CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE0 toReference Title: ESAU
Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATIONTHE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,SC,, THEOR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE0 to
Thieorking paper. It traces the development ol the Sino-Sovietworld Communist strategy, on Chinese foreign and domestic policies, on relations among the parties of the world Communist movement, and on other aspects of the Sino-Sovietthe Bucharest conference of0 to the opening of the Moscowof the Communist parties in
Almost half of this paper Is occupied with threevaluableof, and copious extracts from, the Soviet party's letter ofune to the Chinese party, the Chinese party's letter ofeptember in reply, and the Soviet party's letterovember (to the Chinese party and other parties) in reply to theeptember letter. These letters spectacularly confirmed the existence of Sino-Soviet disputeside range of issues--some of which had been deduced with varying degrees of assurance from the Soviet and Chinese press, and some others of which had been reported!
ino letters added
greatly to mo cwuranixy's xnowieage of these disputes and they revealed other disputes which had not beon deduced or reported.
Another paper, to followonth or so, will deal with the proceedings of the November conference of thearties, the Moscow declarationecember, andSoviet and Chinese presentations (which havo differed considerably) of that declaration.
welcome comment on paperynxs instance to the acting coor-
of the group, at
In tha winter, the Chinese party began toa rather different bloc strategy from that pursued by the Soviet party. Whereas Khrushchevow-risk strategy, making steady gains by non-military means, Maoack more aggressive, high-risk strategy, looking to mock more rapid gains, especially in the underdeveloped areas. Byoviet and Chinese substantive in support of these differing strategies, were vir-rually complete.
tilth respect to the basic assessment, the balance of power, Moscow conceded that tbe West was still strong, while Peiping disparaged the West and its weapons systems. From this fundamental divergence, other important differences derived.
Whereas Moscow spoke of the disastrous consequences of unclear war for the world, Pelping emphasized the bloc'scapabilities and its ability toew world rapidly. Whereas Moscow emphasized the decreasingof general war, Peiping emphasized US preparations for war and reportedly argued privately that an eventual war was inevitable. Whereas Moscow emphasized the ability of the bloc to deter the West also from local wars, and emphasized also the danger of expansion of local wars, Peiping contended that such wars were Inevitable and should sometimes beand it minimized the dangers of expansion. Whereas Moscow promised to support "just" wars but tended to evade this subject, the Chinese jeered that Moscow was so afraid of general war that it would not adequately support these "Just" wars, including "liberation" wars.
Farther, whereas Moscow insisted that "peacefulwas the long-term objective of the entire bloc, defining this term as envisaging competition by all means short of war, Peiping argued that the concept misrepresented relations with the West and thatilitantof It Impeded the struggle with the West. Similarly, whereas tho Soviets contended that there were "realistic" leaders In the West, that negotiations were worthwhile, and that disarmament wasaefal issueeasible long-range goal, Peiping charged that Moscow was boing galled by the West, that the emphasis should be on struggle and not on talks, and that total disarmament was an "illusion."
Further, whereas Moscow asserted the increasingand desirability of Communist parties coelna to power by peaceful means, Pelping argued that violence eas almost always both necessary and desirable and that Communist parties must have the courage to employ it.
Further, In policy toward underdeveloped countries, Moscow and Peiping were in important disagreement as to how fast to seek independence for the remaining colonies and semi-colonies (countries regarded as indirectly under imperialist control, like Batista'snd as to how fast to try to knock over the newly-independent governments and replace them with Communist regimes. Moscow emphasized the need for protracted cooperation with bourgeoisleaders In tbe newly-Independent countries and with bourgeois forces in the countries not yet Independent subordinating the local Communist parties to this end when necessary, while Pelping accused Moscow of exaggerating the Importance oftbe neutrals, emphasized the unreliability of their leaders, called for an effort to bring them down more rapidly, and urged Communist movements in colonial areas to seize leadership of tbe revolution from the bourgeoisie in its early stages.
Futher, whereas Moscow calledradualist program in Western countries, emphasizing Communist cooperation for democratlc"goals, Peiping derided this program asand urged the "revolutionary overthrow" of Western governments.
Finally, whereas Moscowlexible policy in the world Communist fronts, aimed at enlisting maximumfrom non-Communists, Peiping called for the fronts to be "fighting organizations" seeking cooperation only on Communist terms.
Following their action In0 in carrying tbe Sino-Soviet dispute into other partiee and their rejection in May of another Soviet bid for bilateral talks, theangered the Soviet party by their behavior at the WFTU conference In Pelping in early June. The Chinese publicly criticized the Soviet line at the conference, and lobbied against Soviet positions in private meetings. At this point the Russians arrangedeeting of world Commun-nist parties In Bucharest later in the month.
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As ths Bucharest conference opened, the Soviet partyong letter denouncing the Chinese party. reviewing the substantive issues noted above, the Soviet letter accused tbe Chinese of "disloyal and uncomradely" behavior, and closed with an indirect but clear threat toSoviet aid to China unless the CCP backed down. Before issuing its thin and ambiguous coma-unique, tbe conference beard speeches from the delegates of most ofepresented; most of these supported the Soviet party,ew were neutral, and at least one (tbe Albanian)the Chinese. During these meetings, KhrushchevSoviet charges against Chinese views on foreignand Chinese domestic programs; he added some charges relating to Chinese failure to cooperate in certain military projects and Chinese collusion with other parties, observed that the Chinese were too untrustworthy to be given nuclear weapons, and attacked Mao personally for being as vain and as isolated from reality as Stalin bad been. Tbe Chinese retorted in kind,ersonal attack on Khrushchev as having "betrayed" Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Tho conference closed with both the Soviet and Chinese angry and otherconsiderably shaken. It was agreed to hold another con
ference in Moscow In November.
Immediately after tbe Bucharest meeting, Moscow began to apply pressure on Peiping. In early July, the Soviet pressystematic refutation of Chinese positions, Soviet media stopped commenting on Chinese affairs, andinformed Peiping that the CCP's Russian-language magazine circulated in tbe USSR must be suspended. oviet central committee plenum in mid-July denounced the CCP (not named) for "leftvlng sectarian deviation."
The heaviest blow came onuly, when Moscow informed Peiping that all or virtually all Soviet techniciansobe withdrawn in the next five weeks. This action was carried out, despiteprotests tbat tho withdrawal would seriously impair the Chinese program of economic development.
The Soviet party remained on the offensive throughout August, and the Soviet press began to warnfor the firstthe consequences of separation from tho bloc. Moscow in August increased its effort to isolate
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the Chineso party, through letters to other partiesthe dispute and asking for their support. The Chinese party retorted with articles implying Pelping's willingness to do without Soviet aid if necesssxy. In early September, Soviet and Chinese representatives quarreled publicly at the Viet Minh party congress in Hanoi.
Oneptember, the Chinese partyong letter to the Soviet party designed to refute the Soviet letter circulated at Bucharest. The letter reviewed the development of Sino-Soviet differencesChinese behavior, cited many instances in the previous year of Khrushchev's adoption of "non-Marxist" positions, reaffirmed contrary Chinese positions, and, inter alia, strongly attacked Sovivt "concession,tolerance, and compromise" in relations with the Vest. The concluding section of tbe letter asserted that Soviet party resolutions could not be binding on other Communist parties, indicated an intention tothe majority support for tho Soviet party in the world Communist movement, observed that this majority In any caseemporary phenomenon, asserted that the "verdict of history" would vindicate Peiping, accused Moscow (correctly) of exerting pressure on the Chinese
to Moscow for bilateral talks and for work on thecommittee for the Moscow conference. The Soviet and Chinese press continued through September and October the polemical exchanges on the substantive issues, on (Chinese) "adventurism" and (Soviet)n the relative dangers of (Chinese) "dogmatism" and (Soviet)nd so on. Khrushchev in early October revealed that there had also been border incidents between the USSB and China; ho also discussed pro-Soviet forces in the Chinese party leadership; further, he predicted that the Moscow conference would not resolve the dispute. He is also reported to havein this he proved to bethe Chinese had only one supporter, theparty, in the world Communist movement.
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The preparatory committee for the November conference, meeting in the firet three weeks of October, failedully-agreed draft declaration. The Chinesestood on the positions taken in theireptember letter on both substantive issues and the discipline of the world Communist movement, in particular (this is confirmed) on their refusal to accept the principle of majority rule in the movement. Tbe Soviet representatives presumably took the positions later stated inovember letter,tbeir insistence on the principle of majority rule. The Chinese may have had the full support of the Albanian delegation and support on certain issues from the Australian, Cuban, Indonesian. Japanese and North Vietnamese delegations. In any case, the committee after three weeks was ableominal agreement on most of the formulationsto world Communist strategy and the discipline of the movement, but could not reach agreement on some others, in particular on the principle of majority rule. The draft was left uncompleted, for referral to the November conference.
ovember the Soviet party replied formally to the Chinese party's letter ofeptember. The Sovlot letter reviewed the record of Chinese misbehavior and Sovlotreaffirmed Soviet positions on substantive issues in strong terms, and struck especially hard at the Chineseto risk general war. It stated flatly that the Vest "isapernd it described this and other Chinese attitudes as "extremely dangerous." It reiterated the demand that the Chinese party respect majority opinion. It reviewed Soviet aid to China, and asserted that Chinese goods given in exchange were really of "no use." The letter concluded that the Soviet party and its supporters wore "seriously alarmed" by Chinese obstinacy, and that the world Communist movement could not wait for the "verdict of history."
As the Communist delegations arrived in Moscow, they were reportedly givenovember letter, plus the
uncompleted draft resolution for the conference to consider,oviet briefing in ehich the Soviet party asked for their support. By this tlae both the Soviet and Chinese parties had gone to much effort to encourage the view that neither would back down at the conference, even if this meant theorthe Chinese party froa the world Conaunlat movement. In other worda, the two parties were playingIt *as not known whether either was willing to swerve at the last moment.
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Tbe Bucharest Conference, June
Moscow Applies Pressure, Summer
Peiping States Its Case, September
Failuro of Preparatory Work, October
Moscow Reaffirms Its Positions, .
In6 the first serious rift in the Sino-Soviet relationship came to light. Khrushchev apparently did not consult the Chinese before attacking Stalin in his secret speech of The Chinese believed that the attack onMao much admired va too extreme, amounting to an attack on the essentials of Communism itself. At the same time, they believed that the Soviet party had not yet corrected what the Chinese too regarded as Stalin'sin Soviet relations with other parties, especially in Eastern Europe. This latter belief led Peiping to encourage Poland and Hungary in the early stages of their defiance of Moscow Inhich much complicated Moscow'sthere.
ao, mistaking obedience for love, made his experiment with liberalization In China, the "hundred flowers" program. This experiment, going beyond Khrushchev's own loosening of Stalinist bonds on the populace, was derided by the Russians, who were openly pleased when it failed.
Then in the winter, casting aboutomestic strategy to solve China's terrible problems ofand agricultural development, dissatisfied with both the Soviet model and Soviet aid. Mao hit upon the "leap forward" and "people's commune" programs. These programs, relying on an unprecedented mobilization and exploitation of the human material, were clearly obnoxious to Moscow, on both practical and doctrinal grounds. Convinced that these programs were bound to fall, primarily because they slighted material Incentives. The Soviet leadership reacted sharply to the Ideological and political challenge of the Chinese claim to havehort cut to Communismto other Communist countries.
The Sino-Soviet dispute on world Communist strategy seems to have originated at about the same time, inSoviet and Chinese assessments of the significance of
Soviet weapons developments. Khrushchev was fairly confident tbat thesethedeterred tbe Vest from general war, but hetrong sense of the consequences of general war for the bloc ae well as for tbe West. He thus chose to emphasize the bloc's prospects for making steady gains by non-military means, and for rapid gaina when the USSR had surpaased tbe US in economic productivity as well as military power (in or. Mao too believed that the Vest was probably deterred from general war, but, as indicated in his apeecht tbe Moacow conference of Communist parties, beuch more cheerful view of the consequences ofwar for the bloc. Thus Mao was less willing than waa Khrushchev for tbe bloc to compromise in order to avoid the risk of general war, and beore aggressive strategy looking to much more rapid gains, especially in theareas.
Although the ecope of the Sino-Soviet dispute on strategy was not apparent from the start (and aay not yethere were Indications89ide range of policies was at issue. Inhe Chineseseeaed to be trying to force the Soviet party'sto aore seriousthe dispute with Yugoslavia, tbe center of "revisionism." Concurrently,onference of Warsaw Pact powers, the Chinese publicly and scornfully challenged the Soviet estiaate of the world balance of forcea. Inhe Chinese seemed toore aggressive course to counter Western actions In the Middle East. In summer andelping may have failed to get the kind of Soviet support it wanted for Mao's venture in the Taiwan Strait. Shortly thereafter, Pelping renewed its charges that the CPSU poorly estimated the balance of power, and the Chinese began to play an obstructive role In the world Communist fronts.
