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hite BouseSecurity Council r Department of SUte epartment ofperauonj Coordinating BoardEnergy- Federal Bureau of laveiUgatioo

problems affecting the north atlantic alliance

the problem

To identify the principal problems likely to confront NATO over the next decade.


now appears to betage in which its basic concepts and arrangements will come underquestion. New challenges are being posed by mcreased Soviet power and as-sertiveness and by the unsettled state of the underdeveloped world. The costs and risks Involved in meeting theseare increasing. Finally,within the alliance are beingby the re-emergence ofEuropean economic strength and self-confidence, and by the increasingdisplayed by NATO countries in the pursuit of their own interests. At least for some years to come the attitudes of the UK, France, and West Germany in particular toward NATO problems and relationships will probably be greatlyby their differences over questions of economic and political integration.

NATO will clearly have to deal with the doubts within its membership about the basic military strategy of the Despite continuing USregarding the firmness of its NATO commitments and the importance offor the US, there is increasingto question whether, the US can in fact be counted on to risk nuclear devastation to counter Soviet aggression againstmore imme^cliately,onfident and assertive Soviet leadership will feel as restrained as it has been by US nuclear power. Although NATO's European members wish tothe protection provided by USnuclear forces, the growth of Soviet nuclear missile power has led tointerest in creation of Europeandeterrent forces as well. At the same time, there are also likely to be growing pressures from some European sources to reduce the reliance of Shield force strategy on the use of tacticalweapons, both in response toapprehensions regarding nuclear warfare in Europe and in order to giveider range of choice on how to resist nonnuclear threats. In any event, NATO leaders would almost certainly consider that they would have to have

sufficient tactical nuclear weapons at their disposal to counter possible Soviet resort to such weapons.1 )

Popular reluctance to supportShield forces is Still widespread and mightin the event that Soviet diplomatic and militaryencouraged the belief that anyeffort was unnecessary as well as possibly misdirected. Under suchsome move toward scaling down forma! requirements might come to be the only way of placing NATOplanningoliticallybasis. However, we believe that Western consciousness of the Soviet threat will probably remain sufficiently great to make at least the principalNATO members feel compelled to maintain their present genera! level of military effort If there were agreementhield force strategy placing less reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, the European NATO members might accept andomewhat higher level of effort.' v.

The growing assertiveness cf France, andesser degree West Germany, will almost certainly require that they bereater influence in the military and possibly the political aSairs of the alliance, though de Gaulle's efforts toFrance as the spokesman for the continental members of NATO willcertainly continue to incuropposition. Meanwhile theof military integration is-ukely to become more acute, not only because of de Gaulle's advocacy of the alternative concept of national forces but alsoof the probable growth in thefor unified procurement and command as military weapons systems

'See the footnote by the Director tor Intelligence. Joint Staff, on Conclusion 2.

become more costly and complex.)

he years ahead are likely to witness increased pressures from variousto have NATO members coordinate their policies no: only in the NATO area but throughout the world. Someleaders are deeply troubled both by the growing representation o* theworld in the UN and by the alacrity with which the Sino-Sovtet Bloc has sough: to encourage and exploit the erosion of traditional Western influences in that area. However, continuingof outlook within NATO will make actual development of apolicy extremely difficult, while the strength of neutralism in thecountries will make most of them reluctant to accept developmentunder NATO auspices. (Paras.

S actions and policies will continue to be of critical importance to the vitality and policies of the alliance. NATO'smembers feel less dependent on US material support and are likely to be mere assertive and critical in theirtoward the US than in the past, but they will continue to depend onwith US economic and military strength and on US leadership in the continuing contest with theloc. They can probably be persuaded toreater part of the financial and military burdens of the alliance and might accept some reductions in US force commitments to the extent that these could be justified militarily.they would be seriously disturbed by any unilateral reduction of US forces in Europe which appeared toowngrading of NATO in US priorities.t7)



espite the recurrent crises and changing circumstances which NATO has encountered In Its initial II years. It has thus far come through with remarkably little alteration In its basic concepts snd makeup. Though the specifics of military strategy and planning have changed (especially through theof West German forces into NATO and the introduction of nuclearATO has continued to rely on tha concept of tactical forces backed up by massive USnuclear power.ontinuing shortfall in European military contributions to NATO, it hasey element In the defense cf the West. Though the alliance has been marked by recurrent frictions, notably on matters outside the NATO area. It has remained the cornerstone of the defense policy of most of its members.

