Created: 4/6/1961

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



attitudes of key world powers

on disarmament


The foBoidng Intelligence organisations participated in the

preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence

and the intelligence organisations of the Departments^the Army, the Navy, the Air Forte, Tha Jetnt Staff,

Atomic Knergg Commission, and the National Security



onApril IMI. Concurring tert The Director of Inference and Research, Deportment of State: the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department ot the Army; the Assistant Chief of Navalepartment of the Navy; the Assistant chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Com-mltston Representative to the USIB; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of hti jurisdiction


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Federal Bureau of Investigation



the problem

To assess the underlying motivations and objectives of key worldUSSR, Communist China. France, tlie UK. West Germany, andthe field of disarmament and arms control.

as used in this estimate, refers generally to all forms and degrees of arms limitation, controls, regulation or reduction, and is not restricted to the idea ol abolition of armaments. Where useful or necessary, the terms "general and complete disarmament" or "arms control" will be specified in theaccording bo the context.

ThLs estimate does not aim to present the detailed negotiating positions of tho various powers on all disarmament issues, or to examine the merits of differentproposals, but rather to inquire into the underlying motivations and factors affecting the general attitudes of these states


It is clear that the Soviet leaders see, In agitation of the disarmamentrime opportunity to further theirpurposes in the non-Communist world. What is not so clear is the extent to which they may actually desire toagreements on disarmament. In approaching this latter question, they are influenced In contrary directionsariety of considerations.

ommunist ideology sanctions the use of any means which is deemed expedient to advance its cause. Military power in various forms, including the delivery of arms, is one of these means, and theleaders are using it to extend their control and influence. At the same lime, Marx ism-Leninism, while favoring and supporting "wars ofeaches that the fundamental political.


and social forces at work in the world can bring about the eventualtriumph of communism. Anddoctrine enjoins the USSR toand support subversive andactivities to accelerate finalOne theoretically possible way Ut give revolutionary forces freer play would be by reducing or eliminating Western military farce through agreements onMarxism-Leninism therefore permits the Soviet leaders to consider that if the armed forces of their opponents were reduced or eliminated, the results might be worth limitations of their own military power, always provided thepower balance was not shifted to their disadvantage.

The Soviets are also concerned by the consequences to them of general nuclear war. Wc believe that they continue to thinkomplete ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be to theirThey also see advantages in some kinds of disarmament measuresagainst the various ways in which nuclear war might break out. They are probably also attracted to disarmament measuresossible means ofa military advantage by encouraging the West to cut its defense efforts even further than the terms of agreement, and oflimate of relaxationto Communist

On Ihe other hand, the Sovietsdangers and disadvantages in the prospect of substantial disarmament. They are deeply conscious of the impact which the image and the substance of their military strength have made upon the world, of the security which that strength has given them as compared with their exposed position in the past, and of the respect which it has compelled from other nations. Furthermore, the USSR would be reluctant to undertake measures which might endanger its control over Eastern Europe or alter the relationship of power, and hence of political weight, between itself and Communist China.

From the Soviet point of view, the greatest difficulty in reachingagreements favorable to theirworld objectives is presented by Western requirements forrimary reason for the strong Sovietto inspection is military: havingsecrecyajor militarythe Soviets are reluctant to impair and unwilling to relinquish secrecy until assured that the enemy has given up the forces which might use in an attack the knowledge acquired through inspection. Another is political: while the regime's anxieties concerning contacts betweencitizens and foreigners arethe implications of an internationalwith theand recognitionigherin the controlinimical to the political outlookby the Communist Party. Finally, the Soviets obviously oppose effectivebecause it would foreclose the option of evading the agreement.)

Apart from these considerations, the Sovietsost lively sense of the political uses of talking aboutRealizing that the intricacies of the subject are little understood, they have hit upon their proposal for general and complete disarmamentay to capture the universal yearning for peace



and, at the same time, to label the West as "against" disarmament. It isroposal which they expect to have to make good on, but itighly potent instrument of political warfare. (Para. 3D

The Soviet leaders may conclude,that some more modest proposals ofler sufficient advantages, in terms both of their particular effects and the impetus they would provide to general agitation of the disarmament theme, to justifyupon serious discussions of limited measures. They expect their advocacy of general and complete disarmament totrong position for them in any such negotiations. To date, however, the disadvantages of limited measures,the inspection they would entail, appear to have predominated in Soviet thinking. )

The Chinese Communists approach the disarmament questionifferent spirit. They are less concerned than the USSR with the dangers of war, and they regard the tactic of negotiation with the enemy as offering dubious prospects and tending to sap revolutionary fervor. Pei-ping's primary interest in disarmament, therefore, lies in the politicalrecognition, the return of Taiwan, admission to theit hopes to extract when its participation innegotiations is sought.

