NIE-THE OUTLOOK FOR THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA(FYI NIE NUMBER IS UNKNOWN)

Created: 7/19/1960

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THE OUTLOOK FOR THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

THE PROBLEM

To re-examine the outlook for South Africa In the light of present racial tension.

CONCLUSIONS

The re cut wave of racial disturbances In the Unicn of South Africa hasour view that Ln that country the years Ahead will be characterized bytension, culminatingafter considerableiii the end of white domination. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that the white minority, with all the powersodern state at Its disposal, andirm determination to use them, will be able to maintain Its dominance for the next fewirs

2 Despite their number, the Africans are presently too weak and disorganized toroad and sustained campaign of resistance in the face of the means ofavailable to the white community. Nevertheless, localizedoycotts, and other manifestations,y some specific grievances or incidents, will probably flare up more frequently over the next few years. The morenor. white elements art likely to turn to terrorism. Africans outside the Union will probably find means ofat least small amounts of arms and other material support to thewithin the Union,

Continuation of Internal strife in this manner will further increase racial tensions tn the cc mm unity and magnify the difficulties of maintaining white dominance. It mayumber of Asian-Africanperhapsadopt economic sanctions against South Africa. It will lead to some local economic dislocations within the country, and will further reduce South Africa's ability to attract thecapital, both foreign andwhich is needed for the country's continued prosperity. )

At present the rather substantialof influence which the Communists bad established within the leadership of the older non-white political movements in South Africa appears to have been hard hit by recent events Sinceew apparatus will probably have to be started at the local level, itbe accomplished rapidly. Thewill be hampered by the absence of reliable and numerous African cadres.

Over the longer run, however, wilh their conspiratorial skills and their ability to get material support from the Bloc,may come to exercise Important influence within the protest movement In the Union.. Although the white communitysupports the government's eflorts to sump out African dissidence, recent events have aroused increased misgivings, even within the dominant NatvParty, as to the coral, economic, andImplications of theQporlheid policy. Within another year or two, the growth of this feeling will probably begin to force some eas.ng of the government's more onerous racial restrictions, but no comprehensiveto non-white aspirations is likely. Probable government concessions are likely to have no more than acalming eflect, and probably will only stimulate pressure for further change)rowing world disapproval of its racial policies will probably push South Africa into an Increasingly Isolated andposition in International afTairs There is at least an even chance that it will be forced out of the Commonwealth if it carries out its plans to become aSojth Africa willarget in the UN for thenumber ofan members, but It Is unlikely to withdraw unless sanctions are voted against it. Given theof both Afro-Asian and South African feeling, the Western powers will find lt Increasingly difficult to avoid offending one side or the other.)

DISCUSSION

INIBODUCTtON

?.of racial disturbances in

South Africa has dramat-caliy illustrated the growing bitterness of the conflict between the deiermlnatlon of the Union's substantial white minorttj to maintain Its traditionaland the trowingnd as-serUveness cf thend other non-whiteof the population.uued on the concept of whitesome three million whites rulingotal population of about IS million -South Africa has long had the seeds oford within ll This haa been especially so since Its development intomodem industrial tute ia which Africans and

wrro vtrd heredentify the bUck South Afrlcani of Bw.tu ethnic origin.b* term applied to ibe whilecc detcendanu of Dutch (Boer) settlers.

other non-white* represent an essentialof the urban laborhese Inherent strains have been intensifted since IMS by the Nationalist policy of apartheid, under whichsingle-minded and determined cJTort has been made to tghten up and systematize the loose body ot customs and regulations through which racial segregation and the white moncpoly of political and economic power had previously been maintained.he SharpevUlt riot of Marchn whichfricans were kited,irect consequenceivil disobedience campaign, end aimed primarily at the highly unpopular pais system on which control over the urban Africans Is largely based. It was followed by an effective stay-at-home strike in the Cape

orof essentialdau,.

Town aica. In theonth*prior to Sharpe-ville eight other outbursts of violence had taken place. Although all were more or less spontaneous flareups touched oft by some local incidentolice liquor raids, the forced removal of Africans from their homes, the banningopulargave eddit.or.ai evidence ot how close the tempers of many urban Africans were to the boiling point.

disturbances not onlyconflicts but themselvesmaterially to an Increase ofthe whites they have aroused asthe spectre of anarchy andthe Africans and other non-whites,displayed by the governmentany manifestations ol protestcertainly provoked -resentmentdesperation. Meanwnile, Southrelations has b'come even more ain the eyes of the world.