NATO now appears, however, to bea stage in which its basic concepts and arrangements will come under increasing question. Certain key elements of the changed situation areand or clearly in the making, notably: (a) Increased Soviet power and assertlvcness; (b) thestate of the underdeveloped world; (c) the Increasing costs and risks Involved in meeting these challenges; and (d) therelationships within NATO. These are briefly discussed belcw.

The growth of Soviet military and economic power hasonfident, assertive, flexible adversary who believes that aoi mutual deterrence Is emerging In which there will be new opportunities for

vancing Communist power by political,and perhaps even limited military means without serious risks of general war. Although Soviet tactics may vary greatly over the next decade, the USSR will almcstexploit the increased prestige andstrength which its technological ad* vance and growing military and economic power provide.

itself is likely to remain thean intensive and wide-rangingSoviet pressures and inducements aimedthe alliance, playing cn suchBerlin and the "GermannUSSR will seek to exploit the greatof the Federal Republic on thesethe varying and oftenaccorded the West Germans bytheir NATO allies.

worldwide spread of Blocinitiative threatens the interests ofin the underdeveloped world.

the assertiveness of thewe believe aredeveloping an operational nuclearwithin the period of thisto pose new problems for the USother NATO members and tostrains between the US and variousNATO allies.

ven without the Communist threat, many parts of the underdeveloped world, and especially areas of traditional Westernore likely to continue in turmoil. By the end of's most colonial territories will have become Independent and new forms of association between them and the West may have developed. However, the immediate prospect iseriod of confusion andin which the divergent policies ofNATO members will be hard toThe underdeveloped nations, with their growing strength In the UN. will almostband together cn colonial issues and will probably make increasing efforts to exert concerted pressure on the great powers in fields directly affecting NATO, such asand East-West negotiations. And at least In the absence of large-scale andexternal economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries, the economic gap between the technologically advanced West and the underdeveloped world will widen, thus deepening the psychological divisions between the two areas.

The costs and risks involved in these challenges appear to be steadily mcreastng. In addition to the economic problems created by the changing situation Li theworld, the increasing sophistication and complexity of new weapons is placing an ever-mcrtasing price tag onodern military posture. Meanwhile, continuingin various aspects of militaryincluding the spacethe possible spread of. nuclear weapons tocreated the fear In many parts of the NATO community that without drastic arms reduction and control the danger of nuclear war will grow.

The relationships within the alliance have become more complex. Although the US has retained military and political leadership in the alliance, there is concern in Western Europe about US will and ability to exercise this role. At the same time, the nations of Western Europe have regained self-confidence and are showing increasing independence In the pursuit of their own interests.

dramatic resurgence of Westernhas left most of Its members bustlingno longer forced to dependUS for economic assistance andsubsidies. At the same time,this resurgence is probablypopular preoccupation with personalwhich has made many Europeanreluctant to meet NATO defense

re-emergence of anEurope has been accompanied byconfidence, vigor, andits key members, not onlyisbut alsois one another. Deis seeking in various ways toown leadership and to Impose its ownin Western affairs. West Germanyover Its "second class" status and

aspiresreater voice in Western councils. The UK is increasingly concerned aboutits speclai relationship with the US in the alliance, whilehe smaller NATO countries are torn between theof closer association with their larger European neighbors and the fear of being completely overshadowed.

c. Finally, the creation of the European Economic Community (or Commor.ith its political as well as economichasew and critical dimension to the interplay of European forces. The0 mayurope economically and to anegree politically integrated, or one in which the UK and Us Outer Seven partners are still isolatedohesive continental bloc, or one In which the march of economic integration has not basically altered present political relationships. In any case, we are convinced that the UK. France, and Westin particular, will be deeply involvedtruggle over questions of economic andIntegration for some years to come and that this will Inevitably greatly color their attitude toward NATO problems and