Inhe Chinese began to attack Khrushchev's explorationsetente with the US, and at the same time seeaed to be encouraging revolutionary extremists (against Soviet wishes) in Iraq. In9 Peiping publicly criticized Soviet policies vith regard to the underdeveloped countries, and again seeaed to be trying to force the Soviet hand by putting aore pressure on Nasser than Khrushchev wished.
The Soviet party vas veil aware of this challenge, and Itounter-offensive in The Chinese, stung by Khrushcin-v's speeches in Peiping in9 and in tbe OSSR subsequently, attacked with new fury. By0 tbe Chinese were presenting themselves asprophetsomfortable and cynical church. With tbe publication in0eries of unprecedently savage articles in Chinese party publicationswere circulated to otherCbineseon substantive issues were virtually complete.
Whereas Moscow conceded tbat tbe West was still strong, Peiping disparaged tbe West and its weapons systemspaper tiger." Whereas Moscow spoke of the disastrousof nuclear war for the world, Peiping emphasized the bloc's survival capabilities and its ability toew world rapidly. Whereas Moscow emphasized thepossibility of general war, Peiping emphasized USfor war and reportedly argued privately tbat an eventual war wai Inevitable. Whereas Moscow emphasized tbe ability of tbe bloc to deter tbe West also from local wars and argued that tbese should In general be avoided due to tbe danger of their expansion. Peiping contended that such wars were inevitable and should often be welcomed, and it minimized the dangers of expansion. Whereas Moscow promised to support "justhe Chinese jeered that Moscow as so afraid of general war that it would not adequatelytbese "just" wars, not even "liberation" wars.
Further, whereas Moscow insisted that "peaceful coexist ence" was the long-term objective of tbe entire bloc,this term aB envisaging competition by all means short of war, Peiping argued that th* concept misrepresentedwith the West, and that even tbe militant Sovietof it impeded the struggle with the West. Similarly, whereas tbe Soviets contended tbat there wereeaders in tbe West, that negotiations ware worthwhile, and that disarmament wasseful issueeasible long-range goal, Peiping charged tbat Moscow was being gulled by the West, that tbe emphasis should be on struggle and not on talks, and tbat disarmament was an "illusion."
Further, whereas Moscow asserted the Increasingand desirability of Communist parties coming to power by peaceful means, Peiping argued that violence was almost always both necessary and desirable and that Communistmust have tbe courage to employ it.
Further, in policy toward underdeveloped countries, Moscow and Peiping were in important disagreement as to how
fast to seek independence for the remaining colonies and semi-colonies (countries regarded as indirectly undercontrol, like Batista'snd as to how fast to try to knock over tbe newly-independent governments and replace then with Communist regimes. Moscow empahsixed tbe need for protracted cooporation with bourgeois nationalist leaders in tbe newly-independent countries and withforces in the countries not yet Independent,tbe local Communist parties to this end whenwhile Peiping accused Moscow of exaggerating the importance of tbe neutrals, emphasized the unreliability of tbelr leaders, called for an effort to bring then down more rapidly, and urged Communist novenents in colonial areas to seize leadership of the revolution from theIn its early stages.
Further, whereas Moscow calledradualist program, emphasizing Communist cooperation for "democratic" goals, In Western countries, Peiping derided thla program asand urged the "revolutionary overthrow" ofgovernments.
Finally, whereas Moscowlexible policy in the world Communist fronts, aimed at enlisting maximumfron non-Communists, Peiping called for tbe fronts to be "fighting organizations" seeking cooperation only on Communist terms.
tbe bucharest conference,
tbe soviet party replied publicly to the systematicattacks of0peech by kuuslnen onpril condemning "dogmatic" positions. tbe rebuke fell on bard ground. moreover, the failure of tbe paris nimwilt meeting in may seeaed to tbe chinese to justify one of the mostof their positions assailed astbat little was to be expected froa negotiations with the vest, and tbat good communists should attend to tbe struggle.
tbe chinese vere clearly not satisfied by the wrecking of the summit talka. peiping was seeking, and could not find, signsundamental change in soviet policy. indeed, it seems likely that khrushchev reaffirmed the main lines of bis policyetter sent to the bloc parties and certainin late may or early june. the soviet party is alsoto haveetter or letters to the chinese party at tbla time, criticizing chinese positions and callingorld communist conference in bucharest concurrently with the rumanian party's congress in late june.
the chinese returned to the offensive at the meeting of tbe vorld federation of trade unions in0 june. the chinese-are reported, preceding the meeting, to havestrongly to the official vftu report,umber of chinese positions. at tbe same time, liu shao-cbl,une dinner for an albanian(including llrl belisbova, later purged forthe chineseet the tone for the chineseat tbe vftu meeting. lin reiterated chinese warnings
following three sections cover much the samein part tbe same
] additional materials have come to hand, however.
moreover, our paper is aimedomewhat differenttherefore gives greater attention to certainless to others finally, there
are certain differences in interpretation, although these are not fundamental.
against being deceived by US tactics, against "unrealistic notions" about the world's "most viciousbout tho need for courage in tho struggle. Another Chinese leader, welcoming the delegatesune, observed again that "peace cannot be begged for; it can only be won by relying
The leader of tho Soviet delegation to tbe WFTU meeting, speakingune, was hardly friendly to tbe West, but be reaffirmed the Soviet adherence to "peaceful coexistence and peacefultrivingeasonable andacceptable solutions." On the same day, in tbe guise of -support" of Soviet disarmament proposalsune,editorial comment conceded the possibility ofgeneral war but denied the possibility of eliminating local wars as an "impractical illusion."
Speaking to the WFTU meetingune, Liualledlife-and-death struggle" within the termsnd observed that the imperialists in any case would scrap any agreement they might be forced toUnderlining his point for the operations of the WFTU itself, be observed that "we mustlear line between ourselves and the toolsust seek unity throughot through "compromise."
The following day, in the harshest public speech of the meeting, Liu Chang-sheng calledolicy of exposing the imperialists, struggling with them, giving them "blow for blow." It wase said, to oppose warbecause local wars were inevitable and the "Just" wars among them should be supported. Even with respect to general war, which might be averted, empbasis on the possibility of averting it would prepare the people badlyar if it came. He reiterated that local wars bad been continuous since World War II and that it was "entirely wrong andto fact" to contend that they could be avoided. Liu observed that, while Peiping supported tbe Sovietproposal, it was "inconceivable" that tbe West would disarm, that the proposal was useful onlyevice to arouse people to isolate the US, and that any other view was an "Illusion." He derided tbe Soviet view tbatwould release Western as well as bloc funds for tbe use of the underdeveloped countries.
Moreover, during the five-day meeting, other ChineseLiu Sbao-chl and Tengmeetings with various of tbe delegates and lobbied against Soviet positions. Soviet representatives at tbe meeting wero angered by both the public and the privateof tbe Chinese.
The Soviet party retaliated publicly In articles ofndune commenting onh anniversary of tbeof Lenin's "Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Theune article, in Soviet Russia, Invoked Lenin against "leftist sectarian" and "Yeftist doctrinaire" errors, went on to defend the Soviet policy in underdevelopedof protracted Communist cooperation with tbe national bourgeoisie, noted the leftist errors of the Iraqi Communists9 (an Interesting item in an article clearly aimed at thend observed further that contemporary "left-wing deviationism" was manifested in opposition to Communist cooperation with non-Coammnists in working toward common goals, particularly peace.
Theune article In Pravda gavo greater attention to the Chinese deviation in domestic policies. TheChinese being revisionist ratber than dogmatist In thistoparticular road of building socialism of theirnd they tried to "jump over entire historic phases." The article went on to deny that tbe concept of "peacefulhe effort for disarmament, and negotiations between East and Westa "deviation" froa orthodoxy.
In aid-June, two Italian Communist delegates to tbe WPTU meeting which had closed onune publicly identified the Chinese and Indonesians as havingivergent line at the WFTU meeting. This was the first time that any bloc spokesman had publicly identified the Chinese as divergent.
Rfd. ODuoe offered some disagreeable remarks. It reminded Khrushchev that he had erred badly in beingby President Elsenhower's "nice talk" about peace, and it derided Khrushchev's expressed view that there were some sober-minded leaders in Western countries. It also spoke scornfully of the Soviet view that Western knowledge that general war would be suicidal would deter the West, although the Chinese had conceded thisleast as a
other occasions. It was in this editorial that Peiping introduced its little tale of the schoolteacher who trusted the wolf, which upon release tried to eat hln but was beaten to deathpeasant who knew well thenature of the wolf." (Khrushchev soon snapped back that ofolfolf,olf ision.)
Stopping in Moscow on their way to the BucharestChinese representatives, led by Peng Chen,ong discussion with Soviet representatives onune. Thoare said to have maintained their righteousness in these discussions, and to have said that they would alter their views only if other parties were to "prove" themnot simply if outvoted.
People's Daily struck again onune, the day of the opening of the Bucharest conference. It found revolntlonary situations everywhere, even in Western Europe, "an arsenal that can explode at any moment." Directly criticizing Yugoslav rather than Soviet positions, the editorial put the Chinese case against Moscow about asalso aspossible: "The essenco of modern revisionism is capitulation in the name of peace."
Khrushchev spoke on the firsttheparty congress. He reaffirmed Soviet positions under attack by the Chinese, and he described the opponents of his ideological Innovations as persons who "act likeeng Chen spoke the following day, and, while still speaking fairly politely, reaffirmed Chinese differences with Moscow on important features of world Communist strategy.
On the same day, the Soviet delegation reportedlymeet with other delegations to giveystematicof the Sino-Soviet dispute. The most importanta Soviet party letter of aboutages, probablyJune, which the other delegations (Including thepermitted to read In groups. |
The Soviet letter ofune began by reviewing the long "fraternal cooperation" between tbe Soviet and Chinese parties and states, and observed sorrowfully that "in recent tines" differences had become apparent with regard to questions of
world Communist strategy- This had been shown In theChinese attacks on Soviet positions in0 and in Chinese behavior in the world Communist front organizations. Afteroviet overture fortalks about Sino-Soviet differences, the Chinese had taken anti-Soviet positions at the WFTU conference inin inner at that conference, Liu Shao-chl had spoken of important differences, and Teng Hsiao-ping had gone so far as to charge that thef the Communist parties had been jettiaoned by the CPSU. Following this, the Chinese party bad arranged private talks vith other parties, in which they had been critical of Soviet positions, and they had alnce circulated documents among other parties. Such behavior, in the Soviet view was "improper and unacceptable," The Soviet party would thus, in this letter, state Its positions on the "question of (dlacnssed above), the appraisal of the present epoch, questions of war and peace, the concept of "peacefulthe forms of transition to socialism, and the use of the world Communist fronts.
As for the first substantive question, the Soviet letter insisted that the "main content" of the epoch was thefrom capitalism tond it criticized the Chinese adherence to Lenin's description of the current epoch as one of "imperialism, wara and revolution." The Chinese had failed to understand fully the great changes in the world since Lenin's time, reflecting the disintegration ofand the growth of the world socialist system to the point where it could exert a 'decisive influence" onevents. The letter denied that the Soviet party was misrepresenting the aggressive character of imperialism and the consequent danger of war, and it assertod that the CPSU had consistently presented Imperialism as aggressive. However, It went on, the real point was whether Imperialism in present conditions could realize its aggressive plans.
Tho Soviet position, the letter continued, taking up "questions of war andas that the strongth of the bloc effectively deterred the West from war. Tbe Chinese, in denying this, were guiltv of overestimating tho forces of the West and underestimating those of the bloc.
Tbe letter vent on todistinguishing between general and localtbe contention that war waswas counter-productive, in tbat it made the people of the world fatalistic and passive. It observed, correctly, that Mao at Moscow In7 had agreed onyear period of peace, and it noted that the Chinese party had aince changed its mind. It deridedfor asserting simultaneously (a) that the Westpaper tiger" and (b) that the West was so strong it could not be deterred from wax.
The Soviet letter at this point denied tbe Chinese charge that Soviet opposition to general war entailed or Implied Soviet opposition to "liberation" wars aa well. The letter argued that it had become more difficult for tbe West tomilitarily in underdevelopednd it cited events In Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and Cuba ae examples. would not deter tbe USSR from supporting "just" wars as necessary. The letter evaded the question of whether such support would extend to undertaking or seriously risking military conflict with Western forces.
