with first-salvo missiles, so that Ihey can be assigned lo whichever targets are led uncovered by prebumout failures in the first salvo: (c) delaying the launching of standby missiles by as much as five minutes, the time required for flrsl-salvo mini Irs lo complete the burning phase; and, possibly, (dl compensating for thc delays Incurred by the appropriate use of alternate trajectories to achieve ncar-simol-laneous arrival Of missiles on target
echnique. Wc therefore have not used "rcprograminlng" as the basis fortheoretical Soviet requirements.
he USSR's theoretical requirements against the target system considered inCould be significantly reduced if the performance characteristics of its ICBM system were better than we have estimated. Soviet expectations regarding the accuracy of their ICBM under operational conditions would be critical to their evaluation ofagainst semlhardened andtargets. For example, if system CEP with radlo-lnertlal guidance were expected to approximate 1. in (rather
than. used in ourhe theoretical requirement for anunder "best" conditions, of inflicting severe damage onercent of the entiresystem used inould befrom
J If combined with Soviet acceptance of an expectation ofsevere damage on only SO percent of the semlhardened and hardened targets, such an improvement in accuracy would reduce thc theoretical requirement, under "best"against the target system used inD from f;
ILLUSTRATIVE SOVIET ICBM PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS
ILLUSTRATIVE SOVIET ICBM PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMS
building substantial operationalwitb ICBMs, thr Soviets roustigh order of planning and accomplishment in the production of missiles, establishment of launching facilities, provision of logistic support, and training and activation ofunits. The last three of these types of activity, particularly the establishment of launching facilities, are likely to be the pace-setting factors in any coordinated program. Although for convenience this Annex treats production and deployment separately, the extent to which all aspects ol the buildup were Integratedlose lime schedule wouldthe rate at which effective operational capabilities were acquired.
We have reviewed nil evidence bearing on the question of Soviet ICBM production and find it insufficient to establish present or planned production rates. However, theIs sufficient to draw the following
productionof ICBMsin the USSR In" Thisis based on the time elapsed sinceof test firingshe generallyresults of the test program, andthe increased rate of firings Inof which lend credibility toin9 that series productionbeginning.
assembly of ICBMs may beat one or more plants. We nowevidence pointing to two Sovietpossible production sites.
"Scries production Is the producUon of missiles of like type in accordancelanned buildup rale. Thc date at which seriescommences is defined as the date of eom-pleUon of the first mlssltc in the series.
"Tlie Assistant Chief of Stall for Intelligence, Department ot the Army, calls attention to his footnote tof the Discussion.
c. Prototype ICBMn and some spacewere probably assembledovietmissile research and development facility which we believe does not cnguge in large-scale production. This facility may continue to provide some of the vehicles used for space launchings and ICBM research and
an economic point of view, theon Soviet ICBM productionfirst year or two ot the serieswould not be the availability ofor budgetary resources, but ratherrequired to solve the engineeringInherent in the initiation of anyprocess, and to train the laborrale of production wouldearning period until therale of production was achieved.together with our knowledge oftest range activities to date, is areason for somewhat greaterthe limits within which economicallySoviet programs arc likely to fall atthan In subsequent years.
Production of Missiles
Illustrative purposes, we havethree ICBM production programs,of which with respect toInventory are summarized inbelow. Illustrative programinal assembly of ICBMs at one largelis first missile Inpeak rate ofissilesby aboutnalf. Thc rate oferchosen because, on the basis of limitedand feasibility studies,easonable numberissile oflikely size, configuration, and weightSoviet ICUM, when produced In an effl-
operated final assemblyor each such final assembly plant In any program there wouldumber of subsidiary plants to supply specialized components and
rogram "B" assumes that two plants are employed for ICBM final assembly, the second identical with the first In capacity. Inwith Soviet practice In multifacuity programs for other major militaryecond plant would lag the lead plant in order to profit from its solution of technical and production problems. In this program, we therefore assume that Ihe second plantits first missile In0 but that its peak production rate ofCBMs perhc average tune involved in ac-one year.