The Chinese leaders are determined touclear capability and appear to suspect (probably rightly) that Soviet disarmament policy is designed in part to delay or prevent this. They areto forestall any agreements which might have this effect, such asuclear test ban and an agreement not to transfer nuclearand technology to other countries. Wc believe that, as China's weight within the Bloc grows, certain arms control measures are becoming more attractive to the USSR, while at the same time Chinese pressures are impinging upon Sovietof action.

he strongest support forcomes from Canada, which isconcerned with being caught upuclear war and has attempted toa role for itselfeader ofrging the major contestants into serious negotiations. Another strong supporter of disarmament is the UK. which sees in arms controlhance Lo close the nuclear club and to initiate movement toward an East-West detente. In spitetrong and genuine interest in disarmament both at theand popular level, the government does not wish to Jeopardize itswith the US by separating itself too far from US policies on disarmament. France, on the other hand, is determined not to be prevented from acquiring anuclear capability. Frenchon disarmament will continue to be based on considerations of nationaland the satisfaction of de Gaulle's desire for international status, even though his determination to acquireforces is not widely shared by other French political leaders or even by many military leaders. The West Germantoward disarmament is marked by an intense preoccupation with theof any general disarmament agreement for the special securityof the Federal Republic. As West


Germany's national power Increases,schemes confined to Central Europe,

believe that it willorethat these would discriminate

voice in disarmament matters. them and jeopardize collective se-

France and West Germany opposewith tlie West.)



A. General Considerations

may bo worth recalling thathe Soviet Union appeared onscenepectaculardisarmament. Maxim Litvinovtlie world adopt not merely thecarefully hedged proposals forwhich had long been discussednations, but general and completeUtvlnov's effort gainedand won considerable acclaimUSSR, but came to nothing.

ven though the world situation hasaltered, the Soviets recognize now. as they did then, that disarmamentheme for propaganda. They sec the opportunity to identify themselves with popular yearnings for peace, and with the promise of transferring resources expended on armaments to the furtherance of social and economic development throughout the world. Since the intricacies of negotiatedare little understood by the generalthe Soviets hope to be able to discredit the West by labeling it as "against" disarmament, and therefore against the good ends associated with disarmament. They have given increased emphasis to disarmament as one of the central themes of their worldwide propaganda assault on the US and other Western powers,ar for example with the theme of anUcoloniallsm. Their claim to repeated initiatives foras against the alleged Western opposition or mot-dragging on it. is Intended to mobilize world opinion in general support of Soviet conduct and purposes on thescene.

This propaganda effort obscuresrevolutionary alms, and disposessectors of opinion In many countries to accept platforms of Joint political action with the Communists, It thus operates inof current Communist "peacefultactics. The "struggle" foris usednifying slogan to draw Socialist, pacifist, and left-oriented groups Into working cooperation with thethusattern of Joint action which enables the Communists toarger popular following than theirdoctrines alone can gain for them. These "unitedhe Communists hope, can then be manipulated in support ofother tactical objectives they may be pursuingarticular country. At ahowever, such political agitation fronts help to promote dissension within and among the Western nations. At the same time,ore general plane, disarmament appeals are directed toiew to seeking their diplomatic alignment with the Bloc. The issue ofas the Soviets sec lt. therefore, merges into the general struggle between the two world systems.