A. Geoerol

he nature of some of the problems which will confront NATO over the next decade is already apparent and in some cases the search for solutions has already begun. It is clear, for example, that NATO must deal with the growing doubts within Its membership about the basic military strategy of the alliance-doubts not only about the continuing validity of the Shield force concept reflected in the present planning document,ut also about the protection for Europe actuallyby the strategic Sword forces. The changing relationships within the alliance areost of problems and differencesthe direction and organization of

"Minimum Essential Force Requirements,Final Decision or. Report by NATO Military Committee by the North AtlnnUc9. with corrigenda t.nd 3.

NATO. Meanwhile, the erosion ofositions in the underdeveloped world,ith the attempts of the Bloc to ad7ar.ce its influence there, is lending new urgency to questions about how far NATO members should go toward coordinating their political, military, and economic policies outside the present NATO area.

B. Bailc Military Serology Strategic Nuclear Deterrence

So long as the Soviet nuclear capability was relatively modest and dependentomber delivery system, there was only limited disposition to question the original concept of relying ultimately on the threat of nuclear retaliation by US strategic forces to determilitary aggression la Europe. Many Europeans continued to regardeans of formally binding the US totrategy and of making this clear to the USSR and their own publics With the growth of Soviet nuclear and missile power in the last few years, however, serious doubts have emerged about the continuing adequacy of this concept. Although the fears^wldely expressed in the US that the US may be vulnerable to Soviet surprise attack do not appear to have greatly affected European opinion as yet. European NATO leaders have Increasingly taken for grantederiod of "nuclear stalemate" is at hand or fastin which neither side would be willing to strike the first nuclear blow, because it would Incur unacceptable damage In return.

Despite continuing US reassurancesthe firmness of Its NATOand the importance of Europe for the US. there is thus Increasing disposition to question whether the US can in fact be counted on to risk nuclear devastation to counter Soviet aggression againstor. more Immediately,onfident and assertive Soviet leadership will feel asas it has been by US nuclear power. Key European leaders, notably Adenauer and de Gaulle, fear that the changing strategic balance will make the US (as well as the UK) less willing to stand firm against Soviet politico-military pressures. There are appre-

henstons that thewithof its own defense and long-range strike capabilities (for which advanced bases in and around Europe are generallyith balance of payments and other economic problems, and with the problems of maintaining its special position in Latin America"and the Farcut down on its European commitments.

he result has been growing interest in the major continental NATO countries inEuropean nuclear deterrent forces. In this view such forces. If not wholly undercontrol, should be at least far more responsive to European needs and desires than are the existing US nuclear deterrent forces. Thus, even in situations in which the US might appear hesitant to use itsnuclear forces to counter Soviet attacks against Europe, the USSR would still have to reckon with the possibility ofuropean force.

lthough various political and prestige considerations are also involved, thishas provided the rationale for independent British and French nucleartiarx*.uie of reasons the West Germans are showing increasing interest in nuclear weapons under NATOalthough they continue their emphasis on keeping the US and its strategic forces closely bound to NATO. Some of the smaller NATO members remain unwilling to haveweapons, US or other, on their soil-However, we consider it likely that European desiretrategic deterrent of their own will increase with the growth of Soviet missile capabilities.

here have been various suggestions that the US assist in developmentuclear force under NATO control It is argued that this would avoid wasteful duplication in the extremely expensive fields of nuclear weapon and missile development and, by providing for NATO control, would reduce the risksassociatedpread of nuclearWe believe that many NATO members would accept in principle the creationultilateral NATO capability under SACEUR control and not subject to US veto. However, .

retention of warhead control in the handsS national as SACEUR would probably fall short of European aspirations for control of their own defenses and might be ineffective in persuading the USSRenuinelyEuropean nuclear force had been created. Alternative NATO centre!satisfactory to all concerned would be extremely difficult to work out. Francedetermined to proceed with development of its own Independent nuclear capability, and, at least for the present, would probably oppose the organizationATO nuciear force. However, the French might eventually be willing to cooperateATO nuclear force once they had been assured of annational capability and had satisfied themselves they were accepteduclear power along with the US. the USSR, and the UK.*