Program "C" assumes the final assembly of ICBMs at one plant, completing its first missile In9 but building upeak rate of only about eight missiles per monther year) byearalf later.
in developing these illustrative production programs, we have assumed that production continues at the slated peak rales throughnce these rates have been achieved. To determine the quantity Of ICBMs likely to be available for operational inventory at any given time, given thc total numberproduced, allowances must be made for the time required in initial checkout andpipeline, and for the missiles that would be expended for nonoperatlonal purposes. We believe it reasonable to allow two months' plpe-
"In reaching thla Judgment. we have taken into account: lai US ex|ierlence In the production of Atlas ami Titan missiles; lb) evidence which leads us to believe lhal the Soviet ICBMne and one-half staged (Atlas type) vehiclearallel slagcd vehicle, with thc former connguratlon somewhat more likely;nd analysis suggesting lhat theweight of lhe Hoviet ICIIM, lesa nosocone and propulsion syttcm. I* SOercent greater than lhat of the Titan; and (d) evidence on the Industrial engineering methods used In constructing the nual stage of the Lunik vehicle.
line between completionissile and its availability for the Inventory. In programs "A" andurther reductions made to account for missiles used in training and proof testing, as well as those that would be unavailable because of normal attrition and major maintenance.uch larger percentage reduction Is made in the period from9 ton thc assumptionarge portion of the missiles series produced during that period were allocated to test-firings and other nonoperatlonal purposes.'*
An allowance ofercent forpurposes may be on the low side,if thereharp Increase in Soviet space launchings and Ln firings of ICBMs for further research and development. However, such demands could be met at least in part by the continued supply of vehicles from the ballistic missile research and development
There follows our summary of the threeSoviet ICBM series productionand the numbers of missiles they might make available for operational inventory at0
Mid- Mid- Mid- Mld-
Program "A" lone plant)
ProcromIt too plants)
Cumulative series TTO
Available for operaUonal
Cumulauve series produc-
Available for 90
"Soviet accomplishment of moreCBM shotspace launchings to date implies that on the order ofasic ICBMhave been expended In test rangeIt Is not known what proportion of these were built as prototypes in the Soviet ballistic missile research facility, as opposed to those assemblederies production facility.
Eslabltshmenl of launching Facilitia*
production ot these missileslittle significance withoutconstruction programs,of related ground support,and guidance equipment. Thelaunchersood measure of theactivity involvediven ICBMit includes all tbc facilities, othermissiles themselves, which arethe operational weapon system.ground guidance facilities, test,maintenance equipment, fueling andfacilities, as well as housing undequipment.
have no new evidence to establishICBM deployment concept. Weto believe that the system could bebut that the overall deploymentmay Include hard or soft fixedmobile units,ombination of In any case, the system willbe heavily dependent on the Sovietand launching sites are notbe found In areas remote from raila fixed deployment system, thewould lie in the efficientcompletion of large-scalepresumably in widespreada rail system, Lhey would lie in theconstruction of special cars.necessary equipment In them, andof complete missile trains; theof fixed facilities atesser part of the eflort buthave to be scheduled Into the entire
e continue to believe that the USSR would seek toarge initial salvoIn its ICDM force. Because of the planned fast reaction tunes of US nuclear deliveryarge initial salvo capability would be essential for purposes of pre-emptive attack against them. By permitting thcand dispersal of aiming points in the USSR, tt would probably also be viewed by Soviet planners as useful for deterrent or even retaliatory purposes. Consequently wc assume that the Soviets would coordinate
their programs for missile production and launcher activation so that, at any given time in the next few years, there wouldough equality between thc number of operational launching facilities and the number of ICBMs expected to be In commission. On this basis, we set forth below three launcher activation programs, generally corresponding toproduction programsnd
inventory ICBMs Inis-
LaunchersFrog ramOperational ICBM
Inventory ICDMs inI-auneher Program "C" Operational ICDM
Inventory ICDMs Id commli-
egardless of the type of sites employed, either of the launcher activation programs in programs "A" and "B" would requireefforts to build up lo peak rates of launcher activation soon after IOC date, and maintenance of sustained rates over aperiod. Program "A" would involve the activation of aboutaunchers per month fromn, and program "B" wouldeak rate of overer monthomewhat longer buildup period. In programhe planned buildup oflaunchers is deferred until theof the IOC ineak launcher activation rate of only about six per month is reached by about
" In eommistJon rates, derived from the working assumptions given In,re as followi:
Mld-mi Mid-ISOreiBt 0 I
e believe that Soviet siting concepts would stress simplicity, but that construction and installation lead times for fixed launchers would nevertheless be on the orderBhe average time involved tnlarge numbers of launchers could vary considerably, depending not only on theof the schedule, but also on such factors as the location and dispersal of Individual sites, the terrain, and the degree of hardness desired. For an ICBM system employing non-storable liquid fuel and radio-lnerllalwhich we believe to be thc case uteven thc simplest Soviet launch site would probably include: facilities for missile receipt, checkout, and minor maintenance; command and communications facilities; launch control and ground guidance facilities; launch pad(s) with provision for missile erectton, fueling, and final checkout It would also beto provide for logistic support, electric power, crew housing, and other supporting functions for Individual launchers orcomplexes. Much of the foregoing,fuel storage, could be rail mounted and therefore require minimal localactivity. However, the establishment of logistic support, construction of facilities on site. Installation of equipment, and checkout of facilities and equipment by operatingwould need to occur in sequence. Our estimates o( the time involved in activating launchersigh degree of austerity, time compression, and efficiency inInstallation, and checkout.