Communist ideology sanctions the use of any means which is deemed expedient toits cause. Military power in various forms, including the delivery of arms, is one of these means, and the Communist leaders are using It to extend their control and influence. At the same time, Marxism-Leninism, while favoring and supporting "wars ofeaches that thepolitical, economic, and social lorces at work in the world can bring about the eventual worldwide triumph of communism And Communist doctrine enjoins the USSR

lo instigate and support subversive and revolutionary activities to accelerate (lnal victory. One theoretically possible way lo give revolutionary forces freer play would be by reducing or eJlmwatuig Westernforce* through agreements onMarxism-Leninism therefore permits the Soviet leaders lo consider thathe armed forces of their opponents were reduced or eliminated, the results might be worth limitations of their own military power,provided the military power balance was not shifted to their disadvantage.

uch broad political and ideologicalhowever, are not all that form the Soviet attitude toward disarmament The leaders of the Soviet state must also give attention to the practicalities ofthe virtues and defects of variousfor arms control, and the tactics ofThe Soviet approach toon this level is influencedumber of contradictory considerations, which may affect different members of the Soviettn varying degree. The "real" Soviet position can only be ascertained In actual negotiations.

mong the practical and immediatewhich have influenced Soviet views on disarmament in recent years, lhc most compelling has almost certainly been an acute realisation of the destructive power of nuclear weapons The Soviet leadersregard general nuclear war as the one contingency which would gravely threaten their nation and the cause of communism. While they consider their own growingnuclear powertrongloar. they remain concerned that it might occur, and are anxious lo reduce and if feasible to eliminate this possibility.

hort of the virtual elimination of the possibility of nuclear war by disarmament measures, the Soviets are probably Interested In arms control agreements to reduce the chances of unintended or accidental nuclear war. In this connection, they showconcern over the "Nth countryor acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries, and prefer that thefor touching off nuclear war not be permitted lo spread to US allies andor indeed to their own allies.

The Soviet leaders probably also see some chance of obtaining, through arms control measures, political and military advantages in the retraction of Western military power. To diminish Wesiern military means ofsubversive, revolutionary or otherin non-Communistin Algeria andIn their viewan important gain. Thus the Soviets probably believe thai Mwne disarmament agreements, while putting equal militaryon both sides, could be to their net advantage. They may also think that limited arms control measures would engenderunilateral Western militaryThey may even think It possible to get some agreements with control provisionsharacter which would permit evasion with little risk of detection. While the Soviets probably do noL expect Western acceptance of measures which givelearlyadvantage, they do seek to stir up public pressure and to divide tho Western allies In efforts to maximize the advantages they might obtain.

Disarmament measures wouldeneral climate of politicalin the non-Communist world.ery limited agreement on arms limitation or reduction would arouse widespreadof improved relations and furtherAs the Communist military threat seemed to recede still further ln the new climate, the Soviet leaders would expect that differences among the Western Powers would become sharper, and that their alliances would tend to be undermined.

ossible Soviet Incentive foris the economic burden of the arms race. The Soviet leaders are bound to be concerned by the growing cost of complex modern weapons systems. However, they have eased their present economic burden, following the Western example, by unilateral reductions in manpower and In marginally useful older weapons systems We do not believe that the economic burden of the Soviet

miliiary establishment is so great as to exert compelling pressure for arms reductions. There might be economic benefits in limited disarmament arrangements (offset in some cases by the costs ofndmight reduce pressures for higher arms outlays. By and large, however, the economic factor would probably be of minor importance in any agreements short of comprehensive disarmament.

Along with the advantages ofthe Soviets see substantial dangers and difficulties. As good Communists, the Soviet leaders envisage in some far future aworld without arms and without war. For the present, however, they are deeplyof the impact which the image and the substance of their military strength has made upon the world, of the security which it has given them as compared wilh their exposed position in the past, and of the respect which it has compelled from other nations. They arc aware of its usefulness as an instrument of politics, and of intimidation. They will not easily give up any appreciable portion of this element of national power.

Of all the practical difficulties standing In the way of various arms controlfrom the Soviet point of view the greatest is probably that presented byrequirements for inspection. Obviously, in negotiating any agreement the Soviets would hope to leave open for themselves the option of evading it. and would resist demands for Inspection procedures which foreclosed this option. But their objections go much further. The USSR has traditionally given extraordinary emphasis to military secrecy. One of the USSR's major military assets is its ability toigh degree of secrecy concerning weapons production, deployment, and performance. Thus, in the Soviet view,omparatively small amount ofwouldajor sacrifice ofassets by the USSR, and could not be justifiedery substantial sacrifice of military assets by the US were assured. We believe, tor example, that the Soviets are so averse to letting foreign inspectors locate their long-range missile sites that they would not permit the West to obtain such information except as part of the mutual elimination of all long-range striking forces. Particularly if they were concealing considerable weakness in the ofTenslvc missile field there would be an additional incentive not to permit this to become known. The advent of effective US reconnalssuncc satellites mightitigating effect on Soviet aversion to foreign inspectors, especially if the Soviets were not able to counter them.