SeeSfJ. "NATO ReacUona to Possible Forms of US Nuclearated itor further discussion of theof nuclear weapons shanns;.

subject is more fully discussed inlikelihood and Consequences of theof Nuclear Capabilities by Additionalated0

n the absence of progressS-backed NATO nuclear force. West German interest in securingto nuclear weapons by other means will probably be stimulated. Bonn wouldfirst seek to obtain nuclear weapons through bilateral arrangementsa move which would be bitterly opposed both by the Soviets and by many NATO members. If this proved unfeasible. West Germany might decide later in the decade to attempt to associate itself with the French and the other EEC countriesurely continental nuclear program.1 While the creationontinental nuclear grouping including West Germany would also encounter majordifficulties and perhaps vigorousfrom the UK, it would probably notsplit NATO. The magnitude cf thethreat wouldontinuingor the continental NATO members"*to stick together not only with each other but with the UK and the US.

The future of the NATO Shield Forces

There Is also Ukely to be Increasedin some European quarters about the military validity and political practicality ot the present NATO Shield strategy. As rt-Cected inhis calls lor developmentorce equipped with tactical nuclear weapons conslstxg of semeivisions is Central Europe, together with substantial air and naval components. The basic concept is thatcrce would be able to deal with various forms cf hostile military action shortassive Soviet assault on Western Eu-rooe and. Li the event of general war. toor delay thecf Western Europe by Soviet forces pending the outcome of the strategic nuclear exchange. Anelement in this concepteavyon the employment of tactical nuclear weapons from the outseteans ofthe overwhelming numericalof Soviet forces.

The question of the size and mission of NATO's Shield forces has always been avexing one. producing persistenteven among military strategists. Some have argued that US nuclear retaliatory forces provided the only effective counter to Soviet military might and that all that was needed by wayATO Shield was aforce which would symbolize NATOto resist aggression and which, if attacked, wculd servetripwire" for strategic nuclear retaliation. Others have felt that the West must go far beyond the present program in attempting to matchforces in Europe. These differences over Shield strategy are being exacerbated by the growth of Soviet nuclear power and itsfor NATO reliance on tacticalweapons.

As the Soviet nuclear stockpileto grow, the USSR will find iteasier to respond in kind to NATO use of tactical nuclear weapons withoutreducing Soviet strategic attackThe USSR already has sizable numbers of short and medium range missiles which could be used for this purpose. Among Europeans there is concern that even anuclear exchange wculd haveeffects for the heavily populated critical areas of Europe in which NATO bases and installations are concentrated.

There is Inontinuingas to how far the European NATOare actually prepared to go toward pro-viding defense forces of the size and quality deemed necessary on militaryquestion given further urgency by theUS desire to have the Europeans take over an Increased share of the common defense effort now that Europe is againstrong. The force goals set out at Lisbon during the height of the Korean War have long since been drastically scaled down. Nonetheless, several of the Europeanhave been persistently derelict intheir NATO commitments. Largeof the European electorate have been preoccupied with pocketbook issues, skeptical about whether the kinds of war NATO isfor will ever be fought, or generally hostile to the Idea of military preparations.esult some parliaments have beento provide sufficient appropriations to meet NATO force goals or nave adopted short conscription periods which have made It difficult to develop and maintaintrained, combat-ready forces. Insome countries have subordinated NATO commitments to special nationalFor example, the bulk of the French NATO-committed forces has been fully engaged In Algeria for the past several years The British have repeatedly sought to reduce their troop strength in West Germany, citing their budgetary problems and their need to be able to deal with trouble spotsthe NATO area.

NATO Shield forces will almost certainly undergo some modification In the yearsahead. How NATO policy Is likely to veer with respect to the extent to which NATO Shield forces should rely on tactical nuclear weapons and the size of the force required Is far from certain. The complex military Judgments required, in which US thinking willey role, involvedifferences which cannot be readily

solved Much wUl also depend on the extent to which Bloc policies appear to reinforce or reduce the requirements for Shield forces. In the last analysis, the decisions and budgets involved must be approved by politicalwho must be mindful of the popular mood.