PRESSURES rOR CHANGE

espite the relatively large numbersin the disturbances of recent months. South Africa is still far from the pointass uprising by theillion non-whites who make upercent of its population. Active discontent exists primarily among the three Bullion or so urban Africans, whothe best educated and most poetically conscious of the Africans in the Union and are the most heavily burdened by theracial restrictions snd by economic hardships. There Is little indication ofamong tha approximately three million Africans working on white farms. However, there haveccasional disorders in the native reserves, where another three million Africans live under the sometimes tenuous authority of government-approved tribal chiefs and one cannot assume that ruralwill remain quiescent. The Indian and Coloredixed blood) minorities, although their social and economic status hasunder apartheid, still remain morethan the Africans and generally are more passive.

Even amcng the urban Africans there is little likelihoodroadly bawd, closely integrated, and sustained campaign ofcan toon be developed in the face of police countermeasures. The pre-Sharpevllle African political protest organizations which had never really succeeded inroad, organised following, have now beenby the police crackdown, leaving the urban Africans for the moment leaderless and cowed, over and above the problem ofleadership andthese Africans lack the weapons to stand up against the police. Id addition, the fact that most of them liveand-to-mouth basis severely limits their ability to sustain strUres andfor any extended period.

Nevertheless, sporadic manifestations of African unrest will increase in frequency as time goes on. During' year or two these will probably continue to take the fotm of more or less spontaneous local Qareups, In most cases resulting from specific economic or social grievances rather than fiom any polltl* cat motivation. As some semblance ofleadership re-emerges, discontent islikely to Involve strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations designed to bring pressure on the white community, with the objectlhat of forcing removal of onerous racial curbs but with an underlying dttiand for political and civil rights eventually becoming more prominent. Many such strikes andwill lead to at least temporary layoffs among African workers tn other areas and industries and will accordingly lend tothe economic strains contributing to tension and unrest within the African labor force at large.

Olven the temper of the urban African masses and the determination of theto crush all opposition, violence wul probably figure prominently in mostof African unrest. The Jailing of the older and more moderate leaders and the need to operate illegally will probably bringore radical and activist leadership element, operatingarge degreeThe Africans will probably recognize that they would have little hope of develop-

lng an effective armed resistance movement against tee government's overwhelming strength even if they vere able to smuggle in dim) However, the activists among them will probably be increasingly templed lo turn to the deliberate! use of teirorism. regarding it as the only effective means, other than economic pressure, of reinrorcLng their

The growinpirit of resistance among South Africa's urbanini probably spread to thae stimulated not only by the accumulation of local grievances but by the example andof the emerging states of black Africa In sedition to their efforts to bring international pressure against South Africa,ew African states will.almost certainly broaden their eflurts to provide directand support to the Africans of the Union. South Africa has thus far been fairly effectively sealed off from the rest of the continent by the while controlled leirt-toriea of Angola, Southern Rhodesia, and Morambicue, and the delivery of large-scale assistance, whether by sea or by land. Isin view o( the great distance andbarriers involved. However. Africans outside the Union will probably find means of furnishing at least small amounts of arms and other material support to the Africans within the Union.

For the present, the rather substantial structure of influence which lhe Communists bad established within the leadership of the older non-white political movements in South Ali I'M appears to have been hard hit by the post-Snarpeville police crackdown. Since the developmentew apparatus wUl probably have to be started at she local level, itbe accomplished rapidly. The Commu-nista will be hampered by the absence ofand numerous African cadres. Although the oew Afri:an leadership likely to spring up within ths Union will be anxious to get help from almost any source, It wtu probably prefer to get it from other African nationalists. Nevertheless, the Commurust Bloc will seek to exploit non-white unrest within South Africa and sooner or later Is likely to find means of re-establishing contact withelements. Over the longer run, tlicwith their conspiratorial skuis and their ability to get support from the Bloc, may come to exercise unpe.-unt influence within the protest movement In the Union

III. HEACIlONS IN THECOMMUNITY

IT. Following the Sharperille incident, the government moved swuuy to crushsbtanee lo its authority It mobilised the civi'ian ieserves to supplement the military and the police in maintaining order, llall public gatherings. Ittale of emergency giving tne government vast powers unhampered by the usual legalla It arrested virtually all known non-white political leaders and their leading wntU supporters. It banned the principal non-wnne political organizations and tneirAJthougn the pass systembriefly suspended (or tactical reasons, it was soon rc4mpos*d, and thousands of pass delinquents have been rounded up in urban areas, either to be sent to jail or banished to the reserves.