Taking up the third category, the letter stated that "peaceful coexistence" wasemporary tactical slogan but was Instead the "general line" of theong-term objective. Tbe Chinese party was accused of having repudiated an agreement on this point too. The Chinese were further rebuked for conceding tbe possibilitytemporary agreement" on disarmament but simultaneously denying tbeof eliminating wars, and for having stated at tbe VFTU meeting In June that the concept of disarmament was an "illusion."
The Soviet letter reiterated Moscow's viewar with modern weapons would have disastrous consoquenccslobal scale, and that civilization vould be set back The letter expressly rejected Mao's long-standing public position that the "atomic bomb" (as well as the West)paper tiger."
*This Soviet letter apparently did not distinguish here between "local" wars and "liberation" wars.
The letter vent on to deny tbe Chinese charge thatcoexistence" wo v. id Impede the struggle with the West. On tbe contrary, the letter said, coexistence would facilitate
the struggle everywhere.
The letter defended Soviet policy toward "bourgeoisleaders such as those of India, Indonesia, Iraq, Burma, Ceylon, and Cuba. The neutrality of these countries, it said, which inter alia denied the United States bases, objectively served the bloc. The letter went on to reject the Chinese charge that these bourgeois nationalist loaders were backsliding toward imperialism, and it reaffirmed the Soviet position that the bloc should not look to the early overthrow of such leaders. The Chinese were again rebuked for changing theirtime on the question of the importance of neutrals in the struggle.
As for dealing with the West within the termshe Soviet letter reaffirmed the Soviettbat there were two tendencies in thobellicose and tbe relatively realistic. The existence of the latterthe bloc to use tbe instrument of negotiations Moreover, tbe letter said, the prospects for adisarmament were not bad, because the Soviet "edge" in silitary power meant that the West "had to listen." Further, because existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons could "wipe out thell peoples of the world had an interest in disarmament, an interest which permitted new successes in mass movements. The letter conceded tbe difficulty ofisarmament agreement, but it argued that efforts to reach one would be to tbe bloc's advantage in several respects; and it rejected the Chinese charge that this effort waswith prosecution of tbe over-all struggle, especially In the underdeveloped areas.
The Soviet letter than turned again to tbe criticalof local wars,iew put forward by thothat therethird way" in addition to tbeof coexistence and generalcontinued cold war with occasional local wars. The letter reaffirmed the Soviet view that local wars could easily get out of control and therefore should be avoided, or at least not publicly advocated. (Again it did not distinguish "liberation" wars.)
Taking up tha fourth category, forma of "transition tohe letter rejected the Chinese charge that Moscow had overemphasized the possibility of peaceful accession to power by Communist parties. The letter did this, however, by misrepresenting tbe Chineseto the CCP the charge, easy to refute, tbat the Soviet party had said that peaceful acceaslon was the "only" way. The Chlneaewas again accused of havingnetime both peaceful and non-peaceful paths to power were to be expected.
The Soviet letter then turned to tbe fifth category, the question of the proper use of the world Communist fronta. Itumber of instances of Chinese obstructionist activity In the fronts in the preceding nine months, and it reached way back9 for an instance of the CCP having actedthis case, at the Asian Trade UnionsIn Peiping9 at which tbe Chlneae called for "armed struggle" aa tbe principal form of Communist action In Asia wherever possible.* In tbeir attitude toward the fronta, the Chlneae party was again accused ofnetime agreement.
The Soviet letter then returned to what it had earlier called the "question of. the discipline of the world Communist movement, relating it here to Chinese failure to adhere to the Moscow declaration of the Communist parties, and the accompanying Peace Manifesto, of These departures for the most part related to the disputed Issues on world Communist strategy already reviewed. However, the Soviet party additionally rebuked the Chinese party, under this rubric, for continuing to raise the quea-tion of tbe stature of Stalin, for criticizing the Soviet party behind its back (apparently on various issues), ogmatic attitude toward Marxism-Leninism, for criticizing as "opportunist" the Rome declaration of the Europeanparties (which had endorsed the Soviet gradualist
the Soviet charge that the Chinese action wasmay be correct, even though Soviet coavaeat at the time seemed to approve the recommended strategy. There was also the questionarger Chinese role than advisable in Soviet eyes.
strategy for Vesternnd, again, for not dealing directly with the Soviet party but instead dealing aurreptl-tlously with other parties and tbeir
Because the substantive Issues in the Sino-Sovietbad in general been apparent to or surmised by both Western and (probably) world Communist observers before the circulation of thia Soviet letter ofune (aee the Introductory section of thiabe most Interesting portion of the letter was lta conclusion, in which theparty clearly implied tbat Chinese persistence In misbehavior would be costly to Pelping. This section began by remarking tbe damage to the world Communist movement that the Chinese bad caused, described Chinese behavior aeandobserved that tbe Chineserecognized Soviet leadership but disregarded and attacked it in practice, noted that the Chinese party had rejected repeated overtures for bilateral discussions, and gaveof Soviet "tact" in refraining from openlycertain Chinese domestic policies.
Thia concluding section of the Soviet letter thenthe "tremendous" materialand militaryUSSR bad supplied to China. Expressing anto do everything possible to overcome the difficulties with China "without sacrificingnd reminding the Chinese that Sino-Soviet dissension could only benefit the imperialist common enemy, the letter concluded with an expression of confidence that tbe CCP would "draw thein mind that the interests of the world Communist movement were inseparable from theof "building Communism" ia China itself. In other words, unless the Chinese party backed down, the Soviet party would reduce its assistance to China.
The Soviet delegation apparently followed up Its (with the above letter) of the other delegationsloc party meeting toommunique. The communique, datedune but not issued untilune, was short, thin.
ambiguous, and obviously unsatisfactory, reaffirming the7 declaration which the parties Interpreted very differently. The Chinese signed tbe communique after getting permission from Peiping.
Onune, after the Rumanian party congress hadfrom all the partiesepresentedmet for "discussion" of theup by the Soviet party to state tbeir support ofpositions. Someelegates reportedly spokeChinese first
representatives of the parties of France, Syria, Argentina, Turkey, Fast Germany, Austria, Spain, Morocco, Uruguay, Bel-glum, tbe United States and Chile gave substantial support to Soviet positions and were critical of the Chinese. Judging from certain vague or evasive formulations in this sametbe delegates from some of the following parties-Italy, England, Japan, Iran, Cyprus, Indonesia, andmay have tried toeutral position, simply endorsing tbe communique and calling for unity.
Peng Chen, tbe first Chinese speaker, ia reported to have taken note of tbe criticism, to have described it as in large part nd to bave asked for more careful consideration of the Chinese point of view. He defended specific foreign and domestic policies of the Peiping regime.
At about this time, possibly between this meetingone the following day, tbe Chinese reportedly insertedof tbeir own into the proceedings. Thlaranslation of another long (aboutfrom the Soviet party of the Chinesetbe letter of late May or early June.
Ithls letter as having been sharply critical Of the Chinese positions and actions, the Chinese motive was presumably tbat of gaining sympathy by showing how extreme tbe Soviet criticism had been.
At theune meeting, someelegates reportedly spoke before Khrushchev first spoke of these, the delegates from (at least) tbe parties of Brazil, Cuba and Canada seem to bave supported the Soviet party and to bave criticized tbe Chinese. Tbe positions of the delegates of the parties of Lebanon, Luxembourg, tbe Netherlands, Greece, India,
Colombia, Algeria, Albania, and Venezuela are less clear, but, of tbese, tbe Indian, Albanian, and Venezuelan delegates seen to bave been neutral or nearly so, witb the Albanian leaning to the Cbinese.
Khrushchev then spoke, reviewing some of the charges in the CPSTJ'sune letter and perhaps also some of thosein the earlier Soviet letter the Cbinese bad Just made available, and perhaps making some fresh charges. Withto bloc strategy, be is said to have criticized Cbinese positions on the balance of power, on local wars,n policy toward underdeveloped countries (with considerable detail on tbe Slno-Indlan bordernd on tbe world Communist fronts. With respect to domestic policies, he is said to have criticized the "great leaptbe backyard steel campaign and the commune program, and to haveharge of Chinese failure to cooperate In certain common defenserelated to air-warning systems, naval communications, submarine bases, the stationing in China of Soviet nuclear weapons crews, or some combination of those matters. Further, be is said to bave cited Cbinese collusion with elements of other parties, specifically in Latin America, and Chinese intransigence on deStallnizatlon. . He is said also to have attacked Maofor being as vain and insular as Stalin had been,
Peng Chen is reported to have replied in kind. Although the details of Peng's speech, like Khrushchev's, are uncertain, various reports suggest tbat be reiterated Cbinese criticism of Soviet underestimation of tbe possibility (or, perbaps, the eventual necessity) of generalf Sovietof the character of the West, of Soviet overvaluation of the Importance of neutral countries, of Soviet failure to give sufficient support to "liberation" movements (tbe Algerian rebels weref Soviet disfavor for Chinese domestic programs (and Soviet efforts to prevent other parties from adopting similarf Soviet niggardliness ineconomic aid and of Soviet failure to provide eitherweapons or sufficient information relating to theof tbem, of Soviet presumption in speaking for Peiping in
at first argued that
general war was inevitable, ana that he then retreated,without changing his mind.
international bodies (it la not clear what bodiea weref Soviet paternalism toward the Chlneae party, and of Soviet efforts to interfere in Chinese relationships wltb otber(especially in Asia). Peng is said also to have charged the Soviet party with organizing the Bucharest meeting totbe Chinese party, and to have retaliated for's personal attaok on Mao with the assertion that the Chinese party had no confidence In Khrushchev or in bis indeed that Khrushchev had "betrayed" Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and those who had remained faithful to them.
Following these exchanges, other delegates are said to have spoken. The great majority of them gave at leasteupport to the Soviet party. At least one delegation, however, the Albanian, is credibly reported to have supported the Chinese, and others apparently indicated some degree of sympathy for the Chinese. On the same day,une, agreement was reached to hold another conference in Moscow inommission was set up to prepare for It.
Moscow Applies Pressure,0
the Chinese party sent aletter to the Soviet party during the first week of July.
I "* Chinese letter, after
reaffirming some Chinese positions on general and local war, concludedhreat that, unless the Soviet party altered its positions or changed its attitude, Peiping would expel Soviet technicians and publicly renounce Soviet economic aid.
Two days after the publication of the innocuous Bucharest. onune, Pravda and People's Pally commented editorially on the communique"! WhTle neither editorial was offensive in tone, neither was conciliatory. The Sovietwas principally concerned with giving the falsethat the Soviet party had the full support of the world Communist movement. Tbe Chinese editorial was mainly directed to the continuing danger of "revisionism."
In early July, the Soviet party apparently directed Soviet and Bloc informational media to begin to play down Communist China. Tbe Soviet home service ceased to comment on Chinese affairs onuly, an action reminiscent of the boycott of Yugoslavia in
At tbe same tine, tbe Soviet party reportedly Informed the Chinese partyuly) that the Chinese Russian-language magazine Druzhba, circulated in the OSSR, had containedmaterial (propaganda for Chinese as opposed to Soviethat it must therefore be suspended, and that the comparable Soviet Chinese-language magazine (Su Chung Yu Hao) circulated in Communist China would be suspended'! Themay or may not have referred also the Cbinese Russian-language pictorial, Kitai, whichime thereafter failed to appear.
The CPSU central committee met in plenum for five days in mid-July and onulyesolution on tbe results of tbe Bucharest conference. The resolution "completely approved" the line tbat had been taken by tbe Soviet delegation atand charged tbenaming themwith "leftwing sectarian deviation" and narrow nationalism."
As had Pravda earlier, the resolution sought to make It appear that the Bucharest meeting had endorsed the theses of theht congresses and that the delegations had fully supported Soviet positions in the Bucharest debate. Following the plenum, meetings were organized all over the USSR tothe Sino-Soviet dispute. At one of these meetlnge, Suslov is plaualbly reported to have described the dispute aa very serious, and to have said tbat It night leadreak in party relations and that additional Soviet economic aid to Peiping would not be Justified.
In the same period Komaunist No. 10 (signed to the press onuly, presumably appearing In the last two weeks ofndertook an elaborate refutation of positions taken publicly by the Chinese party in0 and privately at theconference. The authors cited Lenin as ridiculingand doctrinaires," Insistedcreative"of Marxism-Leninism, asserted that Khrushchev had provided such an interpretation of Lenin's alleged expectationdecisive" socialist influence on questions of war and peace, reaffirmed the importance of economic competition In the East-West struggle, and rejected Chinese charges that the Soviet interpretation of "peaceful coexlstonce" would weaken the bloc in tbe struggle, that emphasis on the possibility ofaccession to power by Communist parties would encouragend that calls for "mutual concessions" andbetween East and West were unworthy of Leninists.