"Tho Assistant Chief ol Staff forof the Army, believes lhat, fornonslorablc liquid fuel
Ume for soft launching facilities would be more nearly from IB to ZS months depending onlabor, and material considerations as well aa such factors as location and terrain. Asis gained the construction time should approach thc lower limit of IBarge number of launching facilities Is to be constructed simultaneously, thetechnical and labor forces and Ihespecialized equipment probably would be dissipatedoint where the construction time would return to the higher limits.
programs "A" andssuminglead time of one year, somewould have had to be undersimultaneously at the beginning of
the endrogramhe simultaneous construction oflaunchers, while program "B" wouldwell. In programplanned buildup in operationaldeferred until IOC date,ewbeen under construction aty the end0 programhe simultaneous construction oflaunchers.
Implications of Programs
program "A" provides. In mld-
of operational missilesslightly larger thans the lower limit of theSoviet ICBM program; inrogram "A" approximatesof thc range given in the previousThe economic effort required forwould depend to aextent on the type of sites employed,themselves probablyercent of the initial costs ofIf fixed hardened sites werethe cumulative initial andof" toouldbe on the orderillion dollars,billion rubles. The use of railwould probably require nearlyeffort, but soft sites could reduceas much asercent. In anyigorous program, but onoconJuncLton wiih other major miliiarycould be carried out withouthindrance to presently planned Sovietand construction programs
program "B" provides, tnnumbers of operational missilescomparable to those previouslyas the upper limit of the probableprogram. We continue to believeexpanded program would Introducethough not Insurmountable, difflcul-
hese difficulties would not liein Uie added costs, but rather in theto attain and properly coordinate high rates of missile production, launcherand troop training early in the Beyondrogram "B" dif-
- tin-hief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, and the Autitant Chief of Naval operation! for InteUigence,of the Navy, call attention to their footnotea to paragraphf the main text.
fers from that in; it illustrates the operational capability the USSR might achieverogram designed toCBMs on launcher Inerethrough the following two years.
llustrative program "C" ls considerably smaller than that estimated In. There Is no reason to believe that the Soviets would have difficulty in carrying outrogram.
ESTIMATED SOVIET LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE UNDER AN OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE
ESTIMATED SOVIET LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE UNDER AN OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE
(Calculated in accordance withpe. Except that fuel reserves are reduced toaximuminutes loiter al Sea Level, and aircraft operate at altitudes pwmllllng maximum radius range}
Ccmbal Rediuif Range (nm)
Maximum speed Otaltitude
ComSol Ceiflnfl 0
0 0 00
Refueling estimates based ujjOo use of compatible tankers which provide approximatelyerceni increaserange.
Toimited number of BADGER*
CapableH.crinE ASndm "dwh".
0 Ib. bombload.
' Service ceiling al maximumone hour foci reserves pint bombload abroad. So ranee figure is AssociiUed with this altitude.
Note: Improvement* of BISON and BADGER airrrafl weon normal expected improvements in the engine*eriod. Tlie AwiaUnt Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAP, believes thai subsonic, nuclear
powered bomber could becomey
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