IB The government's prompt reaction has been supportedarge majority in the white community, which for the most part was badly shaken by the eruption of African emotionalism and violence. Such feelings have been particularly strong among rural Afrikaners from whom the Nationalist gov. eminent and Its apartheid policy havetheir principal support. Even those whites who felt mat apartheid was being pushed too rigorouslyeed for stern measures to eruorce order. Following Shsupevllle. available stocks of firearms in tne cities were euickly bought up by apprehensive whites Altnouga the attemptedof Prime Minister Verwoerdpril was tha actemented white man. It has at least temporarily reinforced this tendency to close ranks behind the government.the excesses of the present disorders in the Congo are likely to harden attitudes toward Doo-whitea, With Veiwoeid now veil on the road to rccpveiy. the government will remain dominatedigorous andproponent of apa'theid. Veiwoeid

will almost certainly continue to Insist on strict enforcement of racial curbs and will probably seek to speed up programs designed to Isolate the African labor force as much as possible from white communities.

evertheless, the recent wave ofhas insreased misgivings about the moral and practical validity oias presently applied Even within rulingNationalist circles, the small number of intellectuals and cnurchmen who hadquestioned the direction of South African racial policy has been Joined by most of thrbusiness and financial leaders and by tne principal Nationalist newspaper of Cape PioviT.ee. indeed, one member orlirUs'.er of Lands Sauer, has publicly calledt* look at tneuch reservations: wlU "almost certainly become more widespread as the adverseof continued racial tension on South AfrlcaY economy, international standing, and way of life becomes more obvious. Tnere is at least an even chance that within the next year or two effective pressure for an easing of the more onerous racial restrictions wul emerge. Since the Nationalistsut oi ISO seals in the lower bouse ofIfct development of any effectivefor change willreakdown of the strongVerwoerd has thus far bun able to maintain by virtue of his driving uid ccminant personality, his firm control over most of tne party machinery, and the widespread rani ana-file support for his policies. Any significant tnouiflcatloa of racial poliry would probably necessitate dropping Verwoerd. It might evenoalition between the more moderate wing of the Nationalist Party and the opposiUon United Party, which has long soughtoalition as providing its only hope of sharing power.

xceptmall minority, the white population will probably be willing to offer no more than .United concessions to non-wnltt aspirations Wtule the Afrikaner-barkedParty, snd the opposition United Party, which derives Its principal support from the English-speaking populace, represent widely differing political, moral, and religious concepts, they are In agreement on the need to maintain white dominance Theof the United Party to apartheid has been cast Ln terras of constitutional, moral, andrequirements, rather than of opposition to the concept of white supremacy Such modifications of racial policy as art likely to oeg. the relaxation of liquorIhe easing of the pass regulations, the raising of minimumremove some sources or rriction and thus contributeemporary easing of tension. Although such changei aould probably be welcomed by most urban Africans, these and possibly later educational andn politicalwe'd probably fall well ahort o[ African aspirations and expectations at the lime. Over the long run. such limited eon-cessions will probably serve only to heighten non-white aspirations and demands

IV. TrU INTERNAL OUTlOOX

hus the outlook is for increasing tension and strife We continue to believe that the wnite minority, with all the powersodern stale at Its disposal, andilm determination to use them, will be able to roamuin lu dominance for the next few yean. Indeed, the preponderance of military and economi: power oo the white ude.-together with limited concessions, may result in fairly lengthy periods of uneasy quiet. However, the basic struggle wUl continue,afterthe end of white

ven though we believe that the whites will maintain their dominance over the next few years, the costs of doingI inrrcase Particularly L' terrorism emrrgrsajorf non-white protest, the white population will t* forced to live under greater strain than heretofore and probably to endure continued restriction of while as well as non-white civil liberties. South Africa's international stature will decline.