The heaviest Soviet blow in tbe Sino-Sovietblow calculated to have greater impact on Peiping than all the Soviet editorials and speeches putin the form of Soviet letters to the Chinese party onnduly about the status of Soviet technicians in China.* In the first letter, the Soviet party reportedly referredoviet requesthat the Soviet technicians be replaced by Chinese who had been trained in the bloc (the Soviets, however, had agreed to let themoviet willingness to withdraw them 8 when the Chlneae had complained about some of them, and charged that the Chinese had recently been subverting the technicians by circulating among them material of the type originated by the Chinese in It Is
not clear whether this first letter stated an intention to withdraw the technicians. In any case, theuly letterstated that "all" technicians would be withdrawn in the period from late July to early September. Perhaps^notiiall, but'--virtualeem, to:.'have;;been'.i& fact withdrawn
The Soviet party then and subsequently denied that the withdrawal of technicians was an application of severeon tbe Chinese party to force the Chinese to back down in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Obviously that was what it was, however. The withdrawal was bound to have such a serious effect on the Chinese program of economic and militarydisrupting the existingit could have been taken only for tbe most serious of. the entire matter of the Chinese challenge to Soviet leadership of the world Communist movement, not simply the Indoctrination of the technicians. The action underlined indications that Khrushchev was willing toreak with Peiping. Thewas simply tbat of whether the pressure would be effective.
The Chinese party reportedly repliedugust to theuly Soviet letter. The Chinese letter is said to have expressed astonishment at the Soviet decision to withdraw the technicians, praised the work of the technicians, asserted that Peiping had In general been responsive to their advice, and minimized the charge of indoctrination of the technicians. The letter went on to protest strongly that tbe Soviet was legally and morally wrong and that it would hurt the Chinese development program, weaken tbe bloc, and encourage the West. Tbe letter concluded with aMoscowreconsideration of the decision.
In this same letterugust, Peiping reportedly took up the question of stoppage of Cbinese and Soviet "friendship";publications, about which Moscow bad informed Peiping on uly. The Chinese letter contended that the Soviet publication had also contained offensive material but Peiping had not It went on to remark that It was "curious" that Amcrika could circulate in the USSR but the Chinese publication could hot. It concludedequest that the Soviet decision to stop the publications, like the decision to withdraw the technicians, be reconsidered.
The Soviet party remained on the offensive throughout August. Pravdaugust, defending Soviet views on war and peace, described Chinese Communist views (not attributed) on these questions as an "absolute departure" from Marxism-Lenin-ism. Soviet Fleetugust, in the first observed public warning of this kind, reminded Peiping that it was "Impossible"ountry to achieve socialism without close ties with and "brotherly help" from the Bloc; this article went on to explain the forms of the struggle within the concept of "peaceful Red Star onugust jeered at "dogmatists and sectarians" who "mechanically repeat" the once-valid thesis that wars are inevitable so long as capitalism exists; and at the same time, as had Soviet Fleett it rejected the Chinese charge that the USSR was attempting to "beg" peace. Pravda onugust derided "publicists" who selectively quoted Lenin (which, of course, both parties had done from thend it defended coexistenceeans of facilitating the East-West struggle on all fronts. Onugust, an Izvestia article on the same theme charged the Chinese (not named) wi'tn having drawn "absolutely absurd" conclusions from recent international developments, and, further, with having disoriented themselves and misled others.
Beginning onugust, the Soviet provincial press widely published an article which for the first time named China in the context of the dispute and for the first time warned China specifically of the consequences of isolation from the Bloc:
Could one imagine the successfulof socialism in present-day conditions even inreat country as, let us say, China, If this country were in an isolated position, noton the cooperation and mutual assistance of all the other socialist countries? Being subjected to economic blockade on the part of the capitalist countries,ountry at the same time would be subjected to military blows from without. It would experience the greatest difficulties even if It were able to withstand the furious attack of the enemy...
Soviet Russia on 17 August criticized the dogmatists who believed fri the inevitability of wars, and expressly derided the Chinese contention that tbe Western general staffs were to make this decision. Onulgarian paperthe warnings about isolation, and, of greater interest,
observed that "any kind of 'second center' ofould, in effect, help imperialism," Onugust, Pravda denounced "dogmatists and sectarians" whoSoviet policies toward underdevelopedrespect both to nationalist governments and to "liberation"who were thus approachingnd onugust Pravda Ukrainy, ridiculing some Chinesetaken verbatim, warned that efforts to "sow mistrust" of Soviet positions constitutedogmatism and sectarianism" and could cause "serious damage" to the world Communist movement.
Moreover, the Soviet party in August increased its effort to isolate the Chinese party. Many other Communist parties, probably including all those named (the Chinese among them) to the preparatory commission for the forthcoming Novemberreceived in lateoviet party letterdatedugust. The letter appears to have been anversion of theune letter which the Soviet delegation had used for briefing purposes at Bucharest. Reports refer to suchin thethe possibility of avoiding general war, the usefulness of "peacefulhe degree of success of Soviet policies toward the governments of underdeveloped countries, Pelplng's relationships withparties of Asia and Africa, Chinese approaches to other parties throughout the world, Chinese interference in bloc affairs, Chinese pressure for unclear weapons, Chinese domestic programs, the stature of Maoheorist, the relativeof "revisionism" andnd so on along familiar lines. The letter reportedly callederious effort to resolve these differences as rapidly as possible, and described the Moscow conference scheduled for November as the "firstto do this. The letter in effect Invited theto consider the issues And to come to Moscow inprepared to support the Soviet party. The letter may also have asked the parties to make their views known to Peiping before November, as there are unconfirmed reports that some of them did so,
Chinese Communist pronouncements throughout July had been comparatively circumspect and inoffensive, and theyso in early August. ugust, however, four days after the Chinese party had sent its letter expressing dismay over the Soviet decisions on the technicians and thean arresting article appeared In the Shanghai bi-weekly Liberation, the organ of the Shanghai Committee of the CCP.
The theme of the article was the need for bitter struggle in the face of the problems posedackward country, by the frank opposition of the imperialist enemy, and by those who "call us fools who do not know our limitations.- It derided those who "would bave us merely stretch out our hands fornd it emphasized tho need for self-reliance. Similarly, on the same dayeople's Daily, in reprinting an article which in its original 'form hatT emphasized the importance of Soviet aid in Chinese successes, altered the articleowngrade this factor and deleted the passage which had called for "international solidarity" to be the "starting-point" of Chinese actions. Both articles, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, suggestod at least the possibility that the Chinese party, rather than deciding to retreat undor pressure, had decided to dovlthout Soviet aid if necessary.
People's Dally in Peiping reprintedugust Liberation article onugust, and on the same day the newspaper's edi-torial found occasion to cite the "blasphemous talk" of "modern revisionists and their followers" who took anti-Chinese In mid-August, Li Pu-chun, the regime's principal econinlc planner, had an article in Red Flag rolterating the Chinese policy of "self-reliance." Li wrote tbat the party bad "consistently held that we should rely mainly on our own efforts. This was so in the past and will be even more so in tbe future." Li also assailed "modernescribed the Cbinese as "real Marxist-Leninists" and asserted that those seeking to isolate Peiping would only isolate themselves. Onugust, possibly in reply to theugust JPrayda article, the Chinese party renewed its criticism of Soviet policy in underdeveloped countries, emphasizing the need to supportmovements there, describing Soviet policy as aof Lenin's views and Mao's line as "entiroly" consonant with Lenin's views.
The strongest indicationhinese intention to stand firm in the dispute cane in early September at the Viet Minh party congress in Hanoi, on which occasion tbe Soviet and Chinese representatives stated their views, as someone has said, "at point-blank range." eptember, Soviet delegate Mukhitdinov reaffirmed Soviet positions on the non-inevitability of wars, the wicked character but declining strength of the need for "peaceful coexistence" as conforming with the "humanitarian nature of socialism" oncepthinese article two days earlier) the excellence
of Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped countries, and so on. Li Fu-chun followed Mukhitdinoveaff1mation of certain divergent Chinese positions, concluding with tho sour observation that "we must not take the struggleretext for departing from fundamental theoretical positions of marxism-Leninism, nor allow marxism-Leninism to be replaced by revisionism." MUkhitdinov, angered, struck back hard In another speech oneptember, attributing to one of the positions taken in fact by tbe Chinese (on the inevitability ofnd going on to denounce the "divisive activities of the .dogmatists and sectarians" (tbe conventional terns.for the Chinese)serious danger" to the world Communist movement.
Peiping States Its Case,0
Oneptember, tho Chinese party sent to the Sovietery longage) letter designed to refute the Soviet briefing letter ofune. Theetter, [
other Communist delegatee at tne Viet ninn party conference in early September,ounter to the Soviet effort into line up the other parties against the Chinese. The CCP may later have sent copies to the other parties.
Theeptember letter was organized on the pattern of theune Soviet letter, in the interest of systematically refuting the charges in that letter. It took up first theof relations between the Soviet and Chinese parties and then wont into the substantive issues in the dispute. This like theune letter, is worth considering at some length.
The Chinese letter, like the Soviet letter, began bythe Marxist-Leninist basis of the Sino-Soviet relationship and expressing the CCP's gratitude for Soviet aid. It thenthat there wascrisis" in the relationship, that at the Bucharest meeting Khrushchev had made graveagainst the CCP, and that this had been followedress campaign, the withdrawal of Soviet technicians, theof Chinese publications, and the expulsionhinese official from Moscow.
The letter observed that the Soviet letter ofune had contained valid points butumber of views which diverged from Marxism-Leninism and from the Moscow Declarationurther, that it had distorted the Chinese position and made unfounded accusations, in particular that the CCP bad departed from the Moscow Declaration.
The Chinese letter went on to note that serioushad begun with the CPSU Congress in6 when
*Wo are here relying primarily on an excellent!
r-lT,thoulHe6og!rtRea..that-ight be1 interpreted
the Soviet party had mado a ttack on Stalin, his roleuilder ot socialism and defender of Marxism, and when the CPSU bad also put forward an incorrect theory on the "peaceful transition to socialism" withoutfirst consulted other Communist parties.
In the letter went on, the USSR hadforces to move against Poland and had desisted only after representations by the CCP. Further, the Chinese party had deterred Moscow from arranging an international meeting tothe Polish leaders. Immediately thereafter, the letter said, the Soviet party was about to withdraw its forces from Hungaryritical point in the uprising, and It was the CCP which had induced the Soviet party to crush the uprising.
Then at the Moscow conference inhewent on, the Chinese party had impelled significantin the draft ofparty declaration. The Soviet draft had not mentioned the questions of state power or of class struggle, it had spoken only of peaceful paths. The CCP, in its formulation, had agreed toink with theh Congress formulation in order to save Moscow's face.
Also at Moscow, the letter continued, Mao Tse-tung had endorsed the concept of Soviet leadership of the socialist camp. However, the leader must behave responsibly, must have proper discussion with all other parties on an "equalIt is not clear whether Mao made these latter points at.)
The CCP, theeptember letter continued, had adhered to the agreed procedure of bilateral talks with the Soviet party7 However, the Soviet party hadfrom agreed positions and had returned to the mistaken theses ofh Congross, and, particularlyfollowing Khrushchev's visit to the Unitedhe CPSU had made open criticisms of the Chinese party. As instances of deviations and improper behavior, the letter cited Khrushchev's position on the Sino-Indian dispute, several of Khrushchev's speeches In the USSR inhrushchev's criticism of the Leap Forward and the commune programs,assertion of Chinese "adventurism" in both foreign and domestic policies, Khrushchev's derision of Mao an an "old and insensitive" man to be discarded like worn-out slippers.
the Soviet party had made a ttack on Stalin,his roleuilder oi socialism and defender of Marxism, and when the CPSU had also put forward an incorrect theory on the "peaceful transition to socialism" withoutfirst consulted other Communist parties,
Inhe letter went on, tho USSR hadforces to move against Poland and had desisted only after representations by the CCP. Further, the Chinese party had deterred Moscow from arranging an international meeting tothe Polish leaders. Immediately thereafter, the letter said, the Soviet party was about to withdraw its forces from Hungaryritical point in the uprising, and it was the CCP which bad Induced the Soviet party to crush the uprising.
Then at the Moscow conference Inhewent on, the Chinese party had impelled significantin the draft ofparty declaration. The Soviet draft had not mentioned the questions of state power or of class strugglo, It had spoken only of peaceful paths. The CCP, in its formulation, had agreed toink with theh Congress formulation in order to save Moscow's face.