We beLeve that there are likely to tepressures from some European sources to reduce the reliance of the Shield force strategy on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, both in response to popularregarding nuclear warfare inand In order to giveider range of choice on how to resist perinuclear threats. However, many Europeans will probablyto believe that nuclear weapons provide the real deterrent to Soviet aggression against Europe and will argue that increased NATO emphasis on conventional capabilities would weaken the credibility of this deterrent. In any event, NATO leaders would almostconsider that they would have to have sufficient tactical nuclear weapons at their disposal to counter possible Soviet resort to such weapens.

Popular reluctance to supportShield forces Is stiil widespread and mightin the event thatdiplomatic and military policy encouraged the belief that any substantial efTort wasas well as possibly misdirected.such circumstances, some move toward scaling down formal requirements might come to be tbe only amy of placing NATOplanningolitically supportable basis. However, we believe that Westernof the Soviet threat will probably remain sufficiently great to make at least the principal European NATO members feelto maintain their present general level of military effort. If there were agreementhield force strategy placing lesson tactical nuclear weapons, theNATO members might accept andomewhat higher level of effort.

Arms Ifmifofrcn ond CcmYo'

related to the future ofposture is the question of armsand control. Khrushchev hasthat he regards "disarmament"ewarding theme to exploit and thatapable of manipulating it for political ends In an era of mounting military expenditures and of revolutionary advances in military weaponry, disarmament Is likely torowing appeal to large segments of the NATO public. Involved tn the disarmament issue is not only the question of nuclear controls, with its special implications for the French, but the poUticaUy delicate question of the extent or Germany's rearmament. This has already contributed to friction between the UK and West Germany.

ver the next decade the USSR willto make persistent and skillful use of the disarmament issue, and Western popular and political pressure for some sort ofin this field will grow. Under suchunless NATO is able to develop andnified position on armsand control there is likely to be athat differences over this subject willthe cohesion of the alliance.

C. NATO Orgcniiafion and Leadtfihip.

The Overall Direction of Ihe Alliance

n practice. NATO has thus far beenby the US and the UK. Actual power has. of course, been primarily concentrated In the hands of the US. which has been NATO's principal source of arms andand which,eries of USCommanders, has taken the lead in the military planning of the alliance. However, the UK has in effect alsopecial rele by virtue of its close political andties with the US and its possessicnuclear capability. Although France isalong with the US and the UK in the Standing Group, which prepares the basicfcr NATO military planning and preparations, its military preoccupationsEurope have helped relegate it to arole. West Germany, together with the lesser NATO members, is represented in the military command structure but not in the Standing Group.

These relationships are now comingincreasing challenge from France and West Germany, both of which feel that they shouldore active role. Theinitiatives thus far have come from de Gaulle, who haseries of proposals generally designed to replace the NATOof military integration with one offorces. He has also sought to promote closer and more comprehensive politicaland torench-ledbloc which wouldoice sec-end only to that of the US in NATO councils, pressures for readjustment are alsorom West Germany, which will almostwish toole commensurate with its growing economic power and the growing importance of the West German militarytoto achievein the Standing Group. Thesewill almost certainly require somein the control of military policy.

ic appears almost certain that France and Germany will also exercise greater influence on the political policies of their allies than in the past, especially If integration under the Common Market produces greatercohesion on the continent. However, many of the divergencies of national interest which have thus far Inhibited broad NATO coordination outside the military field will remain operative. Additional NATOfor political coordination would go part way toward satisfying French aspirations but would not overcome the obstacles to fullnoted above. Not only the UK but also most of the smaller NATO members would oppose Institutional arrangements making France the spokesman for continentalin NATO. Even the Germans, despite their special ties with the French, would not accept such arrangements.

f.-iiegrolion Venus National forces

foresee no easy solution to theposed by French advocacy ofof national forces. NATO hasfully integrated despite itscommand and staff arrangementscommon Infrastructure system. forces Involved in NATO planning have remained under nationalthe US Strategic Air Commandhe UK Bomber Command, and the US Sixthand most logistic arrangements are purely national. However, NATO planning has stressed greater integrationf late the West Germans have come forward with strong pleasnified logistic system which would provide their growing military establishment with needed support facilities in the NATO rear areas. It Is possible that in seme cases greater French autonomy might be accepted without precluding effective cooperation and coordination. However, it is Ukely that the requirements for unified procurement and command will grow as military weaponsbecome more costlyomplex.