'Setordmr Sou In African eulliary and security forces-

inally, the continuation of Internal strife ll eirlually cretain to have adverse effects on the South African economy. The cumulative impact ofoycotuisturbances of publicithin the country may be appreciable, even though each separateis short-lived. Wore seriouseonsequencea, however, are likely to flow from actions taken outside the country. Tone has already been much discussion,among Afro-Asian nations, of an Inler-naUonal consumer boycott of South African goods; Malaya has adoptedoycott as public policy. The Conference ofAfrican States, meeting li Addis Ababa inalled upon its members to adopt an extensive program of economic sanctions against South Africa. The effect Of Such sanct.ans would probably not be great in the strict economic sense, for theof South Afrlran national product in-vcJved would be very small On Individual producers, hewever, the impact would bethe psychological effect on the South African business community would probably be marked.

Z'. By far the most Important economicof unrest In South Africa ii the un* easiness which It causes among domestic and foreign investors, [hiring mosi of the period since World War II, South Africa has enjoyed high prosper.tyteady inflow of foreign mvestroenL The recent crisis ledharp drop in the price of South African securitieserious decline in gold and foreignreserves, Indicating some <bgnt of capital. IV.ure disturbances will furtherSouth Africa's ability to attract thecapital, both foreign and domestic, which Is needed for the country's continued prosperity.

V. EXTERNAL REPERCUSSIONSicwlng world disapproval of South Africa's racial policies will push It into an increasingly isolated and controversialin international affairs. The new Afro-Asian nations, whose growing numbers give them an Increasingly important voice not only in the UN but in the Commons, ealth, will almost certainly make intensive efforts to rally world pressure against South Africa toodification of its racial policies. Tbe0 meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers refused to give advance approval of South Africa's continued membership if Itepublic, and there appears to be little likelihood that it could obtain theunanimous consent towiihln the Commonwealth.* Indeed, the problem which South Africa present* to the Cornrnonwealth may prove lo be one of the most difficult in the tatter's history. Although South Africa faces no danger of being ejected from the ITS, it is bitter and cynical about that organisation and, if the US should actually vote sanctions against It. would probablynternational controversy over South Africa's racial policies will pose increasing difficulties fcr the West. The US will be facedilemma. If it cultivates good relations with the South African Government, andif It gives that government material support or allows it to purchase arms, it will incur tr.i vigorous displeasure of many peoples and governments, parti* jlarly the new African nations. It is povlble. for example, that the UN voles of the whole group ofstateside variety of issues tr.iy be affected Oo the other hand. If the US strongly condemns the South African Oov-emmenl, it will deeplytaunch antiCommunist friend, and perhaps lose the use of South African territory lor space trackingor And difficulties put in the way of using South African ports and airfields. An especially serious problem might be posed If rtlended racial clashes ahould occur in South Africa, with heavy loss of life among non-whites as wen as whiles.

NaUonallsU have

fortttJleSou* Africa's allerlance to the BrltUh ftm, and, was recent* adoptedeferendum, limited to trfaiw voters, on lu transformation Into ami* proposal, which wifle put ic Uuthis fail, wul probably b* adopted.

ANNEX A

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

in Union of Soulh Africa, whichingleerritory0 and framed dominion status in the Cominonwraithn outgrowlh of successive Dutch settlements dating back toh century and of later BritishThe tctal population of someillion includes someillion black(officiallyboutillion Color edsersons of mixednd close toillion Indians. However, political, economic and social power remains concentrated In the hands of the country's three million whites. The concepts of white supremacy and raciLl segregation are deeply imbedded in the life of the country.

n Its half century of existence. South Africa has developedrosperous modern statea'icnat Income of well over gsear. Although more than half the population Is still engaged in agriculture, with wool and fruits constituting major export cash crCjil. the country's growth has depended mainly oo exploitation of its mineral resources, notably gold, diamonds, and uraniumsince World War n, the Industrial sector hu also greatly expanded, to the point where it now contributesuarter of the naUonal ir.come. South Africa is now self-surncient ia many manufactured Items and hu developed an important market for those products in neighboring African areas.

lthough impetus and direction have come almost entirely from the whites, the growth of the South African economy has depended heavily on the availabilitylenllful supply of cheap noG-waitr labor. Some three million Africansivelihood from employment on white farms. Another three million are in the urban areu, some working on abasis but many of them more or less permanentlyhe Colored and Indian elements, concentrated In the urban centers of Cape Province and Natal,ajorgricultural, unskilled andlaborers, with the Indians alsou merchants. For the most part the non-whites occupy the lower paid unskilled jobs, with the better posts reserved for whiter (orew cases Colorowever, the giuwlh of the economy hu cade theseIncreasingly burdensome, and aof substantial economic growth will almost certainlyiberalization of labor practices. Even where enough white labor Is available, it Is sometimes Inferior to non-white labor, which Is far better educated and productive than name work forces in other ports of Africa.