Also at Moscow, the letter continued, Mao Tse-tung had endorsed the concept of Soviet leadership of the socialist camp. However, the leader must behavo responsibly, must have proper discussion with all other parties on an "equalIt is not clear whether Mao made these latter points at
The CCP, theeptember letter continued, had adhered to the agroed procedure of bilateral talks with the Soviet party7 However, the Soviet party hadfrom agreed positions and had returned to tbe mistaken theses ofh Congress, and, particularlyfollowing Khrushchev's visit to the Unitedhe CPSU had made open criticisms of ths Chinese party. As Instances of deviations and improper behavior, the letter cited Khrushchev's position on the SLno-Indlan dispute, several of Khrushchev's speeches in the USSR inhrushchev's criticism of the Leap Forward and the commune programs,assertion of Chinese "adventurism" In both foreign and domestic policies, Khrushchev's derision of Mao as an "old and insensitive" man to be discarded like worn-out slippers,
the Soviet party had made a ttack on Stalin,his roleuilder ol socialism and defender of Marxism, and when the CPSU had also put forward an Incorrect thoory on the "peaceful transition to socialise" withoutfirst consulted other Communist parties,
Inhe letter went on, the USSK hadforces to move against Poland and had desisted only after representations by the CCP. Further, tbe Chinese party had deterred Moscow from arranging an international meeting tothe Polish leaders. Immediately thereafter, the letter said, the Soviet party was about to withdraw its forces from Hungaryritical point In the uprising, and It was the CCP which had Induced the Soviet party to crush the uprising.
Then at the Moscow conference inhe let-tor went on, the Chinese party had Impelled significantin the draft ofparty declaration. Tlie Soviet draft had not mentioned the questions of state power or of class struggle, It had spoken only of peaceful paths. The CCP, in its formulation, had agreed toink with theh Congress formulation in order to save Moscow's face.
Also at Moscow, tbe letter continued, Mao Tee-tung had endorsed the concept of Soviet leadership of the socialist camp. However, the leader muat behave responsibly, must have proper discussion with all other parties on an "equalIt is not clear whether Mao made these latter points at
The CCP, theeptember letter continued, had adhered to the agreed procedure of bilateral talks with the Sovlot party7 However, the Soviet party hadfrom agreed positions and had returned to the mistaken theses ofh Congress, and, particularlyfollowing Khrushchev's visit to the Unitedhe CPSU had made open criticisms of the Chinese party. As Instances of deviations and improper behavior, the letter cited Khrushchev's position on the Sino-Indian dispute, several of Khrushchev's speeches in the USSR inhrushchev's criticism of the Leap Forward and the commune programs,assertion of Chinese "adventurism" in both foreign and domestic policies, Khrushchev's derision of Mao as an "old and Insensitive" man to be discarded like worn-out slippers,
Khrushchev's comparison ol the Chinese to Troskyists,"embellishment" of American imperialism andElsenhower, Kuusinen'spril article and so on. Thus, tho Chinese letter continued, the CCP had published threegroup of Aprilset forth Its own point of view.
At the WFTU meeting inhe letter went on, it was apparent that there were serious differences in points of view on matters of strategy and consequently on the proper line for the world Communist fronts, relating in general to the intensity and methods of the "struggle" with the West. Moreover, the WFTU Secretary's report had been veryin mentioning the free world without quotation-marks but setting such marks about the Chinese "leap forward" and "commune" programs. The Chinese delegates had been Impelled to talk with other delegations, yes, but this procedure contrasted favorably with Khrushchev's actions in openly criticizing the Chinese and trying to impose his opinion.
As for the Bucharest conference, the letter went on, the CCP had agreed to theune proposal for anmeeting but asked for more time to prepare for it. The CPSU had agreed, and had promised that the meeting wouldan exchange of views rather thanefinitive reaso-lution of differences. However, at Bucharest the Soviet party and Khrushchev hadurprise attack on the CCP, and had followed thisress campaign.
The Chinese letter at this point took up the firstcategory, the nature of the present epoch. Theparty did not hold, the letter said, that the epoch was one "exclusively" of "imperialism, wars, andhe CCP agreed that the main characteristic of the epoch was that the forces of socialism were prevailing over those of Mao had long ago said that the East Wind was prevailing, This did not mean, however, that fundamentals of Leninism had become archaic. In this connection, it was the CPSU, not the CCP, which had deviated from the Moscow declaration. The letter again cited some of Khrushchev's formulations about banishing war,orld without arms, about disarmament freeing funds for underdeveloped countries, about resources in Western countries being used for popular welfare, aboutleaders genuinely desiring peace, about "coexistence" being
eaceful competition, aod about the danger of local wars (including "liberation" wars) leading to general war, with consequent Soviet timidity in supporting "Just" wars and Soviet wishful thinking about peaceful accessions to power. The Soviet party's and Khrushchev's views In these respects were described as non-Marxist.
The Chinese letter agreed that it was worthwh> totoow worldnd to-,for ?dlsU armament, he. slogan ,of -a. world without-arms, armed slnJowmiWisuIsx-this .tho Soviet party was exaggerating the bloc's control over the actions of the West, that imperialism would continue to prepare for war, and that the need for vigilance would continue Imperialism being imperialism, the lettor said, it would never abandon its efforts to dominate by violence, nor would it aid underdeveloped countries, nor would it promote the welfare of the working classes.
Thus, this section of the letter concluded, there were two concepts of the nature of the epoch: one was that of Marxism-Leninism, tho Moscow Declaration ofnd the Chinese party; the other was that which rejected Marxist-Leninist analysis and which was held by Khrushchev and others.
Turning to tho second category, questions of war and peace, the Chinese letter rejected Soviet charges that the Chinese party considered general war Inevitable andannd that the CCP wasleftist, and "adventurist." The lotter reiterated that the CCP agreed on the necessity to prevent general war and to prohibit nuclear weapons. However, the letter went on, the CCP did not believe in the possibility of total disarmament. believe in the possibility of avoiding general war was not the same thing as to believe in the elimination of local wars,wars and civil wars.
Returning to the subject of general war, the Chinesereiterated that the Soviet party underestimated the need for vigilance. In this connection, the CPSU had transformed the non-inevitability of war into something like theof avoiding war. The Soviet line was dangerous, if general war wore to come, the people would be very poorly prepared for it. The letter reiterated that the bloc could not have confidence that the West, even recognizing its relative weakness, would decide against general war.
Moreover, the Chinese letter continued, the CCP had been accused of underestimating the strength of the Bloc, strength which allegedly would influence the West in the direction of good sense. If Khrushchev really had confidence in the bloc, he would strengthen it, rather than weakening it by attacking China and withdrawing Soviet technicians. If Khrushchev really had confidence in the people, Moscow would support their strug-*le, rather than encouraging illusions about Imperialist aid and the possibility of peaceful accession to power. Ifreally did not overestimate (the good sensehe West, he would not have illusions about the results of summit meetings and other conferences. If Khrushchev and his party really did not underestimate the strength of the bloc, they would emphasizeew war would mean the death ofrather than informing bloc peoples of the horrors of nuclear war. Io this connection, the letter said, Khrushchev sometimes declaredew war would mean the triumph of socialism, but "he does not really believe it." The letter wont on to illustrate wtth quotations Khrushchev'sviewpoint." The letter reaffirmed the Chinese view that,ewictorious socialism wouldeautiful
future on the ruins ofon the ruins of
The letter went on to object to Soviet criticism of Mao's description of Imperialism and modern weapons aa "paperhe objective of Mao's concept, the letter said, was tothe "faith" of the people, not to incite adventurist actions.oncept, which he had reaffirmed at Moscowalled for the bloc to despise tho enemy strategically (long-term) while respecting him tacticallyconcopt similar to Lenin's description of Anglo-French imperialism As evidence, the letter went on, Peiping had not been provoked unto any rash action against Taiwan, thus demonstrating its tactical respect for the enemy.
In sum, this section of the letter concluded, there were 'differences of principle" between Moscow and Pelping onof peace andderiving from the fact that the CCP had adhered to the Moscow Declaration of7 whereas the Soviet party had departed from it.
Taking up the third category, "peacefulhe Chinese letter ofeptember denied that the CCPhirdneither hot war nor peaceful coexistence, but
continued cold war. However, the letter continued, since World War II there had in fact been neither general war nor peaceful coexistence,tate of cold war which had to be recognized. Khrushchev had admitted this himself.
The letter rejected the charge that the CCP no longer valued alliances between the bloc and the Afro-Asian neutrals, and that Peiping was opposed to the policy of "unity andwith the national bourgeoisie of those countries.the letter continued, the Soviet position was Moscow recognized that bourgeois nationalist leaders could not carry out the class struggle to the end, but it denied that the continuing class struggle would conflict with bourgeois nationalistoscow supported the concept of "unity andut it had failed to support Pelping in the disagreement with Indian leaders. The letter reiterated the Chinese view that bourgeois nationalist leaders were not reliable, with regard to either domestic progress or opposition to imperialism, and again, by implication, it called for greater support to Communist forces in theseforces which would emphasize "unity" at this time but wouldto bring these leaders down as soon as possible.
The letter went on toarxist-Leninist view of "peacefulstruggle between the two camps by all means short of war between them, with "peacefulItself as "one of the forms of this struggle." had distorted this concept with his emphasis oncompetition, to the point of renouncing the "moststruggle, the political Khrushchev, the letter went on, had gone so far as to envisage "activebetween the camps in some fields, and to describe "peaceful coexistence" as the "highest form" of class struggle.
The letter observed at this point that the Soviet party seemed to apply the concept of "peaceful coexistence" to the struggle of peoples within the non-Communist world. Whereas the Soviet letter had declared Soviet support for "just" wars, Khrushchev himself had emphasized the dangerocal war
It is perhaps unnecessary to remark that this Chinese version of Khrushchev's position shows very little sense of the aggressive elements in his interpretation.
orld war. In other words, In the interest of "peacefulhe Soviet party was advising the "people" everywhere not to undertake any action which might conceivablyivil war which in turn couldorld war. What was to become then of support of just wars, especially "liberation" wars? Was the Soviet party seriously contending that the victory of the people in the struggle against imperialism depended not on tbeir own struggle but on diplomatic relations between the two camps?
This section of the letter concluded scornfully that, while the Soviet party asserted tbat the bloc must "force" the West to accept coexistence, "what is actually occurring" with increasing frequency Is "concession, complacency,and compromise." The letter conceded that concession and compromise were acceptable under certain conditions, but, until the West, especially the United States, discarded Its policies of aggression and war, then the "struggle forcoexistence" would necessarily be identical with theagainst aggression and war. Lenin and Stalin had never tried to "embellish" imperialism and have never regarded the unmasking of an aggressor an an error, whereas Khrushchev and his comrades,ime when the USSR was more powerful than ever before, chose to ignore the faults of the West and to charge the Chinese with being "bellicose."
Taking up the fourth category, tbe problem of "peaceful transition" (accession to power), the Chinese letter ofeptemberifference of both "opinion" andwith the Soviet position. The letter charged Moscow with evading the key questions ofroletarian dictatorship and smashing the existinf state machinery. It reiterated that power could not be established simply through parliaments. Khrushchev failed to recognise that reactionary forces would always resist strongly, that violence vouldalways be necessary, Khrushchev's view, tbe letter went on, would not deceive the reactionaries, it would merely lull the Communist parties.
This section of the Chinese letter concluded with ato Soviet "slander" of the CCP as dogmatists who wished to "exportorld war, and destroybecause the CCP emphasized tbe need to be prepared for violence in revolution. The Soviet attitude waa disaiased scornfully aa "fear offundamental principle of opportunists."
Turning to the fifth category, the use of the fronts, the Chinese letter defined the Sino-Soviet dispute on this point as essentially that of whether the fronts were to be fighting organizations. The letter at this point took up the Soviet charge that the CCPt the Asian Trade Union Conference, had tried to impose its views; the letter argued that the Chinese had merely offered their experience, and had not proposed that the WFTU itself organize armed struggles. The letter defended at some length tbe CCP'swith the WFTU since that tine and then accused the Soviet party of having failed to understand the important role the fronts could play in the antl-lnperlalist and pro-liberation struggles. Indeed, the letter said, the Soviets sere even bidding for tbe support of bourgeois pacifists and those with "colonialhus isolating themselves from the masses. In sum, Moscow wanted to use the fronts simply as an adjunct of Soviet diplomacy. This section of theconcluded with instances of Soviet misbehavior andrectitude.
