SNIE 65-61: MAIN ELEMENTS IN THE CONGO SITUATION

Created: 1/10/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

BRIEF

: Main Elements in the Congo Situation

This Special National Intelligence Estimate was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on Judgments of the estimate are as follows:

There is still no effective central government in Large areas of the country, as well as majorthe National security forces, remain outside of The Congo National Army (CNA) is a

disorganized and undisciplined force consisting of0 men of the former Porce Publique. Tribal animosities or immediate needs, such as food and pay, often determine the direction of CNA loyalties and the course of the troops' frequently capricious and disruptive actions. Nevertheless, the forceey factor in the situation since nearly all important Congolese factions depend upon some Army unit3 for support. In some outlying areas UN forces have almost no control of the situation. Anarchy lies close to the surface and political fragmentation continues. The UN's diminished ability to serveestraining Influence on the several external and Internal forces maneuvering in the Congo has allowed tensions toirise. Under these circumstances new opportunities for short and long range Bloc exploitation arc increasing.

" Given present trends.-Kf spplcproveHru^and.y none at alleolalve outcome which wouldA3 civil authority continues to be exercised in haphazard^ often arbitrary, and sometimes violent fashion, tribal warfare and blood feuds are likely to lead to more widespread disorders. There is no indication that the Congo isationalational party,ational consciousness. instabilityrand scale, probably leading to increased violence and othor excesses, both organized and disorganized, appears to be the most likely prospect for the Congo for some time to come. This might result in the disintegration of the Congoumber of separate Btates. As long as the UN retains an effective military presence it will probably continue to supply some modicum of public order, and more Importantly to put some restraint upon the intervention of outside powers. Yet this restraint will be only partial. It is virtually certain that any individual or faction within the Congo which promises to gain enough power toovernment will be supported by outside powers, but will be opposed by other Congolese factions which are also supported by outside powers, and so will be rendered largely ineffectual.

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Original document.

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