4 Direct foreign investment has alsoto play ar. important role Inteady growth of domestic capital resources which hu been marked by an Increasing participationnterprise. Total foreign investment is of the orderS stake ofillion dollars. Thus5 billion fall Ln South African security prices In the three monthsarcherious shock to the South African money market and suggests that surncient external investment to sustain the recent pace ofgrowth will be lacking. The rush by foreign investors to sell South African se-

' The renvstnuie third of the Aiocsn population In the Dative reserves prankes saauunor apl-(ttltnte alone baSiutnal tine*tee a* tfbect contribution la UseO-'. the reserve*e beronteependent on remittances hy urban workers.

curlties and repatriate the proceeds helpedillion lull in gold and foreign exchange reserve! In the three monlhi follow-Uig the Sharpe*lile Incident.

Social cd Politico' Porfet ni InVKife Coi><nt>ni*y

5 The more thanentury which has pasted (tnce the Boer Wir has not eradicated the mutual suspicions and differences Inbetween the Afrikaans-speakingof Dutch settlers, whol the white population, and the English-speaking inhabitants of British stock. Under the Influence of the Dutch Reformed Church and other organisations, most Afrikanersthe Intense sense of mission Inherited from their Calvmist forbearers. There hasamongiery nationalism which regards their success in carvingation on the African continent and the principle of white supremacy on which it has been based as divinely ordained. In contrast, most of the English'Speaking element are descendants of those lured to South Africa by the prospect of economic opportunity. Although theyommon loyalty to South Africa as their homeland, theirlacks the intensely exclusive quality found among the Afrikaners and is tempered not only by their background of British moral and political concepts butreater Sens* oi soentificauoo with the Commonwealth and the UK.

8 The politica] party structure of tha Union reflects this ethnic division. The dominant Nationalist Party, which with the aid ofgerrymanderingf the ISO seats tn the lower house of the Federaland controls aU provincial assemblies except In Natal, is lha chief organ of Afrikaner nationalism, and has worked closely with the Dutch Reformed Church, the Broederband secret society, and other organisations to moid the AfrikanersghUy knit group. The opposition United Party is essentially the party of the Englirh-speaking minority. Although tt commands more voting strength than its S3 parliamentary seats would Indi-cate. It has lacked vigor and has developed no clearly deflr.ed alternative to the rigorous racial policies advanced by the Nationalist. While critical of the lengths to which the Nationalists have gone in enforcing while supremacy, the United Party and the vast majority of the English-speaking population also consider It essential that whitebe continued The only voices favoring any radical concessions to non-whiteare thosemall body of intellectuals, exemplified by Alan Paton and hu tiny Liberal Party and the somewhat larger but stillinsignificant Progressive Party.

The Po'fcy of Aporlheid

he principle of Raosskop or whitewas initially manifestedollection df customs supplementedatchaork of law Although the status of Coloreds and Indians was clearly Inferior to that of the whites,lawir greater adaptability to the modern social and economic order provided them greater opportunity for advancement than Africans. The Africans enjoyed nominal parliamentary representation and the Colored! voted on the same roll as the whites.

B.S. when the Nationalist Parly came to power, the governments racial policies have hardened. As articulated in Afrikaner Naticnahst dogma. Ihe concept of apanhtyi. on which these policies have been based."is an expression, not of racial animosity, butrofound conviction that the nor.-white races are "different" tn their aptitudes and qualities snd their place in the divine scheme ofit is in their Interest, as well as lhat of the whites, that their status and contacts with the white community be carefully circumscribed. Nationalist-led parliaments have appropriated suable sums fee primary and secondary non-whiteas ofr half of the Africanof school age were enrolled. In the last un years the state has also provided new and vastly Improved housing forillion urban Africans. However, the proponents of oportleld Insist that Improvements In theof the non-whites take place within their own communities and that they be

nilei s* much as possible from the whiteTheir avowed elm is the ultimate resettlement or the buik ol the urban Africans on the native reserves, with factories and other sources of employment nrarby, where they can live under their own leaders according lo their own cuitoms.*