Turning to the final category, and dividing it into the question of "revisionism and dogmatism" and the question of relations among Communist parties, the Chinese letter denied that revisionism had been eradicated In the bloc, and asserted that revisionisn remained in the fora of both bourgeoisin Internal affairs and fear of imperialism in foreign As for the Soviet charge against the CCP of dogmatism and sectarianism, the letter declared flatly that "the CCP does not commit dogmatic and sectarian errors." The letter denied that the "hundred flowers" experiment and the later "leapand commune programs were "heresies." The letter charged that the Soviet wanted the Chinese to "follow blindly" Soviet experience, and tnat Khrushchev at Bucharestupported the rightist opportunist" Peng Te-buai (the defense. That Khrushchev called dogmatism, this section concluded roundly, was in reality Marxism-Leninism, whereas what Khrushchev was doing was what right-opportunists always
As for relations between the parties, the letter went on, the CCP warmly welcomed the Soviet wish for "solidarity" and asserted that the Chinese party was firmly pro-Soviet andthe Soviet party as the "center" of the movement. the letter went on, thiselationship of "equality andot of superior to subordinates or
leader to led. Soviet party resolutions, the letter continued, were not "binding" on other parties.
The CPSU sought to Justify itself, the letter continued, by appealing to majority support for its "position." However, it was not always possible to determine "who is right and who is wrong" by counting votes. Truth is truth, tbe letter said,temporary" majority could not convert error into truth. The letter apparently included at this point an assertion that the "verdict of history" would vindicate Peiping in the The letter reiterated Chinese opposition (expressedith regard to Eastern European developments) to "great-nation chauvinism" and paternalistic procedure.
The Chinese letter ofeptember concluded with anof gratitude for Soviet aid to China, noting at once, however, that "China paid for all of this aid." Further, the letter observed, the aid of socialist countries to otherand to revolutionary forces should not be the ground for "pride and boasting." Host sharply, the letter stated at this point that, if economic and technical aid were usedmeans of pressure" between fraternal socialist countries (as Moscow was usingroletarian internationalism was being violated. The letter declared that this unilateral Soviet action had caused "serious damage" to China. However, the letter declared grandly, "Marxist-Leninist truth cannot be bought with money." Theconcludedious sentiment about the Chinese objective of "unity with brothers" who "travel in the same boat against wind and rain."
Shortly after dispatching this letter to the Soviet party, the Peiping regime, 3 September letter to Lumumba forces in the Congo, made clear its inability to implement, withoutsupport, the aggressive bloc strategy which it favored. The letter, signed by Premier Chou En-lai, observed that Peiping "would like very much to do everything possible" for Lumumba's government. However, because "China is far fromt would not be possible for Peiping to send "military volunteers" and military hardware to the Congo; the best Peiping couldwouldift of one million pounds to Lumumba's This credit was apparently still available as of
Immediately aftereptember, the date of the longletter considered above, Tengand Peng Chen disappeared from the news. Teng and Peng, who, with Liu Shao-chl, had all along played leading roles in tbewent to Moscow at about tbis time in an effort (whether at Soviet or Chinese initiative is not known) to narrow the distance between Soviet and Chinese views and thus to make tbe forthcoming Moscow conference more profitable than the Bucharest meeting had been.*
Kommunist No.ppeared in September with an article on "Lenin's Theory of Socialist Revolution and Ourbeopened with strictures against dogmatism (tbe "talmudlstic approach) and With an assertion of the needcreative"It reaffirmed Sovietn the character of the epoch, the long-term attractive power of the socialist system, the ability of the bloc to Impede Western Interference Incarrying out revolution, the good prospects forcountries to break away from Imperialism, the lack of need for wars to promoto revolution, the terrible consequonces of general war, the excessive price ofar even ifwere to emerge victorious, the value of "lasting peace" in encouraging the "liberation" movement and in depresalng tbe Imperialist economy, the special value of disarmament In tbat connection, the misinterpretation (Chinese) of "peacefulasirtual abandonment of the struggle, the recognition of "just" wars within the terns of coexistence, tbe advantages of coexistence for' the struggle within theWestern countries, the needradualist program on the part of Communists in thebe correctness or the gradualist line taken at the Rome conference of Europeanparties, tbe good prospects for peaceful accession to power by Communistnd the need to strugle against (Yugofe Slav) "revisionism" and (Chinese) "sectarianism."
*It is important to recognize that these party-machineLiu, Teng, and Peng, the .principal figures of the mostgroup among Mao's lieutenants, have been firmdy. associated with the complex of Mao's positions offensive to Moscow.
an extended discussion of tbis aspect of the argument, see tbe FBIS study 'Theory of Revolutions Assumes New Prominence in Sino-Sovietecause the Kommunist article Is directed largely to tbe question of the tactics of Communist parties in tbe developed countries of the West, and because tbis question is not nearly so important in the Sino-Soviet dispute as questions relating to thocountries, the article is not treated in detail in this paper.
; Oneptember, Peipingong article by Li Wei-haa with the frank title, "Study Chairman Mao's Writings and Gradually Change World-Outlook." This was the firsteries of articles attacking Soviet positions through the device of recounting Mao's many years of struggle against his-opponents" in China and underlining the relevance of Mao's views to the present scene. Among tbe points made by Li were these: "The Mao Tse-tung ideology is Marxism-Leninism in its fullest developedevisionists "succumb to theof the bourgeoisie and to the menace of imperialism,the pretext of creatively developinghe revisionists forget that "armed struggle is the principal means of waging thend revisionists "talk of peace and peacefuleglecting the need "tocounterrevolutionary war with revolutionary war."
At the end of September, Peipingusillade at Soviet positions, on the occasion of tbe publicationourth volume of Mao's collected works, edited by thecommittee of the CCP central committee. In the first commentary, remarkable for failing even to mention the USSR, Peiping Radioubstantial reaffirmation of Chinese positions. Among the truths that Mao had long agowere these: one must not harbor "illusions" aboutor be frightened of it; concessions are permissible only if the "basic interests" of the people are protected; peace is achieved by giving one's enemies "hardt is foolish to overestimate the enemy andt is necessary to "struggle" to prevent another world war; the "paper tiger" concept advocatesthe enemy in long-range terms while taking himIn particular engagements; reaction can be eliminated only by revolution; and imperialism cannot change its nature. The commentary remarked the "tremendous significance" of this volume for "present-daymong other things forthe struggle against imperialism and modern
On the followingeople's Daily editorial addressed itself to Mao's fourth volume. The edi-torial covered some of the same ground as hadommentary, but it was much sharper on the need forin revolution. Lenin's writings on this theme were invoked in support of the proposition that theodel "bourgeois democratic revolution led by
the proletariat." The editorial conceded thatarmed struggle cannot be carried out anytime, anywhere, simply by subjectively wishing for it." The "objective and subjective possibilities, the degree of ripeness of thecrisisiven time andust be taken into consideration. However, the editorial continued,the crisis ishe question of "daring or not daring to take up arms and engage in resolutes one of fundamental principle which involves loyalty orto the interests of then other words, although this passage did not mention the Soviet party or any other, there were some "ripe" situations,uarid:Uoeoawaadd its followers had been backing away. The passage went on to observe that the Chinese party, when it had been in this critical situation, had chosen the revolutionary linethan the "opportunist" line, had "had the courage to struggle andith the result that "today we have the Chinese People's Republic."
Two more pronouncements on Mao's fourth volumein Red Flagctober. One ofongreturned to the theme of Mao's insistence onrevolutionary" line as opposed to an "opportunist" line, and It reviewed Mao's scornful remarks to those who had held "timid and impotent right opportunist ideas which feared HJ.S, imperialism" and had overestimated the strength of domestic anti-Communist forces. The editorial defended Mao's "paper tiger" conceptfundamental strategicne which taught that "all Marxist-Leninists who genuinely (sic) want to lead the oppressedust be bold in waging the The editorial went on to rebuke "somenot in theconsidered that the "paper tiger" concept "represented an 'adventurist' point ofhe adventurist view, however, was said to be represented precisely by those who ignored the other half of Mao'sthe half that enjoined tactical caution; and the editorial cited Mao's reaffirmation of both parts of his formulaolitburo meeting in*
The Russians must have been considerably annoyed by Mao's insistence on his conceptrinciple for bloc action.the Russians equally with the Chinese "despised. were confident of long-term victory. The problem lay in their differing estimates of the relative strength of the bloc and the West at this. This led to differing assessments of the risks Involved insituations, in which the Russians even more than the"respected the enemy tactically." Mao's8 reaffirmation of both sides of his concept followed anChinese effort to induce Moscow to take greater risks in the Taiwan Strait venture than Khrushchev wished.
Tbe fourth Chinese pronouncement in this grouped Flag article by Lin Piao, Mao's longtime favoritesleader who9 had displaced Peng Te-huai asof defense. Writing on the theme of the Chinesevictory in the civil warvictory of Mao Tse-tung'sin went over familiar-ground. Heone of Mao's old arguments, however, of relevance for bloc strategy toward the "liberation" movements:
It is the dialectic of history thatnew-born force is weak and small, and in anposition in the beginning, neverthelesseventuallyecaying force whichoutwardly strong and large and in a
Later in his article Lin found occasion to say that "it goes without saying, of course, that victory inis by noindfall which can be obtainedne must not be afraid, he went on, of "frustrations and failures." He concluded resoundingly that "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's lineevolutionary Marxist-Leninist linefrom allhat the publication of this fourth volume was an "important event in the workers'of thend that "to equip our minds with Mao Tse-tung's thinking, to preserve the purity of Marxism-Leninism, and to oppose modern revisionism in all its forms are our most important tasks at present."
Tbe Soviet party continued in this period to comment on issues in the dispute, although not in such volume as Oneptember TASSecent article by the Soviet military theorist Talensky, who, like Kommunlst,the proposition tbat general war might be Justified if it resulted in the demise of capitalism. Talensky also reaffirmed the Soviet position that local wars should be avoided because they could easily get out of control. This latter contention was promptly countered in an articlehinese Communist general reaffirming the Chinese view that the bloc must be willing to fight, support, and encourage local wars to advance the world Communist cause.
The strain in Sino-Soviet relations was highlighted on 1National;tbe failure of anystate except Albania toelegation. Most of
the bloc communiques ofexcept Albania's North Korea's, and Northnot enthusiastic and failed to felicitate Mao personally, and the bloc commentaries displayed differences with the Chinese in their assessments of the world scene.
Thore continued to be indications
a deterioration in relations botween Peiping on ono nana ind the USSR and most of tho Eastern Europoan states on the other. There were reports of withdrawals of Chinese students from Eastern European schools and of Eastern European technicians and students from China, of personal slights and ill-tempered personal exchanges between Chinese and other blocof restrictions placed on bloc diplomats in Peiping,oscow lecturer publicly identifying the Chinese asand of the "permanent" suspension of Druzhba.
In early October, prior to attendingh session of the UN General Assembly, Khrushchev reportedly discussed Sino-Soviet relations with the Eastern European leaders whohim. Much of this roported briefing covered familiar ground: that the Chinese party pretended to accept Soviet leadership but in fact did not, and that the Chinese wereto split the world Communist movement; that the Chinese did not understand the changes In tho world since tbe time of Lenin formulations on the nature of the epoch; that Peipingof Soviet policies toward the underdeveloped countries; that the Chineseuch more militant interpretation of the fight forbat Chinese military thinking, the "leapnd the commune program were all foolish; that th* Chinese had refused to cooperate in certain practicalmatters; that Mao lived an insular life which encouraged delusions; and so on. The account of this briefing added ono sharp ltom, which certain materials in the Soviet press seamed to support: that in recent months there had been disputes along the Sino-Soviet border, sometimes involving the presence of Chinese forces on territory claimed by the USSR.
This account included the first report of Khrushchev's thinking about the important questlor of forces in thoparty leadership which might sympathize with Moscow on aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev is said to have specified Peng Te-hual, th* deposed defense minister, as ono who had unsuccessfully opposod aspects, of-Mao's program.
Re Is said also to have described Chou En-lai as the "mostChinese leader but as one who did not "dare" to oppose Kao.*
Khrushchev is also reported to have told the Satellite leaders that the Soviet party could not abandon fundamental positions,enuine resolution of the dispute wasto take place at the Moscow conference, and, indeed, that Peiping might leave tbe bloc. Khrushchev is further said to have specified that only the Albanian party supported the Chinese.
Onctober, in another defiant gesture, Peipingthe publication by tbe Chinese Communist foreignPress of six pamphlets of quotations from Lenin's works, in six languages (Russian, English, Spanish, French, German, Japanese). According to the American Consulate General at Hong Kong, this was the first time that Peiping had issued selections from Lenin (of this scope) in Ilanguages other than Chinese. As the Consulate General's analysis pointed out, this action was taken in tbe face of Khrushchev's admonitions about mechanically repeating things Lenin had said many years ago under very different conditions; and tbe selections were clearly made for the purpose of buttressing Peiping's case in appeals to other Communist parties for support.