D. The Scope of NATO

he years ahead are likely to witnesspressures from various quarters to have NATO members coordinate their policies not only in the NATO area but throughout the world.onsiderable extent the chief motivations will remain those which havemore or less unsuccessfully in the past Individual members will desire to secure the support of thctr allies (especially the US) In their efforts to deal with pressures against their special interests in Asia or Africa. They will also fear that one or another of their allies (notably the US) is pursuing policies in other parts of the world which may involve undue risks for NATO. However, the erosion of the Western position in Asia, Africa, and even Latinthe alacrity with which the Sino-Soviet Bloc has attempted to exploit thisto be giving new cogency to the contention of de Gaulle and others that without coordinated action by NATO the alliance may find itselfSome European leaders are deeply troubled by the growing representation of the underdeveloped world in the UN. They fear that, even if these states do not fall under Communist influence, the weakness,and anti-Westemism of many of their leaders will pose increasing problems for NATO.

ctual developmentoordinated NATO policy, however, will be extremelyFcr the immediate future the issue will probably revolve around the efforts of France, Belgium, Portugal, and perhaps the UK to secure unified support for theirin Africa. However, there are significant differences in outlook in NATO on colonial matters, not only between thecountries and ethers such as the US, West Germany, and the Scandinavians, but also among one another. Moreover, some NATO countries would be unlikelyoordinated NATO economicechnical assistance program. This iathe case with France and Portugal, whose African policies are designed tospecial economic and political ties with their present or former colonial territories.

ver the next decade It will becomedifficult in many former colonial areas to preserve the kind of special economic and political relationships with the metropole called for under the French Community and at least initially contemplated by Belgium for the Congo. This is especially so In view of the tendency of many new countries to adopt nationalistic economic policies, the falling off in many instances of foreign investorand the probable expansion of Bloc trade and aid activities. Such prospects may give rise to new proposals for NATOin the economic development field. However, the strength of neutralism In the underdeveloped world will make thecountries reluctant to acceptunder NATO auspices. In thesethe NATO countries will have to consider whether to proceedilateral basis or to use" or other international organizationshannel for development aid.

E. Other Problem*

arious other problems also exist or may arise:

a. There will be the continuing problem of East-West trade (eg. levels of credit granted by NATO countries to Bloc countries,on Bloc purchases) and the relatedof trade controls.

question wtlt continue to beNATO's reiatlcnship withWorld alliances. The membershipNATO countries in two or morewill continue to pose problems in

problems will arise as tocertain Instances NATO membersin their collective NATO capacitythe UN, or ether international

question of NATO membershipto come up again, particularlylo Spain.

problems havingfor NATO are likely to arisein the crucial cases of France andbut also in such countries asand Portugal and possibly Italy.

ther possible developments In the course of the decade could have Importantfor NATO. For example:

serious declines in the level ofactivity of some or all of thewere to take place, strainsmembers in the economicgreatly increased.ajoroccurred in the US. theencounter very great difficulties.

a radical break in theovietshould occur, as we believe urilikely.substantially affect the nature ofthreat to Europe.'

Is also'the possibility ofmilitary developments which mightextensive reconsideration ofover and beyond thatbove.


olution of the problems discussed above is complicated by the fact that they are linked together, along with the critical problems of economic Integration and trade blocs,omplex readjustment of relationships not

only as between the US, Canada, and theNATO members but among theThus, proposed solutions to any given problem will be judged by NATO's European members net only in terms of their value in strengthering the alliancehole but also for their implications for the individual national pcsltieE and aspirations of theor countries concerned.