a. In practice, however, the net effect ofpolicy has been lo tighten theplaced on non-whites by custom and by their inferior economic status. Theburden falls on the urban African,the whole of whose life is now governed by inflexible regulations and administrative decisions larg-ly administered by local officials and the police. Taxation has been increased, while repres>nution in parliament (three .rats outas been eliminated. Both men and women are now subject to "pass laws" which seriously restrict freedom of mo.-emeat and often separate families; their education is circumscribed, they may no longer enter "while" universities, their place of resi-tence If prescribed by law. and they may purchase land only in specified townships In the native reterves. Africans may not belong to registered trade unions, are largelyfrom entering the skilled trades, and are forbidden to engage in strikes. With few exceptions, they msy not legally purchase or consume liquor, nor, In urban arras, may they brew the traditional "kamr beer."

embers of the two other non-white groups are subjected to leaser but still onerous restrictions. Whilr the Indians are notto the pass laws, they are forbidden to cross provincial boundariespecial permit and are subject to Importanton Und purchases, and face, In many cases, eventual displacement from residential and business properties Since they are still regarded as an unaulmllable elem-nt, they have no vole The far larger group of Coloreds, who were formerly treated as anof (he white race, have progressively lost in status and freedom.6 the Coloreds were dented their long-established right to participate In ordinary elections and were pliced onseparate elKtoril register to elect four white representatives to partii-ment. Other legislation forbids tntermarriige between Coloreds and whites, providesColored Khools. forbids CNOreds from entering "white" universities, denies them membership in "white" trade unions, andforces them to use separate soclil amenities and transportation facilitieso live in segregated areas

Non-White Political Movements

It. Non-white polltkal activity has centered among the urban Africans Organisations representing Colored and Indian Interests were participants In the Congress of Ihe Peopleommunist-dominated united front promoting non-white interests. However, most of the Coloredl have tended to identify themselves with the whi'cs rather than withsocial and economichave been relatively inactive in the political arena.recarious positionelatively sinill. unasslmilated minority, the Indians have been generally passive and the chief significance of theSouth African Indian Congress (SAJC) has stemmed from its ability to pro-ride adricc and (through donations extracted from rich Indian mrrchints) financial support to the African political movements

IS.as binned early Inh* African National Congress (ANC) was the most important non-while politicalFoundedhe ANC hadincreasingly active since World War II Itirgi but undisciplined body of follow-era.particularly among urban Afrl:ans, and as anf political power was unwieldy and difficult to direct, Nevertheless, under

ih* leadership of ex-Chief Albert Luthull. it md greal prest-ge a* ibe symbol of African aspirations anc constituted the principal ichcol for the poliucal education of the African population.

IS. In9 thereew and mare militant Pan.Africanirt Congresseaded Byoungin Bantu languages at ihe University of the Wit waters'and. It was formedroup of IXC dissidents whoBlackpolicy The new organuition was strongly anti-CommunUi in approach and looked for lnsp.ration to African nationalist indent north erf Ihe Union. It rejected the gradualism and nonviolence preached by the ANC and Its Indian and white advisers and vrred instead chreet and Immediate action by Africans to enforce their demands

he PAC was responsible for Ihe anti-pass campaign ofalling upon Itsto: (a) turn in Iheir passes to police stations as an indication of refusal to obey the piss laws any langer; (b) willinglyonsequence;offer no legalfor their actions and refuse lo pay any fines; and (d) 'fill South Africa'shis strategy was calculated not only to eliminate the keystone of the government's racialtt was also designed to remove thousands of African workers from Ihe labor force and thereby lhrea:en South Africa's economy The PAC leaders clearly indicated lhat their ultimate purpose was to bring about an African government In South Africa,3arget date This campaign ledtoarpevUJe the dent ofarch and to the banning of the PAC shortly

Cooununiil Influence

IS Although bannedhe Communist Party of South Africa continues to operate underground. Ite hard-core membership la composed principally of whites butew Indians and vlher non-whites Thewhite South African Congress of Democratsormed in IMS, provides the organisational framework for overtactivities and has on occasiona journal entitled righting. Talk.