A second aspect of inspection which greatly concerns the Soviet lenders is theon Soviet society of the presence ot large numbers of foreign inspectors having certain rights of movement and inquiry. Therecognitionigher sovereignty ln the international control organization does not fit Ihe pattern of authority which has been created In the USSR. Cooperation on socale with the "enemy" would also run counter to the idea of ideological conflict on which authority in Communist society greatly depends. The Soviet leaders are also concerned over possible subversive contacts, though such concern has declined in recent years as the regime has gainedin the loyalty of its people, as thein standards of living has lessened, and as tourism and cultural und otherhave expanded without serious

While their concern for secrecy remains high, the Soviets are apparently now at least willing to contemplate some limited inspection arrangements, as they have Indicated, forin connection with negotiationsuclear test ban. The political causes of Soviet secretiveness have lessened In recent years and we believe that they will continue gradually to diminish. However. Moscow's desire to preserve its advantage of military secrecy is likely torincipal obstacle to disarmament agreements requiringcontrol arrangements.

Another significant factor in Sovieton disarmament is the effect It might have on the USSR's position within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The Soviet leaders would be very apprehensive about the sta-



of the satellite regimes in Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany, if the shadow of the Soviet military power were substantially diminished. Furthermore, they would be very much concerned over measures which altered the relationship of power, and hence of political weight, between the USSR and China. For example, disarmament of Soviet nuclear-missile forces would at the least make China's vastore important counter in the scales of power, as well as removing one of the key indices Of Soviet strength.

Chinese Communist attitudes are coming toeightier influence on Sovietpolicy. These Chinese attitudes are outlined later, but here we must note that the prospects for Chinese accession to disarmament measures are very poor, at least unless extreme political demands arc met, and that Peiping cannot be compelled to join agreements simply at Moscow's behest. This presents the Soviet leaders with numerous complications. They are probably movedcertain arms control agreements by the desire to restrain Chinese nuclear weapons development. On the other hand, they must calculate the degree of pressure they can exert upon their ally without imperiling the alliance They must foresee the concessions which the Chinese may demand from the West and from the USSR itself. In general, we believe that China's weight within the Bloc will grow, and that the importance of such considerations for Soviet policy will increase.

A final restraininghe Soviettoward disarmament is the general area ot uncertainty, the "unknowns" that would be involved In embarking onrucially important new field markingstrategic decisions and not fully calculable consequences. These unknowns include the risk of oversight in devisingmeasures and controls, andpolitical effects. These concerns are, of course, most prominent in considering drastic moves such as general and completeand their weight probably varies in the thinking of different members of the Soviet leadership.

It is difficult to Judge huw the Soviets might balance all these incentives andln making decisions on anyor arms control measure. Since they use propaganda both to increaseon the West to accede to agreements which they desire, and alan to mask orproposals which they do not, the real Soviet preference seldom is clear from the public propaganda face, ln negotiation,techniques of pressure to extractconcessions before agreement generally make It difficult to divine the true Soviet

The Soviet leaders think It highly unlikely that the leaders of tho "Imperialist camp" would willingly give up principal elements of their power. Accordingly, they almostdo not believe that any substantial disarmament agreements arc likely to be soon negotiated with the West. On the other hand, they do believe that pressures forcan be placed upon the Western leaders by aroused public opinion and byamong the Western states. Theythat the West will seek to gain maximum advantage in any negotiations, but they may believe that in some cases the West would see sufficient benefit to Itself or find Itself under sufficient pressure to agree lo some measures which the Soviets also desired.

B. General and CompUte Diiarmomeni

we have noted, thereense inwould view general andevolt! tlonary politicalfacilitating the victory of worldthrough political, economic, andmeans. Moreover, the danger ofor desperate Western attackseriously arrest the course, if notoutcome, of the historical movementworld to communism, would beFurther, il Is the disarmamentmost likely to offer substantial gainsmore rapid achievement of economicCommunist society, and to causeto sufler economic dislocationAt the some time,complete disarmament would involve


many of tht' disadvantages which we havediscussed, such as the loss of military might, the political implications of inspection, the risks of evacuating Eastern Europe, and Ihc reduction ol the USSR's weight withinoc.