B. France

De Gaulle's return to pewer has brought important elements of strength to France and the West. He has overcome, at least for the present, the political weakness and drift which had previously disrupted andFrance. However, the extreme character of many cf his views has posed majorin" NATO; indeed, one of the principal questions facing the alliance is how tode Gaulle without weakening NATO's posture.

De Gaulle wU! almost certainly continue In various ways to press toward his goal of establishing French powereadership on the continent. Heontinuing need for NATO and for close US association with it. However, his belief that integration of forces in NATOerogation of national sovereignty will not die easily- De Gaulle will also continue his efforts toFrench hegemony by developing the EEColitically as well as economically close-knit bloc. This wlli almost certainly involve major strains with the UK and at leastfriction with the smaller EECand West Germany. Without progress toward an Algerian solution, the bulk of French forces will remain in Algeria and the French will probably be more vehement than ever iniheir.demands.for suds


Germany will alsoereassertive role in NATO affairs in theTo te sure, the West Germanscertainly continue to believe thatgo It alone and must instead baseon participationtrcng.NATO and on strengthenmg theirand pclitlcai ties with Franceother EEC partners. However, theof German eccncmic andIs already producing changes ingreater sensitivity toand ether Western criticism cf theby theincidents andbase agreement with Spainreater dissatafactionarms restrictions directed at them.the nuclearcnnuclear fields.Ukely to bring recurrent pressures onfor political support on such Issuesand reunification, and to criticizefor what they regard as weaknessthe Bloc and as div:de-and-rulethe continent. At the sameis likely to be continuingfor political leadership of theThis is likely to manifest itself infriction with France over themanner of economic and politicaland over the issue of militaryon which West German views,from those of de Gaulle.from the "scene wouldto an increase in Germanprobably notignificantilitantpolicy or toward neutralismwith the East.


the next decade, the UK'samong the European membersis likely to face serious challenges.of the Common Market threatensthe UK economically and to andegree politically from thethe European Free Trade Association

(EFTA, or Outer Seven) promises little by way of compensating benefits nor has it been very effective thus farargaining device. The UK has had to back away from its ambitious efforts of thes to develop andits own long-range missiles. With the growth of West German military power the importance of the British Army on the Rhine has declined.

ritish acxommccaticn with the Ccmmcn Market wiU remain difScult to achieve.the Sritish win to some extent be able to play cn West German resentment of French efTcrti to dominate continental affairs, these prospects are dimmed by Germanof British policy toward theand by the persistent suspicion cc the Germans among the British people. At ieast tor the present, the strong Interest inwith the USSR displayed by theand even more strongly by the Labor

he smaller members of the alliance will also have theirin the Outer Seven becauseof the threat to their economic interests in the Common Market area, the EEC members because of the looming power of France and West Germany, and all of them because the growth of big power influence wUl relegate them to seats even further to the rear in the NATO conference room. On the whole, however, we believe that these countries will continue to believe that their interests can best be served within rather than outside the alliance.


In contrast to the early years of the alliance, we see the NATO ofs as one in which Western European members feel less dependent on US material support and are more confident and assertive. Her.ce they axe likely to be less responsive to US wishes than in the past and will probably seek in various ways tc enhance their own statusis the US.

Nevertheless,ore fully integrated and seLf-suf&cient Western Europe would not match the power of either the US cr the USSR, and would continue tc depend cn association with US economic and military strength and on US leadership in thecontest with the Stnc-Soviet Bloc. Indeed, the growth of Bloc power and of Blocagainst the non-Communist world may push the European NATO members toward even closer association with the US than at present. Specifically, the European NATO powers will continue to rely on US strategic deterrent forces to play an important role in bolstering European defenses and on the US to carry much of the burden of weaponsThey will also continue to lock to thethe most powerful NATO member, and one largely detached from intra-Euro-peantake the lead In proposing policies and resolving differences.

Hence the European NATO countries will remain highly concerned to assure continued full US participation in the alliance, despite their tendency to be less tractable under US leadership than in the past. They canbe persuaded toreater part of the financial and military burdens of the alliance, and might accept some reducticn in US force commitments to the extent that these could be justified militarily. However, they would be seriously disturbed by anyreduction of US forces in Europe which appeared toowngrading of NATO in US priorities.



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