*Peng's fall from favor was almost certainly related to opposition to aspects of Mao's military thinking, or to*of Mao's thinking which had (inadon the military establishment (sucb as the heavy demands laid on the military In tbe "leap forward* and commune. Chou En-lai has been lessssociated with features of Mao's domestic and foreign policies obnoxious .to the Soviets than have the party machine leaders sucb as Liu, Teng and Peng Chen, but, as the report of Khrushchev'ssuggests, there is no evidence tbat Chou has opposed these policies, and be clearly remains in favor. It seems reasonable to believe tbat the Soviet party would prefer Chou to any of the party machine leaders as Mao's successor; at least at this time, Chou seems to be running behind Liu'ahd perhaps Teng too.
Onctober, Peiping commented bleakly on the results' ol Khrushchev's performance at tbe UN General Assembly. Daily reviewed tbe defeats of Soviet proposals at tne session^ cited "insults" to tbe Soviet delegation and its allies, and concluded that the United States had "pushed around" the blocmost outrageous way."*
The Soviet press, commenting on Khrushchev's mission, tookifferent line, describing it as havingfar-flung and irresistible offensive." Khrushchev himself, reporting on bis missionoscow speech onctober, took occasion to defend vigorously some Soviet, positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. He rejected tbe "adventurist" view of advancing Communist interests by initiating wars, asserted progress in winning over tbe uncommitted nations, and,lear effort to undercut the Chinese charge that Moscow as selling out the "liberation" movement, used his strongest language to that time in condemning French policy toward Algeria, to advertise Soviet recognition of the Algerian rebels, and to promise the rebels greater support. also remarked that "no nations" could beto the question of disarmament, and tbat those wbofrom assisting" In the disarmament effort wouldtbe possibility of bringing on themselves as well as others tbe disaster of nuclear war. Toward the end of bis speech, commentiggoontthe recent "deterioration"'in"Soviet-American relations, he expressed confidence tbat relations would improve.
*Peipingery defective sense of the aggressive elemfints^in Khrushchev's positions, in this case the strong indications that the Soviet party wouldas Peiping had beenmore aggressive program in "colonial" areas.
Failure of Preparatory Work,0
There are only fragmentary accounts of the proceedings, during the first three weeks of October, of the meetings of the preparatory committee for the November conference of theommunist parties. These accounts make clear, however, that the preparatory committee failed to arriveully-agreed draft declaration, and that such agreement as existed wasominal agreement.
The Soviet party delegation was reportedly headed by Mikhail Suslov and Frol Kozlov. The Chinese delegation was headed by Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen. All the blocandon-bloc countries were said to bea total ofelegations.
v The committee was apparentlyoviet draftto consider, and they may have been given certain other documents, such as the Chinese party's letter ofeptember to the Soviet partyoviet commentary on this letter. The definitive Soviet statement on theeptember letter, however, was not to comeovember, in the formery long Soviet party letter which is considered in the next section.
Judging from theecember declaration of the parties, the Soviet draft included long discussions of the nature of the epoch, questions of war and peace, "peacefulhe "national liberationrospects for peaceful accession to power, tactics for Communist parties in the West, and questions relating to the discipline of the world Communist movement.
Although there is little specific information on Chinese positions at this preparatory conference, it is reasonable to believe that Teng and Peng stood on tho positions taken in the CCP'september letter. The Chinese thus contended,that there shouldore militant and lessdefinition of the epoch, one emphasizing itscharacter; that Moscow exaggerated the consequences
of general war; that thereontinuing prospect of general wareed for sharp vigilance; that the possibility of avoiding general war did not mean that thereecreasing prospect of local wars; that some local wars, and allwars, were positively to be welcomed; that the concept of "peaceful coexistence" was misleading and worked in general to the disadvantage of the world Communist movement, and that there should be greater emphasis on "struggle" and less on negotiations; that there shouldledge of greater support to the "struggle," including all "Just" wars; that there should be both "unity and struggle" with bourgeois nationalistof independent countries, but with greater emphasis on struggle; that Communist parties in the West should expect and be prepared to use violence; that the Communist fronts should be "fighting" bodies; and so on. As for the discipline of the movement, the Chinese presumably contended that "revisionism" wasanger in the bloc itself, that the Chinese party was not guilty of dogmatism and sectarianism, that the Soviet party was the "center" but all the parties should be equal, that Soviet positions were not binding da other parties (this isnd (this Is also confirmed) that the Chinese party would not be overriddenajority. The Chinese at the October meetings reportedly reiterated some of their charges about Soviet use of economic aidorm of pressure.
Similarly, while there is little specific information on the positions taken by the Soviet representatives in these meetings, it is reasonable to believe that their positions are accurately reflected in the Sovietovember letter. Thus Suslov and Kozlov presumably contended that the Chinese definition of the epoch was far behind the times; that the bloc was strong enough to deter the West from general war and, increasingly, from local wars; that local wars should inbe avoided, due to the danger of their expansion; that the Soviet party did support "just" wars and would continue to do so; that the movement must not conceal the consequences of general war; that "peaceful coexistence"eaningful concept and one which worked to the advantage of the bloc; that disarmamentseful issue, and would be to the bloc's advantageact; that the neutral nations were important
to the Communist cause and should be conciliated; that in some countries Communist parties might como to power by peaceful means; that the movement mustlexible policy in the fronts; and so on. As for the discipline of the movement, the Soviets presumably contended, as didovember letter, that there was no revisionism within the bloc, that the threat was from Chinese dogmatism and sectarianism, that it was the Chinese party whichore than "equal" position, that the "unity" of the movement depended absolutely on the principle of majority rule; and so on. There is no information as to whether other Chinese charges were answered or as to whether the Soviet party made fresh charges.
There wereumber of speeches by otherin support of Soviet positions,peechthe Chinese by the Albanian delegation. Certain other delegations (mostly from the Far Eastern countries) apparently supported the Chinese on certain substantive points andon some formulations relating to the discipline of the
the Chinese claimed to
have the "tun or partial" support of the Albanian, Australian, Cuban, Indonesian, and North Vietnameselus "one wing" of the Japanese.
Following tbe speeches, which reportedly included heated exchanges,ubcommittee apparently met for several days.to consider the many amendments to the Soviet draft (possibly hundreds) which had been proposed. The subcommittee apparently struggled with the draft line by line and word by word.
The full preparatory committee reportedly met again at the end of the third week in October to consider the results of the labors of the subcommittee. Tbe subcommittee bad evidently arrived at acceptable formulations on most of the substantive questions, but not all; similarly, there wasagreement on most of the formulatioivs.relaf ing :to"theof the world Communist movement, but some important questions remained. In particular, judging from the protracted discussion of this point in the Sovietovember letter, the Chinese must have remained intransigently in opposition to the principle of majorityrinciple which seems to have been phrased, in whole or in part, In terms of opposing
Tull" from the Albanians, "partial" from the others.
"factionalism" in the movement. The draft was evidently left uncompleted, for referral to the world Communistin early November. .
In late October, the Chinese party reaffirmed some of its positions in commentaries on the tenthctober) of the beginning of Chinese intervention in the Korean war. The commentaries concluded that the Korean war had proved that. imperialism" waspaper tiger" which could be defeated by struggle. One of these commentaries by the former commander of Chinese forces in Korea, reviewed Mao Tse-tung's warning to the Cbinese people0 not to relax their vigilance, the demonstration shortly thereafter that. imperialism" was the most vicious enemy of the world, the Chinese recognition of the need to participateJust" war, the successighteous causeateri ally superior enemy, the correct Chinese attitude of suspicion toward negotiations, and the correct policy of gaining ettloment by military blows. The entire course of tbe war this commentary arguod, had proved that "only by resoluteand hitting the enemy hard can aggression be curbed and national indepondonco and world peace bo defended."
The editorial discussed7 October Revolution in terms of its vindication of revolutionary violence, which had made it the "prototype" for the world revolution. "Historical evidence has proven to us time andhe editorialthat It is "impossible" to liberate the proletariat and establish socialism without "destroying the bourgeois state machine" and without roletarian Lenin, the editorial went on, had firmly opposed the sacrifice of "fundamental" Interests for "immediate" interests. Moreover, Lenin had been more clear-sighted than thoseand "many self-styledhad opposed the armed uprising of the proletar iat on the very eve of the October Revolution. The present epoch, the editorial asserted, is "unprecedentedly favorable for proletarian revolution" in various countries, andso in the underdeveloped countries.
The longer Red Flag article carried further the Chinese attack on Sovions relating to the possibility of
the proletariat gaining influence in the existing machinery of the bourgeois state. Marx was quoted to the effect that the proletariat "cannot simply make use of the exlsing statend Lenin was Invoked on the need to "destroy" this machine. The Chinese revolution was presented at lengthuccessful illustration of the principle of "smashing" the state machine. The article went so far as to contend that thia was necessary for "any" reform, not to speak of transformation of the democratic into the socialist revolution.
ovember,ouble number of Red Flag following the unprecedented postponement of the nid-OcTober number, the Chinese party again attacked Soviet positions. An editorialonger article in this number seeaed to be directedportions of the article in Kommunist No.everal weeks earlier.*
The article went on to concede that proletarian parties might and should use parliamentary organizations for limited purposes, but, even whore such legal means of struggle existed, it argued, the point of euchto theprecisely that of preparing for "armed uprising and war." The article concludedeneralon the Soviet emphasis on "peace" rather than on revolu-
The modern revisionists and some foggy-minded peoples have treated revolutions in variousand world peace as opposite things, contending that there should not be revolution or else world peace cannot be safeguarded. This view is absolutely preposterous, and is fundamentally opposed to Marxism-Leninism.
ovember, Liu Shao-chi was named to head the Chinese delegation to the Moscow conference, with Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen next in rank. The composition of the entire delegation
number of Red Flag, as well as Kommunist No. is discussed at length iTTThe FBIS studyTheory of Revolutions Assumes New Prominence in Sino-Soviet Dispute."
most important party-machine figures, leading theorists, and specialists in work in front-organizations,-almost all of them persons close toclear that the Chinese would come preparedontinuing struggle.
Soviet and Chinese spokesmen stood firm in theirpositions in pronouncements on the Soviet anniversaryhe very eve of the Moscow conference. Frol Kozlov, speaking In Moscow, politely reaffirmed Soviet positions on the struggle for peace as the "most important" task, the character of the epoch, the consequent feasibility of "peaceful coexistence" and the non-inevitability of war, the ability of the bloc to deter local wars, the need 'for disarmament, the usefulness of East-West talks, the importance of bloc "unity" and the concurrent importance of "fidelity to the principles of creative Marxism, ability to understand correctly and todoctrine In the new historic Chenspeaking in Peiping the same day, had much praise for Sovietbut reaffirmed Chinese positions on the October Revolution as the prototype, on the fidelity of the Chinese revolution to this principle, on the Chinese creative development of Marxism-Leninism (specifying the general line, the "leap forward" and then the serious dangerew world war, on the need to expose the struggle against the United States,on the "main danger" (within the bloc) ofnd so on. Chen concluded with the concurrent assertions that "the struggle against modern revisionism must be carried through to thend that the consolidation of the "unity" of the bloc and the world Communist movement was the "most important condition" for further Communist successes. Thus each party, on the eve of the conference, declared its favor for "unity"its own terms.
Moscow Reaffirms Its Positions,0
0 the Soviet party repliedthe Chinese party's letter ofeptember.
section ol tnis paper deals entirely withovem-ber letter.
The letter began with the charge that the Chinese letter ofeptember did not really answer the Soviet letter ofune. Conceding that differences between the Soviet and Chinese parties had arisen prior it argued that in8 and9 when Khrushchev had visitedparties had discussed these issues frankly. owever, afteroviet bid in March for bilateral talks, the CCP in April had published the series of Lenin Anniversary articlesSoviet positions; and, after rejecting anotherinvitation in May for talks, the CCP had launched its "open attack" on the CPSU, bringing the issues intoorganizations" (the fronts).
The Soviet party, the letter went on, had felt obliged to inform the world Communist movement of Peiping's and the Chinese party had been given an opportunity to state its case at the Bucharest conference. "All" the parties at Bucharest, the letter contended, had disapproved Chinesehe letter did not assert, however, that all the parties supported Moscow on all of the issues which had been in dispute.
Rather than responding in an "objective" way to theletter ofune (the one used to brief other parties at the Bucharesthe letter continued, theparty had continued to raise issues and behaveat Bucharest. Moreover, the Chinese letter ofeptember indicated that the CCP did not intend to heed the opinion of the "absolute majority" of the other parties. Further, whereas the Soviet letter ofune hadcomradely" tone, the CCP'september letter had an
verwraught and "overbearing"the most "outrageous" tone anyone had taken toward the CPSU since the days of the Trotskyites.