t is certain that the Soviets wouldeneral agreement committing all parlies to achieve general and complete disarmament But it is almost as certain that, in theon practical details, particularlythey would be unwilling to meet Western requirements or to carry out such disarmament. They probably do not expect to be confronted with this sort of problem, however. Their ideology leads them to see certain advantages for their cause in general and complete disarmament. It also makes them believe that the capitalists will recoil irom the proposition, and that they will never have to make good on on agreement. Almost certainly, moreover, they recognize that the practical difficulties of enforcing general and complete disarmament, throughout the entire world, would be virtually insuperable. They are also aware lhat lt has been arms or the threat of arms which has enabled thebloc to expand, and in any finalthey would give great weight to this fact. Thus they probably have not felt it necessary toinal decision on whether aworld would on balance beto them. But theyel themselves free to advocate this measure In order tothe "peace" theme In world opinion and to put the West on the defensive In disarmament negotiations It isroposal which they expect to have lo make good on. but itighly potent instrument of political

C. Comprehensive Partial Measure!or some time the Soviet leaders havethat they have no interest In measures of partial and comprehensive dlsarmament-thot is, measures for across-the-boardof weapons and military establishments, but without their abolition. Probably the chief reason for this Soviet attitude Is that any advantage they might achieve thereby would not be sufficient to compensate for the amount of Inspection and control which would be required. Moreover, the Soviets wish to stick to their propaganda lor general and complete disarmament, and to denounce all half measures. They have proclaimed their willingness to discuss what are In effectpartial measures, with controls, if these were clearly stages on the wayirmly assured general and complete And It Is possible that they mightan interest In and proposemeasures outside the context of general and complete disarmament, providing that the degree of disarmament was. in their minds, consonant with tho degree of inspection. In this field the possible permutations andare almost Innumerable, and wcattempt to estimate how the Soviets might respond to various proposals.

D. Particular Arms Control Measures

The Soviets have taken the positionommitment to general andinal goal must precedeof particular arms control measures. They may, however, have an Interest inagreements which would serve particular military or political purposes. If so they would probably agree to discuss suchsingly or in combination, seeking lo put these discussionsramework of progress toward general and completeIt Is possible that two or more measures in combination might in Lheir tola) implications be either more or less acceptable to the Soviets than any one of them taken by Itself. In the following paragraphs weseparately the chief arms controlnow under active or prospective

Huclear Test Ban. The Soviets have seen several advantages to themselves In anbanning all nuclear weapons tests. They hope that such an agreement would gain them credit for having initiated an Important step toward peace, would raise obstacles to the spread of nuclear capabilities to additionalWest Germany and Communistwould lend Impetus to


the movement toward general disarmament. In recent months, however, there have been indications that Soviet interestest ban as an isolated measure may be declining. II this proves to be the case, it may be that the Soviet view has been modified because of pressure from their Chinese ally, because of recognitionan Is not likely to be effective in closing the nuclear club, or becauseesire to free themselves from present constraints on testing and the hope that the L'S will lake the onus of doing sot is an open question whether they now see enough advantage in concluding anto move much closer to Western terms.

CvtofJissionable Materials Production and Reduction of Stockpiles. We believe that the Soviets probably do not favor anto couse production of fissionablefor weapons purposes at this time,because we do not believe that the Soviets have met their stockpile requirements. The Soviets might at some time agreeutoff, but only if they had met theirstockpile requirements, If Ihe control and inspection system were not unacceptable in lis scope, and if mutual reductions olstockpiles could be made inay that the relative power position of the USSRis the US was at no stage impaired.

f/ontransfer of Nuclear Weapons fo Nth Countries The Soviets probably would like to prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to any country not now possessing suchThey consider that the emergence of new nuclear powers would in no case be of advantage to them, and could be particularly dangerous in West Germany and Communist China They are. however, subject to pressure from their Chinese ally, which ii strongly opposed to any arrangement which would effectively and permanently bar it froma nuclearrohibition on transfer of such weapons. If coupled with

'The question of whethert Ihe Soviets have conducted covert nuciear tests Is not discussedis paper.

Assistant Chief or Staff. Intelligence, USAF, believes there is evidence to Indicate the Soviets hiivc continued nuclear testing.

a universal nuclear test ban, would seriously impede acquisition ofapability both by China and by Germany. It is likely,that the Chinese Communists would exert sufficient pressure on Moscow to block one or the other of these measures. The USSR would almost certainly insist that any agreement on nontransfcr be applicable lo alliancesATO) as well as to individual countries, and they might also try to make it dependent upon US willingness to give up the stationing of nuclear weapons in other countries.