It. Communists lh South Africa direct the bulk of their propaganda toward non-whites and their principal organisational efforts toward penetrating and controlling the non-white political movements This they have succeeded In doing In the case of the principal Indian organisation, SA1C, while ihe South African Colored People's Congress, the South African Cor.giess of Trade Unions, and the Federation of South African Women are essentially Communist fronts. Bui Iheas by far the largest racial group andthe principal locus of poltUcal power In South Africa, have constituted the pr-me Communist target, with the African National Congress (ANCl ihe most attractive organira- -tsonal pnse. Since2 Communists dominated the ANC's formil organisational structure and policy directives at the national level, although they had little Ideologicalamong the rank-and-file and several local ANC committees and individual leaders steadily resisted the Communist-controlled national leadership.

ommunist influence within th* ANC was exercisedumber of ways:ew convinced adherents in the ranks of the lop leadership, through mone> provided to the impoverished organisation for operatingand salaries of tlie few full-timeand through the weekly propaganda organ, Nru Age, which had extensive African readership and whichandy club to batter opposition elements within the ANC The disinclination of many respectable and moderate Afrlian* to become involved ln ANC politics further assisted Communist effort* to determine its policies.

lg. In order lo win new adherents to their various front organisations, which Iheyth* ANC to support, the Communists mounted an all-out propaganda campaign against the government's racial policies. However, the Cfcmmunlsta carefully eschewed calls for Immediate action, instead stressing the need for discipline and for building slowly for the future. They extolled passive resist-

hilosophy whichtrong influence or. South Africa's Indian community (of which Mihalmi Osndhlember3nd on miny of the older African readersne Communists' tactical restraint apparently stemmedell-founded fear that any head-ontn the government wouldIn the destruction of the organisational apparatus built up at such great pilni over ro*ny years. This fear appears to have been borne out in large measure since SharpevUle.

ANNEX &

MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES

aU of South Africa's armed forcesrimary mission of assisting inof internal security, thecon Folic* Force has the chief responsibility in thisorcetenerallywell-armed and highly mobilejulpmcnt Includes armored cars, machine guns, and individual automatic weapons Slightly under half ol the police are non-whites who are normally unarmed white on duty. These noo-whltcs are carefully selected and would probably remain loyal to theexcept in the caseull-scale national non-white uprising. As presently constituted the police force Is capable of suppressingand generally preserving order. Organised resistance over widespread areas aould tax its capabilities, however, and again Kftrh* the snobllUation of army reserves. The police are strongly disliked by the bulk of the African populace because of their harsh tactics In crushing political protest demonstia-tlons. Moreover, the police force has been charged with ihe enforcement of the pass laws and other unpopular raciil legislation over the years, resulting In the arrest of about one-tenth of the total population yearly.

The South African Army relies heavily on reserves to carry out Its mission of supporting the police in maintaining Internal security. The professional force on active duty consists ofen. who are concerned mainly wilh training theorce and th*The Immediate source of armystrength is rather the Cifiren Force Composed of part-time volunteerand h'CO's and enlisted conscripts, it Is maintained in an early-ready condition, with personnel assigned lo units near their place of residence. In addition, there ia aorganisation0 men organizedmall units The Commandosholly volunteer body especially trained in marksmanship and infantry tactics. Army mobilisation requirements have beento0 troops withinays, and full mobilization can0 men In the field inays Personnel in all three bodies are drawn from the white population alone.

3 South Africa's Air Forceircraft ofre assigned to tactical units. The force is capable of rapid expansion, drawing onaviation for equipment andersonnel atrength ishiles, ofreeserve forcerew members andsupport personnel could be mobilized rapidly. Tactical strength consists of fire squed-ons, including two Jet interceptor units; no lomber-type aircraft are available. Close cooperation with the army Is stressed In training exercises, and the air force Is proficient In ground support tactics. In addition to Its primary responsibility of supporting ground forces in maintainingsecurity, the air force shares with the navy (and the British Navy) responsibility for protection of the Ka routes around the southern tip of Africa. However. Its capability In this field is limited tosingle maritime reconnaissance squadron equipped with ASW aircraft. South Africa's skilled airmen have excellent fighting qualities.

he active list of the South African Navy now numbers only six combat vessels (DDE and smalleri, two auxiliaries and six service craft. Thre? DDE's are under construction in the UK. Priscnt manpower isO0 backedmall active reserve; all are whiles. The navy lacks any significant offensive power, but has some ASW and mine-sweeping capabilities in home waters. It is currently committed primarily to an internal security role, and during the recent emergency sailors assis:ed the police ln guard _duti ashore I

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