The Soviet letterovember went on to rebuke the CCP for resurrecting such "settled" questions as deStalin-ization and intrabloc relationsnd for making the "monstrous" charge in itseptember letter that the CPSU had departed from Marxist-Leninism. It reiterated the charge tbat the Chinese had indoctrinated foreign CommunistsPeiping in the hope of splitting other Communist Moreover, the letter asserted, CCP leaders werethe entire body of the Chinese partypirit of hostility to the Soviet party. This section of the letter concluded with the warning that the Chinese party bore "full responsibility for the grave consequences" of its actions.
The Soviet letter then turned to the Chinese charge that the Soviet party was "embellishing" imperialism. At this point, in an aggrieved but defensive tone, the Soviet letter offered evidence at some length that the Soviet party had consistently "exposed" imperialism and adopted policies to weaken imperialism. In this connection, the letter went on, itslander" to contend that the Soviet party was "flirting" with imperialism merely because Khrushchev had spoken favorably of President Elsenhower; Khrushchev'sthe letter contended, hadiplomatic objective. The letter went on to emphasize that Khrushchev was notindependently of the CPSU presidium, and to praise Khrushchev's "supreme devotion" to Marxism-Leninism and his "unflagging efforts" at home and abroad.
*The Soviet letter probably misrepresents the Chineseto some degree here, as has frequently been the case with both parties in these exchanges. Chinese pronouncements in6 strongly suggested that the CCP did not favor Sovietintervention in Poland but did favorabout the same time the Soviet party decided. as soon as the Hungarian government indicated its intention to leave the Bloc.
The Soviet letterovember then turned to thehad appeared early in the CCP letterhe CCP had induced the CPSU to adoptpolicies during the developments in Poland and Hungary inontrary to the Chinese assertions, the letter said, Mao6 had been willing to see Soviet troops used in Poland but had been irresolute with respect to the use of Soviet troops in Hungary.* Further, it was not true, as the
CCP'september letter had charged, that Moscow6 had wished toorld Communist meeting to condemn Poland.
The Soviet letter, remarking that the events InEurope6 had been one result of Stalin's mistakes, then took up the Chinese criticism of deStallnlaatlon.everyone had assumed that the CCP endorsed Soviet action against the "pelt >ot theho Chinese^ aowv had resurrected the entire issue. The letter at this point reiterated the Soviet party's rationale for ite re-ovaluatlon of Stalin.
The Sovlot letterovember then turned to thequestions in the Sino-Soviet dispute on worldstratogy. It began by asserting flatly that the CCP was "mistaken" on "fundamental. the character of the present epoch, war and peace, "peacefulnd the "transition to socialism."
With respect to the first question, the letter reiterated the Soviet position that the world socialist system wasthe "decisive factor" in world affairs, that the bloc's strength permitted the conclusion that war was no longer It went on to specify that this foraulatlon meant that the Weet was, and would increasingly bo, deterred from general war.
clearlyisrepresentation; tho CCP's longon this issue in6 made clear that thehad important reservations about the Soviet handling of the matter.
Chinese have used this formulation to imply that Bloc military strength is much greater than that of the West, an assessment which underlies their advocacy of an extremely militant revolutionary program. Khrushchev has usuallynot to assert bloc ailitary superiority, oftentbe formula tbat the bloo is "at least as strong" as the West,
As for the other half of the Soviet position onalanee ofthat the West is still militarily and economically so strong that it Is advisable for. the Bloc to seekactionsitary. cUsnes with the letter dealt with this in terms of rejecting Mao's formulation that the East Wind is prevailing over the Westhe letter observed sharply that Mao's phrase,
"probably advanced with tho pretension" of adding todoctrine, in fact had nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. It criticized this concept on several grounds, includingmission of the "liberation"
Tho letter thon turned explicitly to questions of war. It reaffirmed that the Soviet party recognized thoof war (kind unspecified) so long as Imperialism exists, but argued that war could bewitness events6 in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia, and Cuba. It reiterated that it was now more difficult for the West to undertake wars of any kind than it had been, and it reaffirmed the Soviet view that local wars in general should be avoided, owing tc the danger of their expansion, The letter described the Chinese attitude toward localPeiping's slighting of tho possibility of theiras "extremely danger one."
The Soviet letter agreed that it was necessary to distinguish between Western-initiated local wars and tho concept of "revolutionary wars of liberation" in colonial areas. Such wars, the lotter said, were indeed "permissible andnd were going on now in Algeriaolonial area) and in Cuba (which Moscow and Peiping used to Include in the "semi-colonial" areas,. areas indirectly under imperialist control). The Soviet attitodo toward such wars was described as "positive." The letter apparently again evaded tho question of the degree of bloc support for sach wars, contenting itself with defending the use of variousdeter the West from wars, the implicationhat the Vest was deterredreater effort in Algeria and from military action against Castro.
The Soviet letter then returned to the question ofthe balance of power and took up the related question of the consequences of genoral war. It reiterated Sovietof Mao's "paper tiger" concept, on the ground that this concept encouraged complacency (meaning really,he letter cited Mao's contention at thef the parties tbateneral war "at most half" of mankind would die, that imperialism would be wiped out and Socialism triumphant everywhere, and that population losses would eventually be restored; the letter also cited tho argument that victorious socialism could rapidlyreatly superior civilization on the ruins. The Sovietrejected the notion of presentingoncept to the
nd it stated flatly: "Contemporary imperialism ispaper tiger."* General war, it went on, would exterminate hundreds of millions of people, entail "untold" destruction of productive forces, and make "extremelythe building of the new society. This section of the letter concluded with the assertions that socialism couldorld-wide triumph without general war and that the people must be told "plainly and honestly" of the existing danger.*
Passing on to the question of "peacefulhe Soviet letterovember interpreted the Chineseofeptember as favoring this concept but disagreeing on the proper interpretation of it. The letter rejected the Chinese contention that there had not been "peacefulin the years since World War II; the letter cited successes' in stoppingumber of local wars."
The letter reitenated crtticismiofLGhtneset policiestheationalist leaders of the underdeveloped countries. The Chinese were again charged withthe degree and importance of conflicts between theseand the West, and engaging in harmful disputes with them.**
Still following the organization of theune letter and (approximately) of theeptember Chinese letter,ovember letter then took up the question of negotiations with the West, specifically in terms of disarmament. The Soviet use of the disarmament issue, the letter contended, was an essential part of the concept of "peacefult would not do to hand this issue over to the imperialists. Moreover, the Chinese were mistaken in contending that the achievement of some degree of disarmament would not free funds for underdeveloped countries, as the USSR planned to do Just that as part of the program of seducing such countries. The letter denied that Moscow planned toworld withouts the Soviet plan envisaged militia in every state. Reaching farther, the Soviet letter argued that disarmament would help to correct the weapons imbalance between theand tbe workers, the imperialist oppressors and the colonial liberation forces. The letter conceded again the
*ln the context; this appears to refer to the dreadfulof general war.
**The-letter apparently evaded the other strong charges against the So-vlet conception of "peacefulee)
difficulty ofisarmament agreement, butthisong-term goal.
Turning then to the question of the "transition ofaccession to power by CommunistSoviet letter rejected the Chinese charge that Khrushchevnon-revolutionary" point of view on this. The letter(mlsleatiinglyV Khrushchev had simply said thatwould not always be necessary, and it reviewed Soviet statements on this point. It specified that the Soviet concept was not the "revisionist" notion of simply winning amajority, but rather using the parliament as one of tho means ofroletarian dictatorship. The letter went on to reject the charge that tho Soviet party had "evaded" key questions relating to tho establishment ofpower.
The Soviet letter continued Its discussion of thiswith the contentionroper understanding of the balance ofsame considerations which permitted the thesis of the non-inevitability ofto the possibility of peaceful accession to power. That is, bloc military and economic power would increasingly influence the people of the world, increasingly strengthen the:localparties, and Increasingly deter Imperialistin the affairs of any people carryingevolution. Replying to the Chinese assertion that tbe concept ofaccession was acceptableactic but notenuine expectation, tbe Soviet letter reaffirmed that tbe Sovlot party and its supporters did indeed expect this to happenumber ofhe CCP was rebukod for having insisted that this was never possible.
Departing from the organization of theune letter and of theeptember letter, the Soviet letterovember did not treat separately the question of the use of the world Communist fronts but included this queetlon in the larger category of "questions" of the world Communist movement. This section began by rejecting the Chinesethere was "ideological discord" within the movementhole. There was no goneral discord, the let-tor went on, there was only Chinese dogmatism and The letter reiterated that revisionism in the bloc was routed, whereas dogmatism and sectarianism existed and must be combatted. Countering the Chlneae charge of "bourgeois"
influence.on the Soviet party, the letter observed loftily that "dogmatism as we knowesult of petty bourgeoisnd that the source of "sectarianism' wasimmaturity. There was apparently much embroidery of this theme.
As for the Chinese charge that Moscow wanted everyone tolind adherent to Soviet experience, the Soviet letterovember declared that the Soviet party "respectednew" contributed by other parties (without specifying anyut went on to assert that there could notRussian" Marxism or "Chinese" Marxism or "Indian" Marxism or any other kind of national Marxism. The letterthe Cbinese for having contended (inhat Mao had "Sinicized" Marxism.
This section of the letter concluded by remarking the Chinese tendency to claim the role of "sole defenders and interpreters" of Marxism-Leninism, toonopoly onthis body of thought, and to have the right tothose who disagreed. Judging from the Chinese press, the letter said, "after Lenin therefilled only by the works of the Chinese comrades."
Taking up the question of work in the world Communist fronts, the letter agreed that there certainly werein the Soviet and Chinese views, but it rejected the notion that the difference lay in whether the fronts were to be fighting organizations. Of course they were, the letter said; the question was how to wage the fight. The letterthat it was counterproductive to "Impose alien tasks andnd itumber of instances of suchaction. The letter argued reasonably that the Chinese course would enlist only those who already entirely agreed with the Communist position, and thus would defeat theof the fronts. Tbe letter was particularly sharp in its rebuke of the "shameful and inadmissible" Cbinese attacks on Soviet efforts totheof "national liberationncluding "bourgeois" figures.
Turning to the question of relations among the Communist parties, tbe letter began with the observation that thedesire for "unity" was not supported by practical deeds. After tbe Bucharest conference, the letter went on, thehad continued to Ignore majority opinion and to circulate
documents among other parties. Here the letter Insisted at some length that the "unity" of the world Communist movement depended on respect for tbe opinion of the majority, and it apparently Invoked in this connection the Leninist principle (in lntraparty affairs) of carrying out the party's decision even if one does not agree with it.
The letter went on to reject the Chinese charge that the Soviet party violated the principle of "equality" among parties, and observed that this chargecreon for the CCP's own violations of "equality and comradelyollowing Khrushchev's line at the meeting ofctober, the letter dispensed with the concept of "leaders and led" in the world Communist movement, asserting that the CPSU had rejected this concept as long ago ast Congress. the letter continued, gaining momentum, if there was anyone whoendency topecial position in the movement and to "abuse the trust" of fraternal parties, it was the Chinese comrades. According to the Chinese, the letter went on, the Soviet party had made one mistake after anotherut now the CCP's0 articles had brought clarity out of confusion. Confusion Indeed existed, the letter said, but in the minds of those who wrote
Taking up the final question of relations between the two governments, the letter set forth the record of Soviet political, military and economic support of Pelping, and rejected the charge of having conducted an anti-Chinese Anyhow, the CCP started it, the letter said, with its0 articles and its behavior at the WFTU meeting in June. The letter professed Indignation at the charge that Soviet aid was being usedeans of pressure. tho withdrawal of tho technicians). The letter observed that Soviet aid tomore extensive than simply thebeen given China at the cost of depriving the deserving Soviet consumer, and it remarked at this point that, while Peiping had sent goods in exchange, the USSR "really had no uae for them" and had taken them only to help the Chinese. The letter summed up Soviet scientific and technologicalthe form of documents, designs,andPeiping as having been worth six billion rubles, plusears' experience"by Soviet personnel who had prepared them, plus the assignment of specialists needed in tbe USSR itself. In the
past this had been much appreciated, but now the Chinese party eaa minimizing it. The letter at this pointhriek of outrage at Chinese remarks to the effect that the truth could not be bought and that Peiping would not trade ita principles for technicians. The letter reviewed the Sovietinsufficient infor withdrawing the technicians.
The letter concluded, as had theeptember Chinese letter, with an expression of desire fornd It warned again against actions weakening or breaking this unity. The Soviet party and other parties, it said, were "seriously alarmed" by Chinese actions of this kind.the world Communist movement was not going to wait for the "verdict of history."
By this time (earlyoth the Soviet and Chinese parties had gone to much effort to encourage the view that neither would back down at tbe Moscow conference, even if this meant the separation (voluntary or Involuntary) of the Chinese party from the world Communist movement. In other words, the two parties were playingIt was not known whether either was willing to swerve at the last moment.
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