The Director of Intelligence. Joint Staff, would write the first two sentences as follows: We believe that the USSR continues to favor aban on the use of nuclear weapons,they believe these weapons constitute the principal obstacle to their attainment of Iheir objectives by the use or threat ol lorce and because they believe themselves to enloy ain conventionalhe Director of the Atomic Enemy Commission notes that further development in the nuclear weapons neld could make the use of suchadvantageous to the Soviets also and there-lore Soviet IntenUons in Uiis regard could change with time

Ban on Use of Nuclear Weapons, Wethat the USSR continues lo favor an agreementomplete ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and may press such aparticularlyest ban is achieved. They probably calculate that this would have the effect of weakening confidence inhey also see In this measure an opportunity to reduce the nuclear threat to their national security and tothe conventional superiority which they can bring to bear in many areas. The Soviets would prefer an agreement never to useweapons, but would probablysatisfied with an agreement never lo use themuch an agreement would, in Soviet eyes, further constrain possible Western use of such weapons in limited war situations, and would involve no cost to the Soviets since theydo not intend to use nuclear weapons in such situations anyway.*

Control of Other Weapons of MassThe Soviets include weapons of biological, chemical, and radiological warfare


"wenpons of mass destruction" which should be banned. However, they evidently regard the problem as much less important than that ef controlling nuclear on nuclear weapons were ever reached, the Soviets might press for banning BW-CW-RW weapons. They probably recognize that inspection requirements for BW and CW would be so extensive that effective control measures would probably be acceptable to them only under virtually complete

to Avert Surprise Attack.have shown little interest inmeasures to prevent surprisebecause they recognize that theof Inspection required would bethey arc prepared to accept, as wellthem the option of surprisewould of course like to reducefor surprise allack. forcertain regional disarmamentor by elimination of overseas bases,almost certainly do not expect tosuch reduction on any significant scale.

Deterrent Force Levels. have unofficially discussed withthe Idea of "stabilizing" mutualby fixing the size of long-rangeforces (with necessary inspection).run contrary to the staled Sovieton general and completeInitial unofficial Soviet reactions tobeen negative. Thus far theprobably given no extended study toarrangement, and they continue toas an essential element in thetheir deterrent forces. During theIhey ore almost certain not tothe concept of stabilized deterrents,possibly in the context of ain an agreement on general anddisarmament. As time goes on. theand costs of an unbridled armscome ln time to weigh more heavilyconsiderations, and we cannotpossibility that the Soviets maygive serious attention to such proposals.

Nonmilitarisation of Outer Space. The Soviets vigorously rejected earlier USfor nonmllltarizalion of outer space,they concluded that these proposals were directed primarily against their long-range missile capability. Suspicion on this point has affected their attitude to moreUS proposals directed exclusively against space-launched or space-orbited weapons, but the Soviets may be willing to accept the idea of prohibiting the placing of weapons of mass destruction ln space or on celestial bodies. They favor limiting outer space to "peacefulhich they define as prohibition not only of weapons but also of miliiaryactivities.

Regional Arms Controls. The changing technology of war has altered the military considerations in regional limitations onof nuclear weapons, and on zonal inspectioneans of reducing the risks of surprise attack. The Soviets continue to sec considerable advantages in variousarrangements which would inldbit Western military deployment, particularly in nuclear weapons. These schemes would be of special significance in tlie NATO area, where the Soviets would intend their effect to be the detachment of one or more countries in the zone from NATO. Arms control measures such as nuclear free zones or elimination of foreign basesiven region thereforetoole in Soviet polilical strategy. They arc currently advocating such measures for Africa.

Cessation of Arms Shipments. Except for the special case of transfer of nuclearthe Soviets probably do not believeon cessation of arms shipments would be advantageous to them. They havevarying degrees of influence, and have succeeded in stimulating discord amongin the non-Communist world, bymiliiary equipmentumber ofThere may be exceptions for someareas where the Soviets would consider it to their benefit to agree to ban armsbut we do not believe that they would accept thiseneral approach in the field of arms controls.

Force Reductions. Thehave, by unilateral reductions inand in some conventional arms,for the first time in aposition in the propaganda aboulBy the end1 theyaboul equal lhe US militarylevelittleillionthey are able toargerfield forceivenarge mobilization potential,not mean parity in capabilities onof the Communist bloc.the USSR canargerdivisions Irom an equivalent numberand because US forces are widelythe Soviets probably calculatefurther agreed mutual reductions offorces or military manpowera greater reduction and retractionmilitary power than lt would ofHowever, the Soviets are not likelyto general reductions or limitationsor conventional arms as an


Chinese Communist views onare partistinctive world outlook which derives ln large part from China'sand international position. The regime sees itself as destined to lead its country into the front rank of great powers. The Chinese leaders have reacted billcrly to what Ihey regard as Western unwillingness to accord China the rights and slalus which it claims. Their strategy has been one ofstruggle, expressed nol only in demands for diplomatic recognition as the government of China and the restoration of Taiwan, but also In attempts toore militant anti-imperialist course upon the entire Slno-Sovlet Bloc. This line of maximum enmity has also been useful in Justifying the demands which the regime has placed upon the domestic population.

Thus the Chinese regard East-Westonlyeans of putting pressure on their antagonists, not as an occasion foreven partial reconciliations of interests. With respect to negotiations on disarmament, their views are further affected by theirbelief that China would survivewar and perhaps even gain from it. When their commitment to the belief that the 'imperialists" use negotiations onlyrick is taken Into account, lt becomes evident that the prospects for Chinese agreement in the disarmament field are poor indeed

In particular, we believe that the Chinese Communists are determined to acquire acapability, with Soviet assistance ifbut by their own efforts If necessary. We doubt that they could be dissuaded from this intention, even by the USSR Thus they would adhereest ban only if they were assured that it would not prevent them fromuclear capability. The Chinese appear to suspect (probably rightly) lhatdisarmament policy is designed In part to deny them nuclear status and to limit their ability to undertake independent ventures which might involve the USSR

The Chinese leaders are aware that most major disarmament agreements could not belee live without China's adherence. Peiping has taken the position that it will not be bound by disarmament agreements reached without Its participation, and further lhat it will nut participate in disarmamentwith states which do not recognize it. If its participation is sought, therefore, China would almost certainlyolitical price by raising such issues as diplomatic recognition, the return of Taiwan, endto the UN.

It is not certain that the belligerence which has marked Peiplng's world view7 will necessarily continue unabuted in the years ahead. Even if the Chinese posturemore moderate in the future however, China would still beosition to exert considerable leverage on both the US ond thes price for adherence loagreements would continue high,it might enter into negotiations if in the meantime it had gained admission to the UN or acquired nuclear weapons.



e Gaulle's strong nationalistic beliefs make the French approach topecial problem for the West. Although de Gaulle favors controlled disarmament in principle, he considers the questionto the objective of makingull member of the nuclear club. Because the French nuclear arms program is still in an early test phase, de Gaulle will Judge any partial steps in terms of how they affect the continuing development of his nationalprogram, or in terms of how they affect the French bargaining positionis the other nuclear powers and French leadership in Western Europe.

t the same time, the French recognize the political and propaganda value ofand Insist that France must play an important role in any discussions in this field wilh the Soviets. Their basic position has been, and will almost certainly continue to be, lhat controls cannot be applied toweapons (which they have) without also being appUcd to advanced delivery systems (which they do not yethey have in effect consistentlyniversal ban on nuclear tests and will probably continue their opposition, at least until such time as they are capable of producing the nuclear warheads they want or arc assuredapability from their allies.

De Gaulle Is opposed to European regional disengagement arrangements, fearful lhatany such plan would leave Franceexposed on the continent. Moreover, he would reject any such arrangement that appeared to discriminate against Westnot only out of concern for his close ties with Bonn, but also because of histhat Germany might thereby be set adrift between East and West, and lhat the US in auch circumstances mightfrom the comment altogether.

Because of heavy requirements imposed on them by the Algerian war, the French have resisted inclusion of military manpowerin Wesiern proposals. They do not,oppose such ceilings In principle and probably would, if hostilities were ended, agree to reduction of force levels as long aa they were not below those of the UK and West Germany.

n general, French attitudes onwill continue to be bared onof national prestige and the satisfaction of de Gaulles desire for international status It Is unlikely that he can be persuaded to adapt his own approach on disarmamentoint US-UK position merely for the sake ofnified Western policy. Instead, he will probably continue to emphasize therelationship of various aspects ofand the necessity for reaching general, overall agreement, ln the hope of gaming time for the completion of the French nuclear weapons program.

e Gaulle's belief that Prance must have its own nuclear forces is not widely shared by other French jwlitical leaders or even by military leaders. Seme are concerned about the high cost of developing sophisticatedsystems, some fear that France'sin NATO will decline as itswith an independent program grows, others are opposed to the program simplythey wish to embarrass de Gaulle. The French position will probably become more flexible after de Gaulle leave* the scene.the longer he survives in office, the greater the investment the French will have in their own nuclear weapons and delivery system program, and the more reluctant they will be toisarmament agreement which requires them to forego bringing their effort to fruition

IV. UK ATTITUDES TOWARDn part because of Britain's peculiar sense of vulnerabilitymall, densely populated island, there is strong and genuine interest in disarmament both at the official and the popular level. In comparison to France, the UK places greater stress on disarmament, not onlyeans of reducing military risks, but alsotepore generalof East-West tensions Nevertheless, the government does not wish to jeopardize Its relationship with the US by separating Itself


far irom US policies on disarmament. Thus the UK has consistently seconded US demands that disarmament be approached by limited measures subjected to adequatewhile discreetly pressing the USore flexible position on controls.

he L'K, already an established nuclear power, has placed special stressuclear lest banirst disarmament step. It wishes in this way to inhibit the development ofcapabilities by additional countries. In particular West Germany. In the hope of persuading prospective nuclear powers lo ad-heie loan. the government hasthe inclusion of Communist China In any future disarmament conference. With respect lo France, if the UK became convinced lhat there was no other way to persuade the French to halt their national program. It might reluctantly endorse arrangements for multilateral nuclear sharing through NATO

isengagement In Central Europe Is of less intense Interest in the UK than it was formerly, though some Labour Party leaders still advocate it. The chief reasonsegional arrangement are theof tensions, the establishment of an inspection precedent, and the desire to limit Germany's military role. The UK continues to favor proposals for reduced ceilings onforces, and has been rapidlyreductions in its own forces weU below their proposed ceilings.

isarmament matters are likely to assume increasing importance in UK foreign policy debates The tendency for the UK to play the broker between the US and USSR inwhile remaining the ally of the US. will probably grow Public agitation against nuclear weapons is vigorous By and large, though, the prospect Is for no Important shift In the present UK attitudes toward


he West German attitude towardis marked by an intensewith the implications of any general disarmament agreements for the speciolproblems of the Federal Republic. Bonn sets less store by disarmament effortseans of insuring its security than does, say, the UK. it continues to be particularly concerned that it shouldull part in the formulation of any disarmamentIt Is also especially sensitive to the possibility thai Western defense efforts might be weakenederiod of disarmament discussions.

German concerns centerdisarmament proposals whichgreater restrictions upon its forcesother powers, and those whichBonn's position on Germany'sfuture. For these reasons, theopposes regional schemesCentral Europe, or any that wouldof East Germany or theline, or that would require Westto leave NATO. In addition, whilenot believe that West Germany Isupon acquisition of an independentcapability, tt would probably opposemeasures which permanentlyoption without nt the same timebringing under strict control theof other powers.

Adenauer government has thuscontent primarily to insure Itself avoice in Western councils on Mistrusting the motives of theWest Germans rely upon Francr andto adopt positions which In effectInterests As West Germany'spower increases, we believe that Ita more direct voice In these matters,if negotiations appear to beagreements Meanwhile. Germanwill continue to give strong publicto the concept of generaldisarmamentrerequisite forand the settlement of In this publicthe hope on the part of some Germanthat persistent emphasis on thedisarmament over all othermight postpone negotiations onquestion.

anadian attitudes toward

anada seeks topecial role innegotiations. Fearing lm-olvement in nuclear war. and desiring to demonstrate independence of the US, Canada hasloole for Itselfeader ol tlie "middle powers" urging the majorInto serious negotiations Canada has been unconcerned by Its alues" displeasure at its initiative. The government urges that disarmament not be made contingent upon other political settlements and puts firston the problems of nuclear weapons andcapabilities. Foreign Minister Green in particular has become deeply committed lo this approach and has maderimary concern of Canadian foreign policy. He urges that there be no further nuclearwhether orontrol system is agreed upon. We believe that interest inis widespread and will continue to be reflected in Canadian policy under future administrations.


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